Adnett, N., Bougheas, S. and Georgellis, Y., 2004. On the Trade-off Between Work-related Training and Labor Mobility: The Role of Firing and Exit Costs. Journal of Economics, 82 (1), pp. 49-70.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-003-0031-0
Within an incomplete-contract framework, we examine the consequences of contract renegotiation for contract design/enforcement and training market efficiency. Specifically, we show how the imposition of either firing costs or exit costs can bind together employers and employees in longer-lasting employment relationships that allow both agents to amortize their training investments. Nevertheless, the model implies that, although firing and exit costs provide institutional solutions to the training under-investment problem, this is achieved at the expense of allocative efficiency (efficient separations). Empirical evidence supports the existence of such a trade-off.
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||work-related training - labor turnover - firing costs - exit costs|
|Subjects:||Technology > Business, Management and Marketing|
Social Sciences > Economics
|Deposited By:||Professor Yannis Georgellis LEFT|
|Deposited On:||11 Jun 2010 09:54|
|Last Modified:||07 Mar 2013 15:31|
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