Heald, P., 2007. Transaction Costs and Patent Reform. Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law Journal, 23, p. 447.
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This article considers current proposals for patent law reform in light of a simple theory about intellectual property law: In a world without transactions costs, the assignment of property rights is not necessary to stimulate the optimal production of creative goods. Because potential users of inventions could contract for their creation, a compelling justification for granting property rights in these intangibles is the reduction of real-world transaction and information costs that hinder, or make impossible, contract formation between users and creators. Proposals for patent law reform, therefore, should be evaluated by whether a change in legal rights, or in the regulatory process increases or lowers these costs.
|Subjects:||Social Sciences > Law|
|Group:||Business School > Department of Law|
|Deposited By:||Mrs Denise George|
|Deposited On:||18 Oct 2010 12:29|
|Last Modified:||07 Mar 2013 15:38|
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