Towards corpo-nationalism:
A Bourdieusian study exploring the relationship between nation branding and the reproduction of Polishness (1999-2010)
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AUTHOR’S DECLARATION

Previously presented work

An earlier version of part of the literature review was presented in a paper at the 2006 Media and Politics conference, Łódź, Poland and appeared in the proceedings:


Part of the findings and literature was used as the basis for a book chapter published in a volume presenting implications of the emergence of nation branding in Central and Eastern Europe.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1
SETTING THE SCENE ................................................................................................................................. 1
ACTORS AND THEIR PLAY .......................................................................................................................... 2
REFLEXIVITY AND COMMUNICATIVE PRACTICES .............................................................................. 3
THE CURTAIN GOES UP: OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS ........................................................................... 8

CHAPTER TWO: FROM TOTAL WAR TO TOTAL MARKETING ............................................................... 10
WHAT IS BRANDING? .............................................................................................................................. 10
MAKING SENSE OF NATION BRANDING ............................................................................................. 12
ECONOMICS OF NATION BRANDING AND ITS PROCESS .................................................................. 15
GENESIS OF NATIONAL IMAGES MANAGEMENT ................................................................................ 19
PROPAGANDA MEETS DIPLOMACY ......................................................................................................... 20
GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA MEETS CORPORATE ‘PR-PROPAGANDA’ .......................................... 21
NATION BRANDING AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: EMERGING DEBATES ............................................. 25
DEPOLITICISING NATION BRANDING .................................................................................................... 28

CHAPTER THREE: NATIONALISM, NATION-BUILDING, GLOBALISM ................................................. 33
OVERVIEW .................................................................................................................................................. 33
THE ‘STATE’ AND THE ‘NATION’ DEFINED ............................................................................................ 33
NATION-BUILDING AND NATION- DESTROYING ................................................................................ 35
PARADIGMS IN NATIONALISM STUDIES ............................................................................................... 36
NATIONALISM AND GLOBALISM .......................................................................................................... 39
NATIONALISM AND BRANDING AS IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE ...................................................... 41
NATIONALISM THEORY AND THE MEDIA ............................................................................................ 43
NATIONALISM AND CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS .................................................................... 46
STRUCTURALISM, CONSTRUCTIVISM AND NATION BRANDING ....................................................... 49
PROMOTIONAL CULTURE AS NATIONAL CULTURE ............................................................................. 50
PROPAGANDA AND NATIONAL IDENTITY ............................................................................................ 51

CHAPTER FOUR: SOCIAL THEORY AND NATIONALISM .................................................................... 55
WHY BOURDIEU? ........................................................................................................................................ 55
NEO-LIBERALISM AND FIELD OF POWER ............................................................................................... 57
BOURDIEU: RELEVANT INFLUENCES .................................................................................................... 60
THE FIELD .................................................................................................................................................. 61
ECONOMY OF PRACTICES ....................................................................................................................... 62
SYMBOLISM OF POWER RELATIONS ..................................................................................................... 64
CULTURAL INTERMEDIARIES AND POLAND ..................................................................................... 67
REFLECTION ON BOURDIEU’S SOCIAL THEORY .................................................................................. 69

CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH AGENDA ON NATION BRANDING .......................................................... 73
TABLES

TABLE 1 LIST OF PILOT STUDY INTERVIEWEES ................................................................. 327
TABLE 2 MAIN FIELDWORK LIST OF INTERVIEWEES ..................................................... 327

FIGURES

FIGURE 1 HISTORICAL OUTLINE OF KEY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS ........... 126
FIGURE 2 THE POSITIONS OF AGENTS IN THE FIELD IN 2009 .............................. 143
FIGURE 3 THE TRAJECTORY CORRECTION MODEL OF SOCIAL CHANGE .......... 185
FIGURE 4 OUTLINE OF KEY NATION BRANDING PROJECTS ................................. 208
FIGURE 5 DISSEMINATION OF NATION BRANDING .................................................... 288

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX 1 GLOSSARY OF KEY BOURDIEUSIAN TERMS USED IN THIS THESIS ........ 330
APPENDIX 2 EVIDENCE OF LIMITING ACCESS TO DATA ........................................... 333
APPENDIX 3 RESEARCH LETTER REQUESTING DOCUMENTS ................................... 334
APPENDIX 4 DOCUMENTS ARCHIVE ............................................................................ 335
APPENDIX 5 SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS ................................................. 343
APPENDIX 6 SAMPLE OF PRESS RELEASES ON NATION BRANDING ................. 366
APPENDIX 7 ‘EUROPE IS BIGGER’ CAMPAIGN: NATIONAL LOGOTYPE ................. 369
APPENDIX 8 ‘AN ECONOMY UNDER ITS OWN FLAG’ CAMPAIGN ......................... 371
APPENDIX 9 ‘POLAND. DISCOVER AND SAVOUR’ CAMPAIGN ............................... 373

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I dedicate this study to my father, Mieczysław Surowiec, for making me understand that knowledge can provide enlightenment when travelling through the valleys of darkness.
ABSTRACT

This thesis interrogates the relationship between the emerging transnational field of nation branding practice and Polish national identity discourse. It sets the analysis of its findings in the contexts of the dominant neo-liberal political economy and promotional culture in Poland, but its examination considers the socio-historical conditions of the post-Soviet era accompanying nation branding as a nation building process. By considering specific settings, it outlines a reflexive case study, addressing a shift in the economy of practices at the crossovers of the Polish state’s structures, business groups, the mass media, and cultural intermediaries of nation branding.

This study draws from Bourdieu’s theoretical oeuvre, nationalism scholarship, and corporate communications models. First, it demonstrates the growing impact of corporate communications models on the state as a democratic polity. Second, it sketches out the foundations for the empirical part of the study. Methodologically, it uses an interpretive approach to reveal collective action accompanying the nation branding exercise in Poland. It draws from a range of data to reconstruct the contested vision of the field of nation branding and the dynamics of the relationship between institutional and individual actors performing nation branding in Poland.

The findings of this study unfold the implications of the imposition and invasion of nation branding within the Polish field of power, specifically with regards to the marketisation of Polish national identity, its co-construction and reproduction; attempts to further corporatise overseas propaganda on behalf of the Polish field of power; and a growing impact of private sector consultants on public policy making in post-Soviet Poland. Primarily, this thesis argues that one of the biggest consequences of the invasion of nation branding in Poland is the emergence of corpo-nationalism - a form of economic nationalism which was a weak component, until now, of political economy changes in Poland, post 1989.
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>Advertising Agencies Association</td>
<td>Stowarzyszenie Agencji Reklamowych</td>
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<td>Communication Unlimited</td>
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<td>Department of Marketing Strategy</td>
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<td>DSI</td>
<td>Department of Support Instruments</td>
<td>Wydział Instrumentów Wsparcia</td>
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<td>DE</td>
<td>Polish Embassy in Dublin</td>
<td>Ambasada Polska w Dublinie</td>
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<td>EG</td>
<td>Escadra Group</td>
<td>Grupa eskadra</td>
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<td>EEO</td>
<td>Expo Exhibition Office</td>
<td>Biuro Pawilonu Expo</td>
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<td>GNOES</td>
<td>Grandeskochonoes</td>
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<td>LE</td>
<td>Polish London Embassy</td>
<td>Instytut Adama Mickiewicza</td>
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<td>IAM</td>
<td>Institute of Adam Mickiewicz</td>
<td>Polska Ambasada w Londynie</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPB</td>
<td>Institute of Polish Brand</td>
<td>Instytut Marki Polskiej</td>
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<td>Institute of Public Affairs</td>
<td>Instytut Spraw Publicznych</td>
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<td>MF</td>
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<td>Ministerstwo Finansów</td>
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<td>National Center of Culture</td>
<td>Narodowe Centrum Kultury</td>
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<td>ONM</td>
<td>Orbita New Media</td>
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PCHC POLISH CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
KRAJOWA IZBA GOSPODARCZA

PAEC POLISH AGENCY FOR ENTERPRISE AND DEVELOPMENT
POLSKA AGENCJA ROZWOJU PRZEDSIĘBIORCZOŚCI

PIIA POLISH INFORMATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT AGENCY
POLSKA AGENCJA INFORMACJI I INWESTYCYJI ZAGRANICZNYCH

PL.2012
PL.2012

PMFA POLISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
POLSKIE MINISTERSTWO SPRAW ZAGRANICZNYCH

PMS POLISH MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS
POLSKIE MINISTERSTWO GOSPODARKI

PO PRESS OFFICE
BIURO PRASOWE

PTO POLISH TOURIST ORGANISATION
POLSKA ORGANIZACJA TURYSTYCZNA

SBC SAFFRON BRAND CONSULTANTS
ORGINAL NAME - IN ENGLISH

S&P STAEFIEJ & PARTNERS
STAFIEJ I PARTNERZY

Y&R YOUNG & RUBICAM POLAND
ORGINAL NAME - IN ENGLISH
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

SETTING THE SCENE

Since 1989, the Polish state has been undergoing changes driven by neo-liberal political economy. Although social theorists have already explored social forces responsible for the introduction of neo-liberalism in Poland (Sidorenko 1998), there is little evidence regarding the relationship between systemic changes in the Polish political field, the sub-fields of institutionalised government communications and newcomers into this social space. Although neo-liberalism has mesmerised the Polish political class, ontologically it did not undermine the Polish state, but created a setting in which policy makers needed to consider the ‘transnational position’ of Poland by extending the national economy to transnational markets’ priorities. Simultaneously, the speed of neo-liberalisation in Poland overpowered a sense of economic nationalism (Szlajfer 1997), and the Polish state lacked an explicit nation building mechanism that would suit world-views on globalising the political economy. A group of newcomers into the Polish state structures, nation branders, offered consultancy that responded to this demand.

Furthermore, neo-liberalism has reinforced the neo-Darwinian notion of competitiveness among enterprises in Poland, and left Polish state policy makers in an assumed position to consider their reputation on global markets. While the policy discourse on economic interdependence of the Polish state emerged in the political field soon after the imposition of ‘shock therapy’ (1990), the policy planning to integrate with Western political economy structures accelerated public affairs’ discourses on linking the Polish state interests and its overseas reputations (Kukliński and Pawłowska 1999). At that time, the Polish government launched communicative efforts to represent the Polish national market as foreign capital friendly. The initial post 1989 attempts to market Poland involved institutional participation in exhibitions, production and distribution of brochures and gadgets, enactment of media relations by
the state bureaucrats, commissioning advertorials and transnational advertising campaigns. One of those campaigns, ‘Poland: towards the year 2000’, represented political economy changes in Poland in the following way: “An historic process is under way; Poland is reforging her identity by seizing and creating opportunities for the new Europe” (Time International 1991). Over the years, the Polish state campaigning efforts took various bureaucratic routes and became institutionalised within numerous institutions of the Polish state. For the Polish political field, however, the accession to the European Union (EU) proved particularly challenging in terms of managing world public opinion (Ociepka and Ryniejska 2005). In the run-up to EU accession, interest groups struggled for policy solutions explicitly bridging national competitiveness on global markets with national identity.

ACTORS AND THEIR PLAY

While ad hoc transnational campaigns on behalf of the Polish governments were commissioned soon after 1989, a codified ‘promotional policy’ making has been taking place since the mid-1990s within the Polish state structures and its sub-field of ‘national images management’. Today, its enactment involves private sector actors, some of whom, over the years, attempted to shape the policy directions. Throughout this study, my analysis leads to the re-construction of initiatives of the actors engaged in nation branding and primarily concerns governmental, business interests groups, and a professional class of nation branders. Their collective actions, aligned with the Polish state’s bureaucracy, have been further mediated through the structuring entities of the mass media, businesses, academia in Poland, and market research organisations. These actors have contributed to the perpetuation of nation branding and were used as facilitators for its dissemination. Principally, nation branding is a ‘bottom-up’ initiative that has been enacted at the crossovers of the state and corporate interests among the actors involved in policy discourse on the promotion of Poland.
REFLEXIVITY AND COMMUNICATIVE PRACTICES

Before I embark on the analysis of the developing concept of nation branding, there are a few initial clarifications that reading of this study requires. Scholars have long recognised that images of the state largely depend on its position within the international power structure (Boulding 1959). However, its reception is context-dependent and gives scope to influence domestic and international public opinion in the pursuit of domestic (public affairs) and foreign policy (foreign affairs) goals. In this study, I make references to academically recognised models and studies exploring fields of national images management.

This study understands this field as the state governed, institutional structural network empowered by means of legal regulations and policy commitments, to exercise practices, including persuasive, political or marketing communications, in a struggle to manifest collective identities and leading to assumed change to images of the state and/or the nation. The critical assessment of European and Anglo-American academic literature in this area reveals parallel, relatively complementary coexistence of professional practice and academic research exploring relationships between collective identities constructions and their reception as images. In fact, there are two lucid themes emerging from this examination. First, nation branding emerges in academic and professional discourses as a ‘new’ concept competing with propaganda and its discursive re-inventions. Second, nation branding explicitly aims to bridge a gap between nationalism, national identity, national images and reputations.

Although scholars (Moloney, Richards, Scullion, and Daymon 2003) argue for the development of systematic models of ‘public’ and ‘private’ political message production and consumption within domestic realms of government communications, foreign policy making and its mediation is defined by its own dynamics that merges global and local dialectics. Thus far, scholars have developed models of government overseas communication, but I argue that this approach is limiting in terms of
accounting for specific state actors and new entrants into the state structures bringing their discourses and practices into the new spaces. This ‘static’, ‘modelling’ approach, I argue, poses a challenge in terms of accounting for political economy and cultural dynamics in which institutional or social actors perform their practices and does not explicitly account for social change. Sensitive to Mosco’s (2009) views on political economy, this study explores how nation branding has been used as a power resource shaping changes within the institutional agency in Poland. By drawing from the social theory of Pierre Bourdieu, this study adopts a reflexive epistemology in the exploration of the relationships between actors within state structures and reveals the logic and consequences of reinventing Polish national identity as a ‘brand’.

As far as studies on nation branding are concerned, there is still some ambiguity regarding its practice, which is particularly under-researched by scholarship on the Polish government overseas communication and its dynamics. Among the arguments emerging in contemporary scholarship, there are those based on quantitative and qualitative reasoning. The first suggest the growing amount of actors involved in national images making (Chong and Valencic 2001 p. 3). The latter reveals the introduction of normative approaches into this area of academic inquiry (Manheim 1994). This field of studies originates in the early modernist state bureaucracies’ propaganda practice, which either has been analysed in the settings of public affairs or foreign affairs. The socio-historical accounts from the United Kingdom (L’Etang 2001) reveal that, at the institutionalisation stage, the field was limited in size and explicitly used ‘propaganda’ as primarily of interest to military and diplomatic bureaucrats. Similarly, there is evidence to suggest that propaganda was the first

\[1\]

institutionalised communicative practice used by the Polish governments in their communication efforts at the outset of the modernist era (Szczepankiewicz 2005).

Understanding of this thesis requires explanation of formerly institutionalised communicative practices by the Polish field of national images management revealed in professional accounts by the management of institutional field actors. Among these practices are: ‘public diplomacy’; ‘cultural diplomacy’; ‘investment marketing’; and ‘destination marketing’. At this stage, it has to be emphasised that my fieldwork took place at the time where the aforementioned practices had been adopted institutionally and nation branding was considered by the Polish state actors and policy makers participating in my research as one of a ‘model’ in the discourse on promotional policy. Therefore, this study explores trajectories of actions by agents advocating nation branding. Throughout my fieldwork, participants involved in nation branding make references to formerly institutionalised communicative practices by the Polish state. I define them below as per pre-existing academic accounts. Scholars working with the propaganda model defined this form of persuasive communications as:

*Deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist* (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999, p. 6).

Although international relations scholars (Nye 2004) analysing soft power relations between the states or social theorists discussing nationalisms (Hobsbawm 1990) use the term propaganda, communication studies scholars began to reinvent a propaganda model by offering new terminologies, often advanced without any empirical grounding. Manheim (1994) identifies two streams of propaganda studies. The first focuses on the psychological effects of propaganda influence. The second reveals propaganda techniques which lead to interest in “public relations, advertising
and marketing which tends to be expressed in more *anecdotal* and generally *normative* terms” (p. 5). The argument that public relations and marketing models and practices are applicable to the government overseas communications echoes in the academic discourse. For example, Wilcox, Ault, and Agee (1989 p. 395), in their definition of international public relations, suggest that this practice is enacted by governments:

*Planned and organized activities of organization, institution or government to establish mutually beneficial relations with the publics of other nations.*

While it is not clear from the above definition what establishing mutually beneficial relations involves in practical terms, the further impact of the normative public relations model (Grunig 1992) on the academic field of national images management is revealed. This is particularly so in the conceptual merger with the ‘public diplomacy’ model (Gilboa 2008). Throughout the Cold War era, this term has been gaining currency. Public diplomacy as a communicative practice has been defined as:

*A government process of communicating with foreign publics* (Tuch 1990, p. 3).

Yet another area that is closely aligned with public diplomacy is ‘cultural diplomacy’. This practice has also been institutionalised within the Polish field of national images management. Cummings (2003, p. 1) defines it as practice involving:

*The exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding.*
While in the commercial world propaganda has lost much of its legitimacy and has been dominated by a pro-business conceptual re-invention of public relations (Moloney 2006), public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy (Dizard 2004) - traditionally considered by scholars as ‘political communication’ - have been also subject to re-invention. In terms of production and reception of messages, they can also include marketising messages (Cull 2008). Marketing practice, on the other hand, is by definition committed to legitimizing capitalist social order and the marketisation of new fields (Marion 2006). In fact, two areas of marketing practice that have been institutionalised within the Polish state structures are ‘investment marketing’ that is used as one of the institutional practices aimed at attracting foreign direct investment (Zhang 2005) and ‘destination marketing’ (Pike 2008, p. 27), institutionalised within the Polish state bureaucracy as an extension of the tourism policy. Therefore, nowadays, differentiation between ‘political’ and ‘marketing’ communications blends under the political economy of practices aligned with structures of the Polish state.

Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore every single one of those models in details, I introduce them at this stage, as they emerge in the academic works in relationship to nation branding, and importantly, emerge throughout the findings of this study. The aforementioned definitions of ‘propaganda’; ‘international public relations’; ‘destination marketing’, and ‘investment marketing’ refer to frequently discussed models in the academic field of national images management. While there are more variations of them emerging in communication studies discourse, I leave them out of the main discussion in this thesis as nation branding conceptualists neither recognise nor engage in debate with authors of those taxonomies.2 Their

2 Gilboa (2000) provides categorisation of public diplomacy specialisms: “media diplomacy”, where governmental officials use the media to promote conflict resolution; ‘media-broker diplomacy’, where journalists temporarily assume the role of diplomats and serve as mediators in international negotiations”. His work on public diplomacy recognizes even more terms appearing in the literature: ‘teleplomacy’; ‘photoplomacy’; ‘sound-bite diplomacy’; ‘instant diplomacy’; ‘real-time diplomacy’; ‘television diplomacy’, or the ‘CNN effect’. A starting point in his categorisation is acknowledgement that public diplomacy has been used as a euphemism for propaganda, but he continues to use the term public diplomacy, as it is rooted in the US academic tradition. The ‘CNN effect’, initially introduced by Livingston (1997) refers to the area of foreign policy where the mass media can perform the
presence in the scholarship demonstrates a fragmentation of ideas, terminological inconsistencies, conceptual mergers, and, as I will demonstrate, competition of new concepts with already existing models developed in this area of academic discourse.

**THE CURTAIN GOES UP: OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS**

This thesis is a contribution to the post-Kleinian (2000) tradition of commercial branding that triggered a body of academic works exploring cultural and ideological notions attributed to branding practice. The next chapter unfolds taxonomy used in nation branding, reveals existing conceptual debates and discusses empirical research on nation branding. Chapter 3 and 4 develop the conceptual framework for the empirical part of this thesis and introduce relevant theories explaining the relationship between nationalisms, media and globalism. Within those chapters I also present an outline of Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts guiding this study. Chapter 5 indicates the reasoning for studying nation branding in the context of the dominant neo-liberal political economy in Poland. Chapter 6 lays the methodological underpinnings for the data collection and explains procedures of its analysis. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 report on *emic* findings whereas chapter 10 unfolds *epic* analysis and discussion. Concluding this study, chapter 11, presents the consequences of the imposition of nation branding within the Polish state structures, points out the invasion of nation branding into the Polish political field, and offers a commentary on its consequences. The conclusion also discusses potential for further research in the area of nation branding.

Finally, I would like to make a note on the language used in this thesis. This is both a warning to the readers and an introduction to the palette of linguistic flavours accompanying reflexive sociology. Among the linguistic tokens frequently occurring in this thesis are signifiers such as ‘structuring structures’; ‘structured structures’ ‘field’; ‘habitus’; ‘praxis’; and ‘praxeology’. While my narrative explains the following roles: a) accelerate decision making; b) obstruct foreign policy process; and c) and set the political agenda. Finally, Seib (1997) offers a descriptive account of ‘headline diplomacy’. 

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following roles: a) accelerate decision making; b) obstruct foreign policy process; and c) and set the political agenda. Finally, Seib (1997) offers a descriptive account of ‘headline diplomacy’.
taxonomic nuances emerging throughout this thesis, a full list of those terms has been provided for the reader in a glossary on p. 331. Given that academic discourses have the ability to shape meanings, at the outset, I would like to disclose that throughout the writing up stage, I aspired to remain faithful to academic and professional discourses informing this thesis. Given that this study draws from different strands of scholarship, the taxonomic complexity at times has been challenging to overcome. In the findings and analysis chapters, I have attempted to use the language as close as possible to the one used by my participants. Outlining the conceptual framework for this study has been done in a similar way. Throughout the part devoted to Pierre Bourdieu’s features of this study, I have, however, attempted to reduce his verbosity wherever possible.
CHAPTER TWO: FROM TOTAL WAR TO TOTAL MARKETING

WHAT IS BRANDING?

The concept of ‘brand’ is a product of promotional culture: its contemporary dominant meaning originates in marketing models and practice. Initially, it referred to commodity signification. Lee and Carter (2005, p. 226) define brands as “the means customers use to differentiate products and services based on extrinsic and intrinsic features and are the source of organizations’ competitive advantage”. Thus, branding is hardly new, but contemporary scholarship recognizes a shift of branding focus and its expansion into new areas of social agency. Arvidsson (2005, p. 244) notes:

_Originally, brands had referred to producers. They had generally served as a trademark or a ‘marker’s mark’ that worked to guarantee quality or to give the potentially anonymous mass-produced commodity an identity by linking it to an identifiable producer or inventor or a particular physical place. Nowadays, the brand, or the ‘brand image’, began to refer instead to the significance that commodities acquired in the minds of consumers._

The above shift refers to “contexts of consumption” (Grainge 2008, p. 25). Branding expansionism, on the other hand, suggests that this concept ventured into new fields of agency, changing not only the ways marketing is thought of, but more importantly, it describes a social shift in the culture-economy dynamics by increasing the amount of marketing activities. In formal terms, branding is a soft-selling tool that facilitates commodity exchanges and it is a pro-market oriented practice that aims at increasing the perceived value of commodities. The expansion of this marketing technique and its emergence in different contexts stems from an assumption of its universality: branding of products and services (Kapferer 2005); corporate branding (Balmer and Greyser 2003); personal branding (Montoya and Vandehey 2003); political parties’ branding (Reeves, Chernatony and Carrigan 2006) and branding of
higher education (Chapleo 2010). Even monarchies did not escape subjecting to the idea of branding (Greyser, Balmer, and Urde 2006). Finally, its discourse, in the form of ‘nation branding’ has entered the corridors of state power in post-Soviet Poland.

In the conceptualisation of marketing’s ‘disciplinary shift’ that characterizes the development of branding in the twentieth century, it is important to note how branding has merged with corporate public relations. Moloney (2006) notes that in the mid-1990s branding expanded corporate communication management frameworks. Before that, corporate branding was referred to as “corporate identity” or as a “what do we stand for?” metaphor (ibid., p. 141). The outcome of this merger between marketing and public relations - corporate communications - is an attempt to integrate various forms of organisational communication management. Given that the public relations (PR) academic discourse has a made a contribution to the field of national images management, the following overview of the literature considers how a social construct of branding is re-contextualised as a self-perpetuating management fashion.

Corporate branding is an exercise in corporate image and corporate identity management and it is one of the tools in corporate communications. Cornelissen (2009, p. 5) defines this area of practice as a management

...framework for the effective coordination of all internal and external communication with the overall purpose of establishing and maintaining favourable reputations with stakeholder groups upon which the organization is dependent on.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss corporate branding in detail. Nevertheless, a departure point for exploring the subject of this study, nation branding, is an indication of its relationship to corporate branding. There are two explicit connections that can be made at the surface level. First, marketing writings assume the universality of the brand construct. Balmer and Grayser (2003, p. 975)
claim that “corporate-level brands can also apply to countries, regions, and cities”. Second, corporate branding conceptualists contribute to the development of nation branding (Olins 1999). As it stands, terminology existing in the area of nation branding is derived from corporate branding. Corporate branding is a collective process engaging stakeholders which indicates parallels with nation branding aspirations with regards to collective identity construction. Finally, claims regarding the importance of branding to organizational management (Schultz, Antorini, and Csaba 2005) echo in the academic discourse highlighting the strategic role of nation branding to political governance (Dinnie 2008).

The above utterances demonstrate the perpetuating notion of branding: nowadays the idea of nation branding is welcomed by the Foreign Affairs Ministries, Prime Ministers, and the state agencies. Jansen (2008, p. 123) notes, “even, public diplomacy, a nation’s attempt to shape its image and influence public opinion in other nations (that is, its propaganda), has come under the purview of nation branders”. In part, this thesis reveals how nation branding has been introduced to the state structures in Poland. The pages to follow provide definitions of nation branding and its critique.

MAKING SENSE OF NATION BRANDING

Nation branding originates in the marketing discipline, specifically its sub-field of place marketing. The emergence of place marketing as a semi-autonomous area goes back to 1993 when Kotler and colleagues (Kotler, Heider, and Rein 1993) published ‘Marketing places: attracting investment, industry, and tourism to cities, states, and nations’. Development of the term ‘nation brand’ is attributed to Simon Anholt, a marketing practitioner, policy-advisor and one of the authors in this area. In 1996, Anholt spelled out this idea by referring to the particular states as brands. Initially, he talked about nation brands in the context of country-of-origin effect and signified ‘America’, ‘Brazil’, or ‘Switzerland’ as brands (Anholt 1998, p. 400).
Definitions of ‘nation brand’ and ‘nation branding’ did not emerge until early 2000. It is said that there is a difference between the term ‘nation brand’ and ‘nation branding’. Fan (2005, p. 2) argues that a nation “has a brand image with or without national branding”. He defines nation branding as “applying branding and marketing communication techniques to promote a nation’s image” (ibid., p. 6). Therefore, the pre-existence of the notion of multiple ‘national images’ or ‘national stereotypes’ (Kunczik 1997, p. 46) tends to be replaced with a notion of ‘brand image’ (Gertner and Kotler 2004) and assumes applicability of branding into yet another social space.

Fan (2005, p. 6) identifies different terminologies in the area of nation branding and categorizes them into: ‘product related’, ‘national level’ and ‘cultural focus’ definitions. The ‘product related’ grouping refers to a country-of-origin effect and implies the impact of the image of the country on its products (e.g. Swiss chocolate, Cuban cigars) as well as its inverted version - the impact of products on the country’s image (e.g. stylish French women in perfume advertising). The ‘national related’ category refers to the state’s ‘overall’ perceptions (e.g. Ireland as ‘Celtic tiger’). Finally, although Fan (2005) recognises ‘cultural focus’ definitions of nation branding, he does not provide insights into his understanding of national cultures and collective identities. Elsewhere, however, Anholt (2007) argues that national culture is one of the elements that should be taken into consideration while developing nation brand strategy. The first handbook of nation branding defines nation brand as:

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3 Williams (1977) argues that when taking up definitions one should start with basic ‘practices’, not formed concepts. Although definitions of nation branding offer a basic explanation of this concept, this study is concerned with understanding of nation branding by the agents who engage in its practice. Following Champagne (2005) and Bourdieu (1985), in a later part of this thesis, I reflect on my pre-understanding of this concept and aim to reveal its enactment within the political economy settings in Poland between 1999 and 2010.

4 In this part of the thesis, I remain faithful to marketing authors’ loose use of terminology signifying ‘objects’, e.g. a country (as opposed to the state). Later, however, I explain my understanding of the relationship between branded territorial entities and professional class of nation branders. My understanding of the state and the professional class of nation branders is informed by Bourdieu and colleagues’ (Bourdieu, Wacquant and Farage, 1994) views on the state and Brubaker’s (1996) notion of ‘nationess’.
...the unique, multidimensional blend of elements that provide the nation with culturally grounded differentiation and relevance for all its target audiences (Dinnie 2008, p. 15).

The ‘communication based’ approach to nation branding has been extended by the introduction of ‘a policy based approach’, so-called ‘competitive identity’ management. A key proponent of this idea argues that a departure point for nation branding is evocation of “a spirit of benign nationalism amongst the populace, notwithstanding its cultural, social, ethnic, linguistic, economic, political, territorial, and historical division” (Anholt 2007, p. 16). He further says:

*National identity and nation brand are virtually the same thing: nation brand is national identity made tangible, robust, communicable, and above all useful. Unless the overall strategy chimes with something fundamentally true about place and its people, there is little chance that it will be believed or endorsed by the population, let alone the rest of the world* (ibid. p.75).

While the above explanations make a connection between branding and national identity, they do not reveal a *modus operandi* of nation branding. By introducing comparative metaphors, they offer tautological explanations of the relationship between nation branding, national identity, and national images. Given that, allegedly, the ‘proper nation brand management’ involves a broad range of subject areas, such as policy-making aligned with foreign direct investment, tourism industry, cultural policy, or foreign policy, it is, at this stage, virtually impossible to comprehend the mechanism of its practice. In this logic, all aspects of political economy and social agency seem to be enacted as part of the nation branding exercise. Therefore, I argue, that this universalising feature of nation branding writings requires conceptual reflection and empirical insights. The latter might facilitate understanding of nation branding practice and its relationship to national identities construction.
Initially, there were three contributors to nation branding discourse made by Simon Anholt, Mark Leonard, and Wally Olins. The literature reveals that the first author has coined the term ‘nation brand’ and written on the subject. Anholt is also an editor of a journal entitled ‘Place branding and public diplomacy’. By now, aspects of his professional practice have already been analysed and these include consultancy, policy advisory, and public speaking on the subject of nation branding (Aronczyk 2008). Wally Olins, on the other hand, had previously written on corporate branding. In one of the first public defences of nation branding, Olins (1999, p. 1) argues for overlapping identities between the state and corporate enterprises:

*The relationship between countries and companies is changing. In some ways they are becoming more like each other. Nations increasingly emphasize nationality; global companies increasingly ignore it. Nations increasingly use business speak – growth targets, education targets, health targets; global companies increasingly emphasise soft issues, their value to the society and their benevolent influence. The relationship between companies and countries is getting closer. They compete, they overlap, they swap places. Perhaps the most significant, most misunderstood of this phenomenon emerges in the way nation now attempts to build a brand.*

The above paragraph reveals a new intertwining order in discourses on branding, national identity, and globalization. The early research on nation branding came from the United Kingdom. Awan (2007) reveals that its advocates clustered around ‘The Foreign Policy Centre’ think-tank and had answers with regards to ‘redesigning Britain as a multicultural society. The discourse on nation branding emerged in the UK after the government’s ‘Cool Britannia’ campaign (Leonard 1997; Roy 2007). The first public debate regarding nation branding exercise was met with criticism and
faded away as it lost government support (McNeill 2004). The media studies scholars recognised the British nation branding exercise in the following terms:

*New, more sellable ways to describe us differently with breathy excitement, for it was suggested if you could describe us differently, perhaps, hey-presto, we would be different. It was an essentially propagandistic and certainly ideological view of Britishness, self-consciously shaped for selling us to ourselves and abroad* (Curran and Seaton 2010, p. 300).

Although nation branding discourse lost continuity in the UK political field, nation branding publishing continued. The logic of US domination in commercial branding accompanies Anholt and Hildreth (2004) in their discussion on ‘the brand America’. While in US nation branding emerged as a solution to negative perceptions of the US in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there are anecdotal explanations of the intertwining relationship between nation branders and US politics. For example, Anholt and Hildreth (ibid, p. 6) argue that the US is the mother of all brands as it “quite consciously built and managed itself as a brand right from the very start”. By applying anachronism to their argument, they interpret the US history to the tune of branding logic. Research demonstrating the dynamics of the relationship between the marketing industry, the US government and nation branding analyses the ‘ Shared Values Initiative’ campaign managed by ex-advertising executive, Charlotte Beers. She was appointed by George W. Bush as the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (Plaisance 2005; Fullerton and Kendrick 2006).

The principles of competitive globalised markets are justification of the nation branding. Olins (1999, p. 4) provides the following rationale for nation branding:
competition between nations today increasingly takes place in three commercial areas - inward investment, tourism, and export of goods and services - where success or failure can accurately be charted, and where the questions of reputation, image, identity and hence marketing and branding are central to competitive edge.

Later, Olins (2005) discusses the importance of public diplomacy for nation branding. In fact, the four dimensions of the state policies - inward investment, tourism, trade, and public diplomacy - are dominant sub-areas of interest for nation brand conceptualists. The marketing academics have responded enthusiastically to the idea of nation branding. Their works, however, tend to be descriptive, terminologically derivative, and make executive recommendations that can supposedly be applied to practice (Hereźniak 2010). Furthermore, the conceptual transformation of branding into the statehood resulted in the formation of preconceived notions.

1. Create a working group with representatives of government, industry, the arts, education and the media to implement the initiative.

2. Using qualitative and quantitative methods, find out how the nation is viewed both domestically and abroad.

3. Consult with opinion-leaders regarding the nation’s strengths and weaknesses and compare results with findings of the internal and external studies.

4. Identify the core strategy of the campaign, and create the central idea on which the strategy is based; basically this boils down to a slogan, around which the rest of the campaign is framed.

5. Develop a visual design and attach it to everything that represents the nation abroad.

6. Correlate and adjust the message to target audiences: tourism, internal and external investors.

7. Create a public-private liaison group to launch the programme and keep it active in government, commerce, industry, the arts, and media, etc”.

In summary, the above section indicates that branding has been adopted into many fields of agency. Conceptually, nation branding writings strive to contribute to the field of national images management whereby the state and non-state actors attempt to challenge mediated pre-understandings of national identity features. The section below, on the other hand, maps out the academic literature in this area with a particular focus on conceptual debates and existing research. In the light of this overview, I argue that the application of nation branding into the area of statehood is part of the process of corporatization of government communication. This process manifests itself by re-inventing propaganda by corporate communication models.
The literature review of this thesis reveals that national images management is the extension of political fields. It is a specialised, institutional network engaging communication persuasive practices aimed at changing images of nations. Traditionally, the modernist states were the key player in this area. The modernist era (1917-1939) gave birth to the professionalization and furthering institutionalisation of government overseas propaganda. In Poland this process began as part of the state-building at the beginning of the twentieth century. Pratkanis and Aronson (1991) call this feature of modernism an ‘age of propaganda’. Indeed, academic works discussing the early modernist government communication efforts demonstrate how propaganda was practiced as part of the military warfare during the First World War (Taylor 1981). Given the role of overseas propaganda in facilitating military conflicts, propaganda has been associated with ‘deceit’; ‘manipulation’; ‘mind control’; ‘brainwashing’. Later, the widespread application of propaganda within political fields that stood in opposition to Western liberalism or capitalist order contributed to negative associations of this signification of persuasive communications. Kunczik (1997) goes as far as to argue that propaganda, public relations and public diplomacy are synonymous terms underpinned by persuasion as their inherent feature.

Moreover, one trend emerging within the academic discourse on the subject can be noted: while the term ‘public diplomacy’ was coined as a response to propaganda’s negative connotations (Staar 1988), ‘new public diplomacy’ (Mellissen 2005) has been shaped by corporate communications models and the notion of ‘relationship building’ in order to fit neo-liberal globalism (Held and McGrew 2002). I argue that this notion fits the neo-liberal sensibilities of interconnectedness and interdependency between

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3 Szczepankiewicz (2005) demonstrates when overseas propaganda was institutionalised in the Polish state back in 1917. In intellectual terms, I follow the structuralist sensibilities of modernity, but historiographically my thinking on modernity in the Polish context has been informed by Bauman (1997).
political fields; although ‘interconnectedness’ of the state marries with ‘the relationship building’ utterance favoured by nation brand conceptualists (Szondi 2010), persuasion, inherent to ‘soft power’ (Nye 1990), is not accounted for in those works. Olins (2003, p. 7) himself bluntly confesses that branding is about “persuading, seducing, and attempting to manipulate people into buying products and services”. In Poland, overseas propaganda was institutionalised as part of the state-building exercise after the First World War. The first text on nation brands - ‘Nation brands of the twenty first century’ – did not, however, emerge until end of 1990s (Anholt 1998).

**PROPAGANDA MEETS DIPLOMACY**

Propaganda has been identified as the first model to play a role in overseas government communication efforts. Its institutionalisation coincided with in the modernist notion of a ‘total war’ (Taylor 1981). Thus propaganda was considered as a coercive feature of the military warfare used in diplomacy (Ponsonby 1928), but soon after the First World War was thought of as applicable to relations between the states at the time of peace (Bernays 1928). In his study of the United States Information Agency (USIA), Bogart (1995, p. 195) discusses propaganda as a communicative practice which is “an art requiring a special talent”. Snow (1998, p. 619) takes a similar position of communicative practice at the USIA:

*USIA likes to call its particular branch of foreign affairs ‘public diplomacy’, a euphemism for propaganda. But USIA prefers the euphemism, because it doesn’t want the US public to think that its government engages in psychological warfare activities, and because, among the general public, ‘propaganda’ is a pejorative catch-all for negative and offensive manipulation.*

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6 Wang (2006) links the notions of ‘image’, ‘reputation’, with ‘soft power’. He draws from Nye’s scholarship to explain this concept. According to Nye (1990, p. x), soft power refers to “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”
Consequently, she favours the term ‘propaganda’ to describe the operations of the USIA as it refers to the “public relations instrument of corporate propaganda which ‘sells’ the US story abroad by integrating business interests with cultural objectives” (p. 619). Although popularisation of the term of public diplomacy is accredited to Edmund Gullion, Cull (2008) traces its genealogy back to January 1856 when it was used by the London ‘Times’. In 1965 Gullion, the Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, introduced the term ‘public diplomacy’ in the US.

The USIA contributed to the US’s ideological domination in the post-Second World War order. Dizard (2004, p. XIV) unfolds this argument: “in this process USIA added a new dimension to the craft of propaganda, under a new rubric of public diplomacy”. This new form of propaganda was particularly important in Western-Eastern relations. Staar (1986) provides an overview of Soviet and Western propaganda during the Cold War. Blitz (1986, p. 96) explains his perspective on public diplomacy, which he considers as public information or public communication aimed at shaping public opinion “by telling or displaying the truth”. While, in his view, persuasion is inherent to this practice, it can be also accredited with civic education exercised overseas. Blitz views public diplomacy as a euphemism for propaganda and claims that “public diplomacy is the open civic education of citizens of other countries using means that are not deliberately false. The point of public diplomacy is primarily political and there is nothing knowingly false in what it does” (ibid. p. 96).

GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA MEETS CORPORATE ‘PR-PROPAGANDA’

A separate contribution to the field of national images management has been made by scholars whose research has been informed by public relations models. The early research analysing public relations in the context of national images management was Manheim and Albritton’s (1984) examination of the media content of the US press. Their study takes an outward-inward view of the US political and media systems whereby its key components of media agenda, public agenda, and policy
agenda constitute a basis for understanding the role of external actors’ interests in shaping the mass media coverage. This research explores changing media agendas as an outcome of public relations counselling. Contemporary studies extend the notion of agenda setting to agenda-building (Kiousis and Wu 2008).

Among conceptual works mapping out the crossovers between public diplomacy and public relations are normative suggestions informing its practice by corporate public relations models. As far as chronology is concerned, public relations’ merger with public diplomacy goes back to the mid-1980s. In 1992, Signitzer and Coombs pointed out that with an exception of Koschwitz who, in 1986, observed increasing ‘public relations aspects’ in diplomacy, diplomacy theorists underestimated this area as a useful area of expertise. Signitzer and Coombs (1992, p. 145) talk of ‘conceptual convergence’ between diplomacy and public relations as driven by technological developments and political needs of the modern states. They conclude that “each area can benefit by learning the strengths of the other area and adopting them to the practice of dealing with foreign publics” (ibid. p. 145).

Later, Kruckeberg and Vujnovic (2005) consider public relations as valuable in conceptualising public diplomacy. Drawing on Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) two-way symmetric model of public relations and Kruckeberg and Starck’s (1988) notion of community building, they suggest that both of those models prove efficient in public diplomacy practice in comparison to the US Cold War propaganda. By incorporating ‘symmetry’ and ‘mutual understanding’, Kruckeberg and Vujnovic (2005) imply that this approach contributes to enhancement of public diplomacy practice. Similarly, Dutta-Bergman (2006) suggests that the international public relations literature provides a framework that allows a move away from the propaganda approach to public diplomacy. Drawing from the theory of communicative action (Habermas 1984), Dutta-Bergman (2006) offers a cultural studies approach to public diplomacy, characterised by a shift from ‘imposing’ cultural values to promotion of ‘cultural
understanding’ and adopting a “public relations approach based on dialogue and respect for mutual values” (Dutta-Bergman 2006, p. 121-122).

Application of public relations frameworks to diplomatic practice has triggered the emergence of, so-called, ‘new public diplomacy’. Melissen (2005b) has introduced the underpinnings of this approach by emphasising a requirement for expansion of social networks involved in public diplomacy, and has extended the notion of ‘soft power’ to more agents. Hocking (2005 p. 41), working with the ‘new public diplomacy’ model, points out that “public diplomacy in its state-based ‘strategic’ guise is a more sophisticated variant of a well-established idea - namely that ‘publics’ matter to government as tools of national foreign policy”. In the light of this view, and features adopted from corporate public relations, the ‘new public diplomacy’ raises questions about the relationship between agents involved in exercising soft power.

Finally, Fitzpatrick (2007) talks about a ‘relationship building’ approach to public diplomacy. Her proposition is based on another public relations conceptual idea, borrowed from Ferguson (1984). This approach, largely in line with the Grunigian model of public relations, assumes that “if relationship building management were adopted as a general theory of public diplomacy, the defining worldview would be characterized by symmetry and mutuality and based on genuine dialogue” (Fitzpatrick 2007, p. 207). Yet again, this approach is consensual and normative: she does not address power relations between states or between public diplomacy agents.

Critical theorists of public relations also expressed interest in this area. For example, L’Etang (1996) identifies similarities between public relations and public diplomacy. She notes that an intellectual home for diplomacy studies is a theory of international relations. In her view, this theory has analytical tools to explain changes in the international system whereas public relations scholars have not explored change as a feature of public relations practice. She argues that conceptual reading of the
impact that public relations has on diplomacy should be expanded by contextual and historical factors. L’Etang’s (1996) position is based on a view that there are very few studies exploring crossovers between public relations and diplomacy. Back then, she identified only three relevant papers (Traverse-Healy 1988; Signitzer and Coombs 1992; Grunig1993). Since then new research has been published.

Following the Grunigian model of ‘excellence in public relations’, Yun (2005; 2006) demonstrates transferability of its conceptual features into ‘public diplomacy theory-building’. In his empirical research revealing crossovers of public relations and public diplomacy, Yun’s (2005) survey of foreign agents in Washington D.C. discusses public diplomacy management and behaviour. This comparative approach to public diplomacy analysis concentrates on public diplomacy behaviour and finds public relations management models applicable to the diplomacy practice context. Although this research contributes to an understanding of public diplomacy in the US, it neither considers features of persuasion nor the organisation of government communications in different realms of policy making.

Revisiting academic works (L’Etang 2006a; Signitzer and Wamser 2006) shows more interest in this area. Signitzer and Wamser (2006) note a lack of common research culture between public relations and public diplomacy. Put simply, there is still limited evidence suggesting a shift from traditional ‘government-to-government’ to ‘government-to-people’ communications. In their view, it results in an intellectual divide that require addressing by empirical evidence. While the above academic works suggest that diplomatic practice can bridge domestic and foreign policy realms, there are models in the academic field of national images management that explicitly consider domestic stakeholders’ engagement in governments’ overseas communication. Among the models addressing the domestic-international dichotomy, are: ‘national projection’ (Tallents 1932), ‘mediated public diplomacy’ (Entman 2008), and ‘strategic communications’ (Heller and Persson 2009).
The crossovers of state diplomacy and corporate communication are not only a result of their functional similarities, but also a consequence of interest by public relations consultancies (e.g. Hill & Knowlton) in diplomatic networks (Hiebert 2003). Academics, on the other hand, develop conceptual frameworks, supported by terminologies, taxonomies and modes of thinking that allow closer integration of the two areas – diplomacy and corporate communications. Needless to say, influencing international public opinion via media framing (Entman 2004; Entman 2008), agenda-building (Kiousis and Wu 2008), agenda-setting (Manheim and Albritton 1984), and gate-keeping (Lord 1998) has played its role in foreign affairs. This is the area of research in which adoption of corporate public relations models, albeit debatable, illustrates the process of re-inventing propaganda that historically is an apparatus of domination used by governments and diplomatic networks (Taylor 1999).

NATION BRANDING AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: EMERGING DEBATES

The conceptualists of nation branding do not recognise ‘dichotomous models’: they neither refer to them nor engage in discussion with their authors. In fact, their interpretation of collective identity and its relationship with propaganda is trivialised. For example, Anholt (2007, p. 39) takes the following position on the relationship between the two models:

*It seems to me that what most people mean by propaganda is the deliberate manipulation of public opinion for the purpose of achieving a political end; the search for competitive identity is the consequence of realization that public opinion is an essential component of achieving a political end. It is, one might say, a necessary consequence of democracy and the globalization of the media.*

The relationship between public diplomacy and nation branding models has been examined by Szondi (2009a). His hermeneutic analysis of relevant scholarship leads to the identification of several plausible relationships between nation branding and public
diplomacy. He juxtaposes conceptual features of nation branding against those of public diplomacy. Below, I present his five conceptual positions.

First, Szondi unfolds the view that public diplomacy and nation branding operate as separate areas of practice. He notes that after the end of the Cold War, public diplomacy was undergoing an ‘identity crisis’. As a result, some states that had previously exploited public diplomacy have adopted nation branding and treat them as parallel and separate fields of practice with different objectives. For Szondi (2009a, p. 17, original italics) “nation branding can also be characterised as the production of symbols, signs, territories and spaces for consumption which is manifested in consumers’ investing in the country, buying the countries’ products, or visiting a country and spending money there”. Conceptually, the economic exchange principle differentiates nation branding from public diplomacy and, in this approach, there is no assumed synergy linking communication outcomes of the two areas.

The second type of relationship between public diplomacy and nation branding conceptualises public diplomacy as an integral part of nation branding strategy whereby nation branding is thought of as a master term. Szondi (2009a, p. 19) suggests that recent attempts by policy makers to develop nation branding-related policies aim at ‘commercialization of foreign policy and public diplomacy’. Given that there are still few contributions from academics researching public diplomacy, nation branding advocates make claims that their model incorporates all government-to-foreign publics communication and this process creates a situation whereby

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7 It is argued that, at the time of the emergence of public diplomacy, ‘propaganda’ was going through an ‘identity crisis’, as it carried negative historically-bounded connotations, which were considered as undesirable amongst the American political elites and diplomatic structures; public diplomacy was seen as a more acceptable euphemism for propaganda. Nowadays, public diplomacy scholars rarely talk about paradigm change and argue that its body of knowledge requires clarity (Gilboa 2008).
...public speaks to publics; when a substantial proportion of the population of the country – not just civil servants and paid figureheads – gets behind the strategy and lives it out in their everyday dealings with the outside world (Anholt 2003, p. 123).

The third approach explaining the relationship between nation branding and public diplomacy assumes that nation branding fits into the strategic public diplomacy practice. Szondi (2009a) reveals that the state conducts public diplomacy efforts, but nation branding practice is not yet common. Thus far, nation branding has drawn only limited attention of international relations scholars. For example, Van Ham (2001) has explored the intersection between a broader field of place branding and international relations theory and locates nation branding within its constructivist paradigm. His work, however, has a few fundamental theoretical shortcomings. First, he uses the notion of branding, marketing, and public relations interchangeably and does not explicitly explain the relationships between them. Second, as Szondi (2009a) points out, international relations scholarship and marketing have different bodies of knowledge and Van Ham (2001; 2002; 2008) suggests that the origin of nation branding practice can be traced within the international relations scholarship. Put simply, Van Ham (2002) does not explain how constructivism, as a systemic theory of international relations, is linked with a micro-concept of branding. Rather, he outlines this conceptual relationship on the basis of terminological similarities between branding and international relations scholarship where ‘image’ and ‘identity’ constitute foundations for the relationship between their bodies of knowledge.

The fourth interconnection between nation branding and public diplomacy considers them as distinct, but overlapping concepts, where each of them has separate characteristics. In this case, Szondi (2009a) subscribes to Melissen’s (2005a; 2005b) view who argues that public diplomacy and nation branding are separate models, but they share tactical practices. Nation branding, however, has much broader ambitions due to its ‘holistic’ approach, whereas public diplomacy strives to achieve individual
political objectives. Consequently, Szondi (2009a) identifies links that both models share. The first one is their commitment to national image management where reputation is a by-product of the two practices (Manheim 1994; Anholt 2003). Second, national identities and their manifestations are pivotal in public diplomacy and nation branding writings.

Finally, in the last approach explaining the conceptual relationship between nation branding and public diplomacy, it is argued that they are synonymous. Here Szondi (2009a) argues that the nation branding conceptualists have paid limited attention to public diplomacy and frequently underestimate its intellectual oeuvre as well as treating it as a terminological substitute for nation branding. For example, Dinnie (2008, p. 251) claims that public diplomacy “at some point in the future supplants the term ‘nation branding’”. Szondi (2009a) concludes his evaluation with a statement suggesting that scholars might consider public diplomacy and nation branding as synonymous with propaganda or a post-modern mutation of public diplomacy that is on an evolutionary line that started with propaganda. His discussion does not consider the shortcomings of the two models. Instead, he talks about the ‘crisis of identities’ of communicative models preceding nation branding.

DEPOLITICISING NATION BRANDING

Of particular interest to nation branding conceptualists are changing political governance and consequences of those changes for the state. Simultaneously, the nation brand conceptualists are self-declared protagonists of a globalised market economy. For example, Anholt (2006b, p. 2) reveals his position on the relationship between nation branding and global economy in the following passage:

*I have always held the view that the market-based view of the world, on which theory of place branding is largely predicted, is an inherently peaceful and humanistic model for the relationship between*
nations. It is based on competition, consumer choice and consumer power; and these concepts are intimately linked to the freedom and power of the individual. For this reason, it seems far more likely to result in lasting world peace than a statecraft based on territory, economic power, ideologies, politics or religion.

This logic has reinforced a theme of, so called, ‘post-politics’ where nation branding marks its influence as a *deus ex machina* of neo-liberal identity politics (Bolin and Ståhlberg 2010). Van Ham (2001) signifies nation branding as the beginning of a post-political era. He argues that nation branding marks “a shift in political paradigms, a move from a modern world of geopolitics and power to the postmodern world of images and influence” (Van Ham 2001, p. 4). This argument, in my view, continues a debate on national identities - the means of their reinvention and construction.

The ‘ahistorical’ intellectualisation of branding-driven national identity construction echoes debates within the literature. It is argued primarily via alleged universality and long-lasting existence of nation branding. Olins (2002a) exemplifies this point in his polemic with Girard on the subject of nation branding in France. Girard (2001), one of the early critics of nation branding, argues that the idea of nation branding is politically and culturally grounded, and is not acceptable to some governments and nations. The polemical response was put forward by Olins (2002a). Within it, he uses an anachronic reading of history to argue that the French nation had undergone ‘re-branding’ each time a political regime of the French state changed. This revisionist interpretation, lacking socio-historical evidence, contributes to the formation of mythologized marketing notions.

Within the emerging body of literature on nation branding, there are also arguments implying pragmatism and non-ideological features of nation branding. Yet again, Van Ham (2002, p. 263) spells them out in the following passage:
...this makes state branding different from classical ideology, although the comparison with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and their strong logos (swastika, hammer and sickle), slogans, emotive identities, and ideological manifestations is certainly tempting. Still, Coca-Cola does not send you to the Gulag if you refuse to buy their soft drinks, and Microsoft has no plans to annihilate the Untermensch using Linux software. This is not just a matter of gradation, or style; it makes all the difference. Behind the communist and fascist logos and ‘mission statements’ was a brutal state-machine that used almost random violence to intimidate people. Branding does also not take place in a vacuum; behind the power of the PR and image stands the power of practice. In general, ideology tends to differ from branding in that it takes itself (too) seriously and claims to offer the sole truthful image of the world, which sets it apart from the pragmatic and ideologically undogmatic thinking of PR-people and image makers.

The above a priori assumptions about the relationship between branding and ideology and allegedly undogmatic mind-sets of public relations practitioners opposes a posteriori knowledge that has been revealed by academics studying public relations. While Van Ham (2002) speaks of the ‘non-dogmatic’ mindset of nation branders (referred to as ‘the PR-people’), his claims regarding this professional class do not define their identities and interests. He neither considers the evidence exploring issues

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8 Although Van Ham (2002) suggests that the professional background of nation branders lies in public relations practice, he does not offer any evidence to support his claims. However, in more recent research, Aronczyk (2009, p. 295) defines nation-branders as ‘consultants’: “a category of professionals whose primary role is to offer advisory services to national leaders in the general arenas of reputation, image, and identity. This includes a highly circumscribed group of individuals and firms devoted to the practice of nation branding specifically, but it can also extend to encompass advertising and marketing executives, “creativity” or “competitiveness” gurus, business and social science academics, and others who see their work as influencing policy prescriptions that regulate the intangible attributes of countries for the purposes of national development”.

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of power in public relations (Edwards 2007), nor the body of research revealing how public relations is used by governments to mediate policies at home (Mickey 1997; L’Etang 1998; Richards 2004) and abroad (Kruckenberg and Vujnowic 2005).

The area of statehood that has been characterised shifting towards this ‘post-political’ is that of diplomacy practice. From the state perspective, “diplomacy is concerned with advising, shaping and implementing foreign policy” (Barston 2006 p. 1). The emergence of nation branding, however, leads Van Ham (2001 p. 6) to suggest that brand management has made an impact on the practice of diplomacy:

*The traditional diplomacy of yesterday is disappearing. To do their jobs well in the future, politicians will have to train themselves in brand asset management. Their tasks will include finding a brand niche for their state, engaging in competitive marketing, assuring customer satisfaction, and most of all, creating brand loyalty.*

Van Ham does not explain what the social forces driving and mediating those changes are. Given that models of propaganda, public relations, and public diplomacy have been utilized in diplomatic practice, it is worth asking about the role and relationship of nation branding with the political fields set in the context of a particular state. The aforementioned claims of nation brand conceptualists about the changing dynamics of politics, nationalism, and its international outcomes are controversial and find no validation in a broader body of knowledge. Yet, nation branding is presented as a panacea and we are invited to believe that branding can resolve economic problems, particularly of developing nations (Gertner 2007).

Summing up, at this stage a few points can be made. First, there is a trend in the field of national images management that illustrates expanding corporate models into the area of statehood. Second, this area is much under-researched and nation branding in particular lacks empirical focus. Third, previous research on nation branding reveals
an inclination of political leaders and bureaucrats (Kaneva 2007a) to adopt nation branding to legitimize their power. Fourth, paradoxically, nation branding is considered by its critics as symptomatic of collective identity crisis (Girard 2001, p. 22). The affinity of nation branding with the political fields not only situates politicians or bureaucrats as 'managers of public life', but it affects qualities of public discourses regarding nationhood and, indeed, can be considered as starting point for a qualitative shift towards accelerating marketisation of national identities at the time when global and local features of national identities often intertwine.
CHAPTER THREE: NATIONALISM, NATION-BUILDING, GLOBALISM

OVERVIEW

This chapter introduces the theoretical underpinnings of my thesis. To contextualise my research, I draw from structuralist and constructivist perspectives on nationalism and Pierre Bourdieu’s social theory. First, I turn attention to theories of nationalism as they provide a framework enabling explanation of national identity. Second, Bourdieu’s *oeuvre* allows a data-laden analysis of nation branding. The epistemological significance of Bourdieu’s meta-theory is not exclusively theoretical, but it allows exploration of practice by the field actors. The strength of Bourdieu’s theory of practice has also been recognised in promotional culture studies within the Anglo-American academic fields in the areas of media studies and nation branding.

THE ‘STATE’ AND THE ‘NATION’ DEFINED

There are many academic perspectives on state-building which have provided theoretical underpinnings explaining political, social, and economic forces contributing towards the formation of political entities. Regardless of the perspective there is, however, a common agreement that the state is ontologically a dominant, but not exclusive, actor responsible for national identities construction. A distinction between ‘the state’ and ‘the nation’ is justified, particularly when considering social theory explanations of the relationship between these two analytical categories.

Smith (2001, p. 12) asserts that “the concept of the state relates to institutional activity” while “the nation denotes a type of community” and explicitly sketches out a distinction between the two analytical categories. On this basis, he defines the state as

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9 Rae (2002) has conducted a review of main theoretical explanations of state-building, which she suggests, have been recognised by historical sociologists and institutional economists. Those accounts do not however emphasize the role of culture and identity in state-building. Those are traditionally assigned to social theorists’ interpretations. Among the most frequently recognized approaches embracing culture and identity are materialist explanations of Wallerstein (1979); institutional accounts of North (1981); power-based explanations of Giddens (1985); and rational choice explanations of Hardin (1995).
“a set of autonomous institutions, differentiated from other institutions, possessing a legitimate monopoly of coercion and extraction in a given territory”. For Baylis and Smith (2006) , the state is a dominant, institutional representation of the community of people, which enjoys legal recognition by the community of other nations, and which, by means of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power and legitimised representation, governs a community of people. Although in this approach the relationship between the state and its nation is limited to the confines of a single polity, nationalism scholarship has considered the relationship between ‘global’ and ‘local’ realms of the state and national identities construction (Arnason 1990; Delanty and O’Mahony 2002).

The preceding distinction between the state and the nation, albeit functional at this stage, requires definition of the term ‘nation’. Here, I have recourse to Guibernau’s (2007, p. 60) definition of a nation as “a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past, a common project for the future, and claiming the right to rule itself ”. As far as the Polish state is concerned, its relationship with the Polish nation has been emphasised by Shields (2007, p. 174) in the following passage:

_In Poland, ‘the nation’ has been predominantly explained in ethnic terms, mainly because sovereign statehood was lacking for most of modern Polish history. Nation and state have historically been understood as distinct if not antagonistic._

While historically it might have been the case, in recent years the Polish state and nation have been subjected to centrifugal and centripetal forces reshaping the dynamics of their relationship. Bearing in mind the state and the nation dichotomy, I move on to review the literature on nationalism in order to contextualise the analysis of nation branding and its capacity to shape Polish national identity.
NATION-BUILDING AND NATION-DESTROYING

Despite similarities and differences amongst polities, the state-centred accounts of national identity construction share ‘nation-building’ as a process in collective identity formation. When the term ‘nation-building’ appeared in the 1960s, it primarily signified unification of post-colonial communities. Today, scholars find it useful as a category aimed at examination of the state’s role in constructing identity features. The term nation-building aimed at an epistemological break with systemic (Durkheimian) or developmental (Weberian) analyses of the relationship between the state and the nation. For example, Deutsch (1966, p. 3) claims that his conceptualisation provides a greater analytical scope, and suggests that nation-building is “an architectural or mechanical model”. While the ‘social engineering’ approach (Shah 2003) identifies components required to be ‘put in place’ to define the ‘nation’ (e.g. communities, characteristics, needs, sense of identity, communication), Deutsch’s functionalistic view laid the foundations for constructivism in nationalism studies.

After the emergence of the nation-building concept, scholars extended the scope of this process by emphasising the social change that nation-building involves. Connors (1972) claims that nation-building leads to nation destroying. He argued that “since most of the less developed states contain a number of nations, and since the transfer of the primary allegiance from these nations to the state is gradually considered sine qua non of successful integration, the true goal is not nation-building, but nation-destroying” (p. 336). The social changes require manipulation of national allegiance by the state to ensure the continuation of the nation. The construction of national identity narratives often forces the need to challenge the existing national bonds. Therefore, nation-building coexists with nation destroying. Following Deutsch’s (1966) reasoning, it can be suggested that, because the state precedes and constructs the nation, by inverse logic, the nation could precede and construct the state. Because the genesis of the Polish nation is not at the centre of this thesis, I focus on academic accounts revealing reproduction of national identities.
PARADIGMS IN NATIONALISM STUDIES

While for conceptualists, a departure point for the nation branding exercise is an effort to enthuse ‘benign nationalism’ (Anholt 2007), there are emerging narratives taking this argument a step further by claiming that nation branding can supplant nationalism all together (Van Ham 2001). Simultaneously, connections between nation brand and nation identity are also implicit. Anholt (2007, p. 75) suggests that “nation brand is national identity made robust, communicable and above all useful”. The relationship between nationalism, national identity and nation brand has not been, however, explicitly examined. Thus, it is important to unfold the significance of nationalism to collective identity construction and abilities of nationalism to merge with other areas of practice derived from other than the Polish state politics areas of practice, e.g. its capacity to merge with branding.

To map out the existing schools of thoughts in the area of nationalism studies, I turn my attention to one of its most prominent contemporary scholars, Anthony D. Smith. For Smith (2001) the starting point for analysis of nationalism is an indication of its socio-historical underpinnings. He defines nationalism as “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential nation” (ibid, p. 9) and considers it as a belief-system characterised by: a) propositions to which most nationalists adhere; b) ideas present in nationalism, albeit in varying degrees; c) a range of concepts that give concrete meaning to the core abstraction of nationalism. That aside, Smith (2001) differentiates four key paradigms in nationalism studies: primordialist, perennialist, ethno-symbolism, and modernist. While I recognise the intellectual importance of them all, modernism and its constructivist offshoot have ontologically guided this thesis and design of my research.

Modernists assert that nations originate driven by the emergence of nationalism - ideology, social movements, and symbolism - and were qualitatively new way of
organizing inner-state order. Nations, according to modernists, did not find socio-political parallels prior to 1789. In short, nations and nation-building are the products of modernity (Smith 2001, p. 46). Among other processes, industrialization, division of labour, urbanization, and mobility are the key features of nation-building. In turn, these conditions required unification that was articulated in nationalist ideology. Gellner (1983, p. 48-49) encapsulates the modernist view on nationalism:

*God-given ways of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth: nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is reality, for better or worse, and in general and indispensable one.*

Although structuralism is considered as a dominant paradigm in nationalism, it is internally versatile and offers socio-economic, socio-cultural, political, ideological, and constructivist explanations. The modernist structuralism has been advanced by several scholars emphasising consequences of the state-centred nation-building. To Gellner (1983, p. 57), nationalism invents nations and replaces idiosyncratic social microstructures with national macrostructures. Hechter (1975) points out that unequal modernization by nationalism results in ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’. He moves away from theorising modernization as a way of activating communities. Gellner (1983) also highlights the uneven effects of industrialization in nation-building. For both scholars, mobilization takes place in socio-economic and socio-cultural settings that validate capturing impressions of uniqueness (Delanty and O’Mahony 2002).

Within this paradigm, the early work of Rokkan (1975) on ‘historical diachronics’ is pivotal to understanding the persistence of nationhood structures. For Rokkan (1975), the formation of nationhood involves confrontation and takes places at the crossovers between centres and peripheries. The political centres are the primary points of analysis as the power holders are involved in the boundary-spanning and
boundary-control in the areas relating to nationhood: commodity exchange, messages circulation, and codes or population control. The state-driven institutionalisation, ideological promulgation, religion and mass-media, the political and social centres perform an integrative role in the national identity formation. Rokkan’s (1975) structuralist position does not interpret national identity as static, but as competing with other forms of culturally bounded collective identities. Flora, Kuhnle and Urwin (1999) point out key characteristics in Rokkan’s theoretical framework as attempting to bridge the gap between sociological generalizations and historical contexts.

While structuralism offers theoretical underpinnings for the analysis of nationalism, it has been criticised for its implicit determinism, preoccupation with industrialisation, European-centric analysis, homogenising effects, and ambiguous explanations of the relationship between top-down and bottom-up analytical approaches (Madianou 2005). Hobsbawm’s (1990, p. 11) reflection on nationalism highlights the fact that its ideology does not always guide “what is in the minds of even the most loyal citizens or supporters”. Therefore, nationalism might not be a dominant form of collective identity as national identification is prone to social change. Hobsbawm (1990) questions the deterministic top-down structuralist view and argues for dualism in the analysis of nationalism accounting for bottom-up agency.

The modernist paradigm has been characterised by ‘class decoupling’, i.e. a relative independence in the distribution of power, wealth, and cultural capital from social structuring (Eder 1993). Over the years, the elitism in the nation-building process has been recognised as falling short in its analysis and scholars have identified a need to address the role of classes in the analysis of national identity. Whilst the Marxist analysis of class relations has emerged as an alternative to nationalism as a form of collective identity, its contemporary explanations indicate mutual, elitist and non-elitist, interest of class attachments to nation-building (Blum 2007). In this approach, state structures and the notion of ‘class’ have been factored into the analysis.
of nationalism, structuralism, particularly constructivist orthodoxy, reveals subjective aspects of nationalism and national identity that comes with its discourses.

Traditionally, constructivism is coupled with subjective aspects of nationhood, rooted in ethno-symbolic tradition. Its assumptions derive from the functionalist tradition (Deutsch 1966). In his early work, Hobsbawm (1983) points out that nations and nationalism owe much to the invention of the literary, national histories, mythology and symbolism. For Smith (2001, p. 79), constructivists place the emphasis on “social engineering, technological innovation and fashioning of a cultural artefact or a text, on the use of skill and imagination to create novel forms”. On the contrary, ethno-symbolists accentuate reinterpretation of cultural motives and reconstruction of earlier ethnic ties. Therefore, nations are considered as cultural artefacts where their imagining and reinvention is bounded by the production of nationhood narratives (Anderson 2006). In this approach, nations are understood as emotional communities, bounded by imagination and cognition. In the light of the above, constructivism enables the analysis of national identity narratives: it focuses on unfolding cultural references and representations of national features. Finally, constructivism draws the relationship between the past and present (Smith 2001).

NATIONALISM AND GLOBALISM

While pre-twenty century nationalism was characterised by monocentrism, this view has found an alternative in a polycentric analysis in nationalism studies. Given that neo-liberalism has contributed to the division of power centres, nationalistic monocentrism has been undermined by the complexity of new forces. This approach to nationalism recognises global cultural trends (Smith 1990) as key challenges to state-centric nationalism (Arnason 1990). The globalist thesis in nationalism scholarship is characterised by intellectual dualism. On the one hand, local nationalisms are seen as a reaction to globalism. One the other hand, nationalism finds manifestation in conflicting ideologies undermining the state monocentrism. This
thesis has been substantiated in the academic discourse by arguments on national identity fragmentation (Hopkins 2009); the demise of the state (Miyoshi 1993); consumer culture (Featherstone 1991); accelerating culture of commodification (Hassan 2008) or mediatization of national identities (Madianou 2005). Those processes and accompanying practices (Ritzer 2008) lead to dissolution of nationalism, hybridization of identities and crystallisation of a liquid ‘imagined international community of nations’ (Rusciano 2004). While, arguably, these are characteristics of post-modernism, Smith (2001) claims that post-modern sensibility in nationalism studies is still too sketchy as a research programme.

The academic literature draws a link between globalisation and an emerging post-modern approach to nationalism studies. Smith’s (1995) analysis of nationalism in the global era challenges post-national, post-political and ahistorical interpretations of national identity formation present in the globalist approaches. In his view, collective identity making does not have solid alternatives other than nationalism. He subscribes to Engels’ argument that nationalism is neither patently democratic nor liberal and points out that “nationalism’s central tenets are likely to impede progress to human rights and democracy” (ibid. p. 152). In his later, Weber-inspired work, Smith (2001) outlines parallels between the two belief identity systems - religious and national - and suggests that “...just like traditional religions have periodically undergone the process of change to meet new conditions, so modern national identities are habitually reinterpreted by successive generations” (ibid. p. 146).

In this polycentric setting, the construction of national identities has alternatives. Particularly in contemporary Europe, the nationalistic, state-centric elitism has found a strong alternative in the EU which assumes co-existence of national and European identities (Van Ham 2001). Therefore, recognition of neo-liberalism in Poland as a dominant political economy has raised questions about the relationship between nationalism, the dominant mode of production, and the ability of national elites to form allegiances corresponding with this form of governance. The link between elites,
nationalism and capitalism is not new. Gellner’s (1983) interpretation of nationbuilding explains nationalism as a ‘top-down’ process legitimised by discourses of modernization and industrialization. The relationship between political economy and nationalism has also previously been a subject of theorising. For instance, Seers (1983) analyses nationalism through the lens of distinct approaches: he polarizes ‘anti-nationalist’ and ‘egalitarian’ Marxist views against ‘anti-nationalist’ and ‘anti-egalitarian’ forces of the neo-classical liberals. From today’s perspective, those clear-cut juxtapositions seem limiting in analytical terms. To an extent, however, the above positions inform contemporary explanations of the relationship between capitalism and the state channels renewed versions of nationalism (Greenfeld 2003).

Arguably, economic nationalism (Barber 1995) does not sit comfortably with neo-liberalism as contemporary markets exceed the boundaries of a single state. Some form of nationalism is, however, required to form collective identities. Harvey (2005) undertakes the task of drawing a relationship between the neo-liberal state and nationalism. First, the neo-liberal state institutions play a role in preparation for market operations. Secondly, the neo-liberal state requires a collective identity and some form of nationalism is necessary for the state to function effectively as a corporate and competitive entity. He concludes that the neo-liberal state “forced to operate as a competitive agent in the world market, seeking to establish the best possible business climate, mobilizes nationalism in its effort to succeed” (ibid. 2005, p. 85). In theory, neo-liberalism poses challenges which nation branding seems to have responded to.

NATIONALISM AND BRANDING AS IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE

The indifference of nation branding conceptualists to ideological explanations of its practice is characteristic of the intellectual nihilism rooted in the notion of ‘endism’. Bell (2000) and Fukuyama (1993) have put forward their subsequent thesis on ‘the end of ideology’ and ‘the end of history’ arguing for the irrelevance of ideology and history to social change as the result of the mythologized triumph of Western democracies and
capitalism. Those explanations have privileged understanding of post-industrial nations over their historical and analytical accuracy. While theoretically nation-building has been characterised by “philosophical poverty” (Anderson 2006, p. 5), scholars argue for careful consideration of its ideological features (Smith 2001).

In recent years, scholars of nationalism have extended their scope of analysis beyond considering it as a movement or ideology by arguing against “the dangers of reifying the concept of the nation” and seeing nations as “enduring collectivities” (Smith 2001, p. 10). In his analysis, Brubaker (1996, p. 21) differentiates the nation from nationalism and considers “nation as a category of practice”, “nationhood as an institutionalised cultural and political form” and “nationness as a contingent event of happening”. While scholars (Blanksten 1967, p. 5) have long recognised similarities in ideological manifestations in nation-building, including “an inconsistent desire for economic development and Westernization”, the practice of branding has not been analysed as a nation-building process argued by Brubaker (1996).

Correspondingly to nationalism studies, marketing scholarship recognises multiple aspects of marketing in general and branding in particular. For example, Wilkie and Moore (2003) reveal how marketing can implement universalising frameworks, techniques, and devices reinforcing the efficiency of market economies. Marion (2006) extends their arguments and links marketing ideology and practice to beliefs and to collective representations of marketers. She points out that:

...marketing ideology works as a collective action frame of marketers and extreme generalization of marketing vocabulary shows pervasiveness of marketing ideology (ibid. p. 247).

In her view, linguistic markers of marketing support the legitimacy of market economies. The legitimizations of capitalism are also reinforced by the notion of universality, accompanied by professional reproduction in the field of marketing.
(Marion 2006). Through its apparent functionality, marketing ideology and practice is being reinvented by different agents and expands into new frontiers.

Above all, marketing relies on inventing new ideological concepts. O’Reilly (2006) explains this mechanism with reference to branding ideology, the practice of which is predominantly committed to meaning-making. She claims that “branding discourse relies heavily on an expansionist, linguistic acquisition-by-merger strategy” (p. 269). In her view, branding discourse is “accommodating signifiers in order to legitimate itself within the language” (p. 269) and expanding its portfolio of referents, i.e. ‘product branding’; ‘corporate branding’; or ‘nation branding’. This ‘acquisition-by-merger’ discursive strategy enables marketing principles to overwrite propaganda as an apparatus for national identity construction (e.g. Beck 1999).

**NATIONALISM THEORY AND THE MEDIA**

To date, nationalism scholarship has taken limited notice of the relationship between the media and national identities. While this relationship has been important in media studies, in fact only modernists have paid attention to the mass media as actors in nation-building. This is not surprising if for primordialists national identity is fixed. Constructivists, however, take a different view. Therefore, this section outlines key approaches to the relationship between nationalism and the media. I introduce them here to contextualise my analysis of nation branding. As far as the evidence suggests (Kornberger 2010), in the context of corporate communications, brand management, largely relies on mediation. In fact, Kaneva (2007a) offers evidence that demonstrates how nation branding in Bulgaria involves mass mediation.

Before nation branding entered research agendas, scholars emphasised different aspects in the role media play in mediation of nationalism. Although there are numerous theories explaining links between nationalism and the mass media, Smith’s (2000, p. 73) argument is a strong departure point for examining their dynamics:
The representations and images of the nation exert a profound influence over large numbers of people, exactly because they can be very widely disseminated by the media. In each of these media, specific images of the nation and its liberation, its heroic past, and its glorious future can be created and purveyed, so that the nation ceases to be the abstract community of all those designated as its members and citizens.

This broad statement supports a debate on the relationship between the mass media and nationalism. Madianou (2005) extends the modernist paradigm into discussion of national identities mediation. She maps out the literature and reveals two meta-approaches explaining links between nationalism and the media: strong media versus weak identities and weak media versus strong identities. Within those two approaches, there are several strands of research. In her view, technological determinism (Innis 1972; McLuhan 2001), phenomenology (Martin-Barbero 1988; Scanell and Cardiff 1991), textual determinism (Billing 1995) or market-centred (Price 1995) studies explaining the relationship between media and nationalism fall into the strong media/weak identity category. On the other hand, she suggests that media theories addressing global-local dynamics of national identity formation (Robins and Askoy 2001), particularly discussing collective identities as discourses and performance (Hall 1991), fall into the weak media/strong identities strand of research. Madiano favours the latter explanations. For her, this approach allows accounting for the media as an actor in nation-building by shifting the analysis from media-centred focus.

Van Ham (2002) argues that elites always have been searching for new means of nation-building. The mediation of nationalisms as part of the process of re-imagining the nation is significant to nation-building and it is essentially a dialectical process. For Silverstone (2005, p. 3) mediation is:
...a fundamentally dialectical notion which requires us to understand how the process of communication changes the social and cultural environments that support them as well as the relationships that participants, both individual and institutional, have to that environment and to each other. At the same time it requires consideration of the social as in turn a mediator: institutions and technologies as well as the meanings that are delivered by them are mediated in the social process of reception and consumption.

Among the globalist explanations of the mediated national identities are those addressing its complexity and consequences of globalisation. The most prominent arguments emerging in this debate consider globalisation as a mediated process, underpinned by global-local dynamics and resulting in weakening of the national structures. Curran’s (2002, p. 194) review of academic discourses regarding interconnections between the mass media and globalisation indicates that

\textit{During the twentieth century, globalisation of the economy was incomplete, uneven and discontinuous. This was even more true of the globalization of the media production.}

In a similar vein, the dominant market position ascribed to the US media has, according to Schiller (1996), resulted in the weakening of the national media structures. This process goes beyond the economic arguments and has numerous cultural influences (Tomlinson 2007). This post-Schillerian analysis strives to bridge theories concerning Westernization of the media products and their impact on indigenous cultures. Explanations of cultural imperialism as “the use of political and economic power to exalt and spread values and habits of a foreign culture at the expense of a native culture” (Bullock and Stallybrass 1977, p. 303) have lost academic credit nowadays. This approach reveals that diversity is subjected to homogenization.
of cultures. Those allegedly unifying abilities of globalisation stem from cultures that “remain centred in the West and always speak English” (Hall 1991, p. 28).

While the previous explanations offer insights into the relationship between nationalisms and the mass media, they consider culture as rigid and non-susceptible to changes. Therefore, in my considerations of the media and their role in nation building, I draw from theories revealing mediated, dialectical, non-media centric national identities construction. With Rusciano (1997), I consider nation-building as a process whereby actors struggle for national identity representation in dialectic mediation between the Selbstbild and Frembild. His work addresses transnational milieu for national identities construction, i.e. mediation of national identity features between domestic and transnational realms. This way, Rusciano (2004) extends the notion of imagined community and enables analysis of national identity by accounting for transnational settings. Furthermore, with Ociepka (2003) I consider the ‘weak position’ of the Polish media enabling ‘bottom-up’ movement of actors defining national identities. The above intellectual architecture validates Madiano’s (2005) thesis on national identity dynamics in the Polish settings.

**NATIONALISM AND CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS**

While media plays its role in national identity reproduction, there are groups of actors who require accounting for in this study: corporate enterprises. As mentioned, the Western promotional culture and the academic fields have led to the development of terminologies and practices that corporate actors perform in their management (Cornelissen 2009). The relationship between nationalism, corporate enterprises and policy making involves material and symbolic resources. The argument put forward by nation brand conceptualists (Olins 1999) implying that the state and corporations

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10 I remain faithful to the original, German terms used by Rusciano. His 2003 study explains them in the following way: “A theory has been advanced that the construction of national identity derives, in part, from a negotiation between a nation’s Selbstbild (or the nation’s national consciousness, or the image its citizens have of their country) and a nation’s Fremdbild (or the nation’s perceived or actual international image in world opinion) (Rusciano, 2003, p. 361).
‘trade identities’ is reductionist as the relationship between multinational corporations (MNCs) is contextual and broader than based on ‘branding’ practice. For example, Blanchard (2007, p. 67) reassesses ‘the state in command’ or ‘multinational corporations in command’ approaches to understanding dynamics of the relationship between the state and MNCs and by introducing a ‘bargaining power model’ he considers “the balance of needs, alliances, and the institutional environment”. Although this model considers power as a crucial factor in this relationship, his discussion, however, does consider nationalistic features in policy making.

The relationship between the state and MNCs and business interest groups has been explored by Bucheli (2010). His socio-historical analysis reveals the role of economic nationalism in public policy making in Chile. After Johnson (1994, p. 237-238), he defines economic nationalism as “a political sentiment that attaches value to having property in this broad sense owned by members of the national group.” Buchelli (2010) does not take a statist view on nationalism; he characterises economic nationalism as a form of ideological programme that empowers national actors as opposed to foreign ones. Although his analysis concentrates on property relations, he does not reveal specific forms of agency accompanying policy making as mobilised by economic nationalism. While his analysis concentrates on economic capital, he does not account for the symbolic dimension of economic nationalism as performed in public affairs and mediated via the structures of the Chilean nation and beyond.

The symbolism of nationalism has been emphasised by communication scholars in accounts revealing the relationship between corporate reputation management and nationalism in the globalising economy. For example, Wang (2005) distinguishes ‘the state sponsored’ economic nationalism from ‘consumer nationalism’ among consumer groups; he sees the relationship between the two as a ‘bottom-up’ process enacted by consumers with reference to commodities and services, the media, entertainment products, and tourism destinations. It has been characterised by
...the invocation of individuals’ collective national identities in the process of consumption to favour or reject products from other countries (p. 237).

Wang (2005) extends the attitudinal and behavioural notions of ‘country-of-origin effect’ and ‘consumer ethnicity’ into corporate reputation management. While he introduces the notion of ‘consumer nationalism’, his analysis does not account for the impact that state economic policies and mediated nationalism have on MNCs and their stakeholders. In his view, the agency of consumers as corporate stakeholders is a basis for categorisation of nationalism. His analysis, however, does not link nationalism with either broader political economy or specific corporate communication specialism. Elsewhere, scholars have revealed the entire body of works addressing the ways in which corporations and interest groups pursue their interests by means of complexities of corporate communication (Tench and Yeomans 2009). As far as the relationship between the state and interests groups is concerned, Moloney (2009) argues that the most common practice used to manage this dynamic are public affairs campaigns, employing lobbying as its most powerful tactic.

To further contextualise this study, I extend Moloney’s (2009) argument into the relationship between public policy making in Poland and nation branders as interest groups and by drawing from Rigg’s (1997) work, I recognise the role of nationalism and modernisation as settings imposed on the state bureaucracies to manage various interests. Finally, the relationship between the state and ideologically bounded ‘national interests’ has been discussed by Sklair (2001) in his work on a ‘transnational capitalist class’. Sklair theorises corporate practices enacted by transnational actors as responsible for the advancement of globalisation. For him, the neo-liberal settings, national interests and national competitiveness are ideological categories whereby ‘national interests’ is a universalizing notion, and ‘national competitiveness’ is computed as a way of measuring national performance; and is
based on predetermined categories that are “politically central to the way politicians and professionals use the service of transnational capitalists class use the state” (ibid. p. 137). The categories of globalism, national competitiveness, and national interest echo in nation branding writings (Olins 1999; Alholt 2007).

**STRUCTURALISM, CONSTRUCTIVISM AND NATION BRANDING**

While this thesis recognises the polycentricism of agents involved in national identities construction, it adopts the state-centric ontology. Its analysis is set at the crossovers between the Polish state structures, business and consultancy actors whose actions are further mediated into domestic and transnational realms. Principally, this study draws on structuralism highlighting the role of national elites and their practices in the process of nation-building and its ‘constructivist offshoot’, emphasizing the process of reinventing, interpreting and constructing meanings that form the contemporary notion of Polishness. This thesis understands the nation as a material reality of the state-arbitrated political community organising itself in socio-economic structures and forming numerous, often competing, symbolic, mediated narratives of national identities developed in ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom up’ agency.

In an effort to analyse nation branding, I borrow insights from the modernist and ethno-symbolic strands of nationhood. Following Geller (1983), I adopt the view that national consciousness is a modernist development and a product of the rise of industrialising and professionalising states. With Smith (2001), I recognise that cultural, religious, and ethnic roots of nations may sometimes be traceable to the pre-modern era. Therefore, the symbolic power of nations, including their national cultures is significant to my thesis. After Porter (2002), I recognise that national cultures contain multiple components whereby the ‘multivocalness’ of national identities is mediated through numerous narratives and is negotiated between domestic and world public opinion (Rusciano 2003). With Brubaker (1996, p. 21), I approach nationalising features of nationalism in performative terms; that is, as “interlocking and interactive,
and susceptible to influences from other areas of practice”. Following Harvey’s (2005) position regarding the relationship between neo-liberalism and nationalism, I consider ‘branding’ as an ideology and practice (O’Reilly 2006) aimed at bridging the gap between the Polish neo-liberal state, its nation and the transnational community.

PROMOTIONAL CULTURE AS NATIONAL CULTURE

The analysis of national identity cannot be limited to nationalistic ideologies of the state: similarities and differences of national community are enriched by theorising culture in a social theory perspective of nationhood. The sociological turn towards a culturalistic approach in social theory marks a shift from the ‘hard’ sociology of complex social organisms towards a ‘soft’ analysis of action within a single field. Sztompka (1999, p. 3) characterises this change by introducing the notion of “duality of cultures”. He suggests that culture provides resources for action (e.g. symbols, values, codes of meanings, cognitive content,) and, on the other hand, action is proactively shaping and reshaping culture. Culture is a sediment preceding action whereas action is a determining factor of cultural morphogenesis (Sztompka 1999).11

While, at this stage, I would not like to speculate if nation branders use Polish culture in the outputs of their practice, I use the existing notion of promotional culture (Wernick 1991) to contextualise the emergence of nation branding in Poland. Having recognised the role of cultures in structuralism, I merge it with promotional culture as a setting for the development of new promotional concepts such as nation branding. Although I am conscious of the relative autonomy of cultures, this thesis considers culture as a dependent analytical category. Thus, the underlying position of this section is that socio-cultural systems do not function in isolation and that they are open to influences. Following Kłoskowska (2005), I take the view that to speak of national cultures is to think of certain canons that are accepted as national.

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11 Sztompka (1993; 1993) explains this term after Buckley (1967) who sees ‘morphogenetic processes’ as innovations, the beginnings of new social conditions, or social structures. In essence, says Buckley, (ibid. p. 58) “the morphogenetic process will refer to those processes which tend to elaborate or change a system’s given form, structure or state”.
The notion of re-imagining is linked with promotional culture which Wernick (1991, p. 181-182) has defined as the social condition where self-advantaging communicative acts are “... virtually co-extensive with our produced symbolic world”. After Moloney (2006), I argue that by virtue of competitive markets, neoliberalism is an incubating milieu for promotional culture. The subjectivity of ‘cultures’ requires consideration of promotional culture in Poland. Wernick’s (1991) analysis considers how the June 1989 elections in Poland become a ‘promotional spectacle’. While ties between politics and promotional culture in Poland have been attributed to political marketing, over the last several years, promotional culture in Poland has diversified. Moreover, scholars trace the morphogenesis of branding to agricultural cultures (Kapferer 2005), but throughout Western modernism, it was a corporate management practice. Recently, Kornberger (2010) highlights the transformative power of brands. His thesis on brand society is a revealing cultural studies view of branding. Following his position, my study aims at capturing those transformations leading to the re-invention of the Polish national identity into a brand.

PROPAGANDA AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

According to Combs and Nimmo (1993, p. 45) propaganda is an “indispensable form of communication” and is regarded as a “form of public discourse”. Indeed, my thesis recognizes propaganda as an integrative component between the political, cultural, and economical domains of political economy in Poland. Within this study, I do not consider propaganda in an instrumental manner. On the contrary, I stress a dynamic between relevant institutional actors, their understanding of communicative practices and signification of features that are considered as ‘national’. The bridging factor between nationalism, nation-building, and mediation of particular features of nationhood takes the form of various types of propaganda that, I argue, are subject to institutional re-invention. While nationalism scholars (Hobsbawm 1990) recognize ‘propaganda’ as one of the key aspects in national identities construction and
representation, communications scholars re-invent propaganda into various ‘specialisms’. Persuasive communication - an instrument for arousing emotional allegiances towards the state - has a long academic tradition. For example, Taithe and Thornton (1999), in their historical study, make an explicit connection between state-building, propaganda, and collective identity politics throughout Europe. Here, I focus on explanations that exceed the instrumental approach to understanding propaganda.

Bernays (1928) indicates that ‘invisible governments’ of persuasion aim to create ‘loyal enthusiasms’. Ellul’s (1973) seminal ‘Propaganda: the formation of men’s attitudes’ highlights the relationship between nationalism and propaganda. In his view, propaganda can be categorised into the political and sociological. The former propaganda type describes dissemination of ideologies intending manifestation of political acts whereas the latter is embedded in a sociological context: the established economic and political structures are the media for further ideological penetration. Furthermore, descriptive insights explaining the ability to influence social agency by means of propaganda have been proposed by Lasswell (1934, p. 13) in his definition of this form of persuasion: “propaganda in the broadest sense is the technique of influencing human action by the manipulation of representations” and “both advertising and publicity fall within the field of propaganda”.

Before nation branding emerged as a concept, the ‘soft version’ of propaganda (Moloney 2000), public relations, had also been identified as advantageous to nation-building. Taylor (2000) and Taylor and Kent (2006) discuss public relations and public diplomacy, aimed at domestic and foreign publics, as beneficial to enhancing national identities, particularly among the ‘transforming societies’. Drawing on Kruckeberg and Starck’s (1988) notion of relationship building, they suggest that public relations practice is a useful developmental tool in constructing national identities. They argue that in the context of the ‘Eastern Bloc’, “communication campaigns can help people during difficult times of social, economic, and identity transformations” (Taylor and Kent 2006, p. 335).
Corner’s (2007, p. 673) analysis of the intellectual development of modernist propaganda suggests that “the growth of a culture of political publicity within the context of a more widespread promotionalism in public and commercial life complicates our sense of what propaganda is”. His analysis sheds light on the complexity of communicative practices. While conceptualists consider nation branding as ‘anti-ideological’, propaganda scholars emphasise the link between ideology and propaganda as central to its analytical process (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999). Propaganda’s ‘soft version’, public relations, also requires consideration of its ideological values, principles, interests and purposes that are components of this communicative practice. In fact, Moloney (2006) describes them as ‘public relations ideological transmission’. The assumed ‘anti-ideological’ characteristics of nation branding, however, are presented in the conceptual literature on nation branding as a dialectical antithesis to ideological aspects of policy making and communication. Thus, discussion of the relationship of promotional culture; institutional settings for nation branding practice; the legitimization of its introduction, and analysis of key ‘messages’ describing Polishness are critical to the understanding of the ‘branded’ vision of Polish national identities that branders are struggling to advocate.

In summary, this chapter has presented structuralism and constructivism in nationalism studies as dominant schools of thought underpinning this thesis. Within this research, I extend our understanding of various forms of nationalism as an institutionalized form of practice (Brubaker 1996). Importantly, this thesis recognizes that the mass media and corporate enterprises are powerful actors involved in the mediatization of nationalism (Madianou 2005). Their global outreach and plurality of non-state actors accompanying the mediatization process, I argue, has the potential for re-invention of national identity features. Simultaneously, within this study, I recognize that nationalism involves a significant communicative component inherent to nation-building processes (Taylor and Kent 2006). This contextualization enables me to study nation branding as a new idea introduced into the local institutional
settings in Poland. The next chapter extends theoretical framework of this study by making Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology of practice as central to my investigation.
CHAPTER FOUR: SOCIAL THEORY AND NATIONALISM

WHY BOURDIEU?

This chapter outlines the theoretical underpinnings of my study as spelled out by the social theory of Pierre Bourdieu. It explains his notions of the field, habitus and explains Bourdieu’s understanding of the state, neo-liberalism and power. Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology is based on a relational dualism of social structures and subjective symbolic relations between agents and readily merges with the modernist and constructivist paradigms in nationalism studies. Why have I chosen Bourdieu since so many other theorists have discussed various forms of nationalism?

There are a few answers to this question. First, following Sztompka’s (1999) categorisation of duality in social theory inquiry, this study aims to analyse the strategies of agents that have introduced nation branding into public affairs in Poland. Its overall impact on the structure of the Polish nation is beyond the scope of this analysis as this thesis is concerned with the logic of the social space within which nation branding has been introduced and performed. Second, following the modernist paradigm of nation-building, I set out to explore the relationship between the ideology of nationalism and practice. Specifically, I merge Bourdieu’s understanding of neo-liberal power politics (Lane 2006) with his understanding of the political economy of practices and consider the state structures as a space where struggles for different types of capital are enacted.

Although Bourdieu’s greatest contribution to social theory lies in an explanation of the economy of practices, his research on ‘communicative practices’ is limited (Bourdieu 2005). What is more, Bourdieu has never taken up discussion of French national identity, or nation-building by any other state. While his oeuvre had been previously used to theorise nationalism (Brubaker 1996), the link between the existing scholarship on nationalism and Bourdieu’s work has resulted in the development of the social theory of nationalism and is characterised in the following way:
...most scholars in the field of nationalism agree that we are all constructivists. Thus, the question that needs to be asked is no longer whether but how nations are socially constructed. Indeed, the axiom of constructivism has reached a dominant position in this field even though some argue that essentialist arguments still exist in seemingly constructivist approaches (Helbling 2007, p. 23).

Moreover, contemporary media and marketing studies demonstrate that Bourdieu’s theories and concepts are much appreciated by scholars researching within these academic domains. In support of the Bourdieusian approach of this study, I summarise some of this research. For example, Marlière (1998) uses Bourdieu’s social theory to bridge the gap between the journalistic and political fields; Couldry (2003) discusses the mass media ownership as ‘meta-capital’; Mellor (2008) examines the symbolic labour of journalists as cultural intermediaries; Hesmondhalgh (2006) analyses the mass media as a field of cultural production. Bourdieu’s analytical concepts have also been applied in the context of mediated consumption (Friedland, Shah, Lee, Rademacher and Hove 2006) and analysis of symbolic goods (Couldry 2001). Bourdieu’s work has also found recognition among researchers of promotional culture: Edwards (2006; 2007; 2008) and Hodges (2007) have applied Bourdieu’s theories to public relations research; Cronin (2004) has used them in research on advertising practice. While the above areas of practice have been studies outside of the national building context, this study places it at its centre of its investigation.

As it stands, Kaneva (2007a) is the only researcher who used Bourdieu’s social theory to examine nation branding. Her pioneering study of nation branding in Bulgaria, however, neither explores the relationship between the dominant political economy in Bulgaria and previously institutionalised communicative practices nor addresses its links with overarching cultural settings in which nation branding was enacted. Therefore, her study does not explain the relationship between nation branding and propaganda. Kaneva’s (2007) study reveals discourses and practices of
nation branders in the Bulgarian context. This thesis aims to make an academic contribution by revealing specific discourses and practices of nation branders in the Polish settings. Finally, and most importantly, Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology enables us to distance the analysis from descriptive accounts which have emerged in the Polish academic field with reference to nation branding (Hereźniak 2011). Bourdieu calls for an empirical research whereby his “concepts only make sense when applied to practical research and the whole raison d’être of the approach is that they should be used in new projects” (Grenfell 2008, p. 247). Having identified a limited number of studies on nation branding, particularly exploring its enactment in Polish public affairs, it is anticipated that Bourdieu’s social theory proves fruitful in bridging the gap between my preconceptions, data collection, the analysis of the agency of actors involved in nation branding, and construction of Polish national identities.

**NEO-LIBERALISM AND FIELD OF POWER**

Prior to the explanation of Bourdieu’s concepts that this study draws on, I review his understanding of neo-liberalism. Essentially, nation branding argues for the competitiveness of nations, and this notion is central to neo-liberalism. To Bourdieu (2003), the efforts to apply neo-liberal solutions to the governance represent an attempt to impose a universal economic model that takes its roots in the political and cultural traditions of the US. He argues that within the global field of power, the UK has been acting as a ‘Trojan horse’, enabling the US neo-liberalism to penetrate Continental Europe. Neo-liberalism has resulted in the “insidious impositions representing a whole set of presuppositions imposed as self-evident” (ibid, p. 34-36). Therefore, it is important to understand “the mechanisms through which this neo-liberal ‘doxa’ is produced and imposed” (Bourdieu 1998, p. 34-36). Those impositions are based on ‘structural adjustment’ policies and represent the ‘global’ and ‘local’ dichotomy in a neo-liberal political economy (Bourdieu 2003).

Above all, neo-liberalism is an intellectual project, which according to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999), is reproduced and imposed within the setting of a particular
state by a narrow group of people, typically of centrist affiliations, gathered around think tanks that aim to develop policies, rooted in the language of econometrics. Neo-liberalism is therefore an ideology that

...heads and executives of industrial and financial multinationals of all nations intend to impose by relying on the political, diplomatic and military power of an imperial state gradually reduced to its functions of law enforcement in domestic and foreign theatres (Bourdieu 2001, p. 107-108).

This radical market agenda accompanies nation branding. Jansen (2008 p. 121-122) makes a connection between nation branding and neo-liberalism in the following way:

Some constituents of nation branding that contribute to the production of calculative space are: a) overt embrace of commercial language, practices, and assumptions, reflecting the post-Cold War ascent of the logic of ‘market fundamentalism’; b) formation of public-private partnerships to advance specific trade, industry or corporate interests along with national agendas, policies and ideologies; c) use of private contractors to determine the salient features of a nation’s identity, based upon what can be marketed to tourists, international investors, and potential trade partners; and d) reduction of the input of citizens to what can be measured by market research.

Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of society into fairly autonomous, but structurally homogenous fields of practice, consumption of various cultural and material recourses is interrelated with an overarching field of power. According to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) every field functions, and ought to be analysed, in relation to the ‘field of power’. Swartz (1997) notes two uses of this term in Bourdieu’s oeuvre: that explaining the ‘meta-field’ in which various struggles take place and that signifying the ‘dominant classes’. I merge those two explanations with Bourdieu, Wacquant and
Farage's (1994) understanding of the state as a contestation site and an arbiter for struggles among political or cultural elites. This ‘state-centric’ approach is consistent with Bourdieu et al.’s (1994) understanding of the state as an institutional holder of ‘meta-capital’ and power. The state can be divided into different sub-fields, and its analysis involves positions, beliefs, and strategies of agents in a specific sub-field (Swartz 2004). There are some conclusions that can be drawn from this statement that permit reconciling structuralist and constructivist views on nationalism.

The modernist thesis regarding nationalism as an elitist project emphasizes the state power over national identities construction (Geller 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). As mentioned, the state-centric view is aligned with the Bourdieusian view of the state. Bourdieu et al. (1994, p. 4) define the state as a space for “the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital: capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural or (better) informational capital, and symbolic capital”. In this approach, power of the state as a bureaucratic polity is manifested “in the realm of symbolic production that the grip of the state is felt most powerfully” (p. 2) and leads to effects of universality as the “symbolic dimension of the effect of the state” presented by “performative discourses” in a struggle for legitimacy and symbolic domination (p. 16). The imposition and reproduction of neoliberalism also takes place due to the state’s bureaucratic complicity. Above all, the neo-liberal state’s nation-building politics sets market competition as a primary feature of its relationship with a trans-national community (Harvey 2005).

Following Sztompka’s (1993) paradigmatic divide in social theories (system and field models) and supported by acknowledgement of this partition among nationalism scholars, this thesis falls into the field model of social change. Sztompka (1993)

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12 Bourdieu views on language and discourse are closely aligned with his ideas on symbolic power (see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 142). But most importantly, he understands exercising this power as inherent to symbolic exchanges whereby ‘performatives’ cannot be exclusively reduced to pure communicative exchanges of discursive messages. For him, the power of words to shape action exceeds the illocutionary function of language – it is a power that is exercised by a speaker via all aspects of delegation that is vested in him (Bourdieu 1991). See more explanation of the institutional discursive struggles on p. 60 of this thesis.
speaks of the ‘field image’: the underlying axiom of this perspective is the assumption that societies are dynamic entities. While stable elements (e.g. the state institutions) can be identified as in the system-model, ‘fields’ are endlessly subjected to changes determined by events and sequences of action. Consequently, I embed this research within the ‘field image’ of change and by uncovering social changes as mediated through nation branders, this study is an effort to reveal its dynamics in the field of national images management. With Kaneva (2007a), I take a similar analytical position. In her study of nation branding in Bulgaria, she identifies two meta-fields of nation branding: transnational and local. The first operates within a global field of power and refers to the practices of policy advisors, consultancies and transnational institutions that tout nation branding. The latter refers to practices and discourses of agents who have adopted nation branding as a model of national identities construction in their local settings. Whilst I recognise this relationship, the scope of my analysis is not equal: nation branding in Polish settings is central to this study.

**BOURDIEU: RELEVANT INFLUENCES**

This section outlines theories and concepts I specifically borrow from Bourdieu and offers a critique of the conceptual and analytical position developed in his meta-theory. Bourdieu has been intellectually influenced by Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. What unites the above theorists is a ‘principle of non-consciousness’: they seek explanations of social realities that are not reduced to perceptions, ideas, or intentions (Bourdieu, Chamberdon and Passeron 1991). Although Bourdieu’s understanding of change is embedded and performed within a homogeneous field, Bourdieu shares with Marx materialist roots of consciousness. Following Weber he joins efforts to elaborate on symbolic systems, and with Durkheim he works towards a method that goes beyond “everyday understanding of social life” (Swartz 1997, p. 46). Those three positions have influenced Bourdieu’s *praxeology* that is central to this study.
THE FIELD

‘Field’ is a fundamental analytical unit in Bourdieu’s oeuvre. It describes a space within which two other key categories of action and change are embedded - habitus and capital. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 97) define a field as

...a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in determinations they impose upon occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and the potential situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.).

Fields, consequently, denote particular areas of social agents’ production, circulation, and appropriation of goods, services, knowledge or status, and the comprehensive positions held by actors in their struggle to accumulate and monopolise different kinds of capital. According to Jenkins (2002, p. 85) the existence of a particular field creates a belief on the part of the participants in the legitimacy and value of the capital which is at stake as a result of the struggle within it. The interest in the field is produced by the same historical process that permitted its initial existence.

According to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), the concept of field links different forms of what is objective and subjective: it marks a relationship between social and cultural capital. Social actors, by virtue of their economic and cultural portfolio, have an objective position in the social space, and take positions within this structure based on subjective, relational, positions defined by habitual similarities of a specific ‘class’ (Crossley 2008). The field, as Bourdieu understands it, challenges the materialist reductionism where class relations are predominantly subjected to economic factors.
and access to the means of production. For Bourdieu, relationships between agents are more complex and culturally mediated within the structure of a particular field.

**ECONOMY OF PRACTICES**

Bourdieu’s meta-theory explains practice in terms of struggle over ideas, power and resources. His efforts concentrate on bridging structure and agency in their classical subjective-objective antimony. His endeavour to develop a general approach to theorizing ‘structure-agency’ leads him to the conceptualization of society into social spaces – semi-autonomous fields of practice and demonstrate an attempt to bridge *homo economicus* and *homo-sociologicus* views of action. Bourdieu (1977, p. 3) proposes “a science of dialectic relations between objective structures” revealing “subjective dispositions within these structures”.

For Bourdieu (1977) the notion of ‘strategy’ underpins the essence of practice. In his approach, agency is characterized by *uncertainty*. Implicitly, he indicates that outcomes of actions are seldom unambiguous to the social actors. Swartz (1997, p. 99) summarizes the strategy metaphor as a “maze of constraints and opportunities” determined by the responses of other actors over time. For Bourdieu (1977), strategies are ritualised, but whether the action conforms to rules of the ‘field game’ depends on ‘self-interest’. For Bourdieu, however, action cannot be exclusively understood as the intentional pursuit of material objectives (Grenfell 2008, p. 154-155). Neither, all action is conscious and is prone to ‘misrecognition’ (Bourdieu 1977). However, he considers actors as ‘practical strategists’ as they possess *habitus* that links them with the field. This analytical category is defined as
...a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adopted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them (Bourdieu 1990a, p. 53).

The concept of habitus marries readily with the notion of ‘class’ highlighted previously in the context of the nationalism analysis (Blum 2007). For Bourdieu, habitus remains in a dialectic relationship with field structures; those shape individuals’ internalised dispositions and, in turn, influence externalized actions that tend to reproduce the field’s objective structure. Bourdieu and Patterson (1977, p. 203) sum up this dialectical relationship as “circular relations that unite structures and practices; objective structures tend to produce structured subjective dispositions that produce structured actions which, in turn, tend to reproduced objective structures”. By implication, it permits legitimization of what is ‘taken-for-granted’ and accepted as doxa. Brubaker (1985, p. 770), in his introduction of Bourdieu to the English-speaking world, claims that habitus informs class relations whereby “class struggles are assimilated to sexual, generational, ethnic, and occupational struggles”. Indeed, Bourdieu (1991) argues that classes engage in a struggle over symbolic production, and various competing fields of symbolic reproduction struggle over the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence. In his approach “the field of symbolic production is a microcosm of the symbolic struggle between classes” (ibid, p. 168). Of particular interest in those struggles are discursive aspects of action as, according to Bourdieu, habitus illuminates class by language. Myles (1999, p. 889) explains institutional discursive performativity as integral to Bourdieuusian analysis in the following way:
...to succeed in discursive struggle is also paralleled by the institutionalization of their forms of discourse. But institution in Bourdieu's work, especially when he refers to language, is also to suggest rites of institution - the power to establish and protect classificatory boundaries or distinctions between groups. In this way Bourdieu views performativity as the outcome of the social structuring of the classificatory power of language...

Finally, the dialectics between field and habitus, or between objective structures and subjective dispositions (and predisposition, tendency, propensity or inclination) would not be possible without the aforementioned self-interest as well as material and symbolic profits. In his meta-theory, Bourdieu (1986) speaks of four types of capital – economic, cultural, social, and symbolic – that have extended economic rationality into explaining the culturalistic dimension of struggles. Within the field, different forms of capital not only classify benefits of practice, but are also a measure of distinction: they form a mechanism of ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusions’. Thus, Bourdieu conceptualizes action as an outcome of a relationship between habitus, capital, and field. Swartz (1997, p. 141-142) sums up Bourdieu’s praxeology and points out that “practices are not to be reduced to either habitus or the field, but grow out of the ‘interrelationships’ established at each point in time by the sets of relations represented by both”. The quality of those ‘interrelationships’ depends on symbolic power.

SYMBOLISM OF POWER RELATIONS

Bourdieu’s conceptualization of society into co-existing fields brings to mind the question about the possibility of social change and mechanisms of structuration that are central to this thesis. In order to bridge “the cognitive, communicative, and political systems” he introduces a theory of symbolic power aimed at combining both constructivist and structural aspects of the field (Swartz 1997, p. 83). Bourdieu (1977) supplements his understanding of practice with the notion of power that links
subjective and objectives features of social structures. To Bourdieu (1977), self-interested action engages economic benefits *vis-à-vis* symbolic pursuits. His neo-capitalist thinking goes beyond Marxist economic determinism and Althusserian interpellation. Bourdieu considers culture, which is “a system of symbolism and meaning” (Jenkins 2002, p. 104), as inherent to relationships between social actors. He terms culturalistic dynamics of those relationships as *symbolic violence*.

The structural properties of the field are attributed to all symbolic systems within which the symbolic instruments form a consensus of the social order. Bourdieu (1991) synthesises ‘structuring structures’ and ‘structured structures’ with means of ‘ideological domination’ whereby *knowledge* imposition is accompanied by discursive *means of communication* (Bourdieu 1991, p.165). For Bourdieu, inter-institutional settings are typical field contexts where symbolic violence is exercised by means of discursive markers in a struggle between classes. Myles (1999, p. 889) notes that for Bourdieu the institutional agency link with the notion of “performativity as the outcome of the social structuring of the classificatory power of language” creates misrecognition thanks to which the dominant class gains legitimacy. Swartz (1997, p. 43) extends this argument and says that, in principle, this process denotes the disinterest of their actions. Thus, symbolic violence, inherent to all social structures manifests itself in ideological and pedagogic action. Its essence has been described by Bourdieu and Passeron (1977, p. 4) in the following passage:

> *Every power to exert symbolic violence, i.e. every power which manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force, adds its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations.*

Implicitly, symbolic violence holds *worldmaking power* (Bourdieu 1987). The symbolic violence metaphor enables Bourdieu to consider culture as an outcome of structured structures, means of communication as structuring structures, and
ideologies as instruments of domination. It is through symbolic labour – that is performative acts of the field – that the symbolic aspects of power are exercised (Jenkins 2002). To Bourdieu, the dominant class imposes its culture by social action, which aims at internalization of “the dominant symbols of meanings” (Lin 2001, p. 14). Therefore, cultural capital has a bearing on the practice and reproduction of meanings. By the virtue of its function, language and discourses perform normalization in the process of subordination. Bourdieu (1991, p. 107) indicates that the power of language is extended from ‘symbolic exchanges’ and ‘informative content’, to the illocutionary function of language. He asserts:

The power of word is nothing more than the delegated power of the spokesperson, of his speech – that is, the substance of his discourse and inseparably, his way of speaking – is no more than a testimony, and among others, of the guarantee of delegation which is vested in him.

Finally, Bourdieu discusses ideology as an instrument of social domination and reproduction. The role that he assigns to ideology is that it “serves particular interests, which tends to be presented as universal, shared by the group as a whole” (ibid., p. 167). In this regard, Bourdieu considers ideologies as forms of symbolic power, which, depending on instrument of domination, define relations between agents. Drawing from the Weberian notion of ‘domestication of dominated’, he suggests that symbolic systems are politicised, ensuring that one class dominates the other, and by holding symbolic power it aims to ‘demystify’ those who are dominated. Bourdieu (p. 168) considers ideologies as means to legitimizing domination whereby agents’ engaged in
...a struggle either directly, in the symbolic conflicts of everyday life, or else by proxy, via the struggle between different specialists in symbolic production, a struggle over the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence, that is, the power to impose the arbitrary instruments of knowledge, and expression (taxonomies) of reality – but instruments whose arbitrary nature is not realized as such.

Bourdieu (ibid, p. 167) differentiates ‘ideology’ from ‘myth’ and explains that myth is a “collectively appropriate product” of ideologies.

CULTURAL INTERMEDIARIES AND POLAND

A specific class of agents - ‘cultural intermediaries’ - reproducing ideologies and constructing myths particularly related to the mass consumption has been introduced by Bourdieu in his work on taste-making. This term has been presented by Bourdieu in ‘Distinction’ to describe a ‘new petit bourgeoisie’ - that is a fraction of the middle-class which, in their professional fields, mediate cultural production and consumption. In a much cited passage, he reveals generic characteristics of this class in France:

The new petite bourgeoisie comes into its own in all the occupations involving presentation and representation (sales, marketing, advertising, public relations, fashion, decoration and so forth) and in all the institutions providing symbolic goods and services . . . and in cultural production and organization which have expanded considerably in recent years (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 359).

Given the different dynamics of the relationship between development and events forming modernism in the West and in Poland, I account for those differences by considering the ‘otherness’ mechanism in my study. The new petit bourgeoisie in
Poland tends to use the Soviet era to differentiate their own group identity. The prefix ‘new’, as a signifier of their collective identities, implies social mobility whereby cultural intermediaries are “travelling in the space and time” (Featherstone 1991, p. 91) as they acquired a specific type of ‘cultural valence’ (Kłoskowska 2001). Following Eyal et al. (2000), I recognise that in the post-Soviet societies cultural dispositions are more important to the social mobility than political or economic dispositions derived from the previous political era. In that respect, the new types of practical knowledge are crucial to understanding the concept of cultural intermediaries in the Polish society. This recognition suggests that cultural intermediaries in the post-Soviet context form their collective identity on the basis of distancing themselves or reinvent the socialist past – its aesthetics, heritage, political forms, etc. Thus, I argue that they form their habitus, partly, on the basis of Westernised socialisation. For them, consumption, experiences, careers, status, aspirations, or self-presentation have gained a quasi-political and cultural significance in a renegotiation of lifestyles between ‘Sovietised past’ and capitalist present.

Finally, the position of cultural intermediaries in the structures of Polish society leaves us with a question of their social standing. Although the relationships among the political elites in Poland were characterised by social relations based on a ranking system whereby various social groups gained importance to the field of power on the basis of clientelism (Eyan et al., 2000), the post-Soviet era has reinforced on the Polish society different qualities of relationships. In the settings of transforming social relations, cultural intermediaries’ struggle for various types of capital on the basis of which they aimed at gaining legitimacy within the reconfigured field of power. In that respect, cultural intermediaries had to appeal to various universal concepts – e.g. nation, civic society or God - in order validate their habitus and gain legitimacy by the Polish state and its field of power.
REFLECTION ON BOURDIEU’S SOCIAL THEORY

Although Bourdieu’s social theory constitutes a cornerstone for my analysis of nation branding in Poland, I recognise shortcomings to his meta-theory, particularly ideas within his *oeuvre* that I apply to my study. It is said that Bourdieu’s extensive theory and research, over the years, has led to criticism of his work in two major areas: his understanding of agency and the problem of field boundaries both of which are critical to this thesis. By highlighting ambiguities in his understanding of the state structures, I also consider shortcomings in Bourdieu’s analysis of the state. Simultaneously, I consider his existing responses to criticism and reflect on them.

Although the Polish state is central to my analysis of nation branding, I begin with pointing out criticisms regarding *praxeology* as they are crucial to my earlier arguments. Jenkins (2002) accuses Bourdieu for failing to sufficiently address the structure-agency problem. His over-determinism leads him to over-emphasise the role of habitus. Edwards (2007, p. 73) states that although Bourdieu explains strategising as enactment of trajectories of action within the field, the “structures cannot limit the choices that agents are able to make”. This argument has implications regarding our understanding of symbolic power and the principle of misrecognition as the field agents might reflect on the trajectories of their actions. According to his critics, Bourdieu over- emphasises the role of structure, over-estimates habitus as a mechanism of class reproduction and underestimates the role of social change whereby agents are reduced to the medium reproducing the structures (Swartz 1997). Therefore his research does not always address factors external to the field agency.

Another implication of this inadequacy concerns the class reproduction. This issue has been summarised by Brubaker (1985, p. 762) in his assessment of Bourdieu’s view on class. He comments:
...class and habitus, the twin linchpins of his metatheory, together explain anything and everything. Dispositions (the habitus) directly govern conduct, and because classes are defined as individuals sharing the same dispositions as well as the same external conditions of existence, class becomes the principle of intelligibility of all conduct, and sociology can take as its aim to ‘determine how class condition is able to structure the whole experience of social subjects’.

The broadness in interpretation of ‘class’ that, in Bourdieusian analysis, extended into occupational fields and raises questions about abilities of adopting new sediments into habitus. While on the one hand, this results in a static image of the field, Bourdieu does not account for the possibility of gaining new dispositions outside socialisation fields (Bourdieu 1990a). This assertion results in ambiguous accounts of dynamics of social change. In a critique of the habitus, King (2000, p. 417) claims that “much of what Bourdieu describes under the name of ‘practical theory’ and which he believes justifies the concept of the habitus is, in fact, quite radically incompatible with the habitus”. He, however, defends Bourdieu’s position and notes that

*While the habitus is inadequate to the explanation of social change and, in fact, presupposes the kind of interpretive virtuosity of ‘practical theory’, social change is intrinsic to Bourdieu’s ‘practical theory’. Bourdieu’s ‘practical theory’ insists social reality consists of the negotiation of social relations between individuals and can never be reduced to a static and timeless model. These relations can only be maintained by exchange* (King 2000, p. 428).

Bearing in mind this critique, the notion of exchange is at the centre of my interest.

Another dimension to the agency-structure problem has been articulated by Edwards (2007) who points out that language is also a source of inadequacy in
Bourdiesian social theory. While Bourdieu (1991) argues that the illocutionary function of language exerts symbolic power, he does not explicitly address reflexive or non-reflexive decisions regarding vocabulary choices. This is particularly significant in studies addressing communicative practices, and given that there are several models of national images management, the questions on the relationship between them and possibility of explaining the connections between them as part of the strategic choices made by actors are limiting in Bourdieu’s field theory. The dichotomy of the relationship between discourse and practice suggests that they can be considered as separate analytical entities. This analytical position might limit the analysis of social changes within a particular field. This issue occurs in Kaneva’s (2007a) study of nation branding where she analyses ‘the field of nation branding in Bulgaria’ and does not address its relationship to propaganda that has been a dominant term used publically by institutional actors in the Sovietised political fields.

Importantly, Bourdieu’s view on the state and its relationships with subordinate fields is central to this thesis. By talking about ‘the field of power’, Bourdieu implicitly considers ‘power’ as separate rather than inherent to symbolic violence exercised by the state. The ‘overarching’ characteristic of power does not address the micro-characteristics of power as inherent to practices that emerged, for example, in Foucauldian explanations of power as knowledge and practice. That aside, Swartz (2004) points out two key features in Bourdieu’s analysis of the state: while in his early writings Bourdieu et al. (1994) warns researchers against analysing the state without being aware of the categories of thinking imposed by the state (‘political doxa’), later he emphasises a predominantly ‘top-down’ aspect of symbolic violence wielded by the state (Bourdieu 1998). This perspective is a significant weakness as he does explicitly account for other trajectories of agency within the state structures.

Overall, Bourdieu accounts for the classifying power of the state (Bourdieu 1996) but he has not explicitly considered how different, state-centric or state-sponsored practices form categories of ‘vision and division’. The classifying feature of
the state brings ambiguity to his conceptualisation with regards to categorisations of the sub-field within the state structures. Although Bourdieu speaks of political and bureaucratic fields, his reflection on the typology of the modern state is not as far reaching as to consider a detailed analysis of its structures. In that regard, his conceptualisation of the state demonstrates the problem of the field interconnections (Grenfell 2008). Finally, although I have indicated how I intend to address the global versus local dichotomy, it is important to point out that Bourdieu has not explored this feature in his analysis of the state. Summing up, the Bourdieusian perspective on neoliberalism, the state and his concepts surrounding theory of practice are strong analytical tools for the exploration of nation branding. Mindful of conceptual issues in his social theory, I move on to explain the methodological underpinnings of study.
CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH AGENDA ON NATION BRANDING

OVERVIEW

The preceding part of the literature review discusses relevant models, research, and debates in the area of national images management. This chapter, however, explains the changing contexts for analysis of nation branding; it offers a rationale for studying nation branding in the Polish setting and spells out the aim of this study. Overall, the rationale for this research stems from Moloney’s (2007) call for in-depth examinations of the relationship between marketing and politics enacted outside the electoral process and the nation branding research agenda outlined by Kaneva (2011).

GROWING ANACRHY OR EXPANDING MARKETS?

While the collapse of the ‘Soviet bloc’ resulted in changing discourses about world politics and constructivism (Wendt 1996) which gained a prominence in studies of reputation of the state as an actor in the international system (Mercer 1996), scholars of international relations take nation branding for granted (Sherman 2007) and do not explain how nation branding emerges in different political settings. The system theory, ‘helicopter view’, neither offers insights into the institutionalisation of nation branding nor explains the interests of actors pursuing nation branding. Thus, there is still a requirement for basic questions and empirical insights aimed at understanding nation branding as a ‘communicative’ and ‘policy’ orientated practice.

Following the emergence of social theory inspired examinations of nation branding (Aronczyk 2007; Kaneva 2007b; Jansen 2008), the foregoing academic sources point out the influence of nation branding on rethinking nationalism as a political, cultural and ideological project engaging a specific set of practices. The review of the literature critically assesses the body of knowledge in the still infant area of nation branding research. By emphasizing the importance of ‘the nation’ as crucial to nation branding practice, the review has identified a conceptual difference between
nation branding and other elitist models of national images management - propaganda, public diplomacy or public relations. Finally, this section reveals limited research exploring nation branding in specific social settings (Kaneva 2007a).

While Aronczyk (2007) has analysed symbolic outputs of nation branding in Poland, her work does not consider its legitimacy and the institutional scope of its reproduction. Reflection on existing explanations of nation branding suggests the need for bridging a gap between largely conceptual assumptions of nation branding, and its practice in the field settings. By reviewing the literature, I have recognised the migration of nation branding across borders and I question the ‘universalising’ premises of economic development made by its conceptualists. Principally, this thesis sets out to explore nation branding in its socio-historical settings.

WHY STUDY NATION BRANDING IN POLAND?

The rationale for this research stems from two sets of arguments: intuitive and academic. The intuitive arguments have developed as a result of news media reports reading; exploration of online sources; and reading of professional, marketing and public relations magazines in Poland. At one point, the Polish nation branding programme was pompously described as “the biggest nation branding programme of all times” (Saffron 2007). Having had some interest in governments’ transnational communication, I intuitively assume that nation branding in Poland requires more in-depth interrogation. Although, in the light of my initial mass media exploration, it would be convenient to argue that I have selected Poland as a context for my study because this state has been undergoing a ‘branding exercise’ (Reed 2002) or, as professional marketing periodicals suggest, Poland needs ‘branding’ (Kiszluk 2010). While my initial readings left many questions open, the above sources directly stimulated my ‘academic curiosity’ to explore nation branders as a social movement shaping contemporary notions of Polishness. Apart from intuitive motivations, there is a set of academic arguments which have reinforced my interest in nation branding.
First, post-1989 Polish state identities have been redefined and democracy has been equated with a specific vision of neo-liberal market economy and considered as an intrinsic characteristic of the Polish state (Pachulaska 2005). The elementary evidence revealing the redefinition of the Polish state identities includes changes to political economy; redefinition of the role of state institutions; and decentralisation of the state bureaucracy (Horváth 1997). Moreover, the neo-liberalisation of the Polish state (Berend 2009) intensified the dynamics of ‘global’ and ‘local’ realms and accelerated dialectics of mediation of national identities. In fact, those changes are systemic demonstrations of renegotiation of the Polish state, whose elites conceived it as a ‘nation-state’, or as the state of the Polish nation; yet it is ‘incomplete’ or ‘unrealized’ in a variety of ways. In that respect, for the political elites the Polish state is considered as ‘the nationalizing state’ requiring nation-building (Brubaker 1996).

Second, the introduction of neo-liberalism in Poland has, partly, taken place as extension of other states’ ‘soft power’ political agendas (Ławniczak 2007). Some scholars argue that neo-liberalism has been introduced to Poland in two waves: via US-styled ‘shock therapy’ policies and through selective aspects of Europeanization (Shields 2008). From the outset, ‘shock therapy’ dominated the discourse on political economy in post-Soviet Poland, and, in consequence, the introduction of its policies has made an impact on social relations, construction of new markets and, by encouraging competitiveness, created an incubating milieu for the development of promotional culture (Werninck 1991). Simultaneously, within the Polish state structures, the notion of ‘transitology’ has resulted in changes marked by the replacement of the nomenklatura struggling with the inception of a consolidating technocratic class (Shields 2007, p. 172). This class of professionals has made a mark on the acceleration of promotional culture by introduction of promotional policies developed by the Polish state (Kiełdanowicz-Ryniejska 2007).
Third, re-ideologization of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is the next reason why it is worth exploring the nation branding in Poland. Following Szabos’ (1993) arguments concerning reframing of old ideologies in the post-Soviet bloc, I argue, that, to an extent, political economy changes in Poland have gained support thanks to ideologies of nationalism, religious ideologies and right-wing populism. Those, practised at different levels of social structures, had an impact on the formation of Polish political discourse after 1989 and constitute a fertile ground for emergence of other nationalisms. Bohle and Greskovits (2007, p. 453) point out that thanks to the strong sense of Polish ethnicity, the Polish state avoided ‘the task of nation-state building’. Nationalism, however, comes in diverse forms. While multiple Polish national identities narratives endure in ethnic form (Porter 2002; Zarycki 2004)\(^\text{13}\) and the development of liberal nationalism is well underway (Auer 2004), a modern version of economic nationalism as a ‘nationalising mechanism’ has been a weak dimension of changes in Poland (Pickle 2003). Questions about Polish national identities were particularly vocal after 1989 and before the Polish state accession to the EU in May 2004. On both occasions, the proponents of the integration with EU enunciated them as a ‘return to Europe’ (Wilkiewicz 2003). In fact, research demonstrates that historical interpretations of ‘national past’ have resulted in the re-emergence of a ‘Poland between the West and the East’ narrative. This notion of ‘between-ness’ was yet again articulated in the context of the Polish state’s accession to EU structures (Galbraith 2009) as a signifier of ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states.

Fourth, the post-1989 redefinition of the Polish state identities has led to the emergence of new institutional actors and intensification of communicative practices aimed at promoting the Polish state interests. Among them are the institutional actors empowered by the Polish state to project different versions of Polishness overseas.

\(^\text{13}\) Following this logic, it can be argued that other neighbouring nations played their role in the formation of national identities in Poland. Ethnic minorities, particularly the Jewish community, contributed to this process (Michlic 2006) and took forms of, what Rae (2002) refers to as ‘pathological homogenisation’ and was a feature of nation-building processes among many European states.
Traditionally, the state propaganda practice has been at the heart of advancing nationalisms (Hobsbawm 1990). The scholarly evidence suggests that genealogy of propaganda practice within the Polish state structures goes back to 1917 and coincides with the formation of its diplomatic service (Cull, Culbert and Welch 2004; Szczepanik 2005). Later, according to Ellul (1973), the Polish state’s propaganda belonged to the ‘socialist republics’ of Europe. For example, Dudek (2002) discusses overseas propaganda system of the Polish state and its institutional organisation between the years 1945-1950. Since 1989, the new political economy provided different settings for Polish government communication and its institutional capacity has expanded beyond the realms of diplomatic networks (Szondi 2009b). This way, the Polish state has moved into a multi-stakeholder approach to managing this field.

While there is some descriptive evidence assuming that the Polish state engages in nation branding (Szczepankiewicz 2006; Florek 2006; Znoykiewicz 2008), those works lack sufficient empirical insights as to what are the social forces driving nation branding in Poland. The empirical research (Kubacki and Skinner 2006), on the other hand, uses marketing terminologies to explain the relationship between traditional national identity symbols and communicating ‘the brand Poland’. Although they discuss the relationship between national identity and nation branding, their work *apriori* assumes the ‘nation brand’ as inherent to the Polish state and does not explicitly reveal what nation branding practice involves. Similarly, Johnson (2010) sets to analyse some selected outputs of nation branding in Poland. While he analyses one of the governmental advertising campaigns, his starting point is an assumption that advertising is an outcome of ‘nation branding’. Given that the state bureaucracies (e.g. Taylor 1999; L’Etang 2004) have long used advertising in their propaganda efforts, I started wondering, is it just academics using different discourses to explain the same practice? Is nation branding both professional and academic fashion? None of the above texts question nation branding. They take nation branding for granted.
RESEARCH AIM AND CONTRIBUTION

The above paragraphs demonstrate that nation branding has received attention of, not only Polish, but of many other nations. Its widespread suppositions assume a new dynamics in the relationship between the state and the nation. Stopford, Strange and Heney (1991, p. 1) argue that modern “states are now competing more for the means to create wealth within their territory than for power for more territory”. The era of ‘total wars’ has given way to ‘national competiveness’, and I argue, enabled the emergence of an ‘expansionist’, ‘universalizing’, ‘revisionist’ and ‘totalizing’ concept of branding into new social spaces. So far, it is clear that nation branding is under-researched and empirical works in this area include a few PhD studies (Dinnie 2005; Kaneva 2007a; Aronczyk 2009a) and subsequent works, the number of which explored nation branding in CEE in various national contexts (Dzenovska 2005; Bolin 2006; Aronczyk 2007; Baker 2008; Jansen 2008; Volcic 2008; Kaneva and Popescu 2011). The marketing perspective on nation branding, largely functionalist, has not yet offered an explanation of the implicit mechanisms of nation branding practice.

From a Polish citizen’s point of view, questions regarding national identity construction are relevant on academic and personal levels. Henceforth, the issues surrounding agency of nation branders calls for a necessity to explore the meanings they attribute to their practice as a projection of the vision and division in process of the Polish national identity make-over. The multi-faced characteristics of nation branding and lack of clear paradigmatic shift (in Kuhnian terms14) between models of ‘propaganda’; ‘public relations’; ‘public diplomacy’; and ‘nation branding’ in the academic field requires fundamental analysis concentrating on performative discourse in the field settings. Therefore, this thesis strives to contextualise this research problem by exploring the practice of nation branding in social, historical, and cultural settings. This approach should lend credence to the multidimensionality of the research.

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outcomes and by accomplishing this study I aim to contribute to the body of knowledge in the following areas: a) studies of post-Soviet Poland; b) overseas government communications in Poland; and c) nationalism studies. By exploring nation branding in Poland, it is my intention to reveal its role in the nation-building process and the consequences of its imposition within the Polish state.

To recapitulate, the above chapter has spelt out academic, pragmatic and intuitive arguments justifying this study as well as the research approach proposed for the analysis of nation branding in Poland. In principle, the key argument presented in this chapter suggests that there is a requirement to overcome a descriptive approach to nation branding in Poland and offer empirically-grounded insights into its practice. Therefore the conceptual framework outlined in this thesis aims to make conceptual features of this thesis alive and informed by multidimensional world-views of agents engaged in nation branding as a policy oriented communicative practice. The following chapter (six) explains how the conceptual features of my study aim to come ‘alive’ in methodological and analytical terms.
CHAPTER SIX: METHODOLOGY

OVERVIEW

This chapter outlines the methodological underpinnings for the research. It begins with an explanation of questions guiding the research and, consequently, it explains the research objectives. Subsequently, this section spells out the ontological and epistemological position of this thesis, spanning its theoretical framework, and explains the research design, and methods used to generate data. Moreover, it provides a rationale for a case study design, an explanation of the reasoning behind selecting separate methods, and data analysis procedures. Finally, it presents a self-reflection narrative; notes on the fieldwork in Poland, and reflection on the data collected.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES

Andrews (2003) indicates that questions tend to surface out of the literature. The desk stage of this research allowed me to develop the following research questions:

1. Who are the actors involved in nation branding in Poland?
2. How actors perform nation branding in Poland?
3. How has nation branding been institutionalised in Poland?
4. How do outputs of nation branding practice contribute to nation-building?

Following Grenfell’s (2008) view on Bourdieusian research, this study sets out:

1. To map out agents performing nation branding in Poland and establish their relationship to the field of power;
2. To analysis the habitus of nation branders in Poland;
3. To analyse discourses and practices of nation branders in Poland;
4. To explore the relationship between nation branding practice and reproduction of Polishness.
ONTOLOGY: TWO ORDERS OF ‘THE SOCIAL’

A departure point for ontological considerations of this thesis is the structure-agency relationship between the Polish state and a professional class of nation branders. The ontological positions of this thesis stem from modernist views of nationalism, Bourdieu’s praxeology, and cultural theory. As aforementioned, the agency in the setting of nation-building studies takes place on either macro, mezzo, or micro-levels. While Delanty and O’Mahony (2002, p. 101) explain structural-agentic ontology in nationalism studies, the links between those levels of analysis require specific insights. This thesis follows Bourdieu’s (1989a) ‘structuralist constructivism’ ontological position. His understanding of social reality is embedded in the notion of double structuring: social structures exist in the objectivity constituted by the material and non-material resources. However, structures also operate as subjective patterns driving the actions of social agents (Bourdieu and Waquant 1992). This notion of double structuring has been explained by Bourdieu (1989, p. 20) as:

The perception of the social world is the product of a double structuring: on the objective side, it is socially structured because the properties attributed to agents or institutions present themselves in combinations that have very unequal probabilities: just as feathered animals are more likely to have wings than furry animals, so the possessors of a sophisticated mastery of language are more likely to be found in a museum than those who do not have this mastery. On the subjective side, it is structured because the schemes of perception and appreciation, especially those inscribed in language itself, express the state of relations of symbolic power.

In research terms, this approach is referred to as praxeology: it starts off with mapping out objective structures, followed by analysis of lived experiences and understandings of the field actors (Everett 2002). Bourdieu (1989, p. 14) explains that structuralism and constructivism are complementary stances of the social world whereby:
By structuralism or structuralist, I mean that there exists, within the social world itself and not only within symbolic systems (language, myths, etc.) objective structures independent of the consciousness and will of agents, which are capable of guiding and constraining their practices and representations. By constructivism, I mean that there is a twofold social genesis, on the one hand of the schemes of perception, thought, and action, which are constitutive of what I call habitus, and on the other hand of social structures, and particularly of what I call fields and of groups, notably those we ordinarily call social classes.

There are, however, inconsistencies to those positions. The ontological problem that this thesis faces is a concern about dispositions of the field actors. Jenkins (2002, p. 94) notes that Bourdieu’s field often refers to institutions and individuals. This poses difficulties in establishing features of habitus characteristic to a particular social space. How do I attempt to overcome this inadequacy? With regards to this ontological matter, this thesis turns to Lin’s (2001, p. 38) theory of social action which has adopted the notion of networks. The social networks are in flux and the positions of occupants and resources are defined by rules and procedures. Lin says that it is an agreement, through persuasion rather than coercion which dictate actors’ relationships. This view enables merging of institutional field settings with establishing the habitus of individuals driving directions of the field practices. Lin (ibid., p. 38) asserts that “a particular network may evolve naturally or may be socially constructed for a particular shared focus or interest regarding a resource. However, in general, a social network might be constructed for multiple interests in its different segments – different interests link nodes in different parts of the network”.

Importantly for this study, in his ontology, Bourdieu attempts to distance himself from functionalist settings focused on consensus. In his view, double structuring
allows revealing connections and struggles between institutions, not only their internal structures (Swartz 1997). While this study considers the stable structural actors in the analysis of nationalism (Rokkan 1975), that is the Polish state, it aims at exploring social changes performed at the crossovers between its institutional structures, the field of mass media, and cultural intermediaries of nation branding. This ties with Bourdieu’s (1989a, p. 19) recognition that the world

...does not present itself as totally structured either, or as capable of imposing upon every perceiving subject the principles of its own construction. The social world may be uttered and constructed in different ways according to different principles of vision and division— for example, economic divisions and ethnic divisions. If it is true that, in advanced societies, economic and cultural factors have the greatest power of differentiation, the fact remains that the potency of economic and social differences is never so great that one cannot organize agents on the basis of other principles of division - ethnic, religious, or national ones.

The third strand that philosophically underpins this thesis is that of Critical Theory. The Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt inaugurated critical communications studies, cultural studies, and discussed ideological effects of popular culture. The Institute’s contribution to social theory is thought of as the “interpretative approach with pronounced interests in disputing social realities” (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, p. 144). Their modernist sensibility on Western societies has advanced from a critique of capitalism and the rise of totalitarian regimes in Europe. The legacy of the Frankfurt School offers a philosophical and political project which reveals the structural relationship between political economy and culture. For Adorno (1997), the bridging mechanism between structure and agency is that of ideology. In his interpretation, identity is the primal form of all ideologies. In Eagleton’s words (2007, p. 126) “ideology for Adorno is thus a form of ‘identity thinking’”.
Although the Frankfurt School scholars are considered as overtly theoretical, their ontology leads to several implications regarding interpretations of the social world. Its principles are based on critical hermeneutics and emancipatory interest in knowledge. According to Morrow (1994, p. 267), the work of critical theory “is open-ended and fallibilistic in ways quite distinct from the totalizing theoretical ‘system’” of Western philosophy. The Frankfurt School maintains a dialectical view of society, arguing for consideration of historical context for analysis. For that reason, Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) suggest that research based in a critical tradition reveals patterns of action in terms of negation of historically-grounded relationships. The Frankfurt School offers a cultural theory that transcends related disciplines, including studies on promotional culture (Wernick 1991). Kellner (1995, p. 30) comments on the Frankfurt School’s contribution to communication and cultural studies:

Their studies dissected the interconnection of culture in artefacts that reproduce the existing society, positively presenting social norms and practices, and legitimating the state capitalist organisation of society.

Summing up, this thesis shares the ontological position with the nationalism modernist paradigm in nationalism studies, Bourdieu’s praxeology, and The Frankfurt School’s cultural theory. It recognises that social structures are subject to changes (Sztompka 1993). Therefore, I do not take the view that there exists ‘a field of nation branding in Poland’ as a ‘crystallised structure’ of material and symbolic relations. Because nationalism scholars argue for finding interconnections between different levels of analysis, by following a constructivist objectivist worldview, this study explores culturally grounded, structural and agentic relationships at the crossover of mezzo and macro-levels of the Polish society.
Bourdiesian epistemological knowledge formation is echoed in the Anglo-Saxon academic world preoccupied with empiricism. According to Bourdieu, the critical epistemological underpinnings of the scientific practice are three ‘Rs’: research, relationism, and reflexivity (Maton 2003, italics added).

PRIMACY OF EMPIRICISM

Bourdieu’s worldview is embedded in empiricism. His position on knowledge formation has been summarised by Wacquant (1989, p. 44) as:

The proper object of social science, then, is neither individuals...nor groups as sets of concrete individuals, sharing a similar location in a social space, but the relation between two realizations of historical action, in bodies of (or biological individuals) and in things.

Bourdieu’s distrust towards metaphysical and descriptive accounts of social worlds features widely in his sociology of knowledge. Bourdieu’s oeuvre has left researchers with a meta-theory that can be applied to different research settings. His analytical categories - field, habitus, and capital - gain meaning, if they have been put into the context of empirical research (Swartz 1997). Moreover, empirical research should consider reflexivity, and analysis should be done afresh to find particular field mechanics. Therefore, social classes are argued to be empirical as they do not only exist ‘on paper’ (Bourdieu 1985; Bourdieu 1987). By implication, following Helbling (2007), I extend this position to nationhood reproduction: in the search to understand how and why nation branding has become an ideological discourse shaping actions of selected institutions in Poland, I attempt to join together Bourdieu’s concepts with the fieldwork generated evidence. Despite the primacy of empirical research in Bourdieu’s epistemology, he attempts to integrate structures and practice by distancing his model from ‘substantialism’, ‘realism’ and ‘spontaneous’ theories of knowledge. He does so
by bringing relational thinking and reflexivity into his epistemology. By doing so, he spells out his view on the relationship between the knower and known.

**RELATIONAL THINKING**

Bourdieu’s route to understanding the interdependency between objective and subjective features of ‘the social’ is primarily based on the relational positions taken by agents. This principle is thought of as “a major contribution of structuralism to social sciences” (Swartz 1997, p. 61). Relational thinking aims at breaking up epistemological monism. In the light of this principle, the relational mindset allows extraction of an object of inquiry from practical interests of everyday life (Bourdieu, Chamberdon and Passeron 1991). It is the relations between agents in the field that should be examined rather than the elements that constitute it. Therefore the objective structure is not as important as how agents stand in relation to each other. It is their relative positions that define the relations of power between them. These relations “make the reality of the social world” (Bourdieu and Waquant 1992, p. 230).

To avoid description of everyday relations between agents, the analysis of those relations must be done using tangible qualities (Bourdieu 1987). Put simply, to reveal ‘relations’ of agents in the field, Bourdieu’s epistemology attempts to overcome positivist, phenomenological or existentialist ‘philosophy of the subject’ approaches (Swartz 1997, p. 61). All research using relational thinking must be embedded in empirical reality rather than based on theoretical or methodological preferences. It is the social relations that drive the research rather than examination of the phenomena in isolation. Social relations are meaningless unless comprehensively investigated in a specific context (Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu 1990b). Therefore, Bourdieu allows methodological ‘laissez faire’ whereby research must be appropriate for the object of research rather than those favoured by a particular discipline. Only empirically grounded data should be used as a way of merging theoretical concepts with existing social settings. The choice of research options should include ‘all techniques that are
relevant and practically usable, given the definition of the object and the practical conditions of data collection’ (Bourdieu and Waquant 1992, p. 227). This toolkit, in consequence, facilitates the researcher’s *modus operandi* during the fieldwork.

**REFLEXIVITY**

The last epistemological feature in Bourdieu’s sociology of knowledge, and indeed the most important from the research objectification point of view, is the notion of reflexivity. Bourdieu’s reflexivity is underlaid by a view that, by investigating social reality, the researcher produces information that can contribute to the construction of reality. This distinction, between researcher and an academic inquiry process poses challenges and has implications for researchers as reflexivity should neither be “egocentric nor logocentric” (Ashmore 1989, p. 46). Given the symbolic feature of academic practice, researchers also have the ability to exercise power. If all symbolic systems, academic research included, embody power, is it possible to avoid exercising yet another form of symbolic violence? For Bourdieu and Waquant (1992), the answer to this dilemma lies in reflexive academic practice.

Bourdieu identifies three levels critical to reflexivity: the social position of the researcher (e.g. gender, ethnicity); her/his position in the academic field; and the intellectual bias that can blur the sociological gaze (ibid., 1992, p. 39). All of these areas can be a largely unconscious sources of bias. The reflexive practice implies self-awareness on the part of the researcher. While reflexivity requires incorporation into the research, epistemologically it aims at academic emancipation from influences of the social world under investigation. The researcher’s bias might be derived from: their status, field location, and the political component integral to every social science practice (Swartz 1997). Indeed, those factors also echo in the Bourdieusian epistemic position: as much as awareness of them is significant to self-reflexivity, it is suggested that bracketing, as a means to knowledge objectification, should be based on the sociologised idea of academic group reflexivity (Maton 2003, p. 58).
Therefore reflexivity aims to: become one step removed from one’s own preconceptions; become one step removed from the analytical determinism; and third, a step removed from the practice that is investigated. Fourth, the ‘outsider view’ requires understanding the difference between practical knowledge and a scholastic approach to knowledge. Thus, a scholastic mode of apprehending the social world converts practical knowledge into theoretical knowledge which is “conscious, systematic, and timeless” (Swartz 1997, p. 274). The reflexive stance aids conversion of the practical knowledge into reconstruction of ‘the social’. The lived experience of the research objects can then be reintegrated into the analysis without prejudice and in-depth understanding of the practical sense that drives their everyday lives (Jenkins 2002). Or to use a comparison, reflexivity is a way of enacting epistemological ‘bracketing’. Longino (1996), however, opposes this view. In her approach the idea of being separated from the object of study is untenable. Similar to Maton, she argues for collective reflexivity since “knowledge is constructed by individuals in interaction with one another in ways that modify their observation” (Longino 1996, p. 272). Mindful of these issues, the next section explains the practicalities of methods.

**SHAPING THE RESEARCH AND PILOT STUDY**

In order to present the research design, the pages following offer a brief explanation of how a pilot study contributed towards development of this thesis. Although, at that stage, I had done an initial review of my doctoral studies and a literature review was well underway, it was not entirely clear what I was investigating. As a graduate from an international relations degree, I knew how mediated politics impacts on the international reputation of a state (Mercer 1996). My literature review demonstrated the presence of varied communication-based models facilitating the political field. Throughout the research design phase, I often wondered if, in my area of research, communication scholars use different terminologies to analyse similar phenomena and this way enacted their habitus and pursued their interests. Or perhaps,
there are other interests at stake that I should consider? Simultaneously, I kept wondering what is the relationship between nation branding and Polishness?

Drawn to the notion of nation branding, I was trying to make connections between concepts and actors. At the design phase, this exercise was only intuitive. I also lacked clarity of what was new about nation branding. Frequently, I found myself asking, is this really a new approach to national identity construction? If so, how is it different from propaganda? I kept reflecting on why the Polish media were reporting on some overseas governmental campaigns using ‘business language’? How did that happen and who was responsible for it? The question I was asking myself was is nation branding tactical, or should I understand nation branding in strategic terms? The pilot study set out to clarify those concerns. Therefore, between February and April 2008, I conducted ten pilot interviews both in London and Warsaw (Tab.1., p. 327).

Given the importance of a global-local relationship in the process of national identity formation (Rusciano 1998; Rusciano 2003) and having identified global and local fields of nation branding (Kaneva 2007a), the pilot enabled me to narrow down the scope of this study. While the pilot stage permitted initial mapping out of the actors, it also had an impact on the selection of methods. It became obvious, that the complexity of institutional relationships renders participatory observation by an externally based researcher impossible. This method proved inefficient in the context of multifaceted institutional relationships as it was difficult to apply it to the dynamics of inter-institutional relationships. Moreover, while this study intended to survey the objective positions of agents with reference to types of capitals, this exercise has not been possible as gaining access to data had been refused. During the planning phase, I was refused permission to administer a survey by the actors or attempts were made to influence its design (Appendix 2, p. 334). The multi-correspondence analysis that Bourdieu used in his research had to be replaced with an alternative procedure to capture the positions of actors in the field.
Because of the obstacles to collecting qualitative data, the overall research design was reconsidered. Bourdieu’s empirical works combine qualitative and quantitative sets of data (Bourdieu 1993; Bourdieu 2005). In this thesis, however, this mixed-methods design (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004) has been replaced with a case study. Since this study is primarily concerned with nation branding in Poland, its exploratory approach aims to unfold the uniqueness of its *modus operandi*. Regardless of this change, this thesis aspires to be faithful to Bourdieusian ontology and epistemology. Therefore, this thesis departs from Bourdieu’s typical research design, but follows his methodological pluralism. This aside, this thesis is not concerned with a longitudinal design of Bourdieusian (1977) ethnographic studies. Henceforth, this research precludes the ambition of revealing every single factor shaping relationships between agents. In fact, researchers of media (Russell 2007) and public relations studies (Edwards 2007; Daymon and Hodges 2008) adopted Bourdieu to the local field circumstances. That said, the adjustment of the research design does not significantly impact on the aim of this study. Bearing in mind discrepancies between Bourdieu’s theories and his often used design, this chapter now moves on to present my approach to study nation branding in Poland.

As aforementioned, pilot interviews preceded the main part of the fieldwork. Over time, it became clear that the qualitative component of this thesis would be dominant. Hence, at that point, my study of nation branding became even more influenced by quantitative analysis. As far as the practicality of data collection is concerned, Noy (2009) suggests that public officials often prefer interviewing. Interviewing enables targeting specific individuals in the search for particular data. Indeed, the pilot proved this argument right. While preparing pilot interviews, it was not entirely clear what was the focus of this study. Further events added to my confusion. In April 2008, I attended ‘The Thought Leaders’ conference held at Birmingham University. To my surprise, its keynote speaker, who had been engaged in nation branding in Poland, shouted at me in informal conversation:
Nobody is branding Poland. Do you understand, nobody in Poland is branding Poland! (Michael, personal interview, 2008).

The above events were key motivations behind conducting pilot interviews to test my research questions and clarify the on-going tensions in my thinking. Although pilot studies are not always necessary, according to Daymon and Holloway (2002), many qualitative studies begin with unstructured interviews. They reduce the risk of making errors during the actual fieldwork. In fact, this argument corresponds with my further reflection on interrogation of nation branding. In the initial interviewing stage, I applied the snowball sampling technique: the intention was to follow a bottom-up approach to interviewing or what Goffman (1989) calls an ‘affiliation issue’ whereby making contacts with informants lets the researcher ascend the investigated field (Travers 2001). During the pilot study, sampling was not a primary concern as clarification of the object of study was of greater magnitude then procedural technicalities. While in the field, I identified ambiguities in my interview guide. Consequently, the interview protocol was amended for the main fieldwork.

RESEARCH DESIGN: REFLEXIVE CASE STUDY

This case study interrogates nation branding in Poland using an exploratory research design that aims to bring different categories of data to reconstruct the field. By definition, a case study is “an intensive examination, using multiple sources of evidence (qualitative, quantitative or both) of a single entity which is bounded by time and place” (Daymon and Holloway 2002, p. 105). Principally, a case study is concerned with the uniqueness of phenomena under investigation – that is nation branding in Poland. Specifically, qualitative case studies aim to reveal commonalities and differences within the investigated field (Denzin and Lincoln 2008). Sensitive to its features (Stouffer 1941), I consider practices understood as nation branding; the contexts of their enactment (e.g. historical, economic, political, legal, and aesthetic);
their physical setting; reflect on my findings in relation to other case studies; and involve the respondents through which the case of nation branding in Poland is known.

This outline of case study principles marries with Bourdieu’s epistemology. Bourdieu (1989b, p. 10) explicitly asserts his “absolute rejection to the sectarian rejection of this or that research method”. His methodological polytheism suggests however that method must correspond with the research problem and must be constantly reflected upon in actu. According to Bourdieu and Waquant (1992, p. 30), in reflexive sociology “one cannot dissociate the construction of the object from the instruments of construction of the object and their critique”. Therefore, this study follows Bourdieusian procedural principles summarised by Grenfell (2008, p. 220):

1. The construction of the research object;
2. A three-level approach to studying the field of the object of research;
3. Participant objectivation.

The first of the above points relates to relational thinking whilst engaged in exploration of nation banding in Poland; the second, includes procedural techniques to do with mapping out the field; its relationship with the field of power; and analysis of habitus. The third point involves consideration of reflexivity as central to reconstruction of the field dynamics. Done this way, the cross-examination of qualitative and quantitative data facilitates development of this case study. With this in mind, by exploring discourses and practices of nation branders in Poland, that is the strategies of institutional agents involved in the field, this thesis takes the form of a reflexive and exploratory case study. At this point one clarification ought to be made: I do not define a reflexive case after methodology theorists who tend to describe it as a way of theory testing or hypothesis testing (Yin 2009). My approach to nation branding is critical and reflexive as I do not take nation branding as a given.
This case study answers questions about the influence of nation branding on statehood and nationhood as this thesis searches to explore how corporate branding, rooted in promotional culture (Wernick 1991) merges with political agendas and competes with republican (Delanty and O’Mahony 2002), Catholic (Porter 2001) and other types of Polish national identities. Moreover, in this thesis, an ‘exploratory’ analogy (p. 114) refers to the research direction and its rationale (Yin 2009). Enthused by previous critical works on nation branding (Kaneva 2007a; Kaneva 2007b), I extend my investigation into new frontiers. Thus, I do not intend to develop a branding model. Neither, is this a study in macro-marketing. Instead, it is a reflexive study, in the sense that it asks questions regarding merging practices drawn from traditionally different fields. To clarify: this study does not set out to produce a ‘business case’ or ‘marketing case’, many of which exist in a functionalist approach to nation branding (Gilmore 2002; Dinnie 2008). In this study, I merge reflexive and critical epistemologies, structure-agentic ontologies with a case study design.

Principally, the case study design serves as the operational fieldwork and analytical structure. In the effort to explore the Polish case of nation branding, this thesis is underpinned with four main guiding principles. First, it is a single case as it is concerned with the uniqueness of the research settings – Poland as a site of engagement with nation branding. Second, it is a unique case in the sense that it is sui generis of only one setting. Third, by drawing from different data, it takes a multi-dimensional approach to design. Finally, because of the complexity of the social space it aims to explore, it adopts a latitudinal approach (Yin 2009). It explores material and symbolic relationships between agents engaged in nation branding in Poland.

As aforementioned, research feasibility has played its role in developing a research design. On the whole, the achievability aspect has reinforced undertaking of a case study design. Among academic reasons contributing towards adopting this research strategy is flexibility of a case study to combine theoretical frameworks and
variety of methodologies. While feasibility is crucial to accomplishment of this study, its design enables consideration of the world-lives of the informants. As with most case studies, I draw from triangulated sources of data (Denzin and Lincoln 2008). The complexity of case studies matches the epistemological assertions of the conceptual framework (Stake 2008). As it stands, exploratory case studies, aspire to distance themselves from preconceived notions. This largely ethnographic notion is emphasised by case study theorists (ibid. 2008) who point out the differences between building cases by searching particular types of data and considering versatile world lives. This design concern has been captured by Malinowski (1984, p. 9):

...preconceived ideas are pernicious in any scientific work, but foreshadowed problems are the main endowment of a scientific thinker, and these problems are first revealed to the observer by his theoretical studies.

Indeed, this was a mindset accompanying the design of this study and one that matches the Bourdieusian notion of reflexivity. It was intended to search for all types of perspectives on nation branding in Poland - accounts of those who agree with nation branding claims and those who express resistance to it.

**DATA GENERATION: OVERVIEW**

Three data sources were used to meet the research objectives of this study: documents, interviews, and field notes. By applying triangulation, I aimed at a more in-depth understanding of nation branding in Poland (Denzin and Lincoln 2008). This section outlines how this data was generated and how methods facilitating the data collection were operationalized during the fieldwork. Later, I explain procedures applied for their analysis in an attempt to integrate the gap between the conceptual framework of this study and its research objectives.
DOCUMENT COLLECTION

While methodologists (Bryman 2004) assert that documents contain a great deal of information of potential significance to empirical studies, Bourdieu (2005) used this source of data to explore ‘The social structures of the economy’. Similarly, the first stage of my fieldwork was based on document searches. Those were retrieved by ‘Google.pl’ searches or by scanning the actors’ institutional websites; behest by email or during the fieldtrips. I attach a copy of the request letter in Appendix 3, p. 334. Principally, therefore, I collected documents enabling me to unfold the perpetuation of nation branding in ‘time and space’. The texts that I considered as relevant included the phrase ‘nation branding’ or ‘nation brand’ or its equivalents in Polish (‘marka narodowa’). Overall, the documents assembled offered insights into the Polish state policy; they revealed actors behind their development, disclosed large portions of the contextual data, and revealed progress in ‘implementation’ of nation branding. Upon completion of this task, documents collected were scanned in accordance with Scott’s (1990) quality criteria and categorised as per genre as part of my discourse archive:

1. **Polish state documents**: policy documents; mission statements of the field actors; policy speeches; parliamentary questions; financial reports; evaluation and assessment reports; public bidding notices; press releases, campaign features.

2. **Corporate documents**: consultancy reports; policy proposals; relevant websites; reports and professional research on the state of the industry; press releases; professional presentations; conference materials; projects documentation.

3. **Additional documents**: research reports; biographical notes.

The list of documents analysed in this thesis is enclosed in Appendix 4 (p. 335). Documents were clustered by their relevance and categories (e.g. policy type; political agenda; policy directions; historical background; practices; national identity features).
 Principally, documents facilitated informing research objectives 3 and 4 (p. 80). The exegesis-based procedure was applied to explore the following aspects of nation branding: identification of the key institutional agents in the field; indication of their institutional tasks; understanding the emergence of nation branding; establishing connections with the field of power; outlining ‘structuring structures’ and ‘structured structures’; and analysing the relationship between nation branding and policies accommodating this practice. Governmental and non-governmental documents were largely used as a source of data enabling contextualisation of nation branding. Moreover, document facilitated cross-examination of data and status of actors identified during the pilot study and other objects involved in nation branding. Finally, this set of data enabled me to capture economic capital. This set of data includes mapping out the field based on cross-examination of capital types derived from document and interview data. In this study, this is a contextual procedural exercise.

**INTERVIEWS AND FIELD NOTES**

The second set of data aims primarily at establishing symbolic relationships between agents in the field; their habitus; legitimization and understanding of nation branding. Formally speaking, I used this set of data to inform objectives 1 and 2 (p. 75). This information was obtained by a set of semi-structured interviews conducted in Warsaw and London between June and September 2009 and between March and April 2010. In order to fix the interviews, participants were approached via email or phone. Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim (Appendix 5, p. 343). Some excerpts cited in this thesis were translated from Polish to English whereby I attempted to present their meanings closer to the ‘targeted language’ (Malmkjær and Windle 2011). With regards to the Polish state field actors, I yet again follow the ‘affiliation issue’ and targeted, in the first instance, press officers (as by Polish law they are the institutional ‘voice’), and later, middle or senior management. In case of the private sector actors, I strived to gain direct access to key players. Tables 1 (p. 327) and 2 (p. 328-330) contain a full list of participants.
During this part of fieldwork, reflexivity was exercised in relation to principles and subterfuges outlined in Bourdieu’s ‘The weight of the world’. From this exclusively qualitative study, I adopted the ‘non-violent communication’ principle, attempting, where possible, to minimise intrusion in the flow of exchange. Not only was I interested in the accounts produced by informants, but attention was given to the interview situation, and additional cultural clues. Thus the contexts of interviews enabled me to gain insights about my participants. Following Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009), attention was paid to conscious efforts to view nation branding from different perspectives, avoiding *a priori* assumption and vocabularies. This study applied semi-structured interviews in an effort to uncover the purposes of nation branding and events in the field. The interviews were fixed with the key players forming a social network within the institutional field. The targeted actors either developed the vision of nation branding field in Poland or designed individual projects. The interview questions were aimed at revealing the discourses of agents involved in nation branding, their intentions, commitment to nation branding, interests, and specific practices. Most importantly, the interviews enabled me to establish qualities of relationships between agents. The relations disclose associations between the field agents (Silverman 2006).

Furthermore, interviews were used to comprehend habitus. According to Maton (2008, p. 52), habitus “captures how we carry within us our history, how we bring this history into the present circumstances, and how we then make choices, to act in certain ways not the others”. Previously, researchers (Weinwright, Williams and Turner 2006) used interviews to explore types of habitus. By implication, this method, combined with additional information retrieved from secondary sources, was used to disclose the dispositions of the field agents. Moreover, interviews were used to reveal informants’ ‘practical knowledge’ of nation branding and to account for their reflexivity. Predominantly, interview questions related to professional expertise and included their education background, religious orientation, social status, ethnicity and nationality.
Gender was also considered as a feature shaping the field dynamics. The interviews took place during three fieldtrips – 25 July until 19 September 2009; 7 April 2010 until 25 April 2010, and 20 July 2010 till 3 August 2010.

Overall, interviews in this study generated data facilitating understanding of: a) nation branding practice and events accompanying its development; b) types of habitus; c) and reported meanings which shaped relations between the field actors. Following Huberman and Miles’s (1994) strategies for interview analysis, meanings retrieved from transcripts and digital recordings enabled me to connect with the field network and discover features shaping the relationships between actors. While doing the transcripts (sample attached on p. 343), I reflected on this process as I realised that I was becoming more distant from the complexities of the field. In that I was not alone: Bourdieu (1999, p. 612) himself criticises transcription for limiting researchers as the written word does not allow to capture the rhythm of the interviews and blurs connections between multiplicity of statements. Although this procedure is inconsistent with the process suggested by methodology scholars (Silverman 2006), by listening to digitally recorded interviews, making notes, and summarising key themes and statements, I was able to better engage with digital data than transcribed data. Moreover, the interview data was facilitated with the field notes. Those enabled me to provide additional clues about participants, their surroundings, and interviews setting as well as proving fruitful in terms of recording their observed tastes.

RECRUITING PARTICIPANTS: THE ‘NETWORK’ WITHIN THE FIELD

For the purpose of generating interview data I applied a snowballing technique to recruit participants to my study. This procedure has been defined by Bryman (2004, p. 100) as a process whereby “a researcher makes a contact with a small group of people who are relevant to the research topic and then uses them to establish contacts with others”. Indeed, the field testing stage led to the recognition of organisations engaged in nation branding discourse from which interview informants were identified.
Initially, I made contact with a few brand consultancies and think tanks. From there, I followed personal recommendations as well as other agents emerging from the documents’ initial scanning. The interview criteria were based on decision-making capabilities; participation in policy formulation; engagement in consultancy; research; and involvement in creative aspects of nation branding practice.

**DISCOURSE ANALYSIS**

Bourdieu (1991, p. 78) considers language as a dynamic feature of practice and, for him, “discourses are always to some extent *euphemisms* inspired by the concern to ‘speak well’, to ‘speak properly’, to produce the products that respond to the demands of certain markets”. In that respect, language is referential - it is socially constructed and constructing - and corresponds with class habitus (Myles 1999). Discourse is a way by means of which ‘speakers’ express dispositions significant to understanding their worldviews, actions and relationships with ‘the other’ field players. Although Bourdieu recognises the importance of language to the field mechanisms, he does not explicitly provide prescriptive advice as to how operationalize the analysis of data. Therefore, I reached out for the already existing explanations of discourse analysis provided by social theorists. As far as the examination of my ‘archive’ is concerned, I applied Foucault-inspired discourse analysis to interpret the data in an iterative way. In fact, scholars of sociolinguistics had previously explored nation branding by means of discourse analysis (De Michelis 2008), but I apply a Foucauldian approach to reconstruct the field. Although the objective structure is crucial to the field analysis, in my study, I did not want to lose track of the relational principle that is at the heart of the epistemology accompanying this study. Furthermore, it is the subjective relations between the agents that engender social change in which I am interested.

Methodologically, ‘problem-orientated’ discourse analysis enables consideration of contextual features. Discourse is considered as “an institutional way of talking that regulates and reinforces actions and thereby exerts power” (Link 1983, p. 60).
Discourse can be used to study social action and scholars differentiate between ‘practice in discourse’ and ‘discourse in practice’ (Holstein and Gubrium 2008) accounting for some reflexivity among the actors in the structures. But discourse analysis can facilitate understanding of outputs of social action. For example, Galasińska and Krzyżanowski (2009) apply critical discourse analysis (CDA), to the analysis of the political field in order to unfold transformations in the Polish national identities. As my study problematizes social change and considers the notions of ideology and power, Foucaudian analysis is intellectually closer to this study. In the analytical process, I have considered the features of discourse not merely as ‘textual’ or ‘oral’ representations of practice (van Leeuwen 2008). In order to address ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of nation branding, in the analysis process, I remained conscious of contextual features of discourse. To maintain critical analysis, I considered Foucauldian discourse analysis principles as outlined by Hook (2005), particularly:

1. The role of history in contextualisation of discourse;
2. Discourse-as-knowledge conditioning the statements emerging;
3. Discourse as material connected immediately to textual elements.

Myles (1999, p. 886) reveals that Bourdieusian analysis of language aims at capturing structural differences that “...are not simply to be discovered, counted, and categorized (as in sociolinguistics) but signify fluctuating “battle-lines” or the “stand-off” positions in discursive struggles”. With this in mind, my analysis focuses on making connections between legitimizations of nation branding, performative speech acts, and subjective relationships between actors in the field (McNay 2002). For that reason, policy documents and professional accounts of the field agents enable me to capture ‘performative discourse’ (Bourdieu 1991; Lane 2006) on nation branding as dynamic, flux, and changeable. Having outlined conceptual principles of discourse analysis, I draw from other methodologists’ work that puts this type of analysis into practice. In order to reconstruct the field dynamics, I follow discourse analysis...
methodological procedures put forward by Burchell, Gordon, and Miller (1991) so that I can clarify the areas of discourse that Foucault defines as central to understanding the relationship between power/ knowledge. They are:

1. The limits and forms of sayable – elements of discourse revealing what it is possible to speak of and what is the domain of discourse;
2. The limits and forms of conversation – consideration for elements of discourse retained by actors over time, and reasoning behind it;
3. Discursive memory – consideration for utterances and statements regarded as valid, debatable, and invalid;
4. Limits and forms of reactivation – consideration for elements of discourse reconstituted and transformed over time;
5. Limits and forms of appropriation – consideration for access to discourse and the role institutions play in formalising the relations between discourses, speakers and audiences; How does the ownership of a discourse determine struggle between actors?

Parker (1994) uses Foucauldian discourse analysis to illustrate the strength of social assumptions in every day texts that are doxic. In his view, discourse analysis should reveal the identities presented in an ‘archive’, and the links between them and the themes underpinning these identities. As important during the analytic process is to examine alternatives modes of expression that are not used, or search for unspoken aspects of discourse, in a process of ‘free association’. Finally, the source of the text and the audience for it are critical to understanding subsequent versions of truths and power relations that are normatively defined and presented in the collected archive.
RESEARCH ETHICS

Voluntary participation and protection of informants from harm are two aspects of research on people (Bryman 2004). This research follows Bournemouth University’s (2009) research ethics guidelines. With regards to voluntary participation, solicitation emails were distributed among prospective informants and followed by the phone or Skype conversation before the interviews. During the fieldwork, the purpose of this research was explicitly explained at the start of my interviews: participants were informed of the research procedures; anticipated benefits from participation; and their rights to ask questions or withdraw from participation or refuse to answer certain questions. As a benefit from participation, I offered each participant a summary of the findings. While some participants explicitly asked to remain anonymous, to protect all of them from potential risks (e.g. threat to their job), I have kept separate the names of informants in presenting the findings in this study. This was also done for consistency reasons. To anonymize my participants, I either refer to them by false names or by the role they act within the field. Thus, in this study, their identities remain confidential. I am, however, ready to give examiners fuller profiles of participants if this is needed to further establish authenticity.

LIMITATIONS

As with every research, this study has also its limitations. If this case is to be assessed against its generalisability and universality, its design precludes any ambition of forming ‘context-independent’ knowledge. Because this case study uses a largely interpretive approach in the reconstruction of the dynamics of nation branding as a socially constructed performative discourse, it uses historical contextualisation as well as culturally grounded sources for analysis. Thus it is less concerned with forming universalising statements about applicability of nation branding into other national settings. On the contrary, it aims to use multiple-source data sets to capture the socially conditioned settings which this case study explores. While I was mindful of all quality assessment criteria outlined by Yin (2003), I was primarily concerned with assuring
construct validity and internal validity. From my analytical process, I have consciously excluded the procedure of getting feedback from the key field actors as some of them explicitly attempted to shape the directions of this thesis. This, in my view, would introduce an unnecessary source of bias. I can, however, reassure readers that the language used to report my findings about participants’ insights remains faithful to the language they used.

Because socio-historical analysis is primarily concerned with the conditions of agents in the field, it is the researcher’s responsibility to interpret those conditions. Reflexive research includes two key elements: careful interpretation of data and reflection. The first implies interpretation of data and anything outside of data remains in an equivocal relationship to the object of analysis. Interpretation is at the forefront of this research. The second element, reflection, concentrates on the researcher, his/her relationship with the society and a broader academic community and their assessment of their own work; it can be defined as interpretation of interpretation. In Bourdieu’s (2000) view, research biases are the result of the position of the researcher in the social space and the orthodoxies of the field. Those issues transcended my position as a researcher as the reflexive research is not free from “power effects”, including “domination, silencing, objectification, and normalization” (Burawoy 1998, p. 4). Having been exposed to orthodoxies of the field, I realise that while all my efforts were to ground the findings in the data archive, its analysis remains subjective.

In his outline of reflexive case studies, Burawoy (1998, p. 11) comments that “history is not a laboratory experiment that can be replicated again and again under the same conditions”. Therefore issues of replicability are also of minor consideration in this study. In order to safeguard the quality of this study, I explicitly report which multi-source data I have drawn from; I explicitly present the procedures and cross-examination patterns of its analysis as well as report and reflect on shortcomings in the data sets. The last issue is particularly sensitive: it primarily concerns sources of information revealing ‘private’ relationships between key actors in the field. I was not
offered all materials contributing to the formation of subjective relationships between them (e.g. report of meetings between private and public actors). As contemporary performative politics is conducted by emails or by phone, those symbolic exchanges have the potential to shape the dynamics of the field. In that respect, lack of evidence accompanying those exchanges is a limitation of this study. Another limitation is the physical location issue - had I been engaged in institutional ethnographic research, the data set of this study would have been different. Nevertheless, this case study strives to remain idiographic; to elucidate the uniqueness of nation branding in Poland. I reflect on the missing relationships in the field in the last section of the analysis chapter.

Finally, I would like to stress that this study does not aspire to make generalising statements about nation branding as a socio-political phenomenon. It is therefore neither a universal critique of nation branding nor an attempt to capture all politicised relationships in the field. This study aims at revealing institutional connections leading to the emergence of the idea of the nation brand or nation branding within the Polish field of power in the setting of the dominant, neo-liberal political economy. In the worst case, this study can be considered as a descriptive account of nation branding as a means of national identity construction in Poland. At best, it is the first exploratory, analytical insight into changes to the dynamics of the Polish field of power driven by new entrants - nation branders - struggling to make an impact on public policy making. Either way, the analysis offers exploratory insights into nation branding as a type of knowledge, the imposition and invasion of which bears ideological consequences for the reinvention of nationhood. Below, I present a self-awareness narrative to reflect on my relationship with the object of this study.
ENACTING REFLEXIVITY: ACADEMIC ‘CONFESSION’

Following principles of reflexive sociology, this section offers an ‘academic confession’ regarding the research process. Primarily, it follows Bourdieu’s (1992) epistemology concerning research reflexivity, but it is also informed by other methodologists working within this social theory tradition (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009). This statement serves two purposes: it is designed as a self-awareness exercise and as clarification of how biases and preconceptions were ‘bracketed’ from the research process. To reduce the analytical bias, reflective components are spelled out in the next chapters as an additional narrative explaining my position vis-à-vis knowledge formation.

According to Marton (2003) autobiographical reflection requires an explanation of interest in the particular research. Although my initial proposal aimed at exploring Poland’s overseas propaganda, the emergence of nation branding in Poland drew my notice to this concept. Previously, my interest in government and corporate communications had been shaped by reading Polish academics’ works as a MA student. I quickly realised that majority of those texts are based on ‘imported’ Western models, lacked empirical insights, and were exceedingly descriptive. Initially, my aim was to merge international relations studies with research on Polish government overseas communication. Throughout the desk stage research, however, I discovered that there is a need to ask fundamental questions about relationships between the Polish state and nation branders.

I begin this self-awareness narrative with identifying existing preconceptions regarding the subject that I investigated. Having established that nation branding writers advocate neo-liberal agendas (Bolin and Ståhlberg 2010) and marketization of national identity, I would like to highlight here that I am against neo-liberal marketization of every aspect of public policy or field. I am, however, in favour of modern economic nationalism. While this thesis attempts to reveal the construction of
national identity, indirectly this research is a personal quest to understand changes to my own national identity. While the Polish technocratic class (Hardy and Clark 2005) and their policies of ‘capitalism without a human face’ contributed to the biggest wave of migration from Poland, nation branding conceptualists imply that, myself as an expatriate, should be a ‘brand ambassador’. I was intrigued by this redefinition of my relationship with the Polish state. I was keen to better understand what narrative of Polishness I should present to the world and assess whether I agree with it or not.

As far as my political worldview is concerned, I define myself as a political liberal; social-democrat with regards to economics issues; and conservative as far as social matters are concerned. Like Bourdieu, I was educated and brought up in a republican spirit where history and tradition played a greater role in the formation of national identities than a business ethos. Unlike Bourdieu, however, I grew up in a state dominated by an authoritarian regime. I belong to the generation of Poles which has experienced systemic social changes. However, throughout my schooling (1994-1998), I was neither subjected to business classes nor marketing courses. On the contrary, within my social networks, marketing practice, at the time of my education was considered as shallow and marketing careers as second-rate. When I entered the University of Wrocław, it was clear that the rising popularity of marketing in the Polish academia was a sign of advancing neo-liberal hegemony in Poland.

The social class also plays a role in this research. Schwartzmantel (2006, p. 250) notes how socialist versions of nationalism were embedded in national cultures. After the Second World War, the Polish state favoured ‘socialist nationalism’. Indeed, my parents adopted certain aspects of ‘socialist living’ (e.g. popular culture, aesthetics) but within my family network the imposition of neo-liberalism and re-introduction of democracy in Poland triggered new reflection on Polishness. Capitalism allowed me social mobility, but this has happened at a cost. My sedimented class legacy merges with certain pre-understandings of Polishness, including: political history of Poles, Catholic beliefs, republicanism, and traditionalism. Regardless of those and other
cultural bonds with Poland, I decided to reject the Polish capitalism and in 2003 I settled in England. In my experience, the English version of ‘professionalising’ neoliberalism stimulated my reflection on this version of globalising political economy. While I declare Polish roots, my residency in England has lead to renegotiation of my national identity; it has opened up new avenues of thinking about the contemporary Poland. Moreover, my residency in England also developed a sense of resistance against the reification of collective identities that has been reinforced by Thatcherism. The exposure to ‘English living’ has put my relationship with Poland into a new perspective thanks to which I better understand the Westernisation of Poland.

Importantly to this study, my academic habitus has been predominantly formed by my parents, teachers at the K.K. Baczyński High School in Wrocław, Wrocław University, and my professional life at Bournemouth University and the Sorbonne, Paris. Formally speaking, I am at the beginning of my academic career. In my practice, I aspire to take a reflective view on corporate communications and consider its socio-political contexts and ideological features. Likewise, this research does not serve any political agenda; it has neither been financed by any government nor interest group. Its direction has been shaped by a motivation to develop my research and analytical skills.

At this point, my relationship with the supervisory team requires considerations as reflexivity “constantly assesses the relationship between ‘knowledge’ and the ways of ‘doing knowledge’” (Calás and Smirchich 1992, p. 240). The team has the ability to exercise their ‘pedagogic power’. Indeed, the team has made an indelible mark on the shape of this thesis, but their guidance was Socratic in approach. They did not imply either selection of a theoretical framework or methodological approach. In my view, their work predominantly concentrated on the discussion of concepts guiding this research. I perceive their supervisory philosophy as based on critical debates rather than prescriptive advice. The supervisory team has placed an emphasis on critical thinking, balancing arguments and eliminating preconceptions. Put simply, the team reassured the intellectual development of this study via questioning. Their power over
my thinking focused on rigorous and coherent analysis and delivery of arguments. Throughout the study, there was no explicit conflict of interests among supervisors.

Against this background, I hope to understand nation branding in Poland through the world lives of its agents. During my fieldwork, I attempted to reduce the researcher bias by bracketing out my preconceptions and my ‘images of Polishness’. Among the strategies that I applied during the fieldwork were field notes, in which I attempted to make connections between different types of data and my participants. I strived to understand their social setting; my field notes recorded narratives of self-reflection and further clarifications. Those notes have been included in my analysis section.

DOING RESEARCH IN POLAND

Every study poses methodological challenges. In their Bourdieusian study, Eyal et al. (2000) note that their fieldwork in Poland and other CEE states, resembled ‘detective investigation’ rather than sociological inquiry. Indeed, I reflect on three similar issues that I have encountered during my fieldwork: limited trust, data access, and attempts to influence the shape of the study. I reflect on them one-by-one.

First, the notion of distrust has been prominent feature of my fieldwork. In 1996 Sztompka characterised the Polish society as penetrated by a ‘culture of distrust’. While this feature of the Polish society might be deemed dated, the grasp of it was revealed in interaction with some field agents. During my three months fieldwork in Poland, it occurred to me that informants who lived the majority of their lives during the Sovietised era were more distant and explicitly defensive. Initially, my Western location facilitated fixing the interviews. It is only in the face- to-face situations when some participants expressed uncertainty or they explicitly accused me of having a ‘thesis in my mind’ that allegedly I was trying to prove as a result of my questioning. Some of my informants were genuinely amazed that I bothered with all those interviews. To gain the participants’ trust I took a proactive stance: if required, I offered explanations exceeding basic introductory statements; I offered explanations
that my interviews were not a knowledge test. On a few occasions, I was made to feel that I was interrogating a terrorist plot, not the process of nation-building.

The data access was second issue that I encountered during the fieldwork. Although the Freedom of Information Act (2001) in Poland talks about access to public information in Poland, its reinforcement by the Polish state was rather loose. Very quickly, I realised that it was one of the ways that the Polish state attempts to exercise symbolic violence. As aforementioned, I was not allowed to survey some actors. While the Act has no bearing on surveys in public institutions, the access to public policy information is crucial to exercising citizens’ rights in a democratic society. Although interviews allowed building rapport with participants and offered an opportunity to request documents that I had not been aware of before data collection, I was not granted access to all of them. When I requested a piece of consultancy on nation branding, paid from public funds, it was explained:

*We cannot grant you an access to this document. There was a bit of scandal around it. In fact, it is all bit of a sensitive issue* (Zofia, personal interview, 2009).

Consequently, I began to reflect on those defensive attitudes and look for the data elsewhere. The dismissive attitude towards my request took various forms. One of them was a ‘wait-and-see’ strategy; in the case of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it took me two months to get access to documents. While setting up the fieldwork, I encountered the following statements made on the behalf of the Ministry’s dominant coalition:

*The department is undergoing reorganisation. And because of staff issues and other structural changes, it is simply not feasible to conduct your interviews with our employees...* (Krycki, personal communication, May 29, 2009, see Appendix 2, p. 333).
Attempts to influence data collection were, on the other hand, common:

...the survey would have to be sent to the Department of Public Diplomacy. The management would indicate which staff should fill it in. It is a possibility, however, I am not sure if it would be successful.

The survey, according to information that was passed on by the management would have to short and synthetic (ibid. 2009).

However, informants representing the private sector were welcoming and came across as genuinely interested in sharing their views on nation branding. In the light of my fieldwork experiences, I began to wonder whose culture I was studying: is it my culture? Is it the informants’ culture? These ongoing questions encouraged my willingness to analyse changes to Polish national identity dynamics. My mindset accompanying the fieldwork in Poland was based overall on considering my informants as fellow countrymen discussing their vision of Polishness. Over time, I have managed to establish on-going relationships with those participants closer to my life stage or of similar academic interests.

By outlining epistemological and ontological position of this thesis, this chapter has merged the conceptual framework of my study with procedural and analytical technicalities accompanying the fieldwork and data analysis. The chapter presents questions guiding my interrogation of nation branding in Poland and the research objectives aligned to the overall design of this thesis. Subsequently, this chapter spells out the justification for a case study design and methods deployed during the fieldwork. Finally, it presents limitation to this study; a self-reflection narrative; notes on the fieldwork in Poland, and reflection on the data collected. Having explained the methodological underpinnings of this study, throughout chapters seven, eight, and nine, I present findings emerging from the data collected.
CHAPTER SEVEN: STRUCTURES AND STRUCTURING MECHANISMS

OVERVIEW

This chapter reveals the ‘imposition’ and ‘invasion’ (Bourdieu 2001) of nation branding within the Polish state’s field of national images management on the basis of *emic* professional accounts and public policy documents. First, it demystifies branding in Poland as it is prerequisite to understanding the emergence of nation branding. Second, by unfolding the field’s ‘structured structures’ and ‘structuring structures’, it discloses the settings of this study and accounts for relevant communicative practices preceding nation branding. It moves from an historical exegesis to report on its findings within a social space where the government interests have met with business interests: it maps out the positions of agents and explains their relationships to the field of power. In keeping with an ontological worldview (p. 80), this thesis uncovers buried structures that make up the field, presents mechanisms that ensure its structuration and reveals the resources used by agents engaged in nation branding.

In essence, the findings reveal that nation branding, as envisioned by nation branders, have not been fully institutionalised as a routinised practice (Reckwitz 2002) characterised by its own professional code of practice. While the Polish, private sector marketers and public relations actors explain their understanding of nation branding in ambiguous, often tactical terms, the Western nation branding consultants travelling across the Polish state structures and beyond, alongside their business employers, explicitly define their vision of the field and offer insights into assumed requirements for nation branding practice. The ideological discourse on nation branding has emerged as an ‘idealised model’ that has been imposed on the Polish state by the newcomers to the state bureaucracy. The advocates of nation branding employed ‘succession strategies’ enacted by public affairs campaigning to secure their interests in nation branding consultancy and made an impact on the Polish state’s promotional policy making. Thus, nation branding has been performed through attempts to form
their vision of the field and by attempts to formalise nation branding as part of the public policy in which the Polish state articulates its transnational economic interests.

I start off with demystifying nation branding and offer insights into how this powerful promotional culture idea and practice is rooted within the cognitive structures in Poland. Later, I report on the interrogated field by outlining the historical overview of relevant actors. This section follows a reflexive approach to the analytical process emphasised by scholars studying early modernist government communication (L’Etang 2004). This section also offers a flavour of terminology used by participants. During my fieldwork, I was regardful of the context in which the phrase ‘nation branding’ was used and meanings attributed to it. Altogether, the assumption that there exists an autonomous field of nation branding in Poland is highly contestable.

In fact, the early stage of the fieldwork reveals different ‘institutional labels’ (Everett 2002) within the field, signifying institutional practices: ‘public diplomacy’; ‘national marketing’; ‘investment marketing’; ‘destination marketing’; ‘cultural diplomacy’ and amidst them ‘nation branding’. These are markers of change. These practices are linked with promotional policies of the Polish state and, are defined by the state actors, as aiming at challenging the ‘images of Poland’. Why is it important? First, it captures the conditions within the field. Second, it supports the view that “influxes of new agents into the field can serve either as forces for transformation or conservation” (Benson and Neveu 2005, p. 5). Against this background, nation branding emerges as an additional policy and communicative practice in the nation-building process. The fieldwork data reveals that the first initiative explicitly signified as ‘nation branding’ took place in August 1999, but central to this study, ‘Nation brand building programme’, was contracted on 15th December 2003.

THE MYTH OF BRANDING IN POLAND

Although I had conducted preliminary interviews in London and Warsaw prior to my fieldwork, I was still asking myself, if at all, nation branding is different to its conceptual predecessors? How is it practised? And what purpose does it serve in the
context of political economy and promotional culture in Poland. I arrived in Warsaw on 25th July 2009, having fixed few interviews prior to the fieldtrip. Straight from Chopin Airport, I set out for the city centre. I decided to take up a role of a ‘native tourist’ during my fieldwork. Having put my ‘researcher as a tourist’ glasses on, I headed towards the city centre. Warsaw welcomed me with beautiful weather. The eclectics of Gothic, Art Nouveau and Soviet-style architecture intertwined with the omnipresence of promotional artefacts scattered across the city. Soon after landing, I was drawn to the public information campaign called ‘Choose branded’. In fact, it is an ongoing campaign run by the Polish Association of Branded Goods Manufacturers (2009) tailored to persuade Poles of the virtues of branded commodities. This growing clutter of messages reveals expansion of promotional culture that nowadays is integral to the iconographic landscape in Poland (Chmielewska 2005).

My fieldtrips to Warsaw became an opportunity for a reflection about Poland. Apart from the colonising promotional culture, occupying public spaces, the streets of Warsaw welcomed me with public spaces where the homeless, prostitutes, unemployed, and the impoverished took advantage of the philanthropic support of the Roman Catholic Church. I began to wonder if these social classes of the Polish nation find representations in performative discourse on nation branding. I kept thinking about the culture in which I grew up. I could clearly recall that within my social networks across various fields in Poland, Western branded commodities, services, and corporate brands had been considered as a symbol of ‘long-lasting quality’; ‘high-tech’; often idealised as ‘luxurious’ or ‘conspicuous’ in the impoverished socialist economy by the authoritarian governed Polish nation. I could recall, how ‘branded’ ex definitione meant ‘better’.

15 I consciously use the term ‘socialist’ as the latter has never been an ideological form of governance in Poland in its purity. A distorted version of socialism has been reduced by the Polish Communist Party to an authoritarian regime imposed in Poland by the Soviet government after World War II (with the UK and US governments’ consent) and subservient to its policies. To think of Poland as the communist state is a simplification and does not reflect writings of Marx and Engels.
The representations of commercial branding practice are hardly new to Poland: its myth, or what Bourdieu (1991, p. 167) terms as “collectively appropriated product”, had existed in Poland prior to the emergence of nation branding. As far as promotional culture in Poland is concerned, the myth of branding has gained momentum driven by socialism-capitalism dialectics: branding has gained its impetus thanks to shortages of goods and promotion culture in which Polish socialist enterprises did not use professionalised corporate communication language. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a growing demand for basic products and products rationing were frequently aligned with ‘inefficiencies’ of the socialist system of production. Simultaneously, branding was attributed to Western corporate symbols. In these settings, the myth of branding had been reproduced as self-fulfilling prophecy of Western capitalism. Sidorenko (1998, p. 9) summarises the above points in the following way:

...Polish reality from the late 1970s on compared unfavourably with images of life in the West. These images helped to create a fantasy of communism’s other through the unfortunate medium of the feel good American movies, imported alongside real denim jeans and Pepsi-Cola during the populism of the Gierek regime.

Those contrasting relationships, based on the communism-capitalism dialectics, underpinned by growing demand and inefficient supply logic are also relevant to this study. Indeed, my findings remain consistent with the above observation. The insights presented by the field actors explicitly demystify preconceptions concerning representations of brands and branding as well as contextual meanings attributed to this practice. One of them, in an insightful way, unfolds the culturally loaded myth of branding in Poland, which was presented to me in the following exchange:

**Interviewer:** Why is it so important for contemporary Poland to have a brand?
Interviewee: You see, your question brings about a thesis, a certain assumption. Hm...there are people who claim that it is important for Poland to have a nation brand. They claim that having a nation brand means that a country is better perceived, it is better recognisable. In their view, this can leverage into, say, the economic performance. So if a country is better recognisable and perceived positively.... Because, you see, ‘a brand’ is a positive term, it is not pejorative, right? It has clear positive connotations. So if we say, in Polish, don’t know about English as this might be culturally different, but in Polish, if we say ‘this is a brand’, we automatically assume ‘quality’. We do not explicitly have to say ‘good quality’. We subconsciously assume that we talk about a ‘good quality’. Henceforth, going back to nation branding, if you assume that Poland needs to have a nation brand, some argue, that it would automatically increase Poland’s international prestige. That is what some people think.

Interviewer: Is that what you also think?

Interviewee: I think that the building of national prestige is much more complicated than drawing from a set of brand features (Kinga, personal interview, 2008).

Nowadays, the term ‘brand’ can be demystified as an attribute of ‘outstanding recognition’, ‘prominent position’ or ‘extraordinary qualities’. The perpetuation of branding has gained a dominant meaning whereby making a reference to ‘an object’ as a brand creates ‘a subject’ which is in an assumed privileged market or social position.

Another culturally grounded and contextual feature of the branding myth lies in a presupposition that commodities, services, and organisations in Poland had not been
thought of in ‘branding’ terms and that until recently in marketing practice, Polishness has been rarely signified. Another field actor reveals:

“Even today, the specificity of marketing in Poland is that the commercial enterprises are reluctant to draw on a country of origin effect as a marketing technique. Only now they are awakening to the potential of this tactic in their product and corporate branding (Adam, personal interview, April, 2008).

Further, he recognises the dynamics of marketing practice and gives an example of their client - Kompania Piwowarska\(^\text{16}\) - that widely signifies Polishness in its corporate communications. Indeed, before 1989, commodities, services or organisations in the Sovietised Poland had their own representations, but managerial terminology was not widespread. The myth of branding, further reinforced within the promotional culture, has developed explicit representations of brands and implicit representations of branding. While I was aware that participants of my study lived similar experiences of the political economy in Poland prior to 1989, their construction of meaning regarding branding could have been significantly different. With this in mind, I embarked on the fieldwork eager to understand how nation branding has been enacted in Poland. As shown later in this study, the culturally loaded pre-understandings of branding have played their role in the effort to legitimize nation branding by private sector actors. At this stage, however, the following pages sketch out types of policy and outline the settings accompanying institutionalisation and perpetuation of nation branding.

**PROMOTIONAL POLICY AND PROMOTIONAL CULTURE**

Although there are existing academic accounts for overseas propaganda practice enacted by the Polish state actors (Dudek 2002; Cull, Culbert and Welch 2004; \(^\text{16}\) This corporation has signified Polishness in their advertising campaigns and through other forms of corporate communications. In an act of professional recognition, their advertising agency, DDB Corporate Profiles, received *Effie Awards* for advertising one of their brands, Tyskie.)
Szczepankiewicz (2005), a key development that has been routinised post-1989 within its structures is the emergence of codified, national promotional policies. Those policies are new dimensions of political symbolic power, which are the means for enacting specialised communicative practices by the Polish state’s administration. Additionally, since the beginning of systemic changes to the political economy in Poland, the state institutions have been adapting to the market settings and this process is also prominent among the Polish state institutions managing ‘collective identities’ and ‘multiple images’ of Poland and Poles overseas. Particularly, an accelerated shift from thinking of Poland as a ‘national market’ to its reinvention as a ‘transnational market’ player was highlighted in promotional policies (e.g. Polish Ministry of Economics 2003). Their emergence has affected legitimacy of policy making and the requirement to address interest groups’ (e.g. Polish businesses institutions, market actors, and policy consultants) position on the directions of the policy development. Although the promotional policies developed by the Polish state do not explicitly reveal the role of the Cabinet in terms of mediated representation of Polishness, it was implicitly assumed that ‘promotional policy’ is enacted on behalf of the Government.

In theory, those promotional policies overlap with foreign policy, cultural policy, economic policy and tourism policy goals. Although images of the Polish state can be understood as important from the perspective of those policies goals, the links between autonomous promotional policies of the Polish state and broadly defined goals of foreign, cultural, economic and tourism policies require a separate analysis as they are not explicitly revealed in the promotional policies texts discussed in this study. Those links, however, were sporadically highlighted by management of the state institutions engaged in their making and implementation. The characteristic of those promotional policies in the Polish settings is that they have become a separate type of Polish state institutions’ policy discourse revealing insights into various communicative practices, including nation branding. Their making, however, is based on a ‘silo effect’: their goals, relationships with other policies and relationships with various communicative
practices and tasks are not immediately explicit. What is more, promotional policies are advanced at the ministerial or departmental levels and their status within the political field is ambiguous. Development of those policies and relevant communicative acts were considered by my participants as politics with a small ‘p’.

My findings reveal that nation branders or their business employers travelled at the upper reaches of the Polish society structure and they were, indeed, particularly interested in promotional policies advanced by the Polish state actors. The field of power overseeing planning, making, and enacting of the promotional policies involves actors representing three forms of power: executive power (the Polish government structures including specialised bureaucratic departments or governmental agencies); legislative power (the Sejm); and controlling bodies (the Supreme Audit Office). They represent a triadic division of power of the Polish state. In the light of my findings, this triadic division of power in Poland can be extended by the notion of the fifth estate apparatus exercised at home, over the Polish nation, or abroad.

Indeed, the Polish state policy documents reveal that promotional discourse on Poland can be traced back to mid-1990s. Those policies have been institutionalised within the Polish state structures in the aftermath of neo-liberal ‘structural adjustment’ policies imposed by the rising technocratic class and advanced further in the run-up to the EU accession (European Union Integration Committee 1997). Since the mid-1990s, by means of self-devised regulations, the Polish state institutions have been empowered to develop policies sketching out their role in promoting the state interests, including management of intangible aspects of those policies. The clear change evident in those policies is their attribution as ‘strategies’; this is explicit in names of the policy documents. For example, the most recent policy made by Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009a) was entitled ‘The framework strategy for Poland’s promotion until the year 2015’ and the policy proposed by the Ministry of Economics (2010) was called by its makers as ‘The strategy for internationalisation of Polish economy’. A change to linguistic tokens for policy signification is a marker of institutional change.
Prior to 1989, the Polish state policies of a centrally commanded economy were signified as ‘plans’ and, particularly during 1970s, were a significant component of symbolic power mediated by ‘propaganda of success’. Although the findings of this study do not reveal intentions behind this change, it demonstrates that the Polish state actors adopt new discourses as instruments of domination. Nowadays, the main aim of promotional policies is to present the Polish state interests principally defined as per transnational market priorities. Within the field of power, promotionalism is explicitly linked with global market competitiveness; a governmental report, ‘Poland 2030: development challenges’ states:

*Poland shall define its image and promote it professionally and in a consistent way abroad; this image is coherent with regard to identity and value with the image promoted inside the country, so as to – on the one hand – support the Polish citizens abroad in their positive identification with the home country and with each other, and on the other hand create a positive image of Poland as a modern, dynamically developing country amongst foreigners. Such activities are especially crucial in the era of global capital and investment competition* (Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland 2008, p. 34, English original).

Apart from outlining a link between the contemporary promotional policies with global market forces, the above governmental report is an explicit statement that points to a relationship between promotional policies and national identity construction. This process and its qualities, however, are subjected to instructional relationships.

From the institutional stance, the Polish state has established channels and areas of promotion divided into ‘political’, ‘economic’, and ‘cultural’ areas of the state interests, which, according to policy makers, intertwine with global market forces.
Although this division is arbitrary, it is nevertheless featured in policy documents (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009a, p. 14). Notably, practices of political, economic and cultural fields in Poland are far more complex than those including actors involved in promotional policy making. It is, therefore, the Polish state that is responsible for selection and representation of dominant, pre-defined aspects of political, economic, and cultural interests. Furthermore, my fieldwork reveals that the first codified policy of this kind appeared within the state structures in the year 2000 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000) with a view to facilitate Poland’s EU accession, but formerly ‘The national integration strategy’ presented a short statement on the role of ‘promotion’ of the Polish state with regards to a political objective of EU accession:

> The aim of promotion is to strengthen international image of Poland as a democratic state, characterised by a stable economy and society, respecting the rights of the free markets, respecting private ownership, a dynamically developing economy, as well as enjoying strong relations with its neighbours and as being active on the international arena, etc. (EU Integration Committee 1997, p. 40).

To sum up, it is crucial to distinguish between a broad and narrow understanding of the term ‘promotion’ in the context of public policy making in Poland. The initial findings suggest that a broad view of promotion of the state interests involves every aspect of policy making and implementation defined by the state institutions or elites as national. Its narrow understanding is closer to cultural theorists’ stance on ‘promotion’ as involving self-advantageous communicative acts aimed at changing transnational symbolic representations of the Polish state and its nation.

**PROMOTIONALISM AS SYMBOLIC MEDIATION OF PUBLIC POLICY**

A significant feature of discourse on Poland’s promotion is the definition of outputs of institutionalised communicative practices that have been aligned with the
state policy. The promotional policy documents disclose multiplicity of concepts signifying symbolic outputs of the promotional policy. Among them was ‘world public opinion’, ‘reputation’, ‘image’ and, finally from 2003 onwards ‘nation brand’ emerged as an output of the promotional policy developed by the Ministry of Economics (2003, p 5). While the relationship between those terms remains ambiguous, nevertheless they reveal a symbolic dimension to this policy and practices accompanying accomplishing its goals. Thus communicative acts stemming from its agenda play their role in the mediation of this policy. Those acts, I argue, are inherent mediations of promotional policies and they are the product of the institutionalised communicative practices.

Before, however, nation branding became part of the policy Polish state actors used the term ‘image’ to signify symbolic output of their communicative practices. The evidence surfacing from the institutional mission statement of the state actors supports the above claims. This is supported by the following statements:

*The Department of Public and Cultural Diplomacy creates a positive image of Poland that is favourable to Poland’s foreign policy by stimulating public opinion and promoting Polish culture, science, education and tourism* (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010, underline added).

Another field actor represents their practices in the following way:

*“The mission of The Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency is, amongst other objectives, the formation of a positive image of Poland.”* (PIIA 2010, underline added);

Followed by the Polish Tourism Organisation’s (2010, underline added) statement revealing one of its objectives as:
Formation and consolidation of a positive image of Poland as a tourism destination.

The Institute of Adam Mickiewicz (2010, underline added) in a presentation of its objectives for the year 2010, reveals that one of its aims is:

*To increase the presence of Polish cultural offering in selected countries and regions of the world aimed at strengthening of positive image of Poland on the international stage.*

Similarly, PL.2012’s mission reveals states that one of its institutional goals is:

*Coordination of preparations and execution of the plan covering promotional actions before tournament that impact country's image* (PL.2012, 2012, English original).

Arguably by using a singular signifier ‘image’ the state actors either presume that they can form a single, dominant reception of the Polish state, or the above statements are streams of misrecognitions concerning collective identities (e.g. the state identities or various types of nationalisms) and multiplicity of their mediated representations. The overarching signifier of ‘positive’ reception of communicative acts engendered by communicative practices is a discursive feature common within the field. Notably, each of the above statements foregrounds ‘image’ as a singular output of the institutional practice as if there was only ‘one’ dominant version of collective identity. Therefore, in the light of findings presented above, I refer to the investigated social space as the field of national images management. Simultaneously, I recognised that in the field of power, political actors have the capabilities to mediate their version of collective identities, e.g. the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, the Presidential Palace, and the Polish National Assembly traditionally hold statist capital enabling them to symbolically represent their visions of collective identities. For example, the
official overseas state visits provide such an opportunity (Wang 2006). However, I contain the findings of this study only to those actors in the field of national images management who were subjected to the discourse of nation branding.

At the surface level, the discourse of promotionalism emphasises ‘state identities’ over ‘national identities’. Within the mission statements, the field actors articulate the importance of ‘positive image’ of the Polish state as crucial to their agency. A localised feature of the discourse emerging from the mission statements is the misrepresentation of the symbolic aspect of communicative practices through the articulation of ‘positive’ over ‘negative’ features of collective identities. In other words, the field actors represent those versions of collective identities that are considered by them as ‘truthful’. This insight remains in line with Bourdieu’s (1991) emphasis on connections between discourse, credibility and truth as bearing power over the social order. In that respect, the Polish state actors in the field are committed to a symbolic dimension of promotional policy and by emphasising that through their *praxis*, they struggle for a ‘positive image’ of the Polish state abroad. What is more, the above insights reveal that *nomos*, that is an organising law guiding the principle of vision and division in the field, is the institutional commitment of the field actors in promoting those aspects of collective identities that are considered suitable to the institutional goals.

In the light of the above insights, I argue that these finding are consistent with Corner’s (2007) explanation of the re-invention of the term ‘propaganda’ that has been subjected to routines of promotionalism within political and public domains of modern societies. In the case of the Polish state’s overseas propaganda, dynamics of its re-contextualization were partly manifested by changing signifiers of policies and changes to the names of departments among the institutions which have accumulated

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17 There are many examples of symbolic violence exercised by Polish political leaders through the official state visits. For example, see ‘*Channel 4*’ TV news on 6 May 2004 (Kwasniewski 2004).
statist capital to perform communicative tasks. Those surface changes took up more compound strategies and involved practices demonstrating re-contextualisation of the legitimacy of instruments of symbolic power wielded by the Polish state actors. As far as the complexity of promotional policies is concerned, they reveal that the promotion of the Polish state’s neo-liberal interest is broader than the construction of Polishness via persuasive means of communications. It is explicit that promotion of the Polish state interests and promotional culture as understood by cultural studies scholars are merging in the new context of the culture-economy interplay. Their boundaries, however, are context-dependent and localised within the institutional setting and can be explained through the relationship with non-state actors.

**GENESIS OF THE FIELD ACTORS AND STATE-BUILDING**

Despite the fact that ‘stable structural elements’ (Rokkan 1975), that is pre-1989 year actors, are involved in promotional policies making, from the early 1990s, new institutional actors have been established by the Polish state and equipped with the statist capital to perform technocratic, promotional interests. I present an outline of actors that voluntarily reported involvement in nation branding, bearing in mind that the Polish field of national images management exceeds this social space. Within it, the institutional actors represent themselves as specialised in various areas of promotional policy. Their strategies are versatile and their power stems the statist capital that particular institutional actors acquired (Bourdieu et al., 1994). It is beyond the scope of this study to present agency of all institutional actors engaged in government communication abroad as, to date, not all of them have been targeted by nation branders in Poland and subjected by their performative discourse.18

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18 The Polish Ministry of National Defence has been considered as ‘too political’ to be part of the archetypical nation branding programme. Yet, this actor holds the statist capital (Bourdieu et al., 1994) to secure Polish state interests and construct national identities. On the other hand, the Ministries of Culture and National Heritage and of the Regional Development were envisioned to partake in the central nation branding programme. Prior to the fieldwork in Poland, their management voluntarily explained that they are not pursuing ‘nation branding’ in their institutional settings. One of the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage subsidiaries, however, the Institute of Adam Mickiewicz, has been subjected to discourses of nation branders.
In an effort to contextualise the research objective number 1 (p. 80), this section presents a historical overview of relevant field actors and accounts for new relevant entrants into this social space. To guide the reader through the complexity of findings presented in this section, its key insights are presented in a timeline in Figure 1. Historically speaking, the communicative practice of overseas propaganda was aligned with the Polish state field of power, particularly with diplomatic service and its relevant networks. Under this name, this communicative practice was institutionalised at the beginning of the early modernist era and propaganda was a dominant term applied by the field of power during the Sovietised period of governance. In the outline presented below, however, I demonstrate that post-1989 the Polish state has expanded its overseas communicative capacities by engaging in a state-building exercise and a series of institutional re-inventions of communicative practices. From 1999, those actors, by forming various relationships with external consultants, were involved in nation branding. To report on these findings, in this section I draw from secondary data, which for factual accuracy was cross-examined with information retrieved from interviews. At this stage, I account for institutional developments from 1989 as this year was considered by policy-makers as a benchmark for re-defining the Polish state interests, which enabled the emergence of nation branding. In a reflexive statement, one of the promotional policy documents supports this in the following way:

*After 1989, no sufficiently expanded, coordinated and modern system responsible for promotion of the country’s interests was established.*

FIGURE 1 HISTORICAL OUTLINE OF KEY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS: ACTORS AND POLICIES
Although promotional policy-makers highlight insufficiencies in this area of the state activity, this section shows that since 1989 the Polish state expanded its institutional overseas communicative capabilities. New governmental agencies were established and their management, over the years, became mesmerised by the idea of nation branding. The attempts to form the field of nation branding in Poland overlapped with the field of power and included actors that historically are the ‘stable elements’ of the institutionalised political processes of national identities making: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economics. Data shows that both actors put forward their own promotional policies; the first one by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000) soon followed by the Ministry of Economics (2003). These actors enjoyed institutional stability, but their subsidiaries were established in the aftermath of changes to political economy. I discuss them in the latter part of this section.

Given that there is evidence suggesting that the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had first institutionalised propaganda as apparatus for managing international public opinion (Szczepekiewicz 2005), I begin with this particular actor. Until 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had its own unit coordinating the promotional policy-making process and overseas communicative tasks steaming from this policy. This institutional structure was called the Department of Promotion (set up in the aftermath of a merger of Department of Press and Department of Cultural and Academic Exchange on 1 September 1994; renamed on 14 September 1998 as Department of Cultural Diplomacy; and from 28 December 2001 renamed as Department of Promotion). While academics (e.g. Ociepka and Kiełdanowicz 2005) assumed the term ‘public diplomacy’ in the Polish settings without explaining its institutional appropriation, it was only recently, in 2008, when the Ministry’s management renamed its overseas communicative practice as ‘public diplomacy’ and ‘cultural diplomacy’ and named this structure as Department of Public and Cultural Diplomacy. The head of public diplomacy offered the following statement concerning this institutional change:
I have been a director of this department for one year and since then I have changed the name of this department to ‘public diplomacy’. By doing so, I wanted to demonstrate that we are reaching out to various stakeholders rather than elites; I’m not exclusively interested in governmental elites; I’m also interested in journalists, artists, curators of arts, and archaeologists from a particular country (Zofia, personal interview, 2009)

From 2008 onwards, the Ministry’s management consistently re-invented propaganda as public diplomacy and institutionalised it at its own pace within their policy. Reading of ‘The framework strategy for Poland’s promotion until the year 2015’ reveals the following insights on this practice:

The results of public diplomacy should be the strengthening of political and, in fact overall prestige of Poland worldwide, particularly by increasing our influence over decisions significant to us made by international institutions and organisations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009, p. 17).

Done this way, the Ministry’s communicative practice aimed at managing world public opinion has started the process of representing it as more contemporary and needing to address the expanding stakeholder environment of diplomatic networks.

The next relevant actor, the Ministry of Economics, has also been historically closely aligned with the field of power and has had links with the political field. During the Soviet era, a key role in facilitating international trade exchange was played by the Departments of Trade located in Polish embassies abroad. They were aligned to the Ministry of Industry and Trade and managed centrally. Since the
beginning of 1990s, this actor initiated policies aimed at supporting Polish business enterprises and co-operated with organisations representing industries’ business interests, for example the Polish Chamber of Commerce or the Foundation ‘Teraz Polska’. At that time, the symbolic value of commercial successes of Polish enterprises became of concern to the Ministry; back then bureaucrats started explicitly defining Poland’s economic standing through the prism of country of origin effect of its products and services. On 25 April 1995 the Ministry, then named the Ministry for Industry and Trade, launched ‘The programme for restoring the role of and importance of brand names and trademarks’ (Ministry of Economics 2003, p. 4). A decision accompanying launching this governmental programme was establishing the Foundation Institute of Polish Brand. The programme was the first policy that aspired to bridge a gap between commercial brands as symbols of national identities and national images overseas. The ties with the political field were manifested by endorsement of this initiative by the president of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski (Institute of Polish Brand 1999).

Historical records within the Ministry’s first promotional policy reveal that, between 1995-2001 a body responsible for advising the Minister on policy issues was called The Council for Export Promotion. It was primarily an advisory body and did not hold any communicative tasks to manage images of Poland. Although back in 2003 the Ministry had policy plans to replace this body with a more specialised and centralised Council for Economic Promotion. Initially, this entity was conceived by the promotional policy-makers as a structure, which ought to have its competences extended from advisory to executive and to manage issues to do with “foreign direct investment and national images matters” (Ministry of Economics 2003, p. 3). This entity, however, has never been established. A failure to establish this body resulted in a situation whereby promotional policy making within the Ministry was institutionally dispersed and several departments were involved in its development (e.g. Department of Support Instruments; Department of Bilateral Cooperation; Department of
Department of European Affairs). In the meantime, the Ministry did not establish an internal department responsible for overseas communication practice and those tasks have been divided between its press office, commissioned to private sector actors or passed on to its subsidiaries, the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency, the Polish Tourism Organisation and the Agency For Enterprise Development.

While the above ministries constitute institutional foundations for promotional policies making, their subsidiaries played a role in their enactment. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ policy (2009), setting up new government agencies is attributed to the demands of new political economy in Poland. From 1999 onwards, both ministries have expanded their influence over new policy priorities in a state-building exercise. The government established new institutional actors and equipped them with resources enabling management of world public opinion. Among the actors established post-1989 were the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency, the Polish Tourism Organisation, the Institute of Adam Mickiewicz and PL.2012. The collected evidence shows that the state-building exercise resulted in decentralisation in implementing of those policies. Below I present them in a chronological order.

The first actor established in a state-building exercise is the Polish Tourism Organisation which was formed on 25 June 1999 and started operations on 1 January 2000. Its legitimacy is based on the enactment of tourism policy and has been articulated in its public mission statement in the following way:

Our aim is to promote Poland as an attractive country for tourists - modern, offering high standard services and competitive pricing.

Our promotional activities and development of the Polish tourism is conducted at home and abroad (Polish Tourism Organisation 2010).

The mission statement also reveals its areas of institutional agency among which are:
...promotion of Poland as a tourist destination; development and maintenance of the Polish tourism information system at home and overseas; assistance with modernisation of tourism infrastructure; and cooperation with local governments and local businesses to further develop tourism industry (ibid. 2010).

Until 23 July 2007 the Polish Tourism Organisation was directly linked with the Ministry of Economics, but the field of power has re-shaped its ties and structurally aligned this organisation with the Ministry of Tourism and Sport. Above all, the Polish Tourism Organisation has built a network of semi-autonomous offices in thirteen overseas locations facilitating its operations in foreign markets. This actor develops its own marketing strategy which, in theory, links to ministerial policies. According to its 2008 strategy the contribution of this actor to promotion of the state interests’ lies in the implementation of tourism policy; one of its excerpts reveals the following insight:

*The result of those [promotional] activities should be enhancement of Poland’s recognition as an attractive and hospitable destination for tourists, which offers competitive, high quality tourist products* (Polish Tourism Organisation 2008, p. 5).

The communicative practices of the Polish Tourism Organisation are guided by this strategy. In terms of development of its strategy, this actor engages with multiple stakeholders. This document is important to understanding of nation branding in Poland. At the time of the fieldwork (2009), this actor celebrated its tenth anniversary.

The second actor relevant to this study, which was established in the aftermath of systemic changes to the political economy was the Institute of Adam Mickiewicz. The institute was established on 1 March 2000 as a result of the agreement between the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs signed on 6 October 1999. In 2006, the field of power divided responsibility for the implementation of cultural policy between the Institute and the National Centre of Culture; the Institute goals included the
enactment of cultural policy overseas and cultural diplomacy. Its contemporary status was spelled out by the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage in a ministerial regulation on 1 June 2008. This actor is structurally aligned with the Polish Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, but it also shares personal links with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomatic network (e.g. Polish Institutes). In its public mission statement, the Institute is represented as:

...a state cultural institution whose task is to promote Polish culture around the world and actively participates in international cultural exchange (Institute of Adam Mickiewicz 2011b, English original).

The statement further reveals the institutional goals of this actor:

We promote Polish culture around the world and cooperate with other countries. We present both the heritage and contemporary achievements of Polish culture (ibid. 2011).

This task, according to its public mission, is enacted in the relationship with institutions responsible for cultural policy making, cultural exchanges, and management of public and cultural diplomacy; liaising with the Polish diplomatic service; renowned overseas cultural, media, and academic institutions; Polish overseas institutions popularising national culture and history; individual researchers; and non-governmental organisations established by the Polish diaspora (Institute of Adam Mickiewicz 2011a). Its apparatus for world public opinion management consists of the Communication Department, the existing institutional networks overseas (e.g. Polish Institutes), private sector actors specialising in management consultancy, or networks of their partners overseas (e.g. museums, galleries). A stakeholder approach to management was also evident in case of this institution as it engages with various social and professional groups. Furthermore, the operations of the Institute are defined in a long-term strategy, e.g. ‘The IAM strategy 2010-2016’ whereas its communicative tasks are outlined in ‘The communication strategy and operation principles for the Communication Department’.
The third actor involved in nation branding performative discourse that was established as part of the state-building exercise is the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development. Officially, this governmental agency was established on 9 November 2000. Its mission presents the legitimacy of its agency as for the benefit of Polish economic and social development that aims at supporting:

...entrepreneurship through implementation of actions aimed at using innovative solutions by entrepreneurs, development of human resources, expansion on international markets, and regional development. Its achievement will contribute to the improvement of the competitive position of Polish economy, both on European Union markets and on the international market (Polish Agency for Enterprise and Development 2011).

This governmental agency is structurally aligned with the Ministry of Economics and from 2003 was made responsible for the enactment of communicative tasks linked to promotional policy. As far as promotional policy tasks are concerned, this state actor is a recent entrant into the field. In 2009, this agency was empowered by the Polish government to manage the organisation of the Polish Pavilion at the 2010 EXPO Exhibition in Shanghai. Historically, exhibitions were considered by the policy makers as a significant opportunity to showcase Polish economic and cultural achievements and to manage its mediated representations. For instance, the Ministry of Economics’ (2003) policy revealed that the field of power allotted app. £8.5 m. to the EXPO exhibition in Aichi (Japan). Furthermore, the communicative tasks accompanying EXPO 2010 were divided between a team of public relations practitioners who were responsible for servicing Chinese and other transnational media outlets.

The fourth pertinent actor established post-1989 is the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency. It is responsible for the implementation of promotional policy developed by the Ministry of Economics. Among the tasks stemming from this
policy is the management of world public opinion with a view to attract foreign direct investment to Poland. In a historical overview the extract from its public mission statement discloses the following institutional commitments of this actor:

_The Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency was established on 24th June 2003, resulting from the merger of the State Foreign Investment Agency and the Polish Information Agency. The Agency in its activities makes use of its predecessors’ inheritance_ (Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency 2010a).

Simultaneously, its management defines the statutory objectives in the following way:

_The aim of the agency is to promote Poland and its regions worldwide, with a particular focus on Polish economy, products, businesses and brands as well as in-flow of foreign direct investment_ (Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency 2009).

With regard to the organisation of departments which are relevant to this study, this actors set up internal structures that were responsible for the implementation of promotional policy goals: the Economic Information Department and the Economic Promotion Department. The latter had abilities to manage world public opinion; those operations are enacted by the Public Relations Division and National Marketing Division. The contribution of the Economic Promotion Department to the institutional goals of the agency was presented in the following way:

_[the department] works on promoting Poland as an attractive business partner on the international markets and creating a positive image for the country. The Department does this by organising seminars, conferences and international exhibitions, presenting the Polish economy and its achievements in the fields of technology and_
Its management defines this aspect of operations as ‘investment marketing’ and this was made explicit in the following statement:

_Broadly speaking, the agency is responsible for investment marketing and that includes issues related to images of Poland abroad_ (Wioletta, personal interview, 2009).

Above all, in the past, this actor used external consultancies to manage communicative tasks. For example, in 2005 its management commissioned to BBC World Global Solutions, part of the BBC World, a production of an advertising campaign featured in CNN, BBC World, ‘Time Magazine’, ‘The Financial Times’, and ‘The Wall Street Journal’ (Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency 2007). Later, in 2008, alongside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Polish Tourism Organisation, the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency co-financed another advertising campaign aimed at attracting foreign investment. By virtue of its policy ties and complexity of external environment, this actor operates as a multiple stakeholder player.

Of relevance to this study is also a recently formed governmental agency called PL.2012. This is the last state actor which simultaneously emerged as a part of the state-building exercise. It was established as a result of a decision stemming from an act (7 September 2007) regulating coordination, organisation and the management of EURO 2012 tournament in Poland. Yet again, this actor is a purpose-formed entity, which is aligned with the field of power, specifically with the Polish Ministry of Tourism. It represents itself as relying on multiple stakeholder environments; its public mission reveals the following statement:
Polish preparations for Euro 2012 are coordinated by PL.2012, special purpose entity of the Ministry of Sport and Tourism. In these preparatory works the company collaborates with 173 partners. Never before has such a great number of institutions been involved in any preparatory or organisational actions carried out in Poland (PL.2012 2011).

The institutional strategy of this actor, referred to as ‘The Road Plan’, consists of eight programmes, which also includes:

Coordination of preparations and execution of the plan covering promotional actions before the tournament that impact country’s image (ibid. 2012).

In 2009, there were two offices responsible for this task: the office of National Promotion of Coordinator and the Communication Office. At that time, both offices were being formed and plans were made to conceptualise a communication strategy aimed at mediated representation of Polishness preceding the EURO 2012 tournament.

The above actors were at the receiving end of nation branding, whereas the actors which initiated nation branding are listed below. The collected evidence reveals that nation branding has been instigated by local marketing and advertising industry, and representatives of business groups. Their relationships with the above Polish state actors are central to this study. Yet again, I present the newcomers to the Polish state structures in a chronological order. My fieldwork revealed that the first documented ‘nation branding’ exercise began in August 1999. It was an initiative of a local marketing industry, which was conceived as a non-for-profit coalition and formalised under the name ‘Advertising for Poland Association’ (2000, p. 1). Later, marketing and public relations actors entered or attempted to enter the Polish state structures.
They were: BNA of Corporate Profiles Group (August 2001); Saffron (December 2003); New Communications (December 2005); ‘PR for RP’ initiative (August 2006); Communications Unlimited (January 2006); Stafiej and Partners (2006); Young & Rubicam (2008); Jack Trout Poland (2009). While nation branding is not exclusively the only area of expertise among those actors, they embrace this Western idea and this way, they expanded their consultancy portfolio.

Finally, a fundamental role in the development of nation branding discourse has been attributed to the Polish Chamber of Commerce. This actor was established on 13 February 1990. The Chamber presents itself as being affiliated with international trade organisations. It also enacts the role of commercial arbitration in Poland. From 1995 the Chamber of Commerce reinforced ‘branding culture’ in Poland. From 2000 onwards, the Chamber was commissioned to manage a few international events aimed at promoting Polish state interests overseas (Polish Chamber of Commerce 2009). Within it, there were purpose-set (1992) organisational units to address the Polish state promotional policy issues - The Promotion for Poland Foundation and The Institute of Polish Brand. Their role in nation branding practice is analysed in chapter nine.

A few points can be made with regards to the historical outline. Since 1989, the Polish state’s capacity to manage its images overseas has expanded beyond its field of power. There are a few processes accompanying this shift: a state-building exercise involving foundation of new actors; a development of market-orientated promotional policies; more open management approach and engagement. As a result, the state institutions diversified and specialised in communicative practices and embraced Western names for pursuing Polish state interests: ‘public diplomacy’; ‘cultural diplomacy’; ‘investment marketing’; and ‘destination marketing’. Simultaneously, propaganda as a form of persuasive communication has been silenced. This reinforces questions about the legitimacy of branding. Why does the Polish state require nation branding since there are existing actors holding statist capital for mediation of collective identities and interests overseas? Who is nation branding targeted at? Those
questions, stemming from the above outline, are sound in the context of this investigation. While the state-building policy has expanded the Polish neo-liberal ‘structured structure’, the business actors have been consolidating to enact their interests. Moreover, the policy and interview accounts reveal that nation branding discourse has been also perpetuated by other actors, but they played a secondary role in enactment of nation branding. These actors form ‘structuring structures’ expressed as symbolic power wielded by the state structures and nation branders.

STRUCTURED STRUCTURES: MAPPING OUT THE POSITIONS

Bourdieu and Waquant (1992) argue that every field analysis should begin with a mapping out of the agents in the field and establishing their relationship to the field of power. While I have already indicated that the Polish state actors, representing ‘public administration’, overlap with the field of power, additionally there are private actors in Poland forming a social space in which nation branding has been introduced as a discourse on national identity construction. In the aftermath of political economy changes, the field has grown in complexity. Chong and Valencic (2001, p. 3) note the multifaceted character of contemporary national images management and emphasise the impact of the private sector on its actions. Given that pre-1989 the first governmental departments empowered by the political class to represent the Polish state and national identities overseas were aligned with the diplomatic sub-field, and later grown in complexity, the above argument is relevant for the contemporary field of national images management in Poland. For Moloney (2005, p. 551), public institutions and other actors of the competitive game “speak multiple voices.” This pluralism, characteristic to level playing fields, echoes in the Polish field of national images management: the public administration actors are responsible for promotional policies, but private sector newcomers struggle to change its institutional dynamics.

Because I demonstrate that nation branding has been used as source of symbolic power, I present the outline of the field in accordance to theory of symbolic power (Bourdieu 1991). In my outline of the field, I include ‘structured structures’ and
'structuring structures' enabling discursive performativity of nation branders and facilitating dissemination of this discourse. Thus far, among the ‘structured structures’ of the social space investigated in this study are the state actors including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Economics; the Polish Information and Investment Agency, the Polish Tourism Organization; the Adam Mickiewicz Institute; the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development; and PL.2012, a governmental agency responsible for organisation and overseas communication practices during the EURO 2012 football tournament. They are the ‘stable elements’ (Rokkan 1975) of the field that were targeted by nation branders, but they relied on other ‘trans-connected’ spaces. The newcomers’ to the field listed earlier (p. 138), not only offered expertise in nation branding, but their entry into the field demonstrate new dynamics of capital relations.

The state field actors are aligned to the Government by the Council of Poland’s Promotion, a body formed by the government disposition (legal source) on 30 March 2004 and equipped in its share of the statist capital stake of advisory in the process of policy making. While all those actors enjoy a degree of autonomy in terms of management, every day operations, and decision-making, the primary feature of the relationship between them was based on legal, cultural, political, economic, and personal relationships within the dominant coalitions. It is the management of those actors that was responsible for accumulation and distribution of resources relevant to the field operations. The managements’ power stemmed from their dominant positions, their-decision making abilities and close affiliations with the field of power.

While it might be convenient to assume that the dominant capital in the field of national images management is that of symbolic capital engendered from transnational images of Poland and Poles, this universalising discursive statement begs a question about the other, field specific evidence of resources generation. In theory, nation branders turn this argument on its head. They argue that nation branding offers an opportunity to exchange symbolic capital into economic capital (Olins 2005). The Polish state as a holder of meta-capital (Bourdieu et al. 1994) accumulated multiple
resources and symbolic capital is only one aspect of the state meta-capital. Indeed, the recorded field evidence suggests that, at the time of this investigation, the relevant types of field resources included: economic capital; human capital, cultural capital; social and political capital. In line with Bourdieu’s (1986) forms of capital, it is economic capital that forms the basis for performative discourse on nation branding.

The struggle for advancement of an autonomous field of nation branding in Poland involved particularly those agents which derived their statist capital from: (a) economic capital required to implement policies and its symbolic dimensions; (b) human capital within their structures; (c) social capital of networks; (d) cultural capital encapsulated in competences and expertise; (e) symbolic capital of reputation held by individual field actors; and (f) political capital. Finally, and most importantly, by deriving from those resources, the Polish field of power holds the decision-making capabilities with regards to the promotional policy goals and their directions, which, in return, has bearing on the quality of their relationship with nation branders. The above resources are highlighted in field discourse on nation branding.

While I do not reveal its ‘amounts’, the dominant indicators of cultural capital in the field have been indicated by capturing the ‘amount of institutional competences’; ‘professional experience in nation branding consultancy’; ‘amount of projects accomplished’; ‘knowledge of place branding’; ‘amount of previously accomplished projects’; ‘knowledge of public relations techniques’; ‘amount of academic or professional publications on the subject of nation branding’; ‘academic titles’; ‘linguistic abilities’; ‘knowledge regarding images of the Polish state and the Polish nation’; and ‘market research expertise’. Additionally, a tacit feature of the field resourcing is social capital accumulated through access to the relevant institutional political and business networks (Zofia, personal interview, 2009). Finally, nation branding has been understood as a having potential to be exchanged into unspecified political careers (Darek, personal interview, 2009). Particularly, central to this study, ‘Nation brand building programme’, if successful, was seen as an opportunity to
convert prestige derived from its accomplishment into political capital and was explicitly linked with a political career opportunity. In Bourdieusian terms, all the above, represent institutional resources accompanying the enactment of nation branding and correction of trajectories of performance. The findings section further accounts for how agents reported on this capital and used it to their advantage.

It is beyond the scope of this study to capture the amount of all sources of capital within the field. Later, its main narrative reveals those exchanges explicitly relating to practices signified as nation branding and its corresponding ‘revenue streams’ pursuit by nation branders. At this stage, however, I only indicate the relevance of sources of capitals and their links with the field. Moreover, I use ‘economic capital’ and ‘human capital’ to contextualise the positions in the field (Bourdieu 1986). The relevance of those capitals is articulated in a policy statement:

...Poland allocates on promotion of its overseas interests comparatively small funds, even if compared with budgets of commercial actors operating in Poland. Despite that there are significant differences in allocating funds into different areas of promotion, it is hard to argue that in any of those areas funding is sufficient. Therefore, we argue, that promotion of Poland is significantly underfinanced.

This argument is reinforced further if we compare budgets in Poland with relevant budgets of other countries in the region (e.g. Czech Republic, Hungary) which spend more on some aspects of promotion (e.g. economy, tourism) and are considerably smaller than Poland. The insufficient funding is particularly visible if we look at specific institutions, e.g. Swedish Institute has a budget eight times bigger than its corresponding Institute of Adam Mickiewicz in Warsaw. If compared to the Korea Foundation in Seoul, the Institute’s budget is
forty times smaller. What makes the situation in Poland look comparatively worse is that those institutions are well-known for cost-effectiveness and employ small number of personnel (up to 100 staff). The financial situation in Poland does not even compare with the British Council or the Goethe Institute frequently recalled in Poland (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009a, p. 42-43).

The structuring contextual exercise has enabled me to sketch out the field structure. It was clear from the data archive that economic capital enables the Polish state actors to operate and this type of capital was derived from either the Polish state budget or the EU funds. Furthermore, human capital was considered by the Polish state actors as important to the field, particularly because pre-1989 promotional policies making was underinvested by the field of power in terms of manpower.

What is fundamental to understanding this section, and indeed is an indicator of the infancy of nation branding, is the fact that this communicative practice has become an additional, but not an exclusive, streams of capital revenue for the institutional field actors. This aside, at this stage, I present a map of the field structure based on ‘human capital’ and ‘economic capital’ as an indication of the ‘objective positions’ of the field actors. The financial data revealing economic capital presents an aggregated annual turnover of each field actors. In fact, nation branding has not been an exclusive source of economic capital generation, neither for public nor for private sector actors. The distribution of funds among actors has been cross-examined between the interview data, policy documents and financial reports. Despite the fact that nation branding has become a source of capital, all field actors, public and private, were engaged in additional practices enabling economic capital exchanges. The field stratification that I present below is based on findings of aggregated annual economic capital, integrated with human capital of the institutional actors participating in performative discourse on nation branding. This procedure enables contextualisation of the field structure and captures the positions of the agents by using data for the year 2009 (Figure 1).
This positioning map helps to understand the socio-economic conditions within the field and highlights structural relations between the agents. Although it is an oversimplification to claim that economic capital is dominant in the field, it drives the agency and the field itself. While economic capital is significant to the analysis of nation branders’ actions, human capital is an indication of the backstage resources of the state and non-state actors engaged in nation branding. Nevertheless, there are other types of capital crucial to understanding ‘the exchange rates’ (Swart 1997) between actors in the field. Economic and human capital, however, speak for redistributions in the field in terms of allowing access to the field by non-state actors. Put simply, labour relations in the field are being reconfigured and extended beyond its initial boundaries.
FIGURE 2 THE POSITIONS OF AGENTS IN THE FIELD IN 2009
With regards to aggregated human capital, the state departments responsible for promotional policy making that have been involved in nation branding discourse are medium size institutional structures. Given that the Polish field of national images management has grown in specialisation, it is critical to recognise the specificity of particular aspects of institutions: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economics, the Polish Tourism Organisation, the Polish Information and Investment Agency, the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development or the Adam Mickiewicz Institute as well as institutional commitments that those actors hold in relation to promotional policy making and its implementation. Those actors are diverse in terms of their statist capital, including institutional tasks. Although, human capital among those actors is diversified, private sector actors have sufficient resources to be able to interact with the field, shape it and offer services required by the field.

The number of actors responsible for development and enactment of promotional policies indicates the expansion of the field of national images management within the field of power. The institutional state-building exercise that I had revealed previously is reflected in figures enabling positioning in the field: the numerical breakdown of human capital captures capitalisation of the field with human resources. In 2009 there were 35 staff employed by the Department of Public and Cultural Diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The department was run by one director and two deputy directors. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has its own Press Office responsible for media relations. Apart from performing media relations and reporting on policy issues, the Press Office did not contribute towards development of policy making.

In the same year, there were 19 members of staff within the Polish Tourism Organisation directly involved in marketing activities and one independent public relations post. Each marketing department reports to its own managing director. Above all, additional posts have been created on an ad hoc basis to manage short term marketing projects. The Polish Information and Investment Agency which has overall accumulated 100 members of staff, has its own Economic Promotion Department
employing 21 staff and the Press Centre employing 3 media officers. The Economic Promotion Department reports to its director. The Press Centre is headed by its own communication manager. Media relations and marketing including market research are the key functions of both departments. Overall, the Agency staffs are responsible for enacting policies as developed by the Ministry of Economics which in its own structures holds the Department of Promotion employing 10 members of staff.

The remaining actors, closely aligned with the field of power, are in 2012.PL employing 5 members of staff in its communication office and the Expo Office within the structures of the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development employing 10 staff reporting to its manager and a team managing the Expo Pavilion on the site. Those actors were not a driving force in the development of promotional policies, but their statist capital and their practices accompanied by other forms of capital, placed them on the map of the nation images management field as actors engaged in performative discourse on nation branding. While the above chart represents the accumulation of human capital among the private sector actors engaged in performative discourse on nation branding, the coalitions of organisations targeting the state actors located within the field and the field of power comprised its senior and middle management. In this scenario their employees became a resource. The greatest aggregated human capital was revealed by DBB Corporate Profile and the smallest by Safiej & Partners. The figures presented are subject to constant changes, some of which are the result of external fields’ forces. In the case of the private sector actors, it was reported that the recent economic downturn (2007 onwards) affected their resources. Nevertheless, the collected data enables sketching out a structural map of positions that agents held in the field. Interestingly, it is non-Polish human capital that was the most predominant in terms of advancing nation branding practice. The significance of other species of capital on the field formation and exchange rates is discussed further.

While, in part, the field demonstrates reliance on foreign human capital, sources of economic capital predominantly come from the Polish state budget and the
European Union structural funds. In other words, they are the Polish and the European taxpayers’ funds that had been accumulated and monopolised by the Polish state and are redistributed as ‘grants’ into specialised governmental departments or agencies. Following Bourdieusian neo-capitalist theory (1986), they are exchanged into different forms of capital, including attempts to shape symbolic capital of national reputations. Put simply, it is Poles and other Europeans paying for being subjected to the symbolic power and symbolic violence exercised by the Polish state and its stakeholders and enacted by means of political and marketing communications.

‘STRUCTURING STRUCTURES’ IN NATION BRANDING

The above overview presents insights into the field’s material basis and records those resources that which relevant to enactment of nation branding. Yet, according to Bourdieu (1991) power-centred analysis of symbolic systems should also account for ‘structuring structures’, which constitute a means for objectification of the world. To further contextualise nation branding at the mezzo-level, that is at the crossovers between the state and business interests, I present below this structuring mechanism. The outline of ‘structuring structures’ - including the mass media, the Polish academia, and research organisations - is the second stage of my interrogation of nation branding. Those structures shape ‘given’ aspects of social understanding of nation branding: they determine trajectories of action, symbolic relations within the field and enable one to disclose the settings for objectification and agreements regarding nation branding.

According to Bourdieu (1991, p. 164-165), structuring structures are instruments for “constructing the objective world”. Henceforth, this exercise sets the scene for the analysis of nation branding dynamics and further outlines its relationship with the field of power. As indicated in the methodology section (p. 88), the structuring structures that I reveal in this section relate to the dissemination of nation branding in Poland. This process has been facilitated by the distribution of nation branding ideology and it corresponds with the worldviews of nation branders. One of the consultants noted:
...in fact, it is interesting how it [nation branding] is being disseminated. [...] All of a sudden, somebody has bought into this language, so that idea had already begun to circulate (Franciszek, personal interview, 2009).

Thus, structuring actors have played a role of ‘transmitters’ in this dissemination process. Although within the performative discourse of nation branding external actors - UK brand consultants, EU, transnational media, the World Tourism Organisation, and other stakeholder groups - became as a reference point, they are not as prominent to my investigation as the mezzo-level inter-relationships between the Polish state, business actors, and nation branders.

‘CREATIVE INDUSTRIES’

Given that documented nation branding discourse has been instigated by the local, marketing communications industry coalition, I start off with an outline of both marketing and public relations industries, their professional bodies and relevant media outlets. The term ‘creative industries’ has been used in recent years as a reference point for marketing, public relations industries and visual arts professionals in Poland. Both relevant industries - public relations and marketing - strive for more professional recognition, social status; and they enjoy a fair deal of autonomy from the government policy regulations. The data reveals that marketing and public relations industries in Poland are in their infancy, particularly in terms of their social capital of prestige.

The insights into the industry yet again reveal that the neo-liberal changes to the Polish political economy became a competitive social milieu to seek for opportunities for marketing and public relations consultancy. What is also revealing, those industries seek to protect their interests and struggle for professionalism and social prestige

19 For a critique of this term and explanation of the relationship between public relations and marketing see Stiegler (2010).
within a broader community of professionals. Over the period of investigation, the key
players within those industries have enacted discourse on promotion of the Polish state
and in various ways have adopted the discourse of nation branding. The marketing
‘industry leaders’ involved in discourse on nation branding operate in a milieu where
economy-culture relationships are fundamental to their professional praxis. Although
there is evidence suggesting that state enterprises in ‘socialist Poland’ applied
‘organisational communications’ (Koźmiński 1976) and marketing20 (Samli and
Jermakowicz 1983), post-1989 political economy changes offered an opportunity to
create markets where demand for consultancy lead to the emergence of the industry as
a profession in its own rights. This process accelerated development of promotional
culture driven by competitive relationships between enterprises operating in Polish
national markets and those professionals themselves. At the time of my fieldwork
(2009-2010), the marketing industry was affected by the economic crisis. This
downturn was also reported in Poland. Reputable industry research states:

“2009 was particularly difficult for the integrated marketing
communications industry. Large agencies were particularly in
trouble, which yet again had to reconsider their business models”
(Media & Marketing Poland 2010a, p. 3).

This report reveals the highly competitive environment in which consultancies
perform. An economic crisis forms a specific context for any business operation but it
demonstrates a market driven adaptation of the marketing communications industry as
well as an appropriation and search for new business revenues. The industry’s reaction
to the economic downturn was cost cutting; shift in media orientation towards the
cheaper internet; reducing the consultancy fees, criticism of less professional ‘one-man
operations’, investment in delivery of more services; orientation towards sales driven
services, and maintenance of stable corporate clients’ accounts. The government

20 Examples of marketing communication from Poland, prior to 1989, have been presented in
‘Pictogram’ magazine. One of its contemporary editions offers reprints of advertisements by the
following enterprises: FSO, Lechia, Technochemia, ORS, and Arged (Pictorial 2009, p. 126-147).
contracts have not been explicitly reported in this report. This industry is said to be highly competitive and demonstrating steady market growth in terms of the revenue value. However, the ‘Media & Marketing Poland’ report anticipated that throughout 2010 the market revenue would demonstrate 1.2% growth and its boom would coincide with the football tournament EURO 2012 in Poland and Ukraine (ibid., p. 17). This government managed event offered the industry additional opportunities.

Social capital is also significant to the marketing industry. This has been made explicit in the statutory documents of its regulatory bodies. The first regulatory body of the marketing communications industry in Poland is the International Advertising Association that was established in 1991 and formally registered in 1993. The association emerged as a response to the economic changes in Poland at the beginning of 1990s and recognised an opportunity to formalise and institutionalise the advertising industry in Poland. The overall mission of the association is to form positive attitudes towards advertising, including its benefits to the market economy; shaping and maintaining the industry’s prestige; facilitating professional cooperation; and supporting freedom of choice and professional trade standards. It reports that professionalization is enacted via education and professional training (IAA 2010).

The second professional body, the Marketing Communication Association, was established in 1997, and from 1999 onwards it was affiliated with the European Association of Advertising Agencies. The association forms a professional coalition of seventy three firms in the area of marketing communications, online communications, brand consultancy, and media houses that are committed to the development of an effective marketing communications industry as well as promoting the industry’s interests. It reports involvement in the formation of the industry standards: it organises competitions and conferences enhancing those standards: ‘Effie Awards’, ‘Media Trends’, and ‘Polish Advertising Competition’. The Association describes itself as a platform for “knowledge exchange between advertising firms and lobbying the public administration, central and local, on behalf of citizens and industry” (SAR 2010).
One of the marketing industry’s ‘structuring structures’ perpetuating nation branding discourse is professional events enabling reproduction of marketing ideologies. Of particular significance is ‘The Festival for Promotion of Cities and Regions’ that have been formed by the industry, at the initiative of Ströer Group in Poland (supplier of outdoor and digital marketing solutions). This structuring structure was set up in 2007 and the first edition of this event was held between 17 and 18 April 2007 in Warsaw. For its organisers, the first occasion of this event became an opportunity to invite Simon Anholt as a key note speaker: he delivered a talk entitled ‘Competitive identity: the new brand management for nations, cities, and regions’ (Anholt 2007). This structuring mechanism for dissemination of branding ideology and practice has been routinised into an annual event. Similar events include ‘The Promocity’ organised by the Association for Development of Cities and Regions that presents itself as a network of experts in “place marketing, advertising, public relations, intellectual property issues, the public bidding law, the EU law, online marketing and e-business” (Proregiona 2011). A similar type of ‘structuring structures’ is event organised by think-tanks; they also became instruments for objectifying nation branding. ‘Krynica Economic Forum’ organised by the Eastern Institute, constitutes a ‘structuring structure’ where nation branders have an opportunity to showcase their ideas, and network with the media and policy makers. Anholt was a keynote speaker at this event on 10 September 2009 (Economic Forum 2010). Local nation branders also reported participation in this event (Leon, personal interviews, 2010)

The public relations industry in Poland has also had an involvement with nation branding discourse, but rather ambiguously and poorly documented. The existing market analysis on the industry’s state of the art demonstrates that public relations firms, in-house departments, or Polish government structures have embraced “public relations discourse ” (L’Etang 2006b, p. 23) more frequently legitimizing it with market competitiveness or a growing demand for news stories in local and national politics (Institute for Market Economics 2004). Despite the economic recession, the
The revenue value of public relations market in Poland was estimated to grow by 15% in 2010 (International Communications Consultancy Organisation 2010). Moreover, the Polish industry data indicates that the profession is not highly reputable in Poland (Press Service 2009). Thus far, public relations practice has not even been formally recognised as an autonomous profession by the governmental field of power. It is considered as a broad business consultancy and management function (Central Statistical Office 2007). Moreover, a low social capital of public relations practice is derived from negative associations of this term with what academic discourse defines as ‘black propaganda’ (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999, p. 13) and has locally gained a popular understanding as ‘black public relations’.21

These ‘structuring structures’ presented above demonstrate potential for homologies of positions within the field of power. These homologies might have an impact on increasing ideological effects within the field of power. Bourdieu (1993, p 44) speaks of homologies as a “basis for partial alliances: the struggle within the field of power is never entirely independent of the struggles between dominated classes and the dominant class, and the logic of homologies within the two spaces means that the struggle going on within the inner field are always over- determined and always tend to aim at two birds with one stone”. Those unifying forces had an impact on the relationship between the marketing and public relations professionals and their relationship with the governmental field of power whereby nation branding became a source of unification of language used by them.

21 During the fieldwork, I was drawn by the board member of the Association of Public Relations Firms to an interesting public information campaign. I received a ‘media intelligence’ report and a few related items demonstrating contemporary campaigning efforts attempting to address the social capital of public relations as a response to the misplaced use of the term ‘public relations’ that has the potential of contributing to reinforcement of preconceptions regarding this area of practice in Poland. The report is a supporting evidence for the campaign (Press Service 2009).
NEWS MEDIA AND PROFESSIONAL PUBLISHING

A separate category of ‘structuring structures’, contextualising performative discourse on nation branding are the Polish news media. Given that promotional policy and campaigning are in line with aims of promotional policies, the broadcasting, print and digital media outlets monitor and report on the developments within the field and a broader field of power.22 The news media rely on stories provided by the Polish government structures and other actors (e.g. nation branding consultants or their clients). In fact, media relations play their role in this process. There are three key media relations techniques used by nation branders: networking,23 press releases,24 and media interviews25 on the subject of nation branding. The news media are ‘structuring structures’ channelling messages produced by agents seeking to advance nation branding. Moreover, news media have the ability to appropriate discourse on nation branding and present it as ‘everyday practical knowledge’ (Bourdieu 1991). Through their newsroom and reporting practices, they have ability to normalise and legitimise nation branding. For example, ‘Wyborcza’ (2011) reported on the position of Poland in the ‘Country brand index’ by presenting the following loaded statement:

22 The news stories linking the Polish state’s promotional discourse go back to the accession of Poland into the EU.

23 The evidence for networking with journalists is not less common. This media relations technique has been either enacted at professional events (e.g. ‘The Festival for Promotion of Cities and Regions’; ‘Krynica Economic Forum’) or is explicit at the conference introducing the ‘Nation brand building programme’ to policy makers on 6 December 2004 (Polish Chamber of Commerce 2004a).

24 The Polish Chamber of Commerce, a client of transnational nation branding consultancy, circulates press releases on developments of their projects. For example, in a press release dated 18 April 2007, they state: “How is brand Poland? One thing is for certain: its building is in progress. Throughout the last decade, The Polish Chamber of Commerce has been working on enhancing images of Poland abroad, assuming that a strong brand Poland would benefit everyone” (Polish Chamber of Commerce 2007, p. 1).

25 Examples of media interviews are available in both print and digital media. For example, the CEO of Saffron Brand Consultancy commented in ‘Rzeczpospolita’ (2010) on nation branding in Poland.
There were 113 countries considered in the index and six criteria were accounted for, among which were quality of life, business climate and tourism. Poland’s came out weak in the rating. In the ranking, it took only 79th position, three points better then last year. Even among the European countries, Poland is placed on 29th position, only ahead of Russia, Serbia, Ukraine and Romania.

Although news stories of promotional policies are more likely to feature in the national media, local media have also reproduced nation branding discourse. Given the economic importance of promotional policies, marketing and public relations industry’s professional press took up interests and proactively reinforced contributions to perpetuation of nation branding in Poland. While the mass media outlets report on the development of policies, the professional marketing press in Poland comments on the Polish state field of power for lack of sufficient organisational solutions, and of coherent vision for representation of Poland or Poles overseas; and poor coordination of campaigns produced or commissioned by the Polish state structures empowered to influence world public opinion. Conversely, the mass media content has had an impact on public policy making. The relationship between policies and the media occurred throughout the development of nation branding initiatives.

While the news and professional media played a role in the development of promotional policies, initially, nation branding has been perpetuated within another

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26 Examples of the media outlets professional objectifying nation branding are: voice of the Polish marketing industry, ‘Brief – Marketing Magazine’ and its supplement ‘Brief for Poland’; and the voice of public relations industry, ‘Piar.pl’. Another professional media outlet that comments on the field of national images management is ‘Press’ and ‘Media & Marketing’, both of which are formatted for media and marketing industries professionals.

27 ‘Rzeczpospolita’ on 27 May 2010 offers an example of this kind of reporting in an interview with one of the nation branding consultants. More media relations features on behalf of nation branders have been documented on the Institute of Polish Brand website.

28 A promotional policy of the Ministry of Economics (2010, p. 22) uses media sources to inform the direction of nation branding in Poland.
media related category of ‘structuring structures’ of symbolic domination. They are publishing houses that contributed towards the reproduction of nation branding ideology. For example, the Ströer Group published ‘Promotion of cities: new perspective’; The Institute of Polish Brand published Polish versions ‘On brand’ and ‘Competitive identity – the new brand management for nations, cities and regions’ and Polish Economic Publishers published ‘Nation brand’. 29 This way of disseminating knowledge enabled further objectification of nation branding and provided intellectual foundations for this model of national identity construction.

**TRANSNATIONAL MEDIA OUTLETS**

The transnational media conglomerates are also crucial to understanding nation branding in Poland. While the transnational media can be seen as having power over national representations, the transnational broadcast and print media increasingly offer special broadcasting programmes, sell advertising and advertorial spaces and conduct marketing research 30 into the transnational perceptions of nations and their states. This part of their business revenue has made a mark on discourse and practice of nation branding in Poland. Given that nation branding conceptually merges domestic and overseas realms of national representations, the transnational media have become ‘structuring structures’ for constructing objectifying knowledge on nation branding as well as outlets for nation branding practice-driven representations of Polishness. The ‘Financial Times’ of The Financial Times Group is a good illustration of this point. There are however more media which contextualise performative discourse on nation

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29 All those publications are listed in the reference list at the end of this thesis.

30 Market research was considered by all nation branders as an integral part of their practice. During my fieldwork in Warsaw, I was introduced to several pieces of consultancy reports including market research. For example, one of the local brand consultants introduced me to the report entitled ‘Focus on travel and tourism: online consumer survey’ produced by ‘CNN International’. This research was produced as part of an advertising campaign contract, coordinated by a cultural intermediary of nation branding in Warsaw, but commissioned by the Polish state. In a further part of this thesis, I discuss the most prominent nation branding market research.
branding: they are US and British media corporate structures, e.g. CNN; BBC World; ‘Time’; ‘Fortune’; ‘The Economist’; and ‘Fortune’.

POLISH ACADEMIA

In ‘The state of nobility’, Bourdieu (1996) recognises the role of education to organisation of the contemporary ruling classes worldwide: its division of labour between economic and cultural capital, and its transmission into the field of education that disengages and entwines the two. Their understanding is determined, however, through the specific political economy of practices. The Polish academia is yet another social space contextualising performativity of nation branding. This network of ‘structuring structures’ occasionally delivers lectures, seminars (e.g. Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities; Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University) workshops and professional events on nation branding.

Thus far, nation branding has been introduced in lectures and seminars in the curricula of the higher education institutions, delivering courses in marketing, transnational communications, politics, international relations and business degrees. First, functionalist PhDs on nation branding have emerged legitimising nation branding within Polish academia (Raftowicz–Filipkiewicz 2009). In that respect, academic publishing on nation branding in Poland is considered as “constructing the objective world” (Bourdieu 1991, p. 165). To date, Polish academia has not produced a single critical account of nation branding. If anything, in their works, Polish academics neither recognise its limitations nor explore the consequences. The Polish academia has also been as a source of labour for nation branders and an intellectual powerbase for actors engaged in nation branding discourse. For example, the Institute of Polish Brand offered traineeships to young scholars, some of whom turned their

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31 There are transnational media outlets which struggle to expand their revenue to capitalise on marketing research, consultancy, strategy, creating and selling media spaces. For example, CNN’s Tourism Advertising Solutions and Knowledge Tasks unit was established in May 2007. CNN has its own local, organisational representation in Poland. Its interests in Warsaw are represented by New Communications.
knowledge into career opportunities. In 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs awarded a prize for the best dissertation (Krycki 2007) in the area of international relations for a MA dissertation on nation branding that had been produced by one of the Institute’s trainees. He was later employed by the Ministry.

**NGOs, THINK TANKS, MARKET RESEARCH ORGANISATIONS**

A separate category of structuring structures in terms of mediation of nation branding discourse is constituted by think tanks located in Poland. While some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Poland have participated in campaigning as actors commissioned by the Polish state, among the NGOs are also public policy think tanks that in their professional reports mediate nation branding discourse. Their engagement in discourse on nation branding is secondary as they did not struggle to form the field of nation branding directly, but their practices have been described by nation branders as bearing ‘hallmarks of nation branding’. They have been occasionally contracted by the field of power to produce projects, and the outputs of their professional practice reproduce nation branding discourse.

The most prominent in this category of structuring structures is the Institute of Public Affairs. It is a public policy institution which was established in 1995 “to support modernisation reforms and to provide a forum for informed debate on social and political issues” (IPA 2010). The Institute positions itself as an actor acting at the

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32 One of the mechanisms facilitating enactment of promotional policies by the Polish state technocrats is distribution of economic capital in the form of subsidies amongst the NGOs in Poland. Those subsidies are donated to finance cultural events and campaigns that are primarily aimed at challenging images of Poland and Poles overseas. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs enacts this policy mechanism via competition called ‘Promotion of knowledge about Poland’. In 2009, the economic capital donated to NGOs amounted to 1996286 PLN (app. £ 400.000) (PMFA 2009b).

33 The latest example of a text reproducing nation branding discourse is a consultancy report entitled ‘Images of Poland and Poles in Great Britain’. It was produced after the governmental ‘Polska! Year’ campaign in UK in 2009. One of its findings reveals the following discursive statement: “The brand Poland is rather blurred and indistinct. Polish products admittedly, to be sure can be found everywhere, but there is still lack of brand leaders that can be immediately associated with Poland” (IPA 2011, p. 5). This report was co-financed by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British Embassy in Warsaw.
crossovers between academic fields, the political fields, the media and NGOs structures. Among its statutory priorities is the implementation of projects significant for the public domain, identification of social issues, and public policy development. The Institute enjoys a network of associates and publishes the outputs of its selected practices as books, policy papers and consultancy reports. Its publications are targeted at the Polish state field of power, the mass media and other non-state actors. One of the practices performed by the Institute is the production of the research reports exploring the transnational perceptions of Poland and Poles. In 2003, the Institute legitimised its research with the following utilitarian statement:

_The research results presented in this publication might be used to develop overseas promotional policy of Poland and might be used in the National Marketing Programme_ (Kolarska-Bobińska 2003, p. 8).

The term ‘national marketing’ was used by the Polish Chamber of Commerce (2003) in its policy proposals, prior to employing a Western nation branding consultant. In fact, the Chamber of Commerce co-financed this particular piece of research (IPA 2009). Over the years, the Institute of Public Affairs normalised the term ‘nation brand’ in its publications. Its 2011 report revealing perceptions of Poland and Poles in the UK explicitly includes references to ‘nation brand’ and to a selling scheme for nation branding consultancy called ‘Nation Brand Index’ (IPA 2011, p. 18-20). Finally, research organisations form a ‘structuring structure’ that enables a supporting discourse of nation branding in terms of the legitimacy. Among them are TNS OBOP and Maison both renowned in for their market research. The above ‘structuring structures provide’ “instruments for knowing” (Bourdieu 1991, p. 165) for

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34 Although the professional accounts of nation branders reveal references to the existing market research as evidence legitimizing nation branding, there is no evidence that the TNS OBOP has not used the term nation branding itself, but its polling services were used by nation branders to produce their consultancy reports. This actor in the structuring structure has produced research on the reputation of Poland (TNS OBOP 2005) and its polling research reveals that a sample of Poles supports promotion of the Polish state.
those involved in the distribution of acts of symbolic power inherent to nation branding practice.

**CORPORATE ENTERPRISES IN POLAND: THE ACADEMY OF BRANDS**

Finally, a remaining category mediating discourse on nation branding is selected corporate businesses operating in Poland, but closely aligned with the social space where nation branding was introduced. The literature review reveals that economic nationalism can be enacted by corporate organisations both by corporate communications, including public affairs, and can be reinforced by national sentiments enacted through marketing or public relations messages resulting in extension of the symbolic capital of reputation (Wang 2005). These are the critical prerequisites for enacting economic nationalism by corporate organisations. Nevertheless, the structuring structure that is emerging from the data - the Academy of Polish Brands - has been formed by nation branders on commercial promises as well as national sentiments. In the publication produced by the Institute of Polish Brand (2001), *‘An economy under its own flag’*, nation branders in Poland reveal the organisations forming this structuring structure.

Among them are enterprises operating the Polish markets, some of which were MNCs and their ‘Polishness’ in terms of economic and symbolic capital mediating the Polish national identity features is questionable. This structuring structure consists of sixty one organisations (Institute of Polish Brand 2001). The Academy of Brands scheme was organised by the Polish Chamber of Commerce that awarded membership certificates to thirty one businesses on 27 March 2000 and, once this scheme was formalised by the Ministry of Economics, a further thirty organisations have joined it as per ministerial nomination on 26 October 2000. The Institute of Polish Brand (2001) reveals plans to expand this structuring structure to approximately 2000 organisations. One of the statements emerging from the Institute’s publication (2001, p. 444, original in English) says:
Members of the Academy constitute an unusual intellectual, promotional, patriotic, and financial capital and a huge but as yet untapped driving force. It is time for that potential to start working for the benefit of the Poland brand.

This ‘structuring structure’ extends the performative actions of nation branders into the realm of business organisations and demonstrates the acceleration in the development of ‘branding culture’ in Poland (Kornberger 2010) that had been previously relatively sealed off from the promotional culture within Polish field of power. Its role in the archetypical nation branding project is discussed further (p. 214). Furthermore, consultancy discourse accompanying the central ‘Nation brand building programme’ discloses that the following institutional actors were planned to be included in the envisioned field nation branding: the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economics, Polish Chamber of Commerce, the Council of Poland’s Promotion, and the Ministry of Regional Development (Saffron 2007, p. 120). This vision does not correspond with the social reality presented above.

This chapter has presented this set of my findings which have enabled me to further contextualize nation branding practice. In the first section of this chapter I have uncovered culturally-grounded myth of ‘branding’ as an idea and demonstrated that it is present among Polish state actors in the field. Further, I have presented ‘structuring structures’, which in the settings of my analysis, facilitates the dissemination of nation branding as an ideology. Finally, having identified key types of resources in the field, I have outlined ‘structured structures’ of the field and mapped out positions of the agents in its structure. Notwithstanding shortcomings of my approach to the mapping exercise, this procedure has demonstrated how resources within the field operate as a structuration mechanism. This aside, I proceed to the presentation of types of habitus that have enabled the emergence of nation branding in the field structures.
CHAPTER EIGHT: TYPES OF HABITUS AND LEGITIMIZATIONS

THE FIELD HABITUS

The finding that is central to understanding the relationship between class and national identity construction (Blum 2007), and reconstructing the inter-institutional field dynamics is the habitus of agents enabling the emergence of nation branding in the Polish settings. In this section, I report on a habitus of those actors forming ‘dominant coalitions’ as, by virtue of their decision-making abilities or consultancy initiatives, they had the biggest impact on the field. Those dominant coalitions include, on the one hand, decision-makers among the Polish state actors and, on the other hand, private sector interests groups and nation branding consultants that are newcomers to the field. Therefore, in this chapter I present those collective characteristics “moulding social practices” in the field (Weinwright, Williams, and Turner 2006, p. 537).

The procedure for unfolding habitus, similar to Weinwright et al.’s (ibid.) study, is based on analysis of common characteristics revealing dominant types of habitus in their field. This part of the findings is informed by revealing personal, professional, and institutional dispositions as those were articulated through the interviews as critical to the field dynamics: the internalised tastes, predisposition, tendencies, propensities or inclinations are drawn from the interview data, curriculum vitae and biographical notes used for self-presentation by the agents. All (n=43) participants of the main fieldwork stage shared their dispositions enabling me to disclose the intersections between dominant types of habitus and their role in the field agency. Given that the relationships between the agents were reported as performed in their professional settings, the crossovers between individual, institutional, and professional dispositions is critical to understanding how the professional class of nation branders applies those dispositions in their interactions with the Polish state bureaucrats.
INDIVIDUAL HABITS

I start off with disclosing the individual features of habitus as the relationship between individual and society is significant to understanding their trajectories. Among the professional class of nation branders are senior management of the Polish Chamber of Commerce, senior players in marketing, advertising and public relations industries and senior and middle bureaucrats within the governmental field of national images management. Given the subject of this study, this section captures personal dispositions of the field actors. Although national identity construction has been linked to the proprietors’ class (De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999), its understanding has been extended into the institutional and professional classes (Artaraz 2006). Indeed, the record of those characteristics enabled me to make explicit links between the field and practice and remains in line with the class-driven vision of national identity.

The field actors here are predominantly representatives of business with some background in corporate communications. Although social theorists until recently have been reluctant to talk about the emergence of a ‘middle class’ in Poland, the majority of them are middle class professions or reveal inclinations to bourgeois behaviour, tastes, and experiences. For Bourdieu (1984) ‘taste’ is the category which indeed operates as a ‘class marker’ (understood as a quality). What is worth noting is that not all the Polish field actors come from the ‘intelligentsia’ background (Eyal at al., 2000), but nation branders have been attempting to exchange their dispositions to facilitate their upwards mobility in their professional milieu. Their professional backgrounds also indicate a belonging to the middle class, which is, on the one hand, structurally close to the field of power, and on the other, by virtue of their professional skills, enjoys privileged access to the field of power. Because nation branders claim expertise in practice which has a symbolic dimension, it was seen as of relevance to policy goals.
The dominant field actors operate as a senior and middle management within the Polish or they are entrepreneurs with business consultancy, politics, marketing, advertising journalism, the media production, or public relations backgrounds.

While the data does not explicitly register ages of the field actors, there was a notable generational gap in the field. Particularly, those representing Polish youth emphasised the division on the basis of ‘bureaucratic’ or ‘apparatchik’ mind-sets as a characteristics of distinction between older and younger players in the field. In this context, a distinction between bureaucrats and nation branders was made with regards to understanding nation branding practice:

*For us it was clear, but for decision-makers nothing is clear. This is a completely different world* (Franciszek, personal interview, 2009).

Readiness for adaptation of nation branding by the state institutions in Poland was also highlighted by private sector consultants:

*Similar to individuals, institutions also undergo a process of maturing”* (ibid. 2009).

He further continues:

*I think that among the employees of those institutions, there is a developing feeling that, we are ‘civil servants’ [original in English] and we have some aims to meet. And one of those serious aims is, indeed, promotion of Poland* (ibid. 2009).

In other words, age has been seen as a generational differentiator in assessing ‘consciousness’ of marketing knowledge in general and nation branding in particular. For nation branders, the bureaucratic mindsets, associated by them with the Soviet
past, were seen as an obstacle to understanding the importance of nation branding. It is not to say that the ‘homo sovieticus’ was a feature revealing different qualities in the field. On the contrary, specific aspects of the Sovietised sedimentation that might have been an impediment to enacting nation branding have not been explicitly revealed, but age as a quality was associated with professional mobility, interest and understanding of marketing and requirement for nation branding practice. Those closer to the state structures were allegedly less inclined to fully recognise its practical value.

Given the complexity of the investigated social space, biographical differences among dominant actors in the field are not revealing. However, they have inhabited few widespread features. With regards to cultural clues, the interview places, such as cafes (e.g. Coffee Heaven; Coffee Karma; the staff café at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Bar Teatralny Syrena; Numery Litery), restaurants (e.g. Nesebar; Dyspensa), work settings (e.g. institutional or business offices or conference rooms), or private flat, revealed some of their tastes. Although different from one another, the taste markers of the field actors suggests that they surround themselves with middle class aesthetics and attributes: books, including professional publications, and reports (the book collection of senior managers at the PTO and the PMFA included Polish editions of texts on nation branding written by Olins and Anholt), reproduction of paintings (e.g. ‘Pologne Polen Poland Polska Zakopane’ by Stefan Norblin in the IAM), posters (e.g. posters representing UK ‘Cool Britannia’ nation branding campaign, featuring Mark Leonard were displayed on corridors of the Polish Chamber of Commerce); furniture (e.g. Art Nouveau style interior design at the PMFA and the IAM); architecture (e.g. purpose redecorated for the IAM, Art Nouveau styled Sugar Refiner’s Palace); national symbols (e.g. Polish national emblem in case of the PMFA or the ME displayed in offices); classical music (e.g. ‘Four seasons’) or display their past achievements (e.g. professional awards, certificates, media clippings), including, in some cases, nation branding related projects displayed in their offices (e.g. framed
The interviews offered an opportunity to reveal another aspect of the individual habitus: formal dress code (either formal, e.g. suits or smart casual, e.g. jeans, jackets shirts, polo shirt, brief cases); courteous linguistic social interaction (e.g. small talk before the interviews); tactful individual conduct (e.g. for example, interactions with co-workers); and, with few exceptions, attention to etiquette. The class markers have been common across the field actors both in private or professional social milieus. Regardless of the institutional belonging and self-account of their practice, the field actors declared enacting their communicative practice in the field for a common good. Their professional practice has not, in their views, served exclusively their individual pursuits, but served the overall public interest. It was seen in utilitarian terms. This sense of public service was also shared by marketing, public relations and advertising consultants: their professional practice has been ‘performed for Poland’. Although those worldviews have not always been appreciated by the bureaucratic class in the field, nevertheless they have been seen as important in the field.

An additional characteristic that was common across the field is a Westward orientation, or the Western professional experiences of the field actors. The Westward orientation is notable in policy making by the field actors. The Western experience, by and large professional, discloses development of an extra layer of sedimentation that has shaped the field mechanisms. For example, the Deputy CEO of the Polish Tourist Organisation, director of the Adam Mickiewicz Institute and director of the Public and Cultural Diplomacy Department had worked in the US and Western Europe. Also private sector nation branders revealed Western professional experiences, either in the marketing industry or elsewhere. As far as their understanding of the branding skills set is concerned, it was explicitly associated with the Western worldviews:
We were pioneers of this kind of thinking [about ‘branding’]. It arrived in Poland from the West (Tymoteusz, personal interview, 2010).

With regards to the remaining aspects of the individual habitus sedimentation, the actors studied were males n=27 and females n=16. One of the myths concerning national identity in Poland often emphasises religious affiliation as a true essence of Polishness. As far as the religious sedimentation is concerned, the actors studied reported wider believes affiliations: Roman Catholics (n=22); not practising Roman Catholics (n=2); Protestants (n=2); Agnostics (n=4); Atheists (n=1); Buddhists (n=1); unidentified or not revealed (n=11). Those working locally were all Caucasian, ethnic Poles. Only one of the local field actors reported as from a multi-ethnic, Polish-Russian family background. The transnational nation branding consultant, who played a significant role in advancing nation branding in Poland, was British by birth. He did not reveal his religious affiliations. He was a Caucasian male.

As far as the assessment of personal features required to work in the area of nation branding, the field actors predominantly emphasised individual skills including: ‘performer’; ‘charismatic’; ‘authoritative’; ‘analytical’; ‘visionary’; ‘committed’; ‘patriotic’; ‘critical’; ‘powerful’; ‘influential’; ‘independent minded’ or enjoying ‘cultural sensitivity’. Interestingly, no taught skills have been identified as critical to nation branding practice. As far as recognition of the expertise in nation branding is concerned, the field actors have struggled to recognise them. On a very few occasions, the names of Simon Anholt, Wally Olins, Mark Leonard, and local Polish consultants (e.g. creative director of the Escadra Group or the CEO of the Institute of Polish Brand) were seen as holding sufficient dispositions to perform nation branding in Poland.
Although this is not the central vector in my analysis, data archives reveal that gender has been explicitly noted as having its role in performative discourse on nation branding. Although, my findings are not conclusive, among the seventeen private sector branding consultants there was one female in a senior position. Her grasp of the field explicitly links gender with nation branding; she made an explicit connection between competitive relationships among actors in the field and masculinity:

**Interviewer:** There are many institutions in Poland talking about nation branding. How would you, as an external observer, describe relationships between them?

**Interviewee:** Terribly competitive in the sense that they all say ‘this is my field and I have the monopoly for knowledge’. Thus, without having to wait...

**Interviewer:** Sorry, I understand competition for knowledge, but what are those people competing for? What is at stake here? This is what I am trying to understand...

**Interviewee:** For implementation, completion of projects, I am guessing. I don’t really know. And because for so many years nothing was happening and I was observing how different men were jumping down each other’s throats. I finally concluded that I should do my own thing (Natalia, personal interview, 2009, underline added).

Although for Bourdieu (1998) gender is an important aspect of habitus, and his publication of ‘Masculine domination’ sparkled a debate with feminist writers on the position of females in the Western societies, the evidence I collected does not allow me to present an exhaustive insight of the relationship between gender and nation
branding in Poland. The above statement explicitly reveals male domination among nation branders, and in my view, has been made explicit as it has emerged in the account presented by the only female nation branding consultant in the field. None of the male nation branders commented on gender related features of the field dynamics or their attributes. Some of them, however, drew the line of distinction between them and a female consultant by referring to her as a “clever business woman” (Arkadiusz, personal interview, 2009). Gender division in the field requires further data.

INSTITUTIONAL HABITUS

*Vis-à-vis* personal habitus, the institutional dispositions are a second essential dimension facilitating understanding of the field dynamics. Given that nation branding was discussed at the crossroads of few institutions, it is worth capturing how broadly defined practices interlink with the settings of a particular field actor. With respect to the institutional interactions, this study follows the view that “institutions and incumbents of institutional positions shape each other in an unpredictable way” (Eyal et al. 2000, p. 44) and class distinctions between the dominant coalitions shape the directions of relevant institutional agency.

The difficulty of capturing all qualities of the field management lies in the fact that some of the actors changed and moved beyond the field. For example, the former head of public diplomacy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agnieszka Wielowieyska travelled to the Chancery of the Prime Minister to become a director of the Foreign Affairs Department and Andrzej Sadoś, was sacked by the Prime Minister Donald Tusk from his position as the head of public diplomacy. Personel changes at the key positions in the field are characteristic of the government actors there. Until 2008, the Institute of Adam Mickiewicz had eight directors. Changes among senior management in other institutions have also been reported, but those at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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Throughout the fieldwork, those actors refused to be interviewed. In a telephone conversation, Sadoś refused to offer insights into his professional practice and Wielowieyska’s office informed me on her behalf that it is best to speak to the policy makers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Affairs are critical to promotional policy making and its relationship to nation branding projects. However, management operating with the field at the time of the fieldwork operate partly driven by their instructional objectives, partly from trans-institutional relationships with other actors. In fact, the institutionally signified ‘we’ or ‘us’ is equally important as trans-institutional connections between the players. The institution-centric view, however, remains a prominent feature of the field. The collective ‘we’ and ‘us’ have been emphasised in the professional accounts by actors forming dominant coalitions in the field. Those emerge as markers of institutional belonging, including directions of policy making and projects planning. The Deputy Director of the Polish Chamber of Commerce reveals it in the following statement:

*Nation branding has arrived in Poland thanks to us, and it can be said, that it was imported by us*” (Maciej, personal interview, 2009, underline added);

Similarly, the department director at the Ministry of Economics discloses the development of nation branding and links it with institutional world-view as sediment of habitus:

*We are starting off with a big European project, promotion of the Polish economy that is part of ‘The Innovative Economy’ programme. Thanks to this programme we are hoping to finalise the construction of the overarching ‘meta-message’ about Poland and then transfer it into our area to do with promotion of branded exports.* (Tadeusz, personal interview, 2009, underline added);

The institutional dispositions are also revealed by the head of public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
To me, a practitioner, but also a governmental official... hm, I associate branding with products or commodities. Many marketing and nation branding publications that I have read told me that Poland can be considered as a commodity and it should be sold. I don’t quite believe in this. It is not about launching or selling a product. Poland already exists in the international communication flow, but the main issue at the moment is its presentation (Zofia, personal interview, 2009, underline added).

The organisational habitus of group belonging was also emphasised by nation branders. The leader of a local initiative, The Advertising for Poland Association, the first non-governmental organisation engaged in nation branding in Poland, reveals:

The Association was a very cool idea as it was all about combining expertise. You see, everyone in the industry is interested in serving the national brand as it is prestigious and who knows what else and we have attempted to pre-empt the competition. We said, let’s don’t do the public bidding, let’s don’t compete with each other, let’s do something together for this country (Igor, personal interview, 2009, underline added).

The closest institutional settings in which nation branding has been performed is critical to understanding dynamics of trajectories, but the field where this discourse has been contested has one common denominator: both policy data and professional accounts of dominant actors in the field declare responsibility for or vested interest in symbolic representations of Poland overseas. It would be a simplification to claim that senior and middle management of the field institutions are exclusively closed within their own institutional life-worlds. On the contrary, a central characteristic among the management of public institutions is openness to listen to new institutional voices
whereas marketing and public relations professionals or their clients have been less flexible with regards to accepting varying institutional practices or policy solutions.

Furthermore, institutional habitus is important to the field dynamics as nation branding advocates offer their institutional solutions on how Polish nation branding should be performed; who should enact its praxis and who should manage it. Indeed, the statement by a transnational nation branding consultant suggests that public and private sector actors should set up their own institutional framework to perform nation branding in Poland:

_We should have a coordinating committee_ (Michael, personal interview, 2010, underline added).

This narrative unfolds in the consultancy report, ‘A brand for Polska: further advancing Poland’s national identity’ produced as part of the central nation brand building programme:

_There are five main elements: a new national branding directorate, a steering group, an advisory panel, task forces and brand champions_ (Saffron, 2007, p. 119).

This institutional arrangement, as envisioned by nation branders, is to liaise with the so called, ‘steering group’, including: the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Economics; Polish Chamber of Commerce; the Council of Poland’s Promotion; the Polish Tourism Organisation and the Ministry of Regional Development and the assumed inclusion of chairman from Saffron Brand Consultancy (Saffron 2007, p. 120). This _centralised_ approach to leadership is closer to the habitus sedimented by corporate managerialism than an institutional network developed in the state-building process done through the legislation process.
As it stands, institutional habitus enables understanding of the actors as nation branders entered in a specific institutional setting in Poland; nation branding had been contested within pre-defined institutional network, and nation branders had their own vision of institutional management. Further insights into the actors’ characteristics enabled me to divide the habitus into the institutional settings: bureaucratic or technocratic fraction, driven by various policies and business habitus, driven by predispositions to manage nation branding. With regards to the Polish bureaucracy, their institutional habitus unfolds their relationship to the type of policy making they are engaged with. The senior and middle management of the Polish state actors also emphasised the significance of communicative practice within the institutional structure they manage. The head of public and cultural diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs links its institutional communicative practice and the Polish foreign policy objectives; she states that the primary role of public diplomacy is:

...communicating the Polish story overseas by simultaneously making sure that it fits with objectives of the foreign policy (Zofia, personal interview, 2010).

The professional account by a senior manager of the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency reveals that his institution is accountable for marketization of Poland and facilitation of economic policy aimed at “attracting external investors” (Jacek, personal interview, 2009). Similarly, institutional policy ties are reported by the senior manager of the Polish Tourism Organisation where tourism is considered as part of the economic policy therefore “requiring management by applying wide tools to enact this policy” (Daniel, personal interview, 2009). The institutional habitus has also been shaped by historical features: the struggles over competences and changing links between actors which impacted on the contemporary situation within the field.

The institutional habitus also emphasises interdependency with the broader field of power. This feature demonstrates relationships between the political field in Poland,
leadership style, and the quality of relationships as defined by dominant coalitions among the field actors. Indeed, the institutional processes and visions were reported as dependant on the political field: both political alliances within it and personal qualities of politicians. One the one hand, the links between political alliances and the field was explicitly linked to the representations of Polishness; an advisor to the Polish Tourism Organisation states:

...Law and Justice would like Poland to be represented overseas in a Romantic, 1920s sort of way, whereas the Civic Platform seem to strive towards more modern representation of Poland via promotional activities (Igor, personal interview, 2009).

On the other hand, the head of public and cultural diplomacy reports how her superiors’, minister Sikorski habitus, links to institutional dynamics:

Sikorski is a new type of minister in his thinking about Poland [...] He understands, quite rightly, the fact that [...] we shouldn’t be ashamed of anything, that we should be down with martyrdom, and that we are a strong country. To me his thinking is more of a result of his personality, education, and a traveller’s mindset, than an actual idea that is being conceived here (Zofia, personal interview, 2009).

While the approach to representing the institutional processes has had links with the field of power, it was reported that the state actors can also benefit from their own managers’ career progression. It was reported by one manager at the Polish Tourism Organisation that one of their former employees was nominated to the rank of the undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Sport and Tourism and this progression better positions this actor in the field of power (Kinga, personal interview, 2010).
As far as bureaucratic class properties are concerned, the management of the field plays a key role in the field dynamics. This has been reported by the managers by revealing their commitment to the statutory either institutional or departmental tasks, struggles as part of the policy making (e.g. consultation processes), adherence to procedures (e.g. public bidding), interests and analysis of in the market research and media reports (e.g. market reports), attention to changing legislature (e.g. institutional changes proposals), sensitivity to the external auditing (e.g. policy reviews), learning from ‘best-practice’ from the overseas institutional competitors, and most importantly, to their decision making capabilities.

Furthermore, institutional habitus, depending on the levels of institutional seniority, clearly exceeds boundaries of a single institution. Particularly, the senior management of key institutional actors report cooperation and exchange of ideas on the level of policies making, institutional consultations, personnel crossovers and governmental projects or campaigns managed within the field. Although, it was characterised as not an ‘ideal cooperation’ in terms of inter-institutional exchange of ideas or projects coordination, nevertheless, it undoubtedly exceeds the boundaries of a single state institution. For instance, it was reported that promotional policy making at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is subject to broader consultancies (Zofia, personal interview, 2009); the head of public and cultural diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one of the undersecretaries of state at the Ministry of Economics have a seat on the Council of Polish Tourism Organisation (consulting body on tourism policy) (Polish Tourism Organisation 2011); in 2004, a body called the Council of the Promotion of Poland was set up to stimulate cooperation on promotional policy.

As far as the institutional habitus is concerned, it is also characterised with a high level of formalism, particularly regarding qualifications. This quality remains in line with Bourdiesuan notion of the bureaucratic class whereby the state tends to legitimize their views of academic credentials (Poupeau and Thierry 2005). For example, a senior manager with a well-established tract of service for the Polish state
emphasises this formalism by accentuating the importance of formal qualifications over practical skills among the bureaucrats; in the context of career progression description for the Polish state, he states:

> I had to get my own money, go to a private university, and pay. Nobody here [in public administration] is asking you about practical skills. You have a piece of paper and this is it [reference to qualification certificate]. Unfortunately, that’s how it is (Jacek, personal interview, 2009).

As aforementioned, management of the state institutions and departments responsible for specific areas of promotional policy making have reported holding academic qualifications (either on MA or PhD levels) in their relevant areas of institutional practice. Interestingly, none of the actors, either the state or non-state, revealed the requirement of formal qualifications to practise nation branding.

On the other hand, the collective habitus of private sector nation branders is less formalised with regards to education and qualifications. I define their disposition as ‘business habitus’. Given that the habitus is characterised by “older forms of behaviour and prior ideas continue to shape actions within new collectivities” (Eyal et al., 2000, p. 44), the emerging themes support that their entrepreneurial dispositions facilitated venturing into the new avenues of business and consultancy. Dominant nation branders are aligned with either marketing or public relations industries, and specialise in consultancy and ‘brand management’ practice. For public relations marketing, and advertising consultants - local or transnational - nation branding is an ‘extra service’ in their business portfolio or operations. For them, nation branding is not their exclusive consultancy area: it is a part of their business framework. For example, the corporate websites of the Saffron Brand Consultancy (2011); the Eskadra Group or Corporate Profiles (2011) offer corporate branding consultancy. On the other
hand, the management of the Polish Chamber of Commerce took interest in nation branding as it is concerned with national economy; its deputy CEO states:

> **Overall, Polish elites have limited knowledge of the economy. Perhaps it is understandable in our historical context, but it’s very harmful [...]. To break through with certain economic agenda therefore is very difficult** (Maciej, personal interview, 2009).

As far as institutional dimensions of the business habitus reveal, it is linked to business opportunities. One of the local nation brander presents her world-view on Poland as a dynamic ‘Never, never land’ offering plenty of opportunities:

> ...so if we live in a country in which dynamics of change are so vast, a country in which opportunities, ‘those opportunities’ [original in English] are enormous, so dynamics of change are so fast that it is difficult to define anything in a specific timeframe and say, this is how it is, because it will change in a second. The landscape is changing every single day (Natalia, personal interview, 2009).

Therefore, the business habitus sediments are based on a set of professional identities valued in marketing and creative industries: strategic thinking; creativity; research skills; networking skills; presentation and organisational skills; professional writing skills; analytical and research skills; understanding of bureaucratic procedures (e.g. public bidding), communication and advocacy skills. Those qualities have been emphasised in discourse on nation branding by advocates of this model in their professional testaments on their practice. The crossovers between the institutional habitus and the business habitus is represented in the following statement by the head of public and cultural diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
I am against generating all ideas by bureaucratic heads. Because this is my life-world, I am limited in some ways. I am not a branding or marketing expert so I might find it difficult to figure everything out on my own (Zofia, personal interview, 2010).

This openness to listen to new ideas was common across the state bureaucrats within the field. However, the selection of newcomers’ qualities remains in line with specificity of the project or type of external expertise required by the institution operating with the governmental field of national images management and the field of power. This openness to marketing ideas was also characteristic of other governmental actors across the field, but some treated them with greater reflexivity than the others, leading to resistance against some solutions offered by nation branders. For example, the centralised approach to nation branding management was questioned by the Deputy Chairman at the Polish Tourism Organisation; he points out:

There are some people who argue that everything that involves promotion of Poland abroad should be under the one wing, in one institution. But, if you consider, for instance, the European solutions, there is no country with such institutional setting...for a moment, just a short moment, not so long ago, perhaps four or five years ago...that all aspects of promotion of foreign direct investment, trade, including tourism were attempted to be integrated by Portuguese government. Namely, they merge, I believe it is called ISEP, but they quickly gave up this type of institutionalisation...in Poland this tendency for some reason still exists (Daniel, personal interview, 2009).

While the institutional dimension of habitus was important from the point of view of understanding how my participants’ ‘life-worlds’ shaped the inhabited social space, the next layer of sediments of their socialisation reveals insights into habitus that was an outcome of their professional trajectories and performativity.
PROFESSIONAL HABITUS

In a Bourdieusian study of making capitalism work in CEE that also explored Poland, Eyal et al. (2000, p. 41) characterise the socio-economic conditions preceding the democratic 1989 revolutions in the following way:

Surviving in Central and Eastern Europe in the last past half century can be linked to travelling in outer space and trying to plot a safe course. The course of action has not always been clear. Learning how to navigate in this strange, ever changing environment eventually reinforced self-confidence. One stayed on the course, no matter what.

This section demonstrates sediments of professional habitus of the field agents as reported in their education and overall career trajectories. The above statement strongly resonates among the field actors. Their professional habitus also important to this study as performative discourse on nation branding has been reported to be enacted in their professional milieu and their past professional sediments translate into their understanding of nation branding practice. The professional habitus has also a strong bearing on nation branding performative discourse. In fact, the professional habitus of key Polish bureaucrats travelling across the field varied from institution to institution, specifically with regards to attitudes to nation branding. Overall, the managers of public institutions are primarily policy driven, competences orientated, and procedures sensitive. The crucial feature of their professional habitus is their empowerment to shape directions of public policy. Their professional careers have been aligned with the Polish state whereas the professional habitus of the newcomers to the field has had the greatest impact on advancement of nation branding in Poland.

Principally, nation branding in Poland has been seen by marketeers as another level of the marketing toolkit that can be applied into yet another social space. Their professional accounts reveal that nation branders have a background in business,
public administration, management, or the professional fields of marketing, journalism, public relations, visual arts, or a combination of the above. Data reveals that only two participants (Arkadiusz - The Charted Institute of Marketing certificate; and Jacek - MBA) reported having a formal marketing qualification. Although nation branders have declared senior executive positions in transnational marketing consultancies, their career trajectories reveal that they have learnt their profession on ‘the job’. Given that nation branding is a derivative of marketing practice, one could assume the field actors would potentially have marketing education. Nation branders, however, merged their previous professional socialisation with the one acquired later in their lives and applied their professional discourse into the context of opportunities. Even, a so-called ‘guru’ in nation branding, a transnational brand consultant, spoke of himself as a ‘self-made man’. This statement reveals how he has conceived an idea of nation branding:

*I have read history at the university and I have always been very interested in history, always been very interested in aspects of history that you might describe as cultural or anthropological, or sociological or something. And it occurred to me very many years of ago that nations have a path of identity. And if you read about, say, the French revolution, or for that matter the first or the second French revolution, you will continually see this dynamic of change. When I started using the phrase nation as a brand, I really don’t know. Probably around 1985 or something like that, something like that, I would think.*

(Michael, personal interview, 2010)

He further unfolds the impact that Eric Hobsbawm, a Marxist historian, has had on his thinking on national identity while he was thinking on ‘brand’ and reveals that:
So I think my interest in history, and my interest in, what we then called identity got me into that world (Michael, personal interview, 2010).

While Hobsbawm’s (1990) structuralist view of nationalism is influenced by Marxist explanations of history, and he was comfortable with the term propaganda, the use of this term is shunned by nation branders with a professional background in corporate communication or brand management. However, the selection of specific words to signify branding practice remains a conscious behaviour among nation branders and it becomes a part of the professional habitus that marketers are engaged with. One of the local nation branders describes this process as “marketing the marketing ideas” (Arkadiusz, personal interview, 2008). Indeed, links between a careful selection of words and nation branding have been made explicit, contextual and depend on what type of clients nation branders are talking to:

These are terms that people use ahhh... in different situations. If I am talking to a very academic individual or to very academic institutions or if I am talking to a charity, the word ‘brand’ is anathema, they don’t like, but they do like reputation. So, if I am talking to Amnesty International, let’s say, or Oxfam, I might talk about your reputation. If I am talking to Oxford University, actually, Oxford University is all about brand now, because they know all about that. Well, destination branding, destination...it is all just words people use, they are semantics (Michael, personal interview, 2010).

As far as the Polish nation branders are concerned, the specificity of their professional habitus lies in the distinction between the type of education they have internalised and their contemporary professional occupation. One of the interviewers reveals dynamics of a dichotomy between ‘education’ versus ‘career’ in Poland, particularly at the
beginning of the 1990s. In a self-presentation statement revealing the generational situation of the Polish youth post-1989 he states:

_It was the beginning of all changes in Poland. People ended up in various jobs, often completely by accident. To an extent, it was pure luck that determined where people worked as all you had to do is to have a common sense approach and ability to speak a foreign language and you could do whatever you wanted_ (Wojciech, personal interview, 2010).

He further goes on to report a lack of academic courses in marketing in Poland at the beginning of 1990s:

_When I started my studies, marketing and other related academic courses did not exist_ (Wojciech, personal interview, 2010).

Although a few actors stated that marketing (but nation branding) had been part of the curricula of their academic courses at home or overseas universities. Indeed, his case was not isolated: it was clear those actors who pursued careers in marketing industry, despite having different educational backgrounds, spoke of nation branding with a great enthusiasm. Among the field actors, travelling in the institutional field, there were two people with formal, academic or professional qualifications in the area of marketing. It was clear that nation branding had not been studied as a separate academic discipline in Poland (or anywhere else in the world) and as far as this sub-field of marketing is concerned, Poland was considered as ‘a desert’ in terms of qualifications and even academic publishing.\(^\text{36}\) Some of the field actors shared their professional experiences within the field of education in Poland: they extend their

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\(^{36}\) During the pilot study, I was drawn by one of the nation branding advocates to a book manuscript that has been considered as one of the very few publications exploring the relationship between marketing in cities and regions (Szromnik 2010). Later, during my fieldwork, another book publication that I was drawn to is by Proszkowska-Sala and Florek (2010).
professional identities by academic teaching, e.g. tourism management, public relations, or organise seminars on nation branding at Polish universities. Few of the field actors have been educated to PhD level. All of them had a higher education degree, typically at MA level.

Yet another aspect of the professional socialisation of nation branding in Poland was a professional development of nation branders. While one of the transnational consultants reported that he conceived an idea of nation branding (p. 183), local marketing, advertising, and public relations consultants reported that they have been following the sub-field of marketing by reading professional publications, professional press, professional workshops, and the news stories reporting on nation branding. One of the key figures in the local advertising industry stated:

*The first Michael’s visit to Poland was the beginning of a vast debate on the subject of nation branding. Back then, the first logo was created and, I think, it was a turning point, a milestone so to speak, in building branding for Poland. It was the beginning of a debate when his ‘Creative Tension’ idea was produced. We tried to understand what he meant by it and how to implement this idea; this resulted in a debate* (Leon, personal interview, 2010).

Apart from following ideas of key industries’ professionals, professional socialisation also took place by exchange of ideas within the industry networks (e.g. professional events) and collaboration of mutual projects with nation branding ‘gurus’. Notably, one of the nation branders offered a critical commentary of his industry colleagues as “not reading, not developing as professionals, but constantly replicating industry slogans and ideas” (Arkadiusz, personal interview, 2009). His critical reflection on professional development among nation branders was unique and, in that regard, stood out from other interview accounts.
Overall, the professional habitus of nation branders in Poland remains in line with that previously defined by Aronczyk (2009b), but it can be extended to public relations practitioners who adopted nation branding as part of their professional portfolio of business and expertise. Although my findings do not entirely correspond with her definition, the professional class doing nation branding in Poland express an interest in consultancy and promotional policy developed by the state actors. The difference between Aronczyk’s (ibid, p. 295) definition and my findings lies in level areas of operations: nation branders travelling within the Polish state structures are engaged in consultancy for commercial, not only government clients. Another discrepancy between my findings and Aronczyk’s definition is a clear distinction between transnational and local class of nation branders explicit in my study. While UK nation branding consultants travel across many national locations (including Poland), the local class of marketing, advertising, and public relations consultants pursuing nation branding have not been, at the time of my fieldwork, engaged in consultancy for any overseas governments. In that respect, my findings suggest that the UK consultants belong to a corporate fraction of ‘transnational capitalist class’ (Skilair 2001) whereas Polish consultants’ agency was restricted to national settings; at the time of my investigation they targeted exclusively the Polish state clients.

Overall, the above findings regarding characteristics of dominant agents in the field can be graphically represented using Eyal et al.’s (2000, p. 45) institutional trajectory correction model of social change (Figure 3). This model demonstrates that types of habitus do not only account for rational choices made by actors but articulates how their dispositions influence institutional trajectory of action that is not exclusively driven by economic criteria and choices. The idea of habitus connects the structure to individual motives, world-views, and performativity in fairly autonomous, context-dependent but also, I argue, to persuasive relationships. In the context of nation
branding dissemination in Poland, those relationships form a new type of *bricolage* bridging the state structure and self-interested pursuits of nation branders within it.

Eyal and colleagues (2000) explain their model of institutional change using two key axiomatic assumptions. First, they highlight that social change is an outcome of agency which does not only occur as a result of reproduction of social structures as a path-dependence model would have it. For them, social actors change and build institutions in an attempt to stay on their social trajectory in order to preserve as much of their identity as possible. This way, Eyal *et al.* (ibid.) reject a thesis that if the ‘right’ institution is created, the ‘appropriate’ behaviour will inevitably follow. On the contrary, they emphasised that “institutions and incumbents of institutional positions shape each other in unpredictable way” (ibid. 2000, p. 44). Second, the trajectory correction model of social change highlights that the institutional imposition of neo-classical economics might not instantly lead to the development of a class of capitalist-minded citizens. This is explained by diversity of habitus in the structure as agents might subvert, constrain and obstruct radical social changes.

In the context of this study, the neo-classical ideology of neo-liberalism in Poland has led to the formation of new structures, such as new institutions in the field of national images management. It also enabled new entry of new actors to pursue institutional strategies crossing over ‘path dependence’ between traditional economic pursuits and new, culturally-grounded ideas and practices that that have sedimented among them and been brought into new institutional settings. In that, nation branders represent a class of professionals that build and/or change institutions and social relations and by following their habitus they aspire to “preserve as much identity as possible – in a rapidly changing social space” (ibid. p. 42). Thus, an institutional field is not being only reproduced, but also shaped in mutually reinforcing relationships.
Having established individual, institutional, and professional habitus within the field, this thesis moves onto outlining legitimacy of nation branding and emic explanations of its practice. While the habitus section outlines key characteristics of the dispositions acquired in the past, the next section reveals how those sediments translate into the enactment of nation branding in Poland. By drawing primarily from policy documents and the interview archive, it shows how nation branding was understood by the participants of my study engaged in nation branding.

LEGITIMIZATIONS OF NATION BRANDING

This section reveals how nation branding in Poland has been legitimised by the field players. Bourdieu and Passeron (1977, p. 5) claim that “representations of legitimacy” contribute to the exercise and perpetuation of power. According to Bourdieu (1991), power is partly enacted by legitimization: it is the cement of class relations (including the professional class) and all forms of power require legitimating.
The ideology of nation branding as a system of symbolic violence has the capacity to impose meanings, which, in turn, have the ability to articulate different position-taking. For Bourdieu (1987, p. 13) every symbolic imposition involves aptitude to “legitimate a vision of the social world and of its divisions”. Following Bourdieu’s (1989, p. 377) claim suggesting that “legitimization of power leads to justification of the arbitrary character of ideologies”, it reveals why Poland and Poles need nation branding. This section also reveals the ideological misrecognitions accompanying nation branders. By doing so, this section informs the research objective number three.

Within this study, the problem of nation branding’s ideological legitimisation has been addressed by interview questions. This research objective was transferred into interview questions enabling me to highlight various positions by participants of my study. At first, I was trying to capture the worldviews of my informants with regards to their understanding of the emergence of nation branding in Poland. The macro-micro divide is an inherent feature of all social realities. Although participants brought to attention macro factors while legitimizing nation branding, this section is not an attempt to bridge the macro-micro divide, but to understand why, in their views nation branding should be turned into a component of policy. My efforts concentrated on revealing their understanding of why, given that there are the state actors equipped with resources to symbolically represent collective identities, Poland, in its post-Soviet socio-historical context requires a brand building programme.

On a surface level, the need for nation branding practice in Poland has been legitimised in accordance with the supply-demand logic. It was stated by one of the nation branders:

*Poland does not have a distinct brand, therefore it needs one* (Leon, personal interview, 2009).
This professional account creates, in its own right, the requirement for nation branding practice. The alternative statements among nation branders suggest that although Poland has a brand, it requires more professional management (Krzysztof, personal interview, 2009). Regardless of the differences in fundamental rationalisation of nation branding, there are more compound discursive meanings emerging about this area of practice. In their approach to interpretative practice analysis, Holstein and Gubrium (2008) argue that ‘why’ questions can reveal directions of performative practices. Those types of questions enabled me to understand the invasion of nation branding within the state structures and their emergence within localised settings. The complex legitimisations ‘why does Poland need nation branding’ are explicitly articulated by the actors travelling in the field. They unfold in the following order: competitiveness, marketization, modernisation, mediation, and professionalization.

**TRANSNATIONAL COMPETETIVNESS OF POLAND**

The reoccurring narrative legitimising nation branding practice in Poland is a growing need for transnational competitiveness. There are a few themes that surface from the data archive which justify this aspect of nation branding. Interestingly, nation branding, similar to the writings of nation brand conceptualists (e.g. Anholt 2005) has been justified by actors with advancing the competitive position of Poland as well as requirement for building a sense of national identity that fits the changing global position of the Polish state. This argument has been presented as a metaphor whereby a comparison of competitiveness among firms to competition between the states is an inherent feature of globalisation. For nation branders, EU membership has further interdependence of transnational relations and therefore increased requirement for nation branding. This remains in line with Stopford *et al.*’s (1991, p. 1) argument that contemporary states are competing more for “the means to create wealth within their territory than for power over more territory”.
The governmental technocrats who have been sympathetic to nation branding reveal that national competition takes place over “capital, knowledge, resources and technology” (Jaroslaw, personal interview, 2010). However, this generalising statement demonstrates ideological misrecognition as the relationship between the symbolism of nation branding and competition over material resources is more complex than the one presented by nation branders or its sympathisers. It is economic capital that is at the centre of producing exchange value, whereby symbolic capital is a derivative of this process. Implicitly, competitiveness as a feature of neo-liberalism (King and Sznajder 2006) had been appealing to the Polish technocracy in the past. Nowadays, it also forms a defence for market-orientated ideology of nation branding. The legitimacy of nation branding unfolded throughout the interviews reveals metaphorical comparisons of competitive relations whereby marketing in general and nation branding in particular are considered as “warfare of the twentieth first century” (Igor, personal interview, 2009). While those legitimisations are largely metaphorical, the exchange of relationship between symbolic and economic capital remains an unspoken part of the legitimising statements on nation branding.

First, themes reported by the architects of nation brand building programme justify their practice with a notion of reinforcing Polish competitive identity and its relationship with a ‘country-of-origin effect’. For them, nation branding has the potential to position national brands within better segments of international markets (Maciej, personal interview, 2009). This, in return, according to this rationalisation, increases the probability of capitalising economically Polish enterprises and strengthening the economic position of Poland as a player within the global markets. This justification is also common amongst the field of power: Polish public administration institutions responsible for influencing world public opinion; technocrats working in those institutions competitiveness of Polish commodities; Polish tourist products and cultural products. They are all important aspects of national image making, but they are not always sympathetic to consultancy and terminology of nation branders.
The second competitiveness related theme rationalises nation branding by articulating the ‘otherness’ utterance. There were examples of alleged nation branding exercises which have increased the necessity for nation branding practice in Poland. Among them a special role has been played by Spain and Ireland as examples to consider in debates on nation branding. In the view of nation branders, the success stories of nation brand make-over were worth paying attention to (Krzysztof, personal interview, 2009). This, by implication, significant aspect of competitiveness, is crucial from the national identity construction of the notion of ‘otherness’ (Wodak et al. 1999). Given the pro-market orientation of nation branding, ‘the otherness’ is utilised simultaneously in national and market terms. Therefore, a common validation for nation branding practice is either the fact that ‘the others are engaged in nation branding, therefore we ought to’; or ‘we have to do it; otherwise we will be left behind’. The following statement demonstrates that:

**Interviewer:** Why, in your opinion, does contemporary Poland need a brand?

**Interviewee:** Most contemporary countries in Europe and around the world think of themselves as brands and attempt to strengthen their brand images. There are measurable profits that can go along with it (Leon, personal interview, 2009).

The third theme within this competitiveness line of argumentation is the notion of contemporariness which also plays its role in national competitiveness. A pragmatic legitimising position that has been brought to the attention by nation branders is that nation branding has become a mark of our times: Poland and Poles need nation branding “because this is the world we are living” (Natalia, personal interview, 2009). This theme integrates well with the notion of modernisation. The sense of ‘space and time’ has merged together in order to legitimise nation branding practice.
MARKETIZATION

Although branding practice (O’Reilly 2006) had been defined as a capitalist meaning making process, nation branding, by means of specific discursive statements, has been legitimised in market terms. Among the legitimising discursive tokens used by nation branders, were those capturing socio-historical settings for this ideology and practice in Poland: ‘between past and present’; ‘Polish success story’, and the most prominent, ‘competitive identity’ of the contemporary national market. The latter, was spoken by nation branders as neglected by the Polish neo-liberal faction of the political class. The policy-making was characterised by them as lacking a dominant entrepreneurial orientation in terms of facilitating national enterprises by the Polish state. This policy issue, combined with ambiguous attitudes within the political field to promote national industries, and subsequently corporate brands, or product brands, has encouraged the Polish Chamber of Commerce to manifest the competitive identity of Poland via ‘Nation brand building programme’. To the management of the Chamber, since 1989 Polish enterprises did not construct a strong enough recognisable corporate brand or product brand that would enjoy reputable status on transnational markets and could have been used as a national flagships by the actors in the field of national images management in their communicative practices. This is how nation branding has been defensible in the context of the first wave of neo-liberalisation of the Polish state:

The neo-liberals rejected discussion on the questions of identity. If anyone discussed questions of identity, it was the identity derived from nineteenth century Romantic tradition of uprisings [...]. Overall, the Polish history has had a tendency towards Romanticism at the expense of Positivism (Maciej, personal interview, 2009).

37 The ideological notion of a Polish national market has been articulated in a book produced by the Institute of Polish Brand and entitled ‘Market identity: attributes of the competitive state’. This book contains chapters written by prominent Western nation branders and managers from the Ministry of Economics and the Polish Chamber of Commerce.
This state of affairs, according to nation branders, has been harmful for the Polish economy. With regards to the notion of Polish national identity, the national market was a dominant notion among nation branders. Therefore, nation branding driven manifestations of collective identity yet again necessitate the need for modern, dynamic, and contemporary vision that would fit with the logic of competitiveness.

The relationship between identity of the national market (assuming that there is only one Polish market) and Polish national identity (assuming that there is only one Polish national identity) is not always clear in the legitimising discursive order. Nation branding, however, aspires to perform this imagined frame of reference by bridging the gap between Polish markets, and social attitudes of Poles and foreigners towards Poland. The marketization theme has also been revealed by governmental actors in the following utterances: ‘tourism market’ (Leon, personal interview, 2009); ‘tourism products’ (Daniel, personal interview, 2009); ‘cultural products’; ‘heritage as a product’ (Jarosław, personal interview, 2009) that were reoccurring in discourse on nation branding. Those reinforce the view that Poland should be thought of primarily in market and commodities terms as well as being marketed to other nations.

Interestingly, this changing dynamic of the relationship between Poland as a market and Poles as citizens is also justified with the need to shape existing and new generations of ‘brand ambassadors’. This forward-looking view of nation branders is justified with a long term commitment to nation branding as a way of changing the self-images as well as images of Poles amongst the community of nations.

**MODERNISATION AND DEVELOPMENT**

Modernisation is the next legitimising theme which features in discourse on nation branding practice. Yet again, participants reveal conditions that enabled its emergence in public affairs and references were made to macro factors shaping the necessity for nation branding as a ‘modernising process’. For them, post 1989 changes to the political economy of Poland and changes to the international position of the Polish state signify justifications for nation branding make-over. The interview
accounts reveal that democratisation of Poland is a feature of the political field enabling the emergence of the nation branding idea. It is emphasised in the following way:

“Post 1989 everyone was focused on building democratic structures. It was important back then. Now, that we have moved onto a different level we can think about the national brand” (Edyta, personal interview, 2009).

While a link between democracy and nation branding emerges as a legitimising notion, a silent aspect of the discourse on nation branding practice is the relationship between democracy and the market forces influencing the Polish state. A discursive feature which was foregrounded within the ‘modernisation’ theme is the assumption that modernisation is seen in progressive terms and in this context nation branding is legitimised as having the ability to describe what Polishness is ‘truly all about’. For nation branders, their practice involves manifestation of ‘modernising ambitions’ whereby changes in Poland can be manifested in conspicuous ways. Moreover, the notion of truth is linked with the notion of normalisation understood as, on one hand, enjoying democracy, and on the other hand, as having a free market economy and broader participation within communities of nations. The following statement by one of the bureaucrats is revealing:

For the first twenty years [after 1989] we did not engage with nation branding as there were other priorities – national security, border issues, bilateral agreements with neighbours, NATO accession, the European Union membership. Nowadays, in my opinion, on the one hand, we need to politically catch up with the European states in order to demonstrate that we are a normal European country and, on the other hand, catch up with them economically (Edyta, personal interview, 2009).
The private sector nation branders take a different position and largely explain the requirement for nation branding as a result of negligence of this idea by the Polish state. They also, however, make an association between nation branding and modernisation in the context of discussing challenges to this area in Poland:

...not just to convince [cultural and political elites] that nation branding is a recipe for economic success and that thanks to it everything can be easier, but it would be interesting to talk about how to make ordinary Poles’ lives better (Arkadiusz, personal interview, 2009).

Although modernization features widely within discourse on nation branding practice, its ‘politicised’ aspect is a setting for the nation branding. There are two dominant aspects of nation branding as a modernisation project that, in the view of my participants were strongly emphasised: economic and socio-cultural. With regards to economic modernisation, it was argued, that nation branding should bring relevant economic effects by attracting tourism, investment and export support for Polish commodities and services (Krzysztof, personal interview, 2008). This legitimisation of nation branding practice, however, does not emphasised explicitly who is the beneficiary and how specifically nation branding facilitates the economic exchange.

Socio-cultural legitimizations of nation branding merge with the notion of national identity. While nation branding was justified by facilitating transnational economic exchange, its practice simultaneously aims to address the alleged inferiority complexes of Poles. Moreover, it was revealed that nation branding is understood as having the ability to update specific aspects of traditionalism existing within the Polish national community: e.g. Polish commodities, Polish cultural heritage, Polish tourism destinations, Polish historical events, political movements and Polish political figures. Those features of national culture carry a modernising value to nation branders. In
fact, the socio-psychological aspects of nation branding have been legitimised as a form of national spiritual healing - a cure against the trauma of the Polish past (Adam, personal interview, 2008). In that respect, nation branding was presented as a forward looking practice seen in terms of moving from traditionalism to modernism.

**MEDIATION**

While, within a modernisation theme, nation branders emphasised a crucial role of nation branding in terms of representing the contemporary notion of Polish national identity, mediatisation of their representations was equally important to understanding the significance of nation branding practice. The mass media play a dual role in this process: it was seen as a mirror for understanding Polish national identities abroad and a means to challenging pre-existing identities of Poles overseas (Rusciano 2004). The mass media was spoken of as a solution to the negative representations of Polishness and as a problem. Alongside cultural, economic or sport events that had the marketable potential to be mediated and to represent Poland and Poles in a ‘positive way’. Those, ‘pseudo-events’ (Boorstin 1985) were praised by nation branders for their outreach and marketable storytelling opportunities. Additionally, those events were considered as the potential contexts for launching a nation branding programme.

Within this underlying legitimising theme nation branders and the Polish state bureaucrats shared a view that Poland is quantitatively underrepresented, particularly in the Western media: its political, economic and cultural achievements were considered as undervalued by the media outlets. Among local nation branders, the Western media were mythologized as powerful transmitters of opinions. With regards to the mediation of national identities, the struggle for contemporary representation of national features has been described in practical terms. Against this argument, nation branders emphasised that even mediation by advertising can bridge a gap between underrepresentation of Polishness in the Western media and new identities:
It is better to do something than do nothing (Natalia, personal interview, 2009)

A strong Westward orientation with regards to mediation of identities by means of publicity generation and advertising was also reported by the state actors. To stay connected with the voices of world public opinion, state actors monitor overseas media content. Within the legitimizing narratives certain media stories about Poland or Poles have been used in an anecdotal way to demonstrate the requirement to challenge the Western mass media representations by, supposedly, bringing Poles into disrepute: e.g. lost football games by the Polish national team or, purportedly, bad behaviour of Poles overseas (Arkadiusz, personal interview, 2009). Among the local nation branders, there was a tendency to highlight the negative media stories. This causality of explanations was common among local nation branders whereas a key consultant travelling across the Polish state structures takes a position that nation branding requires a clear branding idea that can be further mediated. He states:

"We should then talk to all...you have to get the media on our side. This is very important. You need to get the media on the side because the most important audience for Polish identity is the Polish people" (Michael, personal interview, 2009).

In professional accounts, the significance of the mass media to nation branding practice was considered as an oracle without a clear prophecy. What remained a silent aspect of nation branders’ discourse were characteristics of the Polish markets, political issues, social issues, or cultural production that are mediated by the field of journalism regardless of their vision. Although the mediation was stressed as fundamental to nation branding practice, the distinction between ‘manageable’ and ‘non-manageable’ aspects of national identity representation were not spoken of by nation branders. For nation branding consultants, management of the national brand assumed the mediated control of messages manifesting their core idea. This modernist
mind-set of ‘command and control’ did not consider multiple interpretations of their messages. Furthermore, the requirement for careful media planning was emphasised as “no nation is able to afford exposure in all media” (Natalia, personal interview, 2009). Those generalising statements concerning media planning lead, as it turned out, to a struggle over channels and messages construction. Those are discussed later in this thesis (p. 217).

Another argument that emerges within the mediation theme is acceptance of third party endorsements as reinforcers of positive features of Polishness flowing within transnational news media. For example, local nation branders consider opinion leaders and their mass mediated commentaries on Poland (e.g. Michel Platini) as endorsers of favourable opinions. This ‘third party tactic’ was considered as useful to national identities representation, but connections of those news media stories and consultancy projects were not made. In the light of this ambiguous explanation, a distinction between stereotypes and auto-stereotypes has been difficult to capture: it was not always clear whether local nation branders referred to their auto-stereotypes or foreign stereotypes of Poles. The anecdotal selection of news media stories as a discursive strategy legitimizing nation branding has one more feature, namely, some realms of representation of Poland and Polishness are more important than another:

**Interviewer:** Let me ask differently. If, during his official state visit, Aleksander Kwaśniewski [former Polish president], appears drunk on the TV or openly acknowledges that he used to work illegally in the UK and this event or interview is mass mediated, is that nation branding?

**Interviewee:** Everyone has weak days. Besides, during communist times a lot of Poles worked illegally overseas” (Natalia, personal interview, 2009).
An assumed disconnectedness of nation branding from political representations of Poland and Poles is reoccurring within nation branding discourse. The bureaucrats in the field took a position that their institutional communicative practices can be more effective in terms of challenging perceptions of Polishness. Among them there was a sense that their agency is less politics-driven, therefore has greater potential to shape images of Poland in comparison to the actions within the political field (Daniel, personal interview, 2009). The influence of the mediated qualities of the Polish politics, domestic and foreign, on the Polish national identity representation has been silent among nation branding consultants. Furthermore, neither nation branders nor state policy makers explicitly emphasised the mass media as an actor in the promotional policy planning or policy making. This feature has not been reported in the legitimising order of discourse.

As far as the overseas mediation theme reveals, those who refer to Poland as a brand also emphasise journalistic professionalism as an issue regarding building of the brand Poland. In their view, cases of foreign journalists reporting within a specific ‘thinking paradigm’ about Poland leads to the reproduction of negative opinions on Poland (Bronislaw, personal interview, 2010). Yet again, to demonstrate their points, I was introduced to the news media stories perpetuating anti-Polish stereotypes. While research discussing stereotypes of Poles abroad (e.g. Kolarska-Babińska 2003) was brought up by nation branders, their interpretation of this study was vague. For example, the analysis that had been referred to by participants is that of the Institute of Public Affairs, a Warsaw-located public policy think-tank. Prior to Poland’s EU accession, it conducted a serious of studies. Among them were two noticeable streams of research: quantitative research on stereotypes of Poles among selected European national samples (e.g. Kolarska-Babińska 2003) and a stream of research aimed at the analysis of the mass media content (e.g. Babiński 2004). The interpretation of this research by one of the local nation branders was the following:
In the case of Poland, it is difficult to determine its brand, as Poland has one common feature among all countries in which the Institute of Public Affairs has conducted its research: it is lack of clear associations with Poland and, overall, limited knowledge about its people... (Natalia, personal interview, 2009).

And further,

...therefore, every true information about Poland which is disseminated overseas contributes to the formation of positive images of Poland (Natalia, personal interview, 2009).

This statement suggests that the Polish state and Polish nation, virtually, do not exist in the consciousness of the transnational community of nations. It enables legitimization of nation branding as a way forward to defining collective identities of Poles. A detailed discussion of the Institute of Polish Affairs’ research is beyond the scope of this section. However one aspect of this research is worth emphasizing. Its findings demonstrate that Polish identities feature in the foreign mass media and Poles enjoy some recognition among the transnational community of nations. The results of those studies reveal that images of Poland and Poles differ from one national sample to another. The media content analysis also reveals differing insights. The above statements by consultants reveal the role of research in legitimising nation branding.

PROFESSIONALIZATION AND PROMOTIONAL POLICY MAKING

Yet another legitimizing theme within the discourse on nation branding practice in Poland demonstrates the necessity to further professionalise the field and relevant policies and organisational strategies produced within it. This sense of advancing professionalism also included communicative practices exercised by the field actors whereas the emergence of nation branding was seen as a trigger of professionalization. Furthermore, the management of the nation brand building programme in accordance
with the vision put forward by nation branders had further potential to advance the field expertise. Within this theme, justifications for nation branding were argued as contributing to professionalization of public life in Poland, particularly manifested through the prism of public-private enterprise. A contractual advisor to the Polish Tourism Organisation, sympathetic to nation branding took the following position:

*Among those factors is the requirement of professionalization of public life, especially in the context of emerging entrepreneurship laws enabling a mix public and private funds in common projects* (Igor, personal interview, 2009).

The professionalization of policy making has been explicitly linked to nation branding practice. The initiators of the nation branding brand programme for Poland consider it in terms of ‘public education’ targeted at “young academics, the mass media as well as the Polish public administration” (Maciej, personal interview, 2009). To them, discussion of nation branding and public education is also a feature of ongoing professionalization in policy making. Indeed, the practical solutions that the discourse offers, e.g. ‘strategy’, ‘programming’; ‘projects’; ‘execution’; ‘effectiveness’ are appealing managerialist buzzwords normalised within the field and they are considered as having an impact on professionalization of promotional policy making. In that respect, the archetypical ‘Nation brand building programme’ was acknowledged by policy makers within the field in ‘professionalising’ terms:

*At the beginning of the decade, a grassroots initiative by the Polish Chamber of Commerce and Prof Olins from London - ‘Brand for Poland’ - has resulted in an in-depth reflection on images of Poland and promotion of our interests. This project resulted in the professionalization of debate on promotion of Poland. Only in recent years, an understanding for the systemic approach to promotion has*
been created: strategic planning, coordination, and redefining the institutional reforms” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009a, p.15).

The professionalization of policy making and implementation as a feature of public affairs has not, however, been consistent with positions taken by nation branders. They took a view suggesting that there were shortcomings in their implementation by the Polish state actors: lack of clear policy vision (Tymoteusz, personal interview, 2010); decentralised approach to policy making (Maciej, personal interview, 2009); poor coordination of campaigns (Miroslaw, personal interview, 2009); diffused resources (Franciszek, personal interview, 2009); and unclear campaign objectives (Arkadiusz, personal interviews, 2009). To them, there was room for improvement in the enactment of this policy and nation branding could facilitate this process.

Chapter Eight has presented findings informing the second research objective. By outlining characteristics of dominant - individual, institutional, and professional - types of habitus in the field, this chapter has revealed that within the field habitus is one of the mechanisms for institutionalization of nation branding in Poland. Throughout this part of the thesis, I have also presented this set of findings explaining how habitus translates into the legitimacy of nation branding and requirement for enactment of nation branding as a feature of public policy. While on the one hand, nation branders perceive their new practice as advancing and modernizing symbolic aspects of Polishness, Polish state bureaucrats contest features of nation branding as a consultancy practice enacted on the basis of ‘public-private’ partnership. Therein lies the tension between those who advocate nation branding as an institutional practice and those actors who are supposed to accept it. In the next chapter, I present symbolic relationships between agents and struggles in the field. This chapter accounts for those field events which have led to the emergence, reproduction and appropriation of nation branding as an ideological discourse in the Polish settings.
CHAPTER NINE: SUBJECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FIELD

MAKING SENSE OF NATION BRANDNG: DISCOURSE ON PRACTICE

The departure point for this section is a statement that initial nation branding projects, including the paradigmatic ‘Nation brand building programme’ (2003-2007), have failed to be implemented as masterminded by their proponents. Above all, there was no agreement among the Polish field actors that nation branding can be spoken off as a sustainable practice within the field of national images management in Poland. It was clear, however, that most institutional ‘objects’ have been ‘subjected’ to nation branding discourse (Foucault 1988). Therefore, in this section, I start off by revealing nation branders’ discourse on their practice. While the field actors predominantly associate nation branding with the expertise of Simon Anholt, Wally Olins or Mark Leonard, or a nation brand building programme commissioned by the Polish Chamber of Commerce, its breakdown lead them to a reflection revealing that this area of practice in Poland has not gone beyond ‘endless meetings’; ‘conferences’; ‘policy consultations’; ‘policy statements’ by governmental field actors (Arkadiusz, personal interview, 2009). However, a coherent nation brand building programme has not been pursued by the Polish field of power or the actors empowered to manage national images abroad. The advertising campaigns commissioned by the governmental actors in the field have been characterised as ‘bearing hallmarks’ of nation branding practice, but lacking a common denominator in terms of representation of Polishness.

Having revealed the legitimisation of nation branding in Poland, this study moves on to unfolding the field mechanism. First, this chapter presents how nation branding practice is understood by actors (Bourdieu 1990). Second, it reveals events leading to the institutionalisation of this nation-building exercise (Brubaker 1996). Following design of this study (p. 89), I present nation branding practice through the prism of its practitioners; their views, however, were cross-examined with reference to outputs of their practice. The link between agency and outputs of their actions allows
better insights into communicative practices. While nation branders reveal multiple positions on nation branding, they explicitly reported it as a communicative practice:

_Nation branding is about communicating positive aspects of Polishness_ (Natalia, personal interview, 2009).

By means of comparisons, nation branders spoke of nation branding as a practice involving a commodifying process:

_Poland is a similar product to foodstuffs; it is a similar product to a politician. Its attributes need to be defined, highlighted and presented_ (Natalia, personal interview, 2009).

A comparison between commodities branding and nation branding has been reiterated in a few other accounts by the local national branders. In that respect, to them nation branding was closer to commodities branding than to corporate branding. However, the crossovers between corporate branding and nation branding emphasised in nation branding writings (Olins 1999) have not been captured by the local nation branders. The practice of nation branding has been reported as requiring a central, inspiring idea:

_You have to have a coherent, consistent idea, which is of course fragmented in the sense that what you do is for you, but it relates to somebody else. The United States is a good example of that..._ (Michael, personal interview, 2010).

Nation branding was understood in terms of meaning-making, e.g.

_It is about building a recognisable brand of a country and connotations referring to the experience of this country_ (Edyta, personal interview, 2009).
There were also accounts which link nation branding with statehood:

> You know what, for me, nation branding is a set of activities in various areas of the state agency, which will result in improving the position of the state on the international stage. And this should, naturally, bring some real benefits in the areas of tourism, foreign direct investment, or international engagement (Arkadiusz, personal interview, 2009).

The term ‘nation branding’ has also been identified as confusing:

> I am not sure if the term nation branding is adequate: given that one state can be a home to a few nations, I guess, state branding might be more appropriate (Leon, personal interview, 2010).

Direct questions, about the relationship between public diplomacy and nation branding, although asked retrospectively, resulted in the following statements:

> Searching for words is a completely different discipline... that is choosing the adequate words. I am also inclined to accept the poetics, such as public diplomacy rather than branding. It is mainly to do with the fact that...uhh, if we talk about it on the national level we talk about nation brand. Nation brand is a fact. It is also a fact that nation brand exists or that reputation is important. It is also a fact. Branding, understood as a method of developing the brand is not necessarily a fact (Krzysztof, personal interview, 2008).

In that respect, nation branding is concerned with reputation. It was also explicitly reported in functionalist terms:
Nation branding is one of the methods of increasing the international competitiveness of a country (Maciej, personal interview, 2009).

The above characteristics of nation branding emerging from the field were at times confused by examples demonstrating the scope of the nation branding exercise. For example, the Museum of Warsaw Uprising was reported as an exercise in nation branding. It was reported by a local nation brander:

...but we are talking about marketing. This museum was set up so to expose the next generations of Polish youth to its ideas and simultaneously it was created to keep the memories of the Warsaw Uprising alive. And, I think, this is a marketing construct (Tymoteusz, personal interview, 2010).

While museums as social spaces are considered (Blum 2007) as having potential to reproduce national identity, the literature nor my fieldwork make explicit connections between those social spaces and nation branding. I argue that this discursive statement demonstrates a professional distortion among some nation branders whereby in hypothetic examples, they have inclination to extend the scope of their emerging practice into new settings. The previously disused (O’Reilly 2006) discursive ‘acquisition by merger’ strategy creates mythologized marketing notions. Furthermore, this insight offers evidence of dialectical interplay between the past that emerged from the fieldwork archive as more solid discursive theme.

TIME AND SPACE DIALECTICS: PAST VERSUS PRESENT

With regards to promotional policy implementation, the Polish experiences of the last two decades, have lead the field actors to some reflexivity on promotional policy making. In fact, a special theme that has emerged both in promotional policy

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38 A decision to open the Warsaw Uprising Museum was made by the former President of Warsaw, Lech Kaczyński, on 2nd July 2003.
and professional accounts, supports self-reflexivity among the field actors, part of which is the context of nation branding ideology and practices as a special role was attributed to Poland’s past. The agents often represent their overall institutionalised practices in relation to the socialist experiment in Poland. During the fieldwork, I was drawn to a report edited by the director of the Institute of Adam Mickiewicz (2010) which offers a self-reflexive institutional account on promotion of Poland, ‘From cultural exchange to new intelligent power: culture and promotion of Poland’. While this report documents a link between Polish culture and a nation’s brand, more importantly it reports on political economy changes in the following statement:

In the aftermath of 1989, promotion has come out of its political isolation and remained only dependant on infrastructure, staffing, application of modern tactics, and methods of their implementation. All those elements, never gained importance in the Polish Peoples Republic (PRL).

This overarching theme - ‘past and present’ - also emerges from the interview data with the field actors. Although, in their professional accounts, nation branding is legitimised through different statements, ‘past and present’ theme plays an important role in their understanding of the nation branding practice. A theme that strongly emerges from the interviews data is a dialectical understanding of promotional practices by the field actors: the contemporary promotional practices remain in a dialectic relationship with the pre-1989 era. An overarching discourse of promotion, underpinned, by neo-capitalist principles suits the technocrats for whom democracy and marketization coexist in an inseparable order. This logic was summed up:

Post-1989 everyone was focused on building democratic structures. It was important back then. Now, that we have moved onto a different level we can think about the nation brand (Edyta, personal interview, 2009).
Their attitude towards communicative practices is also dialectical and reflects how the Polish past is enacted in the contemporary performative discourse on nation branding: while propaganda carries a Sovietised stigma whereas promotion, including a set of institutionalised Western communicative practices (e.g. public diplomacy) is understood as performed, allegedly, for the benefit of all Poles. This position is shared by nation branders themselves; one of them stated:

_We are not talking about the previous system. We are talking about this reality, a normal reality. Previously there was propaganda, in a ‘top-down’ sense – it was a one party line, you know. Now it is democracy and we cannot agree on common goals [in nation branding]_ (Franciszek, personal interview, 2009).

This ‘command and control’ approach in the Polish state’s propaganda before 1989 has been replaced with a plurality of interests, and complex institutional settings. Furthermore, for the field actors, Polish national history is seen as an obstacle to modern nation-building: nation branding is seen a forward looking practice, a new vision of Polishness for the future whereas the tendency to ‘unhealthy’ martyrdom that is present in the Polish public discourse does not match well with their outward looking vision of Poland as a brand. The historical conditions in which Poles live nowadays were described as an effort in ‘catching up’. In fact, the nation branding exercise aimed at describing some of those efforts:

_In the last twenty years we had to catch up approximately one hundred years: in many areas: knowledge, marketing, advertising; same thing happens in case of technology etc. [...]. There are plenty of things happening in Poland, we live very fast, but at the same time Polish capitalism is at its infancy_ (Natalia, personal interview, 2009).
MECHANISMS AND AGENCY IN THE FIELD

This section presents nation branding as an institutionalised “event and happening” (Brubaker 1996, p. 21). In part it reads as a historical narrative as nation branders and government actors reported on the development of different nation branding initiatives. This part discusses how nation branders have been forming a relationship with the governmental actors in the field. There are three key field mechanisms that enabled establishing those relationships: marketization of the governmental side of the field; the influence of nation branders on the promotional policy-making, and mediation of nation branding beyond the boundaries of the field.

These processes coincided with the development of projects which were an ideological interpelling force for cultural intermediaries of nation branding. At this stage however introductory, culturally grounded comments ought to be made in order to better guide the reader throughout the field mechanisms. A departure point for consideration for the nation brand building programme was an assumption that Polish enterprises have not developed strong enough brands that are highly reputable abroad. The reported initiatives in nation branding, particularly the archetypical ‘Nation brand building programme’, reveal how enactment of nation branding has been put in place as an attempt to bridge the gap between the Polish state and the notion of ‘country-of-origin effect’ that is not widely signified by the Polish enterprises. The key discursive events reported in this section are summarised in the Figure 4.
FIGURE 4 OUTLINE OF KEY PROJECTS LEADING TO IMPOSITION AND INVASION OF NATION BRANDING
NATION BRANDING AS LEVÉE EN MASSE

The culturally grounded habitus of the local nation branders played its role in their reports on the field. For example, ‘levée en masse’ has gone down in Polish history as a phrase characterising the early modernist military mobilisation of the nobles at times of war. Principally, they were ‘bottom-up’ movements of the Polish aristocracy who were mobilised by an external threat to the security of the Polish state or sought to expand its territory. Interestingly, those ‘bottom-up’ initiatives in nation branding were reported in metaphorical terms as unified by mobilisation of marketing and public relations industries in a struggle to support the Polish state at the time of increasing market competitiveness. Those similarities were reported by means of socio-historical comparisons between marketing and military warfare:

“Marketing is warfare of our times. Similarly, the Polish Hussars who advanced at Kircholm or Vienna and did a good job for Poland as a brand” (Igor, personal interview, 2009).

The individual industry initiatives were reported as their mobilisation and attempts to build relationships with the Polish state actors. As far as development of nation branding is concerned, for the governmental field of power in Poland, corporate and product brand icons played a role in national and global political economy in terms of conveying messages of Polishness and national reputation. While actors in the field of national images management and a broader field of power recognise in their policies that brand images of corporate enterprises in Poland and their specific brands can benefit the Polish state, thus far, in the view of nation branders, the Polish enterprises have not produced brands that are recognised abroad.

Back in 1995, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, upon the initiative of the Polish Chamber of Commerce, introduced ‘The programme for restoring the role of
From 1999, the President of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, endorsed this programme and called for the construction of ‘modern patriotism’ based on symbols of economic success (The Institute of Polish Brand 1999). The business organisations, marketing, advertising and public relations industries responded to this call for action. In fact, the enactment of this programme has laid later foundations for a number of initiatives that lead to the development of ‘Nation brand building programme’, including ‘The Academy of Brands’ and an extended market research project, ‘The Economy under its flag’. For their initiators, those projects were understood as predecessors of nation branding in Poland. Their details are reported later in the findings section. In the meantime, discourse on nation branding attracted other actors and mobilised their entrepreneurial efforts to contribute to development of nation branding practice in Poland.

The competitive mechanism in the relationship between agents is evident in the proliferation (‘The Session of the Century’; ‘The Apple’; ‘Nation brand building programme’; ‘Poland: Europe is bigger’) of ‘bottom-up’ attempts to reinvent Poland as a brand. The local marketing, advertising and public relations industries welcomed a nation branding discourse as it coincided with their professional habitus. Several of those projects failed and, as it turns out, explanation of those failures depend on who was revealing them - the governmental field of power or private sector initiators of those projects. This reflects subjectivity as a feature in Bourdieu’s relational view of social spaces and corresponds with his notion of position taking in the field (Bourdieu and Waquant 1992). Furthermore, the multiplicity of initiatives, labelled as nation branding, demonstrates the reproduction of this ideology, and bodily effects on

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39 This programme has been reported in a discourse on nation branding practice as a foundation for the development of the archetypical nation brand building programme. However I have not been granted access to the policy itself. A documented account of this programme is included in a booklet produced by the Polish Institute of Brand, ‘Brand for Brands – the Programme for Restoring the Role and Importance of Brand Names and Trademarks in Poland’. One of its chapters spells out the accomplishments regarding this programme, including popularisation and professionalization of branding among the Polish enterprises, the mass media, and academic fields.
professional class agency. Most importantly, it illustrates compliance with a Western promotional culture and resistance against some of its features by the Polish state.

To date, the field actors revealed three significant initiatives in nation branding that have been performed at the crossovers of the state structures and professional class of nation branders. In August 1999, a number of Polish marketing industry leaders formed a coalition attempting to establish a non-for-profit organisation for marketing Poland as a tourist destination. A key role in this enterprise was played by the Eskadra Group and publishers of ‘Brief Magazine’, AdPress. The management idea underpinning the partnership was to unify their expertise in order to prevent competition over individual campaigns. Its leaders aimed to achieve this goal by tightening cooperation between organisations committed to this project. Furthermore, its leaders were hoping that cooperation of key players on the market would prevent fragmentation of campaigns in the area. In the first instance, the industry leaders targeted the newly established, semi-autonomous governmental agency, the Polish Tourism Organisation (1999). The alliance of marketing consultancies and media agencies representatives operating in the Polish markets was initiated with a brainstorming session entitled ‘The Session of the Century’. This industry partnership was formalised as The Advertising for Poland Association. The management of participating actors offered their expertise to set the foundations for the “systematic promotion of the tourism dimension of brand Poland” (Igor, personal interview, 2009).

The creative idea conceived for the first TV advertising campaign aimed to challenge historically grounded stereotypes of Polishness, particularly in Germany, the biggest tourist market for Poland. While strategy planning and brainstorming of creative ideas for the campaign began soon after the Association was established, it soon came to a stop. In the meantime, the Association’s initiative generated some publicity that mediated the project outside the field. Although the project temporarily attracted the attention of management at the Polish Tourism Organization, it soon lost its momentum. The remaining artefacts, outputs of their production are the

The management of the Association revealed that the initiative did not meet with the interest of the Polish Tourist Organisation as a result of politically motivated changes among the senior management of this institutional actor (Igor, personal interview, 2009; Piotr, personal interview, 2009). However, the management of the Polish Tourism Organisation reveals the limitations to the creative side of the campaign as a reason for not executing this particular project (Daniel, personal interview, 2009). Further attempts to revive the Association were unsuccessful and some of its leaders moved their attention to the Polish city councils in the search for other consultancy and, this time commercial, opportunities. Later, however, The Polish Tourism Organisation commissioned advertising campaigns. For example, in a later newcomer to the field, Orbita New Media produced a TV advertising campaign for the Polish Tourism Organisation entitled ‘Let’s boast about Poland’ (2008).

The subjective relationships between the two agents, the Association and the Polish Tourism Organisation, demonstrate position taking. While on the one hand, this suggests that nation branders understand their practice through planning, strategising, and tactical application of advertising, it simultaneously demonstrates how the Polish state actors within the field convert its statist capital into the exercise of symbolic power in deciding on partnerships. For the Polish Tourism Organisation, the creative idea behind the first campaign ‘Poland: an adventure with happy end’ was not acceptable. As far as the silent of this discursive order are concerned, the nation branders did not reveal details of their meetings with the state officials. They also did not report how long they were planning to work on ‘a no fee basis’.

212
A cultural artefact - the Polish national logotype (Appendix 7, p. 363) and accompanying brand book called 'Signifying a general promotion' - was important to the performative discourse on nation branding in Poland and was produced by an advertising agency DDB Corporate Profiles and their affiliates from Brand Nature Access as part of ‘Poland: Europe is Bigger’ campaign. The logotype and a brand book materialised in response to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ promotional policy (1997) preceding the aforementioned in this study of EU accession. This project was formalised in an agreement between the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DDB Corporate Profiles in August 2001. The objective for this campaign was to produce a visual identity representation for ‘brand Poland’. At that time, the idea accompanying the state policy makers was that this symbol should be used by all governmental agents in the field. Its significance for performative discourse is twofold: it was the first act of compliance toward the branding informed makeover of national identity in Poland and it was later considered for incorporation into a broader ‘Nation brand programme’. While the post 1989 changes in Poland yielded development of new national symbols and a revamp of the national paraphernalia, those are considered by nation branders as too political therefore requiring new symbols and ideas to reflect changes in Poland as “representing a break from the past” (Aronczyk 2007, p. 105). The notion of post-politics reappears further in discourse on nation branding practice with reference to the leadership of nation brand management.

A similar scenario happened in the case of the local public relations consultants’ initiative, ‘Public Relations 4 Poland’. In 2006, a number of public relations practitioners formed a coalition which aimed at counselling the Polish government on the strategic direction for mediated aspects of promotional policy. This time, the consultants targeted the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After a few months, this initiative lost its impetus and initial negotiations held with the Head of the Promotion Department at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not yield results. The management of the Ministry’s Department of Promotion (nowadays Public and Cultural Diplomacy) at that time was characterised as distrustful of external strategic
consultancies and finalised tactical tasks itself. This enterprise of public relations consultants generated publicity in the professional press and the Polish news media shaping symbolic capital of prestige (Teodor, personal interview, 2010).

For local marketing, advertising and public relations professionals, engagement in nation branding carries the symbolic capital of prestige and social recognition (Igor, personal interview, 2009. These projects are considered as high profile. Professional accounts present the above initiatives as ‘consultancy free of charge’ implying that the struggle for economic capital is of secondary importance to the marketing and public relations actors in the field. This mechanism has been, to an extent, reinforced by Polish technocrats within the field. For example, DDB Corporate Profiles charged the Polish state a symbolic sum of 1PLN (app. 20 pence) for the outline of the ‘Poland: Europe is Bigger’ campaign. How long private sector professionals were prepared to work for free was not revealed in their accounts. Overall, the economic capital matters remain ambiguous in discourse on nation branding practice: although the private sector industry professionals report on their coalitions as ‘non-for-profit’ or refer to them as ‘social marketing’ initiatives, it is not always explicit what is the dynamic of the relationship between economic and symbolic capital. Those projects, however, generated publicity as well as industry awards both of which engender symbolic capital of reputation. For example, the campaign developed by DDB Corporate Profiles and its sister BNA Brand Consultants generated publicity and hit the headlines of some international media outlets, including ‘The Financial Times’ (Reed 2002). In 2003, DDB Corporate Profiles was also nominated for this campaign to the ‘Effie Awards’, a prestigious advertising industry contest (DDB Corporate Profiles 2010).

To nation branders the competitive field conditions have led to a reassessment in the approach to operate in the field by looking for further opportunities with regards to what Polish state field might find appealing. For example, a senior manager of New Communications, a Warsaw-based branding consultancy and a business partner of ‘CNN’, ‘Financial Times’, ‘The Economist’, ‘G+J’ and local representative of
‘Superbrands Ltd’ had been involved in the development of a proposal for a nation branding project. While the senior management of this actor reported that Polish capitalism has not produced transnationally recognisable corporate organisations or commodities representing iconic Polish brands, New Communications had conducted market research and developed a consultancy proposal which indicates that as far as national symbols are concerned, Polish foodstuffs and cuisine are strong features of Polishness and equally can be considered as icons in the development of the nation branding project with overseas outputs (Natalia, personal interview, 2009). Moreover, in their view, the existing transnational symbols of Polishness, e.g. Solidarity movement, do not carry enough exchange value.

Therefore, a proposed symbol of national representation, in their view, should be traditional Polish cuisine and an overarching symbol of Polishness proposed in this project was an ‘apple’. Consequently, this proposal was presented to the Ministry of Agriculture, but had not been accepted. As a result, New Communications continued to facilitate generation of publicity featuring Poland, advertorials and production of advertising campaigns representing Poland and Poles overseas in global media. This field actor pressed on to provide tactical consultancy services to the Polish state actors state and Polish cuisine became part of the narrative story in an advertising campaign featured on CNN (2009a). The significance attributed to this campaign was that the field of national images management actors – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Polish Tourism Organisation, and the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency – co-financed this project. By the governmental technocrats it was considered as an act of cooperation and they attempted to generate publicity at home (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008). While the projects of local nation branders lead to attempts to influence organisational agendas in the field and assumed trans-institutional cooperation, their projects have never become a part of the promotional policy. There was, however, one exception that was reported by the field actors and it is a central project of this study.
During the course of the investigation, I have encountered evidence suggesting that more private actors attempted to target the field of power with their ideas labelled as ‘nation branding’. They typically relate to what is considered by nation branders as a ‘national product’ or a ‘flagship product’. Some proposals (e.g. ‘Poland at 2010 EXPO World Exhibition in Shanghai: a draft version of programme’) (Corporate Profiles 2008) produced by nation branders have neither been incorporated into any policy nor been enacted in practice. In return, it lead the nation branders to change their actions and, in the light of lack of unifying policy guidelines for nation branding, they maintain relationships with the Polish state field actors by producing or managing tactical communicative outputs: in 2008 TV advertising campaigns (e.g. New Communications initiated and managed parts of ‘Autumn of change’; ‘Eye on Poland’ campaigns); generation of publicity (e.g. special reports on Poland published in ‘The Financial Times’ (2008; 2009); production of logos (e.g. selection of the visual identity system for the Polish Institutes was coordinated by a director of ‘Brief for Poland’); production of professional publications (e.g. ‘Economy under its own flag’; ‘Market identity’) (Institute of Polish Brand 2001) on the subject of nation brandin and organise events (e.g. Young & Rubicam organised workshops on nation branding for the Polish Tourism Organisation; other events in their portfolio of nation branding include ‘Everything can be a brand’) or produce market research (e.g. Young & Rubicam’s ‘Brand Asset Evaluator’). Although consultants criticised the Polish state actors in the field for not taking nation branding seriously, their interest in the subject continues to exist and, in the meantime, they were happy to pursue tactical projects.

40 This documents re-invents Poland as a ‘brand’ – one of its sections is entitled ‘Poland as a brand’.

41 Those advertising campaigns were commissioned by the governmental agents in the field as prompted by a manager at New Communications. The field itself takes credit for those campaigns and reports on it in press releases (Polish Tourism Organisation 2008). The economic capital for those projects came out of promotional budgets at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Polish Tourism Organisation, and the Polish Information and Investment Agency. Polish national airlines ‘LOT’ co-financed those campaigns.
NATION BRAND BUILDING PROGRAMME: ARCHETYPICAL PROJECT

A large-scale nation branding initiative, ‘Brand for Brands’ programme, was initially produced in a draft policy proposal, ‘The Programme of National Marketing’ (Polish Chamber of Commerce 2000). This programme reveals how nation branding had invaded the field in Poland from 2000 onwards. A special role in the struggle to reinvent Polish national identity as a brand was enacted by the Polish Chamber of Commerce, its institutional ally, the Institute of Polish Brand and a British firm, Saffron Brand Consultants. These field actors were the spiritus movens behind the ‘Nation Brand building programme’ for Poland. Their efforts to reinvent Polish national identity as a ‘brand’ were propagated as “the biggest nation branding project of all times” (Saffron Brand Consultants 2007). Indeed, this project has gained a high recognition among policy makers in the field and local nation branders. Again, a reported departure point for this initiative was an assumption that local enterprises have not produced transnationally recognisable brands. This project was an attempt to bridge a gap between commercial interests of the business world with the reputation of the Polish state that potentially affects product and corporate brands (Dinnie 2007).

The entry of Saffron Brand Consultancy to Poland, followed by the formation of a coalition including Saffron and the Institute of Polish Brand, was made possible thanks to the Polish Chamber of Commerce and its senior management. In their professional accounts, the management of the Chamber of Commerce revealed that they approached their chairman as their attempts to pursue their ‘Brand for brands’ programme that had been taken up by the Ministry of Economics (Maciej, personal interview, 2009). In result, the senior management of the Chamber attempted to pursue nation branding autonomously, without an initial engagement of the Polish state actors. What is more, it was revealed that the personal network of actors in the field structure enabled the exchange of ideas and suggestions made with regards to whom should be in charge of nation branding. Those relationships were formed on the basis of personal recommendations. Having worked for the Polish state, the management of
DDB Corporate Profiles reveals in their professional accounts that, back in 2001, the Polish state would not support the Polish marketing industry’s development of a long term nation brand building programme, partly as a result of the low symbolic capital of expertise in nation branding held among the local consultants.

Following on from that, DDB’s management persuaded the Polish Chamber of Commerce to seek knowledge in this area elsewhere, hoping, that it would, not only result in the development of a strategic vision for the nation branding programme, but in institutional centralisation: concentration of economic capital; centralised enactment of promotional policy; definition of national identity features leading to its consistent application across various media platforms, and creation of its visual representations. This coincided with the corporate interests of the Polish Chamber of Commerce as this field actor was interested in the economic policy, commercial branding and had already been involved in enactment of the state policy formation back in 1995. Moreover, the Chamber of Commerce accumulated some symbolic capital of prestige among policy makers by contributing to the enactment of events stemming from the promotional policies. Among them were: ‘Expo Exhibition’ in Hanover (2000); International Arts Festival ‘Europalia’ in Belgium, Luxemburg, Spain and Denmark (2001; 2002); ‘Polish Year’42 in Sweden (2003); ‘European Economic Summit’ in Warsaw (2004); ‘Expo Exhibition’ in Aichi (2005) and other national exhibitions (Polish Chamber of Commerce 2008). These enabled positioning the Chamber as an actor proactively seeking solutions for management of national reputations.

This initiative best demonstrates how nation branders struggle to enact their ideas in practice. Importantly to this study, this programme has been extensively recognised by actors within the field by both public and private sector actors and the policy documents confirm those statements:

42 The ‘Polish Year in...’ are the field managed cyclical cultural events and accompanying campaigns organised by the Polish state overseas. For example, 2009/2009 was a Polish Year in Israel; 2009/2010 was a Polish Year in UK. For the private sector players, those events provide an opportunity to enact commercial opportunities for research and consultancy.
“At the beginning of the decade, a grassroots initiative by the Polish Chamber of Commerce and Prof Olins from London - ‘Brand for Poland’ - has resulted in an in-depth reflection on images of Poland and promotion of our interests” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010, p.15).

While none of the initiatives by local consultants have made an impact on the policy making, over the years, the Chamber used their capital resources to secure enactment of nation branding on a policy level. Initially, this programme began as a bottom-up process: nation branding ‘climbed up’ from the mezzo-societal level of Polish business into the macro-level, penetrating policy at the Ministry of Economics (2003); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009a), and organisational strategies at the governmental agencies (Polish Tourist Organisation 2007; Institute of Adam Mickiewicz 2010). This way, nation branding has been appropriated by the Polish state players and turned into a localised institutional aspect of their agency.

Prior to the instigation of the ‘Nation brand building programme’, management of the Polish Chamber of Commerce established ‘The Academy of Brands’ - a scheme that aimed at professionalization of branding practice among Polish enterprises (Institute of Polish Brand 2010). This scheme was considered as a step towards strengthening promotional culture among Polish enterprises. As part of this scheme, the Chamber awarded, ‘flagship brands’ status to those enterprises that had a further potential to be marketed abroad. Those solutions, initially supported by the field of power, were to become a source of capital of prestige for the Polish enterprises and a revenue source for The Chamber as it was The Chamber that was responsible for auditing applicants for this scheme. The corporate enterprises participating in this scheme formed a structuring structure through which nation branding was mediated as
symbolic power. A call for action accompanying ‘The Academy of Brands’ was the slogan ‘Support what is strong!’ (Krzysztof, personal interview, 2009).

The marketable potential of the scheme and its mediation was exemplified in discourse on nation branding practice by an advertising campaign (2001), ‘An economy under its own flag’, commissioned by The Chamber of Commerce. A print advert (Appendix 8, p. 365) produced for this campaign, featured in ‘Time Magazine’, applied endorsement to present the corporate logos of businesses certified by the Chamber. Interestingly, this campaign offers another insight. In his professional account, the Chair of Institute of Polish Brand reveals the logic behind featuring this campaign in ‘Time Magazine’ was that “they [Time Magazine] used to write positive things about Poland” (Krzysztof, personal interview, 2008). Therefore, it was not the outreach of the message, but the symbolic capital of reputation of the specific media outlet that was the dominant feature in representing Polish corporate enterprises in this campaign. Simultaneously, this insight shows how powerful the myth of Western media is among nation branders both in terms of interpreting and representation of Polish collective identities.

The ‘Academy of Brands’ scheme was officially recognised by the Polish Ministry of Economics as part of its promotional policy. In an explicit reference to the ‘Nation Brand Building Programme’, the Ministry of Economics (2003, p. 4) acknowledged the following progress on the programme:

As part of the nation brand building programme, the following has been achieved: (a) a system of commercial brands certification had been developed and put in place; (b) the Academy of Brands had been established; (c) two global advertising campaigns had been launched; (d) Economy Under its Flag had been implemented; (e) research exploring the best Polish brands, in the period 1996-2002 had been
This record in the governmental policy represents actions taken by nation branders preceding the development of the programme. Those projects enabled the Polish Chamber of Commerce and The Institute of Polish Brand to increase symbolic capital of expertise in nation branding. At this stage, it has not been revealed what the relationship was between the Ministry of Economics, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Institute of Polish Brand. By what means this policy record was made, remains a silent feature of the discourse on nation branding by the Chamber’s management. Nevertheless, the search for branded symbols of venture capitalism in Poland continued; as was the search for new consultancy and projects. The Chamber tried to dominate the discourse on branding by extending its position within the promotional policy. While their previous branding-driven schemes set the grounds for the vision of Poland as ‘brand society’ (Kornberger 2010), the remaining issue was to persuade decision-makers that Poland requires a concerted nation branding programme.

In fact, the attempts to set the policy agenda for the programme were enacted via conferencing and public meetings. For example, on 7 March 2000 a conference entitled ‘National marketing: a challenge for Poland’ was held in the Polish Parliament43 (the Sejm) and aimed at consolidation of efforts between the field of power and the Polish business in developing policy solutions and, most importantly, laid out their vision of the field. The Chamber of Commerce also embarked on informal negotiations with the field of power, but having been unsuccessful, decided to hire an external consultant with a higher symbolic capital of expertise than theirs or any local marketing expert, and to develop the programme without the field of power’s consent. The holder of such symbolic capital was a British branding consultant.

43 I consciously use the word ‘conference’ not ‘a parliamentary debate’ as this event was not a scheduled parliamentary session; the term ‘conference was used by nation branders themselves (Krzysztof, personal interview, 2009). This way, the Sejm has become a space for pitching the marketing ideas to the Polish policy-makers.
Although nation branding ideology initially met with the compliance of the Chamber of Commerce senior management, its implementation over time encountered acts of resistance among the field of power. The head of the Institute of the Polish Brand became a prominent ‘compliant professional’ (Cialdini 1993) who embraced the discourse of Western consultants. His familiarity with the subject, influenced by the quasi-academic publications of nation brand consultants, and his co-operation with Saffron became a source for upholding the nation branding ideology. Initially, the Institute facilitated the dissemination of this ideology by translating and publishing key nation branding texts by British consultants into Polish. This commercial scheme was labelled as ‘The Library of Brand Academy’. His effort was particularly targeted at Polish youth and was billed as ‘an act of education’. The Institute also relied on the Nation Brand Index, a recognized selling tool for nation branding consultancy, in its efforts to contextualise a large-scale branding programme. This background exercise facilitated further perpetuation of nation branding ideology.

In the efforts to position itself as an expert in the area, the Institute also paid attention to its corporate communications, predominantly manifested via online communications which reports on the work of the Institute and offered selling features for its commodities and services. The website (www.imp.org.pl) reveals that among the tactics enabling reproduction of nation branding ideology are media relations, enacted in the form of interviews or production of featured articles. Additionally, press releases (Appendix 6, p. 367) on the subject of nation branding were produced by the Chamber of Commerce. Their corporate website also reveals that the genres of nation branding discourse and cultural production of the Institute involves production of professional presentations (e.g. ‘National Marketing Programme’), drafts of policy documents (‘National Marketing Programme’), production of featured articles for the mass media, production of case studies (e.g. ‘Poland: a case study’); translations of Western consultancy reports (e.g. ‘Marka dla Polski – idea przewodnia’); production of commentaries on marketing indices (e.g. ‘Nation Brand Index’) by Western nation
branders - all making explicit references to nation branding. While a detailed content analysis of the Institute’s corporate communications is beyond the scope of the findings section, it is clear that both traditional and new media have been used by its protagonists to mediate and normalise nation branding in Poland.

The above mediated outputs of nation branding practice partly overlap with genres of public relations discourse (Courtright and Smudde 2010) and demonstrate inter-textuality of nation branding and its mutual reliance on the Polish journalistic field in the dissemination of ideological messages. Those features of performative discourse of nation branding demonstrate the problems with the field analysis that Thomson (2008) points out in her discussion: ‘the problem of field borders’ and ‘the problem of the inter-field-connections’. There is a thin line between corporate communications and other fields of praxis that enable redistribution of discursive formations. The struggle to fully enact the nation brand programme continued closer to the field of power and they were accompanied by additional, non-mediatised practices on the side of nation branders. The events started to unravel.

On June 14, 2003 the Sejm hosted a conference, which was an attempt to publically introduce the ‘Brand for Poland’ programme masterminded by the Polish Chamber of Commerce. The purpose of this conference was to move the nation branding agenda forward. This conference received the patronage of the Speaker (Marek Borowski) and other primary stakeholders (including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economics, the Polish Information and Investment Agency, and the Polish Tourist Organization) and it was a stepping stone to receiving financial and political backing from the Government for the launch of a large-scale nation branding programme. Simultaneously, it was an attempt to gain the status of strategic importance as the programme was defined as a ‘matter of national importance’ (The Institute of Polish Brand 2002a). At this stage, in 2003, the programme has gained support of the Ministerial technocrats (undersecretaries of state in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economics), but not the Government itself.
In December 2003, the Polish Chamber of Commerce commissioned Saffron Brand Consultants to work on the nation branding programme. Their plan assumed implementation of a long-term (app. 10-15 years time span) branding strategy under the patronage of the Polish President (Michael, personal interview, 2010). Due to its five years tenure, the Polish presidential seat was seen as stable and less-politicised and therefore more appropriate for endorsement of the ‘Brand for Poland’ programme. It was speculated that implementing a long-term nation branding strategy combined with the support of the President would yield better outputs in terms of enactment of this strategy. At the outset, to obtain support for the programme, the Chamber of Commerce relied on a network of personal contacts developed by its management among politicians aligned with the Social Democratic Party (SLD). In fact, their cooperation with the Polish Presidential Palace began when President Aleksander Kwaśniewski declared his patronage of their ‘Brand for brands’ scheme to propagate the symbolic value of product and corporate brands for the Polish economy (p. 210). However, Polish presidents, neither Kwaśniewski (1995-2005) nor his successor, Lech Kaczyński (2005-2010), have ever fully endorsed the programme. While Kwasniewski’s position became a silent feature of the discourse, it was highlighted that Kaczyński was not interested in the programme as he “hated the business” (Krzysztof, personal interview, 2009).

The search for political backing for the programme continued. The professional accounts of nation branders aligned with the Chamber reveal that other political figures, i.e. the Prime Minister, Marek Belka, aligned with the SLD, had been targeted as a possible endorser for the programme by the Cabinet. Yet again, the programme had not received strategic, governmental support in terms of political and financial support. The lack of the Government’s consent to support this programme, however, did not, at this stage, stop the Chamber and Saffron to continue developing the programme further. At this stage, between 2003 and 2004, their ‘intellectual labour’ concentrated on defining the features of Polishness. The outputs of their production
have emerged in two consultancy reports - ‘A brand for Poland: advancing Poland’s national identity’ and ‘A brand for Polska: further advancing Poland’s national identity’ (Saffron Brand Consultants 2004b; 2007). These texts constitute discursive order on collective identity features that have been institutionalised as part of the process of ‘imagining’ Polishness as a brand (Anderson 2006). Below I reveal those features and demonstrate how they have been incorporated into performative discourse on nation branding. Thus, the findings in this section inform objective 4 (p. 80).

WHAT KIND OF POLISHNESS?

Saffron Brand Consulting and its chairman coordinated work on the nation branding programme. Alongside the search for the political support for the Chamber of Commerce coalition, Saffron’s team conducted a corporate styled-audit exploring overseas perceptions of Poles and their own self-perceptions (2004). According to Saffron, this exploration captures the features of Polishness. Their examination has lead to the articulation of ‘brand attributes’. The research side of the audit was based on interviews with representatives of Polish business, bureaucrats, arts professionals, sportsman, academics, the media professionals, and young opinion leaders (Saffron 2004, p. 194-198). Additionally, diary notes of a single Briton travelling to Poland informed this report (ibid. p. 108-177). Feedback from ‘opinion leaders’ was collected by means of focus group interviews (ibid. p. 203-203). The production of consultancy reports was preceded with a desk stage research and within them the authors drew from secondary sources. Moreover, the procedures for analysis of the empirical data remain unexplained.

While this investigation generated some empirical data, the team of Saffron and the Chamber of Commerce also relied on secondary data collected by the Institute of Polish Affairs (Kolarska-Bobińska 2002) to decode overseas perceptions. Saffron’s work did not reveal the morphogenesis of Polish stereotypes or the roots of Polish auto-stereotypes. Rather, through unknown procedural analysis, the Saffron audit
ended up articulating, yet another, discursive order of signifiers ascribed to Poles as their collective characteristics. The output of this investigation emerged in two consultancy documents produced by Saffron. Both texts were reported by nation branders from the Chamber and Saffron as central to understanding ‘branded’ features of Polish national identity and a guideline to action their programme. These consultancy reports were also the means to articulate the nation branding field in Poland. By using proposed procedures outlined on p. 99-102, I analyse them below to inform the research objective number four.

THE FIRST STAGE: CORE IDEA

In autumn 2004, Saffron drew up a consultancy report entitled, ‘A Brand for Poland – Advancing Poland’s National Identity’. While this piece of consultancy articulates a discourse order on Polish national identity features, other themes emerging are: legitimizing claims and contextual settings. Those themes of the discourse are excluded from presentation in this section as, at this stage, my analysis aims at revealing statements defining branded features of Polishness. Arguably, this is an important aspect of nation branding practice as it leads to the articulation of

“...a simple and powerful core idea that could permeate the millions of messages that Poland sends out through political action or inaction, through popular culture, through its products, services, sport, behaviour and architecture” (Saffron Brand Consultants 2004b, p. 13).

This statement implies that other fields (e.g. political field, cultural production, and manufacturing, etc.) in Poland were aimed to be subjected to nation branding and inspire Poles to follow the core idea. Thus, the core idea for nation branding required

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44 It should be noted that in my interviews with Polish nation branders the term “stereotype” was avoided and replaced with professional marketing jargon, such as “nation brand image” or “Polish brand perceptions”.

consent. This structural bias is encapsulated within the consultancy discourse whereby nation branders see themselves as leaders and co-creators of Polishness. Principally, the core idea emerging from this consultancy report is an attempt to organise a ‘cacophony of messages’ produced by the field and an attempt to organise them in a ‘synergetic way’. The report also follows the assumption that nation branding is both an ‘overseas’ and ‘domestic’ exercise. Within it, attempts were made to uncover perceptions and self-perceptions among a sample of participants. With regards to the research presentation the report reveals its limitations in the following statement:

“The ideas and quotations that follow are not meant as exhaustive of what people told us. Rather, they provide a snapshot – we hope an accurate, representative one – of views widely held amongst each group” (ibid. p. 42).

While I am less interested in the research process accompanying development of the ‘core idea’ for a nation brand building programme, nation branders have divided their assessment of Polishness into two categories: ‘round one’ and ‘round two’. These signify the process of presentation of the core idea, themes contextualising it, and attributes of the branded vision of Polish national identity. I present them below.

ROUND ONE: CORE IDEA ‘CREATIVE TENSION’

The core idea on Polishness emerged from the examination and interpretation of data embedded within the consultancy discursive order. It has lead Saffron to suggest that Poland is ‘normalising’ and its ‘external perceptions’ are ‘catching up’ with the ‘domestic reality’. Moreover, stakeholders engaged in promotional policy making and their implementation can be subjected to the ideas and prescriptions of Polishness advanced by Saffron. These collective identity features then became a basis for generating what the marketing industry calls ‘a big idea’ - a solution to the imagined marketing issue - namely, the lack of recognition of Poland abroad. Moreover, that this
issue emerged largely due to poor coordination of promotional efforts by the Polish field of power and the governmental field of national images management in Poland.

This ‘diagnosis’ of Polishness, or to put it in corporate terms, brand Poland, was developed in two rounds, each of which was tested by collecting feedback from representatives of the Polish field of power. In the first round of the diagnosis articulation, the Saffron team has developed four thematic metaphors enabling a contextualisation of their vision of Polish identity as a brand. Among those metaphors is a comparison of Poland (yet again, accentuating the Polish state identity) to Janus, a god derived from Roman mythology. This god is typically represented in storytelling and its iconography as a two-faced persona, facing the opposite directions and personalising the past and the future. It has been embedded within nation branding discourse to signify that:

*Poland faces the West and the East (specifically Russia) and is at ease with the cultures and societies of both. Poland knows eastern mentalities and cultures, scientific achievements, and above all, soul. As one of the few countries in the West to occupy this position, it seems that Poland’s natural role is to act as a bridge between these two worlds, and to capitalise on its understanding of the post-communist psyche and the Eastern European construct* (ibid. p. 65).

The second metaphor underpinning the core idea concerns Polish *individualism*. In Saffron’s (2004) view, this is allegedly a collective feature of Poles; it is a point of differentiation or the otherness that is worth articulating further. The individualism metaphor is yet again, arguably, visible in several fields of human agency in Poland. The generalisations regarding Polish individualism are yet again confused between the identities of the Polish state and the community of Poles as references are made to both. The ‘individualism’ theme, demonstrating confusion of the object of reading, unfolds in the following statement:
Poland is a boisterous, unique, individualistic country. Poles are neither bland nor boring. They make their presence felt. Poles always have a point of view. That’s why Poland is such a great country for the arts, culture, sports, the creative world, tourism, and above all for business. Poles are natural entrepreneurs. Overall, Poland is just different (ibid. p. 67).

Moreover, the above narrative emphasises the essentialist aspect of ‘entrepreneurship’ as a foundation for the business friendly capitalist political economy in Poland. This aspect of the Polish national identity remains in dialectic opposition to the authoritarian views of Polishness insofar as it articulates the state managed system of production embraced by the Polish elites and communities of people in Poland prior to 1989. This report takes entrepreneurship for granted as it is a feature that, given the legitimization of nation branding, has a market value.

From this statement, the narrative moves on to reveal interpretation of the dynamics of recent changes in Poland. This is done by using a ‘work in progress’ metaphor, which unfolds in the following passage of the consultancy report:

Poland is inextricably changing, in every area – in business, the arts, tourism, in health, education, infrastructure, Poland is evolving rapidly. What you saw five years ago, two years ago, last year, is different and better every day. It will be more different and even better in five years or ten years. Poland is, brilliantly, a work in progress.
You think you know Poland – you don’t! (ibid. p. 68).

Among the factors behind the changes which Saffron’s report discusses are those to do with changes to the political economy in Poland. The discourse on nation branding suggests that contemporary Poland is a place of ‘endless opportunities’. It is not clear,
however, what those prospects are and who has access to them. Saffron’s (2004) report further exposes that the changes to Poland are predominantly explained in terms marketable features of the Polish cultural or natural landscape. While ‘the work in progress’ metaphor captures the changes in the political and economic landscape and hopes to empower Poles to believe that they are in ‘charge of their national identity’, it also, according to its narrative, facilitates the credibility of Poland.

The last metaphor which materializes as part of the ‘core idea’ construction of the brand Poland is that of ‘polarity’. It emerges in a narrative of the dialectical characteristics presented as binary features of Poland and juxtaposed as ‘West-East’ or Poles as ‘romantic-down to earth’ or ‘ambition-unassuming’. Its full version unfolds in the consultancy discursive order in the following way:

*Poland is a very individualistic country that draws its personality and strength from multiplicity of apparently opposing characteristics. Poland is part of the West, but it also understands the East. Polish people are irrepresibly romantic and also down to earth. The Polish character is ambitious and also unassuming* (ibid, p. 70).

In the second part of the same narrative, the legitimisation of these dialectical features emerge as a means to understanding the prime mover of actions among Poles in different fields and changes in Poland; this is expressed in the following way:

*This polarity at the heart of Poland engenders a restlessness that’s never satisfied with the present and boisterousness that is always stimulating and often creative. It explains why Poland produces so many entrepreneurs, artists, and sportspeople, why Poles have always tried to achieve the seemingly impossible, and why Poland is constantly moving on* (ibid, p. 70).
Although this section of my study is concerned with reporting on national identity features as understood, defined and articulated by nation branders, interestingly their reports reveals that they were explicitly sensitive about the notion of truth. In one of the sections of ‘A Brand for Poland – Advancing Poland’s National Identity’ report, the following utterance emerges:

_Polarity embraces a whole set of characteristics that are true – some of which were considered covered in the other ideas as well – and presents them as a single positive idea_ (ibid. p. 70).

This utterance links with the Bourdieusian (1991) notion of performative discourse, as Saffron as a newcomer to the Polish field of national images management, manifests its commitment to the particular vision of mediated ‘truth’ on Polishness. For Bourdieu (1991) discursive truth is connected with the notion of credibility and, as demonstrated later, credibility has had an impact on the destiny of ‘The Nation Brand Building Programme’. What is more, Saffron’s version of truth on collective identity of Poles is explicitly subject to revision of the report findings as they performed several ‘feedback sessions’ with representatives of different social fields in Poland including the governmental field of power, marketing and advertising fields, business field, the field of NGO’s, the journalistic field, the religious field, the field of fashion, the field of law, and the field of arts (Saffron 2004 p. 203-203). Furthermore, as indicated in the above utterance, the reinterpretation of those metaphors leads Saffron to the re-articulation of features of Polishness ascribing to them ‘positive’ signifiers.

**ROUND TWO: REVISITING ‘CREATIVE TENSION’**

In the first instance, the discursive renegotiation of the core idea resulted in the reduction of the amount of metaphors, allegedly, capturing the notion of Polishness: the ‘Janus’ metaphor was dropped all together and remained a silent feature of the nation branding discourse on Poland. However, two remaining signifiers –
‘individualism’ and ‘work in progresses’ – have been kept unchanged in the consultancy report whereas ‘polarity’ has been replaced with a ‘creative tension’ metaphor which later on became a popular name for ‘The Nation Brand Building Programme’ for Poland. As far as revisiting of the ‘polarity’ metaphor is concerned, the ‘creative tension’ feature of Polishness is explained in similar terms as its discursive predecessor. In fact, it is argued by Saffron that thanks to the dialectical features of Polishness:

...these tensions create restlessness unsatisfied with the status quo, and a boisterousness that’s always stimulating and often astonishing. Indeed, this ‘creative tension’ is why Poland produces so many entrepreneurs, artists and sportspeople. It’s why Poland is constantly changing and evolving, sometimes tumultuously. And it’s why Poles have always tried to achieve the seemingly impossible – and often succeeded (Saffron Brand Consultancy 2004 p. 78)

The core idea for the Polish brand programme was also labelled as ‘Creative Tension’ and uses three metaphors, which form, I argue, deification of the neo-liberal capitalist principles. The explicitly articulated characteristics, arguably, capturing Polish national identity were summarised within the consultancy discursive order as: a) ‘individualism’ - signifying this feature of Polishness as an attractive feature for investors and tourists; b) ‘work in progress’ - defining Poland as a growing, expanding state, which thanks to the dreams and aspirations of Poles can be leveraged into investor relations, and, on the other hand, the liveliness, fashionables and buzz has the potential to be memorable for its visitors; and finally, c) ‘creative tension’ - standing for the interpreted opposing national identity features whereby
Poland draws its personality, power and perpetual motion from a wealth of apparently opposing characteristics: Poland is part of the West and also understands the East; Polish people are passionate and idealistic and also practical and resourceful; the Polish character is ambitious and also down to earth (ibid. 76-78).

In spite of its institutional setting, an explicit feature of the discourse is that these re-interpretations and representations of Polishness reproduce the tenets of neo-liberal ideology, which had been outlined by social theorists within academic discourse. For example, Eagleton (2007) illustrates how ‘individualism’ is a descriptor of neo-liberalizing societies. Eyal et al. (2000) demonstrate how non-capitalist classes in Central and Eastern Europe, Poland included, struggled to build a neo-liberal political economy the complexity of which exceeds ‘work in progress’ as a way of defining post-1989 socio-political changes in Poland. The ‘creative tension’ metaphor builds on a geo-political myth of Polish post-Soviet past: formerly Polish nationalism, fuelled by populist explanations of the nation’s history, had faced the need to construct a narrative of “Poland between the West and the East.” The idea of between-ness was re-articulated in Poland’s integration in the EU, where the divide between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe has been explicit in the Polish public affairs in various fields (Galbraith 2009). This narrative echoes in the consultancy discourse, particularly this part of its order re-imagining nation branding driven features of collective identity.

THE CORE IDEA: ARTICULATION OF ‘BRAND ATTRIBUTES’

Although the above findings reveal the features of Polish national identity that were to be become part of the brand Poland architecture, according to Burchell et al. (1991), reactivation is also an important part of the discourse (p. 101) . While the discourse on nation branding has been reactivated by many field actors, as far as the core idea ‘Creative Tension’ developed by Saffron is concerned, it has been subject to
discursive reactivation on numerous occasions. The broader field circumstances of its reactivation by different field agents are to be discussed later. However, at this stage, I consider reactivation of national identity features by Saffron in a second consultancy report entitled 'A brand for Polska - further advancing Poland’s national identity’ and produced in July 2007. This text was also commissioned by senior management of The Polish Chamber of Commerce that was its immediate audience.

Yet again, the report unfolds practices related to nation branding and revisits the core idea which had been constructed by Saffron and presented back in 2004. This discourse order on nation branding unfolding in the second consultancy report begins with pointing out carefully selected issues ‘political’, ‘social’, ‘economy’, and ‘EU’ issues and current affairs in Poland. Those ‘issues and events’ are represented without an explicit intellectual or analytical connection between them and categorised in the following themes: ‘Poland in Europe’; ‘Poland in Poland’; ‘the economy’; culture and sport; ‘Poland in the world’; ‘young Poles abroad’; and ‘young Poles in Poland’. They are sanitised utterances unfolding into justified narratives which, according to Saffron, can be defined in terms of their brand idea. While, this consultancy report makes references to political, cultural and social aspects of nationhood, it fits into the classical, systemic, social theory categorisations (Weber 1948). Those, however, have been reduced into a single idea that, arguably, is a source of competitive advantage among a transnational community of nations (Rusciano 2004).

The consultancy discourse has been extended by articulating a set of signifiers, which have been characterised as ‘brand attributes’. According to Saffron they ‘flesh out’ the idea of ‘Creative Tension’ and among their features are the following keywords signifying Polishness: ‘creativity’; ‘imagination’; flair’; ‘talent’; ‘adaptability’; ‘charm’; ‘intellectualism’; ‘pragmatism’; ‘energy’; ‘vitality’; ‘passion’; ‘belief’; resilience’; ‘individualism’; ‘ambition’; ‘boisterousness’; ‘moodiness’; ‘abrasiveness’; ‘tension’ (Saffron Brand Consultancy 2007, p. 65-67). The above ‘brand attributes’ were presented as having potential to be utilised in ‘vectors’ through
which the Polish state communicates overseas: tourism, investment, brand export, and public diplomacy. The report recommends context-dependent application of brand attributes in the indicated areas of the statehood. For example, in the case of public diplomacy, it suggests to ‘play up’ ‘creativity’; ‘adaptability’; ‘flair’; ‘pragmatism’; ‘passion and belief’ whereas ‘boisterousness’; ‘moodiness’; ‘abrasiveness’, and ‘individualism’ should be ‘played down’ (ibid. p. 75).

In the light of the articulation of the above signifiers, the relationship between the ‘brand attributes’ and the complexity of public diplomacy messages that Poland projects overseas as well as their relationship to the transnational and intercultural communications among different publics overseas remain a silent part of the consultancy discourse. The implicit assumption is that the Polish brand attributes can be used to represent Polishness overseas on a basis of a ‘globalised approach’ (Schultz, Antorini, and Csaba 2005). What also remains unclear, however, and yet again becomes an unspoken feature of the consultancy discourse on nation branding is the relationship between the Polish foreign policy and public diplomacy as a means to achieve its goals. This discursive omission, I argue, demonstrates a limited understanding of foreign policy making by Saffron Brand Consultants as well as superficial reading of the complexities of pluralist democracies.

To sum up, this discursive order leading to the reinvention of collective identity as brand attributes was informed by collection of anecdotal data generated and interpreted by unclear analytical procedures and expressed by corporate-styled modes of the discourse resulting in the articulation of a set of generalisations on Polishness. According to Saffron, the re-imaging of national identity as a brand, further required development and management of a system of visual representation of their core idea. While, consultancy reports discourse order reveals that Saffron had considered adopting the existing national logo (Appendix 7, p. 370) designed by DDB Corporate Profiles in 2001 as part of their ‘Poland: EU is bigger’ campaign, it eventually stated that this symbol does not capture well ‘the Polish spirit’. This logo was considered as
not “destined to be a cultural icon” (Saffron Brand Consultants 2007, p. 88). In a self-serving statement, Saffron sketched out the requirement for the production of new symbolic representation. This symbolic system was explained in the following way:

Although the role of design is very different than that in corporate branding, it is nonetheless essential. A system of brand expression for Poland needs to be thought through and developed (ibid. p. 83).

Despite the claims regarding the role of design and symbolism in nation branding and corporate branding praxis, the difference between the two remains a silent aspect of this nation branding consultancy discourse order. Although, within the discourse it is foregrounded that nation branding is different to corporate branding, neither the consultancy discourse derived from the professional reports nor the interview archive reveals differences between a ‘nation’ and ‘corporate’ branding praxis.

**TENSIONS WITHIN THE FIELD OF POWER**

The emergence of ‘The brand building programme’ resulted in a discussion over the ways this idea could be implemented. Between January and September 2005, the Polish Chamber of Commerce and the Saffron team coalition aimed at establishing a system of visual representation for their programme and conducting an institutional audit in order to implement the project. The consultancy discourse claimed that, as far as nation brand building was concerned, Poland had an advantage over its competitors:

Poland has both first and second mover advantage. Poland started early and correctly, achieving that most elusive component of a successful branding programme: a viable core idea. This happened more than two years ago. The idea and the ambition of the national reputation and branding programme are well known now in certain circles; the pump is primed (Saffron Brand Consultants 2007, p. 33).
The report also indicated that because other nations undertake nation branding, so should Poland. The acts of compliance, inherent in promotional culture (Wernick 1991; Moloney 2006), have another strong dimension in Polish nation branding discourse: its logic is, partly, rationalised by the fact that other nations engage in nation branding and therefore Poland needs to follow this market trend. A special role in this discourse has been played by Spain and Ireland whose economic propaganda, as featured in global media outlets, was presented as a model to follow.\textsuperscript{45} Both of those states had, purportedly, been re-branded and are showcases of how to enact nation branding. Nation branders enthusiastically use them as examples to follow, but the failures of nation branding in the UK (Awan 2007) and the US (Fitzpatrick 2010) are not addressed in legitimations of nation branding.

While the core idea for the programme was being constructed, Saffron Brand Consultancy (2007) also claimed the right to produce a ‘brand book’ - a guide to further the structural imposition of the programme and produced with a view to

\textit{...to convince as many sub-brand holders as possible to embrace the national brand and adapt it for their purposes} (ibid. p. 96).

In another self-serving narrative, Saffron emphasised the requirement for continuing external consultancy for the next ten years since the launch of the programme, claiming that none of the local nation branders and their relevant firms hold the symbolic capital of expertise to enact this enterprise (ibid, p. 129). At this stage, the remaining aspect of nation branding praxis was to secure the specific vision of the

\textsuperscript{45} During the fieldwork, the CEO of the Institute of Polish Brand had drawn my attention to his exploration of nation branding in Spain. His thinking on this practice was, in part, informed by the content of the Spanish overseas propaganda: advertisements and advertorials commissioned in the overseas media outlets, compiled in a document entitled, ‘\textit{Introductory study of national marketing for Poland: Spain as the last frontier in Western Europe. National marketing, Campaign of 1988-1992’}. This text also re-emerges in ‘\textit{The nation marketing programme}’ (Institute of Polish Brand 2002a). It would be interesting to see whether the current economic crises in Ireland and Spain have changed nation branders’ understanding of their practice.
field by gaining the support of the Polish governmental field of power and by securing economic capital to impose the programme as envisioned by its advocates.

In the light of Saffron’s (2007) consultancy discursive order, the field vision outlined in their report argues for the reconfiguration of the existing institutional settings in order to manage the programme. Although, in principle, the report takes the structuralist view of the field settings, it is based on a division of tasks between field agents. The report recommends establishing a ‘National reputation and branding directorate’ and a ‘Steering group’ empowered to oversee the programme and manage its recourses (including bureaucrats representing the Polish state actors); the ‘Advisory panel’ consisted of representatives of ‘different walks of Polish life’; ‘Task forces’ comprising specialised teams managing selected tasks; ‘Brand champions’ opinion leaders from different industries. What is important to recognise is a consensual statement produced by Saffron with regards to how nation branding should be managed and implemented. This statement emerges in various contexts within the consultancy discourse as well as explanation of their practice:

*In our experience the most successful way to make a programme of this kind to work is to get people who are concerned with their own specific initiatives or substantive areas (e.g. fashion, or higher education) to agree to the overall direction, and to work with them to modulate their activity so that it fits in with, and even amplifies, the programme as a whole, thereby both giving strength to the programme and deriving strength from it* (ibid. p. 122).

This consensual mind-set of nation branders clashed with the socio-political reality in Poland and power relations between agents in the field. On December 6, 2004, ‘Creative Tension’ was publically introduced to decision-makers. The Chamber of Commerce organised a second conference in the Polish Parliament which aimed at presenting the foundations for the programme. This event was an opportunity to get
further feedback on the programme and to make a case for the requirement for the programme. The imposition of the nation branding discourse within the confines of the parliamentary setting along with the senior ministerial technocrats from the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was enacted by its nation branders via professional presentations, conference publications, networking, and media relations reproducing nation branding beyond the field boundaries (Institute of Polish Brand 2004a; Institute of Polish Brand 2004b).

Throughout 2005 and 2006, the team Chamber of Commerce and the Institute of Polish Brand team were attempting to gain public support for their programme by enacting media relations, delivering presentations, participation in workshops with the government actors (e.g. Polish Tourism Organisation) and by engaging with Polish youth, predominantly students. Those features of performative discourse were described as “informing, interpreting, inspiring and engaging” with nation branding as the domestic introduction of nation branding was seen as requiring education (Maciej, personal interview, 2009). Among their reported non-government stakeholders were:

*It can be said that we educate three stake-holding groups. First, we educate young academics, because there were either MA dissertations or PhD theses produced as a result of cooperation with us. To us, those people are natural apostles of our cause [...] Second group is the general public that we reach out to by media relations. There were numerous pieces in the press, either inspired by us or by our work that are widely cited by various people [...] And the third audience that we reach out to is business. However, we try to specifically reach out to business bigwigs as this way we can think of practical aspects of creating so called flagship brands* (Maciej, personal interview, 2009).

The key dimension of their struggle, however, was to convert nation branding ideology into an integral component of the promotional policy of the Polish state. In
their professional accounts the senior management of the Polish Chamber of Commerce and the Institute of Polish Brand took a position that one of the biggest issues behind nation branding in Poland was the fact that changes within the Polish political field, that is the reconfiguration of the field of power, were considered as obstacles to the introduction of a wide scale nation branding programme. Their description of the relationship with the field of power was represented by the utterances such as “attempts to influence” (Maciej, personal interview, 2009) or revelations of cancelled meetings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Krzysztof, personal interview, 2008). The reports on the struggle for the support of the field of power remains partly based on the articulation of issues and blaming the Polish field of power that they do not pay enough attention to the question of nation branding.

Although the interview data only sporadically reveals actions of the Chamber of Commerce and the Institute of the Polish Brand, there is secondary data in the form of corporate websites and policy documents which unfolds, in part, the dynamics of this relationship. In December 2006, an actor aligned with the field of power - The Supreme Audit Office (the NIK) - released a ‘Report on the assessment of the governmental Programme of economic promotion of Poland until 2005’ that put pressure on the field agents. This is a record on the implementation of policy in the area of global economic exchange. Among the policy issues this report problematizes is the management of ‘world public opinion’ as a governance feature important to the Polish political economy and national markets. The policy control report unfolds limited cooperation between the field actors; poor professionalism with reference to management of the world public opinion; and overlapping competences between actors within the field, particularly the ministries of Economics and Foreign Affairs (ibid. p. 24) 46.

46 According to one of my interviews (Jacek, personal interview, 2009), the institutional tensions and between the Ministries of Economics and Foreign Affairs have an historical origin and go back to the Polish Peoples’ Republic (PRL) era when there were disagreements over institutional structures and competences of the Polish embassies overseas. The institutional struggle takes place over the statist capital, including economic capital. Its recent manifestation has been articulated in the form
Indeed, the report explicitly argues that, initially, the Polish Chamber of Commerce established close professional relationships with the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Department of Promotion (nowadays Public and Cultural Diplomacy). The policy review by the Supreme Audit Office (2006, p. 23-24) reports that the Polish Chamber of Commerce and its institutional affiliate, The Institute of Polish Brand, used their relationships established during the development stage for the programme to further push the nation branding discourse and praxis by setting the policy agenda. At that stage, they managed to set the agenda within the Department of Promotion, bring the nation brand building programme to the attention of the Council for Poland’s Promotion, and secure cooperation on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 2006 policy document, in which the nation brand building programme was aimed at, according to the report’s narrative, becoming an integral part of this policy. The report reveals that on 1 July 2005 the Minister of Foreign Affairs passed on a memo to the Government suggesting moving on to the ‘implementation’ stage. The memo also included financial data estimating the cost of the programme at 12 m. PLN (app. £ 2.4 mln).

On 22 July 2005 the ministers met with the Prime Minister, Marek Belka, but a common position on the programme was not proposed. Although this narrative unfolds the institutional discourse relating to the policy-making process, it also reveals that there were are no documented alternative narratives supporting these positions as no minutes were taken from the meeting on 22 July 2005. Above all, the Ministry of

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47 Back in 2005, before the fieldwork in Poland and London, I received a working version of the nation brand building programme from the Department of Promotion at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was Saffron Brand Consultancy’s (2004a) memorandum entitled ‘Defining the Polish brand: core idea, brand attributes, and brand benefits’. This note was dated 12th November 2004.
Finance took a position that it was not certain if economic capital could have been provided to support the private sector’s initiative on the top of other costs accompanying promotional policy (The Supreme Audit Office 2006 p. 23). These bureaucratic inter-relationships were further complicated by shifting power relations resulting from changes to the political field in Poland. Simultaneously, one of the recommendations articulated in the report produced by The Supreme Audit Office was the suggestion that the field should continue works on ‘Nation brand building programme’.

In October 2005, the parliamentary elections reconfigured the political field. The Polish conservative party, Law and Justice, took over power, and formed a coalition Government. At the start of their governance, the nation branding programme was preserved in the field and governmental discourse. Although, prior to the election date, the Ministry of Economics, did not participate in planning of the programme, in October 2006 a new Minister of Economics, Grzegorz Woźniak, set up an expert team with the aim of transformation of the consultancy discourse into an integral element of policy and, in consequence, embedding further the nation branding within its institutional settings. The policy was to be spelled out in a strategic document ‘Brand for Poland Programme, 2007-2017’. This document aimed at opening the second phase of the ‘Brand for Poland’ programme previously incorporated into the Ministry’s policy (2003). It was planned that the final version of the policy document would be presented to the Council of Poland’s Promotion in March 2007, a body mediating relations between the promotional policy-makers and the Government.

Until early 2007, nation branding continued as part of the Government agenda. In fact, the annual action plan (Chancery of the Prime Minister 2007) accepted by Jarosław Kaczyński included work on the nation branding programme as an element of the governmental policy agenda for 2007. At this stage, the destiny of the programme was decided within the Ministry of Economics. The expert team that was responsible for coordination of work on ‘Nation brand programme’ lost its
significance. After two meetings, the last taking place in December 2006, changes to the team’s leadership and changes to the Ministry’s policy priorities and approach to its implementation were the reasons for withholding work on the programme.

In the meantime, the early elections in October 2007, yet again changed power relations within the governmental structures and this time the Civic Platform and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) formed the coalition Government headed by Donald Tusk. In the aftermath of elections, personnel changes took place at the management level in the Ministries of Economics and the Foreign Affairs. The bureaucratic newcomers reviewed promotional policies in both ministries and on 31 March 2008 a decision was made to liquidate the experts’ team working on nation branding and affiliated with the Ministry of Economics. This decision coincided with a receipt of an additional economic capital of 78 m. € by the Ministry from EU structural funds. Those funds were disposed as ‘Innovative economy programme’ and the Ministry, as a key beneficiary of this fund, secured app. 30 m. € of this capital for implementation of new promotional policy. During the fieldwork, I received a draft version of its document. It explicitly reveals that the policy discourse shifts away from the notion of nation branding programme. It reveals that the policy-makers revisited documents, correspondence, and policy proposals, which enabled the following position:

In Poland too much attention is paid to thinking about the perceptions of the Polish national economy in terms of requirement to promote ‘the Polish brand’ whereas not much is done, on the executive level, to support new export instruments or offering the Polish enterprises accessible, free of charge services aiming at stimulating their market share expansion overseas (Ministry of Economics 2010, p. 22).

Soon after the release of Saffron’s second report in December 2007, the nation branding initiative lost its momentum as political elites were concerned with current affairs and election campaigning. With regards to the future of promotional policy by
the Ministry of Economics, nation branding did not become its integral component. The policy document (Ministry of Economics 2010) states that it is the Polish enterprises and their marketing that can further develop the national reputation of Poland and Poles\(^\text{48}\). Also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009), in its promotional policy 'Direction of Poland’s promotion until 2015’, reveals a reflective approach to insufficiently coordinated governmental campaigns overseas. Their position reveals:

At the beginning of the decade, a grassroots initiative by the Polish Chamber of Commerce and Prof Olins from London - ‘Brand for Poland’ - has resulted in an in-depth reflection on images of Poland and promotion of our interests. This project resulted in professionalization of debate on the promotion of Poland. Only in recent years, has an understanding for the systemic approach to promotion been created: from strategic planning, coordination, and redefining the institutional reforms (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010, p.15).

Interestingly, the self-critical narrative presented by the Ministry addresses policy prescriptions put forward by the nation branders. With regards to the formation of one institution that would be responsible for overseeing enterprises such as nation branding, the policy claims that this postulate is ‘unrealistic’ as no other state has a similar institutional structure (ibid. p. 60). The second, frequently emerging argument regarding tighter coordination on policy making and campaigning efforts received a sympathetic response in the Ministry’s policy by the creating of new mechanisms of policy planning (ibid. p. 60-61). Similarly in the Ministry of Economics, there was a

\(^{48}\) Apart from the review of previous policy documents, the policy draft refers to an interview with Simon Anholt, a nation brand consultant, which was published by ‘Brief’ (professional marketing magazine) and further reprinted in the online edition of ‘Wyborcza’ (one of the Polish dailies). This demonstrates how policy-makers are influenced by media discourse in their policy-making process. Although Anholt was one of the leading figures advising on intangible elements of policy prescriptions, his position on nation branding, over the years, has changed (e.g. Anholt 2009). This change of position was illustrated in the interview that was embedded by the policy draft (Polish Ministry of Economics 2010, p. 22).
policy shift away from the notion of a nation branding programme and only sporadic references were made to the consultancy project masterminded by Saffron Brand Consultancy and their business partners from the Polish Chamber of Commerce.

**NATION BRANDING: A LOST BATTLE?**

For the Chairman of Saffron, the democratically elected conservative (Law and Justice) politicians leading the Polish political field, Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński, became a scapegoat for the breakdown of his programme. For example, in a talk at the Birmingham Business School in April 2007, he took Polish politicians to task for their lack of interest in nation branding. At this stage, the imposition of a centralized nation branding programme in Poland ceased, although in 2009 Saffron worked again with the of Institute Adam Mickiewicz on a visual identity for Poland’s campaigning efforts in Britain accompanying ‘The Polish Year in UK’. This government managed showcase of predominantly cultural events was rebranded as ‘The Polska Year’.

Although between 2003 and 2007 nation branding in Poland was not enacted according to the nation branders plan, their activities left a legacy: nation branders still wanted to capitalise on their expertise; a consultancy bill of €300,000 that was paid to Saffron (Darek, personal interview, 2009); figures in the Polish political field that were sympathetic to nation branding, and a cohort of Polish academics who invested in reproducing nation branding ideology (e.g. Jasiecki 2004; Florek 2006; Ociepka 2008; Hereźniak 2011). Over time, the private sector field actors have reassessed their altruistic priorities of supporting the government and their initial focus on symbolic capital is now also motivated by the possibility of gaining economic capital. For example, in 2006 the Institute of the Polish Brand charged the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs PLN 900,000 (app. £180,000) for a piece of consultancy exploring overseas perceptions (based on polling) of “brand Poland” (OBOP 2006), followed by a set of policy ‘recommendations’ (Krzysztof, personal interview, 2009). The Institute also offered its consultancy services to the Warsaw City Council in 2007 (see Institute
of Polish Brand 2007) and to the Polish Tourism Organization in 2008 (see Polish Tourism Organisation 2008). The struggle for economic capital in the field is enacted on the basis of self-proclaimed expertise in nation branding. This point demonstrates that professional practice on nation branding develops faster than academic accounts analysing the development and consequences of the expanding, middle market of promotional culture and remains consistent with Wernick’s (1991) analysis.

The resistance towards nation branding among Polish technocrats within the field since 2007 has been largely the result of their view of a conceptual weakness in ‘Creative Tension’. It was argued that this creative idea misses the point with regards to the essence of Polishness. Moreover, nation branders underestimated the workings of democracy whereby changes in the political field often entail new institutional management and means of representation of Polishness via communicative acts. While Polish bureaucrats in the field offer reflexive insights into nation branding practice and how this idea has developed in their settings, the concept of “Poland as a brand” per se is not questioned. Saffron’s ‘Nation branding programme’ is seen as a step towards the professionalization of this practice: it resulted in a homology of language used by technocrats, and attempts to coordinate promotional campaigns as well as subjecting the institutionalised communicative practices to nation branding.

There are also notable, culturally grounded acts of resistance towards nation branding ideology: among them is a disagreement and discontent with its exchange value principle (‘selling Poland’ has negative historical connotations going back to its partition in the 18th century and re-occurs as a narrative in interpretations of the ‘Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact’ of 23 August 1939). Another position emerging from the interview data indicates that resistance towards nation branding is a result of an ossified management of the field institutions, post-Soviet style bureaucratic mindsets, and reluctance to institutional change (Arkadiusz, personal interview, 2009). But, private sector nation branders in Poland remain hopeful and believe that the political
field (political elites and political parties in Poland) will have to understand the requirement for nation brand programme.

Similarly, a hopeful position on nation branding was taken by the Polish Chamber of Commerce. Their management turned changes within the political field as an opportunity and was struggling to influence the field of power. Although until the end of my fieldwork, the nation branding programme did not become a component of promotional policy, in November 2010, the management of the Chamber again targeted the Polish field of power in an attempt to gain support for the already developed ‘Nation branding programme’. Their discourse on nation branding was reactivated on 3 November 2010 when the Polish Chamber of Commerce passed on a letter to the President, Bronislaw Komorowski, in which they pointed out the urgent economic issues. Among the arguments in this letter was a necessity for the nation brand programme. They argued that previous Governments ignored the requirement for the programme, which lead to poor coordination of governmental campaigns, and lack of synergy resulting in limited cost-efficiency of the state campaigning (Polish Chamber of Commerce 2010). However, they offer neither data nor analysis to support those claims. The management of The Polish Chamber of Commerce attempted to reinitiate nation branding agenda by means of mediated events. On 23 November 2010, the Chamber organised an event, ‘Why not Poland, when Poland?’ Among the speakers at this event was the chairman of Saffron Brand Consulting, the head editor of ‘Brief’, and Polish academics who published on the subject of nation branding. Media relations have been employed to perpetuate nation branding ideology: a press release was circulated accompanying an invitation distributed to the Polish journalism field.

LOCAL APPROPRIATIONS OF NATION BRANDING

Although the ‘Nation branding building programme’ has not been enacted as envisioned by ‘vision and division’ (Bourdieu 1996) of The Chamber of Commerce and nation branders, it has left a powerful mark on the actors within the Polish field of
national images management and later re-emerged in the Polish political field. Despite the failure to enact the archetypical nation branding project, the Polish field of power still tends to reproduce ideological discourse on nation branding in order to legitimize its power and the prevailing Westernised social order. The dominant, assumed competitive world order encapsulated in the neo-liberal discursive ‘newspeak’ and practices derived from promotional culture, had previously attracted attention in the Polish political field, but never before so explicitly with regards to national identity politics and nation-building. According to Wacquant (2005, p. 3-4), proposing a lucid understanding of these qualitative changes is particularly important to sociology at the time when political institutions use “...the market rhetoric of efficiency, opinion polls, focus groups, and other political marketing techniques” and they “have become major ingredient in the rationalization of domination”. Indeed, marketing ideologies in general and branding in particular have become one of those rationalising and legitimizing mechanisms within the Polish political field. Bourdieu (2003, p. 163) himself discusses how this new science of market logic serves as a mechanism legitimizing power relations and, by corrupting democratic processes, advances arbitrary categories of market tyranny and presupposes depoliticization.

Similarly, in this section, I demonstrate that the performative discourse on nation branding still reoccurs in the field, and thanks to its inter-institutional mediation, it is being transferred and rationalised within the Polish political field. In that respect, Bourdieu’s views on the market mechanisms remain consistent with my findings. As aforementioned (p. 187), the appropriation of discourse on nation branding has been taking place in Poland by normalising it within the localised institutional settings of the field actors. The insights into the Polish Tourism Organisation’s (2008, p. 7) strategy reveals that destination marketing leads to enhancement of brand Poland:

*The tourism dimension of brand Poland as the most important aspect of our mega-brand ‘Poland’ might become an engine for marketing*
Poland overseas. The strategy can become a pioneering promotional artistry in a particularly important decade of modernisation already implemented in Poland as the EU member state.

On the other hand, the institutional strategy of the Institute of Adam Mickiewicz (2010) provides insights into the normalisation of ‘nation brand’ within its local settings; its strategy reads reveals the following strategic goals:

1. To increase the value of the brand ‘Poland’; 2. To enhance effectiveness and of brand Poland’s communication in the area of culture; 3. To maintain the fifth [market] position in the European cultural exchanges.

What is more, the Institute’s (2010, p. 13) recent communications strategy demonstrates an explicit appropriation of the idea of nation branding by drawing from Saffron’s consultancy discursive order. One of its excerpts provides the following insights:

Our vision fits into ‘Creative Tension’, that is a core idea developed for Poland by Michael. Although it has never been officially adopted, it is still remembered and recalled as, for example, part of cultural settings for EURO 2012 tournament. This indicates that the core idea had been accurately identified and that it touches the right emotional string of Polish identity.

Indeed, the vision of the Institute presented in the strategy speaks of the ‘brands’ architecture’ and highlights points of convergence between product brands such as cultural events enacted as part of cultural diplomacy (e.g. ‘Polish Year in Israel’; ‘Polish Year in UK’), the Institute’s corporate brand, and the concept of nation brand. Simultaneously, the strategy points out limited relationship between the above types of
brands and “lack of clear visual identity of brand Poland” (ibid. p. 17). The logic accompanying those statements is that communicative practice of cultural diplomacy activities enacted by the Institute contributes to the formation of national brand. In the case of the Institute, the perpetuation of nation branding ideology is demonstrated by an explicit reference to the archetypical nation branding programme which reveals that its management is compliant to consultancy ideas. Their reactivation demonstrates a doxic application of ‘nation brand’ and suggests that elements of nation branding discourse are reconstituted and transformed over time within the institutional settings.

Another opportunity for the reactivation of nation branding discourse was during the organisation of the EURO 2012 football tournament in Poland. In this case, the setting for its re-occurrence was an actor responsible for its management - PL.2012. Although at the time of my fieldwork in Warsaw (2009-2010) this actor was at the planning stage of a formalised strategy presenting communicative practices or acts, I was drawn to a presentation produced by Corporate Profiles which summarised workshops entitled ‘Guidelines for promotion of brand Poland in the context of UEFA EURO 2010™ with elements of its implementation’. The workshops were held on 13 and 23 July 2009 and were attended by representatives of key stakeholders engaged in the organisation of the tournament, including some of the field actors. Within the presentation, local nation branders presented a set of ideas that could guide communicative acts accompanying this sporting event. Yet again, the discursive memory of Saffron’s programme was present within the presentation:

\[\textit{The strategy for brand Poland is a’ supreme being’ and it is a reference point for thinking about the strategy for promotion of Poland in the context of EURO 2012.}\]

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\[49\] I was presented with this cultural artefact by one of the advisors at the Polish Tourism Organisation (Igor, personal interview, 2009). However, the managing director of Corporate Profiles did not acknowledge that his firm was involved in this workshop (Tymoteusz, personal interview, 2009).
As it stands, the weakness is a poor transferability of the Creative Tension core idea to a specific set of promotional activities, which could make up the main axis for promoting brand Poland via specific tactics (Corporate Profiles 2009, p. 10).

While the core idea of ‘Creative Tension’ was recalled by local nation branders who organised the workshop, their professional presentation reveals changes to the nation brand attributes. Furthermore, in this section I am not able to account for density of this presentation as my fieldwork ended before the tournament. This appropriation of nation brand, however, was not always explicitly influenced by nation branders. For example, I did not find evidence uncovering that the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development normalised the notion of nation branding in their settings as a result of professional interactions with nation branders. Nevertheless, the doxic utterance of ‘Poland as a brand’ emerges in its institutional discourse. For example, in 2004 the agency produced a research report ‘The perceptions of Polish brand in the EU countries’ which not only signifies ‘Poland as a brand’, but offers insights into perceptions of Polish products and corporate brands in the European common market. Elsewhere, the agency reinvented ‘Poland as a brand’ in the context of the 2008 EXPO Exhibition in Saragossa. One of its documents preceding the organisation of this event stated:

According to the research conducted for the Organising Committee in November 2006, Poland, to an average Spaniard is a cold, dark, poor, and sad country. It is a country in which nothing exciting happens; a country that one should stay away from. Poles, on the other hand, are perceived as clever, hard-working and honest, but at the same time, as introverted and full of complexes. We are faced with an interesting situation whereby for Spaniards the brand ‘Poland’ virtually does not exists, but brand’ Pole’ has several positive attributes (Polish Agency for Enterprise Development 2008, p. 1).
The above evidence suggests that appropriation of nation branding by the above institutions leads to market orientated significations of the symbolic outputs of their communicative practices. The previously institutionalised communicative practice of ‘cultural diplomacy’ by the Institute of Adam Mickiewicz, ‘destination marketing’ enacted by the Polish Tourism Organisation, or communicative acts performed by the Polish Agency for Enterprise and Development lead to the formation of brand Poland. In that scenario, the field is replacing the signifier ‘image’ to that of ‘brand’, which is, I argue, the output of their communicative narratives on Polishness. On the contrary, the resistance to the idea of nation branding by the management at the Public and Cultural Diplomacy Department demonstrates that the communicative practice of public diplomacy is not thought of in nation branding terms.

The institutional perpetuation of nation branding went further and at a point, political elites began to refer to Poland as a brand. At this stage, I provide insights into the perpetuation of nation branding outside of the Polish field of national images management, and in the light of emerging evidence, suggest its appropriation by the Polish political field. Despite their discontent with the promotional policies, nation branders note transferability of nation branding discourse into the political field:

_A few months have passed and the Minister Sikorski says that he and his experts produced some kind of strategy and all of a sudden the talks about brand ‘Polska’, that in the branding efforts we should use the term ‘Polska’. Nobody says that it was Michael’s [changed name] idea; nobody says where it came from, but they sell those ideas as their own. OK, he is a politician. […] But it is interesting how it is being disseminated […]_ (Franciszek, personal interview, 2009).
This ideology enables the Polish political class to use it as a symbolic means of legitimising their power. A discursive formation supporting the Bourdieusian notion of power legitimation is explicit in the annual parliamentary speeches delivered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In fact, they are explicit in the Parliamentary exposes of 2008, 2009, and 2010. For example, Radosław Sikorski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs unfolds the foreign policy directions that include the following statement:

*Third priority of our policy is to improve the perceptions of Poland overseas. Since the majority of foreign nationals visiting Poland leave the country having a better opinion of the country than on arrival, it means that our brand is worse than the reality* (Sikorski 2008).

The year after, Radosław Sikorski upheld his position regarding foreign policy priorities, included in the following statement:

*Poland as an attractive brand: a country of success, loving freedom and willing to share its freedom* (Sikorski 2009).

Interestingly to this study, Jarosław Kaczyński, also the alleged political opponent of the archetypical ‘Nation branding building programme’, has contributed to the reproduction of this discourse. While nation branders claimed that the former Prime Minister opposed the enactment of their branded vision of Polishness, in a recent interview on the state plane crash near Smoleńsk, in the context of its investigation Jarosław Kaczyński revealed the following rationalisation of ‘Poland as a brand’:

*It is the Government’s task to act determinedly to change this situation; to make sure that the investigation gets to the truth, but also act to protect the status of Poland and defend the Polish brand as its brand today is seriously threatened, weakened, and degraded* (wPolityce.pl 2011).
Nation branding also re-emerges in a relationship to a particular reported political event. The current Polish Presidency in the European Union has been also an opportunity for the Polish political class to engage in discourse of nation branding. For example, in October 2011 the European Parliament hosted a conference co-organised by the Ministry of Economics and the Eastern Institute entitled ‘Brand Poland – enhancing the images of Poland worldwide’. The official reports from the conference reveal that the attendees explicitly refer to the consultancy reports produced by Saffron Brand Consultancy (2004; 2007) and offer a similar line of rationalisation offered by their discourse (Economic Forum 2011). Elsewhere, a discourse on nation branding springs up in the field of power: the Ministry of Economics has recently published a consultancy report ‘The perception of Poland and its economy among main economic partners’ (Ministry of Economics 2011) which offers an insight into reactivation of nation branding by the field of power. While it is explicit that nation branding discourse is being reproduced in public affairs in Poland, this ideology is still very much alive and attracts the attention of the Polish political field. This new dynamics of branding culture (Kornberger 2010), susceptible to the discursive principle of continuity and discontinuity, is transforming the Polish field of power, but its overall direction is defined by what Bourdieu calls the ‘field uncertainly’ (Swartz 1997).

Following Brubacker’s (1996) notion of nationalism as “event and happening”, this chapter has offered insights into the reproduction of nation branding in Poland. In essence, this chapter has informed the third and fourth research objectives. First, this chapter has accounted for projects which were labelled as ‘nation branding’ efforts. Second, it has demonstrated how those projects were institutionalised within the field boundaries of the Polish state. Third, this chapter demonstrates why nation branding was a bottom-up process and how the intersubjective relationships between the private and public sector actors, over the years, have lead to the emergence of new discourses within the Polish political field. Finally, this chapter offers insights into an intellectual design of nation branding programme, attributes of Polishness, and a dissemination of...
ideas surrounding nation branding as a consultancy aimed at the Polish state. Chapter Ten, the analysis section, explains the consequences of introduction of nation branding within the investigated field.
CHAPTER TEN: ANALYSIS SECTION

OVERVIEW

This chapter offers an etic account, forming a foundation for my analysis of performative discourse on nation branding. It offers reflection on the trajectories of action of nation branders in Poland. Overall, nation branding performative discourse emerged as a communicative expression of neo-liberal political economy interests whereby the field of national images management has become a setting for private sector actors’ participation in policy making, consultancy, and co-production of national identity features. Specifically, this section unfolds the nation-building process that Kaneva (2007) eloquently calls ‘nationing the brand’ (Kaneva 2007) or what in nationalism scholarship is referred to as ‘nationalising nationalism’ (Brubaker 1996). Moreover, this chapter discusses the social and political consequences of nation branding ideology invasion within the structures of the Polish field of power. This chapter also reveals the misrecognitions of nation branding ideologists. Later, it moves forwards to draw conclusions. Furthermore, it presents a commentary on the reinvention of the Polish national identity as a brand. Its overall narrative ends with recommendations for further research on nation branding and the Polish field of national images management as a social and dynamic space.

PRACTICES ACCOMPANYING NATION BRANDING

The findings section of this study reveal that during 1999 and 2010 nation branding was contested within the field of national images management and the Polish government field of power. Overall, nation branding has been enacted at the crossover between the public and private sectors – implying lobbying on behalf of interests groups keen to contribute to promotional policy of the Polish state. The findings section reveals that central to this investigation the ‘Nation brand building programme’ was temporarily deposited within promotional policies and it shows that the notion of ‘Poland as a brand’ has been appropriated into the local conditions, but
has not been enacted in accordance with the vision developed by its proponents. Alongside the institutionalisation and designing architecture of the programme, over the investigated period, nation branding was supported by numerous auxiliary practices implying enactment of advocacy on behalf of nation branders and the Polish business. Not only nation branders were interested in developing communicative aspects of the programme, but in the case of the archetypical ‘Nation brand building programme’, the Chamber mobilised their skills and resources in an attempt to put pressure on the technocrats in the pursuit of their interests that have been legitimised as a ‘national interest’. Moreover, the Chamber of Commerce has gone as far as setting the governmental policy agenda and temporarily shaping its direction. In that respect, I argue, nation branding has become a matter of public affairs campaigning for private sector actors that used different strategies to capitalise on nation branding. Thus, the illusionary discourse on nation branding mobilised the agency among nation branders that goes beyond the emic explanations of the field actors and, I argue, requires analysis exceeding the reported logic of the field mechanisms. This section is a commentary on democracy and public policy making in post-Soviet Poland.

The fundamental issue regarding sedimentation of nation branding within the promotional policy by the Ministry of Economics suggests practices enacted via lobbying, one of the most powerful practices in public affairs campaigning (Moloney 2006). While the findings demonstrate that the term ‘lobbying’ has emerged in the discourse on nation branding practice, the practices exerting ‘influence’ had not been always explicitly labelled and therefore required careful consideration. The findings section of this study (chapters 7 and 8) confirms that nation branding was performed at the crossovers of macro level (government), where the promotional policies are made, and mezzo levels (corporate), where the Polish business and initiatives of nation branders originated. Following the Bourdieusian view of the field image, my analysis considers strategies used by advocates of nation branding. In his theory of practice, Bourdieu speaks of three main field strategies: “conservation, succession, and subversion” (Swartz 1997, p. 125). The conservation strategies are pursued by those
who hold a dominant position in the field and enjoy the seniority whereas succession strategies define attempts to gain access to the dominant positions by the new entrants. Finally, the last categories of subversion strategies are pursued by those who expect to gain little from the dominant field (ibid. 1997). Following this categorisation of strategies, I argue, that in order to preserve a dominant position over the promotional policies making, the state actors in the field applied ‘conservation strategies’ whereas new entrants into the field - nation branders - used ‘succession strategies’ to securing their interests.

As far the peripheral aspects of nation branders’ praxis is concerned, their agency is driven by the search for attention within the field of power as a means to allocating resources to nation branding projects. With regards to the relationship between the private sector nation branders and the field of power, their actions have been marked by two trajectories: following the Polish state power and searching for the economic and/or symbolic capital. Given that the dynamics of the struggle are determined by the type of field (Bourdieu 1992), what is at stake in the case of nation branding is ‘promotion’ of the Polish neo-liberal political economy interests including modern representations of Polishness among the world public opinion and its ‘reputation’. In Bourdieusian analysis “the establishment and the subordinate challengers, both the orthodox and heterodox views, share a tacit acceptance that the field of struggle is worth pursuing in the first place” (Swartz 1997, p. 125). Bourdieu (1992) calls it doxa which refers to a “fundamental agreement on the stakes of the struggle between those advocating heterodoxy and those holding orthodoxy” (Swartz 1997, p. 125).

The findings section demonstrates that nation branding, although implemented as per initial consultancy visions, has been enacted by private sector agents and introduced to the governmental structures by means of public affairs campaigning and further invaded the Polish political field. The situation of ‘conflict’ or competitiveness that is inherent to public affairs definitions fits the Bourdieusian view of the field
whereby the struggle for resources is the main driver of trans-institutional agency. The findings section reveals that the agents performing nation branding applied succession strategies to secure their corporate interests within the Polish field of power or within the field of national images management. As aforementioned, the Chamber of Commerce and their allies went as far as to influence the promotional policy in order to secure their corporate interests in projects stemming from the promotional policy. Their field vision attempted to override the existing institutional order and to privatise the field of national images management that enacts public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and destination marketing on behalf of the Polish Government. They mobilised public affairs resources - economic, cultural, human, and symbolic capitals – in the attempt to gain access to and support by a highly politicised field agency. How were those resources enacted?

The subversion strategies, particularly explicit in reports by the Polish Chamber of Commerce and the Institute of Polish Brand, adopted tools straight from the public affairs praxis. Harris and Fleisher (2005) reveal tactics used by public affairs managers and among them are the following applied by the Chamber of Commerce and its allies: lobbying, promotional policy monitoring; research and policy scanning; web activism; coalition building; community relations; engagement in action committees, and media relations. Additional tactics supporting enactment of nation branding in the field were based on the production and translation of consultancy reports; market research; professional publications; and production of policy-proposals; public meetings with government officials; organisation of workshops; conference participation; and public speaking. Those tactics have enabled setting the nation branding agenda in Poland and, over time, have led to influencing the state structures, particularly between 2003 and 2005 when the ‘Nation brand building programme’ gained governmental support. At this stage, the Chamber of Commerce and its allies have left a mark by introducing nation branding to the promotional policy-making process.
The prominent discursive feature emerging from the policy proposals and consultancy reports (see, p. 166) is the reconfiguring of the institutional field boundaries. Part of the nation branding discourse was based around questions of its leadership. Given that, traditionally, the Polish government overseas communications and codified promotional policy making has been a component of the Polish state’s meta-capital and its field of power (Bourdieu et al. 1994), the attempts to participate in this field as a dominant force is evident, I argue, suggesting privatisation via influencing public policy making. While privatisation of the state enterprises (Jackson, Klich, and Poznańska 2005) was a prominent feature of systemic changes of the Polish political economy after 1989, nation branders have not been successful in their privatisation attempts: their role has been reduced to performing tactical projects rather than large scale nation branding projects or they moved on to seek opportunities elsewhere, including at the local government level. In that respect, the cultural productions of local nation branders illustrate their subordinate positions in relation to the field of power.

Despite the commitment to convince the promotional policy makers that Poland requires a large scale nation branding programme, the findings also reveal how market research is making an impact on policy-makers in Poland. The findings remain consistent with Jansen’s (2008, p. 122-123) arguments that nation branding contributes to the production of calculative space defined as:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a)] overt embrace of commercial language, practices, and assumptions, reflecting the post-Cold War ascent of the logic of ‘market fundamentalism’;
  \item[b)] formation of public-private partnerships to advance specific trade, industry or corporate interests along with national agendas, policies and ideologies;
  \item[c)] use of private contractors to determine the salient features of a nation’s identity, based upon what can be marketed to tourists, international investors,\end{itemize}
and potential trade partners; and d) reduction of the input of citizens to what can be measured by market research.

Indeed, all those characteristics have been explicitly put forward by nation branders’ discourse in regards to their practice. This insight also remains consistent with Bourdieusian studies exploring the manipulative role of marketing research techniques used in the French political field (Wacquant 2005).

Given that public affairs campaigning became inherent to nation branders’ praxis in Poland, the idea of ‘Poland as a brand’ has been discussed by Polish academics. So far, however, nation branding has gained a non-critical status within the Polish academic field. To date, the Polish academy has not produced a reflexive study on nation branding. The critical approach to nation branding exploration has not been undertaken by Polish academics. The ‘Poland as a brand’ simile which emerged in public affairs has been legitimised by academic discourse. Existing studies on nation branding produced in Poland argue that the Polish state needs more branding and that this praxis requires further institutionalisation (Raftowicz-Filipkiewicz 2009). The implications of this are twofold: given the high levels of symbolic capital academics in Poland enjoy, their discourse provides credibility to nation branding as an ideology advanced within professional contexts and actors who performed nation branding can further travel to the Polish academic field.

Within the legitimating discursive order stemming from nation branders’ accounts, there are emerging appeals to ‘public good’ insofar that nation branding is regarded as a matter of ‘national importance’ (Institute of Polish Brand 2002a). This universalising ideological claim remains, however, largely based on the assumption

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The secondary data evidence suggests that, over the past decade, academics, particularly those with professorships have been consistently holding the highest stakes of symbolic capital of prestige among the surveyed samples of Poles. In 1999, 84% of a survey sample (n=1111) reported that they perceived professors as highly respectable professional class (CBOS 1999). A 2008 survey shows similar results - 84% of a sample (n=1050) considered professors as the most respectable profession (CBOS 2009).
that new investment capitalisation of Poland can happen thanks to the articulation of symbolic, simplified and trivialised aspects of national identity used as marketable signifiers in the branding programme. What remains an unspoken aspect of the nation branding discourse is its relationship to specialised aspects of the Polish state transnational political economy: foreign policy, economic policy, or tourism policy as articulated by the Polish governmental field of power and as having a potential impact on the reputation of Poland and Poles overseas. The complexity of those policy areas, including their mediation and reception among stakeholders, begs a question regarding the possibility of creating a synergy through transnational government communication praxis, either marketing or propaganda. Moreover, there is no evidence that nation branding can contribute to economic capital gains for the state as effectiveness of its praxis as a separate toolkit in the field of nation images management has not been assessed to date. In the light of findings and previous Bourdieusian studies, this is misrecognition of nation branders as it is economic capital that is a primary source of power. Finally, nation branding discourse does not address intercultural features of communication existing, for example, in public diplomacy scholarship (Seib 2010). It assumes representation of Polishness based on a globalised strategy.

Indeed, the findings of this study demonstrate that doxa within the field is the policy requirement to ‘promote Poland’, that is to say the interests of the state, as defined by dominant institutional actors in the field. However, the ways to pursue those interests within the transnational community of nations include more complex solutions and other practices that go beyond nation branding projects. Technocrats used conservation strategies in order to maintain a dominant position over the field, by securing their dominant role in promotional policies making and their enactment and did not accept proposals put forward by nation branders in its pre-designed form. Those strategies varied between the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the case of both ministries, nation branding initially met with some interest, but their leaders ended up exercising conservation strategies as a means to maintain their dominant positions within the field (Bourdieu 1992). On the one hand,
it is the nation branders, particularly the coalition established by The Polish Chamber of Commerce, which held orthodox views of the field and nation branding practice that assumed a direct reproduction of their consultancy work into sustainable praxis financed by the Polish state. In return, the government technocrats offer a heterodoxic view on nation branding revealing that they see their existing practice - derived from promotional policy - as contributing to ‘building the national brand for Poland’. They use this term in a loose way - as synonymous to ‘national images’ or ‘reputations management’.

A special role in public affairs campaigning aimed at the introduction of a large scale ‘Nation branding building programme’ has been performed by lobbying of the Polish governmental institutions. Particularly, the Polish Chamber of Commerce and the Institute of Polish Brand used this tactic to secure their interests. However the findings suggest that local nation branders also used their social capital of personal networks to secure benefits of participating in nation branding. Moloney (1997, p. 168) defines lobbying praxis as “persuading public policy makers to act in the interests of organisations or groups”. The professional relationship between the senior management of the Chamber of Commerce and promotional policy makers reported in the findings demonstrates the dynamics of pursuing interests within this area of public policy making whereby nation branding has been used as a means to generate economic, symbolic capital (and aspirational ‘political capital’) for those actors and, allegedly, symbolic capital for the reputation of the Polish state. Bourdieu (2003, p. 47) recognises the impact lobbying can make on creating policies of ‘depoliticization’. In fact, he argues for transparency in public policy making as a means to resist ‘brute economic interests’ of the corporate world. Indeed, transparency is a weak component of the Polish promotional policy making and initiatives such as nation branding are not documented in details and their promises thus far have been poorly scrutinised. Its weak aspect is a lack of public record and access to the records of the ‘private’ messages exchanges by the nation branders and policy makers.
Although nation branding has attracted the attention of the Polish field of power, and has temporarily become an objective in promotional policy, its advocates have soon been isolated from the field discourse on promotional policy. The themes emerging from the interview data reveal that it was the conceptual weakness of ‘the big idea’ - ‘Creative Tension’ - and personality traits of its advocates that have, partly, led to a decision to cease the implementation of the programme. The state actors in the field of national images management at first exercised conservation strategy to preserve their dominant position by isolating nation branders from the policy discourse. Subsequently, nation branders lost their role in policy enactment. Between 2005 and 2008, the policy-making has been dominated by the field of power: the government actors reduced consultancy input into the policy; changed the approach to policy making; liquidated the action committee working on nation branding planning; and made a decision on not granting economic capital for the programme. At that stage, the coalition of The Chamber of Commerce and their allies also found themselves in a subordinate position, subservient to the field of power on an ad hoc basis.

Although the conditions in the field can be characterised by the competitiveness of actors, nation branding brings into this field another dimension: ideological misrecognition. Its advocates assume that regardless of power relations in the political field, under their management, the field can operate on principles dictated by their vision and division outlined in the consultancy (Saffron Brand Consultancy 2004; 2007). They also assume that the market orientation of promotional policy and the pragmatism of branding praxis should not be subject to political influence. Therefore, it should be conducted on a long term basis to be successful. This way nation branders attempt to depoliticise their practice from power relations. Their argument that nation branding should be apolitical demonstrates limited understanding of power relations within the democratic societies whereby political elections might lead to personal
changes in the bureaucracy or policy changes. The notion of ‘depoliticization’ remains consistent with the Bourdieusian (2003) view on the myth of globalisation. He argues that the normative claims regarding ‘globalisation’, understood as mystifying neo-liberalism, are not a result of economic inevitability, but a conscious and deliberate policy making. Likewise is the case of nation branding in Poland: nation branding was aimed at inclusion into the promotional policy and, over the years, has become subject to public affairs campaigning whereby the relationships between actors within the field are subject to mechanisms of commercial pluralism over the policy solutions, resources and power exercised by means of ‘symbolic violence’ held by the Polish state (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). This way, I argue, nation branders strived to further legitimise the universality of branding and the marketing profession within the field of power. Their struggle aimed at gaining greater social legitimacy.

With regards to the normative utterances emerging from the consultancy discursive order (Saffron Brand Consultants 2004b; 2007), there are arguments that the field ‘should’ include the representatives of private sector, governmental actors and ‘should’ be organised on the basis of a centralised institutional worldview. This is against the interest of the field of power as every single institutional actor responsible for the development or enactment of promotional policy in Poland has accumulated various types of capital that they are attempting to secure and increase. For example, the promotional policy introduced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009) suggests that by 2015 government actors engaged in promotion of the Polish state should have their budget increased: up to 70-80 m. PLN (app. £15.5-17.8 m.) in the area of public diplomacy; up to 100 m. PLN (app. £ 22.3 m.) in the area of cultural diplomacy; up to 120 m. PLN (app. £ 26.7 m.) in the area of economic promotion; and 100 m. PLN (app. £ 22.3 m.) in the area of tourism promotion. This policy, however, does not

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51 There is historical evidence to suggest that as far as the overseas propaganda apparatus is concerned, its management is politicised and tends to change as a result of changes in the political field. For details see Cull (2008) who reveals management changes in the United States Information Agency and its close alliance to the US political field.
include specific task budgeting and it is not clear where those additional funds would be specifically allocated to. Bourdieu’s view on field struggles corresponds with Moloney’s (2006) argument that pluralist democracies are underpinned by competing actors who speak with multiple voices in the general cacophony of messages. The field of national images management, however, defines those competitive relations on the basis of expenditure of public funds, either Polish or European funds, as a means of sustaining the competitiveness of the Polish state.

Regardless of the power relations between the Polish state actors and nation branders, and competitive relationships within the field there are signs of ad hoc cooperation between the actors in the field on selected aspects of policies or individual campaigns overseas. Given that the promotional field actors in Poland have different priorities, various target markets, and tasks, they ‘speak’ by means of campaigning to different target publics in different ways. This is a feature of pluralist societies whereby power relationships within the political field tend to change the mediated aspects of national identities (Rivenburgh 1997; Madianou 2005).

PROMOTIONAL CULTURE AND NATION BRANDING

What is clear from the collected data archive is that the interpretations of what ‘nation branding’ is varied among the field agents. This inability to differentiate, particularly between public diplomacy and nation branding, illustrates an unconscious and intuitive approach. That is activation of, what Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) refer to as ‘practical sense’. For them, “practical sense precognizes; it reads in the present state the possible future states with which the field is pregnant. For in habitus the past, the present and the future intersect and interpenetrate one another” (ibid. p. 22). Although findings do not unambiguously isolate which of the virtual sediments of nation branders have the greatest impact on trajectories of action, it is explicit that their previously acquired professional background in corporate communications mediates the
practices in the field. Furthermore, it is explicit that for nation branders national identity can be imagined as a ‘brand’. But how is this notion conveyed in practice?

Yet again, the notion of practical sense offers an insight into the process whereby silent features of Polish national identity are represented by outputs of nation branders’ practice. The ‘self-advantageous’ promotional culture (Wernick 1991) has the ability to advance new concepts taken by social agents into new institutional frontiers. Indeed, nation branding has entered the field of power as mediated by a class of professionals who struggled to be converted to an integral component of promotional policy. While it was legitimised as an expression of the Polish state’s political economy interests, it principally served nation branders in the struggle to accumulate higher states of economic, social and symbolic capital. Nation branders reveal that tactical features of nation branding ‘messaging’ should be enacted by means of symbolism, advertising and media relations (Saffron Brand Consultancy 2004; 2007); but its performative discourse draws from traditional propaganda tactics such as publicity and advertising (Lasswell 1934; Moloney 2000). Those are the fundamental tactics of this practice and in the past they were enacted by governments (Manheim 1994). Nation branding emerges as an anecdotal concept that attempts to organise a cacophony of messages on Polishness. It was conceived as an idea that was meant to represent Polishness for all the field actors.

The key explanation to changes in the field lay in the notion of accelerating promotional culture (Wernick 1991) whereby nation branders have been attempting to secure their interest in this area of the Polish state bureaucracy by formalising nation branding programme as a policy and a ‘fixed middle market’ for their services. The attempts to form the homogenous field of nation branding in Poland demonstrate a concerted effort by nation branders and/or their business employers to exploit a national context of promotional culture for the creation of ‘a middle market’ in a relationship between the Polish state and private sector actors involved in performative discourse on nation branding. How did that happen? What field mechanism allowed this change?
First, it is the field of power that has enabled marketization by commissioning tactical communicative tasks and their market orientated ‘position’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) encouraged nation branders to engage with the field. As a result, newcomers into the Polish field of national images management offered their consultancy services, labelled as ‘nation branding’, to the state actors within the field. This market exchange-based, contractual opening has encouraged private contractors to enter the field with a greater confidence. In fact, the Polish Chamber of Commerce and its coalition took nation branding a step further - beyond tactical means - and have been struggling to secure their institutional interests underpinned by national economic priorities by making an impact on the direction of public policy in Poland.

Second, the state actors responsible for promotional policy making have been subjected to public affairs campaigning or they have been targeted with business proposals produced by nation branders. Given that the directions of the promotional policies have not always been explicit and that their enactment is characterised by the field of power as limited accountability (The Supreme Audit Office 2006), nation branders argue that privatisation might result in cost-efficiency and better economic outputs. For them, until 2000, promotion of Poland was poorly managed, involved chaotically designed messages, and poorly coordinated overseas campaigning efforts. Those field developments confirm the Bourdieusian notion of field ‘uncertainty’ (Swartz 1997) and reveal that in a complex institutional field there are many forces, centrifugal and centripetal, that strive for their representation of Polishness.

Third, in Polish democracy, power relations within the political field have bearing on the bureaucratic field of national images management and they did not match the consultancy proposals by the Chamber of Commerce, Saffron Brand Consultancy, and the Institute of Polish Brand. On the one hand, a direct imposition of nation branding demonstrates ‘asymmetry of rationality’ (Staniszkis 2003) whereby Western practices invade Poland by social and institutional actors. On the other hand, it is the Western nation branding consultants who did not grasp the complexity of policies and autonomy
of actors engaged in national identities construction. For example, Prizel (1998) in his discussion of the relationship between foreign policy and national identity in Poland reveals the dynamics of this relationship. The complexity of this area of the state politics, the mediation of which has a great impact on national reputation (Mercer 1996), is a political resource for developing relationships between imagined national communities (Rusciano 2003). The relationship between Polish foreign policy and nation branding consultancy has not been addressed by nation branders, which in my view demonstrates disconnectedness between their discourse and state politics. This argument can be extended to any other policy area (e.g. tourism policy or cultural policy) developed by field actors. The limited reflection on nation branding among its advocates, their grand promises, and a lack of broader relationship with specific policy goals demonstrate a mesmerising relationship of the Polish field of power with concepts conceived within Western promotional culture (Wernick 1991).

Fourth, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economics and their subsidiaries preserved their power over the promotional policy making and reduced the position of nation branding advocates to delivery of *ad hoc* tactical projects and minor consultancy services. This demonstrates how dominant field forces maintain their symbolic power over the instruments of dominations (public policy) and the means of their mediation (persuasive communication). If a ‘nation’ is considered as a symbolic system signifying an ‘imagined community’ (Andersen 2006), for Bourdieu (1991) the symbolic systems are ‘codes’ and deeply structured instruments for communication and instruments for knowing. Simultaneously, they are instruments for social domination whereby the dominant symbolic systems provide integration for dominant actors. The findings explicitly reveal that The Chamber of Commerce and its coalition attempted to use deep cultural codes of positive associations accompanying the myth of branding stemming from allegedly successful nation branding projects in the West, as a means to reinvention of national identity. However, over the years, the Polish field of power has used its statist capital to suppress them to subordinated positions in the field. According to Swartz (1997), this is the very reason why fields perform a political function.
In sum, the collected evidence is consistent with cultural theorists’ arguments regarding marketisation of promotional politics, collective identity construction, and its crossovers with popular culture. Wernick’s (1991, p. 186) attribution of Adorno (1997) and his role in explaining ‘promotion’ as culturally conditioned and performatively enacted remains in line with the introduction and perpetuation of nation branding in Poland. Although the Frankfurt School’s claims were made with reference to the early modernist Western societies, after 1989 the imposition and invasion of the Polish political field with the codified policy discourse, the morphogenesis of which is rooted in the Anglo-Saxon political fields, became common (e.g. Sidorenko 1998). Adorno’s (1997) ontological, structuralist position, however, prioritizes structure over the action and limits the possibility for bottom-up agency. This worldview does not correspond with the findings of this study. Although nation branding ‘grass-roots’ initiatives in Poland were not enacted in its preconceived form, their advocates travelled across the field of national images management and the field of power, left a mark on the public policy agenda, and set priorities among the field players. In that regards, my findings demonstrate the greater analytical plasticity of Bourdieu’s field theory. Nation branding is yet another ideology which demonstrates efforts to impose the Anglo-Saxon worldviews (Bourdieu 2003) onto various social spaces in Poland. As far as normative aspects of its practice go, nation branders also argue for ‘monopolistic centralisation’ in nation branding management; ‘standardisation’ of language derived from the corporate lexicon; ‘sensate emphasis on style over work’ whereby ‘core idea’ is more significant than agency accompanying its implementation. More importantly, the construction of mid-market, merging ‘popular culture’ of branding (Olins 2003) with the statesmanship traditionally attributed to policy making networks responsible for the official representation of national identity features construction and mediation.
For Bourdieu (1979, p. 82), the field analysis involves consideration of the ideological effects of their actors as “the homology between two fields causes the struggles for the specific objectives at stake in the autonomous field to produce euphemized forms of the ideological classes between classes”. While I have already reported on the classes that have been participating in the field struggle (bureaucratic versus nation branders), the ideological effects of nation branding align with the Bourdieusian notion of misrecognition. In lieu of the traditional apparatus of propaganda, the Polish state has introduced specialised policies and stemming from them communicative practices, but nation branders put forward ideological claims that facilitated their legitimacy in the field and beyond.

Among the discursive strategies used by nation branders are those containing utterances legitimizing nation branding as a form of ‘corporate managerialism’. This phenomenon simultaneously corresponded with social theorists’ claims regarding, what Bourdieu (2003) terms as the inevitability of markets. In Poland, the market principles of nation branding were legitimized as ‘post-ideological’ (Bell 2000) whereby nation brand management serves as the representation of the ‘national market’ and therefore it is free of ideological intentions; ‘post-political’ (Žižek 1999) as nation branding should be bipartisan and not serve any political party agenda; ‘post-historical’ (Gehlen 1956) as it was considered that it was time for the Polish nation to move away from its gloomy history of suffering. Those statements remain in tension with the types of capitals that nation branders struggle for as well as the socio-historical context of their practices. Moreover, nation branders do not explicitly acknowledge auxiliary practices accompanying nation branding. But thanks to campaigning efforts they have been, however, able to set the institutional discourses and promotional policy agenda.

For nation branders, their projects were a way out of a national inferiority complex and, in their worldviews this had to be free of self-interest. They strived to
legitimize the nation branding programme in universalizing terms as an economic ‘matter of national importance’ contradicting themselves with regards to promises and ways of evaluating their project (Saffron Brand Consultants 2007). This misrecognition is based on singling out nation branding as a practice that, in its own right, has the ability to attract investment capital to Poland. I argue that this is an overestimation of the relationship between symbolic capital of reputation derived from branding and the complexity of attracting economic capital to Poland. By doing so, nation branders have failed to address non-manageable aspects of the Polish state’s reputation. In their view, corporate managerialism was a way forward for Poland and the enacted pragmatism of consensual nation branding model (p. 18) was assumed to be free of any ideological connotations. Thus they struggle to use it to legitimise their interests.

I argue that nation branders’ misrecognition is twofold: they do not fully recognise a link between the political economy of their praxis and the purpose of the nation brand as they are driven by their own interests. As far as construction of a large scale nation branding is concerned, the Chamber of Commerce and the Institute of Polish Brand rely on verbal and quasi-academic accounts of nation branding among different nations and fail to accept the lack of empirical evidence of economic successes in nation branding. The mythologized, at this stage, nation branding serves largely as a signifier for reinventing collective identity symbols and messages that traditionally were attributed to propaganda practice (Sussman 2012). Interestingly, the transnational nation branding discourse is subject to change: on reflection, it can be added, that there is evidence suggesting that even those advocates of nation branding who accumulated high stakes of cultural capital of expertise in this area have reassessed their position on the idea that nation can be ‘branded’. For example, Anholt (2008, p. 1) claims that nation branding “does not exist; it is a myth, and rather a dangerous one”. In Poland, however, this discourse is being reproduced to perform ideological functions in the political field. This feature of ideological effect is revealed in the last part of this study.
The vision of nation branders capturing ‘Poland as a brand’ is consistent with the totalizing feature of ideology, described by Lukács (1971) as inherent to reification. Nevertheless, nation branding takes this process further: by merging its popular culture discourse with the field of power it strived to de-politicize selected aspects of nationhood and attempted to strip them of their original political, aesthetic, and cultural values. The Polish field of national images management has been subjected to a discourse, the logic of which was based on commodity fetishism that was directly applied into nation-building process. The re-inventing of national identity as a brand, by allegedly ‘anthropologically’ grounded attempts to distance the sense of national identity from its historical past, is a social change which is aimed at distancing from the past, ‘socialist’ vision of Polishness and attempting to reinforce a new one, based on neo-liberal values (Connors 1972). This is how, I argue, the Bourdiesuan (1996) ‘principle of vision of division’ is enacted in the field settings and has bearing on understanding national identity politics in Poland.

**IMPLICATION I: PROMOTIONAL POLICY COMMODIFIED**

The reflexive sociology approach characteristic to Bourdiesuan inquiries brings us to the question of the consequences of exercising symbolic power by nation branders and their impact on public policy. While promotion of Poland is overall perceived by the state actors in terms of ‘evolution’ and a ‘learning curve’, the issue of the impact of nation branders and marketing research on promotional policy making raises questions about the professionalism, accountability and transparency of promotional policies advanced by the Ministries of Economics and Foreign Affairs.

On the one hand, the reliance of the Polish public policy makers on marketing data offers insights into trends in the Polish field of power. It discloses tools for domination and mediation of the relationship between nations and directions of policy making process. On the other hand, the entry of newcomers, nation branders, into the field of national images unravels what are the social forces facilitating changes in the
agency within this specific area of policy in Poland. It offers insights into how market research shapes the logic of promotional policy making by reinforcing the neo-liberal logic of ‘competitiveness’, ‘marketization’, and ‘privatisation’. Thanks to the agency of think tanks, local consultants and consultants representing the ‘transnational capitalist class’ (Sklair 2000), neo-liberal logic has entered yet another social space and public policy making-process. This marketizing logic has been normalised by the Polish field of power and left its legacy on the practices contributing towards perpetuation and self-presentation of nationhood and has been extended into the political field.

Bourdieu (2005) and his colleagues reveal how in Western Europe market research has made its way into the policy making process threatening the quality of the democratic discourse and autonomy of public institutions. For example, Champagne (2005, p. 128) analyses the relationship between political marketing, opinion polling and democracy and concludes that “polls have become the agent and emblem of political cynicism par excellence”. The findings of this study demonstrate that in the case of nation branding in Poland a similar situation occurs - market research is used as guiding policy making and, in result, mediating relationships between the Polish state and transnational communities of nations.

Furthermore, the interest of private sector actors in the promotional policies making reveals that those so called ‘strategies’, I argue, are becoming ‘public commodities’. Their primary stakeholders were attempting to capitalise on the input in their making. Partly, this is a consequence of subjecting the policy making process to nation branders’ consultancy discourse and public affairs campaigning enacted at the crossroads of corporate interests, i.e. representation of Polish business, the mass media and Polish state structures. Bourdieusian studies discuss the relationship between marketing praxis and the field of power in the Western contexts, but my findings offer insights into similar developments in public policy making in post-Soviet Poland. In case of nation branding, polling and focus groups are the main driver of collecting data
or developing their nation branding projects. Champagne (2005, p. 128), working within the Bourdieusian tradition, comments:

*Democracy presupposes spaces of debate, time for reflection, the diffusion of useful and reliable information, so that citizens can make up their minds with full knowledge of the facts – in short, a set of conditions that are bypassed or negotiated from the outset by the routine of polling in politics.*

The development of nation branding initiatives has not involved a greater debate engaging Polish citizens or the overseas publics. Instead, their role has been reduced to the expression of limited input into consultancy projects. In that respect, nation branding forms a calculative social space whereby citizens’ opinions are quantified and used to inform commercial interests. In that respect, market research contributes towards commodification of public policy at its design phase. As Hassan (2008, p. 136) explains, commodification as a cultural process involves “...the physical embodiment of social relation. The insertion of particular logic of production and consumption into the lives of people that was constituted around ‘cash nexus’ - or the marketization of increasing realms of social interaction”. Those commodifying social relations, I argue, were accompanying performative discourse on nation branding in Poland. However, it remains to be seen if this will result in Polish citizens’ cynicism similar to the one resulting from the application of polling in the context of political elections (Lilleker and Scullion 2003).

**IMPLICATION II: NATIONAL IDENTITY COMMODOIFIED**

This commodification is a result of the nation branders’ agency within the Polish field of power and their influence over public policy. In the aftermath, ‘colonisation’ of branding has been underpinned by economic developmentalism. However, thus far, nation branders in Poland have failed to explicitly provide evidence or measures to
assess the growth of the Polish economy and its relationship to the nation branding programme. For Hassan (2008) commodification emerges from social relations that require understanding of the ‘object’ and ‘subject’ of this process. However, as the findings reveal, in the case of the performative discourse on nation branding in Poland, it is not always consistent about what was to be ‘branded’: the Polish state, the Polish nation, or the Polish flagship products. Consequently, it is not clear what is being commodified. On the one hand, the local, Polish marketing and public relations agents unfold requirements for ‘brand Poland’ management and do not explicitly reveal which features of the Polish state as an actor within the global economy can be branded. The argument that the state or the nation can be treated as a commodity, i.e. that they can have a ‘unique selling proposition’, I argue, is a great oversimplification.

According to Hassan (2008), commodification is characteristic of modernist societies whereby its process is upheld by the political economy of practices, including those performed within the field of power. It is the extent of this process that raises doubts about the totality of nation branders claims. While they recognise the diversity of Poland, they define qualities of the Polish state and Polish national identities constructed at home and overseas and end up making commodifying statements:

“Poland is a product amongst other countries. Nation branding is important as geographically, historically, and socially Poland is a cool country” (Arkadiusz, personal interview, 2009).

For nation branders, Poland can be considered as product that can be ‘sold’ on international markets. Although the notion of ideological reification is present within nationalism scholarship (Brubaker 1996), the notion of commoditisation brings another layer of functionalist thinking on Polishness. More importantly, it is not the issue of terminology that immediately links ‘branding’ with ‘commoditisation’, but the complexity of legitimisation and dissemination of nation branding ideology within the Polish state structures. The branded attributes of Polishness are simultaneously linked
with the notion of ‘coolness’ and the importance of market transferability of flagship products. This insight stands in opposition to the literature whereby nation branding is conceptually closer to corporate branding rather than product branding (Olins 1999). In that respect, the rise of nation branding, I argue, entails commodification of social relations between citizens and the Polish state thorough the corporatisation process.

**IMPLICATION III: CORPORATISATION**

This section offers a reflexive narrative analysing the implicit consequences of the ‘imposition’ and ‘introduction’ (Bourdieu 2001) of nation branding in Poland. It considers the intellectualisation, creativity and means by which the nation branding driven national identity construction was performed in Poland from 1999 onwards. Given that the contemporary meaning of ‘branding’ practice is derived from Western promotional culture, the institutionalisation of nation branding in Poland has been enacted by agents whose habitus is shaped by corporate marketing ideologies and their former professional practice which mediates social relations within the Polish state structures. The findings of this study demonstrate that imposing a set of unifying features of national identity as a means of generating economic and symbolic capitals is a simplification in understanding the complexities of political governance. Furthermore, it exemplifies the limits of branding in the process of nation-building.

The archetypical nation branding programme, the vision of which has been primarily spelled out in consultancy reports (Saffron Brand Consultancy 2004; 2007), emphasises that it is the Polish national identity features that can drive this enterprise. Those consultancy reports use the notions of the ‘state identity’ and ‘national identity’ interchangeably and confuse ‘the object’ and ‘the subject’ of the commodification process. Therefore, the social consequences of its imposition in Poland illustrate how the new ‘cultural intermediaries’ in the field of power attempt to rearticulate the pre-existing notions of Polishness and by subjecting them to the exchange values obliterate their original use-values. By interlocking the nation branding ideology into the
imaginative process of national identity commodification, it leads, however, to a more reflexive reading of its consequences; namely attempts to corporatise the Polish field national images management and the field of power by suggesting that the Polish state should be considered as an ‘corporate entity’ operating within the competitive transnational markets. Post-1989, the field of power in Poland had been previously subjected to marketization and the agency of its actors resulted in commodification of the Polish national culture; but the nation branding programme constitutes an additional discursive layer of corporate-styled practice and aspires to be applied to explicitly signify the features of Polishness. The commodification of the Polish national identity does not emerge as a result of marketing practice, but as an ideological misrecognition based on the assumption that the complexity of the Polish state or a nation can be reduced to ‘brand identity’. This, I argue, leads to trivialisation of its features.

The literature demonstrates the growing impact of corporate communications frameworks on the statehood and the government overseas communication. Similarly, the findings section also reveals how trajectories of agency among nation branders result, I argue, in the process of corporatization of the state structures in Poland. To explain this phenomenon, I follow Shirley’s (1999, p. 115) understanding of ‘corporatization’ as “efforts to make state owned enterprises (SOEs) to operate as if they were private firms facing a competitive market or, if monopolies, efficient regulation”. In her view, this process does not only include regulation of the state enterprises but “steps to put state firms on a level playing field with private firms by removing the barriers to entry, subsidies, and special privileges, forcing SEOs to compete for finance on an equal basis with private firms, and giving state managers virtually the same powers and incentives as private managers” (ibid.). The social space analysed in this study is characterised by the mechanism of competition whereby various actors’ struggles over the resources or ideas. Appropriation of nation branding, however, by some of the field actors is a manifestation of a corporatizing mechanism
underpinned by transnational market competitiveness. Therefore, in the context of this study, the notion of corporatisation should be also understood by an increased amount of corporate styled activities. The Polish case of nation branding illustrates how the private sector interests operated to pursue their interests as part of the Polish state policy agenda. Particularly, the Polish Chamber of Commerce positions itself as the centre for bridging corporate, state, and national interests.

THE WEAK ‘ESSENCE’ AND FASHIONABLE COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

While nation branding practice is seen as a form of promoting neo-liberal state interests, the adoption of corporate marketing discourse, nation branding included, has been previously considered as a crisis in national identity (Gerard 2000). In the case of Poland, there are two streams of research demonstrating the relationship between the state and the nation: the emergence of civic forms of nationalism strengthening the democratic foundations of the Polish state as well as those emphasising the crisis of national identity and highlighting difficulties of transformation and inequalities among Poles (Auer 2004). However, at the core of the argument made by Girard (2000), is the fact that nation branding represents a reductionist version of a far more complicated issue addressed by social theorists and studies of economic nationalism (e.g. Greenfeld 2001). In her analysis of nation branding and its relationship to national identity, Aronczyk (2008, p. 54) notes that

...regardless of the makeup of stakeholders or the qualities of the core idea, the primary responsibility for the success of the nation brand lies with individuals: the nation’s citizens, members of the diaspora, or even non-citizens in distant locations who may find cause to engage with the nation and therefore wish to have a stake in its success. For national citizens in particular, the key function is to “live the brand” – that is, to perform attitudes and behaviors that are compatible with the brand strategy. By “immers[ing]” themselves in the brand
identity, citizens carry “the microbes of the brand” and “infect” those with whom they come into contact. This role is described variously as a “brand ambassador,” “brand champion,” “brand exemplar,” or “brand carrier.”

Thus far, neither the Polish state actors nor the private sector advocates of nation branding have explicitly revealed what the introduction of the ‘core idea’ does mean for Polish citizens. Needless to say, in the context of pluralist democracy and complex institutional setting a suggestion that all citizens or enterprises might be unified by one idea of Polishness raises questions regarding ‘latitude of its acceptance’. The reduction of nationalism, underpinned by promises of economic development, to a set of ‘brand signifiers’ and simplistic visual symbols is, I argue, an example of a populist approach to national identity construction and trivialisation of nation-building on the part of nation branders. This insight remains consistent with Lilleker’s (2006, p. 160) understanding of populism in political communication practice whereby “populist communication is propagandist and rhetorical and can draw from emotionalism and authenticity”. The main features of populism include appeals to nationhood; threats to the nation; extreme promises; production of symbolism images, and myths. Yet, the findings demonstrate that for the Polish field of power as well as nation branders, the redefinition of citizens as ‘brand ambassadors’ signifies a qualitative change in the relationship between the Polish state, its citizens and the community of nations. The re-occurring utterance of ‘Poland as a brand’ is I argue, a ‘new speak’ of promotional social domination over the Polish community.

MISSING RELATIONSHIPS

While throughout this study I have revealed relationships in the field that have resulted in the reinvention of Polish national identity as a ‘brand’, I am also aware that not all of them could have been captured in detail. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) argue that the primary aspect of research relates to the reconstruction of the field in relation to the research object. No one study could uncover all possible relationships in
detail. As indicated in the findings section, I was not able to capture amounts of social, cultural, and symbolic capital. For example, as pointed out in the methodology chapter, I was not able to measure ‘quantities’ of cultural capital required to perform nation branding. Therefore, it can be argued, that capital relations require more insightful analysis and it is one of the limitations of this study. Second, it has been revealed that peripheral aspects of nation branding and wielding symbolic power over the policy makers have been performed in the privacy of institutional settings of the Polish state actors. The discursive archive implicitly reveals that this process took two plausible directions: a) subordinate state actors have lobbied dominant actors in the field to partially represent interests of nation branders; b) meetings between the bureaucratic class and private sector agents took place, but there is no public record of those events. On the one hand, this does not enable me to fully grasp personal relationships in the field; on the other hand, it much reduces the transparency in the promotional policy making. I argue that this is, in part, a legacy of the Sovietised era whereby bureaucrats have a tendency to withhold information to avoid criticism.

Furthermore, transparency has been blurred by other relationships in the field. The data collected also reveals relationships based on unlawful practices. Riggs (1997, p. 347) puts forwards the following argument:

*Industrialisation has vastly expanded both the tasks assigned to all contemporary governments and the resources (domestic and international) placed at their disposal. This has not only increased the need for efficient and humane public administration, but it has also magnified the necessity for bureaucratic power in order to ensure competence and impartial management of public affairs, but regrettably it also enhances opportunities for corruption and mismanagement.*
As indicated in the findings section, promotional policy and its expanding stakeholder environment offers growing commercial opportunities. It was revealed by participants of my study that some elements of the promotional policy implementation were perceived as based on corrupt relationships (Zofia, personal interview 2009; Grzegorcz, personal interview, 2009). Those allegations, however, were not made in connection to nation branding, but more about subsidising marketing activities of commercial enterprises by one actor in the Ministry of Economics. The indication of potential for corruption in interviews, however, only reinforces the importance of transparency in public policy making, including promotional policy of the Polish state.

MODELLING EMERGING ‘CORPO-NATIONALISM’

Finally, I arrive at the stage of my analysis in which I would like to present a model of social-institutional phenomena that I call ‘corpo-nationalism’ (Figure 4). This is the output of my interrogation that encapsulates the complexity of the Polish case of nation branding as nation-building. Done this way, I attempt to complete this study, following suggestions made by Bourdieu himself, whereby ‘theorising’ requires the construction of “a very concrete empirical case with the purpose of building a model (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 233). This study is a case in point: by drawing from various sources of data, I have revealed performative discourse on nation branding in Poland and its institutional sedimentation, but the density of its description cannot be reduced exclusively to ‘empirical passivity’. Thus, I contextualise my data with a graphical representation of the field relationships among various actors.

For clarity, this section focuses on a model, but I do not claim its generalisability in different national or institutional settings. It has been made explicit by Bourdieu (ibid., p. 233) that those models need not to be mathematical or abstract to be rigorous. What I present the reader with is an explanatory model contextualising how powerful dissemination of ‘bottom-up’ corporate ideas by the newcomers into the Polish field of
power can be. Principally, I do not claim that this model reflects the ideas of nation branders, but rather how the phenomenological reality of the field had been found in this study. What I propose, therefore, is a model that considers habitus as a crucial mediating element, triggering institutional change rather than the deployment of models of nation branding, either in its conceptual (Olins 1999) or consultancy discursive order (Saffron Brand Consultants 2004b; 2007). On the one hand, the model I put forward cannot be generalised, and on the other hand, represents exclusive trajectories of correction of performativity among the Polish field actors.

In order to develop this model, I extend the trajectories correction model of social change (Eyal et al. 2000) into the context of my investigation and marry it with empirical insights drawn from the findings section. While the relationship between an individual and social milieu, or in this case, professional milieus, is crucial to all field dynamics, in my analysis I did not want to lose track of the specificity and contexts of agency among the actors in the field going beyond performative discourse on nation branding. In fact, the contemporary field of national images management in Poland is an institutional area that has only recently begun to clarify its role within the field of power and therefore struggles between social forces which are inherent to its dynamics, particularly shaped by the neo-liberal ‘shock therapy’ in Poland. Although I understand the shortcomings of historical analogies, a similar situation occurred in Poland post-1945 whereby the imposition and invasion of Sovietism in the political field radically recontextualised the priorities of overseas propaganda by the Polish state and organisation of its system (Dudek 2002).

Similarly, nowadays, neo-liberalism in Poland creates a state of institutional chaos that is shaped under the influence of various forces leading to the “effect of universality” (Bourdieu et al. 1994). Those have been summarised by a client of nation branding consultants from the Chamber of Commerce in the following way:
These were the years devoted to basic education, you know. I think, after seven years, since 2007, we are at the different level of social consciousness and perception of the importance of nation branding among widely understood elites; we come across more people who recognise what we are talking about and who understand this problem (Maciej, personal interview, 2009).

Indeed, scholars (Szondi 2009) have recognised how powerful the idea of nation branding has become in Poland and other CEE national settings, but in this study I attempted to reveal specific mechanisms, account for institutional settings and the dynamics of its appropriation, dissemination, transformation and normalisation. For Bourdieu the state structures are key settings for all social struggles. By recalling his understanding of the state as a space for “the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital” (Bourdieu 1994, p. 4), we see that it is “in the realm of symbolic production that the grip of the state is felt most powerfully” (ibid, p. 2). For him, the internal struggles within the state lead to effects of universality as the “symbolic dimension of the effect of the state” is manifested by “performative discourses” in a struggle for legitimacy and symbolic domination (ibid. p. 16). And, indeed, this thesis records this effect of universality by revealing how nation branders have reinforced construction a sense of national identity based on promises of transnational markets and corporate-style discourses and practices.

Given that Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 97) suggests that a field is “a space within which effect of field is exercised, so that happens to any object that traverses this space cannot be solely explained by the object in question”. Henceforth his analysis involves an exploration of the interconnections between players in the field and, I argue that in modelling of nation branding in institutional settings in Poland we need to understand the specificity of its context and the process of sedimentation of
This form of discursive struggle. Myles (1999, p. 889) reminds us of this aspect of analysis in Bourdieusian studies. It is that...

...to succeed in discursive struggle is also paralleled by the institutionalization of their forms of discourse. But institution in Bourdieu's work, especially when he refers to language, is also to suggest rites of institution - the power to establish and protect classificatory boundaries or distinctions between groups. In this way Bourdieu views performativity as the outcome of the social structuring of the classificatory power of language, the "management" of the right to name.

In the light of the evidence collected, we can sum up the understanding of nation branding to institutional performative discourse that has been disseminated throughout the field structures and various structuring channels. While for Bourdieu and Waquant (1992, p. 105) “every field has its own logic, rules and regularities”, the field of national images management in Poland is, among many institutional tasks, concerned with persuasive communication of symbolic representation of collective identities of Polish statehood and nationhood. The ideological effects of nation branding stem from similarities between ‘identity, image, and reputation’ of the Polish state as wielded by the field and ‘identity, image, and reputation’ as developed by nation branders in their arbitrary attributions of identity features. The key issue, however, is what the Polish state and the field setting has done with nation branding and why it is that they continuously refer to Poland as a ‘brand’. And this is the key of point of this thesis: it demonstrates that the Polish state bureaucracy is mesmerised by promotional culture, new developments within it, and transforms it into its own use.

The first point in making connections between nation branding and its Polish case is therefore a careful analysis of the mechanisms and logic of its institutional
dissemination of this idea. Principally, nation branding has emerged and been enacted as a bottom-up nation-building process and demonstrates a pressure put on the Polish state by non-state stakeholder groups and a class of nation branders in order to more effectively manage its symbolic representations. While the ‘bottom-up’ aspect of agency is reductionist in Bourdieu’s (1992) approach to the field analysis, this feature of collective action corresponds with social theory approaches to nationalism studies (Delanty and O’Mahony 2002). These form the conceptual framework for this study. Therefore, I extend Bourdieu’s understanding of the field analysis into possibility of ‘bottom-up’ action whereby emerging nationalism has a power as a cognitive ‘scheme’, ‘categorisation’, and ‘myth’ (Helbling 2007) and it is institutionalised as a powerful social change accompanying political and bureaucratic processes.

The second point that I would like to foreground in this model is that a key concept driving this social change in the field is that of habitus. I find this concept particularly useful to capture the discursive process of sedimentation of nation branding in the Polish setting and to inform interactions between agents. It makes the notion of habitus particularly interesting to conceptualise social and institutional change (Eyal et al. 2000). To reiterate, Bourdieu speaks of habitus (1990a, p. 53) as a

... a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adopted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.

Because performative discourse on nation branding is both socially constructed and socially constructing, it has lead its appropriation, transformation or resistance against it. Simultaneously, nation branders tend to adopt their trajectories of action
into local field circumstances or travelled outside of the studied field to pursue new opportunities elsewhere, for example at the level of local councils or city councils. While the agents in the Polish field of nation branding have rejected nation branding in the shape envisioned by nation branders in their commercial projects, some of them have appropriated nation branding in their institutional settings to re-invest the symbolic outputs of their existing institutional communicative practices as a ‘brand Poland’.

Furthermore, their bureaucratic milieu has become an environment enabling facilitation of further dissemination of nation branding into the Polish political field in which the Polish political class uses this idea of nation branding as a means of power legitimization in public affairs and collective identity politics. Habitus, therefore, explains and captures changing trajectories of choices made by the field actors: if the nation branders are confronted in one institution, they make decisions to target different institutions or reshape their ways by which they ‘sell’ nation branding consultancy to the Polish state - on ‘national’ or ‘local’ government levels. This way, a powerful mechanism of the Polish state overseas communicative practices is being adapted to serve the purpose of national market priorities whereby transnational competitiveness plays a crucial role in nation-building. As pointed out by Brubaker (1996, p. 17), nationalism “is induced – by political fields of particular kinds. Its dynamics are governed by the properties of political fields, not the properties of collectivites.” Therefore, I argue, that nation brand is a communicative expression of a specific form of economic nationalism, which marries the corporate and the Polish state discourses and practices in order to: symbolically reinvent nationhood as a form of economic corporate collectivity; to accelerate economic growth; to historically condition the modernising aspiration of the Polish state; to further embed Polishness within neo-liberal political economy tradition; and to adopt nation-building to transnational competitiveness of the Polish state. Because, this process was induced by
corporate discourses of nation branders and further adopted by the field and political class in Poland, I call it a corpo-nationalism.

**FIGURE 5** DISSEMINATION OF NATION BRANDING AS A CONCERTED INSTITUTIONAL EFFORT OF SOCIAL CHANGE LEADING TO CORPO-NATIONALISM

Summing up, this chapter has offered an extensive interpretation of nation branding and has unravelled implicit mechanisms accompanying this area of practice.
In principle, this chapter is a commentary on public policy making in Poland as well as the complexity of relationships between the interest groups advancing nation branding and the Polish state actors. Throughout this chapter I have presented consequences of the ‘imposition’ and ‘invasion’ of nation branding on the Polish state institutional settings which include changes leading to: commodification of public policy, commodification of Polish national identity, and corporatisation of the Polish state. This chapter summarizes the findings and demonstrates that a localized appropriation of nation branding discourse within the Polish state structures leads to a concerted effort of reinventing communicative practices to the tune of the nation brand ideology. Finally, I present a model of corpo-nationalism which is the most significant aspect of social changes engendered by the performative discourse on nation branding in Poland. This model reflects dynamics of those changes and accounts for interactions between actors, their agency and the field structures. In the last section of this thesis I present conclusions and potential avenues for the future research on nation branding.
CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This thesis makes an empirical contribution to the body of knowledge in the area of nation branding (1999-2010). Primarily, it demonstrates a discrepancy between the ‘theoretical’ and ‘empirical’ features of nation branding discourse. By revealing the actions of a specific class of professionals - nation branders - and their performative discourses, this thesis reveals the process of the institutional dissemination of nation branding in Poland. While, in theory, nation branding as a practice involves conscious construction and communicative manifestation of national identity (Olins 1999), this thesis offers a problematizing approach to the interrogation of nation branding. The analysis of this study is set within the structures of the Polish neo-liberal state, specifically its sub-field – ‘the field of national images management’.

This politicised, institutional space primarily includes the state actors that have been accumulating the statist capital including their capacity to exercise ‘soft power’ (Nye 2004) overseas and ‘symbolic power’ (Bourdieu 1991) at home. As this study demonstrates, nation branding has been institutionalised within the Polish state structures through a number of ‘bottom up’ initiatives; persuasively propagated by the private sector actors who engendered nation branding discourse; normalised it within their own institutional structures and public affairs; formed alliances; produced consultancy reports for governmental consumption, and travelled across the state networks in order to secure support for nation branding as an autonomous field and practice for advancing Polish national identity. Principally, this study reveals the private sector actors who have been mobilised by the issues of transnational competitiveness of the Polish state and who were particularly vocal in the public affairs before the EU accession (1 May 2004). In their struggle, they strived to legitimise their actions by linking them to national competitiveness understood in symbolic, intangible terms. Their efforts took approximately six years and, I argue, were aimed at gaining legitimacy for ‘branding’ as a practice whereby nation branders
were a professional class seeking legitimacy within the field of power in Poland (Bourdieu 2003).

Overall, the findings of this study support Valencic et al.’s. (2001) argument concerning a growing mobilisation of non-governmental actors in the process of symbolic national representations overseas. In that respect, nation branders advocated ‘co-construction’ by ‘privatisation’ of national identity making. Whilst the events leading up to the emergence of nation branding in Poland coincided with the concerns over national reputations, the archetypical nation branding programme is a manifestation of more-complex social processes leading to changes in the Polish field of national images management. The preconditions enabling the emergence of nation branding within the studied social space include specific, localised features of ‘promotional culture’ (Wernick 1991) in Poland: the myth of ‘brand’, particularly corporate brands understood as shortcuts for successful national organisations; belief in Western consultancy; national competitiveness of Poles; marketization of communicative tasks within the field of national images management; concern of the private sector actors over the mediated national identity features and the ways that the state translates its meta-capital into ‘identity, image, and reputation’ politics. Moreover, the state-building process, entailing the emergence of new government actors in the field, and the subsequent emergence of codified promotional policies offered opportunities for newcomers into the field. Below I summarise the consequences of ‘the imposition’ and ‘invasion’ (Bourdieu 2003) of nation branding as conditioning mechanisms. Furthermore, I sketch out potential for future research on nation branding.

Indeed, several conclusions arise from this case study. Its key findings verify the assumption that the role of the Polish state in national identity construction is characterised by a ‘marketplace of ideas’ metaphor (Price 1995). While the settings of this study are mapped out within ‘domestic’ officialdoms, nation branding as an idea exceeds the domestic principle in national identity making: its construction process
should be shaped by ‘global’ and ‘local’ forces legitimizing it and informing directions for its enactment. The findings of this study demonstrate that nation branding is not merely a concept: it is an ‘intellectual project’ that has materialised as a discourse having traceable embodiment (Bourdieu 1977) and as merging idiosyncratic and systemic features *hexit* leading to social agency, including attempts to shape policy making process in Poland. In that respect, it remained a powerful and appealing ‘metaphor’ to the Polish political class that is still being reproduced within the Polish political field as a means of power legitimisation.

For nation branders, however, their grand vision of the ‘nation branding’ programme encompasses a set of neo-liberalizing, but ‘collective identity ’ signifiers that are underpinned by market fundamentalism whereby the role of the Polish state is defined as supporting ‘strong’ aspects of Polishness. Its legitimization and ‘magnetic promises’ stems from mediatization, modernization, marketization, competitiveness and a requirement for public-private partnerships in performing their branded vision of national identity. In that respect, nation branding stands in opposition to the old doctrine of economic nationalism as a protectionist mechanism: it is based on assumed power of attraction rather than coercion. Here lies the paradox of nation branding: while neo-liberalism assumes none or limited intervention of the state in entrepreneurial activities, it is the Polish state that was at the centre of attention by nation branders; the state was considered as a sponsor and an arbiter in the implementation of their projects. The second paradox of neo-liberalism and nation branding is an underlying assumption among nation branders that through nation branding efforts, the Polish state should been involved in marketing private sector organisations. Why it is that the Polish or the European taxpayer has to subsidise this process remains a silent feature of nation branding discourse.

The findings of this study reveal that the political economy of neo-liberalism is an incubating milieu for the rise of the branded state. In lieu of a strong modern economic nationalism (Szlajfer 1997) doctrine, the discourse on nation branding in
Poland reveals the weak position of native commercial symbols - corporate and products brands. In their place, the Polish Chamber of Commerce aimed at enacting a nation branding programme that would facilitate the self-presentation of commercial successes on national market. While questions can be asked whether the Polish state should have co-produced branded content on behalf of the business organisations, I argue that the nation branders aspired to add greater value to the Polish economy than the material outputs their practice suggests. Or to use the marketing metaphor, the ‘added value’ of nation branding in the formation of national identity is highly questionable. This is, I argue, due to ideological misrecognition of branding and its ambiguous relationship to more complex promotional policy.

Nation branding has emerged as a discourse on Polish identity manifestation and as a means to develop a long-lasting national reputation overseas. However, my analysis reveals little understanding of international power politics among the self-proclaimed nation branding experts, marketing and public relations practitioners in the field. National reputation is an extension of a specific dimension of mediated foreign and domestic politics and the behaviour of the state as an actor in the international system. Social theory approaches to international relations explore this matter. For example, Mercer (1996) offers a middle range reputation theory of the state; Sharman (2007) contextualises the complexity of national reputation within rationalist and constructivist frameworks and discusses how powerful foreign policy making is for national reputation. This is neglected by those who advanced nation branding ideology and attempted its semi-autonomous enactment in Poland. Given that nation branding in Poland does not address foreign policy matters in a strategic way, questions about its effectiveness and the credibility of nation branding consultants should be asked. If a prevailing aspect of national reputation is a derivative of a specific dimension of foreign or domestic policy, nation branding consultants miss the point in their approach to ‘identity, image, and reputation’ politics. As far as the reputation of the Polish state is concerned, nation branding discourse has emerged at the time when Polish foreign policy was geared up towards the Iraqi war that has been of contested
legitimacy. Soon after, transnational media reported on ‘CIA camps in Poland’ (Watt 2005). But this is too political for nation branders. Instead, they offered a discourse that trivialised both the national reputation of Poles and of Polish national identity construction. In that respect, nation branding is a ‘smoke screen’ shifting public opinion towards promotional practices and distancing national reputation from foreign and domestic policy issues.

Furthermore, in theory (Olins 1999), nation branding appears intellectually closer to authoritarian regimes than to the democratic politics and institutional structures of pluralist nations. Its commitment to unification and synergy of collective identity projections is hardly viable in any democratic political field where the institutional voices represent various interests. O’Shaughnessy (2009) demonstrates why the idea of brand is closer to the propaganda practices in totalitarian Nazi Germany, where the unification of messages underpinned organisation of its propaganda apparatus. The imaginative writings of prescriptive nation branding ‘textbooks’ do not attempt to address the specificity of pluralist institutional politics and different versions of nationalisms and national identities stemming from a specific political economy and cultural settings. Their generic and normative approach, based on the modernist mindset of ‘command and control’ management (Holtzhausen 2000) of nation branding, demonstrates misrecognition of democratic processes whereby different actors ‘speak of Poland’ via their policies and communicative acts in a context-dependent way. Nation branding, however, is still present in public affairs in Poland. There is new evidence emerging that the political class reproduces the idea of nation branding in their everyday political struggles outside of the studied field. This process leads to the transformation of nation branding which results from the discursive notion of ‘continuity and discontinuity’.

This brings me to the presentation of the potential for future research on nation branding in Poland and elsewhere. Given that nation branding has emerged in Poland thanks to the agency of cultural intermediates on a transnational capitalist class of
nation branders, I do not preclude the possibility of their success in persuading the Polish political class to enact their vision of the programme. This feature of performative discourse on nation branding itself requires further academic inquiry. Indeed, nation branding in Poland has still some proponents willing to continue engaging in its practice in its *orthodox* form. This offers an opportunity the future research with regards to enactment of this concept that might lead to further institutional re-inventions of propaganda practice. Moreover, having been already subjected to powerful institutional public affairs campaigning, nation branding ideology is reproduced by the Polish political class as a discourse legitimising their interests and power. This offers a next direction for the future research that might explore what the Polish political class do with the notion of nation branding in their everyday discourse and practices. The further research might also explore dynamics of the relationship between nation branding and political parties’ programmes in Poland. Notwithstanding the criticism of nation branding presented in this thesis, the concept of ‘brand’ and its nationalising offshoot has attracted the attention of a narrow group of professionals in Poland. While the Institute of Polish Brand no longer operates as an institutional entity, some of the cultural intermediaries discussed in this study reshaped their profile and established new organisations offering ‘branding’ as part of the portfolio of their ‘know how’ (cultural capital). For example, ‘Best place’, a consultancy established by one of the local nation branders has jumped on the transnational nation branding band wagon by engaging with institutional clients in Ukraine and Belarus. Similarly, consultancy outlets might also contribute to the perpetuation of nation branding.

To sum up, the findings of this study reveal that The Chamber of Commerce in Poland and its Saffron team took a position suggesting that the Polish state does not sufficiently promote national interests and by attempting to legitimize the concept of branding and to increase the social standing of branding practice in Poland. However, the problems of Poland’s nation branding did not stem from a lack of political will for managing the images of Poland overseas. Rather, they were the result of the
intellectual shortcomings of nation branding as a concept which underestimates the values of democratic politics – i.e., a pluralism of ‘voices’ driven by different versions of nationalisms and represented via different communicative practices, acts and messages. This case study demonstrates that, regardless of the position of nation branders’ a nation branding programme cannot be directly imposed as per the ‘handbook’ into different social realms. However, the findings of this study unfold that nation branding has left its legacy in Poland. The field image we are left with is that of a neo-liberal corpo-nationalism. It is a form of identity politics underpinned by global competitiveness, which aims to enhance the sense of national identity via the application of marketing ideologies and practices. Paradoxically, the emergence of nation branding is symptomatic of a national identity crisis in Poland: compliance with promotional culture and the belief that Poland can be reinvented as a brand demonstrates that Polish technocrats struggle to offer new viable visions of Polishness. In sum, nation branding in Poland has emerged as an ideological discourse that mediates the power structures of government with corporate interests and has been used by Polish technocrats to legitimize the dominant neo-liberal social order.
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### TABLE 1 LIST OF PILOT STUDY INTERVIEWEES (10 interviews; n=12)

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### TABLE 2 MAIN FIELDWORK LIST OF INTERVIEWEES (48 interviews; n=43)

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<td>Igor</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>Polish Tourism Organization/Department of Marketing Strategy</td>
<td>11/08/09; 16/04/10</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Aleksandra</td>
<td>Spokesperson</td>
<td>Polish Tourism Organization/Press Office</td>
<td>30/07/10</td>
<td>30/07/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Tadeusz</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Polish Ministry of Economics/Department of Support Instruments</td>
<td>14/09/09</td>
<td>14/09/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Julia</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
<td>National Center of Culture</td>
<td>24/07/10</td>
<td>24/07/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Wojciech</td>
<td>National communication coordinator</td>
<td>PL.2012/Department of Promotion</td>
<td>11/09/09; 27/07/10</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Teodor</td>
<td>Public relations consultant</td>
<td>Freelancer/unemployed</td>
<td>14/04/10</td>
<td>14/04/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Leon</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman</td>
<td>Young and Rubicam Poland</td>
<td>15/09/09; 28/07/10</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Marta</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Open Arts Project</td>
<td>20/04/10</td>
<td>20/04/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Agata</td>
<td>Managing director</td>
<td>Citybell Consulting</td>
<td>28/07/10</td>
<td>28/07/10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:**
2556 min.

329
APPENDIX 1 GLOSSARY OF KEY BOURDIEUSIAN TERMS USED IN THIS THESIS

CAPITALS (TYPES OF) Bourdieu is often thought of as a neo-capitalist as in his understanding of society he considers other than economic capital types of resources. They are socially scarce goods and values that co-construct social spaces. Apart from economic capital, he frequently speaks of ‘symbolic capital’; social capital’, ‘cultural capital’, but also ‘political capital’ and ‘intellectual capital’.

CULTURAL INTERMEDIARIES It is a term that refers to groups of professionals, who, in their occupational positions produce symbolic goods and services. Their key features have been spoken of by Bourdieu as based on presentation and representation abilities.

DOXA Originally a Greek word for ‘belief” or ‘popular opinion’, but Pierre Bourdieu used it to explain truths taken for granted in any particular society. Bourdieu tends to speak of them those beliefs as ‘natural’ or as ‘self-evident’.

FIELD Or ‘champ’ in French. Within the Bourdieu’s body of work, it signifies a social space in which various actors are engaged in specific practices. Fields are fairly homogeneous and structured by resources and subjective relationships.

HABITUS It is an analytical concept used by Bourdieu to describe a set of identities characterising a specific group of actors. For Bourdieu habitus, primarily relates to cultural characteristics and dispositions developed by actors over time and it is a driver of their practices. The notion of habitus is frequently considered as a mechanism for understanding differences between classes of agents. On the one hand, it is a feature shaping their social agency and, on the other hand, manifesting collective identities.
**HEXIS** Originally, a Greek word for ‘having’ or ‘possession’. In Bourdieu’s body of work it is used as ‘bodily hexis’ and refers to peoples’ embodied practical sense of social orientation.

**HETERODOXA** It refers the emergence of the new, competing beliefs on social phenomena which entail a move from practical action to discursive exchanges. It leads to the situation of social change, which is mediated by dominant, taken for granted social order.

**ORTHODOXA** It refers to the situation where the arbitrariness of ‘what is taken for granted’ (doxa) is recognised, but accepted in practice by social actors in their fields.

**PRAXIS** It refers to the whole body of human action, including the process of engaging, applying, exercising, reflecting and practicing.

**PRAXEOLOGY** It is a study of action that Bourdieu describes as a type of universal anthropology. Praxeology, according to Bourdieu, takes under consideration historical conditions and highlights relativity of social structures, while recording the ways participants of social life form those historical structures.

**SYMBOLIC POWER** It is a type of power that has the ability to shape a legitimate vision of the social world and its division; it tends to legitimize political and economic relations and contributes towards to the reproduction of social arrangements.

**SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE** It is a form of violence that is exercised upon social agents with their complicity; exercising this type of violence takes place in the situation whereby agents know that they are subjected to it and they themselves exercise it too.
STRUCTURALIST CONSTRUCTIVISM It is Bourdieu’s ontological position that guides his sociological explanations of action. In this worldview, there is an interplay between actors and the structure whereby the social world is created by objective relations (determined by resources – types of capital) and symbolic relationships (determined by habitus) whereby the conditions construct action of the agents.

STRUCTURED STRUCTURES In Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power, it is a dimension of every symbolic system that is organised in a comprehensive way and includes objective structures, means of communication and the process of signification that is an output of the condition of communication.

STURCTURING STRUCTURES In Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power, it is a dimension of symbolic systems that explain the way of knowing the world; it consists of instruments of knowing and constructing the objective meaning whereby objectivity is understood as an agreement between subjects.
APPENDIX 2 EVIDENCE OF LIMITING ACCESS TO DATA

Panie Pawle,
Dziś jestem często pod biurkiem.
Postaram się więc w nielicznej syntece opisać nasze wrażenia związane z Pana sprawą:
1/ idee jest jak najbardziej ok., tym bardziej, że brakuje w Polsce znaczących tekstów i badań
2/ możliwość badań w NSI; z przykrością muszę podkreślić, iż nie ma możliwości przeprowadzenia osobistych wywiadów (rozmów) z pracownikami.

Departament jest w trakcie reorganizacji i z racji zmian kadrowych, a zwłaszcza strukturalnych jest to obiektywne zrealizowania.

Panie Pawle – doceniając pańskie zaszanowanie i wartość badawczej pracy, widzę ewentualną możliwość przeprowadzenia a zdalnie, którą musiałby Pan przesłać do DDPK. wybór ośnch ankiety wane, a niejako do kierownictwa. Wyjazd to, zgodnie z informacją mro Q, w lustrań waszy być krótko i syntetyczna. Mógłby Pan je przesłać do nas pocz.
APPENDIX 3 RESEARCH LETTER REQUESTING DOCUMENTS

The Media School
Bournemouth University, UK

Salutem

Dear Sir or Madam,

I am a Research Assistant at the Media School, Bournemouth University, UK. I am writing to request a set of documents that are necessary for my research.

I would like to request the following documents:

1. A report on the impact of social media on the mental health of teenagers in the UK.
2. A survey on the use of social media by students at Bournemouth University.
3. A case study on the use of social media in the entertainment industry.
5. A comparison of different social media platforms and their effectiveness.
6. A study on the influence of social media on political activism.
7. An analysis of the role of social media in disseminating misinformation.

Please send these documents to me at [your email].

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,
[Your Name]
APPENDIX 4 DOCUMENTS ARCHIVE


Chancellery of the Polish Prime Minister, 2008. Strategiczny plan rządzenia. Warsaw: Chancellery of the Polish Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland.

Chancellery of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, 2008. Poland 2030: development challenges. Board of Strategic Advisors. Warsaw, Poland: Chancellery of the Polish Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland.


Mogłaby Pani rozwinać ten wątek, dlaczego słowo “marka” jest kłopotliwe?

Dla mnie jako pewnego rodzaju praktyka, ale i urzędnika państwowego, marka kojarzy się pewnie z produktem i z towarem. Wiele rzeczy z brandingu i z marketingu mówią, że Polska jest towarem i trzeba go sprzedać. Ja nie wierze. To znaczy, dla mnie towar... hm... My wcale nie chcemy go sprzedać, bo on i tak jest już sprzedany. To znaczy, my i tak istniejemy w obiegu. Teraz jest tylko kwestia tego jak to pokazać. Moim zdaniem... I dlatego dla mnie, być może jest cięka granica pomiędzy właśnie towarem, który należy sprzedać, ale ja uważam, że Polska jest już ugruntowaną jak gdyby jednostką w Europie czy w świecie. Teraz pytaniem nie jest jak ją sprzedać tylko jak ją dobrze pokazać, bo ona jest różnie pokazywana i różne są jak gdyby opinie. Ja mam, powiedzmy szczerze, kłopot ze słowem ‘marka’. Być może rozumiem to dość prymitywnie, ale jednak takie mam wrażenia.

To bardzo interesujące. Czym jest zatem dla Pani branding narodowy? Bo to jest pytanie, które tak naprawdę gdzieś krąży.

To bardzo trudne muszę powiedzieć.

Ja wiem, że ono jest trudne. Ono jest proste, ale trudne.

Bo ono jest wszystkim i niczym. Dla mnie nadal, eh... to znaczy jest to nadal sposób narracji o naszym kraju, o historii, o tradycji, ale i o współczesności. Dla mnie branding jest to umiejętność snucia opowieści o Polsce. To nie jest kwestia konkretnego produktu np. jakiegoś ‘Ćmielów’, który jest jednym z lepszych designów lat 60-tych czy 70-tych. Bardzo słynny. Dla mnie branding narodowy jest to mówienie o narodzie i o kraju w sposób spójny, spójny jeden komunikat. Pokazanie jak gdyby pewnych rzeczy. Nie wiem czy ja nie wprowadzam rewolucji w Pana myślenie....

Nie, nie...

Jeżeli nawet... proszę to traktować tak jak moje przemyślenia po roku tutaj. Bo jestem dyrektorem tego departamentu tutaj, od roku i od roku zmieniałam nazwę tego departamentu na ten „public diplomacy”, żeby jednak pokazać, że pewne docieranie do interesariusza niżej niż wyżej; mnie nie interesuje klient rządowy, tylko interesuje mnie dziennikarz, artysta, kurator wystawy, archeolog danego kraju, i to tak działamy...
przez instrumenty...być może do instrumentów później dojdziemy, to co chcemy pokazać.

Czy ja mogę zapytać gdzie Pani po raz pierwszy usłyszała termin branding narodowy, i w jakich okolicznościach?

Ja branding narodowy słyszę od lat. Powiem tak szczercem, że to jest chyba kwestia jakiś siedmiu lat temu. To było...mój mąż jest dziennikarzem „Media & Marketing Polska”, czyli jednego z lepszych i poczynniejszych pism. Także, tak jakby z tego. Ja czytuje o wilekim branding wogóle, ale niekoniecznie narodowym, bo akurat tym sie gazeta nie zajmuje. Natomiast mam licznych znajomych pracujących w agencjach PRowskich, to też kiedyś jako tak słyszałam. Ponieważ od roku jestem tu, to się bardziej teraz nad nim koncentruje, czy doczytuje.

Dlaczego jest takie istotne dla Polski, żeby obecnie posiadać markę? Pani podchodzi do tego tak naprawdę z jakimś dystansem?

Tak, ale rozumię pytanie. Dlatego że jesteśmy niewyraziści moim zdaniem. To znaczy mówiąc „Polska” mam wrażenie, że z niewieloma rzeczami się kojarzymy. Kojarzymy sie z pewnymi ikonami typu Jan Paweł II i Wałęsa i koniec. I to jest problem. Z produktem – no wódkę zabrali nam Rosjanie niestety jako produkt, tak...Nokii nie mamy niestety. Nie mamy serów i win tak jak Francuzi – to znaczy mamy...ale dla mnie ważna jest to żeby zyskać kilka cech, albo pokazać kilka cech....przepraszam jeszcze raz pytanie, ponieważ odbiegłam w swoich myślach?

Dlaczego tak istotne teraz jest dla Polski posiadanie marki?

Dlatego żeby z czymś się kojarzyć. My mamy podobny problem jak Szwedzi na przykład, jak Finlandia. Nam się kojarzą oni ekologią, ale tak naprawdę z niczym innym. Czyli my musimy szukać wyrazistości w tym świecie, który jest dosyć zuniifikowany. Moim zdaniem, bo ja patrzę bardziej od urzędniczego punktu widzenia, takiego bardziej nawet politycznego. Żebyśmy nie zniknęli z tą politycznością, którą miewaliśmy do pewnego momentu, czyli jako kraj solidarny, kraj, w którym rzeczywiście udało się obalić komunizm itd. A później nic...20 lat nic nie zrobiliśmy...nagła pustka, z tym co moglibyśmy zrobić.

W całej tej debacie fascynuje mnie pewna rzecz. Dlaczego Polska nie potrzebowała marki przed rokiem 1989 albo pomiędzy 1989 albo 2002, kiedy tak naprawdę do dyskursu albo debaty publicznej weszła idea brandingu narodowego?

Ja nie wierzę, że w takim systemie, jaki był, że było to możliwe. Byliśmy krajem, który był uważany za jakiegoś satelitę Związku Sowieckiego, także przedtem...hm.. Dla mnie jest to oczywiste, że z powodów takich bardziej historycznych i politycznych nie było to możliwe. Myślę, że jak się odzyskuje niepodległość, to inne

**Pani wspomniała, że jest dyrektorem departamentu dyplomacji publicznej od roku.**

Tak.

**Ale jeśli miałaby Pani określić, jak wyglądał rozwój, albo koncepcja brandingu narodowego w MSZ-cie. Ponieważ ja czytam przemówienia Pana Sikorskiego do Sejmu i Pan Sikorski mówi, że Polska to jest marka, która powinna być, on definiuje tą markę w swój sposób, i mówi o wolności, o kraju kochającym wolność.**

Myśmy mu to napisali...

**Domyślałem się... W wywiadach dla BBC Pan Sikorski mówi nie o marce tylko o „trade-marku” i tak naprawdę ten branding narodowy gdzieś tam sobie funkcjonuje. Czy mogłaby Pani wskazać jak ta cała koncepcja ewoluowała w Ministerstwie Spraw Zagranicznych. Pojawił się ten legendarny „Latawiec”. Jak to funkcjonuje w przestrzeni publicznej?**

Ja nie jestem w stanie powiedzieć o ewolucji. Ja jestem w stanie wypowiedzieć się o tych akcentach takich, które się dokonywały, a które pewnie się na te ewolucję składają. Natomiast mam wrażenie i tu przyznam się szczerze, nie można powiedzieć, że to jest process... na razie to było do tej pory i to od roku było troszeczkę lepiej, i jeśli rozmawiamy o tym, co ja tutaj robię, że były to takie strzały, które przychoǳiły komuś do głowy, że „Ojej, ale to jest ważne!” Kilka lat temu pierwsze takie kampanie wizerunkowe w CNN były robione. Nie wiem, kiedy to było... około 2004, ale to były drobiazgi. Placówki pracowały nad jakimiś rzeczami, ale to było raczej instynktownie... było robione jak rozumie to instynktownie... niż wynikało ze zrozumienia albo jakieś przyjętej strategii. Natomiast... powiem tak... Sikorki jest nowym typem ministra, w swoim myśleniu o Polsce, bo dotychczasowym ministrowie, choć nie można im nic zarzucić, natomiast on rozumie pewien fakt, z którym ja mam trochę problemu, ale to jest jak gdyby inna rzecz. On twierdzi, i słusznie, że nie ma się czego wstydzić, że precz z martyrologią, że jesteśmy silnym krajem i my to pókażemy. Ale to bardziej wynika z jego charakteru, wykształcenia i tego, że jeździ po świecie, niż naprawdę z takiej idei, która się tu rodzi. Niestety... natomiast...
I to, co pani powiedziała jest bardzo interesujące. Z jednej strony precz z materologią, a z drugiej strony Państwo, proszę mnie poprawić jeśli sie mylę, jesteście zaangażowani w tę kampanie, która ma na celu przypomnienie Europie Zachodniej i tym samym Polakom, że Mur Berliński to nie był symbol upadku komunizmu tylko tak naprawdę to wszystko zaczęło się w Polsce. Ale to nie jest martyrologia... ja uważam, że martyrologią jest np. rocznica Drugiej Wojny Światowej. Bo myśmy ją przeryżeli...przegrali i nie ma się czym chwalić. Moim zdaniem 4 czerwca jest zwycięstwem. I to jest, to znaczy w naszej... zdecydowanie nawet jak rozmawiałam z Sikorskim to mówił, że trzeba”wygrać” 4 czerwca, bo myśmy to wówczas wygrali. Tylko pokazywanie pewnie tego co nie istniało przez 10-20 lat....wracając do tamtego pytania... że myśmy...rozgaślałam się troche...

Nie, nie...ja nie chcę być niegrzeczna, po prostu kontroluję czas...

...że myśmy nie zadbali przez te 10-20 lat o...o swoje miejsce w Europie i dlatego teraz tak się dopraszamy do tego, że Mur Berliński był konsekwencją 4 czerwca i okrągłego stołu w lutym. I to nie jest martyrologia...to jest moim zdaniem kawał dobrej historii zwycięskiej. Martyrologia to jest to, co niestety moim zdaniem będzie się odbywało i odbywa się Druga Wojna Światowa. Proszę może nie cytować...Oczywiście czcić trzeba, natomiast nie róbmy z tego, że Polska na każdym lądzie ginęła... No ginęliśmy, i nic z tego nie było...jeszcze nas rozebrali pod koniec w Jalcie i Poczdamie, także...w ten sposób idę...

Czy w Pani przekonaniu te działalności, które można określić jako zaczynające, umówmy się, branding narodowy w Polsce...Czy one skierowane są do publiczności międzynarodowych, czy do społeczeństwa Polskiego również? Czy może skierowane jest to w obu kierunkach? To znaczy czy była kampania, albo PRowska, którą ministerstwo zaczęło? Jak Państwo komunikujecie to co robicie społeczeństwu polskiemu? Wiadomo, że to były kampanie międzynarodowe, skierowane w publiczności międzynarodowej, tylko tak naprawdę, jaka jest rola społeczeństwa polskiego, i jak Państwo komunikujecie to społeczeństwu polskiemu?

Myślę, że jest to problem. My tego nie robimy idealnie. Wręcz powiedziałabym, że w ogóle tego nie robimy. To znaczy, mam wrażenie dużej rozbieżności naszej działalności. Praca mojego departamentu to jest publiczna diplomacja na zewnątrz... W ogóle nie robimy czegoś takiego jak PR do narodu. Jakoś częściowo jest to u rzecznika. Natomiast to jest kwestia niestety nadal, chociaż ja uważam, że jest to błąd, i nawet opowiem o pomyśle, który mi przyszedł do głowy razem z jedną z gazet, ale niestety rzecznik się nie zgodził. Rzecznik bardziej komunikuje działania Sikorsiego, czy MSZ-u wogóle, i mówi, że były to działania temu poświęcone, ale nie tłumaczy
społeczeństwu Polskiemu, że to jest nam potrzebne. To jest ważne, bo budujemy jakiś tam etos naszego kraju. Tego nie ma. Moim zdaniem to leży. Ja nie ukrywam, że z jedną z gazet, z którą wymyśliłam...to jest pierwszy krok do tego żeby zrobić taką serię wkładek czy wkładkę, czy nawet główny program o tym, co MSZ robi. To znaczy chodzi o tłumaczenie działań naszemu społeczeństwu i przy okazji takie edukowanie, bo to, że tłumaczymy, że to i to jest ważne, ale takie troszeczkę takie pozyskiwanie do siebie. Ja mam wrażenie, że ludzie z zewnątrz myślą, że tu się nic nie dzieje, a my tu jednak coś robimy. To był pomysł, który nie może być sfinansowany przez ten departament, mimo że ma spore finanse... zdecydowanie moje paragrafy finansowe na to nie pozwalają, żeby działać w Polsce. Ja nie mam prerogatyw do tego żeby wydawać pieniądze w Polsce i robić akcje, które są skierowane do Polaków.

Czyli istnieje tak naprawdę jeszcze problem prawno finansowy?

Ja tego nie postrzegam jako problem. Ja myślę, że to jest problem w MSZ-eście. Nikt mi nie powiedział - „OK, Pani departament ma sumę pieniędzy, którą ma i rzeczywiście dysponuje tak jak uważa...rozsyłam na placówki i na różne akcje i pomysły”’. Natomiast ktoś powinien powiedzieć rzecznikowi, że dodaje mu 10 osób, albo 5 osób, daje jakiś tam budżet, większy czy mniejszy, i on robi PR MSZ-u w kraju i PR Polski w kraju. Tego nie ma niestety. Tu mamy lukę. To powiem szczero, ja uważam, że moje działania absolutnie nie są skierowane na zewnątrz.

A skąd dystans rzecznika prasowego, bo ja z nim chciałbym chwile porozmawiać. Czy to jest dystans czy to jest po prostu…

On chyba...myślałem tego nigdy nie robili. Myślę, że to jest taka zmiana, która tutaj powoli już zachodzi w myśleniu, czyli w tym departamencie. Kiedy ja nastałam już ona zaszła. Uznalam, że my musimy przynajmniej wejść na ten taki trakt trochę, wizerunkowy i mówienia o Polsce się wspią...robić coś innego niż robiliśmy do tej pory. Natomiast chyba takiego myślenia jeszcze nie ma. Bardziej mentalnie niż osobościowo mam wrażenie.

Jakie taktyki według Pani do tej pory były użyte w tym, co można określić w Polsce jako branding narodowy? Jakie konkretne narzędzia komunikacyjne?

Ale MSZ-woskich...no ja mam kilka takich narzędzi...niewykorzystanych jest pewnie trochę więcej. Naszym narzędziem konkretnym np. są wizyty studyjne, czyli dziennikarzy i wszystkich innych środowisk. My mamy na to pieniądze żeby wyłapiać dziennikarzy, którzy o danej tematyce...kto nas interesuje, bo placówki ich po całym świecie szukają. Następnie zapraszamy tych dziennikarzy do Polski i organizujemy jakieś spotkania i „tour-y”, pokazując pewne rzeczy, o którzy np. źle pisali o Polsce. Wylapujemy ekspertów, którzy twierdzą, że były „polskie obozy śmierci”. Zapraszamy do Auschwitz...i to jest jeden z instrumentów. Drugi to na pewno ta strona internetowa, zarówno nasza poland.gov.pl. My mamy dwie i MSZ-
owska strona, którą to stronę przebudowywujemy. “Poland” przebudowywamy i już zmieniliśmy, bo była to strona bardzo niewiszczna. Także to pewnie jest instrument informacji. Kolejne instrumenty... powiem tak, to wszystko to, co robimy. To znaczy pieniądze na kampanie, które możemy przeprowadzać. One przeróżnie tak naprawdę wyglądają. Natomiast teraz akurat skoncentrowaliśmy się na CNN i dobrze nam się współpracuje, to jest oczywiste i to idzie w te rejony świata, które nas interesuje, przez Internet i na cały świat. Także tych instrumentów jest kilka. Są też kwestie tego, że jesteśmy w stanie zainspirować i później odkupić np. prawda...do fajnych filmów. I książki o Polsce. Coś co jest takim...ja siadam np. z kilkoma wydawnictwami i mówię, że na rynku brakuje tak naprawdę tego tego i tego, które pokaż Polska na swój sposób. To jest jakiś sposób, jakiś instrument, który ja mam i z którego mam pieniądze, Ja mam palcówki pod sobą. 150. I rozumiem, że w każdym momencie przez placówkę mogę też zadziałać.

Jakie to są wydawnictwa, które Państwo do tej pory wykorzystujecie? Ja jestem świadom tego filmu „Katyń”, który został pokazany we współpracy z MSZ w Rosji.

Tak, na całym świecie z porozumieniem z MSZ. Każdy film, prawie, że każdy twórcza filmów, jak np. “Gry wojenne” czy jak np, „Katyń”... „Katyń” teraz mamy film o Księdzu Jerzym Popiełuszczce, przychodzą tutaj do mnie i pytają: “Pani Dyrektor czy nam Pani pomoże rozpropagować ten film i w jaki sposób?”. Wszystko ja to następnie dekretuję na placówki, które uważamy, że promocja taka tam być powinna, wysyłam więcej pieniędzy. Ambasador czy ktoś inny wynajmuje salę i wynajmuje PR agencję czasami do tego żeby to jakoś wyglądało. Tak jak teraz w Londynie mamy “Rok Polski” i zdecydowanie Instytut Adama Mickiewicza rzeczywiście działa we współpracy z naszym Instytutem Kultury Polskiej, z moim dyrektorem Hojnackim. On dostaje pakiet pieniędzy i za ten pakiet jest w stanie wynająć jakąś firmę PRowąską, która mu tam wszystko zorganizuje. Ja chciałbym żeby Pan miał świadomość, czy pisząc czy zastanawiając się jak to u nas wygląda, że bardzo często jakaś idea wizerunku czy jakieś akcje wychodzą od placówek i oni realizują to na swoim terenie. Nie można zrobić jednej akcji na Azje, bo w Azji coś innego się sprzeda np. Chopin, a w Niemczech Chopin to nic takiego. Placówki bardzo często same z siebie mają swoje własne kampanie... I ja mówię “Tak, oczywiście, super róbcie to. “, dlatego że prowadzimy sobie badania na ten temat, że właśnie w ten sposób w metrze w Madrycie puszczany ten i ten film będzie miał świetny odbiór. Ja tego nie musze narzuczać z zewnątrz, musi Pan to zapamiętać i wiedzieć, tej, dwutorowości działań. Samodzielne placówki i my tutaj te kampanie czy akcje prowadzimy, ale istotnie nie do końca one muszą być spojone. Nie to, że nie są...żle powiedziałam...ale patrzmy, że co innego idzie na rynek Europy a co innego możemy w Ameryce Południowej zrobić, bo pewnie rzeczy w Ameryce się w ogóle nie sprowadzą, np. jak Mur czy Wojna Światowa. No kto będzie za murem...

I tu się pojawia odwzorcze pytanie czy jest to możliwe żeby w pluralistycznym społeczeństwie, wielopartyjnym, które jest tak naprawdę zunitaryzowane, ale różne
dokonać komunikacji jednego narratywu Polski? Biorąc pod uwagę to, że w różnych państwach jesteśmy inaczej postrzegani. Z Polską różne państwa mają różne doświadczenia historyczne i tak samo różne rzeczy mogą być sprzedawane w humorystyczny sposób w różnych państwach. Ludzie po prostu w różnych krajach mają różne poczucie humoru. I tak naprawdę tu jest tyle czynników, które można by wziąć pod uwagę. I pytanie jest czy jest to możliwe żeby zunifikować jedną opowieść o Polsce?

Trudne pytanie znowu. Ja mam takie wrażenie patrząc na doświadczenia hiszpańskie, że im to zajęło kilka ładnych lat, jak nie więcej, ale istotnie tam była ta zmiana historyczna, którą myśmy już stracili niestety... bo gdybyśmy ten branding zaczęli od 1989 roku budować to my byśmy w ogóle tutaj już nie siedzieli, bo to by już było zrobione. Hiszpanie wykorzystali ten czas po Franco i takie zmiany... ale była wielka zgoda społeczeństwa, żeby Hiszpania wyszła z tego ubóstwa z tego zacofania potwornego, które mieli...i politycznego i gospodarczego...wszystkie siły, o których Pan mówi powiedziały “Tak, zróbmy to.” U nas jest to trudniej... nie zrobiliśmy tego po roku 1989, kiedy teoretycznie, chociaż jatwierdze, że właśnie tak się zafiksowaliśmy na pewnych innych rzeczach gospodarczo-społecznych, że się nie dało. Mi się wydaje, że da się. Bo ja myślę, że to jest tak jak piramida - czyli, że na górze jest taka jednolitość wizerunku i przekaz, a później rozchodzi się na niższe szczeble, które troszeczkę w Azji może być to inaczej pokazane. To znaczy, że tu jest zbiór pewnych wartości i rzeczy, tego, co to jest ta Polska, tego, co to jest ta marka Polska czy branding. Moim zdaniem da się zunifikować. Natomiast przekaz może być inny, bo ja tak to traktuję, że idea jest taka sama, a inaczej ją przekazujemy w Azji a inaczej w Ameryce.

Gdybym ja chciał sobie opisać w swoim doktoracie kilka projektów, które MSZ zrealizowało, które według Pani noszą znamię branding narodowego? Które mam opisać? Prosze mi je wskazać, a ja je opisze tak ja je Pani rozumie...

Niełatwo...to znaczy, ja myślę, że kampanie reklamowe, wizerunkowe te CNNowskie, z tych ostatnich dwóch lat. Dlatego że one miały większy wymiar, bo łączyły w kolei bardzo dużo samorządów i resortów. Czyli to dla mnie było takie coś, że nareszcie coś spróbowałam i nareszcie udało mi się zgromadzić wraz CNN-em przy tym stole 15 partnerów, którzy teoretycznie mogą się zwalczać nawzajem, ale tego nie zrobiliśmy. Bo uznaflatmy, że to jest wspólna sprawa, my dajemy pieniądze i robimy coś razem z CNN. To na pewno. Myślę, że fajnie by było, gdyby miał Pan czas żeby pojechać do Berlina, do Instytutu Polskiego. Mogłabym jakoś tam, jeśli bedzie miał Pan możliwość, jakoś zarekomendować dyrektorowi Dąbrowskiemu. Jego kampania i jego pomysły w Niemczech, bo to jest jak gdyby dla nas ważne nawet ze względów politycznych. Bo my jak gdyby cały czas, MSZ musi się cały czas obrać w tym, co się nazywa polityką zagraniczną naszego kraju. Czymś, co jest dla nas bardzo ważne. Czyli akurat Niemcy czy jako “Partnerstwo Wschodnie”, czyli Rosja. My musimy w tym myśleniu wiązać kampanie, nie tylko tak jak inne czy POT czy Ministerstwo
Kultury, z kampanią historyczną, albo z kampanią turystyczną. Dla nas jest to szczerzej, my musimy patrzeć też jak nas widzą w innym kraju, ale także, na których nam jako partnerach zależy.

W Polsce wiele instytucji mówi o branding narodowym. Jakby Pani określiła zależności pomiędzy tymi instytucjami?

Zależności nie ma. Każda instytucja jest absolutnie niezależna i niepodległa. Istotnie prawdą jest, że to MSZ ma wpisane w ustawie zajmowanie się promocją Polski za granicą i tak to wygląda. I rzeczywiście w MSZ-ecie, i na czele tej Rady Promocji Polski, która istnieje, która na szczęście się od roku ożywiła...to MSZ stoi na czele tej Rady Promocji Polski. To jest ciało na razie opiniiodawczo-doradcze każdego rządu. Rada jest skupiona, tam jest 12 resortów. Także każde działanie jest niezależne, natomiast ta Rada Promocji Polski pozwala na to, że 12 resortów, które gdzieś tam maja też wpisane rzeczy związane z promocją Polski za granicą i ta Rada to wszystko skupia. Nie ukrywam, że to jest bardzo ciężka praca żeby udało się narzucić, albo wymóc na partnerach pewne ruchy, które są dla wizerunku Polski korzystne. Ta Rada spotyka się 3 razy do roku. Mam nadzieję, że we wrześniu będzie następne spotkanie. Jedynym takim ciałem, które skupia kilka instytucji, i dla mnie jest takim zaczynem, że można mówić wspólnie i mieć wspólny własny przekaz jest Rada Promocji Polski. Tam nie działa jeszcze idealnie, ale chcemy zmienić jej prerogatywy.

Jakby Pani dokonała refleksji na temat praktyki albo inicjatyw, które nosiły znamię, brandingu narodowego w Polsce, z dzisiejszej perspektywy?

Cały czas mam wrażenie, że są to lub były to inicjatywy związane z czymś, czyli nie takie strategicznie przemyślane, tylko są to inicjatywy, które wynikają z czegoś. Teraz podam przykłady. To, że robimy jakąś kampanię, przeciw „polskim obozom śmierci” razem z „Rzeczpospolitą”, wynikało z tego, że w gazetach to się pojawia. To nie wynikało z naszego myślenia, tylko to była reaktywność. Cały czas... kampania CNN była reakcja na mur Berliński, który nam trochę zaszkodził. Czyli to bardziej jest reaktywne...

Wiem o tym między innymi dzięki szefowi mojej szkoły, bo pracował wtedy jako dziennikarz i opowiadał, że relacjonował wówczas z Berlina, bo nie było telefonów komórkowych, było 100 dziennikarzy czekających do kolejki.

Doskonale znam ta sytuację. Natomiast to jest kwestia jak ja to oceniam, nadal reaktywnie. My musimy mieć bardziej problem strategiczny i my „atakować”, znaczy wymyślać coś niż odpowiadać na to o się dzieje. Nie oceniam źle, ale zawsze może być lepiej i tu w ogóle nie ma, o czym mówić. Jest to kwestia pomysłu i jest to kwestia pieniędzy. Natomiast cały czas myślę, że to są takie przykrościęcia zamiast działania na podstawie poważnej strategii.
Jakie są według Pani największe wyzwania, jeśli chodzi o praktykę brandingu narodowego w Polsce?

Jedno wielkie wyzwanie. To znaczy, nie wiem czy dobrze powiem po polsku, to znaczy...zjednoczenie ludzi i ich mózgów żeby zrozumieli, że pewne rzeczy są ważne. Pewne rzeczy trzeba ustalić wspólnie. Potem każdy może się rozejść i inaczej swoje rzeczy realizować. Dla mnie trudnością ogromną jest przekonanie wszystkich, że to nie jest interes Pani Zofii, że robimy CNN, że to jest interes kraju. Ja bym powiedziała, że ta sfera jest bardziej społeczna jest ważna, czyli zrozumienie swoich partnerów żeby wyszedł jeden komunikat, nie żeby Polka Organizacja Turystyczna ze mną się kłóciła, że ich logo Polska to dla mnie nie jest logo, tylko obrazek. Oni mnie chcieli przekonać, że to jest świetne logo, dla mnie logo to nie jest obrazek. Chodzi mi o to że pewne zrozumienie partnerów, dla mnie to jest wyzwanie.

Czy Pani pozycja dyrektora wydziału dyplomacji publicznej przyczynia się w Pani codziennych działaniach do budowania i konstruowania marki Polski?

Bardzo mocne pytanie. Ja uważam, że tak. To znaczy...chyba w moich działaniach, jako w mojej osobie czy w departamencie w ogóle, mam wrażenie, że nie ma działania, o które by teraz moi partnerzy nie pytali. Znaczy ja sobie tak ustawiałam, jeśli można to tak nazwać, czy ustaliłam kontakty właśnie z POT-em, czy PAIZ-em, z Ministerstwem Gospodarki najtrudniej, ja tam wszędzie jestem. To znaczy, nie ma możliwości zrobienia, znaczy rzadko, kiedy powiem delikatnie, to się zdarza... ta spółka 2012.PL, bardzo fajnie opracowali...zerknie Pan nawet, na tę prezentację, bardzo fajna rzecz...Nie ma tak, że ktoś nie przyjdzie tutaj i nie zapyta, że nie, jeśli o pieniądz, o które mamy, a pieniądze dają w pewnym momencie władzę, tak nad tym, że można powiedzieć, macie pieniądze macie to zrobić tak i tak. Natomiast mam wrażenie, że sobie na tyle zapracowaliśmy tu całym departamentem, nie tylko jedną osobą... rzadko nas gdzieś nie ma, ktoś musi zdecydowanie nas nie chcieć mieć MSZ po swojej stronie żeby tutaj nie przyjść i nie porozmawiać. Myślę, że jest zdecydowana zmiana. Mówię też bardziej o takich resorowych rzeczach, bo może mam mniej kontaktów z innymi czy z agencjami czy z innymi środowiskami. Natomiast o takich resortowych rzeczach to zdecydowanie jestem na każdym spotkaniu, które mówi o jakimś budowaniu czy jakiejś kampanii.

Czy ja mogę zapytać o kilka bardziej osobistych pytań, w sensie metryczki?

Tak, oczywiście.

Czy mogę zapytać o Pani wykształcenie?


Ma Pani jakieś kwalifikacje marketingowe?
Nie.

_Czy ja mogę zapytać o poziom wykształcenia Pani rodziców?_

Wyższe i średnie.

_Czy ja mogę zapytać o krótkie nakreślenie ścieżki kariery?_


_Czy ja mogę zapytać o Pani wyznania religijne?_

Katolicyzm.

_Czy obydwoje Pani rodziców są Polakami?_

Tak.

_Jak najlepiej określiłaby Pani kandydata, który mógłby pracować, albo miałby pracować w obszarze branding narodowego w Polsce?_

Kreatywny, otwarty, patriotyczny w sensie zrozumienia tego kraju.

_Kto według Pani jest największym autorytetem, jeśli chodzi o branding narodowy w Polsce?_

Nie ma takiej osoby.

_Która z kampanii branding narodowego w Polsce uznałaby Pani za najbardziej efektowną?_

W CNN, rok temu. Była pierwsza, ale najlepsza.

_Pani Natalia [imie zmienione] powiedziała mi, że z tego wszystkiego mają być jakieś badania niedługo._
Tak i zdecydowanie ja się z tego bardzo cieszę. Tego nam brakowało. Bardzo często jak pan wie wszyscy są ekspertami od promocji. Ja chcę mieć czarno na białym czy to się opłaca czy nie. I zdecydowanie wiem o tym czy oni te badania robią, o tej kampanii zdaje się, bo poprzedniej nie zrobiono z różnych przyczyn, bo CNN w ogóle nie chce takich rzeczy robić. Ale po tej maja być, i ja z utęsknieniem czekam, bo patrzę czy to jest warte tego.

Jaki według Pani jest wpływ branding narodowego na Polskie społeczeństwo?

Trudne pytanie. Ja mam wrażenie o branding narodowym możemy mówić wśród 10% - 15% społeczeństwa i reszty to nie obchodzi i nie musi obchodzić powiem szczerze, bo to nie jej krytyka tylko ja uważam, że jeśli te 10% - 15% coś zrobi, to bardzo często to pozostała część ludzi przynajmniej pozostałych przyjmie to załapie, pokaże to rzeczywiście...

Czy ja mogę zapytać ile osób pracuje w wydziale dyplomacji publicznej i kulturalnej?

33 osoby łącznie.


Ostatnie dwa lata?

Tak.

To dostanie Pan to.

Bo ja tutaj wszystkiego nie mogę opisać...bo tak naprawdę nie interesuje mnie to ile Państwo wydajecie pieniędzy, jak to zwykle interesuje dziennikarzy żeby robili z tego sensacje...

Ja już mogę powiedzieć, że budżet mój w tym roku wyniósł 55 milionów złotych polskich...to jest tegoroczny wydatek 2009. I to jest 150 placówek i samych instytutów. Z tego w lutym, ponieważ placówki przygotowują plan swojego działania w grudniu, w listopadzie ja dostaje pieniądze; a w styczniu od ministerstwa finansów, to już wiem, komu, na co rozdzielici. To idzie 20-30 milionów na placówkę a reszta zostaje tutaj w kraju, reszta to mam na myśli 30 milionów. Oznacza to że idzie na kampanie CNN i na inne konkursy.
TRANSCRIPT 2

Interviewee No. 1; 20 April 2010; London; the office of Saffron Brand Consultants; conference room.

Well, after listening to all those interviews and after reading your books, after reading many other books on nation branding, I started wondering if the idea of nation branding or, to be more specific, and kind of cohesion in communication is possible at all? And the reason I started thinking about it is simply first of all, all those...in any liberal democracy different institutions would have different priorities, different target publics, different market priorities....that’s one aspect of it...and the second aspect of my reflection is, say you take a country, Poland, for example, it is seen differently in different countries...

Seen in many different countries?

Yeah, so I simply started wondering how is it possible that we project one coherent nation identity if the country is seen differently in different places.

Is that a question or you’re making… a rhetorical question?

Rhetorical question....

Well carry on if it is a rhetorical question.

So do you think cooperation among those institutions in Poland is actually feasible?

You did the interviewing, I didn’t. There are several answers to the question. If the question is do I think the cooperation between those institutions in Poland is possible, the answer is: it is possible, but it is not very likely.

OK.

The more interesting question, which was the rhetorical question and that, was behind the question, which is not necessary about Poland specific here, but about any nation… The issue for nation is the reflect changes from what it was to what it is. It needs to have a feeling about itself, and that feeling needs to be communicated to the people hearing that, and people who deal with it. And when they deal with it, there rather deal with it as tourists, as an investment proposition, or some of them absorb the culture or have some other connections with it. Now, obviously to the very considerable extent, all happens when the nation projects an idea of itself, is that very different bodies project very different individual ideas to very different audiences.

Sure.
But, frequently a series of ideas emerge and what emerges can become coherent, it can be paradoxical, it may even be contradictory, but it is there. And the larger the nation is and the more it communicates in this despair and unconnected passion, you would think, that the more contradictory the impressions of the nations are... Frankly enough they are not.

**OK.**

There are not that different. The classic example is the United States. That is the classic example. It probably communicates more loudly and more incoherent than any other nation brought out here. It is loud because it has a huge clutch and influence. And it is incoherent because it varies from Obama to Bush, or Bush right to Obama to Disney, to Apple to religious fundamentalists pro-life maniacs and so on and so forth.

**Sure.**

Nevertheless, having said all that, there is an idea. At the more manageable level, there is the idea of Spain. Spain is in many respects like Poland. It has 40 million people, give or take; it is on the edge of Europe, on the Western edge and the Eastern edge. Not exactly on the edge, but slightly peripheral not in the centre. Put it kindly, both countries had complicated history, putting it kindly.....

**Putting it kindly...**

Putting it kindly... Until fairly recently Spain was in very deep declined from 18th century onwards nobody almost heard of Spain, nobody saw Spain. It recently had an authoritarian...

**Regime?**

...deeply dislikeable dictatorship with rather a poverty-stricken backward country. And that was not that long ago, a couple of generations ago...until the 1970s. It has all changed, changed. Spanish companies are now among the most successful in the world. You don’t laugh at Santander if you are a British man.

**No?**

It is not funny. It is not peculiar. It just is. It is not particularly remarkable that [poor recording]...as far as I am concerned, as soon as they give Heathrow to Spain then better. Businesses are powerful, respectable, culturally it is in a top league, and seem to be...in sport, it is terrific...there has been a Renaissance in Spain, including architecture and everything. And how did that happen? It did not happen through an organised and controlled mechanism. It happen because people talked to each other. Spain is not that big, not bigger then Poland is...500 people, 1000 people, 1500 people
talked to each other, they knew each other. The politicians knew business people; business people knew the arts people; the arts people knew the sporting people and so on and on that the idea developed. And that is communicated through everything that the nation doesn’t what appears to be an individual fashion, but there is something there that you recognise. Let me give you an example. Seat, which is a German-owned Spanish motorcar company – how does it describe itself? ‘Auto-emotion’, a car with passion. You look at everything that Spanish do, you will see words like ‘passion’; ‘emotion’; ‘vibrancy’ – you will see that. If you look at the petrol stations that we designed for Repsol they look Spanish...

**But, I am just trying to find a parallel to Poland...**

Now, the point is that it could happen in Poland, but it is not happening in Poland. It could because there is an idea around ‘Creative Tension’ that you could use to inform everything that you do. You could make it work. You don’t tell people what to do – you inspire them. They get the ideas and they start using them and each of those ideas relates to and has an impact on other ideas. So, collectively they become very powerful. A lady phoned me up the other day from some Polish newspaper. Every two or three weeks people phone me up...."What will the Chopin festival, what’s celebration of 200 anniversary of the birth of Chopin gonna do for Poland”, she asked? And I said, “Nothing, absolutely nothing”.

**Why is that?**

Because it is a one-off event. Because people don’t know that Chopin was Polish and if they do so what? What’s that to do with anything? You have to have a coherent, consistent idea, which is of course fragmented, in the sense that what you do is for you, but you related it something else! United States is an example of it. It is contradictory – one of the things about United States is that it is big, everything bit. And if you have that sense of what it is you represent, which I think we genuinely created in the idea then you can help people to do things collectively. Of course people in Paraguay are not very interested in Poland whereas people in Lithuania are very interested in Poland. And people in Russia have a different view of Poland...I understand that perfectly well...just like people in France...I know that...I know that...

**Sure.**

That is not an issues. The issue is that Poland has changed. I don’t need to tell you this. From being a grey, boring, communist country, associated with misery to the most dynamic country in Europe. Mind you, that’s not saying much, but nevertheless, it is the most dynamic country.

**But it is dull...I went there in February to do some skiing...**
No wonder, in February...Zakopane or something?

No, I went to Krynica.

In Tatras somewhere...

How did you come about investigating, researching, thinking and developing the idea of nation branding? Because as I understand, you are a mastermind of all this business...

For Poland or in general?

For Poland...

We have been asked...I made a speech somewhere in Poland about branding or about national branding or something...and then we were approached by people by first of all Krzysztof [name anonymised], then by Maciej [name anonymised] and then we were given a contract. It was not very much money, but we were interested in that.

And what happened next with this project?

How much time do you have?

How much time have you got?

Basically, what happened is that we did all the investigation, we did all the research, we talked to everybody we could think of and eventually we produced this idea. And virtually everybody we have spoken about the idea and presented the idea to, think it was the right idea. I have not come across anybody who thinks that it doesn’t work, because it talks about individuality in Poland and by implication a lack of ability to cooperate and this kind of stuff...It gives you an opportunity being very different, very powerful...

But I would like to know where the resistance against this idea come from? Why is it that the project has not been implemented?
The resistance came from those two political, identical twins and I hesitate to discuss the impact they had on me everything else.

I also hesitate the impact they had on me...

Anyway, they didn’t help. Half way through the project...[poor recording] Since we came back, since the new administration has been in charge nothing has happened. I wanted to make it happen, Maciej wanted to make it happen, but they don’t seem to be interested. And I had very clear idea of what should be done.
OK, so what should be done?

Right, we should have a coordinating committee to examine the idea. We should develop a visual system so that when you see Poland you see things that relate to Poland...whether it is a colour or a symbol....I had very good idea for the symbol, actually. We should then talk to...you have to get the media on the side. It is very important to get the media on the side, because the most important audience of the Polish identity is the Polish people. So we have to have the media on the side. We should then deal with PAIZ, deal with tourism, deal with all of those people in a way that everything you are doing is, the way of speaking...you carry on doing what you doing, but you speak and look in a particular way so everything becomes mutually supportive. You don’t go away and do things, which look and sound completely different from everything else. Everything you do, if there is a Polish national week, if there is a Polish film festival, if there is a Polish-Ukrainian football thing, if a Polish company...there is a relationship between everything. Gradually, in the minds of people who are dealing with Poland from time to time an idea emerges just like gradually an idea emerged about Spain. That’s what you do. And you control it. And you manage it. You don’t spend fortune on advertising. If you have a budget for advertising that is fine, but don’t use it in a way that is completely different from something else.

I understand...

That’s what you do. You make it coherent. You don’t push people, you organise it. It is particularly difficult in Poland, because Poles don’t work together. They don’t work together very well. They argue with each other more than most people do.

And here comes another question...I have been reading a lot of stuff about, well, I call it the field of national images management and maybe you share the same point of view...Because the idea of ‘Creative Tension’ seem to me is an on-going idea, something that should be managed for a number of years.

Well, 10 years, 15 years. It is part of what Poland is...

Yes, but the governments change. Once the government change, here comes another director of PAIZ or CEO of PAIZ, here comes another director of public diplomacy...

Exactly, you are quite right. That’s one of the things that make it difficult. Let’s suppose, for the sake of the argument, that our friend is not the president of Poland. Let us pretend that somebody else is a president of Poland. For example, I got on well with the former minister of foreign affairs, Cimoszewicz, and I rather hoped he was going to be the next president of Poland. As we know, it is not going to happen, but
let’s just pretend that is does happen. Another word, a non-political figure, a bureaucratic maybe...a non-political figure reporting to the president should be responsible for this. It is not a political issue. It is not to do with politics. It is to do with a long term interest of the country. Here is a reason why Spain is so interesting, because there isn’t anybody in charge. There is nobody in charge. If you asked who is responsible for image of Spain, nobody knows. But it works, because they kind of have a feeling for each other. So, if you make people feel it doesn’t matter...it doesn’t matter which political party, it doesn’t matter who is running PAIZ. This is what we are, this is what we do. Now, if you look at some countries, there is an understanding of what is Spain, there is an understanding of what is New Zealand. New Zealand has an idea about itself, which is really, really interesting. What is the worst thing that they can be – ‘remote’; what is the worst thing they can be – ‘pure’. So you turn this on its head, and it is ‘pure’ and it does not matter which political party is in charge. It makes sense. Poles argue with each other all the bloody time. Fine. So, what have we got? Creative tension. This huge individual sense of purpose. It allows in extremely difficult circumstance to produce something remarkable, which is actually true. Don’t ask if we have a good football team – we don’t do that. But we do skiing...another words, it is intrinsic to the country.

**OK. Can I just ask about nation branding as an idea, as a theoretical concept... When did you for the first time thought about a nation as a ‘brand’?**

I have read history at the university and I have always been very interested in history, always been very interested in aspects of history that you might describe as cultural or anthropological, or sociological or something. And it occurred to me very many years of ago that nations have a path of identity. And if you read about, say, the French revolution, or for that matter first or the second French revolution, you will continually see this dynamics of change. When I started using the phrase nation as a brand, I really don’t know. Probably around 1985 or something like that, something like that, I would think. But I was also amused by and impressed by a book that Hobsbowm....you know him, he is a Marxist historian....he edited the book...I cannot remember what it’s called now...I think it is called ‘Nations and nationalism’....

**I think I know which one you are talking about....**

And I found that...I was writing a book at that time and using the confederate states of America as my national brand...I was talking about branding...I wasn’t particularly thinking about nation as a brand, but I was thinking about the ‘brand’ and the USA and I wrote about it and Hobsbowm saw my book...anyway, he and I had a quite a long dialogue and that got me more interested. So I think my interest in history, and my interest in, what we then called identity got me into that world.
There is a particular reason behind this question. I looked at the literature, theoretical concepts and, historically speaking, nations have always projected their identities one way or the other. Now, they also attempted to manage it...

Did they?

...so...at first there was an idea of propaganda...or international propaganda...and later Americans developed the term ‘public diplomacy’. That was another term. Marketers coined the term ‘destination marketing’ and all of a sudden we have this idea of nation branding. What I am trying to establish is the relationship between them or if there is a point in wondering what is the relationships between them?

These are terms that people use ahhhh... in different situations. If I am talking to a very academic individual or to very academic institution or if I am talking to a charity, the word ‘brand’ is anathema, they don’t like, but they do like reputation. So, if I am talking to Amnesty International, let’s say, or Oxfam, I might talk about your reputation. If I am talking to the Oxford University, actually, Oxford University is all about brand now, because they know all about that. Well, destination branding, destination...it is all just words people use, they are semantics. What’s the different between internal engagement and employee brand?

_Semantics?_

I don’t see any difference between them. Fine, you talk about propaganda. The Nazis used propaganda, the communists used propaganda, but we use branding. Fine, OK. Of course if you are an authoritarian regime and you have a very strong point of view and you are able to control all media outlets that are available to you. Naturally, you can create as the Nazis did, as the Soviet Union did, or as Cuba has done very strong brands. Why? You don’t like brands in the context of Nazis? It was a corporate brand of the Nazis filthy ideology. The brand is immoral. The brand has not morality. That is why Naomi Klein’s book is so silly – ‘No logo’.

_Why is it so silly?_

Because she implies that the brand is immoral. Brand is not immoral. What she is saying is “I don’t like capitalist society. I do not like exploitative societies”. To pick on that little bit of capitalist society that you see, which are the symbols of capitalism... ‘No logo’...logos are nothing...they are neither good or bad. They have no morality. The Nazis symbol is horrible, but the Red Cross symbol is lovely.

_But it depends what kind of ideas they connote and where their reputations come form..._
Exactly, that is why ‘No logo’...she is a very clever writer. She is a very attractive personality. She is a very powerful personality. But the book is not about branding, it is about capitalism. So don’t pretend it is about logos.....that is the bit she is fixing herself to.

But even you in your work claim that nation branding as an idea serves capitalistic purposes....attraction of foreign investment....attraction of tourism

Of course. Absolutely. So it is used by capitalist societies, but it can be also used by anybody...by Hitler...by Piłsudski....Anybody can use it. Belonging is a matter of a human condition and protecting an idea of belonging... [poor recording].

Interesting...Do you know, I declared in my PhD is my own question to discover national identity...

Go on...

So I am trying to investigate changes to Polish national identity and I am looking at, how Poland is projecting the identity, how different projects represent narratives, storytelling on Poland. Whether it is coherent or not, I am not going to argue. My thesis is sociological, it is not sensu stricto marketing based, but I know theoretical changes. Basically, it is my question to understand my nation.

Well, the Polish nation today is not what the Polish nation was in 1939. The Polish nation before the first partition of Poland...one of the problems in Poland is that there is a lot of discontinuity. There is, there are huge areas of discontinuity. There are huge populations issues, populations come, populations disappear. The Ukrainians come and disappear, the Germans come and disappear, the Jews come and disappear. So Poland is now a homogenous nation. It used to be heterogeneous...so that is a profound issue...

Which also implies that is should be easy to co-operate, but...

If you are busy fighting everybody, what makes it easy to co-operate. Look at your history. One of the reasons why Poland has a national inferiority complex...Why does Poland have a national inferiority complex? Because Poland has never been able, despite its enormous authority in many respects, to sustain a long term national pattern. Because it wielded itself into the catastrophe with the attacks from Russia, Austria and the only reason for that... it was so anarchic that it refused to be ruled.

So there is a notable idea of national inferiority complex...have you come...
Among the younger people there is much less of it. I think, I know it is generalisation, but people under 35 even...there is a huge gap, attitudinal gap in under 35s. But over 35s...there is a huge sense of grievance, of grudge, against German, against Russia, against the Jews, against Ukraine [noise]. There is a sense of grievance, sense of grudge, and a sense of inferiority...

**Was this idea of ‘Creative tension’ an attempt to reinvigorate this national identity?**

No, what ‘Creative tension’ does, is to say “Let us make the most of what we are, let us make the most of the strengths we have. And the strengths we have are the ability to bounce back, bounce back...here we are again...you crapped all over us and we are back again- very much Polish characteristic. A kind of, it is not exactly a sense of humour, but it is a sense of fun, a sense of joy...Poland as a country is not confident, but lots of individual Poles are confident.

**Maybe over-confident...so difficult to work with, they “know it all”...**

Perhaps...it is not that they know it all...they enjoy an argument with...

**For the sake of argument...?**

Yeah, do you agree with any of this?

**Of course. But I recognise all this stuff as I have a sense of perspective...I have been living in UK for seven years. If you were to say that to another person in Poland they would be seriously offended.**

I said that to them in Poland. I said to the people I was dealing with.

**You know what is one of the aspects of the Polish inferiority complex?**

What?

**Poles listen to foreigners and they seem to have a great respect for them. So, for example, Mr. Michael comes to Poland and says something about Poland and they shut up and listen to you. It is a culture of compliance and I think it is also generational.**

That could be true. I don’t know. That could be true.

**Last year you cooperated with a Polish institution on a “Polish Year” in United Kingdom. How would you assess the professionalism of this campaign?**

I think they were very professional. But somehow this campaign did not have an impact it should have. I think they were very good and very professional, very
thoughtful people. The campaign should have had bigger impact. Maybe there was a shortage of money, I don’t know.

*I was looking for the media coverage, here in UK...*

There wasn’t enough. There was something wrong, somewhere. I don’t know what it was. But people I dealt with were very professional, there were very competent and very nice.

*From your observations, how would you evaluate the relationships between all those institutions that are responsible for promotion of Poland?*

They don’t talk to each other. Look. You say to somebody, “I deal with foreign direct investment”. So one the reasons I choose to invest in a country is the rational reasons, education of the labour force, taxes, and incentives. But there are also emotional factors e.g. education of my kids, do they speak English. Stuff like that. Another word, they are not rational, but emotional. I like it, I really like it so I am gonna but house here. Am I an investor or a tourist? Or if I come as a tourist, I like Gdańsk. I like the Baltic so much that I am gonna buy house here. Is that tourism or a direct foreign investment? So when you speak to people, there are areas here where there is an overlap. I have my budget, I have my responsibility to my investor, I have my audience, I have done research...400,000 people came this year, 750,000 people came this year....thank you very much. Or you say to somebody interested in Poland, for example, in tourism...let’s look at maps, so we have Vienna, we have Prague, and Budapest, and Kraków...and we also have Baltic, we have Gdańsk. There is a huge amount to be seen, but a lot of it is not Polish, a lot of it is from everywhere. They find it very difficult to cooperate. I am not saying that this is unique to Poland as it isn’t. People have a better understanding of what is in Spain and then what is in Poland. So if you are trying to get a tourist to come to Poland, there is the whole issue of the relationships, or where it all comes from...so tourist go to Vienna, Budapest, Kraków and they find it complicated. But they don’t want it complicated, they only have five days. Where would you go on holiday? I went to Austria, I went to Czech Republic, and I went to Poland..it was all Habsburg. So, it is all complicated...

*Are you in a way trying to say that those organisations compete with one another?*

No, they don’t compete. They ignore each other. Because tourism looks at what it regards as tourism and it doesn’t think that it is anything to do with foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment thinks it has nothing to do with tourism. They don’t see that there is coherence between them. They just ignore each other. They have nothing to say to each other.

*Fine. When did you start cooperating...or monitoring the market in Poland?*
I mean, I get on well with Krzysztof and Maciej. I like them and I think they like me.

_Have you noted any changes in promotion of Poland since 2003?_

I have noticed a lot of changes in peoples’ attitudes towards Poland, but that hasn’t got to do with the ways Poles have emerged and how Poland has emerged within the European Union...the political changes and so on. But, I have noticed no changes about promotion of Poland. I have noticed changes in the way people write about Poland, but it is not because of promotion of Poland. It is because the way they perceive Poland. Another word, perceptions of Poland are actually beginning to change, despite the fact that nobody is doing anything about it.

_So what would you say is the biggest challenge when it comes to nation branding in Poland?_

The biggest challenge is getting people to do something in a coherent fashion, which doesn’t undermine or detract from individual initiatives. That is the biggest problem.

_Fine. I guess that is pretty much it. Can I ask few more personal questions? It is just for a biographical note._

Of course you can.

_You said that read history at the university. Have you got any marketing qualifications?_

Sorry...

_Have you got any marketing qualifications?_

I don’t have anything like that...

_So when it comes to marketing you are a self-made man?_

I suppose you could say that. When you go up on the website it says who I am. By the way, have you read my book about nation branding?

_I have read a lot of stuff about nation branding, propaganda, particularly British propaganda and when it was institutionalised and the US overseas propaganda, particularly United States Information Agency._

So you have read all this stuff, what’s your view of nation branding?
Can I send you my PhD? Sure. I would not like to say anything now as I don’t think it would be professional.

You are too academic for me [noise]...

You are a marketing person, you sell marketing ideas...

I am not a marketing person. I am partly academic, partly creative, and partly strategic. I am a very unusual mixture. I am not an ordinary marketing person.

I realised that...I am just a PhD student with policies behind him and the university does not allow me...they simply tell me to shut up for the time being...

Is it a subject worth studying, nation branding?

Well, I am trying...it is....

Most people don’t know anything about it....

There have been some PhDs written on this subject...there is a lot of publications about public diplomacy as well.

Most of the stuff about nation branding is terrible. It is not good. Most of the articles, it is not thoughtful, it is not...Simon Anholt is a good thinker.

I know his work. Financial details of your cooperation with Poland, is that confidential?

[Nods]. It wasn’t much.

Fine. I have read in interviews that you complaint about it. Are you working with anyone on nation branding at the moment...?
APPENDIX 6 SAMPLE OF PRESS RELEASES ON NATION BRANDING

Informacja prasowa

Do kasety tym...


Planując zarządzanie statkiem, ze państwo jest znanym na globalnym kosmosie, gdzie aż kilka z naszych firm ma niezliczona, ale w gruncie rzeczy, flotę, która ma znaczenie dla naszej gospodarki. To dlatego trzymamy nasze relacje zintensyfikowane, oraz staramy się, aby nasze środowisko było bardziej przystosowane do wymagań przedsiębiorstw.


Krajowa Izba Gospodarcza na zakończenie, że zgodnie z rozkazami podziękowali politycznym wywrotom, które są podobne do naszych, jakie jest organizacja adwokacka w Polsce, w 2011 r.
Projekt Marka dla Polski

Marka dla Polski to nazwa pierwszego etapu Programu Marketingu Narodowego Polski. Realizują go – na razie swoimi siłami i za swoich środków – Krajewa Izba Gospodarcza oraz Instytut Marki Polskiej, przy udziale międzynarodowego zespołu konsultantów pod kierownictwem światowej renomowanej firmy Wally’ego Olinsa.

Partnerzy projektu Marka dla Polski

Projekt realizowany jest przy poparciu najważniejszych dla promocji narodowej instytucji w kraju: Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych, Ministerstwa Gospodarki i Pracy, Polskiej Agencji Informacji i Inwizyjnej Zagranicznej, Polskiej Organizacji Turystycznej. Czynnym partnerem jest Akademia Mistrzostwa – grono 100 firm ot potwierdzonych audytem certyfikacyjnym najmożniejszych w Polsce markach firmowych. Na te poparcie środków zawodowych związanych z marketingiem, reklamą i promocją, uczestnicy oraz miast i regionów. Garam się do tego ambitną firmę, środowiska młodzieżowe, zwłaszcza studenckie, pasjonaci i patroni społeczności lokalnych, środowiska polonijnego, armatniej.

Cel projektu Marka dla Polski

Celem projektu jest znalezienie prostej, prawdziwej, atrakcyjnej i unikalnej idei dla marki narodowej. Na to być fundamentalne myśli promocyjne dla Polski, z której będą wyszły się inspiracje polskie firmy, ręgony, rząd, samorządy, instytucje życia publicznego, organizacje obywatelskie, indywidualni Polacy. A w konsekwencji polskie produkty, usługi, miasta, wydarzenia, kultura, sztuka, univerzity, sport – wszakże przejawy naszej aktywności i twórczości w ciągu najbliższych 20–25 lat.

Potencjał promocyjny Polski

Polska roku 2004 nie powinna mieć kompleksów – jest normalnym krajem UE. Szybko nadszedł 50 lat nieodporności w wonym świecie wolnego rynku. Wytwarzanie wyrobów i usługi klasy europejskiej, często światowej, chociaż znane światu najczęściej pod innymi markami. Posiada znakomite firmy i produkty, 3 miliony przedsiębiorstw, wybitnych twórców, naukowców i osobiści życia publicznego, atrakcje turystyczne formatu europejskiego, walory społeczne, towarzyskie, ekologiczne, ogromny potencjał energii i dobrego wykształcenia młodych pokoleń.

Zespół Public Relations Krajowej Izby Gospodarczej
ul. Teatralna 4, 00-074 Warszawa
Tel. (22) 630 97 79, 630 97 62, e-mail: pr@kia.pl, www.kia.pl
Świat jednak ciągle postrzega nas zupełnie inaczej – jako biedny, szary, postkomunistyczny i niedrażowny kraj, gdzie dzieje się. Traci na tym gospodarka, turystyka, kultura, nauka, miasta, regiony i społeczeństwo.

A nie musi, bo mamy stut, który jest większą rządkością; polska rzeczywistość jest znacznie lepsza od polskiego wizerunku. Potwierdzają to wszyscy, którzy u nas byli: politycy, biznesmeni, turysta, dziennikarze, badacze. Wszystko się pozytywnie Polską zaskoczyło.

Te dodatnie różnice między rzeczywistością kraju a jego wizerunkiem oznaczają potencjał promocyjny. Jest to przywilej dość długi, który w wielu kulturach, a tym samym Polski. Dlatego że nasza rzeczywistość zawsze się na lepsze jeszcze obecnie jest jeszcze głębiej niż do tej pory.

Dostępne Krajów Izby Gospodarczej z Instytutem Marki Polskiej podjęły się zadania zwrócenia Polski uwagi na potencjał marki narodowej i jej podjęcia Programu Marki Narodowej Polski. Od prawie 10 lat obie instytucje prowadzą działania w celu zmiany nieporozumieńnego wizerunku Polski w kraju i za granicą.

Idea przewodnia marki narodowej

W ramach wielophasowego projektu jako jest Narka dla Polski rok temu rozpoczęto prace nad opracowaniem idei promocyjnej, Polski, najważniejszej i najznaczącej zapewniającej współpracę Polski i Polaków.

Idea przewodnia na odzwierciedlać tę obszynę naszego kraju i narodu, które stanowią o jego odmienności i wyjątkowości. Musi być bezwzględnie prawdziwa, pozytywna, choć nie pozwolona sprawności. Można je z radością, z trudnością, a tym bardziej w długim okresie, a także na tyle uniwersalna, by była użyteczna dla wszystkich dziedzin życia społecznego: rządu, regionów, biznesu, kultury, polityki, sportu.

Idea przewodnia to fundament, na którym można budować markę narodową, a jedno, koncept, iez, DNA: jedno, koncepcja, KWIAT, koncepcja, czyli przewodnia.

To nie słowa ani hasło reklamowe. Te pojawiają się później, na etapie wdrażania. Idea to wyrażona w środach ukraińskich, charakterystyka Polski jako marki, „filozofia myślenia” o Polsce – uczestnika globalnego rynku, fundamentalny sposób definiowania polskości jako naszego asyptu i etu. Podstawą, na której buduje się tworzenie przez dwie dekady połączenie ogólne strategii promocji naszego kraju oraz strategii sektoralnych dla niemieckiego eksportu gospodarczego i kultury, bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych, turystyki i dyplomacji publicznej.

Po badaniach i analizach w Polsce i na świecie oraz rocznych, wielomiesięcznych konferencji z liderami opinii publicznej Polski (NSZ, MOIP, KAZiR, PII, liderzy branży reklam) międzynarodowy zespół pod kierownictwem Wallygo Olina zdefiniował ideę przewodnią strategii promocyjnej Polski.

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Zespół Public Relations Krajowej Izby Gospodarczej
ul. Trebaczka 4, 00-074 Warszawa
Tel. (22) 635 07 0, 635 07 61, email: rz@ziak.pl, www.iziak.pl
APPENDIX 7 ‘EUROPE IS BIGGER’ CAMPAIGN: NATIONAL LOGOTYPE

ksiega znaku ogólnej promocji Polski

Polska

Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych
NAZWA PISANA PO POLSKU
NALEŻYMY DO EUROPY,
UŻYWAMY ALFABETU
ŁACIŃSKIEGO I JESTEŚMY
SOFIEJ
ROZPOZNAWALNY W
ŚWIECIE, WSPÓŁCZESNY

PIERSZA KONSTRUKCJA
DZIAŁAJĄCA (DZIECKO),
MARZENIE, MŁODOŚĆ,
ŚWIADOMOŚĆ
PRZYSZŁYCH

LOT, PROCES
UWOLNIENIA, RUCH,

KOLORY ZGODNE Z BARWAMI
FLAGI, GODŁA - INSYGNIA
POLSKI Jako NARODU I Państwa

NOTATKA,
RYSUNEK KONFERENCYJNY
LLEKOŚĆ, BRAK NAPIĘCIA,
"MIMOWOLNY KOMENTARZ"

PRZEDMIOT PRAKTYCZNY I MAGICZNY

POLSKA

POLSKA

PRZEDMIOT PRAKTYCZNY I MAGICZNY

PIERSZA KONSTRUKCJA
DZIAŁAJĄCA (DZIECKO),
MARZENIE, MŁODOŚĆ,
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UWOLNIENIA, RUCH,

KOLORY ZGODNE Z BARWAMI
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POLSKI Jako NARODU I Państwa

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PRZYSZŁYCH

LOT, PROCES
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APPENDIX 8 ‘AN ECONOMY UNDER ITS OWN FLAG’ CAMPAIGN

An Economy Under Its Own Flag

In a modest medieval town south-west of Warsaw a stone post marks the geometrical centre of Europe. For twelve years now Poland has been working hard to make sure that there is much more to her location than just geography. The economy is back to the mainstream of the European way of life with its democratic institutions, open society and thriving free market economies. Soon, the membership in the European Union will complete the process of making Poland a reliable and strong partner in the community of prosperous, competitive and secure nations.

Poland's corporate sector with well over one million private businesses lead the way in quick to grasp the art of European business standards, quality management and marketing. Next it is clear that leadership can only be afforded by companies with a soundly revised image, perfect reputation and strong market presence. This is why the Promotion Foundation Poland - Institute of Polish Brand has been asked by the Polish Chamber of Commerce and the Ministry of Economy to encourage such leaders to demonstrate their success, as other thousands of others may follow. The best performers are invited to join the Academy of Brands.

The Institute of Polish Brand
For more information: wwww.ipb.org.pl
Academy of Brands

Agriculture

The Institute of Polish Brand

Manufacturers of combine harvesters, with 130 years of tradition behind it. Part of the New Holland (AGCO) group, a market leader, proud of its distinguished service in modernization of agriculture and rural life in Poland.

One of the leading brands and the biggest retail bank in Poland, with a countrywide network serving thousands of facilities. Its brand has been recognized over 100 years. Synonymous as a bank in many Polish households.

Modern oil refining and petrochemicals giant, dynamic leader in production and sales of liquid fuels and petrochemicals. Poland’s biggest fuel stations chain. A reliable market position, extensive capital group and financial results. Spokes of public opinion and trust.

A big power plant that has become a public attraction with a human face. Successfully managed, it helps to improve the image of the entire industry in Poland. From a new environmental program involving new technology and own patents.


One of the biggest producers of ready-to-drink alcohols. The firm combines the traditions of the proverbial brewery factory with modernity. Hundreds of new models, many awards, big interest in its products in Poland and abroad.

Dr Witt

A pioneer of centuries-old apertitiv tradition, producing splendid varieties of honey and mead, a traditional blue alcoholic beverage. Owner of historic sculptures and objects from the last few centuries, publisher of books on beekeeping.

Agrona Fortuna Sp. z o.o.

Producers of pies, drinks, jams, soups, preserves. Its trademarks: Fortuna, Euroka, Milica, pies and drinks made in the nature’s second biggest producer: Fortuna Polish Food Group, with assets worth over 35 bn.

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APPENDIX 9 'POLAND. DISCOVER AND SAVOUR' CAMPAIGN

Poland. Discover and savour

Thousands of the 2.5 million private firms operating in Poland have mastered the art of modern business in no time at all. They have assimilated world standards and implemented quality management and marketing systems. They realize that thanks to their reputation and strong market identity, they will play the most important role in the process of Poland’s accession to the European Union.

The best Polish companies, hand-picked by The Institute of Polish Brand at the request of the Ministry of Economy and the Polish Chamber of Commerce, are invited to join the Academy of Brands, in the hope that their success will encourage thousands of other to follow in their footsteps.

The Institute of Polish Brand is proud to present two authentic examples in the collection of the Academy of Brands:

Wieliczka Salt Mine (13th-14th century) is the oldest operating industrial enterprise in Poland and one of the world’s oldest operational industrial enterprises. The mine has been inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List, which has attracted over 180,000 visitors from all over the world every year.

The salt mines of Wieliczka are as magnificent as the pyramids of Egypt, but they are even more accessible. They are a glorious monument to the Poles’ hard work (...). (Le Labrador, 1646).

Bolków Ceramic Cooperative, a world class producer of Polish ceramics, offers a wide range of high-quality, imaginative designs and top-quality products. The Cooperative carries on the ceramic tradition of Bolków, with a unique blend of artistic and utilitarian elements, with an emphasis on innovation, craftsmanship, and tradition.