

## **Workshop Title: Parties and Campaigning in the Digital Era**

### **Broadcasting to the masses or building communities: Polish political parties online communication during the 2011 election**

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#### **Introduction**

The professionalisation of political communication is an evolutionary process (Lilleker & Negrine, 2002), a process that adapts to trends in communication in order to better engage and persuade the public. One of the most dramatic developments in communication has been the move towards social communication via the Internet. It is argued to affect every area of public communication, from commercial advertising and public relations to education (Macnamara, 2010). It is no longer sufficient to have an online presence; we are now in an age of i-branding; with the 'i' standing for interactive. Yet, trends in online political electoral campaigning over recent years indicate a shallow adoption of Web 2.0 tools, features and platforms; limited interactivity; and managed co-production. The Internet is now embedded as a campaigning tool however, largely, the technologies are adapted to the norms of political communication rather than technologies impacting upon internal organizational structures, party relationships to members and supporters, or the content and style of their communication.

We examine these themes, and develop them through a focus on the targeting and networking strategies of political parties, in more detail in the context of the Polish parliamentary election of 2011. Through a sophisticated content analysis and coding scheme our paper examines the extent to which parties use features that are designed to inform, engage, mobilise or allow interaction, which audiences they seek to communicate with and how these fit communication strategies. Comparing these

findings with maps built from webcrawler analysis we build a picture of the strategies of the parties and the extent to which this links to short and long term political goals. This paper firstly develops our rationale for studying party and candidate use of the Internet during elections within the Polish context. Secondly we develop a conceptual framework which contrasts the politics as usual thesis (Margolis & Resnick, 2000) with arguments surrounding the social shaping of technologies (Lievrouw, 2006) and the impact on organisational adoption of communication technologies and post-Obama trends in Internet usage (Lilleker & Jackson, 2011) and posit that, despite the threats from an interactive strategy (Stromer-Galley, 2000) one would be expected within the context of a networked society (Van Dyjk, 2006).

Following an overview of our methodology and innovative analysis strategy, we present our data which focuses on three key elements. Firstly we focus on the extent to which party and candidate websites inform, engage, mobilise or permit interaction (Lilleker et al, 2011). Secondly we assess the extent to which websites attract different visitor groups (Lilleker & Jackson, 2011) and build communities (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2012). Thirdly we assess the reach strategies of the websites using Webcrawler technology which analyses the use of hyperlinks and whether parties lock themselves within cyberghettoes (Sunstein, 2007) or attempt to harness the power of the network (Benkler, 2006).

### **Online Political Communication in emergent democracies**

We contextualise our analysis in the neo-liberalisation of politics (Sidorenko, 1998) and rise of a 'promotional culture' (Wernick, 1991) in Poland. Within academic discourse, the former is seen as an incomplete process whereas the latter is a milieu that, arguably, has bearing on the development of online political communication and various forms of political participation. Audits of election campaigning (e.g. Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2011) reveals that political parties in Poland engage in online political communication and, on a surface level, this 'communicative' development can be interpreted as an attempt to shift the focus of the political parties' communication in Poland towards interacting and engagement with, and mobilisation of, the Polish electorate. While conceptualised by Polish academics as a movement towards 'e-democracy' (Grodzka, 2009), there is no analysis exploring the online strategies used by political players (e.g. parties and candidates), their impact or their

importance for the quality of political communication that over the years has moved from a sealed off system of political propaganda to pluralism.

It has been twenty years since 17 August 1991 when the first TCP/IP connection was made between the University of Warsaw and the Copenhagen University and this event is symbolically considered as the introduction of the World Wide Web to Poland. While, according to Juza (2011), its technological power was strongly undermined by existing corporate networks (e.g. IBM's European and Academic Research Network), the impact of the Internet on the political field and democratisation in Poland was not intellectualised until the beginning of 2000s. In the meantime, following neo-liberal agendas of Western Europe, political elites in Poland have been introducing public policies aimed at digitalisation. Those were presented publicly as a step towards the emergence of the 'information society' in Poland (Grodzka, 2009). Although 'digitalisation' is a new feature of the evolution of the 'liquid democracy' of Poland, our understanding of the potential contribution of the Internet to democracy remains unclear.

According to Hassan (2008), digitalisation is 'relational' and has several socio-political consequences. Since the post 1989 transformation, the Polish elites have been attracted to the republican notion of 'civic society' (Pachulska, 2005), but the recent technological advancements, accompanied by the intertwining discourses around the 'information society', require careful analysis. This way, in our view, we can gain a better understanding of the quality of democracy in Poland. The academic attempts to assess democratisation in Poland have been centred around perspectives of civic life being 'half full' (Roberts, 2010), or 'half empty' (Mokrzycki et al, 2002; Ost, 2002; Pachulska, 2005): the former argues there is progress in democratic revival; the latter highlights the shortcomings of democracy in Poland. To date, however, there is a gap in the body of knowledge on democratisation in Poland.

Notwithstanding criticisms of democratisation, we argue that the introduction of neo-liberalism in Poland has changed the democracy-economy dynamics in terms of a re-invention of political communication from a propaganda model to one that is more open, accessible and interactive. The rationale for this study stems from a few observations. While political elections become a 'promotional culture' spectacle

(Wernick, 1991; Cwalina et al, 2011) to date, trends in online communication suggest that political parties and candidates cannot just ‘promote’ but must develop a way of campaigning that is compatible with Web 2.0 environments. If a more interactive and participatory mode of campaigning is emerging then this may support a civic culture and contribute to democracy. Studies have shown that the mass media has been playing its role in the formation of ‘civic society’ (Ociepka, 2003), and Grodzka (2009) offered a descriptive account of ‘e-democracy’ in Poland. We approach the questions around democracy through an exploration in the role of the Internet during one election campaign. In a sense this is taking the democratic temperature at the supply side, analysing the extent to which Polish parties and candidates are contributing to democratic participation through their style of campaigning.

A key driver of Internet usage is whether the infrastructure is in place to make online communication viable. The modernisation of telecommunications in Poland has been slow and evolutionary. Trammell et al (2006) report that since 1996, when dial-up service was made available by the national telephone operator to some 500,000 consumers, market penetration has been steadily increasing and reached a moderate average, compared to other European nations which constitutes overall 2.9 % of the overall European internet services market. Recent industry data suggest growth of this market by 8.4% to reach a volume of 5.4 million subscribers (Datamonitor, 2010). Between 2003 and 2009, estimated growth rate of the Internet subscribers was 10%. More recent data (eGospodarka, 2012) revealed 95.2% of Polish households have potential access to the Internet and 23.5% of workplaces are online. Overall web penetration rate in Poland is at the level of 55.4% and, importantly, trends in social networking are equally taking hold among Poles (eGospodarka, 2012); for example data on the Social Bakers website (2011) claims that in the past six months the number of Poles using Facebook has grown by 79%. In other words, over 2.4 million new users have created profiles within the past six months. There are over 5.5 million Polish profiles on Facebook at the moment, which makes it the seventh biggest country in Europe on Facebook<sup>1</sup>. Alongside Facebook there are some 13.9 million Poles with profiles on the Polish social networking site Nasza Klasa (a social network primarily dedicated to find friends ‘from the past’). Therefore, if only from a strategic

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<sup>1</sup> (The UK is first, with almost 29 million Facebook profiles, closely followed by Turkey with 26m and France with almost 21m.)

point of view, it would appear that Poland would be fertile ground for an online and interactive strategy given that there are trends towards social uses of online spaces which can be appropriate for political communication.

### **Politics as Usual or a Co-created and Networked Campaign?**

In the majority of advanced democracies, the Internet represents a fairly low cost way of reaching a significant amount of the population; therefore unsurprisingly it has become a key campaigning tool. However, early predictions that the nature of online communication, in particular that anyone can publish and interact with other users, could lead political communication away from a purely broadcasting model were soon confounded. Margolis and Resnick (2000) produced the first study of political communication online and found that this represented what they and subsequent scholars have referred to as politics as usual. In this paper we focus on two dimensions of the politics as usual thesis; normalisation versus equalisation and informing versus interacting. It was initially suggested that the Internet would reduce inequalities between organisations and encourage smaller parties to be proactive communicators. In order to achieve parity with their better resourced rivals they might have the most sophisticated web presences (Hauben & Hauben, 1997; Shapiro, 1999). Studies (Kluver et al., 2007; Resnick, 1998) have found, however, the reverse to be the case. Offline inequalities are directly reflected online and smaller parties are least likely to have a website and use more sophisticated, Web 2.0 tools. This was particularly the case for Polish parties and candidates standing for the European parliament in 2009, comparing their use of the Internet to counterparts in France, Germany and the UK there were clear inequalities between major, minor and fringe parties with the latter showing highly underdeveloped online communication strategies (Lilleker et al, 2010). This research assesses the extent to which this has changed since 2009.

A further deficiency in Polish online political communication in 2009 was the use of Web 2.0 features and in particular those which encourage site visitors to participate in some form of activity. Activities can range from those which are engaging, such as playing games, to those which are conversational. The notion of the Internet as an architecture of participation (Jackson & Lilleker, 2009) suggests that increasingly the online user is seeking spaces in which to read, share and create; not simply to read.

Yet, within a political communication context the Internet has largely become a tool of campaigning normalised within the traditions of broadcasting and one-way political communication. Scholars suggest that such uses of the Internet are inappropriate (Kalnes, 2009). If the online users who are likely to visit political websites are also those who enjoy participating (sharing and creating) they will not find sites which purely inform attractive. Their abandonment of these sites will mean that they lose their persuasive potential by not being what is referred to as sticky (Jackson, 2003), qualities that encourage visitors to stay on the site and browse as well as return again to that site. It is equally the case that political participation may take place online regardless of party use of interactive features, and recent studies suggest that campaign communication now resembles a multi-authored diegesis as opposed to a single-authored monologue (Lilleker, 2013). Due to the granularity of communication across online platforms, political communication works within an ecosystem and will become co-created (Chadwick, 2012). Parties and candidates can choose to ‘harness the power of the crowd’ and allow their online supporters to add to and enhance the campaign (Jenkins, 2006), however this happens rarely and instead the norms of politics as usual are found.

The politics as usual thesis leads us to raise three key questions, and we phrase these as questions rather than hypotheses, for our study of the 2011 election in Poland.

1. Do we find evidence of politics as usual when comparing the average online performance of Polish **political parties**: both in terms of the style of communication, the extent of innovation and imbalances in terms of resources;
2. Do we find evidence of politics as usual when comparing the average online performance of Polish **political candidates**: both in terms of the style of communication, the extent of innovation and imbalances in terms of resources;
3. To what extent to Polish political parties and candidates permit **visitors to contribute** to the campaign in some way?

### **Online Political Communication Strategy**

Regardless of resource differentials or the use of the Internet as a participatory space, the various online platforms are becoming embedded within strategies for targeting and persuading different voter groups. Studies of political campaigning online have focused on counting what features are present on a website and then and categorising

them by communication style (informing, engaging, interacting) alone (Gibson & Ward, 2000; de Landtsheer et al, 2005; Lilleker et al, 2010). However, to truly understand not only what features are used but why more sophisticated categorisations are required. A comparative study of political campaign websites noted how they appeared to target a range of audiences. Understanding which audiences were targeted offers an indication of the priority for the website and who the creator believes will visit. Political communication is increasingly targeted and narrowcast (Howard, 2006), yet websites remain a broadcast medium (Kluver et al, 2007).

We identified five potential audiences that parties and candidates might target within the context of an election campaign. The first audience would be *random browsers* who may stumble across a site and would only stay if they are engaged by the content; high levels of eye-catching content and entertaining features at the front end of a website, as well as relevant and personally interesting content, will indicate browsers as a target audience (Spink et al, 2002; Marchionini, 2006). Secondly, *information seekers* who would visit for professional reasons, in particular journalists seeking position statements, news feeds or similar simple ways for finding information or having it delivered directly (Panagopoulos, 2009, pp. 7-8; Erickson & Lilleker, 2012). The third group we refer to as *issue activists*, individuals who want specific policy information and perhaps wish to interrogate party members on their position regarding a specific area of policy. In the case of candidates these may be local political activists and campaigners, at a national level outside lobby groups who do not have direct access to senior politicians or advisors but that parties or candidates may attempt to recruit (Cober et al, 2004) but through using specific forms of informative and interactive communication (Stutzer & Frey, 2006). The fourth group are *supporters*, the converted, these would be targeted with persuasion geared to bringing them closer to the campaign and would possibly be the main group for whom interactive mechanisms are designed (Norris, 2003: 42; Gerodimos, 2008). The fifth and final group are *activists* to whom most tools that aim at mobilisation are targeted and who may be especially active during the campaign (Greer & Lapointe, 2004; Lilleker & Jackson, 2011).

Consistent with targeting audiences is having strategies which position the party as a whole, as well as candidates. I-branding refers to the way that an organisation can create a brand personality through the use of communicational acts. We suggest that any online platform can have specific functions which relate to brand positioning and personality development (Jackson & Lilleker, 2013). We argue that there would be three main strategies. The first is a pure *sales* strategy which is designed to target browsers and supporters through the use of engaging but persuasive devices (Rohrschneider, 2002; Neys & Jansz, 2010). The second is one of *personalisation* (Langer, 2010) which, for a party website, would focus on the leader or key figures within the party or movement, for a candidate it relates to self-presentation and perception management (Goffman, 1959; Jackson & Lilleker, 2011). The third strategy is one of *e-representation*. This focuses on governance and representative issues and links to communication that targets issue activists in particular (Coleman, 2007; Small, 2012).

The focus on the strategy behind website development leads us to raise four key questions, and we again phrase these as questions rather than hypotheses, for our study of the 2011 election in Poland

1. Do party websites show evidence of specific strategies, or a mixture of strategies which suggest a maximisation of the use of online environments?
2. Given the context, will parties focus on targeting and mobilising activists?
3. Can we identify any relationships between the party use of the online environment and the outcome of the contest?
4. How do party campaign strategies compare to those of candidates?

### **Community building and Communication Reach**

A by-product of developing communication strategies around e-representation in particular, and the targeting of different types of online users, is that communities can form around a political movement (McLeod, 1999). Communities have largely formed organically online through the use of social networking tools and other interactive sites, spaces where participants are able to have influence and social status (Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001; Rojas et al, 2005). One of the key lessons taught to political campaigners by the Obama campaign is that a campaign can also build its own community (Harfoush, 2008; Lilleker & Jackson, 2011). In reality there were

many pro-Obama communities, some official and some unofficial. The Internet facilitates interaction across platforms so linking together communities, the campaign communication within each community space thus enters into an ecosystem and is diffused and disseminated across the Internet. As Chadwick (2011) spoke of a political news information cycle, there can also be a campaign communication cycle where assemblages of online users comment on, share and create communication that moves across online platforms to create what some have referred to as a big conversation (Anderson, 2006; see also Coleman, 2004). Drawing on the work of scholars such as Castells (2002) and Van Dyck (2006) we characterise the community around a campaign as a neighbourhood connected through information channels; just as populated areas are connected to one another by roads. Hyperlinks are ways in which website creators can link into networks (Zafiroopoulos & Vrana, 2011). Hyperlinks act as roads along which visitors can travel to and from a website. Parties can either tap into the wider network or attempt to inform only, build enclosed (private) communities or engage with the widest possible groups of online users. Considering the impact of networking on community building and linking into an online network effect we pose two questions:

1. Are parties creating enclosed communities around them and how does this link to their overall online communication strategy?
2. How does the party's relationship to the online network relate to their overall online performance as well as their ability to attract the attention of prospective voters and win support in the contest?

The risks associated with diverging from a politics as usual paradigm of online political communication are well documented (Stromer-Galley, 2000). However, arguably the dangers associated with losing control of the message are largely beyond the control of any party online.. There is no way to avoid online users talking politics, and no way of controlling what material the online browser might find regardless of how well the official campaign is optimised for being located by search engines (Lilleker, 2013). The question is whether the desire to participate is and can be channelled effectively by political parties. We enquire, holistically, how party campaigning in Poland has evolved, what strategies are observable and do they attempt to tap into network effects to extend their messages. These are important questions in understanding how online political election campaigning is evolving.

### **Analysing online political communication strategies**

Our methodology draws on the longstanding and well-tested feature counting methods developed by Gibson and Ward with features added in order to accommodate the changing usages of the Internet. However, to understand the professionalization of online political election campaigning it is necessary to move beyond simple categorisations in order to gain an understanding of the strategies which underpin website development. Like previous studies (Gibson & Ward, 2000; Foot & Schneider, 2006; Kluver et al, 2007) we divide features into providing information, being engaging, facilitating interaction and being aimed at mobilisation. We also categorise features as belonging to the eras of Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 in order to test for innovations and adherence to hypermedia campaigning norms (Lilleker & Vedel, 2013). However, when studying campaigning within a hypermedia era we need to go beyond these. We therefore focused on determining which of our features were most likely to be used to target specific types of website visitors; and which features best indicated adherence to our strategies of sales, personalisation and e-representation. We therefore focus on measures of performance, a continuation of previous work, while building on two new dimensions for the study of online election campaigning: targeting audiences and branding strategy.

Our data is developed from a content analysis of 172 candidate and 11 party websites. For our analysis we have chosen candidates from all eleven political parties who were on the top of the regional lists, a total of 331 candidates of which 172 had websites. There are 41 electoral regions and 7 parties were present in all regions. We had to make a methodological choice which candidates should constitute a sample. We believe that this is a methodologically interesting question – on how to choose sample from among thousands of more and less important candidates. Our decision was driven by the assumption that those who topped their party lists would be the most active politicians and most representative of party strategy; as a corollary the expectation was they were most likely to have an online presence due to their chances of being elected and their access to greater resources.

Content analysis was conducted one week before elections (1<sup>st</sup>-7<sup>th</sup> October), all websites were also archived<sup>2</sup>. All the updates (number of entries, number of friends and followers were counted within two days of the elections). The content analysis identified the presence or absence of 89 features. The websites were coded by three coders, all coders passed inter-coder reliability tests (Cohen's Kappa (.72) and Krippendorff's Alpha (.72)), any irregularities were checked and corrected.

Categorising features as potentiating experiences, in particular engagement, is complex. Any new layer of analytical complexity raises further issues. Features in themselves are a priori in their ability to be communication events. The way that a feature is embedded by the creator determines how its use is intended; however actual usage, either as a perceptual or behavioural influence, is the responsibility of the individual visitor. However, given our focus at the strategy side, we propose that we can develop an understanding of what was intended based on study of the website as a series of communication events. It is argued that the only way to discover the strategic intentions of the creators of political communication is through in-depth interviews (Vaccari, 2008), the danger here is that interview data can include a degree of post-hoc rationalisation based on outcomes and strategists can play up or down their input and intentions based on failure or success (Lilleker, 2003). The true way for understanding the processes that underpin particular communication tactics is through observation, a highly time-consuming and complex procedure that depends upon gaining the trust of all those being observed. As Nielsen (2012) argues gaining access is difficult, in particular to meetings where decisions are actually made. We argue that the website as an artefact for research is a static instantiation of strategy (Xenos & Foot 2000). In other words by understanding how features are used through the analysis of usage of the online environment, and how features play specific roles within shaping users' perceptions and experiences, we can gain significant insights into the strategic role of the Internet within a campaign and how this may contribute to the health of democracy within the context of the contest.

The categorisation of features involved a series of discussions between the authors and other researchers involved in a range of projects (Lilleker & Jackson, 2011;

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<sup>2</sup> The data archives were downloaded to local computer at Sciences-Po, Paris. It was performed by TelePort Ultra provided by Tennyson Maxwell Information Systems, Inc.

Lilleker et al, 2010; Koc-Michalska & Lilleker forthcoming). We also conducted concept testing with web design specialists working within the Centre for Excellence in Media Practice at Bournemouth University. This delivered a categorisation strategy which permits us to understand how features can be read as indicators of specific strategies. The challenge is where features belong to multi categories, in particular when assigning these as targeting specific audience groups. However, through concept testing alongside data collection we determined that it was not a problem that not all features were discrete to specific categories and could apply to more than one targeting strategy. We show our categorisations strategy in Appendix 2.

In order to make direct comparisons between different parties we develop what we entitle an average online performance score (AOP). The AOP score was calculated by initially counting the number of features present for each category to create an overall mean. We then divided the mean score for each category by the maximum possible score eg. in Web 2.0 category AOP for all parties was .35 (all parties mean performance was 10.18 that number was divided by 29 (max possible score). This technique allows us to compare performance within different categories of features (as each have a different number of features) as well as according to different characteristics (for the purposes of our analysis we use party size/resources, vote share gained in elections and political ideology). We are also using Poisson regressions in order to understand the characteristics that influence online performance. Poisson regression was chosen as the best statistical method for estimating count data variables as well as allows us to control for a large number of zeros in the data set (Wooldridge, p.645)

To construct a topology of online networks created through the hyperlinking strategies present on a large corpus of politics-related websites we used two programs Issuecrawler<sup>3</sup> (for data gathering) and Gephi<sup>4</sup> (for creating and analysing the web map). These tools, which analyse hyperlinks from web-based platform, allow us to see the extent of use of social media, traditional online media websites and other connections to the online community (for example linking to the platforms of supportive bloggers, journalists etc). Firstly all links present within the Polish

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<sup>3</sup> [Program issued by the University of Amsterdam](#)

<sup>4</sup> [Program issued by MediaLab at Sciences-Po Paris](#)

political online space were gathered by using the snowball technique. Issuecrawler was programmed to follow all the links that were spread from 10 starting points (all party websites addresses (see Appendix 1), due to a technical problem one starting point 'Nowa Prawica' was not used by the crawler). Following data gathering, we have manually run the Gephi program which allowed us to create a map showing connections between different websites. 850 websites were included, however some of them could have been cited (linked) by different websites (e.g. gazetawybrcza.pl, the most popular newspaper, was linked by many different sources). Even though we do not have control over the number of websites that were gathered, some manual data corrections were made in further analysis (e.g. those websites which have the same layout but had different IP addresses: psl.pl and psl.org.pl were merged). Data gathered, the so called 'nodes' (equivalent for web addresses), are represented by the dots on the map. The size of the dot depends on the number of links it gathers – the largest dots are 'authority points' (e.g. Facebook is marked by a large dot since, as we know from our content analysis, it is very popular among political actors). Even though the map of networks created by Issuecrawler and Gephi remains the same, it is possible to make further recoding/grouping of the nodes and show them in different perspective. For our analysis we have used general recoding for main characteristics of the nodes (e.g. political party, social network, media or according to political ideology or to the party size etc.)

### **Polish Parties and Candidates online: 'politics as usual'**

The extent to which sites inform, whether information is presented in engaging ways, or they permit interaction or attempt to mobilise visitors is understood through the construction of a general web performance score (Table 1). Polish party websites appear to be catching up in terms of feature use and the levels of sophistication employed. While the websites are still more Web 1.0 than Web 2.0 the narrow gap suggests an attempt to catch up with their Western European counterparts compared to previous contests (Lilleker et al, 2011). More surprisingly is that they use, on average, more of the features that permit interaction than any other group of features. This does not mean their websites are predominantly interactive but that the website and linked platforms offer a mixture of experiences. Information is clearly present, but much is presented using engaging modes of communication such as videos; the parties are also clearly attempting to mobilise their supporters.


**Table 1: General web performance for Political parties**

	Mean performance	Max number of features in category	Average Online Performance (AOP)
Web 1.0	16.636*	36	0.462
Web 2.0	10.181	29	0.351
Information	14.545	42	0.346
Engagement	12.636	43	0.294
Mobilisation	7.091	19	0.373
Interaction	9.091	22	0.413

All numbers in the tables are gathered for political parties or candidates present during the Polish parliamentary elections 2011, source: own

The above data suggests that in this dimension politics as usual is no longer an explanatory factor. When analysing whether there are relationships between party performance and their resources (see Appendix 1), using their position in parliament as a proxy for vote share, membership and so the funds they have available, we find politics as usual has equally limited explanatory power. Figure 1 does indicate that larger parties use the highest number of features across each category. However, the inequalities are not as clear as was found in previous studies and the patterns of usage show greater diversity in feature use across all parties. Yet inequalities do remain, particularly if we take the adoption of Web 2.0 features as an indicator of sophistication. There are also clear divisions between major and minor parties and again between minor and fringe parties in using features designed to mobilise activists and that facilitate interactivity. The inequalities between parties in the use of those features suggests they do not have the resources to handle large numbers of volunteers or to channel the activities of their supporters. Equally they are not prepared to respond to or moderate interactions on their websites. It is perhaps appropriate that poorly resourced parties do not attempt to create an interactive brand as, to be successful, there needs to be evidence of telepresence: that interactions do not disappear into a void but that there is a human there to interact with. If this is unmanageable then parties with fewer resources will remain unable to develop sophisticated online strategies.

**Figure 1: General web performance for Parties by resources**



The data from the analysis of the websites of Polish candidates show they still lag behind the parties in the use of Web 2.0 features and focus mainly on informing. The low numbers of features used show most relay information in traditional ways but much of this is presented using engaging formats (in particular the use of video etc).

**Table 2: AOP for general website performance for Candidates**

	Mean performance	Max number of features in category*	Average Online Performance (AOP)
Web 1.0	10.401	27	0.385
Web 2.0	4.831	23	0.210
Information	10.448	32	0.326
Engagement	8.959	32	0.280
Mobilisation	2.506	16	0.157
Interaction	5.552	21	0.264


\*There is different number of max features per grouping for parties and candidates this is due to the fact that some features are not available for candidates (eg. money donation) and some for parties (e.g. private info on family)

The regression analysis on candidates general web performance (see Appendix 3) shows that independent variables having positive significant effect on web performance are: belonging to major parties (in opposition to minor and fringe), the number of years the party has existed (the more established the better their candidates' performance), web penetration levels within the area they seek election (especially for higher performance in engagement and interaction performance) and number of terms in the parliament. There is also a visible generation gap with older candidates performing worse.

### The ideological dimension

Of more interest is the differences found when comparing parties by ideology. Research tends to suggest that centrist parties will have the more sophisticated sites (Sudulich, 2009), though there is debate over whether ideologically-led parties will be more interactive or not (Copsey, 2003). What we find is that parties of the right tend to dominate in average online performance, equally in their use of interactivity by centrist parties alone. Left wing parties tend to focus on informing.

**Figure 2: AOP for general web performance for Parties by ideology**



Overall we find that the Polish election campaign was largely politics, and political communication, as usual. However, as we found with the communication of MEPs (Koc-Michalska & Lilleker, forthcoming) interaction is no longer marginalised. Due

to the embeddedness of social networking within social communication of most parties (N=8) and a significant number of candidates (61% of those having websites) use Facebook, as well as some using Twitter and the Polish platform Nasza Klasa, many also use YouTube and have blogtools embedded in their websites. Free platforms such as these offer visitors simple but quite sophisticated ways in which to interact, and so incrementally may be impacting significantly upon the meaning of political participation in the context of elections. Therefore, in terms of the nature of political communication, it is not simply politics as usual anymore.

**Table 3: Party and Candidate use of social networks**

	Parties	Candidates (out of those having websites N=172)
Facebook	N=8	61%
Twitter	N=5	21%
Nasza Klasa	N=3	9%
Blog	N=2	16%
Youtube	N=10	55%

### Targeting and Strategy

Table 4 shows the overall averages in terms of which audiences are targeted, on average, across the websites of all political parties.

**Table 4: AOP of audiences targeted by Political parties**

	Mean performance	Max number of features in category	Average Online Performance (AOP)
Browsers	10.727	29	0.383
Information Seekers	21.545	59	0.365
Issue Activists	10.273	24	0.428
Supporters	24.091	63	0.382
Campaign Activists	21.182	52	0.407

As the data shows, Polish party websites provide areas for a wide range of visitors but the raw data, focusing on the simple numbers of features within each category, suggests that information seekers, activists and supporters are served best. This is perhaps logical given the context. Persuasion is one key role of a website, in particular during an election contest. Elections also rely on channelling the energy of party activists to work on behalf of the campaign as well as going out to vote. Hence there is a concentration of features designed for supporters and activists. However all potential audiences are served well by party websites.


**Table 5: AOP of audiences targeted by Candidates**

	Mean performance	Max number of features in category	Average Online Performance (AOP)
Browsers	9.907	22	0.450
Information Seekers	15.238	47	0.324
Issue Activists	5.703	22	0.259
Supporters	14.279	48	0.297
Campaign Activists	11.430	44	0.260

Candidate websites (Table 5), in contrast seem to focus mostly on features that appeal to browsers perhaps reflecting a strategy of reaching out to potential large constituencies (also visible in regression, see Appendix 4), who may be the most likely visitor to their sites. Professional information seekers are equally well served but there appears to be little focus on providing many features that would satisfy issue-specific visitors, party supporters or activists; it seems these are expected to visit the party websites rather than those of the candidate.


As Figure 3 shows there is little difference between major, minor and fringe parties, with the most obvious difference being in terms of the overall numbers of features on the party's websites; showing minor and fringe party websites are largely less sophisticated. The data appears to indicate fringe parties, as an overall percentage of the total number of features give greater focus to issue-specific and party-loyal activists.

**Figure 3: AOP of audiences targeted for Parties by resources**



As with overall average online performance, parties of the right out-perform their centrist and left wing counterparts. However, the overall pattern which maps onto resources is maintained almost exactly across the different groups. It therefore appears that any differences are a factor of the overall average online performance which shows an overall higher sophistication of parties of the right.

**Figure 4: AOP of audiences targeted for Political parties by ideology**



## Communication Strategies


In terms of the link to overall strategies they tend to reflect the findings previously shown. Party websites (Table 6) follow a sales strategy firstly followed by an e-representation strategy. Combined, this constitutes an experience that is persuasive while focusing on the benefits of supporting the party and the way in which it can engage with and involve voters.

**Table 6: Strategies as averages for Polish political parties**

	Mean performance	Max number of features in category	Average Online Performance (AOP)
E-representation	14.091	37	0.381
Personalisation	3.636	17	0.214
Sales/Persuasion	14.636	38	0.385

As with the other data, patterns remain constant. Major parties perform best with a clear divide between them and the minor parties with a smaller but statistically significant division between minor and fringe parties. The minor difference is that the sales strategy is less pronounced for both minor and fringe parties who equal their focus on persuasion with features that evidence an e-representation strategy.

**Figure 5: AOP of strategies for Parties by resources**




As Table 7 shows, candidates focus almost exclusively on a personalisation strategy, providing information about the individual lives and experience, a sales approach is a distant second with e-representation seldom featuring, despite this being a key aspect of the marketing of candidates in marginal seats in the UK (Lilleker, 2006). Regression analysis indicates that a personalisation strategy is highly influenced by the size of population that candidates try to reach (Appendix 5).

**Table 7: AOP of strategy use for Candidates**

	Mean performance	Max number of features in category	Average Online Performance (AOP)
E-representation	10.285	36	0.286
Personalisation	6.308	14	0.451
Sales/Persuasion	9.511	28	0.340

There is very little differences for candidates across parties, the resource differences found when analysing party websites show, ideology plays little role, although centrist candidates have more sophisticated websites, this contrasts with data from the sites of the parties themselves. As Figure 6 demonstrates, independent of party, which are arranged by ideological position on the left-right scale, a mixture of strategies are employed but overall patterns remain with few real differences emerging.

**Figure 6: AOP of strategy use for Candidates by party left-right**




### Harnessing the Network?

We assess the use of the network effect through our webcrawler data. We assess the extent to which parties reach beyond their own network, understanding how they position themselves online vis-à-vis the broader network and whether they endeavour to create a greater sense of accessibility as well as credibility. The hyperlinkages map gives a sense of the ecosystem from the perspective of the parties and the way in which they build connections, paths along which they intend visitors to travel, to other parts of the Internet. The hyperlinkages map suggests a self-contained ecosystem; the reason is that this was constructed by the web addresses fed into the webcrawler software. In reality there are no direct links between any of the parties, not even those who have been working together as coalition partners. This is not unexpected, more a point of clarification. The map shows the parties are on the edge of the ecosystem, what connects them is their hyperlinks to main online media sites, those of the offline media, major online players such as key bloggers, and social media platforms, in particular Facebook. Parties of government also link into governmental sites, perhaps reinforcing their credibility and experience. Opposition parties have no links to government sites, apart from the largest opposition party who lost power in 2007, this may suggest that on the whole there are insider and outsider strategies at play. The strategy that predominates for all the parties is creating their own cyberghetto, linking to supportive sites or sub-sites. The clearest strategies are seen among minor and fringe parties. The PSL (Peasant Party) were coalition partners and position

themselves as insiders, linking to the government departments they have been running. Alongside this they have a strong party-centric community linking to their own television channel, and having youth pages as well as links to their ‘friend’ bloggers or politicians. The PSL strategy is one of creating a sphere of supporters around the party while their narrative reinforces their role as experienced and responsible in government. In contrast the Polish Labour Party (PPP), a fringe movement, have a highly localised and media based strategy, pulling in content from other sites, mostly those who share their ideological orientation. The PPP site is unsophisticated with a low AOP overall, their strategy is to populate their space with supportive content from around the Internet. Largely, however, we find little sense of parties connecting to a wider network, rather they create their own large or small network, linking to pages, spaces and sites that are subsidiaries, supportive or reinforce their messages. Figure 7 shows a general map of Polish websphere, more of them would be discussed in more details during the conference.

**Figure 7. Polish political web sphere**



## Searching for impact

In order to understand the impact that online communication may have in elections we use share of vote as a dependent variable. We try to understand if different communication strategies applied by candidates on their websites help to build online communities (number of friends/followers on Facebook, Nasza Klasa and Twitter). Table 8 shows the outcomes of regression analysis on the vote share obtained by candidates during 2011 Parliamentary elections, we find there is an impact from having an online presence. The positive result remains significant even if controlling for personal (age and gender) as well as party characteristics to which candidate belong (size, political ideology, years of existence) suggesting that there is an electoral dividend from being online. However, if we assume that those candidates with websites were also proactive communicators, a key indicator of professionalism (Negrine & Lilleker, 2003), what we are showing here is that the more professional the candidate as a campaigner the greater their potential vote dividend.

**Table 8: Vote share obtained in 2011 Polish parliamentary elections for Candidates**

	Coef.	Std err	sign
Personal characteristics			
Age	-.021	.021	0.319
Gender	-.716	.556	0.199
Nb of terms in Parliament	<b>.909</b>	<b>.169</b>	<b>0.000</b>
Party characteristics (acc to party belonging)			
Party size	<b>8.208</b>	<b>.602</b>	<b>0.000</b>
Political id	<b>-.281</b>	<b>.078</b>	<b>0.000</b>
Party years of existence	<b>-.099</b>	<b>.037</b>	<b>0.007</b>
General characteristic			
Web penetration rate per region	.051	.047	0.274
Having website	<b>1.014</b>	<b>.478</b>	<b>0.035</b>

Note: OLS regression. Dependent variable: % of vote share in 2011 elections (continuous) for N=331 candidates. Independent variables: gender (dummy, 1=women, 0=men); age (in years); number of terms in Parliament (continuous, 0 to 7); Size of the party that candidates belong to (major vs. minor, fringe as reference); Political ideology of the party that candidate belongs to ((1=left to 11=right)); Party years of existence (continuous); electorate size (number of voter/number of seats in the parliament per circumscription); Web penetration rate per region; Having a website (dummy, have website=1).

In order to follow the logic of the communication strategies we ran regression on the community size, using the number of followers and friends on candidates profiles on social networks and microblogs (Facebook, Nasza Klasa and Twitter) as the dependent variable, the results are in Table 9. Model A shows the effect of e-representation, personalisation and sales strategies and the frequency in which the social network profiles were updated (using data from one month before the elections). Model B uses the same independent variables as Model A while controlling for other individual and general characteristics.

Model A demonstrates significant positive influence of two of the strategies used on the websites which are correlated with the size of online community: e-representation and personalisation. Using a sales strategy has no statistically significant effect. The frequency of updating social network profiles has a positive impact on accumulating followers. While it is difficult to assess a direct causal relationship between the extent to which a candidate is a proactive communicator and whether they attract a following, there is evidence to suggest this is the case. Both regression analysis and Spearman's Rho correlations show similar outcomes. Using Spearman's rho correlation we find that the relationship between update frequency on Nasza Klasa and the number of followers is ranked at .670 ( $p < .000$ ) for candidates and .857 ( $p < .000$ ) for parties [for Facebook this is .831 ( $p < .000$ ) for candidates and .573 ( $p < .000$ ) for parties]. Usage of Twitter shows an even stronger relationship of .914 ( $p < .000$ ) for candidates and .859 ( $p < .000$ ) for parties. This suggests that a highly professional, proactive candidate can accumulate a following which may also have an electoral dividend. The Pearson's correlation between vote share in 2011 and community size was: for Facebook .407 ( $p < .000$ ) and .376 ( $p < .000$ ) for Twitter (however with no statistical significance for Nasza Klasa).

**Table 9: Community building**

	Model A			Model B		
	coef	Std err	sign			
Strategy e-representation	<b>.170</b>	<b>.098</b>	<b>0.084</b>	<b>.148</b>	<b>.060</b>	<b>0.014</b>
Strategy personalisation	<b>.190</b>	<b>.062</b>	<b>0.002</b>	<b>.115</b>	<b>.048</b>	<b>0.016</b>
Strategy marketing	.007	.120	0.957	.039	.061	0.519
SN updating	<b>.004</b>	<b>.001</b>	<b>.004</b>	<b>.004</b>	<b>.002</b>	<b>0.014</b>
Age				-.005	.023	0.812
Gender (men=0)				-.123	.264	0.640
Nb of terms in Parliament				.084	.095	0.377
Party size (major=1)				<b>.711</b>	<b>.248</b>	<b>0.004</b>
Political id				-.093	.058	0.107
Party years of existence				-.027	.032	0.390
General characteristic						
Web penetration rate				.036	.035	0.304
Electoral size				<b>.0001</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>0.000</b>
Pseudo R2				0.6746		

Note: Models are results of Poisson regression, robust. Dependent variable: community size (continuous, number of friends on Facebook + number of followers on Twitter + number of friends on Nasza Klasa). Independent variables: gender (dummy, 1=women, 0=men); age (in years); number of terms in Parliament (continuous, 0 to 7); Size of the party that candidates belong to (major and minor, fringe as reference); Political ideology of the party that candidate belongs to ((1=left to 11=right)); Party years of existence (continuous); electorate size (number of voter/number of seats in the parliament per circumscription); Web penetration rate per region. Online Strategies e-representation, personalisation marketing (as in Appendix 2); Updating (continuous) – sum of number of entries in month before elections (7<sup>th</sup> Sept. To 7<sup>th</sup> October 2011) on Facebook, Nasza Klasa and Twitter.

Model B confirms the importance of the two strategies, while controlling for other characteristics, (noting the exception for Marketing Strategy which is not statistically significant) and frequency of updating for building communities. Aside from adherence to one of the strategies and variables relating to frequency of updates, the only findings that show significance suggest that candidates representing major parties, representing less right oriented parties as well as those appealing to the larger audience in their circumstances are more likely to attract a larger following online. Those findings are consistent with our previous findings on the importance of updating and strategies used by the Members of European Parliament in building their online supporting communities (Lilleker and Koc-Michalska 2011 forthcoming)

### **E-campaigning: thoughts on professionalism**

We set out nine questions to explore in this paper, we will briefly answer these prior to discussing the implications. Our first questions related to the politics as usual thesis. Politics as usual was evidenced in terms of resources across both party and candidate websites; correlations indicate a very clear internal relationship between all dimensions. This shows that parties with a high average online performance within any one category tend to have high AOPs in other categories. There was, however, a weakening of control over communication. Parties not only use blogtools but, by moving into social spaces, they have to allow interactions from visitors to their sites. Therefore we find a degree of innovation that is breaking down a key dimension of politics as usual. As expected we found a mixture of strategies across all party and candidate websites, surprisingly though there was minimal targeting identified and mobilisation was not as prominent as we might expect. Candidate sites did appear to use a targeting strategy, but only through focusing on browsers and personalising their webspaces. Independent of other variables parties do not reach far into the online network, they create small communities around themselves with the sophistication of their use of the online environment governed by resources. We do identify an impact from online activity however. Parties and candidates who adhere to e-representation and personalisation strategies earn a following. It may be that these strategies link to being more proactive communicators, and this in turn also builds a following, the more proactive the larger the following in fact. Cumulatively, parties and candidates that pursue proactive and personalised e-representative strategies earn a greater vote share than those who are not proactive. We do not suggest this to be simply a feature

of online performance, rather higher resources equate to better campaign communication which, in turn, has an impact on electoral performance.

Our study of the use of the Internet during the 2011 Polish election indicates that Poland is catching up and election campaigning is becoming normalised and professionalised as with other Western democracies. The imbalances in sophistication reflect inequalities in resources that would be familiar to campaigners the world over. Professionalisation occurs across all forms of communication and the evolving use of the Internet is no different to adaptation to the demands of changing news cultures or even the adaptation to newspapers, radio and television. Parties have to some extent adapted to social uses of the Internet, by migrating to social networking sites, microblogs and sharing sites, and by building blogtools into the architecture of their websites. However, the logic of political communication also constricts the levels of interactivity offered and puts parties and candidates with fewer resources at a disadvantage. Resources enable greater proactivity in their communication, proactivity now includes more interactive modes of communication using a range of platforms. Parties and candidates with greater resources are able to create strong interactive brands as well as offline brands and combined these provide electoral dividends. To some extent this may serve democracy, given the shift towards more interactive forms of communication; conversely this places greater control over access to the public to those with the greater level of resources. Resources ensure greater access to the mainstream media, ensure greater embeddedness within the online political network and provides the capacity to attract more supporters to their webspaces.

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## Appendix 1

	Party website	Party Name	% of votes in 2007	% of votes in 2011	Year of creation	Nb of regions where party has presented	Nb of candidates present in elections	Major/minor/fringe	Right / centre / left
1	<a href="http://wybierzpis.org.pl/">http://wybierzpis.org.pl/</a>	Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (Law and Justice)	32.11	29.89	2001	41	916	Major (opposition)	Right
2	<a href="http://www.stronapi.n.pl/">http://www.stronapi.n.pl/</a>	Polska Jest Najwazniejsza (Poland Comes First)	x	2.19	2010	41	786	Fringe	Right
3	<a href="http://www.sld.org.pl">http://www.sld.org.pl</a>	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Alliance)	13.15	8.24	1999	41	914	Minor (opposition)	Left
4	<a href="http://www.ruchpalikota.org.pl/">http://www.ruchpalikota.org.pl/</a>	Ruch Palikota (Palikot's Movement)	x	10.02	2011	41	861	Minor (opposition)	Left
5	<a href="http://www.komitetwyborczypl.pl">http://www.komitetwyborczypl.pl</a>	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (The Polish People's Party)	8.91	8.36	1990	41	918	Minor (coalition)	Centre
6	<a href="http://www.partiapracy.pl/">http://www.partiapracy.pl/</a>	Polska Partia Pracy (Polish Labour Party)	0.99	0.55	2001	41	776	Fringe	Left
7	<a href="http://wybory.platforrna.org/">http://wybory.platforrna.org/</a>	Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform)	41.51	39.18	2001	41	915	Major (coalition)	Centre
8	<a href="http://www.samoobrona.org.pl">http://www.samoobrona.org.pl</a>	Samoobrona (Self-Defence)	1.53	0.07	1992	9	165	Fringe	Left
9	<a href="http://www.prawicarzeczypospolitej.org/">http://www.prawicarzeczypospolitej.org/</a>	Prawica Rzeczpospolitej (The Right of the Republic)	x	0.24	2007	20	382	Fringe	Right
10	<a href="http://nowaprawica.org.pl/">http://nowaprawica.org.pl/</a>	Nowa Prawica (New Right) (party not present in the webcartography analysis)	x	1.06	2010	21	387	Fringe	Right
11	<a href="http://www.mniejszoscniemiecka.eu/">http://www.mniejszoscniemiecka.eu/</a>	Mniejszosc Niemiecka (german Minority)	0.2	0.19	1990	1	24	fringe	centre

### Party finances

Parties can finance campaign with their private funds (members' fees, or individual donation, donations from companies are forbidden)), they also obtain a state subsidy based on the number of votes gained in elections.

### Major, minor, fringe

We have divided parties according to the number of votes they gained in elections. Major are those in parliament earning 11% of the vote or more; Minor are those in the Parliament with 5-10.9% of votes, Fringe are those which not in Parliament (and received less than 5%, the minimum vote share allowing to enter the Parliament). There is one party German Minority which do not fulfil the requirement of 5% in order to enter the Parliament but their votes are counter proportion to other votes in the circumscription (however they are present only in one region in the south –west of Poland). They have one representative in the Parliament.

**Correlations**

		str_mark	str_pers	str_erepr	aud_campa	aud_supp	aud_issue	aud_infosee	aud_brows
str_mark	Pearson Correlation	1	.711*	.919**	.911**	.910**	.837**	.830**	.894**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.014	.000	.000	.000	.001	.002	.000
	N	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
str_pers	Pearson Correlation	.711*	1	.425	.415	.474	.262	.335	.568
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.014		.193	.204	.141	.436	.313	.068
	N	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
str_erepr	Pearson Correlation	.919**	.425	1	.964**	.968**	.939**	.927**	.876**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.193		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
aud_campa	Pearson Correlation	.911**	.415	.964**	1	.981**	.975**	.910**	.859**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.204	.000		.000	.000	.000	.001
	N	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
aud_supp	Pearson Correlation	.910**	.474	.968**	.981**	1	.944**	.928**	.863**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.141	.000	.000		.000	.000	.001
	N	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
aud_issue	Pearson Correlation	.837**	.262	.939**	.975**	.944**	1	.919**	.768**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.436	.000	.000	.000		.000	.006
	N	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
aud_infosee	Pearson Correlation	.830**	.335	.927**	.910**	.928**	.919**	1	.751**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	.313	.000	.000	.000	.000		.008
	N	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
aud_brows	Pearson Correlation	.894**	.568	.876**	.859**	.863**	.768**	.751**	1

Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.068	.000	.001	.001	.006	.008	
N	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

## Appendix 2

### WEB 1.0

Link from party website; Info about date of entries; Update during campaign (1mth); Newsletter (any); Section for/from media; Section with private info about candidates; Calendar; Section with FAQ; Section with videos; Animated photos; Section with photos; Any links to other websites; Search engine; Contact: e-mail; Contact: postal address; Contact: online form; Section with public opinion polls; Facilities for disables (to read website); Section: with any issues (region, group interest ect.); Possibility to download materials; Possibility to print materials; Possibility to volunteer; Possibility to donate money; Possibility to subscribe to the party; Section with political program; Section with previous political activities; Thank you note after elections; Value statement; Shop to buy gadgets; Section with information on how to vote; Automatic visit count; Information about support from VIP; Information about support from other party supporters; Online games; Online public opinion poll; Possibility to volunteer in the campaign

### WEB 2.0:

Possibility to leave comments on the website; Link to additional own blog; Possibility to comment on the Blog; Is there a blogroll on the Blog; Is there a videoblog; Is there: a link to the Video sharing site; Is there: a link to the Video sharing site with candidates profile; Is there a webcam; Is there: a link to Photo sharing site; Is there: a link to any Social Network sites; Facebook: entries during campaign; Facebook: comments during campaign; Facebook: possibility to share FB link online; Twitter: link to Twitter; Twitter: entries during the campaign; Other

Microblogging link; RSS; Possibility to share web entries with others; Is there a tag cloud; Possibility for the visitors to update information on website; Possibility to debate on website; Embedded elements; Mobile version of the website; Facebook: link to fun page; Facebook: link to party FB profile general; Facebook: link to party FB profile for elections; Facebook: information about campaign (for political party)

#### INFORMATION

Link from party website; Info about date of entries; Link to additional own blog; Is there a newsletter on the website; Is it possible to subscribe to the newsletter; Are there any articles from the press; Are there any programs from the TV; Are there any programs from the Radio; Are there any release for the media; Information on: candidates political career; Information on: candidates family; Information on: candidates hobby; Information on: candidates education; Calendar; Section with FAQ; Section with videos; Section with photos; Search engine; Facebook: information about Family; Facebook: information about Hobby; Facebook: information about Education; Facebook: information about Interests; RSS; Is there a tag cloud; Section: on regions; Section: on work in the parliament; Possibility to download materials; Possibility to print materials; Section with political program; Program: in pdf; Program: in online version; Section with previous political activities; Value statement; Section: Negative campaigning; Section with information on how to vote; Facebook: link to fun page; Facebook: link to party FB profile general; Facebook: link to party FB profile for elections; Facebook: information about campaign (for political party); Facebook: information about candidates (for political party); Facebook: information about program (for political party);

#### ENGAGEMENT

Info about date of entries; update during campaign (1mth); Entries on the own Blog during the campaign; Is there a blogroll on the Blog; Is there a videoblog; Is it possible to subscribe to the newsletter; Information on: candidates family; Information on: candidates hobby; Is there: a link to the Video sharing site; Is there a webcam; Animated photos; Is there: a link to Photo sharing site; Any links to other websites; Is there: a link to political party website; Is there: a link to any ideological group; Is there: a link to any other blogs; Is there: a link to any other candidates; Is

there: a link to any Media; Is there: a link to any NGO;Is there: a link to any Youth organisations; Section with public opinion polls; Facebook: entries during campaign; Facebook: information about Family; Facebook: information about Hobby; Facebook: information about Interests; Twitter: link to Twitter; Twitter: entries during the campaign; Possibility to share web entries with others; Facilities for disables (to read website);Is there a tag cloud; Embedded elements; Thank you note after elections; Shop to buy gadgets; Mobile version of the website; Automatic visit count; Information about support from VIP; Information about support from other party supporters; Link to special website dedicated to the elections; Link to the own TV website; Link to the youth organisation; Link to the supporting organisation; Online games; Online public opinion polls;

#### MOBILISATION

Possibility to leave comments on the website; Possibility to comment on the Blog; Is it possible to subscribe to the newsletter; Calendar; Section with public opinion polls; Facebook: entries during campaign; Facebook: comments during campaign; Facebook: possibility to share FB link online; Twitter: entries during the campaign; Other Microblogging link; Possibility to share web entries with others; Possibility for the visitors to update information on website; Possibility to debate on website; Possibility to volunteer; Possibility to donate money; Possibility to subscribe to the party; Possibility to volunteer in the campaign; Facebook: information about campaign (for political party); Section: on work of the government

#### INTERACTION

Possibility to leave comments on the website; Possibility to comment on the Blog; Is there: a link to the Video sharing site; Is there: a link to the Video sharing site with candidates profile; Is there a webcam; Is there: a link to Photo sharing site; Contact: e-mail; Contact: postal address; Contact: online form; Section with public opinion polls; Is there: a link to Facebook; Is there: a link to Nasza Klasa; Facebook: entries during campaign; Facebook: comments during campaign; Facebook: possibility to share FB link online; Twitter: link to Twitter; Twitter: entries during

the campaign; Other Microblogging link; Possibility to share web entries with others; Possibility for the visitors to update information on website; Possibility to debate on website; Online public opinion polls;

#### A:BROWSERS

Info about date of entries; update during campaign (1mth); Link to additional own blog; Is there a videoblog; Information on: candidates political career; Information on: candidates family; Information on: candidates hobby; Information on: candidates education; Section with FAQ; Section with videos; Is there: a link to the Video sharing site; Is there: a link to the Video sharing site with candidates profile; Animated photos; Section with photos; Is there: a link to Photo sharing site; Any links to other websites; Section with public opinion polls; Is there: a link to any Social Network sites; Facebook: entries during campaign; Facilities for disables (to read website); Embedded elements; Section with previous political activities; Section: Negative campaigning; Information about support from VIP; Link to the own TV website; Online games; Online public opinion polls; Section: on work of the government

#### A:INFO SEEKERS

Link from party website; Info about date of entries; update during campaign (1mth); Link to additional own blog; Entries on the own Blog during the campaign; Is there a blogroll on the Blog; Newsletter (any); Are there any articles from the press; Are there any programs from the TV; Are there any programs from the Radio; Are there any release for the media; Information on: candidates political career; Information on: candidates family; Information on: candidates hobby; Information on: candidates education; Calendar; Section with FAQ; Section with videos; Section with photos; Is there: a link to political party website; Is there: a link to any ideological group; Is there: a link to any other blogs; Is there: a link to any other candidates; Is there: a link to any Media; Is there: a link to any NGO; Is there: a link to any Youth organisations; Search engine; Contact: e-mail; Contact: postal address; Contact: online form; Section with public opinion polls; Is there: a link to any Social Network sites; Facebook: information about Family; Facebook: information about Hobby; Facebook: information about Education;

Facebook: information about Interests; Twitter: link to Twitter; Twitter: entries during the campaign; Other Microblogging link; RSS ; Is there a tag cloud; Section: on regions; Section: on work in the parliament; Possibility to download materials; Possibility to print materials; Section with political program; Section with previous political activities; Value statement; Section: Negative campaigning; Section with information on how to vote; Link to special website dedicated to the elections; Link to the youth organisation; Link to the supporting organisation; Facebook: link to party FB profile general; Facebook: link to party FB profile for elections; Facebook: information about campaign (for political party); Facebook: information about candidates (for political party); Facebook: information about program (for political party); Section: on work of the government;

**Audience: Issue audience**

Link to additional own blog; Newsletter (any); Calendar; Is there: a link to the Video sharing site; Is there: a link to the Video sharing site with candidates profile; Is there: a link to any ideological group;

Is there: a link to any NGO; Contact: e-mail; Contact: online form; Is there: a link to Facebook; Is there: a link to Nasza Klasa; Twitter: link to Twitter; Other Microblogging link; RSS; Possibility to share web entries with others; Is there a tag cloud; Section: on regions; Section: on work in the parliament; Possibility for the visitors to update information on website;

Possibility to debate on website; Section with political program; Section with previous political activities; Value statement; Facebook: information about program (for political party)

**Audience: Potential supporters**

Info about date of entries; update during campaign (1mth); Possibility to leave comments on the website; Link to additional own blog; Entries on the own Blog during the campaign; Possibility to comment on the Blog; Is there a blogroll on the Blog; Is there a videoblog; Is it possible to subscribe to the newsletter; Are there any articles from the press; Are there any programs from the TV; Are there any programs from the Radio;

Section with private info about candidates; Calendar; Section with FAQ; Section with videos; Is there: a link to the Video sharing site; Is there: a link to the Video sharing site with candidates profile; Is there a webcam; Section with photos; Is there: a link to Photo sharing site; Is there: a link to political party website; Is there: a link to any other candidates; Contact: e-mail; Contact: postal address; Contact: online form; Section with public opinion polls; Is there: a link to Facebook; Is there: a link to Nasza Klasa; Facebook: entries during campaign; Facebook: comments during campaign; Facebook: possibility to share FB link online; Facebook: information about Family; Facebook :information about Hobby; Facebook: information about Education; Facebook: information about Interests; Twitter: link to Twitter; Twitter: entries during the campaign; Other Microblogging link; Possibility to share web entries with others; Section: on regions; Section: on work in the parliament; Embedded elements; Possibility to volunteer; Possibility to donate money; Possibility to subscribe to the party; Section with political program; Section with previous political activities; Value statement; Section: Negative campaigning; Mobile version of the website; Information about support from VIP; Information about support from other party supporters; Link to special website dedicated to the elections; Link to the own TV website; Link to the supporting organisation; Online public opinion polls; Possibility to volunteer in the campaign; Facebook: link to fun page; q22\_6\_1FBtalking; Facebook: information about campaign (for political party); Facebook: information about candidates (for political party); Facebook: information about program (for political party); Section: on work of the government;

**Audience: Campaign participators**

Link from party website; update during campaign (1mth); Possibility to leave comments on the website; Link to additional own blog; Entries on the own Blog during the campaign; Possibility to comment on the Blog; Is there a blogroll on the Blog; Newsletter (any); Are there any release for the media; Calendar; Section with videos; Is there: a link to the Video sharing site; Is there: a link to the Video sharing site with candidates profile; Is there a webcam; Is there: a link to Photo sharing site; Is there: a link to political party website; Is there: a link to any ideological group; Is there: a link to any other candidates; Is there: a link to any Media; Is there: a link to any Youth organisations; Contact: e-mail;

Contact: postal address; Contact: online form; Is there: a link to Facebook; Is there: a link to Nasza Klasa; Facebook: entries during campaign; Facebook: comments during campaign; Facebook: possibility to share FB link online; Twitter: link to Twitter; Twitter: entries during the campaign; Other Microblogging link; RSS; Possibility to share web entries with others; Is there a tag cloud; Possibility to download materials; Possibility to print materials; Possibility for the visitors to update information on website; Possibility to debate on website; Possibility to volunteer; Possibility to donate money; Possibility to subscribe to the party; Section with political program; Section with previous political activities; Thank you note after elections; Section: Negative campaigning; Shop to buy gadgets; Mobile version of the website; Link to the youth organisation; Link to the supporting organisation; Possibility to volunteer in the campaign; Facebook: link to party FB profile general; Facebook: information about campaign (for political party);

#### STRATEGY\_erepresentation

Link from party website; update during campaign (1mth); Possibility to leave comments on the website; Link to additional own blog; Entries on the own Blog during the campaign; Possibility to comment on the Blog; Is there a blogroll on the Blog; Newsletter (any); Section with private info about candidates; Calendar; Section with FAQ; Is there: a link to the Video sharing site; Is there a webcam; Is there: a link to Photo sharing site; Is there: a link to political party website; Is there: a link to any ideological group; Is there: a link to any other blogs; Is there: a link to any NGO; Is there: a link to any Youth organisations; Contact: e-mail; Contact: postal address; Contact: online form; Section with public opinion polls; Is there: a link to Facebook; Is there: a link to Nasza Klasa; Facebook: entries during campaign; Facebook: comments during campaign; Facebook: possibility to share FB link online; Twitter: link to Twitter; Twitter: entries during the campaign; Other Microblogging link; RSS; Possibility to share web entries with others; Section: on regions; Section: on work in the parliament; Possibility to debate on website; Online public opinion polls

#### STRATEGY\_personal

Section with private info about candidates; Information on: candidates political career; Information on: candidates family; Information on: candidates hobby; Information on: candidates education; Is there: a link to the Video sharing site; Is there: a link to the Video sharing site with candidates profile; Is there a webcam; Section with photos; Is there: a link to Photo sharing site; Facebook: information about Family; Facebook: information about Hobby; Facebook: information about Education; Facebook: information about Interests; Information about support from VIP; Information about support from other party supporters; Facebook: link to fun page

#### STRATEGY\_marketing

update during campaign (1mth); Entries on the own Blog during the campaign; Possibility to comment on the Blog; Is there a videoblog; Newsletter (any); Section with private info about candidates; Calendar; Section with videos; Is there: a link to the Video sharing site; Is there a webcam; Animated photos; Section with photos; Is there: a link to Photo sharing site; Is there: a link to political party website; Is there: a link to any ideological group; Is there: a link to any NGO; Is there: a link to Facebook; Is there: a link to Nasza Klasa; Facebook: entries during campaign; Facebook: possibility to share FB link online; Twitter: entries during the campaign; Other Microblogging link; Possibility to share web entries with others; Section: on regions; Section: on work in the parliament; Embedded elements; Section with political program; Section with previous political activities; Value statement; Section: Negative campaigning; Shop to buy gadgets; Information about support from VIP; Information about support from other party supporters; Link to the own TV website; Link to the supporting organisation; Online games; Online public opinion polls

## Appendix 3

	web1	Stat sign	web2	Stat sign	information	Stat sign	engagement	Stat sign	mobilisation	Stat sign	interaction	Stat sign
<b>Age</b>	<b>-0.007</b>	<b>0.014</b>	<b>-0.022</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-0.011</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-0.014</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-0.025</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>-0.022</b>	<b>0.000</b>
Gender (men=0)	0.027	0.670	0.040	0.755	0.067	0.353	0.072	0.348	0.120	0.396	0.058	0.604
Party size (major=1)	<b>0.253</b>	<b>0.001</b>	0.082	0.544	<b>0.192</b>	<b>0.004</b>	<b>0.242</b>	<b>0.003</b>	0.101	0.501	0.176	0.119
Party years of existence	<b>0.015</b>	<b>0.001</b>	0.017	0.043	<b>0.012</b>	<b>0.008</b>	<b>0.021</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>0.023</b>	<b>0.018</b>	<b>0.017</b>	<b>0.021</b>
Web penetration rate	0.004	0.493	0.022	0.049	0.006	0.268	<b>0.015</b>	<b>0.029</b>	0.016	0.213	<b>0.016</b>	<b>0.082</b>
Nb of terms in Parliament	<b>0.047</b>	<b>0.010</b>	0.044	0.188	<b>0.036</b>	<b>0.062</b>	0.029	0.219	0.030	0.458	<b>0.060</b>	<b>0.055</b>
Political id	0.019	0.170	0.008	0.756	0.010	0.433	0.001	0.938	0.010	0.725	0.017	0.435
Electoral size	0.000012	0.219000	-0.000007	0.754000	0.000013	0.165000	<b>0.000020</b>	<b>0.058000</b>	-0.000024	0.351000	0.000007	0.700000
Pseudo R2		0.0776		0.0421		0.0511		0.0675		0.0374		0.0582

|

Appendix 4			Info		Issue		Active		Activists/	
	Browsers	Stat sign	seekers	Stat sign	oriented	Stat sign	supporters	Stat sign	Campaigners	Stat sign
<b>Age</b>	<b>-0.011</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>-0.012</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-0.013</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>-0.015</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-0.012</b>	<b>0.001</b>
Gender (men=0)	0.044	0.491	0.064	0.315	0.016	0.861	0.067	0.369	0.013	0.865
Party size (major=1)	<b>0.172</b>	<b>0.008</b>	<b>0.213</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>0.188</b>	<b>0.041</b>	<b>0.179</b>	<b>0.013</b>	<b>0.223</b>	<b>0.004</b>
Party years of existence	<b>0.016</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>0.015</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>0.022</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>0.016</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>0.016</b>	<b>0.002</b>
Web penetration rate	0.009	0.109	0.006	0.223	<b>0.013</b>	<b>0.077</b>	<b>0.010</b>	<b>0.089</b>	<b>0.011</b>	<b>0.096</b>
Nb of terms in Parliament	<b>0.042</b>	<b>0.021</b>	<b>0.046</b>	<b>0.018</b>	<b>0.058</b>	<b>0.010</b>	<b>0.044</b>	<b>0.044</b>	0.034	0.118
Political id	0.004	0.747	0.011	0.337	0.013	0.466	0.010	0.487	0.013	0.416
Electoral size	<b>0.000014</b>	<b>0.089000</b>	0.000012	0.156000	0.000014	0.248000	0.000005	0.622000	0.000011	0.333000
Pseudo R2		0.0520		0.0832		0.0544		0.0740		0.0640

## Appendix 5

	str_erepr	Stat sign	str_pers	Stat sign	str_mark	Stat sign
<b>Age</b>	<b>-0.013</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-0.015</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>-0.011</b>	<b>0.001</b>
Gender (men=0)	0.061	0.421	0.061	0.450	0.041	0.546
Party size (major=1)	<b>0.175</b>	<b>0.020</b>	<b>0.197</b>	<b>0.021</b>	<b>0.183</b>	<b>0.011</b>
Party years of existence	<b>0.020</b>	<b>0.000</b>	<b>0.014</b>	<b>0.009</b>	<b>0.022</b>	<b>0.000</b>
Web penetration rate	0.009	0.137	<b>0.014</b>	<b>0.027</b>	<b>0.012</b>	<b>0.050</b>
Nb of terms in Parliament	<b>0.044</b>	<b>0.036</b>	0.011	0.636	<b>0.035</b>	<b>0.078</b>
Political id	0.014	0.305	0.004	0.803	0.005	0.732
Electoral size	-0.000003	0.785000	<b>0.000027</b>	<b>0.015000</b>	0.000004	0.687000
Pseudo R2		0.0640		0.0456		0.0577