

The need for bottom-up assessments of climate risks and adaptation in climate-sensitive regions

Declan Conway^{1*}, Robert J. Nicholls², Sally Brown^{2,3}, Mark Tebboth^{4,5}, William Neil Adger⁶, Bashir Ahmad⁷, Hester Biemans⁸, Florence Crick^{1,9}, Arthur F. Lutz^{10,11}, Ricardo Safra De Campos⁶, Mohammed Said¹¹, Chandni Singh¹², Modathir Abdalla Hassan Zaroug¹³, Eva Ludi¹⁴, Mark New¹³ and Philippus Wester¹⁵.

¹ Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment. London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK.

² School of Engineering, University of Southampton, Southampton. SO17 1BJ, UK.

³ Department of Life and Environmental Sciences, Faculty of Science and Technology, Bournemouth University, Fern Barrow, Poole, Dorset, BH12 5BB, UK

⁴ School of International Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK.

⁵ Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK.

⁶ Geography, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, EX4 4RJ, Exeter, UK.

⁷ Climate, Energy and Water Resources Institute. National Agricultural Research Centre, NIH, Shehzad Town, Park Road, Islamabad, Pakistan.

⁸ Wageningen Environmental Research, PO Box 47, Wageningen, The Netherlands.

⁹ International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), 80-86 Gray's Inn Road, London, WC1X 8NH, UK.

¹⁰ FutureWater, Costerweg 1V, 6702 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands.

¹¹ Department of Physical Geography, Utrecht University, P.O. Box 80.115, Utrecht, The Netherlands.

¹¹ Kenya Markets Trust, Nairobi, Kenya.

¹² Indian Institute for Human Settlements, Bangalore City Campus 197/36, 2nd Main Road, Sadashivanagar Bangalore 560 080. India.

¹³ African Climate & Development Initiative, 6th floor Geological Sciences Building, University Avenue South, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch, 7700, Cape Town, South Africa.

¹⁴ Overseas Development Institute, 203 Blackfriars Road, London, SE1 8NJ, UK.

¹⁵ International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, GPO Box 3226, Kathmandu, Nepal.

*Author for correspondence: d.conway@lse.ac.uk

Abstract

Studies of climate change at specific intervals of future warming have primarily been addressed through top-down approaches using climate projections and modelled impacts. In contrast, bottom-up approaches focus on the recent past and present vulnerability. Here, we examine climate signals at different increments of warming and consider the need to reconcile top-down and bottom-up approaches. We synthesise insights from recent studies in three climate-sensitive systems where change is a defining feature of the human-environment system. Whilst top-down and bottom-up approaches generate complementary insights into who and what is at risk, integrating their results is a much needed step towards developing relevant information to address the needs of immediate adaptation decisions.

45 **Introduction**

46 It is well established that a global mean level of warming can include large differences in
47 rates of regional warming and the magnitude of impacts between and within countries, even
48 at 1.5°C and 2°C¹⁻³. For example, in the ensemble mean of CMIP5 models the future
49 warming rate over drylands was found to be roughly 1.35 times that of the global mean
50 surface warming⁴. Studies on the emergence of climate change also suggest that in low
51 latitude regions climate signals may emerge more quickly than in many areas of the world⁵.
52 Moreover, impacts are not always linearly related to global mean temperature, for example at
53 1.5°C simulated maize yields in drylands decrease slightly, whereas at 2.0°C more significant
54 reductions in yield occur⁴. One estimate based on a range of emissions scenarios shows future
55 daily temperature extremes will affect the poorest 20% to a greater extent than the wealthiest
56 20% of the global population, because of the geographical distribution of poverty⁵, a result
57 confirmed in many studies and assessments⁶

58 Understanding the impacts of 1.5°C of mean warming compared to the impacts at 2°C, is a
59 major challenge for research and policy, and to date has primarily been addressed through
60 top-down modelling approaches. Top-down assessments involve taking climate model
61 projections as a starting point to assess physical and ecological impacts and using multiple
62 projections to assess ranges of uncertainty for future states. We refer here to this wide body
63 of modelling and assessment activity as the top-down approach^{7,8}. Top-down assessments are
64 most frequently applied to define initial assumptions and to scope adaptation assessments,
65 often without critical engagement with underlying physical or social relations within the
66 original models of the systems⁹. Such approaches are not without their challenges and whilst
67 these have been recognized for some time^{7,10,11} progress towards effective linkage between
68 top-down and alternative approaches has been piecemeal^{12,13}.

69 There are multiple challenges. First, methodological complexities mean that various methods
70 have been used to develop projections from global climate models at different levels of
71 warming each with its own strengths and weaknesses¹⁴. Some changes will also continue
72 after global climate has been stabilised around a given level, especially sea-level rise which
73 has a strong commitment^{15,16}. Second, impact model inter-comparison exercises such as The
74 Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project (ISIMIP, including biophysical and
75 economic models) have shown that results from different impact models simulating the same
76 systems under the same climate change conditions may show considerable variability^{17,18}.
77 Third, describing biophysical impacts of climate change produces a generalized indication of

78 future risks, but in itself this does not provide a direct entry point into present-day decision-
79 making and adaptation^{e.g. 19-21}. This additional step involves translation of model results into
80 more user-relevant information that is contextualized to suit the specific needs of agencies,
81 communities and individuals, and generally requires a role for intermediaries²²⁻²⁴. A focus on
82 ‘systems of receptors rather than conventional sectors’²⁵ can be useful; one such example is a
83 multidisciplinary methodology building on value chain mapping, with analysis tailored to the
84 specific characteristics of semi-arid areas (seasonality, mobility and informality) and
85 assessing climatic risks at all stages of the value chain²⁶.

86 The essential and common elements of bottom-up assessments are: finer geographical scale
87 and focus on physical, ecological or social processes and current sensitivity to weather and
88 climate; assessments of the plausible options for adaptation within current technological,
89 ecological or perceived social limits; and a diversity of normative measures of risk to
90 elements of society including strong analytical emphasis on vulnerable populations^{27,28}. To
91 our knowledge there are relatively few examples of bottom-up approaches at specific levels
92 of warming^{e.g. 29}, because these holistic studies include multiple drivers of change (which can
93 be significant), and because many bottom-up studies seek to produce contextualised
94 information relevant for decision-makers, whatever levels of climate impacts are plausible^{7,30}.
95 Furthermore, a major discrepancy exists between the large scale at which biophysical impacts
96 of climate change are generally studied and the local scale of analysis typically adopted in
97 bottom-up studies^{31,32}. The bottom-up approaches are people-centred and attempt to derive
98 and generate knowledge based on peoples’ understandings of present and changing
99 conditions, risks and responses. Such studies take a person or population as the starting point
100 and seek to locate climate change within a broader array of vulnerabilities and behaviours¹⁹.

101 Both bottom-up and top-down approaches grapple with the challenge of characterising the
102 effects of climate change in complex human-environment systems. This complexity is
103 strongly manifest in many developing countries where current rates of socio-economic and
104 environmental change are unprecedented. Population growth, urbanization and other non-
105 climate stressors may obscure the effects of slow onset changes in climate and changes in the
106 frequency/intensity of infrequent extreme events. The direct and indirect impact pathways of
107 climate effects are entangled in webs of interconnections at various temporal and spatial
108 scales^{e.g. 33}. It is noteworthy that the IPCC AR5 only attributes a few changes to observed
109 climate change with high confidence of detection and attribution: many observed effects
110 could be explained by mechanisms other than observed climate change³⁴. The assumptions

111 required for modelling often preclude the ability to capture such detail. Whilst more bottom-
112 up fine-grained analyses address complexity, their results may be difficult to generalize
113 because of their specificity.

114 Many frameworks have been proposed for adaptation²⁸, climate risk management^{e.g. 35,36} or
115 risk screening^{e.g. 37,38}. Most approaches incorporate elements of top-down and bottom-up
116 approaches and involve a sequence of actions and, that can be broadly summarized as
117 follows: (1) consult about the problem and agree the aims of the exercise; (2) integrate
118 climate risks in the context of users' wider attitudes to risk (including non-climate risks) and
119 decision-making processes; (3) identify current vulnerabilities to climate and assess the
120 significance of future climate risks to current situations or plans; (4) identify options and
121 prioritise responses; (5) implement decisions; and (6) monitor, evaluate and adjust.

122 The assessment of risks (stage (3) in the list above) has been dominated by top-down
123 approaches and is challenging as climate projections and impacts are highly uncertain, even
124 in the near term and frequently do not match user requirements for specific detail and levels
125 of confidence that are sufficient to influence decisions. Resolution of these issues and the
126 dichotomy between bottom-up and top-down approaches has the potential to contribute to the
127 demands of international and national adaptation policy. Policy-driven requirements are
128 creating examples of pragmatic approaches to climate risk assessment²⁵, although to date they
129 are primarily in high-income countries and none consider change at specific levels of
130 warming. For example, The Dutch National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy adopted a
131 rationalised approach to climate model projections using just four combinations comprising
132 moderate and warm global temperature increases coupled with low and high atmospheric
133 circulation pattern changes³⁹; The Third US National Climate Change Assessment
134 emphasised recent climate trends and vulnerabilities within regions and sectors to
135 characterise future risks and opportunities⁴⁰; The UK Second Climate Change Risk
136 Assessment adopted a stronger focus on present day and future vulnerability, and
137 prioritisation of adaptation action²⁵.

138 The synthesis of top-down and bottom-up approaches presented here draws on experiences
139 and examples from the Collaborative Adaptation Research Initiative in Africa and Asia
140 (CARIAA) research programme that aimed to build resilience in three climate sensitive
141 systems by supporting research on adaptation to inform policy and practice⁴¹. CARIAA
142 comprised four multi-disciplinary consortia with partners from the global north and south,
143 mainly universities but including think-tanks, non-governmental organisations and

144 practitioners. The design and diversity of each consortium and the programme as a whole
145 highlight the range of activities and roles necessary to understand and inform actions on
146 adaptation. The requirement to inform policy and the prior experience of the research teams
147 led the programme to cultivate similar elements to the national assessments described above
148 and to include many examples of top-down and bottom-up approaches.

149 In this Perspective, we address two questions: to what extent is it possible to characterise
150 climate signals at increments of warming in rapidly changing situations? And is it possible to
151 reconcile results from top-down climate model projections of climate change with bottom-up
152 assessments of vulnerability to inform actions on adaptation? We present insights from both
153 top-down climate projections and bottom-up descriptions based on recent research conducted
154 through CARIAA (see Table 1 for a summary of locations and methods used in the studies
155 presented here). These studies come from three climate sensitive systems (areas with high
156 numbers of vulnerable, poor, or marginalized people intersecting with a strong climate
157 change signal^{32,42}); deltas, semi-arid lands, and river basins dependent on glaciers and
158 snowmelt. We describe methodologies for the alternative top-down and bottom-up
159 approaches and summarise results from studies based on contrasting methods. We conclude
160 with a discussion of the need to reconcile the different approaches to produce decision-
161 relevant information for adaptation at specific intervals of global warming.

162

163 **Climate projections and modelling impacts (top-down)**

164 Table 2 summarises the main results of Global Climate Model (GCM) projections for each
165 climate sensitive system. With warming at 1.5°C and 2.0°C, deltas still experience slow
166 ongoing sea-level rise (even if emissions or temperatures stabilise), compounded by
167 subsidence, and potential impacts increase to 2100 and beyond. The GCM projections show
168 rates of warming higher than the global mean in most cases across 49 African countries/semi-
169 arid lands⁴⁵. Higher warming is also seen across the river basins dependent on glaciers and
170 snowmelt of the Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra. Due to elevation dependent warming,
171 mountains are more susceptible to warming than the global average⁵⁸. A global temperature
172 rise of 1.5°C implies a warming of $2.1 \pm 0.1^\circ\text{C}$ in the high mountains of Asia⁵⁹. Whilst the
173 studies did not include detailed impacts modelling the levels of warming suggest that
174 adaptation for these regions (which is not specified) would need to consider impacts of
175 warming above 1.5°C and 2.0°C in both systems.

176

177 **Dynamics of vulnerability and adaptation options (bottom-up)**

178 *Deltas – observational mixed methods studies*

179 Adaptation options are diverse in delta environments: these regions are accessible, productive
180 and are frequently sites of major populations and urban economic growth poles⁶⁰. Delta
181 social-ecological systems are functionally diverse, and incorporate regions dependent on
182 fisheries, aquaculture, agriculture and rapidly developing economies. Global assessments of
183 climate risks to deltas as natural systems have principally highlighted biophysical risks from
184 sea level change, subsidence and salinization of coastal waters, exacerbated by dam building
185 and regulation of rivers⁶¹. To test propositions about adaptation options and vulnerability,
186 integrated assessments of adaptation, vulnerability and mobility were designed as part of the
187 CARIAS programme, using policy analysis and observational studies on individual
188 behaviour and choice using both in depth and extensive methods, building on experience of
189 integrating bottom-up and top-down assessments for delta regions⁶².

190 Critical adaptation dilemmas in deltas include the balance between hard engineering for
191 protection, living with risks and possibly trying to work with nature, and the potential for
192 eventual submergence/loss of coastal land. Governments seek to reconcile these dilemmas
193 and have, for example, intervened to relocate whole vulnerable settlements from coastal
194 regions^{63,64}. Many such planned relocations have been shown in bottom up assessments to
195 create new vulnerabilities and loss of agency for the communities involved⁶⁵.

196 How delta resources are used are the outcome of myriads of individual decisions: hence a
197 need for observational studies on agency and choice. Rice farming practices in deltas, for
198 example, are highly exposed to both periodic floods and to creeping salinization, affecting
199 food security and health outcomes^{51,52}. In depth methods including semi-structured interviews
200 and focus groups with farming communities in the Mahanadi delta in India, show that
201 insecure land tenure and uneven access to credit drives the spatial patterns of vulnerability to
202 environmental hazards⁵¹.

203 Where populations are vulnerable to climate change, does this lead to higher levels of
204 mobility and out-migration from these marginalised areas? Migration is a well-established
205 means of economic development in deltas, which have been net recipients of population over
206 the past five decades⁶⁶. A major cross-sectional representative survey in four delta regions
207 (n=5450; Table 1) reported 31% of households with at least one migrant⁴⁷. Additionally, 40%

208 of household heads reported an intention to migrate in the future. Are environmental risks
209 part of this movement in deltas? The survey data captured motivations for migration: of 1668
210 households with out-migrants, 60% reported that economic opportunities were the principal
211 reason behind migration. Only 0.6% of respondents cited an environmental factor as the main
212 deciding factor. Ostensibly, there were no or few self-reported environmental migrants in
213 deltas under present conditions.

214 These bottom-up assessments of migration systems and decision-making have shown, across
215 vulnerable environments globally, that environmental factors are significant in driving
216 migration decisions, even where they are not directly reported as the principal motivation, or
217 the risks are long term in nature⁶⁷⁻⁶⁹. In the CARIIA research a large proportion of
218 populations over the four delta areas reported increased degradation, increased exposure to
219 hazards, and declining environmental quality over a five year period. Perceived
220 environmental risks such as erosion, floods and cyclones were found to be positively and
221 significantly correlated with future migration behaviour across all deltas⁴⁷. The diverse
222 studies across deltas indicate that adaptation options are highly limited in socially
223 marginalised populations, and that established migration flows, which have acted as a
224 mechanism for diversifying risk, are sensitive to climate changes.

225

226 *Semi-arid lands – life histories*

227 Livelihoods in semi-arid lands are under pressure due to macro-economic changes and
228 incorporation into global markets, national development priorities, increasingly variable and
229 stressed environmental conditions, and social and cultural change⁵³. The interaction of
230 macro-level changes with highly dynamic local conditions generates a constant flux in
231 livelihoods as people respond to changes and seek to actively manage their vulnerability⁷⁰⁻⁷².
232 A life history approach was adopted by the CARIIA programme to understand the
233 trajectories of people's lives⁷³⁻⁷⁶ that builds on approaches in the area of livelihood responses
234 but has rarely been applied to study vulnerability and adaptation in relation to climate
235 change^{77,78} (Table 1). The study examined how livelihoods in semi-arid lands are
236 characterised by 'everyday mobility' (less exceptional than migration and built into the fabric
237 of people's lives) and how this mobility shapes household risk portfolios and adaptation
238 behaviour⁷⁹. A strength of this approach is its capacity to capture significant points in
239 people's lives and emphasise how risk and response portfolios change over time.

240 Across four semi-arid regions studied in Ghana, Kenya, Namibia and India, the results
241 showed that mobility is an essential feature of many livelihoods (e.g. pastoralism, farming,
242 natural resource-based trading). Mobility enables people to access livelihoods (e.g.
243 commuting) and provides a means to relocate and swap one location for another⁸⁰. Four
244 dominant, but not exclusive, mobility types were identified: high frequency, short duration
245 and often cyclical mobility; more idiosyncratic movement of varying durations and
246 frequencies; permanent relocation; and immobility.

247 These cases demonstrate the fluid nature of migrant livelihoods across rural and urban areas
248 and showcase how people switch between livelihoods often in opportunistic and unplanned
249 ways. Whilst the risks, such as drought but also things like conflict, gender-based violence,
250 and family deaths, are strongly associated with specific livelihoods they also hint at the more
251 structural nature of vulnerability. For example, chronic conflict that erupts periodically and is
252 simply unavoidable for many undermines the already marginal livelihoods practiced. Moving
253 is often found to bring new risks as well as helping to positively impact on the profile of
254 existing risks.

255 A dynamic relationship between livelihood shocks and responses is apparent. The ability to
256 conceptualise a person's trajectory is important as it can reveal whether they are moving in a
257 positive or negative direction⁵³. Knowledge about a trajectory and the nature of the risks and
258 adaptation options available to a person or household can provide a good indication of the
259 type of interventions that might be effective^{78,79,81} and when to intervene.

260

261 *Semi-arid lands – survey and econometrics*

262 Econometric techniques can be used to tease out specific relationships between climate
263 factors and wider socio-economic activities to study how adaptation is manifest and its major
264 influences, based on empirical data obtained through one-off or repeat surveys. The object of
265 analysis is generally economic agents, often farmers^{82,83}, but includes small businesses⁸⁴ that
266 represent a critical employment opportunity for many people, in particular in rural areas in
267 developing countries⁸⁵. Analytical scales may range from studies of individuals using
268 qualitative⁸⁶ and quantitative methods⁸⁷ to studies of large organisations⁸⁸.

269 Within the CARIAS programme a survey of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in
270 Kenya and Senegal was designed to collect extensive information on firms' adaptation
271 behaviour to both current climate variability and future climate change⁵² (Table 1).

272 Adaptation responses were grouped into three categories: sustainable adaptation (business
273 preservation measures); unsustainable adaptation (business contraction measures, including
274 sale of assets); and planning measures firms take to prepare for climate change (forward
275 looking and long term). Statistical models were used to examine two questions: how the
276 balance between sustainable and unsustainable adaptation changed as a function of climate
277 stress; and how current adaptation behaviour affected the likelihood of firms planning for
278 future climate change. Surveyed firms reported on their exposure to droughts, floods and
279 various other extreme climate events.

280 The average number of climate extremes experienced by firms in the last five years was 1.86
281 (SD = 1.49). Of those surveyed, two thirds did not recognize climate change as an immediate
282 priority. Nevertheless, the survey results revealed that the majority of firms (52%) are
283 adapting to current climate variability and employing a range of strategies, often including a
284 mixture of sustainable and unsustainable measures. Adapting firms experienced substantially
285 higher climate risks but only 45.2% of firms had adopted some sustainable adaptation
286 measures, whilst 25.6% resorted to business contraction strategies. The most frequent
287 adaptation response was an adjustment in the commodities or crops produced.

288 Using an ordered probit model, the link between current adaptation behaviour and the
289 likelihood of planning for future climate change was examined⁴³. The extent and quality of
290 current adaptation practices was found to have a significant influence on the probability that
291 SMEs would plan for future climate change. SMEs which were currently engaging in
292 adaptation practices were more likely to plan for future climate change and the likelihood of
293 future planning was higher for those adopting sustainable practices. The authors note that
294 their analysis was based on cross-sectional evidence making it difficult to determine
295 conclusively the causality of some of the correlations obtained – collection of panel data
296 would strengthen the evidence base⁵².

297

298 *Glacier and snowmelt dependent river basins – mixed methods*

299 There is an important strand of bottom-up approaches represented in community-based
300 adaptation⁸⁹ and community-level risk assessments⁹⁰ that draw from an underlying
301 positionality that aims to foster participatory engagement through a suite of methods that
302 comprise participatory rural appraisal⁹¹. These methods are designed to elicit information
303 about livelihood contexts, resilience and local hazards through dialogues, seeking to gain

304 trust of communities. Through learning about the indigenous capacities, knowledge and
305 practices, the aim is to identify local risks and responses⁸⁹.

306 As part of CARIAA, in the Gandaki river basin in Nepal household surveys that considered
307 migration decisions, major environmental stressors and adaptations⁵⁴ were complemented by
308 consultations including focus group discussions with village development committees, and
309 interviews with stakeholders at local, district and national levels to identify, categorize and
310 rank feasible adaptation options⁵⁵. A majority of the households (91%) reported perceiving
311 changes in the climate and experiencing environmental shocks over the last decade including
312 increase in annual, summer and winter average temperature. Households also reported a
313 decrease in rainfall and snowfall and more erratic rainfall. Agriculture is the major source of
314 livelihood for more than 80% of the households, but only 35% of the households reported at
315 least one adaptation measure, despite more than 90% perceiving a change in the climate. The
316 response measures undertaken by households are mostly autonomous and taken to ward off
317 immediate risks rather than proactive adaptive strategies.

318 In upstream areas of the basin, education was the major reason given for migration followed
319 by employment, whereas in midstream and downstream areas, seeking employment was the
320 major driver. Only three per cent of respondents had been displaced temporarily due to
321 extreme events in the last ten years. Permanent outmigration of whole families was high and
322 this large-scale depopulation was felt to have negatively impacted existing socioecological
323 systems, increased human–wildlife conflict and increased invasive species, with negative
324 consequences in the agricultural sector. The overall impact of these changes is contributing to
325 the neglect or abandonment of agricultural lands in these study sites⁹².

326

327

328 **Discussion**

329

330 We set out to consider the extent to which it is possible to characterise climate signals in
331 rapidly changing developing country situations and at particular increments of warming. The
332 top-down climate model projections suggest that rates of warming in climate sensitive
333 systems are likely to be higher than the global mean and that there are quantifiable
334 differences in temperature and, to a lesser extent precipitation, between 1.5°C and 2.0°C. We
335 note that the methodological challenges associated with defining changes in GCM projections

336 have not been dealt with consistently across the studies and this might affect the magnitude of
337 some of the differences obtained. Whilst this is an important point from a scientific
338 perspective, the level of technical complexity required to achieve full consistency would
339 likely be too demanding for the operational realities of adaptation planning. For deltas the
340 slow response in sea level rise has consequences beyond 2100 even with a stable
341 temperature¹⁶. Hence stabilisation of climate reduces the threats to deltas, but it is insufficient
342 to characterise these benefits solely by analysing reduced flood depths and areas in this
343 century. Similarly, even if global temperature stabilized at its present level, Asian glaciers
344 would continue to lose mass through the entire 21st century⁵⁹.

345 The top-down studies we consider here do not simulate the sectoral impacts of climate model
346 projections – the impacts are implied – and presented with the message that in many cases
347 they will be greater in these climate sensitive systems than the global mean. Such information
348 is valuable to a mitigation agenda aiming to cut emissions to reduce long-term future
349 impacts¹¹³. It might be desirable to run sectoral or integrated assessment models with these
350 projections to describe impacts. However, impact models have their own limitations
351 including inter-model differences and high demands for data inputs and technical capacity,
352 often lacking in low income countries. These issues compound the challenge of incorporating
353 and communicating the high levels of uncertainty arising from multiple climate projections,
354 particularly for precipitation (e.g. the projections for African countries/semi-arid lands in
355 West Africa in Table 2 include both wetting and drying scenarios).

356 In all four bottom-up examples socio-economic change is, if not a defining then at least
357 highly important, feature of the human-environment system. However, the extent to which
358 socio-economic change dominates the climate narrative is partly a function of the aims and
359 scope of the analysis. Where there is a strong aim to focus purely on the role of climate, it
360 inevitably forms a large part of the results. For example, analysis in Nepal (in one of the
361 glacier and snowmelt dependent basins) shows strong linkages between the effects of climate
362 trends and extremes on livelihood outcomes (including migration). In cases where the aims
363 are more targeted to understanding system dynamics (such as in the life histories approach in
364 semi-arid regions), a more complex picture emerges in which the role of climate is hard to
365 disentangle, or features as a minor direct influence on the process being studied. In deltas the
366 rates of socio-economic change are so high in recent and near-term future decades (for
367 example, in the last 70 years, Bangladesh's population increased more than four times) that
368 they all but swamp climate signals⁶⁰⁻⁶², apart from short-run effects of extreme events like

369 cyclones. In semi-arid lands variability and flux are clearly inherent and critical aspects of the
370 human-environment system; it is therefore essential to consider both climate and non-climate
371 factors for a full understanding of such systems relevant to effective adaptation and
372 development even within the timescales of when 1.5°C and 2.0°C warming could occur.

373 The bottom-up approaches consider the effects of climate change in the recent past, typically
374 based on recall, and on specific aspects of human-environment systems. The surveys and
375 statistical modelling exercises presented here test hypotheses about the role of climate
376 hazards in affecting migration decisions and SME actions on adaptation. The life histories
377 and participatory survey provide insights to the frequency of mobility associated with
378 changing environmental conditions and the livelihood impacts of climate trends and hazards,
379 respectively. These methods add to the existing suite of approaches such as agent-based
380 modelling, climate analogues and participatory scenario planning that examine climatic and
381 non-climatic drivers of adaptation action⁷⁸. Climate signals in all four examples are manifest
382 in complex ways within each system and beyond damage assessments of specific extreme
383 events, it is extremely challenging to characterise in detail the role of climate
384 variability/change. Respondents in the surveys rank environmental factors as a very low
385 linear (or direct) influence on decisions about migration in deltas²⁸, and climate change to be
386 a low priority for most SMEs in semi-arid lands⁴⁷. However, in both cases respondents may
387 not include indirect effects in their evaluations, and secondary impacts could include
388 disruption to livelihoods and to reliability of service delivery such as water and electricity,
389 through disruption to infrastructure⁹³. The literature on migration cautions against simplistic
390 ‘driver-response’ analyses arguing that decisions to migrate are highly complex and location
391 specific^{79,94}. The bottom-up research highlights the reliance either directly or indirectly of
392 many people on the natural environment and the significant role of compounding shocks in
393 people’s (downward) trajectories. Bottom-up studies may also address why people are
394 differentially vulnerable and why some people adapt while others do not.

395 In summary, the four bottom-up examples presented here do not provide clear attribution of
396 climate signals at increments of warming because of confounding factors, but they do find
397 that climatic risks mediate response behaviour. Their focus on the recent past provides
398 valuable insights into vulnerabilities within societies that have experienced the local climate
399 manifestation of about 0.65°C global warming since 1950. These insights are empirical
400 evidence of likely sensitivities and opportunities that will arise as climate change is
401 increasingly manifest in the future. The embeddedness and interplay between climate and

402 society (and hence difficulty with attributing causality) underscores the critical need to situate
403 climate adaptation within the context of broader socio-economic, environmental and political
404 processes; something that top-down approaches often fail to consider.

405 Our second aim was to examine whether it is possible to reconcile results of top-down model
406 simulations of climate impacts with bottom-up analyses of vulnerability, to inform actions on
407 adaptation. A large part of the difference in the resulting knowledge generated is ultimately
408 derived from this contrast in approach: one that embraces the complexity of lived experiences
409 and the other that aims to simplify complex systems to simulate the climate signal. Bottom-
410 up approaches comprise a vast array of initial assumptions, methods, scales and analytical
411 designs. Likewise, top-down approaches have to choose from many different models and
412 assumptions, scales and analytical designs. All methods have their strengths and weaknesses,
413 for example three of the four bottom-up studies have used questionnaire surveys that can be
414 biased in favour of the respondent (particularly the head of household) or lack flexibility to
415 elicit nuances in responses with respect to environmental change and degradation⁹⁵. There
416 are important methodological concerns and more fundamental critiques of the discourse of
417 participation^{96,97}.

418 The multiplicity of choice is not necessarily a bad thing, but providing clear guidance on
419 strengths and weaknesses of methods will help researchers and practitioners with less
420 experience. Moreover, as programmes such as ISIMIP¹⁷ support standardised approaches to
421 promote consistency and comparability in impacts studies, so bottom-up approaches will
422 need to consider consistency and representativeness. Whilst some bottom-up approaches are
423 not easily commensurate with or appropriate for such requirements⁹⁸, the demand for studies
424 of specific intervals of warming (e.g. to inform the IPCC) and the requirement of
425 international programmes to measure and track progress on adaptation⁹⁹ (e.g. Article 7 in the
426 Paris Agreement) will prompt renewed efforts to achieve this. Calls to systematise evidence
427 and findings from the rapidly growing literature on adaptation^{100,101} recognise the importance
428 of this need. Bottom-up studies of adaptation are important for policy development -
429 governments are looking for examples of what works and what doesn't work when
430 developing adaptation policies and thus corroborating studies. At the same time such policies
431 are developed within a broader climate change framework often informed by model
432 projections - most if not all National Adaptation Plans and Climate Change Acts will mention
433 or frame policies within a context of future climate projections.

434 Whilst the examples shown here from the CARIIA programme do not reconcile the
435 alternative approaches (e.g. their timescales and types of information), we argue that it is
436 possible to blend insights from bottom-up and top-down approaches using expert judgement
437 to generate a description of vulnerability and risks that is sufficiently detailed to inform
438 decisions. The four bottom-up cases all provide contextualised insights to climate impacts
439 that can capture the complex exposure units of interest to stakeholders and decision-makers
440 (e.g. factors influencing mobility and business decisions). Although there is a different
441 temporal focus between top-down (future) and bottom-up approaches (past and present) the
442 distinction is not exclusive. Bottom-up knowledge of complex human-environment dynamics
443 has informed agent-based modelling for simulations of the future^{102,103} and the role of climate
444 therein can be used to infer consequences of future climate change impacts at different levels
445 of warming derived from top-down approaches. Top-down approaches can be designed to
446 focus more on recent and current trends, for example, the use of empirical crop-climate
447 relationships and GCM projections to assess near-term food security risks¹⁰⁴. They can also
448 be designed to address more practical and policy-oriented questions (considering systems of
449 receptors) and to include a wider range of socio-economic and other changes alongside
450 climate. Alternatives to projections involving narrative-based descriptions of climate are also
451 gaining traction¹⁰⁵⁻¹⁰⁷. In the absence of local and national impacts assessments at specific
452 global warming increments one CARIIA consortium used a hybrid approach to generate
453 locally relevant impacts information¹⁰⁸. Previous national and regional impact assessments
454 using transient GCM projections were used to identify relevant impacts in water resources,
455 agriculture and health at specific time slices in the future; these results were then scaled by
456 the global temperature in the underlying GCMs to estimate impacts at 1.5°C and 2.0°C.

457 Much needed progress in this direction will require increasing engagement between the two
458 broad approaches^{e.g.25,39,40,109}. For example, the need for an iterative process that uses the
459 outputs from top-down approaches to feed into the bottom-up approaches, the outputs of
460 which can then be used to increase the skill of top-down approaches. In this way we see a
461 continual process through which both top-down and bottom-up approaches inform each other
462 conceptually and practically, generating hybrid methods and information that is likely to be
463 of greater utility in the short and long-term. A role for knowledge brokers is central to this
464 process as it relies on knowledge synthesis and communication to inform practical actions.
465 This role is already well recognised^{23,24,110}. Information from research needs to be filtered to
466 fit knowledge demands of diverse stakeholders, a role or skillset that researchers often lack.

467 In CARIIA for example, each consortium adopted a strongly stakeholder-oriented approach
468 in their research processes, including examples of co-design or repeat consultation through
469 mechanisms like multi-stakeholder platforms, participatory vulnerability and risk
470 assessments¹¹¹, transformative scenario planning¹¹², engagement through participatory
471 research and transformative action research with migrants to delta cities⁴⁷. By recognising the
472 fact that throughout any decision-process subjective prioritisation and normative judgements
473 are required^{28,113}, no matter how much the process is quantified, an integrated approach based
474 on expert judgement and consultation provides a pragmatic basis for decision-making.

475 Human-environment systems have co-evolved with climate and by necessity untangling them
476 will always be challenging and will inevitably require blending of methodological
477 approaches. We have presented examples that show the importance of understanding climate
478 within the context of rapidly changing climate sensitive systems in the developing world
479 through bottom-up approaches. Insights from such approaches provide critical information
480 that addresses the needs of practical adaptation agendas. Bottom-up approaches need to
481 receive more recognition in climate risk assessments, including those aiming to characterise
482 impacts at different levels of global warming.

483

484 **Author contributions**

485 DC and RJN conceived the paper and outlined the first draft, DC led subsequent drafts, SB,
486 MT, BA, CS, RDC, WNA, FC, AL and MZ contributed case study examples, all authors
487 commented on subsequent drafts and revisions.

488

489 **Data availability statement**

490 No datasets were generated or new analysis performed during the current study.

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840 Tables

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	Deltas	African countries/Semi-arid lands	River basins dependent on glaciers and snowmelt(Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra river basins)
Top-down	To assess the cumulative area in the flood plain, the magnitude of sea-level rise in a given year (from ⁴³) was added to a modelled surge component. This was undertaken for the Ganges-Brahmaputra, Indian Bengal, Mahanadi and Volta deltas in 2000 and with sea-level rise at 1.5°C and 2.0°C in 2100 and 2300 ⁴⁴ .	35 global climate models (GCMs) were used from CMIP5 with the RCP8.5 forcing scenario for projections of temperature and precipitation. They evaluated the national level changes in temperature and precipitation in 49 African countries at global warming levels of 1.5°C and 2°C ⁴⁵ .	An ensemble of 2 x 4 downscaled GCMs representative of the CMIP5 ensemble under RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 was used for the Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra river basins in South Asia. A regional quantitative assessment of the impacts of a 1.5°C versus a 2°C global warming was undertaken ⁴⁶ .
Bottom-up	Cross-sectional survey in 120 locations in the Volta, Mahanadi, Indian Bengal and Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (Bangladesh) deltas that resulted in 5450 completed questionnaires ⁴⁷ . Complemented with observational mixed methods studies ⁴⁸⁻⁵¹ .	Two examples; 1.) Data on adaptation collected through a structured questionnaire survey of 325 small and medium enterprises in Kenya and Senegal ⁵² . 2.) Qualitative interview methodology used to detail life histories of individuals in Ghana, Kenya, Namibia and India ⁵³ .	A hybrid approach used employing both qualitative and quantitative tools in Chitwan District of the Gandaki basin in Nepal. Household surveys using stratified and some purposive sampling ⁵⁴ . Qualitative methods included focus groups with communities, and discussions with local, district and national level stakeholders. ⁵⁵ .

842 Table 1. Summary of methods used in the studies presented. Full details can be found in the
843 respective publications.

844

Example	Global Climate Change			
	1.5°C		2.0°C	
	Projections	Implications	Projections	Implications
Deltas (Ganges-Brahmaputra (GB), Indian Bengal, Mahanadi and Volta) ^{56,57}	Sea-level rise slows but does not stop with stabilisation, representing a long-term threat.			
	Sea level is projected to be 0.40m and 1.00 m above present values by 2100 and 2300 ⁴³ , respectively (plus local subsidence).	Flood plain area increases up to 46% (GB); 80% (Indian Bengal); 47% (Mahanadi); and 58% (Volta) from 2000 to 2100.	Sea level is projected to be 0.46m and 1.26 m above present values by 2100 and 2300 ⁴³ , respectively (plus local subsidence).	Flood plain area increases up to 47% (GB); 80% (Indian Bengal); 49% (Mahanadi); and 58% (Volta) from 2000 to 2100.
African countries/Semi-arid lands ⁴⁵	The relative change between 1.5°C and 2.0°C is much larger for countries with high aridity. There is greater national level warming relative to global in the more arid countries, and less warming in more humid countries. African national level temperatures, and in a number of cases precipitation, are climatologically different at 1.5°C and 2.0°. This suggests that at current levels of vulnerability, the differential impacts of climate change at these two stabilisation levels will be significant.			
	Of 49 countries analysed, only five show an ensemble median national warming less than 1.5°C and 19 more than 1.75°C. In southern Africa, all countries show ensemble median changes drying; In East Africa wetting in all countries, except Djibouti and Eritrea. West African countries exhibit a mixed signal.	There is a clear pattern of greater national level warming relative to global in the more arid countries, and less warming in more humid countries. The relative change between 1.5°C and 2.0°C is much larger for countries with high aridity.	31 countries warm by more than 2.25°C and 5 by more than 2.75°C. Precipitation decreases in southern Africa become more severe. In East Africa the increase is greater than at 1.5°C. West African countries exhibit similar patterns to 1.5°C.	African national level temperatures, and in a number of cases precipitation, at 1.5°C and 2.0° are climatologically different. This suggests that at current levels of vulnerability, the differential impacts of climate change at these two levels will be significant.
River basins dependent on glaciers and snowmelt (Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra river basins, IGB) ⁴⁶	A global average warming of 1.5°C is associated with warming of 1.4 – 2.6°C for the IGB. Precipitation most likely increases for the entire IGB. Inter-annual variability of precipitation decreases in areas with low inter-annual variability and increases in areas with high inter-annual variability.	Quantitative changes in a set of ten climate change indicators are linked to expected impacts for different sectors.	At 2.0°C global average warming, the IGB is associated with 2.0 – 3.4°C. Changes in climate change indicators other than air temperature correlate linearly with temperature increase. The range in the precipitation projections is large.	The regional impacts of climate change will be more severe for 2.0°C than 1.5°C. Temperature differences can be largely attributed to elevation-dependent warming in the upstream IGB basins, i.e. the stronger warming of areas at high altitude compared to low-lying areas.

846 Table 2. Summary of three studies in climate sensitive systems focussing on climate model
847 projections and implications at 1.5°C and 2.0°C. GB is Ganges and Brahmaputra delta.
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