Dwelling-mobility: a theory of the existential pull between home and away

Duncan Light and Lorraine Brown

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Abstract

This paper puts forward a theoretical framework of existential well-being that incorporates the twin human drives towards stability and adventure. Todres & Galvin (2011) were inspired to develop the dwelling/mobility framework by Heidegger’s notion of Gegnet (translation: “abiding expanse”). The paper will employ examples of tourist practices that reveal dwelling and mobility to be simultaneously intertwined. In so doing it will highlight the blurred boundaries between home and away and will demonstrate the continued relevance of existential philosophy to understanding the tourist experience.

Key words

Existential authenticity, Heidegger, Gegnet, dwelling-mobility
Introduction

There is a growing body of research that addresses the role of existential authenticity in tourism experiences. This argues that, through various practices of tourism, individuals can achieve a temporary relief from the strain of everyday life; a holiday can be a vehicle for achieving the fulfilment of the true self. Indeed, Wang (199, p 360) argues that life on holiday is “simpler, freer, more spontaneous, more authentic”. Steiner & Reisinger (2006) support the correlation between a refreshing break from routine and the growth of existential authenticity, even if this is only momentary (see Rickly-Boyd, 2012a). Others have argued that the liminal nature of tourism means that it creates opportunities to escape the shackles and inauthenticity of the day to day (Belhassen, Caton, & Stewart 2008). Kim & Jamal (2007) make a similar point with reference to festivals which offer freedom from quotidian constraints, and permits the emergence of the authentic self.

Brown (2013) highlights the value of tourism in providing a catalyst for existential authenticity. Using Heidegger’s concept of the Spielraum (literally translated as play space with obvious connotations for tourism and leisure), Brown conceptualises tourism as a space for reflection. Heidegger introduces the term Spielraum in Being and Time to denote a place in time and space outside of the everyday. It represents, in the words of T.S. Elliot (1941 [1963]), “the still point of the turning world” (p.191). In the Spielraum, tourists may stand back and evaluate their life and the choices they have made; they may reconsider their future plans. There is a clear parallel to be made between the Spielraum and the liminal space offered by tourism (although it must be noted that liminality is not always or solely associated with reflection on existential issues).

In various ways, tourism is able to prompt personal growth and improved self-understanding and self-sufficiency, all of which are conducive to existential authenticity (Brown, 2009; Kirillova & Lehto, 2015; Knudsen et al., 2016; Stone, 2012). However, it is important to note that this is not always the case, as Canavan (2018) observes in his netnographic study of backpackers: tourists may seek challenging experiences that help catalyse existential authenticity, but they may also pursue at other times existential avoidance. As Kirillova & Lehto (2015, p. 121) observe, existential authenticity is “dynamic, relative, and multidimensional in nature”: some vacation experiences offer a temporary growth in existential authenticity while others may trigger lasting transformation. This is noted in the phenomenological study of tourism and existential transformation by Kirillova, Lehto & Cai (2017a) which found that participants made meaningful changes to their life following their trip even though they had not aimed for a transformative experience. Similarly, in their quantitative study of tourism experiences and existential authenticity, Kirillova, Lehto & Cai (2017b) proposed that the changes tourists experience on holiday persist beyond the trip. Existential anxiety was also found to persist,
which may have positive implications for lasting change (see Brown, 2013). It must be noted however that existential authenticity is not stable or constant; it is a project of ongoing negotiation (Sartre 1969)

Any discussion of authenticity cannot avoid its corollary, alienation (an ever-present issue in existential philosophy). However, as Knudsen, Rickly & Vidon (2016) argue, the concept of alienation is under-represented in discussions of existential authenticity in the tourism literature, despite its obvious relevance to the human condition. According to existentialist philosophy, alienation is universal (see May, 1977; Yalom, 1980). Therefore discussion of existential authenticity in the context of tourism is increasingly also embracing issues of alienation. Tourism has been proposed as a way to alleviate feelings of alienation (Xue, Manuel-Navarette & Buzinde 2014). Similarly, Vidon & Rickly (2018) argue that alienation contributes significantly to touristic desires for escape, rejuvenation, and existential experiences. For example, Vidon (2019) argued (with reference to nature tourists in the Adirondack Park) that engagement with the wilderness and reconnection with the biological child enabled visitors to feel that they had transcended alienation. Knudsen et al. (2016) argue that this is a dynamic, continuing project: “authenticity is not something one finds and then retains perpetually thereafter; authenticity must be continually pursued….one must constantly fight the various forces of life that lead to alienation” (p. 37). Using Lacanian psychoanalysis the authors argue that authenticity achieved through tourism is a fantasy that helps to episodically escape feelings of “fundamental alienation” (p. 43) (see also Vidon, Rickly and Knudsen 2018).

Nevertheless, the application of existential philosophy (particularly the work of Heidegger and Sartre) is not without its critics. Shepherd (2015) argues that tourism researchers are misguided in their use of Heidegger and Sartre to draw a link between existential authenticity and tourism. Shepherd bases his arguments on the fact that Heidegger stated that authenticity could only be achieved within a community (that is, at home): it could not be achieved in isolation or among strangers. Shepherd further argued that, in his later work, Sartre moved from a focus on the individual to one on community and commitment to political action. Shepherd contended that these stances mean that we should not be convinced by an argument for travel away from home as a means of experiencing existential authenticity that references these philosophers as the source for inspiration.

This paper has its origins in reflecting on Shepherd’s (2015) critique of the application of existential philosophy to tourism. We contend that Shepherd’s judgement is based on his own partial reading of Sartre and Heidegger. Although it is true that Sartre advocated political activism (de Beauvoir, 1963), we do not accept that this negates his early work that focused on an individual’s exploration of existence. Indeed, one can detect a journey in Sartre’s existentialist philosophy from an initial confrontation with the painful and anxiety-provoking truth that life is chaotic and meaningless to the liberating realisation that we are free to create our own meaning and to make our own choices: “to be
is to choose oneself” (1969, p.440). Along with choice comes responsibility for one’s actions, and for Sartre, this led to a commitment to activism. It is puzzling that Shepherd concludes that this fact undermines Sartre’s existentialist examination of issues such as authenticity, anxiety and freedom. Furthermore, although Sartre did not himself link authenticity and travel, he was, unlike Heidegger, a great traveller all his life (de Beauvoir, 1963).

Moving on to Heidegger, though it is again true, as Shepherd notes, that Heidegger in later life focused on rootedness, homecoming and community (see Todres and Galvin 2010), this likewise does not negate his earlier focus on conformity, death, and individual potential. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger (1962) claims that people live in a state of *Unheimlichkeit* (anxiety) borne of their awareness of the chaos of life and the inevitability of death. Heidegger postulates that people numb this unsettling recognition through everydayness (*Alltäglichkeit*), which allows them to hide from their profoundly unsettling insight. Everydayness has a tranquillising function; it allows people to avoid uncomfortable existential truths of existence. However, it also has a dulling quality, robbing people of the chance to reach their potential. It may provide “a protecting shelter” (p. 214), a form of being-at-home, but it is simultaneously stifling and alienating. For Heidegger, facing anxiety is a necessary corollary to the avoidance of a routine and conformist life, the development of authenticity and the fulfilment of potential. In existential homelessness, anxiety is a constant companion. Later on in his work, Heidegger articulates the possibility of an existentially authentic homecoming that follows the journey through homelessness. Only when anxiety has been confronted can an individual dwell, not in avoidance and conformist everydayness, but in peace, in the comfort of home and in self-acceptance. The ability to dwell at peace is therefore predicated on a transformative confrontation with chaos. Existential homecoming offers a peaceful attunement to existence, characterised by acceptance and the possibility of peace (Todres and Galvin 2010). This, however, does not undermine his earlier work on anxiety, as Shepherd infers.

Nevertheless, Shepherd’s assessment of the life and work of Heidegger and Sartre led us to reflect on the delineation marked by Shepherd between home (dwelling) and away (mobility). This led us to question the idea that leading a peaceful and authentic home life was incompatible with travel involving movement away from home. Therefore, in this paper we use Heideggerian philosophy to elaborate a theoretical framework of existential well-being that is grounded in both dwelling and mobility. The framework was created by two health researchers, Les Todres and Kate Galvin (2011), who drew their inspiration from Heidegger’s notion of *Gegnet*. *Gegnet* is defined by Heidegger (1966) as “*die verweilende Weite*”, translated into “abiding expanse”. *Gegnet* refers to two seemingly contradictory states: a desire for stability and for peace (abide) and an urge for adventure and for movement (expansce). Todres & Galvin (2011) argue that well-being is achieved if an individual responds to both drives.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the following section we outline Heidegger’s thinking about *Gegnet* and identify its potential for integrating dwelling and mobility. Thereafter we identify and examine 3 scenarios, involving tourist practices in which dwelling and mobility are simultaneously intertwined. These scenarios are: 1) achieving mobility within dwelling through imaginative and armchair travel; 2) achieving dwelling within mobility through ‘homemaking’ in hotels; and 3) making dwelling whilst physically ‘on the move’. These scenarios are illustrative rather than paradigmatic or definitive (see Azaryahu, 1996) and we certainly do not claim that they are exhaustive. This paper is intended as a piece of conceptual research (Xin, Tribe & Chambers, 2013) and therefore we do not present empirical data relating to the practices we examine. Our intention is to demonstrate what Heidegger’s ideas about *Gegnet* have to offer in understanding the interdependence of tourism, authenticity and home.

**Gegnet: dwelling and mobility**

The term *Gegnet* was first introduced in Heidegger’s Conversations on a Country Path (1966). *Gegnet* belongs to the root word ‘*gegen*’, which indicates a dynamic movement. In English, there is no translation for the German word that retains the idea of movement and that is fundamental to understanding the term. Heidegger 1966 (p. 65) defines *Gegnet* as “an expanse and an abiding. It abides into the expanse of resting. It expands into the abiding of what has freely turned towards itself.” *Gegnet* is “an abiding expanse which, gathering all, opens itself, so that in it openness is halted and held, letting everything merge in its own resting” (Heidegger 1966, p. 66). The various interpretations of *Gegnet* have centred on the dialectical and dynamic pull between movement and resting, though as Dalla Pezze (2006) points out, “one of the major problems we face when approaching Heidegger’s thought is that we are forced to dwell in uncertainty” (p. 1). Dalla Pezze refers to *Gegnet* as a space for “gathering, returning, sheltering, resting, abiding” (p. 152). Thus, a contrasting and dynamic movement is emphasised. Lovitt & Brundage Lovitt (1995, p. 11) set “pure resting in itself” against “outreaching intensity”. This is informed by Heidegger’s (1971) notion of *Gelassenheit* (“letting-be-ness”), which refers to an existential peace or stillness. Mugerauer (2008) states that *Gegnet* is a shelter that offers “the long-anticipated, long held off final possibility of completion” (p. 467).

Todres & Galvin (2011) saw the value of *Gegnet* in developing a theory that could incorporate seemingly opposing aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy and that could integrate “the experiences of movement and stillness” (p. 2). Their theory of dwelling-mobility identifies two seemingly opposing
drives: mobility (a sense of adventure and possibility), and dwelling (associated with a feeling of rootedness, peace and belonging). Existential mobility and existential dwelling combine to contribute to overall wellbeing. Todres and Galvin (2010) state that the inclusion of the term “existential” indicates that both mobility and dwelling are experienced authentically: neither are retreats from uncomfortable truths. Todres & Galvin observe that if Heidegger’s work finished at the point of necessarily dwelling with anxiety in order to live authentically and creatively “he would leave us in quite a nihilistic position in which we have to stoically come to terms with our homelessness” (p.3). But Heidegger describes an alternative type of homecoming that is authentic: a shift from the inauthenticity of averageness, an embrace of existential homelessness, and the eventual possibility of an authentic homecoming, of finding peace in the home environment. Indeed, Todres & Galvin (2011) argue that without leaving home - in other words, without fleeing the comfort of conformity, in order to fulfil potential - an individual cannot subsequently and in good faith return to the rootedness of home. This points to an existential journey that parallels that already observed of Sartrean philosophy: through discomfort comes resolution.

The dwelling/mobility framework builds on a previous paper which articulated well-being as the intertwining of peace and movement, of being at home and on an adventure (Dahlberg, Todres, & Galvin, 2009). The authors argued that “movement is the other side of peace, as peace is the other side of movement. Movement and peace should not be understood as pure opposites, since peace can be the origin of movement and movement can be the origin of peace.” (p.269). Therefore, these are not mutually exclusive categories. In 2011, Todres & Galvin developed the notions of peace and movement into the more comprehensive terms of dwelling and mobility. In their framework, the two states of mobility and dwelling are juxtaposed, but they are not mutually exclusive.

There is a temporal element to the notion of Gegnet: “when dwelling is experienced in a temporal way, there is a sense of being grounded in the present moment; when mobility is experienced in a temporal way, there is a sense of forward movement” (Todres & Galvin, 2011, p.5). Mobility may feel energising and creative: there is “a sense of unfinishedness that seeks future possibilities, people and projects” (p. 3). Meanwhile, existential dwelling refers to “a peaceful attunement to existence” (p. 5). Heidegger uses the term Gelassenheit (letting-go) to refer to acceptance and peace. It is important to note however that to dwell does not imply an absence of suffering. Indeed, a feeling of peace can come from the acceptance of pain: “to dwell is to come home to one’s situation, to hear what is there, to abide, to linger and to be gathered there with what belongs there” (p. 4). There is a link here to psychoanalysis whose goal, according to Freud (1895), is to transform hysterical misery into ordinary unhappiness: there is no avoiding the common struggles of everyday life.
Given the well-developed focus among both tourism and qualitative researchers on embodied experience (see Small, 2016; Soica, 2016; Stevenson & Farrell, 2018), the embodied qualities of dwelling-mobility are of interest. Todres & Galvin observe that when dwelling is experienced in a physical way, there is a sense of peace, of acceptance, of comfort; when mobility is experienced in a physical way, there is a sense of restless adventure, of excitement, of potential. There are therefore physical consequences of achieving well-being through dwelling-mobility.

The articulation of Heidegger’s concept of Gegnet through a theoretical framework for existential well-being is original, but Todres & Galvin were not the first to introduce the opposing notions of dwelling and mobility. Indeed, the emphasis on the importance of rootedness and freedom can be found in earlier psychoanalytic texts. Fromm (1942) for example refers to the twin human need for rootedness and belonging alongside striving for a goal and for a sense of accomplishment. He observes that freedom represents the ability to realise oneself “fully and uncompromisingly” (p. 232); it allows a person to reach their potential. But he also recognises the human desire to avoid the anxiety that comes with such freedom.

Yalom also links existential anxiety with the desire for comforting external structures: “we are creatures who desire structure, and we are frightened by the concept of freedom which implies that beneath us there is nothing, sheer groundlessness” (1989, p. 8). The apprehension of freedom and responsibility are frightening insights, “thus one seeks structure, authority, grand designs, magic, something that is bigger than one’s self” (1980, p. 222). The creation of a structured routine lulls us “into a sense of cosy, familiar belongingness; the primordial world of vast emptiness and isolation is buried and silenced, only to speak in brief bursts, during nightmares and mythic visions” (1980, p. 358). Yalom (1980), like Fromm, identifies the pursuit of self-actualisation as something that gives life meaning, offsetting the void and pointlessness of existence. The value of the notion of Gegnet is that it permits a view that dwelling in peace is not necessarily an inauthentic retreat from the confrontation with personal meaninglessness (Mugerauer 2008).

**Gegnet and its application to tourism**

Dwelling-mobility describes both the adventure of being called into existential possibilities as well as the being at home with what has been given. Such a conceptualisation both builds on, but moves beyond, the call to consider tourism as a mode of dwelling in the world (Pons, 2003). In her book on being and dwelling through tourism, Palmer (2018) considers the interconnections between being,
dwelling and tourism, using multidisciplinary perspectives. She addresses the sensuous, material, architectural and earthly dwelling that tourism permits, and by using Heideggerian philosophy to do so, she underlines the value in returning to his work to understand tourist experiences.

Mobility may take many forms including its literal expression of movement in terms of tourism. Seeing mobility as being a companion of rather than an alternative to dwelling allows us to counter Shepherd’s critique of the usefulness of Heideggerian philosophy. It also allows us to challenge the view that the philosophy of Heidegger (and Sartre) should not be used to understand tourist behaviour. As the framework shows, it is perfectly possible to be rooted in the home environment in an existentially authentic way and simultaneously to be called into existential possibility.

In the following discussion we set out how Heidegger’s concept of Gegnet, interpreted by Todres & Galvin (2011) as “dwelling-mobility”, can be applied to the complex practices of contemporary tourism. In particular, we examine scenarios in which dwelling and mobility are simultaneously intertwined. Our starting point is recent academic debate about the nature of tourism itself. Much of the early analysis of the nature of tourism was predicated on an (often unstated) assumption that ‘home’ and ‘holiday’ were two, clearly-differentiated realms, in terms of both time and space (McCabe, 2002). Notions of tourism as an experience characterised by difference (Urry, 2002) imply that when we go on holiday we leave home firmly behind us. This enables conceptualisations of tourism that are characterised by escape, liminality and otherness.

More recently this perspective has been called into question, and many academics have highlighted the fuzzy and blurred boundaries between ‘home’ and ‘away’ (Cohen, Duncan & Thulemark, 2015; Larsen, 2008; McCabe, 2002) in a way which creates the potential to position “dwelling-mobility” within this debate. As Hannam & Knox (2010, p.102) argue, “everyday life and tourism are not two separate realms of practice...each is implicated in the other”. First, far from seeking difference and strangeness when on holiday, many tourists specifically seek familiarity and a destination which resembles home. The desire for familiarity is most apparent in particular forms of mass tourism. For example, Andrews (2011) has highlighted the ways in which many British charter tourists in Spain relish the same food, drink, television, newspapers and even place names that they are used to at home. In Heideggerian language, tourists may create a sense of dwelling whilst being mobile as one of the many practices of meaning-making that takes places during their holiday. However we recognise that the nature of their connection and attachment to the destination is likely to be different from that of residents.
Repeat tourism, which refers to tourists visiting the same destination more than once (Opperman, 2000), is a phenomenon that further exemplifies the interplay between dwelling and mobility. Due to satisfaction with a previous visit, tourists start to develop loyalty to a destination which is important in their decision-making (Alegre & Cladera, 2006). Knowledge of the destination is accumulated over time especially in the case of frequent visits, and the tourist, though away from home, can achieve a comforting level of familiarity such that being away starts to feel like home. A similar intersection between home and away can be found in the VFR (Visiting friends and relatives) phenomenon, whereby VFR tourists may feel at ‘home’ when staying with friends and family, but they may also experience feelings of being ‘away’ (Shani, 2013).

*Mobility within Dwelling: Imaginative and Armchair Travel*

There are many instances where the adventure and vitality of mobility can be experienced whilst being in the settledness of dwelling (see Todres & Galvin, 2011) and without any corporeal movement away from home. One example is imaginative travel – in which the ‘tourist’ is imaginatively mobile (Urry, 2002; White & White, 2007) – and which is frequently underpinned by the anticipation of mobility. Anticipation has long been recognised as a key part of the travel experience (see Clawson & Knetsch, 1966). As Löfgren (1999) argues, as soon as our holiday is over we begin fantasizing about the next one and our travel dreams colonize the weeks when we are not on holiday. In planning and anticipating their next holiday, would-be tourists engage in a wide range of imaginative meaning-making practices: speculation, fantasy, reverie, dreamwork and mind-voyaging (Rojek, 1997). They plan where they will go, where they will stay, and what they will see and visit. In doing so they engage with a wide range of representations and imaginaries (Salazar, 2012) including tourist brochures, guidebooks, online review sites and personal recommendations.

If, as Kirillova & Lehto (2015) argue, the pre-holiday phase is characterised by the “normal anxiety” of everyday routines and a low level of existential authenticity (see also Kirillova et al., 2017a), these diverse practices of anticipation can also be underpinned by the hope or expectation of achieving existential authenticity whilst on holiday. In this sense, anticipation is a tactic for achieving existential authenticity at some future moment. This implies that any consideration of the transformational nature of tourist experiences must also include the pre-trip stage (ibid). What is significant is that all of these practices take place within the familiarity of home/dwelling, underlining the ways in which the meaning and significance of tourism (and the meaning-making practices of tourists) lies in far
more the actual week or fortnight of the holiday itself. Consequently, disentangling dwelling and mobility becomes problematic.

However, imaginative travel is not only about looking forward: it can also involve retrospection (Larsen, 2004), another key phase of the travel experience. The post-trip stage can be critical (Kirillova et al., 2017a). It can be characterised by a return to feelings of alienation and normal anxiety (Kirillova & Lehto, 2015), but it can also be a time when tourists identify and confront existential predicaments and make significant changes to their lifestyle in order to live more authentically (Kirillova et al., 2017a, 2017b). In this way tourism can act as a catalyst for a more existentially meaningful life (see Brown, 2013), but crucially such transformation may be stimulated after – rather than during - the holiday itself.

One of the key things that happens after a holiday is memory work and memory travel (Urry & Larsen, 2011). Tourists engage in numerous calculated performances to ensure that a holiday is remembered (Bærenholdt, Haldrup, Larsen & Urry, 2004). Foremost among these is the practice of photography. As Rickly-Boyd (2012b) argues, photographs are an attempt to capture the aura of a holiday experience and looking at them inevitably activates an imaginative journey (Larsen, 2004). The practice of viewing photographs reopens “a particular space of experience”, temporarily transporting an individual into a “mini-liminal space” (Garlick, 2002, p. 296 and p. 302) that may resemble the experience of the holiday itself. Souvenirs play a similar role in materialising the memory of a holiday (Haldrup & Larsen, 2006). Through their presence souvenirs connect a person to another time and space: in so doing they have an “after life” which continues to build meaning (Rickly-Boyd, 2012b, p. 285).

Such practices of remembering can represent a tactic to recapture or retrieve (even if fleetingly) sensations of existential authenticity that were experienced whilst on holiday (see Kirillova & Lehto, 2015). This may particularly be the case among individuals who experience moments of existential freedom whilst on holiday but who are confronted with alienation and anxiety upon their return to normality. Crucially, such imaginative memory travel is rooted in the reassurance and comfort of home, often surrounded by family, who have shared the holiday experience. This allows us to expand the notion of dwelling-mobility proposed by Todres & Galvin (2011). They argue that mobility experienced in a temporal way is about forward movement. However, we also need to recognise that such mobility (particularly imaginative mobility) can also be backwards: memory-work and nostalgia are alternative ways in which an individual can seek existential authenticity.
Another form of imaginative travel which illustrates the fusion of mobility and dwelling arises when there is no intent to engage in corporeal travel. This takes the form of ‘armchair travel’: for more than two centuries some ‘tourists’ have preferred to engage with distant places without leaving home (Stiegler, 2013). Some (perhaps constrained by age, disability or lack of funds) may choose armchair travel as the closest they can get to corporeal travel. Alternatively, some may deliberately choose to experience “co-presence” with the distant world without being troubled by the bodily inconvenience of physical travel (Larsen, 2004, p.25). Others may shun the disciplines, rituals, scripts and performances that are associated with being ‘on holiday’ in a new location (see Jansson, 2007). Some may even engage in armchair travel in order to minimise their carbon footprint.

At first sight it may appear that such individuals are denied the opportunity to experience existential authenticity through tourism. Indeed, the inability to travel may itself be a source of existential anxiety. However, armchair travel can also be a choice underpinned by autonomy, freedom, and self-determination. The decision to not ‘go away’ on holiday can be motivated by a desire to live authentically and in a way which is true to one’s personal values. In such cases, armchair travel can represent a form of existential courage (Kirillova & Lehto, 2015). It can also represent a meaningful substitute for tourism among those unable or unwilling to travel.

Numerous technologies have been developed to facilitate armchair travel. In the nineteenth century new technologies of visualisation – including photography and stereoscopes – enabled the world to travel to the spectator (Larsen, 2004; Stiegler, 2013). Later, the new genres of travel writing and travel guides (along with travel brochures) expanded opportunities for sedentary ‘travellers’ to imaginatively engage with other places. The potential of armchair travel expanded rapidly in the late twentieth century when the internet created myriad additional opportunities to find the enchantment of the faraway in the comfort and familiarity of home. Websites and online guides provide new means to encounter distant places. Travel blogging and social media have further enabled armchair travellers to follow the travels of others (Molz, 2004), whether friends/family or complete strangers.

Furthermore, new digital technologies such as Google Streetview and Virtual/Augmented Reality have created new possibilities for the sedentary ‘traveller’ to immerse themselves in other places. While Augmented Reality has most potential for enhancing the experiences of tourists within a destination (Kounavis, Kasimati & Zamani, 2012), it is Virtual Reality that is most relevant to the armchair traveller. Such technologies enable people to experience ‘presence’ in a destination (Tussyadiah, Wang, Jung & tom Dieck, 2018). While of interest to a would-be tourist planning a
holiday, virtual reality also creates entirely new horizons for the armchair traveller who has no intention or ability to visit the place represented.

The availability of so many opportunities for armchair travel raises the question of whether it is necessary to physically journey through space in order to be a tourist (Garlick, 2002). Certainly armchair travel lacks the embodied sensations and experiences of ‘being’ in other places which are usually held to be integral to tourism. However, we suggest that armchair travel, like corporeal travel, can create opportunities to relieve existential anxiety or experience existential authenticity. Heidegger’s concept of the Spielraum (1962) – a place for reflection involving “a reprieve from everydayness” (Brown, 2013, p.183) – is relevant here. The Spielraum offers opportunities for “moments of vision” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 422) or experiences of authentic being. Armchair travel is one opportunity to engage with the Spielraum. Since, as Wassler & Kirillova (2019) argue Being-in-the-world is about coexistence with other people, armchair travel may offer people the opportunity to reach out to other places and people, even if they do not (or cannot) physically travel there. Imaginative travel can make someone feel “more connected to the world and others” (Kirillova et al., 2017b, p.14; see also Gössling, Cohen & Hibbert 2018). While previous conceptions of the Spielraum in tourism have emphasised ‘going away’ (Brown, 2013), we suggest that it is also possible for an individual to encounter other places in the Spielraum without leaving home.

What is significant about the forms of imaginative mobility and armchair travel outlined above is that they involve simultaneous experiences of dwelling and mobility in a spatial sense (Todres & Galvin, 2011). Through imaginative travel an individual can enjoy the adventure, excitement and desire of engaging with the abiding expanse of the world. They are able to embrace “the call of the future and the energetic feeling of possibility” (ibid, 4) and experience embodied sensations of vitality and excitement. At the same time, the armchair traveller can enjoy the peace and rootedness of dwelling and ‘being-at-home’, characterised by embodied experiences of comfort and a sense of temporal grounding in the present moment. The body enjoys the ontological comforts, reassurance, familiarity and peace associated with home, whilst the mind enjoys the adventure, vitality and enchantment of travel (even if such travel involves no movement away from home). Consequently, this form of dwelling-(imaginative) mobility can contribute to existential well-being by satisfying simultaneous desires for adventure and familiarity (ibid). In this way, dwelling becomes a context and setting for various performances of imaginative mobility even while the ‘traveller’ is corporeally static.
Dwelling within mobility 1: Homemaking in hotel rooms

In other circumstances tourists can seek the familiarity and reassurance of dwelling whilst mobile. In particular, the act of homemaking in hotel rooms illustrates the dynamic interplay between dwelling and mobility. Hotels are, of course, a long-standing theme in tourism and hospitality research. However, much of the academic debate has focused on issues of hotel operations and management (Valtonen & Veijola, 2011) and there has been little scrutiny of the everyday practices of tourists in their hotel rooms. Some research has explored guests’ preferences for how their room will be equipped (for example, Millar & Baloglu, 2011), particularly with reference to the sustainable or energy-saving practices of the hotel itself (for example, Barber & Deale, 2014). There has also been attention to the ‘green’ behaviour of hotel guests (for example, Han & Hyun, 2018). Other researchers have conceptualised the hotel room as a liminal space in which various forms of transgressive behaviour can be played out (Pritchard & Morgan, 2006). However, the more mundane practices of tourists within hotel rooms are poorly understood. This is especially surprising given that staying in (and using) a hotel room is such a commonplace dimension of the tourist experience.

The hotel room is a “strange yet familiar” setting (Pritchard & Morgan, 2006, p.770). It is the epitome of a functional and anonymous space, built to a standard design, containing standardised (and mass-purchased) furniture and fittings, and usually identified only by a number (Vanlennep, 1987). It can be a space which is alienating in its unfamiliarity. While the room may be uninviting when a tourist first enters it, one of the first things that they do is to claim the space as their own, a practice which Frochet, Domonique & Statia (2019) describe as “nesting”. One of the ubiquitous performative rituals of being a tourist is to personalise our temporary accommodation space in order to turn it into a temporary or alternative home (see Larsen, 2008). It is an example of how people (tourists in this case) create structure in the face of existential anxiety (Yalom, 1989).

Unless only staying for a single night, the tourist will usually unpack their suitcase, hang their clothes in the wardrobe, and distribute their belongings (books, magazines, travel guides, cosmetics, toiletries, a bedside clock, phone chargers) that, crucially, they have brought with them from home. Indeed, the more that has been brought from home in the luggage, the more opportunities and possibilities there are to create a ‘home from home’ in a hotel room. These may be relatively unreflexive practices (see Pons, 2003), but nevertheless in a short time the hotel room is transformed, so that upon returning to it for the first time, it has already become to the tourist “my” room (Vanlennep, 1987, p.213). Indeed, it is not uncommon to hear tourists inadvertently referring to their hotel room as ‘home’.
What is happening here is the act of ‘homemaking’ (Wang 2007), with ‘home’ defined as “a place where we are at ease and can let our guard down” (Sack, 1992, p.148, cited in Wang, 2007). Places can be considered at multiple scales, ranging from an individual room to an entire city (Cresswell, 2004). Hence there is little that is problematic about conceptualising a hotel room as a place. Homemaking in hotel rooms is a set of spontaneous and habitual activities, illustrating how “places are claimed and shaped through every day, and often mundane, social practices” (Lew, 2017, p.449). Homemaking transforms the anonymous space of the hotel room into a more intimate dwelling place that resembles home. Hotels thus become “welcome anchorages” in the world which provide the traveller with a sense of ontological security (Lynch, 2017, p.179). In the terminology of the mobilities paradigm this is about establishing moorings during temporary breaks in mobility which enable tourists to connect to a particular location (Anderson & Erskine, 2014).

Such practices of homemaking and place-making within a hotel illustrate the intertwining of dwelling and mobility within the tourist experience (Todres & Galvin, 2011). Dwelling is a spatial experience, constructed within the intimate confines of the hotel room, and when dwelling is experienced spatially the tourist can have a sense of being at home (ibid). If, as Relph (1976, p.83) argues, home is “a central point of existence” then the tourist, even though mobile, can create such a central point in their hotel room; a temporary home or dwelling established whilst in mobility. It is through their individual agency that the tourist carves out a space of familiarity in an unfamiliar setting (the destination) thereby achieving the possibility of existential well-being (Todres & Galvin, 2011). Such well-being is both cognitive and embodied: both the mind and body find comfort, reassurance and rootedness in the temporary ‘home’.

Even among those who wish to distinguish home and away, it is difficult to succeed in making a decisive break from home (and everyday life) when on holiday: instead, in a variety of ways, we take home with us when we go away: it is our constant companion. Whether we like it or not, the cultural baggage which we bring with us from home – in the form of prior knowledge and understanding, expectations and fantasies about the destination – structures the way that we make sense of the places that we encounter (Craik, 1997). Indeed, home is the constant point of reference when away (McCabe, 2002). As such being on holiday can have the effect of reinforcing the “advantages, comforts and benefits” of home (Craik, 1997, p.114; see also White & White, 2007). Meanwhile, owing to advancements in smartphones technology, tourists are rarely completely disconnected from home (White & White, 2007). Thus, dwelling and mobility can be intricately intertwined, which
is reflected in contemporary conceptualisations of the tourism experience as a hybrid of home and away (Bærenholdt et al., 2004).

_Dwelling within mobility 2: Experiencing dwelling on the move_

Both of the above sections have examined forms of mobility which are defined with reference to dwelling that is static. However, we now consider forms of travel where the tourist’s dwelling is itself mobile, something that has been termed “dwelling in transit” (Crang & Zhang, 2012, p.898). This again enables us to extend the ideas of Todres & Galvin (2011) to embrace forms of existential authenticity which arise in situations where dwelling is itself in motion.

The nature of such mobile dwelling can take many forms. In extreme forms, mobility can be constant and prolonged. The best example is lifestyle travel (Cohen, 2011) in which mobility becomes a way of living and being. Lifestyle mobility takes many forms including backpacking, ocean yacht cruising and climbing (ibid; Rickly-Boyd, 2012a; Rickly, 2016). Such travel is characterised by “hypermobile lifestyles” (Rickly, 2016, p.243) as a deliberate and long-term choice (Cohen, 2011; Cohen et al., 2015). It is undertaken by individuals who seek “tropophilia” (Anderson & Erskine, 2014), that is, motion, change and transformation. Among particular hypermobile communities, a life of sustained mobility may offer possibilities for achieving existential authenticity (Canavan, 2018; Rickly-Boyd, 2012a) through escaping from everyday routines and overcoming physical challenges. Furthermore, such a way of living may be integral to senses of personal identity among participants (Cohen, 2010a, 2010b).

For lifestyle travellers, home and dwelling are fluid concepts. Such travellers can be at home in mobility since “their route is their residence” (Anderson & Erskine, 2014, p.142). In effect they can find and dwell within multiple homes (for various durations) during their travels (Cohen, et al., 2015). They can also make home within mobility (Cohen, 2011), for example by living in their campervan, motorhome or tent (Rickly, 2012, 2016). Thus dwelling is less about a particular location but instead is “enacted in complex networks...where hosts guests, objects and information coalesce for a particular time in a specific space” (Rickly, 2017, p.58). Such lifestyles illustrate a particular archetype of the dialectic of dwelling and mobility (Todres & Galvin, 2011): the peace and rootedness of dwelling are experienced simultaneously with the excitement and possibility of mobility. This particular configuration of the “abiding expanse” creates opportunities among hypermobile travellers for a distinct form of existential well-being.
In other cases, mobility is more mundane (Edensor, 2007). This is well illustrated by holidays using caravans (significantly, also known as ‘mobile homes’), campervans, tents, and boats (such as canal boats). These ways of holiday-making enable tourists to take ‘home’ with them on holiday. With caravanning the vehicle is relatively immobile with the main journey being from the usual place of residence to a caravan site, whereafter the caravan will be static for a longer period or even the entire holiday (Mikkelsen & Cohen, 2015). In some cases, caravan holidays will involve travel only a short distance away from home (Jeuring & Haartsen, 2017). Travel involving campervans and boats may entail a higher degree of mobility with the vehicle being in motion during the day, but stopping during the evening when the holidaymakers wish to sleep. Such mobility need not be rapid: for example campervan travel can be centred on “unhurried mobility” (Wilson & Hannam, 2017, p.26).

On these types of mobile holiday, the sense of Gegnet involves a synthesis of adventure/unfamiliarity and the everyday. While the tourist in a caravan, campervan, motorhome or boat is able to enjoy the enchantment of the unfamiliar, their holiday is frequently underpinned by the rhythms, routines and habits of home, something which offers ontological stability, comfort and reassurance (Kaaristo & Rhoden, 2017; Mikkelsen & Cohen, 2015). For example, many caravanners will engage in very similar activities to those undertaken at home: shopping for food, cooking and preparing meals, eating as a family, washing the dishes, cleaning, changing nappies and reading bedtime stories (Larsen, 2008; Mikkelsen & Cohen, 2015). Furthermore, many will stick to the same embodied daily routines – such as when they eat meals together or go to bed – that structure their life at home (Mikkelsen & Cohen, 2015).

Holidays where the dwelling unit is itself mobile are circumscribed by a tension between “flow and fixity” (Mikkensen & Cohen, 2015, p.676) and a blurring of the ordinary and extraordinary (Kaaristo & Rhoden, 2017). This, in turn, enables the holiday-maker to simultaneously experience “rootedness and flow, peace and possibility” (Todres & Galvin, 2011, p.1). While enjoying the ontological comfort and security of home and dwelling, tourists can engage with adventure and unfamiliarity in ways which contribute to existential well-being. In such cases the “abiding expanse” of Gegnet need not be characterised by an emphatic departure from home and the everyday: in some instances the ‘expanse’ can be localised, mundane and underpinned by the familiarity of dwelling.

This leads us to a broader point about the conceptualisation of existential authenticity within tourism to date. There has been a tendency to focus on how tourists can achieve existential authenticity whilst undertaking challenging physical activities (such as backpacking or climbing), in novel locations, and through experiences characterised by liminality (for example, Canavan, 2018; Kim &
Jamal, 2007; Noy, 2004; Rickly-Boyd, 2012; Rickly, 2016). However, there is much less consideration of other, less demanding and more mundane forms of tourism (which are arguably more common). For example, Vidon & Rickly (2018) point out that we understand little about issues of existential alienation and authenticity in the context of mass tourism. This raises the question of whether a tourist can achieve existential authenticity through holidays (such as caravanning or motorhoming) which are often physically undemanding and where the routines of home are ever-present. Certainly it is possible for a caravanner (or a mass tourist) to experience autonomy, freedom and a sense of doing something their own way according to their own values (see Xue et al., 2014). Furthermore, Wang (1999) speaks of inter-personal existential authenticity in which a family group can experience “a sense of authentic togetherness and an authentic “we relationship”” (p.364). Therefore, holidays which eschew a radical departure from the routines of home can also create possibilities for existentially authentic moments, among both individuals and groups. What is, perhaps, more important is that the interplay between dwelling and mobility creates opportunities for temporary experiments in being (although not all tourists may want to - or choose to - engage in such ‘work’).

**Conclusion**

Some researchers are sceptical about the utility of researching tourism from the perspective of existential authenticity. For example, Vidon et al. (2018, p.63) claim that existential authenticity “has been over-extended as a conceptual framework for understanding tourist experience”. On the other hand, Wassler & Kirillova (2019) argue that there is still scope for the exploration of existential themes in tourism research. In this paper we have sought to move the debate in a new direction by proposing a theoretical framework for dwelling/mobility inspired by Heidegger’s notion of *Gegnet*. One of our key arguments is that it is not only forms of tourism that involve radical departure (from home, from everyday routines) that can lead to existential authenticity. Instead, forms of tourism which are circumscribed by the routines and practices of home (or where the tourist does not even leave their home) can also create possibilities for realizing moments of existential authenticity.

In this paper, we have contested Shepherd’s (2015) claim that the use of existential philosophy by tourism researchers is inappropriate. Shepherd based his argument on Heidegger’s emphasis in later life on home and rootedness and on Sartre’s commitment to political activism. We have also sought to challenge Shepherd’s dichotomous view of home and away. We have introduced a conceptual framework, which refers to seemingly opposing feelings of rootedness and flow, of peace and possibility. Conceptually, it is possible to distinguish the two dimensions of mobility and dwelling; however this paper shows that they are not mutually exclusive. As Larsen (2008, p. 29) observes,
“the possibilities of being at home while travelling and coming home and dwelling through travel mean we need to rethink dwelling so that it is no longer the antithesis to travel”. Crang & Zhang (2012) corroborate this point: there is no need to see dwelling in one place as authentic dwelling.

The original contribution of this paper is twofold. It puts forward a framework that is inspired by Heideggerian philosophy to encapsulate dwelling and mobility, and it illustrates the value and validity of the framework by reference to scenarios from the tourism and hospitality literature. The framework describes a capacity for both movement and for settling which co-exist in dynamic and complex ways. It moves beyond the view of tourism as an escape from mundanity, from alienation, to which the tourist returns refreshed (McIntyre, 2007; Rickly-Boyd, 2013), but rather it emphasises a dynamic flow between being at home and at peace and an energetic desire for movement. Mobility emphasises the future and creativity whilst dwelling emphasises peace in the present. Gegnet implies the freedom and openness of mobility, which can be expressed through tourism, as well as the coming back home to dwell in peace and acceptance. Thus, a desire for travel can sit alongside a desire for rootedness. As Malamud (2018) observes, a sense of home is strengthened by having been away from home: there is a dynamic interplay between the two. It is apt that Shepherd’s disapproval of the use of existentialist philosophy by tourism researchers is countered by Heidegger’s own notion of Gegnet.

The coexistence of mobility and dwelling provides the basis for well-being which is characterised by both rootedness and flow. Indeed, well-being has become increasingly important to tourism researchers (Voigt & Pforr, 2014). Furthermore, through the 1999 Global Code of Ethics for Tourism the UNWTO has identified that tourism – in particular access to, and discovery of, the planet’s resources – is, in principle, a basic right open equally to all people of the world (UNWTO, 2018). At the same time the lack of access to tourism among a large proportion of the world’s population is a prominent research theme (Devile & Kastenholz, 2018; Scheyvens & Biddulph, 2018). This paper puts forward a framework that is useful in understanding the role of tourism in individual well-being, at the same time as defending the use of Heideggerian philosophy by tourism academics, but we do not forget that tourism remains an unachievable luxury for many.

The framework presented in this study which is inspired by Heideggerian philosophy has utility and value for tourism research in both understanding tourist behaviour and in setting an agenda for future research. One avenue for further research is an empirical investigation into the role played by tourism in a rooted existence. A second line of enquiry is pointed to by the reference to the
importance of the experiential nature of mobility and dwelling. In keeping with its roots in phenomenological/existentialist philosophy, the felt embodied sense of mobility and dwelling could be explored through a phenomenological study that focuses on experience, with reference to a wide variety of forms of contemporary travel and tourism. A third direction for future research would be to unpick in greater detail the assemblages and networks of both human and non-human elements (see Pons, 2003) through which dwelling-mobility is realised in the lived experience of tourists. Such non-human elements may include books, maps and online sources, luggage and other personal possessions, and vehicles. Finally, the mundane routines of tourism can be explored through the lens of the dwelling-mobility framework. Such unreflexive practices – which might include settling into a hotel room, creating home in a campervan or motorhome, and maintaining contact with home through social media whilst on holiday - are increasingly receiving the attention they merit within tourist studies.

References


