VICTIMHOOD AS A DRIVING FORCE IN THE INTRACTABILITY OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT:
Reflections on Collective Memory, Conflict Ethos, and Collective Emotional Orientations

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IN MEMORY OF MY GRANDPARENTS

Moussa and Aisha

AND, TO MY GRANDMOTHER

Ghefra Ghannam

From whom I learned about a vanished homeland
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ABSTRACT

In intractable conflicts the feelings and claims of victimhood are as mature and well-entrenched as the conflict itself. The longer a conflict is waged, the more the geopolitical reasons for victimisation shift to the psychological. This gradually blurs the difference between facts and perceptions, rendering the conflict harder to resolve (e.g. Coleman 2003; Bar-Tal 2013). The general assumption in this study is that due to unique historical and political circumstances, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict draws heavily — perhaps more than other conflicts — from past and present victimisations to rationalise, justify, and perpetuate the status quo. The study seeks to examine the extent to which the narratives of victimhood add to intractability and therefore hinder settlement. It mainly but not exclusively draws on Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological framework of collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations to guide the discussion. First, the study proposes that Israel’s victimhood draws much of its validity from the Jewish collective memory, especially the Shoah. That among other things gave rise to ethos that established the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of the Jewish continuum of suffering, and not entirely as a political struggle with defined geopolitical causes. It is also proposed that collective memory and the current conflict have established certain emotional responses ranging from soft emotions like guilt and shame, which have subtle but significant reverberations, to strong emotions like fear. Building on Bar-Tal’s claims (2001) that fear dominates Israel’s emotional state, it is suggested that fear also represents a main force behind Israel’s ‘hyper security,’ which is seen as the most destructive manifestation of Israel’s victimhood narratives. Second, it is argued that even though Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish victimhood narratives are socio-psychologically similar, there are factors mainly determined by the conflict power hierarchy which make certain aspects of Palestinian victimhood different and more salient. Whilst Israel’s collective memory is premised on the fear of annihilation, Palestinian memory is mainly centred on the fear of being forgotten. And, whilst Israel’s dominant emotion is fear, Palestinian emotional orientation is largely steered by a sense of collective humiliation. The conflict ethos, as a result, seems to excessively focus on muqawama (resistance) as a reformatory measure against humiliation. Even though the societal beliefs about victimhood in Israel or Palestine are not completely homogenous, they are prominent enough to have a detrimental effect on conflict resolution.
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND: PERSONAL NARRATIVE

I was born and lived my entire childhood in a humble household in the heart of Al-Shati Camp, Gaza’s third largest refugee camp on the Mediterranean. My family, like everyone else in the camp, were refugees from villages and towns in what became Israel. Through the intensely idealistic and profoundly reminiscent anecdotes of my grandparents, I learned about a vanished homeland. I imagined my grandparents’ village as a utopian society with leafy footpaths, lines of olive trees evanescing into the horizon, and fields embellished with countless poppies. I visualised it — as Said (1992) once described it — as ‘a mythologised spot of land,’ one that stood in stark and brusque contrast to life in the camp. At an early age, you learn about loss, a concept that would grow clearer and more intense with age. You also internalise immense nostalgic feelings for a piece of land that you never physically set foot in.

During the First Intifada (1987-1993), I witnessed first-hand the Israeli army’s abusive policies, the almost daily house break-ins, and the repeated curfews. It was the time when my grandparents’ utopia started to grow ever more remote, yet more desperately needed. I did not then understand the intricacies of politics, but like most of my peers, while lacking the proper term, I had little trouble recognising a victimiser.

Early in life, you realise that being a Palestinian “…serves to remind you that you can never take who you are for granted. It is a destiny which you can negotiate a space of your own but from which you cannot escape” (Suleiman 2016, p.5). You learn that you have no choice but to embrace your loss and create a proud identity out of it. At times, nonetheless, I surrendered myself to taboo self-monologues; I wondered perhaps with bitterness and confusion, why was I born to this people? Why not in a normal country where the very act of existing did not feel like an accusation? I was not ambitious, I just imagined a perfectly normal place that looked like our camp, only its inhabitants were not scattered over three planes of being: a mythological past, an unpalatable present, and a helplessly Sisyphean future. But as our primal survival instincts had it, we
would soon resettle into a mode of hesitant acceptance. You learn to create a private space in the illusion we called normality.

Victim is a default Palestinian mindset, a non-negotiable identity, and sometimes, Jayyusi (1992) reflects, a means of arrogant defiance, and a lens through which we see the world. Everywhere you turn, in art, literature, and academia, the narratives of victimhood overshadow all other aspects of Palestinian self-awareness. It is also a ‘purgatorial’ state of mind; you are trapped between the desire to escape and the inability give up the victim status. As a result, immersed in the moral and political advantages of our suffering (Neslen 2011), we ended up perpetuating our traumas and locking ourselves in a rigid, one-sided perception of reality.

My transition from viewing our victimhood as unparalleled to beginning to see something of a victimhood narrative amongst Israeli-Jews was slow, reluctant, and somewhat confusing. For most of us, a military uniform was everything that represented Israel, seeing beyond this image needed a special paradigm shift. The first was leaving Palestine, which helped me step outside the circle and view the conflict from a clearer vantage point. The second was the events that followed — two incidents in particular: the 2010 Israel’s attack on Navi Marmara and a Channel-4 interview during the 2014 Gaza onslaught.

In May 2010, the IDF attempted to thwart a peace flotilla headed for Gaza to ‘symbolically’ break the Israeli blockade. The raid soon turned bloody with the death of nine Turkish activists. I was puzzled by Israel’s indignation at the international community for criticising the lethal raid. I struggled to understand why instead of a serious soul-searching about the morality, let alone the legality, of soldiers raiding a ship in international water, many Israeli-Jews were engaged in a Kafkaesque conversation in which the military attack on the civilian ships was characterised as a legitimate “act of self-defence” (Cook 2010).
I saw how Israel’s mainstream media depicted the soldiers as victims of bullying by the activists. Yedioth Ahronoth (Ben-Yishai 2010), for instance, described the raid as “ambush for the Israeli commandos.” Netanyahu reportedly called it “lynching of our soldiers” and “a clear act of self-defence.” I felt that the Israeli rhetoric was something of blaming the victim or an act of ‘shooting and crying.’ It appeared like an attempt to clear one’s conscience without admitting responsibility.

The second instance was during Gaza’s third onslaught in 2014, otherwise known as Operation Protective Edge. As televisions around the world aired footage of destroyed neighbourhoods and hundreds of dead Palestinian civilians, Israeli media was occupied with depicting the offensive as a pure act of self-defence and the Operation as a full-blown war between equals. The message was that the IDF’s excessive use of firepower was justified not only to protect Israel’s citizens against Palestinian rockets, but also to preserve the country’s very existence.

I recall an interview on Channel 4, titled “Mothers of Israel and Palestine” (2014). On one side of the screen stood a Palestinian mother from Gaza, wearing a ‘Press’ marked bullet-proof vest and helmet. Behind her was the pitch black Gaza City. On the other, appeared an Israeli-Jewish mother, dressed in neat summer clothing with no protective gear. Behind her was the vibrant scene of Jerusalem’s streets — a visual statement of the paradoxical realities between the conflict rivals.

Initially, both women engaged in expressions of motherly worries. However, confronted by presenter Jackie Long’s statement that Palestinians so far lost 1400 people to Israel’s attacks yet there were no Israeli civilian casualties, the Israeli-Jewish mother dismissed it as numbers and semantics. She claimed that 80% of the dead were Hamas fighters. “Do you look across to Gaza, see children dying…being buried?”, asked Long. The Israeli-Jewish mother answered, “Some of those pictures are horrific, there is a question of how we can, in fact, counter that in the media.”
The Israeli-Jewish mother appeared aware of the horrific scenes coming out of Gaza, but seemingly wanted to suppress them in order to win the who-suffered-more competition with Adeem. Her reference to the soldiers “as our children, whom I kissed goodbye,” seemed like an Abrahamic immolation ritual (Svirsky 2014), perpetuating motherhood as a national mission — almost indistinguishable in spirit from a seemingly compos mentis Palestinian um al-shaheed (martyr’s mother). Although not fully comprehensible at the time, that appeared like an attempt to affirm the IDF’s innocence; an Israeli soldier, albeit armed and protected, is equal in his victimhood to hundreds of Palestinian civilians whose homes were turned into rubble over their heads.

To see parallel, I attempted to divorce myself from the conflict, to expel the ghosts of Ben-Gurion, Shamir, Sharon, and Netanyahu, and cleanse my soul from the burden of victimisation. Like Nassri Al-Sayegh (2005) in his ambitious book If I were a Jew, I wanted to foist an identity crisis upon myself and try to be the Other. But, like Al-Sayegh again, it was extremely challenging to fully disjoin my consciousness from the Palestinian collective. Similarly but on the other side, Yossi Klein Halevi in Letters to My Palestinian Neighbour (2018) tried to engage in self-reflexive, empathic communications with an imaginary Palestinian across the segregation wall. In them, he explained his reasons as an Israeli-Jew and attempted to show understanding to Palestinian suffering. But, like us, he remained undetachable from his collective. His very ‘neighbourhood’1 on the hillside in East Jerusalem where he wrote his letters and from which he looked at that Palestinian neighbour — and declaratively empathised — was no more than a settlement on an occupied land. Nevertheless, my overly ambitious and borderline arrogant strife to ‘fully identify’ has yielded some understanding. Full identification requires emotional investment, but as I came to learn, emotions in conflict may be too precious a commodity to share. Understanding is nevertheless affordable. It can be a first step not only to see the self in the Other, but also to reexamine one’s own identity — the victim identity.

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1 French Hill is a Jewish settlement in northern East Jerusalem.
Zooming backward and forward and sifting through my *emic* and *etic* perspectives on what I initially thought was a preposterous victimhood claims by an oppressive occupier, I managed to capture some logic behind those claims. The Israeli-Jewish mother’s lack of apparent empathy was perhaps not sinister or overly conscious. When she reduced Palestinian deaths to ‘semantics’ and a ‘numbers game,’ she may have been motivated by an aggressive desire of self-preservation closely tied to the historical Jewish fear of annihilation.

The fear of hurt, although disproportionate to the existing physical harm, was great, no doubt. But the fear of Israel appearing as an aggressor was perhaps greater. It seemed to me that only by depriving the people of Gaza of their victimhood, or by condemning the Turkish activists on board the flotilla, was Israel able to maintain her self-image as the perpetual victim. It would otherwise fly in the face of everything that Jewish memory holds dear.

That made me wonder about what it meant to be a victim and opened my eyes to the nature of narrative in intractable conflict. Through learning about the victim claims of the Other, my thoughts and feelings about my people’s victimhood narratives were disrupted. This disruption encouraged me to question our experience and engage in self-critique. It remains a fact, however, that being on “the wrong side of power,” to quote Said (in: Bayoumi & Rubin 2000), I might not achieve full empathy with the Other, but possibly a sympathetic understanding.

**PROBLEM STATEMENT**

_The narratives of victimhood in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict contribute to intractability and hinder settlement._

Moving from one level of intractability to another, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to invite considerable critical attention. Abundant literature, often reflecting a particular view or another, has been published on the historical and political causes of the conflict and its tortuous chain of deadlocks (see: e.g. Said & Hitchens 1988; Said 1992; Segev 2000; Morris 2001; Dershowitz 2003; Finkelstein 2005; Tilley 2005;
In what might be considered a leap forward in conflict studies, there is now a tendency to attribute the conflict complexity to a set of interwoven and interconnected dynamics (see: Coleman 2003; Coleman et al. 2010, 2011; Vallacher et al. 2010). Although this approach has facilitated the incorporation of psychology in conflict studies, the core scholarship remains largely focused on the geopolitical interpretations.

To date, only a few researchers, although growing in number, began to look at the socio-psychological side of the conflict, slowly but effectively deconstructing its complex understructure (e.g. Kelman 1987, 1999; Northrup 1989; Coleman et al. 2010; Volkan 1989, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2013a/b; Bar-Tal 2000b, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2011, 2013; Halperin et al. 2010; Shavit 2014; Halperin & Pliskin 2015). An important understructure that received little attention is the narratives of victimhood. Most researchers who looked at victimhood did so without exploring its specifics and generally viewed it as a secondary byproduct of conflict, and not as a multi-dimensional phenomenon that can affect the conflict trajectory. Volkan (e.g. 2001, 2004, 2006), for example, approached victimhood through the notion of ‘chosen trauma’ and ‘transgenerational transmission.’

Bar-Tal and colleagues came close to identifying and conceptualising victimhood as a barrier to peace (Bar-Tal & Halperin 2009, 2013; Bar-Tal & Jacobson 1998a). Developing the notion of ‘siege mentality,’ or what he and Antebi (1992a/b) originally called ‘the Masada Syndrome,’ Bar-Tal et al. (2009b) highlighted the subjective nature of victimhood and argued that Israeli-Jews because of their past coupled with the current conflict indeed felt victimised. Bar-Tal’s hypothesis was expanded and developed in his work on the socio-psychological foundations of intractable conflict (2013). Bar-Tal is no doubt a scholarly authority in the field, but his views on victimhood, although advanced, are still lacking in certain areas. His seemingly unavoidable and sometimes useful *emic* Israeli-Jewish perspective makes some of his views somewhat one-sided. Also, the little attention in his work to the conflict asymmetries ignores the core reason that makes many of Israel’s victimhood claims against the Palestinians questionable.
This study does not question the legitimacy of the feelings of victimisation amongst Israeli-Jews or the Jewish history of persecution, but argues that given the geo-political landscape, many of Israel’s victimhood claims vis-à-vis the Palestinians lack contextual validity. They lock many Israeli-Jews in a state of siege mentality and produce aggressive military and security policies that serve to perpetuate the conflict. Because of the power hierarchy, Palestinian victimhood may be contextually understandable, at least as a face-value, but it too becomes problematic when it disregards Palestinian agency and defines every aspect of Palestinian life in terms of pure suffering, especially if those aspects are not directly related to Israel’s occupation. The clash between the two narratives enlarges the political and psychological cracks between the two peoples and makes any form of settlement very difficult.

PURPOSE & OBJECTIVES

The purpose of the study is to explore, describe, and critique how victimhood has and continues to be a salient component in the master narratives of Israel and the Palestinians. And, how that serves to reinforce intractability and hinder settlement.

Against the backdrop of the available literature on conflict intractability, its geo-political and socio-psychological foundations, and the multi-angled scholarship on victimhood (e.g. Said 1979; Burton 1987; Northrup 1989; Zerubavel 1991, 1995, 2002; Segev 1993; Falk 1993, 1996, 2004; Bar-Tal & Jacobson 1998a/b; Volkan 2001, 2004, 2006, 2013a/b; Deutsch 2002; Grosbart 2003; Rouhana 2004; Bar-Tal 2007, 2009a/b, 2013; Vallacher et al. 2010; Peleg 2015), this study seeks to analyse the motives, assumptions, and behaviours that constitute the various aspects of victim identity, as well as explain its various manifestations. Approached narratively, the study looks at the historical, political, and ideological factors that shape Israel’s victim identity — and how this identity is defined by and itself has redefined Israel’s collective memory, conflict ethos, and emotional orientations. By judging Israel’s victimhood against the Palestinian situation, the
study seeks to assess Israel’s victimhood as a possible component in the conflict intractability. Analogously, aided by the abundant literature (mostly on Israel) on trauma, memory, beliefs, identity, and emotions (e.g. Kelman 1999; Margalit 2004; Volkan 2006; Lentin 2010; Bar-Tal 2007, 2013; Oren & Bar-Tal 2014; Masalha 2015), as well as through my personal observations as a member of the Palestinian collective, the study investigates what is viewed as contentious aspects of Palestinian victimhood and assesses their effect on intractability.

RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND OVERALL APPROACH

This work is humanities based and its prime goal is to generate verstehen (intimate understanding) whilst being engaged in an inductive process, advancing concepts and emergent hypotheses, not a theory. It focuses on the subjective experience but without disregarding the external factors that shape it. It seeks to provide an insightful, critical and philosophical image of what is on the other side of the glass pane, and asks fundamental questions of value, purpose, and meaning in a rigorous and critical way. To this end, it uses an eclectic synthesis of doctrines, paradigms, and insights from various disciplines of thought without necessarily adopting the whole parent system for each discipline (Paterson, in: Given (ed.) 2008).

A humanities approach also means interpretive and flexible methodologies (ibid.). This study implements a narrative research method. The multiple data used throughout are largely treated as narrative and analysed using a ‘categorical-content’ approach, one focused on understanding the latent content and meaning units. Reflexivity is also utilised as both a narrative source and a tool of analysis.

ASSUMPTIONS AND PERSONAL CONVICTIONS
There are variations in the roles and positions that researchers take up in relation to the research phenomenon and settings and the ways a researcher’s social identity and location are interpreted (Ravitch & Carl 2016). In this study, two fundamental personal convictions define this author’s relationship with the research subject-matter. First, the occupation is a fact and Zionism [in Palestinian eyes] is a form of settler-colonialism. Therefore, what might have the face-value of a polarised or binary standpoint may spring from a) an overall post-colonial perspective characterised by unbalanced power relations, or/and b) a subjective outlook due to unresolved emotionality towards a conceivably oppressive occupier. Second, the feelings of victimisation — no matter how debatable — are valid for the assumed or self-defined victims, Israeli-Jews and Palestinians alike. Nevertheless, part of this author’s perception of Israel’s victimhood remains contextually swayed by the Palestinian experience.

**LIMITATIONS**

Not including the inherent limitations in qualitative research (reproducibility, ambiguity, subjectivity, or bias), there were physical and conceptual restrictions that dictated this study’s information gathering, analysis and methodology.

This work primarily uses conceptualised secondary sources. Access to Israeli archives or interviews with Israeli officials, for instance, would have benefited the study’s scope greatly. But being of Palestinian descent comes with certain logistical and political limitations. It was not going to be easy, if at all possible, to travel to Israel or access Israeli archival materials. Also, conducting interviews with Israeli officials was not going to be without sensitivities. I nevertheless contacted the IDF Arabic spokesman Avichai Adraee for an interview. While he was initially responsive, it was a long-winded process and eventually nothing materialised. I also spoke with Shimon Peres’ office manager, only few months before Peres’s passing in September 2016, but

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2 The Home Office advises that British nationals of Palestinian origin may be denied entry into Israel. See the Home Office website, travel advice, entry: Israel — https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/israel/entry-requirements
scheduling an interview was not successful. Busy schedule was also an issue with ‘Arab’ and Jewish members of the Knesset.

The thesis did not heavily engage with Arabic literature from non-Palestinian sources. This is not on the ground of scarcity but because many of these sources often had ideological purposes and for the large part lacked the ‘lived experience’ element that Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian sources — although ideological at times — usually provided. For the general Arab populations, reflects Barari (2009), writing on Israel becomes a matter of struggle and strife rather than a means of exploration.

This work mainly focuses on the **common denominators**: it examines a variety of the most occurring narratives amongst the majority of Israeli-Jews and Palestinians. The Israeli-Jewish or Palestinian societies, however, are not deemed strictly monolithic or completely homogeneous. Counter-narratives, especially from Israel, are frequently used to support and expand the argument.

**RESEARCH QUESTION(S)**

The central question is: *to what extent do the narratives of victimhood hinder settlement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?*

The question is broad and to provide a satisfactory answer it is perhaps important to start at the top by asking questions about the place of victimhood in intractable conflict and its possible socio-psychological nature and the ramifications of that. This also raises important questions about its manifestations, the most salient of them, and which ones are most discernible in Israel and among the Palestinians. The multi-angled exploration leads to an understanding of the extent to which victimhood adds to intractability and therefore hinders settlement.
**RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE**

Zionism won the legitimacy battle over Palestine in the international community partly due to the representations, rhetorics, and images it attached to the conditions of European Jews (Said & Hitchens 1998). Palestinians placed much of their legitimacy claims to Palestine on being the indigenous population and European Jews as foreign invaders. The Jews saw themselves as returning to Zion after two-thousand years of exile. Although a Jewish State was supported by Britain and some Western countries from the outset, it was the Nazi crimes against Europe’s Jews however that gave the Jewish State endeavour in most of the international community a sense of urgency and the Jewish claims to Palestine a boost of legitimacy (Kanafani 2017). This among other things resulted in the Palestinian grievances being disregarded, and the resistance to Israel’s occupation was soon separated from the context of Palestinian victimhood. A significant aspect of this study is its attempt — largely from a Palestinian perspective — to analyse Israel’s victimhood, and by doing that it also calls attention to the several hardly discussed aspects of Palestinian victimhood. It challenges the common orthodoxies of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and opens up new paradigms for understanding its complex dynamics. This should add to knowledge and may eventually contribute to the production of peacemaking models.

Victimhood is often studied as a stand-alone, independent phenomenon. Little is said about its varied manifestations. This study expands the range of manifestations, increasing the angles from which victimhood can be studied and developing the understanding of its effect in conflict. Here, the manifestations are presented and filtered through collective memory, conflict ethos, and emotional orientations. Security, for example, is usually viewed as a geo-political or psycho-political phenomenon, or is measured in international
relations terms. But in the study it is seen as one of the most significant manifestations of victimhood — and is analysed as such.

The study is particularly important because it advances the knowledge about the understudied Palestinian victimhood. Dissimilar to other studies on the Palestinian struggle, where the Palestinian situation is often approached politically or tackled as zero-sum: David-versus-Goliath or mindless terrorism, this study, among other things, assesses Palestinian victimhood on the basis of ‘agency.’ Even though Palestinians are viewed largely as the conflict underdogs, the study still questions some aspects of their entrenched ‘ideal victim’ self-identity (see: Christie 1986). It seeks to explain the make-up of Palestinian victimhood and that mainly includes the fear of memoricide, humiliation, and the conflicted national character which the ethos about muqawama helps create. By trying to hold the mirror up to Palestinians and thinking of the Palestinian experience critically and reflexively, this study to some extent presents a counter-narrative from within to the Palestinian victimhood narratives. This is a rarely seen endeavour in Palestinian society.

KEY TERMS

• **Amalek**: An ancient nation described in the Hebrew Bible as the enemies of the Israelites. In the modern sense, Amalek represents those perceived as enemies of the Jewish people and reflects Israel’s trans-generational/transhistorical sense of fear.

• **Arab**: If emphasised or used between two quotes, ‘Arab’ or ‘Arabs,’ it usually refers to Israel’s description of the Palestinians. The term is problematic as it helps sustain the Zionist denial of Palestinians as an independent identity and culture. If there is no distinct Palestinian identity, goes the rationale, then there is no such thing as Palestine, and therefore Israel is not an invader or an occupier. Although these days mainstream media in Israel refer to Palestinians as Palestinians, social media platforms show that ‘ordinary’ Israeli-Jews still refer to Palestinians as ‘Arabs’ more than they do ‘Palestinians.’ That could indicate that the majority of Israeli-Jews still regard the conflict as a Jewish-Arab conflict (Gilad 2015).
The term also falsely suggests that the Arab world is a single entity that displays uniform attitudes and policies vis-à-vis the Jews, Zionism, and/or Israel (Caplan 2009), and Israel is standing alone, surrounded by tens of millions of antagonistic Arabs.

- **Ashkenazi**: Jews who originated in Eastern Europe (Western Jews).

- **Common Denominator**: The majority of Israeli-Jews or Palestinians who adhere to certain narratives.

- **Conflict**: The word conflict conjures a sense of parity, of two equal parties who disagree (Abdullah 2015). Conflict is a more appropriate word to describe the relation between Israel and some Arab states — the Arab-Israeli conflict, but not the situation between Israel and the Palestinians. Not least because describing the situation between Israel and the Palestinians as a conflict is to disregard the distinction between the “occupier” and the “occupied.” Although this study continues to use the term, it should be noted that this author continues to view it with skepticism and uneasiness.

- **Galut**: (He.) The Jewish Diaspora/Exile.

- **Hamas**: The Islamic Resistance Movement, founded by Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood leaders in 1987 and is currently the second largest Palestinian party and the de facto ruler of Gaza.

- **Intifada**: (Ar.) Literally means shake-off — the Palestinian uprising(s) against Israel's occupation. There were two main Intifadas: the First Intifada 1987-1993 (the stones Intifada), and the Second Intifada 2000-2005 (Al-Aqsa Intifada).

- **Israeli-Jew**: A Jew who lives in Israel and/or holds Israeli citizenship or identify as Israeli and generally adheres to the Zionist worldview and ideology. It may not include Zionist Jews who are not Israelis or Israeli Jews who do not identify with Zionism such as the ultra-Orthodox groups Neturei Karta and Satmar Hasidim. When the term ‘Israeli’ only is used, it refers to the state bodies or policies, like saying: ‘Israeli policies, or Israeli army.’ This is a power structure that most non-Jews in Israel do not take part in. Those non-Jews are mostly Palestinians with Israeli citizenship and they represent 20% of Israel’s population. Israel officially defines them as ‘Arab’ citizens of Israel (MFA 2013). They are the Palestinians who

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3 According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) (2013), the 'Arab' population is approximately 1.638 million residents (20.7% of total population).
remained in their homes after Israel’s establishment in 1948. The majority do not serve in the IDF and like the rest of Palestinians, they consider Israeli Jews foreign invaders (Rouhana 1997).

- **Isteshhadi**: (Ar.) Literally ‘would-be-martyr’ — suicide bomber.
- **Likud**: Israeli centre-right to right-wing political party, founded in 1973 and came to power in 1977 with Menachem Begin as prime minister.
- **Mechabel**: (He.) Literally ‘saboteur’ — it generally means ‘terrorist’ and is used by Israel to describe Palestinian dissidence.
- **Meta-narrative / Master Narrative**: The overarching national narrative that defines the common societal beliefs and the ideological and cultural infrastructure of the state institutions.
- **Mizrachi**: Jews who originated in the Middle East and North Africa (Oriental Jews / Arab Jews).
- **Muqawama**: (Ar.) resistance, mainly to Israel’s occupation.
- **Nakba**: (Ar.) The Palestinian exodus and dispossession of 1948. The word began to establish itself amongst Arabs in 1948 onwards as a means of underscoring the gravity of the ḥazīma (defeat) (Manaa’ 2013). It was broadly circulated by Arab nationalist Qustantine Zureiq in a pamphlet titled “the Meaning of the Nakba” (1948). Ma’ajam Al-Ma’ani Arabic Lexicon (2016) defines it as “A painful catastrophe that befalls man’s family/clan, or fortune.” Today, however, it has become almost exclusively ‘a Palestinian word’ — usually preceded by a definite article al (the) — al Nakba. It has become an abridged word for a series of disasters that commenced with the first Zionist Congress in 1897 and peaked in 1948, up until now. It suggests a ‘fierce unexpectedness’ on the part of the Palestinians who failed to foresee the inevitability of the Zionist project (Dawood 2011). In the Palestinian popular memory the Nakba commenced lamma ajjo al yahud (When the Jews came), to borrow the common expression of the Nakba generation (Eqeiq 2011).
- **New Jew**: The Zionist notion of an independent, self-sufficient, and free Jew in a Jewish homeland.
- **Palestinian Authority (PA)**: The Palestinian administrative body governing parts of the West Bank and Gaza, formed in the wake of the Oslo Accords in 1994.
• **Paradigm Shift**: A radical change in or a challenge to the accepted belief system. It is also reflected in the term ‘cognitive dissonance’ (see: Festinger 1957).

• **PLO**: The Palestine Liberation Organisation, founded in 1964 as a coalition of various Palestinian factions.

• **Power Asymmetry, Balance, Structure, Hierarchy**: Refers to the steep disparity in military, political and economic power between Israel and the Palestinians.

• **Occupied Territories (OT) or Palestinian Territories (PT)**: The remainder of historical Palestine that Israel occupied in 1967 - Gaza and the West Bank.

• **Sabra**: (He.) Arabicised Hebrew which means ‘cactus’ and refers to the rooted, tenacious Jew in the pre-Israel Palestine. See: *Yishuv* below.

• **Shabak / Shin Bet**: (He.) Israel’s Internal Security Agency.

• **Shaheed**: (Ar.) Martyr, comes from *Isteshhad* or *shahada* (martyrdom).

• **Shoah**: (He.) The Jewish Holocaust. *Shoah* is an ethnicised designation which defines the *Holocaust* with specifically Jewish dimensions. It is purely Jewish and purely secular (Novick 2000), or as Rosenfeld (1999) explains, it satisfies those who wish to retain an exclusive claim to “their” Holocaust. The word *Holocaust*, on the other hand, is ‘heavily connoted’ and not neutral (Ashcar 2010, p.13). In the Greek Old Testament *Holocaust* means ‘a burnt sacrificed offering dedicated exclusively to God’ (Evans 2001). The Jewish genocide, however, was not an expiatory offering to God, but rather a genocide ‘in the name of ethnic purity’ (ibid.; Kamins 2005; Aschar 2010). The term was also used by Churchill and some contemporary writers to refer to the Armenian genocide in the early twentieth-century (Fisk 2007; also see: Warsch 2006). Its universalist connotation makes it less suitable for the purpose of this research. The term ‘Jewish genocide’ will occasionally be used.

• **UNRWA**: UN Relief and Work Agency, founded by the UN General Assembly in 1949 to aid Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

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4 Most recently, the onslaught in Aleppo was also called a holocaust. Sky News [October 2016]: Aleppo mayor blames West for doing nothing over ‘holocaust’ in city. BBC [Ancil & Young, November 2016]: Syrian conflict: Surgeon says life in Aleppo ‘like a holocaust’. Time of Israel [Sales 2016a]: Arab Israeli newscaster: Aleppo onslaught is ‘a holocaust’
• **We / Us / Ourselves:** The Palestinian collective and is indicative of the author’s positionality and reflexive input. When *they* is positioned against the *we, us,* or *ourselves,* it should mean Israel or Israeli-Jews.

• **I / me / myself:** Variants of the auto-ethnographic ‘I’ and are often used to indicate the author’s reflexive thoughts and auto-ethnographic unfolding of personal experience in relation to the research question.

• **Yishuv:** The Pre-state Jewish settler communities in Palestine (1882-1947).

• **Zionist Entity:** Derogatory term from Arabic *al-kayan al-sohiyoni,* and is designed to question Israel’s legitimacy. The phrase emphasises *Zionist,* showing that the Arab rhetoric was against the Jewish state, not the Jewish presence (Tilley 2005). Also, attaching ‘entity’ to ‘Zionist’ adds a sense of temporariness and rootlessness to Israel — a comforting notion for many Palestinians. In this research, ‘Zionist entity’ is only used if quoted or cited, or if needed for the context.

**TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION**

Several Arabic and Hebrew terms are used in this work. Some had already been translated and transliterated by other authors and are used as such. The rest are done by this author. Had an Arabic/Hebrew texts been translated by other authors that I was not aware of, it is possible that my phrasing and vocabulary would differ slightly, but the general meaning is likely to remain similar. The transliterated Arabic and Hebrew terms follow a simplified form of romanisation, no diacritics or special characters are used.

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5 In fact, the expression ‘Zionist entity’ goes all the way back to 1917, and was first stated during a Friday prayer’s sermon by the Imam of Al-Taqwa mosque in Algeria who was protesting and responding to the Balfour Declaration [BBC 1917].
CHAPTER ONE

LITERATURE REVIEW
OVERVIEW

The purpose of this study is to explore the role of victimhood narratives in sustaining the intractability of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and consequently hindering settlement. In reviewing the literature, an overview of intractable conflict’s definitions, geo-political foundations, and socio-psychological nature is first provided. It is used as a means to better understand the landscape in which the narratives of victimhood emerge and develop (Lederach 2005). The study then reviews and critiques the available yet limited scholarship on victimhood as a socio-psychological phenomenon. While the study benefits from the contributions of several scholars, it more than others examines and critiques Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological work on intractable conflict, focusing mainly on collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations. These represent the broad framework through which the narratives of collective victimhood are analysed (see Fig. a.1.0). The chapter thereupon proceeds to discussing the limitations in the current victimhood literature and how they are addressed in this study. Finally, a conclusion is provided reiterating the core literature and elaborating on the conceptual framework that will guide the thesis throughout.

INTRACTABLE CONFLICT

A large and growing body of literature has investigated how and why conflicts occur and why some conflicts become intractable while others do not (Coleman and Goldman 2005). The literature, however, remains largely fragmented on the exact causes (Vallacher et al. 2010).

Northrup (1989) maintains that some conflicts are likely to evolve over time, seeing changes that are either relatively idiosyncratic to each conflict situation, or may be conceived as occurring in a fixed sequence. This opinion is shared by Kriesberg (1991; 1998; 2011), who presented a ‘stage theory,’ pointing out that conflicts move through a series of stages and acquire new characteristics (becoming protracted, violent, perceived as
irresolvable, and demands extensive investment) that may form a recurrent cycle whose outcome is the basis for a new conflict. Similarly, Azar (1986; Northrup 1989) criticises the international relations theory for its tendency to regard conflicts as discrete actions with clear delineated time period, implying that conflicts are subject to development and changes over time, and are therefore fluid.

There seems to be a general agreement however that intractable conflicts are defined in terms of persistency, longevity and destructiveness (Kriesberg 2005). Burton (1987, in: Coleman et al. 2014) referred to “deep rootedness” as key to intractability. Azar described ‘protracted social conflicts’ — a term he coined to refer to intractable conflicts — as “on-going and seemingly unresolvable” (Reimann 2002; Crocker et al. 2004, p.191). Goertz and Diehl (1993) proposed the concept of “enduring rivalry,” suggesting that intractability occurs as an outcome of accumulative and persistent disputes between states.

Deutsch (2002) defined intractable conflicts in terms of incompatible activities, which Vallacher et al. (2013) described as preventing, obstructing, and injuring. According to Bar-Tal and Halperin (2013), conflicts break out when two or more groups believe that their goals or interests are in direct contradiction and decide to act on this basis. Hence the traditional belief that resolving conflicts is realised through the elimination of the incompatibilities between goals and interests. Such belief may have been influenced by the literature from the realist schools of political theory and international relations (e.g. Kennan 1951; Aron 1967). It defined conflict in terms of ‘causal logic’ and downplayed the role of beliefs, needs, and ethos. It attributed political behaviours to primarily conscious interests, which could to some extent help explain events like failed peace and instability (Mearsheimer 2001; Betts 2004; Sorgenfrei 2009). Frankel (1996, in: Legro & Moravscik 1999) suggested that material interests in this case constitute a fundamental ‘reality’ that exercises an exogenous influence on state behaviour no matter what states seek, believe, or construct.

Vallacher et al. (2010) speculated that defusing a conflict is tantamount to eliminating the perceived incompatibility and creating conditions that foster common goals and values. This, in theory, suggests that a
conflict with no end in sight serves the interests of very few people, drains both parties’ resources, wastes energy, and diminishes human capital. Therefore, it becomes urgent for the conflict parties to seek a solution by removing the incompatibilities. However, in practice, simply removing the incompatibilities may not truly end the conflict. Mitchell (2014) reflects that over the course of a conflict what adversaries do to one another often widen the gap between them, causing the underlying incompatible goals to give rise to an additional set of goals. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has gone through multiple phases since the late nineteenth-century, therefore the perceived incompatibilities have repeatedly begotten other incompatibilities, further complicating and occasionally redefining the original geo-political essence of the conflict.

For the most part, antagonistic encounters stemming from incompatible interests and worldview(s) could be short-lived and run their course without causing irreparable damage to either party (Vallacher et al. 2010). Only a small number of conflicts become excessively complex and, ultimately, intractable. Coleman (2011) argues that only five percent (out of 11,000 interstate rivalries between 1816-1992) become resistant to traditional methods of conflict resolution and, therefore, intractable. Bercovitch, on the other hand, identified seventy-five serious interstate conflicts out of 309 occurring in the period of 1945-1995, which were violent and lasted for at least 15 years (2005, cited by Bar-Tal 2014, p.222). Regardless of the difference in quantitative data, intractable conflicts tend to share common characteristics: long-lasting, enduring without cessation for years, and show no signs of solution in the foreseeable future.

**GEO-POLITICAL TO SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTRACTORS**

Overstepping the limitations in traditional literature on intractability and attempting to establish a unified meta-framework, several scholars have pushed for a dynamical approach to intractable conflict. Ricigliano (2011) proposed that intractable conflicts should be treated as complex systems similar to cells, ant colonies, or cities. The purpose is to help scholars move from a fragmented analysis to a more comprehensive understanding of conflict and also generate a portable analysis that can be fed into strategy, program
development, and monitoring and evaluation. This approach was further substantiated by the introduction of the concept of ‘attractors’ (Coleman 2003, Vallacher et al. 2010, 2013), which referred to the interaction of both existing and new elements, which — together — created a higher level of complexity in a conflict. As if to say that intractability occurs when many different conflict components collapse together into one mass, into one very simply ‘us versus them’ story that effectively resists change (Coleman 2011a, 2015). The more entwined elements a conflict comprises, reflects Peleg (2015), the more likely it will fall into intractability. In this case, intractable conflict acquires a new dimension where it can be further described as complex, dynamic, nonlinear system with a core set of interrelated and mutually influential values (Coleman 2003).

In the process of developing the concept of ‘attractors,’ Coleman (2003) identified fifty-six variables associated with the persistence of destructive conflicts. These variables include but are not limited to political instability, power asymmetry, survival, dignity, deep symbolism and ideology, zero-sum collective identities, emotionality and trauma. Aiming to establish a unified system, Coleman in cooperation with Vallacher, Nowak, and Bui-Wrzosinska introduced the Dynamical Systems Theory (2009). The theory’s central premise was to help individuals and institutions understand the relationship between elements which promote, sustain, or deepen conflicts, recognise patterns that lead us into or away from intractability, and reveal and influence the underlying forces that give rise to conflict.

The dynamical system seems to suggest that some of the essential features of intractable conflicts are indeed tangible and have a discernible causality. Other features, however, such as viewing the conflict as existential, irresolvable, and zero sum (see: Bar-Tal 2007, 2013a) are socio-psychologically driven and might not necessarily reflect the conflict geo-politics. This is in line with Northrup’s (1989) original thoughts that most factors at all levels of conflict have both subjective and objective components. Separating the external and the cognitive-emotional, he suggested, is an artificial distinction. Similarly, emphasising the dynamical nature of conflict as a basic starting point in conflict resolution, Mnookin and Ross (1999) suggested that a conflict has three interactive barriers: the tactical/strategic, the organisation/institutional/structural, and, more
importantly, the psychological. Burton (in: Kriesberg 1991) remarks that conflicts originally erupt over material resources and interests in which basic human needs such as identity and security become central to the conflict and their resolution. In Coleman’s view (2003), what initially starts off as geo-political issues such as borders and security could under certain circumstances evolve into deep symbolic meanings and narratives. Put differently, over time a conflict acquires a socio-psychological character (Gray et al. 2007).

Nowadays, acknowledging the dynamical, non-linear nature of intractable conflict, several scholars began to adopt a dominantly socio-psychological approach to conflict studies. This is based on the general notion that to most people the socio-psychological landscapes of intractable conflict feel terribly real. That is, as the conflict rages on, the psychological forces begin to take control, creating simplistic narratives about the conflict that are devoid of nuance and serve to lock people into a rigid belief system that might not correspond with the tangible, geo-political complexities on the ground (e.g. Vallacher et al. 2010; Coleman 2011a; Kelman 2007, 2010; 2015; Bar-Tal 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2013; Bar-Tal & Halperin 2009, 2013; Halperin & Shavit 2015; Bar-Tal & Jacobson 1998; Bar-Tal & Rouhana 1998; Volkan 2001, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2013a; Jones 2015).

For Israeli-Jews and Palestinians, what started off as a geo-political dispute has now become laden with socio-psychological meanings. Ramsbotham (2011) speculates that those meanings and narratives, unlike the geopolitical interests, are ontological in nature and, therefore, non-negotiable. Think of the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks as an example. Neither the negotiating parties nor the mediators seemed to fully appreciate the psychological burden of ‘the other side.’ Gross (2004) speculated that they merely attempted to solve some of the problems of the 1967 disputes. Israel’s obsession with security and Palestinian ‘overpowering demands for justice’ (Peleg 2015) were generally understood within the limited terms of geo-politics. This is hardly surprising considering that the negotiation methods of the mid to late 1990s were influenced by the scholarly work of the time — mainly the ‘principled negotiation theory’ (Fisher and Uri 1991) — which saw the success of the negotiations in detaching the people from the conflict problems and focusing them on finding
mutual interests. This is an approach chiefly dependant on integrative or interest-based bargaining (Spangler 2003). Aware of these limitations, Rouhana (2004) has insisted on using ‘reconciliation’ instead of ‘settlement’ or ‘agreement’ to emphasise the cognitive-emotional nature of the Israeli-Palestinian relations and to stress — like others have hypothesised (see: Volkan 1985; Montville 2001; Coleman 2005; Staub 2006; Kelman 2008, 2010) — that a final status agreement may not necessarily bring about instant reconciliation. It would otherwise run counter to all historical experiences (Mertes & Khano 2013).

VICTIMHOOD AS A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL DYNAMIC

Even with the acknowledgement of the socio-psychological dynamics in conflict intractability, it remains difficult to generalise. Drawing on and developing Kriesberg’s conception of intractable conflict characteristics, Bar-Tal (ibid., 2013a) explains that all these characteristics may evolve with time and each of them has its own pace of development. Once they all appear the state of intractability begins. Bar-Tal (2007) proposes that although the socio-psychological principles and dynamics seem similar, each intractable conflict has its unique context, content, and features. This also suggests that based on the conflict there may also be certain socio-psychological attractors more intense and dominant than others.

In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict victimhood is possibly one of the most dominant socio-psychological attractors. There is indeed a good volume of literature on victims and victimhood. However, traditionally but with few recent exceptions (see: Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992a/b; Noor et al. 2012; Vollhard 2012; Rimé et al. 2015; Noor et al. 2017; Bouchat et al. 2017), most of the available literature did not view victimhood as a socio-psychological phenomenon nor explored its collective dimension (e.g. collective memory, ethos, and emotions [Bar-Tal 2007]) in intractable conflict. Much of the current scholarship seems occupied with objective victimhood, mostly viewing victims as synonymous with ‘physical harm’ (McDowell 2007). The Oxford Dictionary Online (2016), for example, defines a ‘victim’ as “a person harmed, injured, or killed as a result of
a crime, accident, or other event or action.” Similarly, in Collins English Dictionary Online (2016) a victim is defined as a person or thing that suffers harm, death…from another or from some adverse act.

The first type of physical harm is one viewed as caused by natural disasters (Confino 2005). A victim in this case is mostly defined in terms of the deprivation of basic human needs (see: Azar & Burton 1986; Ramsbotham et al. 2011) and the approach to him/her is usually humanitarian. The second type of physical harm is where victims are targets of structural and direct violence. This entails a clear-cut victim-perpetrator dyad and where the victim is often innocent and without agency. This is typically present in narratives regarding colonialism, slavery, terrorism, racism, and genocide (Christie 1986; Bayley 1991; Meister 2002; Govier 2015) and is believed to have been partly motivated and influenced by the increasing focus on human rights and trauma (Noor et al. 2017).

There is also the fact that the basic unit of exploration and analysis in the dominant victimhood literature seems to be centred on the first-hand victims and their individual experiences (Bouchat et al. 2017). This may have had its roots in victimology and psychiatry where the focus was on the needs of particular groups of ‘vulnerable’ victims, such as the victims of crimes, women and children who experienced domestic violence, abuse, or have been sexually assaulted (van der Kolk 1989; Zur 1994; Garkawe 2004; Dignan 2005).

Dealing with victimhood as mainly an individual occurrence or a product of physical harm, however, leaves so much to be desired in our understanding of victimhood in intractable conflict, not least because the victim is and should be viewed as a multidisciplinary subject (Jacoby 2014) with deep ties with the in-group’s collective memory and the conflict ethos, cognitive appraisals and emotional response tendencies (Bar-Tal 2007, 2013; Halperin & Schwartz 2010; Halperin et al. 2011).

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6 See next chapter for details.

7 See next chapter for details.
While not denying the tangible, geo-political events that initiated the feelings of victimisation, the focus is primarily on victimhood as an experience-based dynamic (Bouchat et al. 2017). One way to view it, as a concept and practice (attitudes, behaviours, and perceptions), victimhood has a meaning primarily within the context of human relations (Kelman 2008), which Zur (1994) further argues, happens within the context of a certain environment or culture. Challenging the stereotypical ‘rationality’ narratives in the study of world’s politics (Tetlock 1998) where victims are the product of tangible circumstances, victims in conflict can also be affected by intangible experience related to identity, trauma, loss of security, and even — speculates Confino (2005) — loss of the old self. In other words, Garkawe (2004) sees, victimhood is not only an objective occurrence, but is also based on a subjective experience. This premise has encouraged some scholars to shift much of their attention to the experienced events in their study of victimisation. Aquino & Byron (2002), for instance, referred to ‘self-perception of having been the target of harmful actions.’ This at the very least suggests that a socio-psychological view of victimhood should be concerned — as a basic starting point — with how victims perceive themselves ‘as victims,’ not only as others see or define them. Accepting that premise has induced a significant psychological dimension to the conceptualisation of victimhood. Zur (1994), for instance, emphasised elements in victims’ psychology that emerge as a result of the harmful action, such as the feeling of helplessness and hopelessness, self-pity, low self-esteem, guilt, distrust, and loss of sense of control.

Using the above as a point of departure, it can be argued that since victimhood is largely a socio-psychological dynamic, its role in intractable conflict may belong to those psychological-hypothetical constructs, which reside in the human mind, as other beliefs and feelings are (Bar-Tal and Jacobson 1998). This leads one to assume that there may not actually be a close correlation between the ‘tangible’ indicators of victimisation (e.g. the degree of physical harm) often associated with the history of a specific group and ‘perceptual’ victimisation held in the narratives that shape collective memory and which can easily distort reality. The connection between victimhood and tangible social reality, scilicet, may be indirect and metaphorical (Baumesiter & Hastings 1997, in: Bouchat et al. 2017; Assmann & Conrad 2010; Rimé et al.
2015). Above all, as it will be elaborated on in the next sections, this premise allows one to view victimhood or the perceptions of victimisation more broadly and deeply by tying it to collective memory, ethos, and emotional responses that are both byproducts and attractors of intractable conflict.

VICTIMHOOD IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

The above assumptions have informed and motivated several discussions and theorisations about victimisation in the Israeli-Palestinian context (e.g. Falk 1993, 2004; Ochs 2006; Rose 2007; Enns 2007, 2012; Burg 2008, 2014; Navon 2009, 2015; Pappé 2010; Benbassa 2010; Noor et al. 2012; Vollhard 2012; Peleg 2015; Gratch 2015; Noor et al. 2017). Only few scholars — each with their own agendas and intellectual orientations — struck close to home (of victimhood) as intended in this study or introduced a certain socio-psychological context that could aide the development of the research question. The most important contributions came from Daniel Bar-Tal. However, to advance the understanding of victimhood in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this study also draws some inspiration from Kelman’s early observations on identity and Volkan’s conception of ‘chosen trauma.’ These add to Bar-Tal’s broad and encompassing socio-psychological framework, particularly in regard to collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations, which will largely guide this study.

Kelman: negative identity

In line with the growing literature on the dynamical nature of intractable conflict (see above), Kelman argued for the subjective aspects of conflicts and their impact upon conflict resolution (Kelman 2007, 2008), emphasising that the socio-psychological methods were especially effective once the conflict has taken its course. Like Coleman (2003) and also in keeping with Burton’s basic human needs theory (1990), he claimed that in conflict the psychological forces would seem more fundamental than the material ones and, therefore, the conflict becomes inescapable from the daily lives of the conflicting parties. This is a notion that Bar-Tal
and Halperin (2009) later identified as the “culture of conflict” and Volkan (2006, 2013b) incorporated into his ‘large-group identity.’

Kelman’s thoughts on conflict identity are of a particular interest. Based on his involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he maintained that the collective identity of each group in the conflict was bolstered by national narratives that are reliant on threat and the negation of the other’s identity (Kelman 1999). This is particularly true when each people’s collective identities are woven into their ‘sense of victimhood’ (see: Bar-Tal et al. 2009b). Kelman described that as ‘negative interdependence’⁸ (Kelman 1987, 1999), viz., a victim identity is only valid if the opponent’s victim identity is not. In different ways, he says, both Palestinians and Israeli-Jews have lived on the edge of national oblivion. The themes of destruction, physical annihilation, and nonexistence play a central role in their national self-image, (Kelman 1987, p.354) and ultimately their sense of collective identity. When positioned against the opponent’s identity, society members’ desire to be identified as victims becomes even more profound (Marker 2003). Think of the Palestinian Nakba narratives; the fact that they are ignored or denied by Israel makes Palestinian cling to them even more and increasingly, if not existentially, become the trademark for a legitimate, exalted victim identity. Stretching Kelman work outside its ostensible boundaries, it may also be argued that victim identity locks the parties into a reactive narcissism that prevents them from seeing the others’ suffering (Schimel et al. 2001 & Stosny 2010). This is regulated through ego-defence mechanisms such as denial, rationalisation, self aggrandisement, and sense of entitlement (Brown 1997; see: Bar-Tal’s framework below). The result is possibly more obstacles to settlement.

Because Kelman mainly focused on the psychological underpinnings of national identities for conflict resolution purposes, he seemed to disregard some of the fundamental differences between the two peoples’ narratives, at least in terms of history and the conflict power hierarchy. This influenced Kelman’s conceptualisation of identity in several ways. Accepting that both peoples have equal responsibility in the

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⁸ The term ‘negative identity’ is also used in this work to refer to the same concept.
making of their negative identity may suggest that the cognitive-emotional evaluations of the conflict, much less those connected to collective memory, are equal. The overall psychological perception of, say, the Nakba and the Shoah as chosen traumas (e.g., Volkan 2001, 2004) may produce similar cognitive appraisals and accordingly elicit specific emotional response tendencies such as distrust, fear, anger, or hatred (Lazarus 1991; Frijda et al., 2000; Halperin & Schwartz 2010; Halperin et al. 2011). However, the hierarchal nature of the conflict suggests that the experiences of Israeli-Jews and Palestinians are significantly different and, therefore, the cognitive and emotional evaluations and responses are, too, different — some are more salient than others. Fear may steer Israel’s security (see: Bar-Tal 2001), but for Palestinians the feelings of humiliation are probably more dominant (see Chapter Seven). There is also the fact that when Kelman highlighted the role of negative identity in hindering conflict resolution he did not pinpoint what exactly in that identity that primarily impeded conflict resolution, a limitation that Volkan and, specifically Bar-Tal, each in their own way, sought to address.

Volkan: chosen trauma and trans-generational transmission

Like Kelman, Volkan did not specifically focus on victimhood as an overarching signifier in his conceptualisations of intractable conflicts. He, nevertheless, established trauma as an important context through which the socio-psychological dynamics of conflict, and by default victimhood, may be viewed, studied, and analysed.

There is abundant literature on trauma in a large spectrum of topics, especially in the fields of clinical psychology and psychoanalysis. That includes but is not limited to natural disasters (e.g. Escobar et al., in: Elliot 1997), child sexual abuse and the resulting suppressed or false memories (e.g. Williams 1994; Elliot 1997), physical assault (e.g. Resnick et al. 1998), and post-traumatic stress disorder relating to armed conflicts and political distress/processes (see: e.g. Fassin & Rechtman 2009). Volkan’s overview of trauma is not in its overall approach unique. However, its inclusion of the social context and the transition from the classic
individual-based trauma to the examination of the collective trauma has created a broader context through which the various manifestations of victimhood can be studied.

Taking Kelman’s hypotheses on identity to the next level, Volkan (2001, 2013b) has formed the concept of large-group identity. The term is possibly a re-utilisation of the “large group” from the literature of psychoanalysis (e.g. Freud 1921). But in Volkan’s work, large-group identity refers to a collective subjective experience of tens of thousands or millions of people, who share certain feelings of sameness. The main task of the members of that large-group is to protect and maintain their group identity. To Volkan, a ‘chosen trauma,’ represent a primary component in the formation of that identity.

Volkan (2001, 2004, 2013a, 2013b; also see: Ainslie 2015) defined ‘chosen trauma’ as the shared mental representation of a massive trauma that the group's ancestors suffered at the hand of an enemy. When a large group regresses, its chosen trauma is reactivated in order to support the group's threatened identity. This reactivation may have dramatic and destructive consequences. The possibility of reactivation suggests that a ‘chosen trauma’ is tightly entwined with the collective emotional orientations of society (see: Bar-Tal 2001, 2007, 2013a) and is therefore never completely dormant. Volkan argued that this is due to the inability of the group to mourn its past, being virtually stuck in what Bar-Tal came to call the ‘freezing of beliefs’ (Bar-Tal 2001). In point of fact, this was the essence of Israeli-Jewish psychoanalyst Avner Falk's thesis (1993, 1996, 2004). He argued that Israel’s victim mentality may have been a result of the Jewish people’s inability to mourn or reconcile with the past. In order to overcome the socio-psychological barriers in conflict, the group needs to properly mourn the past and learn to see their identity in a new light and in a new

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9 When Sigmund Freud (1921) imparted his theory of large group psychology, he did not specifically use the term 'identity'; instead, he used the term ‘ego ideal.” Freud's theory nevertheless was based on his observation that large-group dynamics paralleled those seen during an individual’s oedipal phase. Freud dealt primarily with leader-follower interactions, from which he concluded that any hostility between a member of a large group and its leader had to be transformed by other members into a type of loyalty to the leader. Just as a son identifies with his father once the oedipal conflict has been resolved, the group members identify with the ‘idealised’ leader as a superego figure. The members of the group are then connected to one another through their devotion to that leader. Following Freud, psychoanalysts continued to write about large groups from the perspective of what the group means to the individual. For Volkan, the narratives of shared traumas (or triumphs) provided points of strong collective identification. [see: Volkan 2001]
relationship with the other (Rosenberg 2003). Mourning can be particularly difficult if the group is still involved in an intractable conflict.

A significant feature of a ‘chosen trauma’ is its ability to be transmitted trans-generationally. The sense of victimisation associated with that trauma is usually passed down from generation to generation, regardless of whether a person has physically experienced any trauma themselves. ‘Trans-generational transmission’ may have its roots in Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham’s *Children in War* (1943, cited by Fromm 2012, p.102), which showed that during the London Blitz, children whose mothers were traumatised by the experience developed trauma symptoms themselves.¹⁰ In *Killing in the Name of Identity* (2006), Volkan called this process the “depositing” of own injured self-image into the child.

Since trauma can be transmitted historically and experienced vicariously, it stands to reason to assume that the desire for redemption too can travel from generation to generation. For victims, redemption is meant to reverse the course of history and right the historical wrongs, at least symbolically (as in the case of commemorations). Because this is carried on across generations, it becomes a national consciousness and identity. But redemption also involves the victim seeking to hold the perpetrator accountable. Whilst this can take the form of legal actions, remedies, and compensations, it may also materialise as aggressive measures not necessarily against the original victimiser, but anyone who would pose a threat or minimise one’s historical suffering (e.g. Mamdani 2001). In other words, adding a further dimension to Volkan’s conception of ‘chosen trauma,’ the desire to redeem the self or one’s group may develop into actions that would turn the historical victims into victimisers. Drawing examples from the former 1990s Yugoslavia, several scholars (e.g. Anzulovic 1999; Gödl 2007; Stockdale 2009; Volkan 2013a, 2014) argued that the Serbs’ collective memory

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¹⁰ Freud and Burlingham showed in their influential book, *Children in War* (1943) — based on their experiences in three of WWII’s War nurseries in England for the Foster Parents — that during the London Blitz, nursery-age children whose mothers were traumatised by the experience developed trauma symptoms themselves, whereas this was not the case for children whose mothers were able to serve as ‘protective shields’ despite the severe nature of the threat. The authors thus demonstrated that the potential effects of trauma were mediated by human relations. They hypothesised that whenever certain essential needs are not fulfilled (as in the cases of conflict or war), lasting psychological malformations will be the consequence. These essential elements are: the need for personal attachment, for emotional stability, and for permanency of educational influence. Freud and Burlingham’s findings and speculations contributed to the understanding of the problems of the children of Shoah survivors which began to appear in academic studies nearly thirty years later. [see: Fromm 2012]
of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo — and later the traumatic events during World War II — added to the Serbian extreme nationalism which ignited the wars and led to horrendous acts of revenge, mass killings and ethnic cleansing. Similarly, Mamdani’s significant work on the Rwandan genocide When Victims Become Killers (2001) has provided a deep insight into the ethics and consequences of a traumatising history, and presented a remarkable perspective on how victims become victimisers. Mamdani asked (p. 34), “…What happens when yesterday’s victims act out of determination that they must never again be victimised? What happens when yesterday’s victims act out of a conviction that power is the only guarantee against victimhood?

Capturing this insight, this study takes Volkan’s ‘chosen trauma’ a step further by investigating the victim-to-victimiser dynamics in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” There is undeniably a good volume of literature on the Shoah as a ‘chosen trauma’ for the Jewish people and its implications for Israel’s victimhood claims (e.g. Segev 1993; Niroumand 1995; Rosenfield 1999; Zertal 2005; Ochs 2006; Alam 2009; Navon 2009, 2015; Benbassa 2010; Ofer 2013; Miller 2014). As a matter of fact, much of the literature on trauma trans-generational transmission mainly comes from the studies on the Jewish Shoah survivors and their offspring (e.g. Volkan 2013b; e.g. Bar-On & Chaitlin 2001; Zerubavel 2002; Fromm 2012). However, most of it emanates from Israeli-Jewish, Jewish, or Western sources, which probably means that the study of victim-to-victimiser dynamics have been limited in the scope of exploration and level of analysis (Noor et al. 2012).

To this author’s knowledge, not many Palestinian scholars, if any, capitalised on Volkan’s conceptions to examine the Palestinian victimhood narratives outside the perpetrator-victim dyad. Being ‘professional sufferers,’ as described by Volkan (2013a, p.61), many Palestinians give little thought to their own agency. The ability to hurt Israel has often been kept within the ‘ideal victim’ status (Christie 1986), blinding many of us to the fact that we too can at times step outside our victim status quo to become perpetrators. The victim-to-victimiser potential can also aid our discernment of the future and allow us to hypothesise as to what happens if the balance of power in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has shifted (see Chapter Seven: Ethos about Muqawama).
Volkan’s thoughts are essential for understanding historical victimhood. By labelling trauma as ‘chosen,’ it may encompass two aspects of the collective memory of victimisation: first, ‘chosen’ as an anchor point in a traumatic collective memory that continues to orient the cognitive-emotional dimension of today’s conflict (as in conflict ethos), and second, ‘chosen’ in the sense of being a conscious instrumentalisation of memory for political gains. This duality continues to be examined as the study unpacks Israel’s victimhood narratives in particular.

Because Volkan’s thoughts are most focused on the relationship between the original trauma and the group’s current psychological make-up and identity, little attention is given to the actual process of traumatisation and victim identity construction. Bar-Tal’s work seems to have addressed some aspects of this ‘processual gap’ by crafting an encompassing socio-psychological framework, focusing primarily on collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations, and with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in mind.

**Bar-Tal: collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations**

In the history of social psychology very few scholars have contributed as much to a scientific understanding of intergroup conflict and group dynamics as Daniel Bar-Tal. For nearly 40 years, his writings have helped illuminate some of the darkest recesses of collective belief and behaviour (Jost et al. 2015, p. 47). Bar-Tal’s characterisation of ‘intergroup conflict’ is broad enough to encompass concepts such as, security, oppression, military occupation, discrimination, and stereotyping. His work in many ways began with a simple but powerful assumption that emerged from the classical social psychological work of scholars like Sherif and Lewin (1936, 1947, in: ibid.), which revolved around the idea of shared societal beliefs that motivate prejudice, conflict, and war.
Not only did Bar-Tal embrace some of the existing definitions of intractable conflict, he significantly expanded and developed them. In addition to the Kriesberg’s four features of intractable conflict (1993 in: Bar-Tal 2007, 1998) — protracted, violent, perceived as irresolvable, and demand extensive investment — Bar-Tal (2007, 2013) proposed three more: total, central, and perceived as zero-sum. These features are patent forces that move the conflict, energise it, maintain it, and prevent its resolution (Bar-Tal 2013). Some of them may fully or partly apply to most intergroup conflicts, but in the Israeli-Palestinian case — for reasons related to the conflict unique structural and perceptual characteristics (see: Bar-Tal and Rouhana 1998) — centrality, totality and zero-sum have deeper meanings especially for the in-group’s social identity construction (Kelman 1987; see also: Tajfel & Turner 1986).

Bar-Tal (1998, 2000a, 2007, 2013) interprets the conflict collective beliefs within the framework of ‘shared societal beliefs,’ which he defines as cognitions shared by society members on topics and issues that are of special concern for their society and contribute to their sense of uniqueness. These form a socio-psychological repertoire, which is eventually institutionalised and disseminated to become a ‘socio-psychological infrastructure’ through which society members view and cope with the conflict.

Bar-Tal (2013) argues that after an extended period of time when society members have fully absorbed these beliefs, they begin to believe that they are leading a ‘normal life.’ He calls this the ‘normalisation’ and ‘routinisation’ of conflict. In the literature of social psychology ‘normalisation’ and ‘routinisation’ is a recognised phenomenon, and is known for making the conflict resistant to solution (Franks 2004; Capelos et al. 2014). Routinisation, adds Bar-Tal (2007, 2013, also see: 2001), allows society members to live in a chronic state of fear with a facade of normality. Israeli-Jews, for instance, attempting to fulfil their basic psychological needs for safety, knowledge, and positive identity (Burton 1990; Kelman 2007, 2008), use the Shoah and Jewish history of persecution as an epistemic basis that provides justification for the conflict and its development. However, because the conflict has permeated all strata of society and became a routinised system, the old traumas become normalised and then institutionalised, leaving little room for scrutiny. This process is purely
psychological as it depends on the evolution of belief that is not always based on reality and not necessarily used in the right context (Bar-Tal 2013).

Importantly, in Bar-Tal’s conceptual framework, the socio-psychological infrastructure is broken down into three parts: collective memory, conflict ethos and collective emotional orientation (Bar-Tal 2000a, 2000b, 2007, 2013; also: Bar-Tal & Halperin 2013). These should represent the core framework for this study.

- **Collective memory:** Bar-Tal views collective memory as part of the meta-narrative of a nation and in terms of its relation with what he calls ‘national ethos.’ He argues that the societal beliefs of collective memory — popular or official — do not necessarily reflect the actual historical events, but they are socially constructed narratives which have some basis in reality, but provide a biased account of history that fits the current needs of society in conflict (Bar-Tal 2000a, 2007, 2013). This effectively establishes the difference between historical truth and narrative truth (Spence 1982). On top of justifying the eruption and continuation of violence, and presenting a positive self-image of the in-group and demonising the out-group, collective memory also emphasises the sense of collective victimisation. Bar-Tal’s (2007, 2013) explains that collective memory makes Palestinians and Israeli-Jews view the conflict as black and white — a pure victim or a complete perpetrator. Possibly building on Volkan’s ‘chosen trauma,’ he advances the traumatic memories of the Shoah and the Nakba as original markers for the victimhood narratives.

Highlighting collective memory’s negative implications for peacemaking, Bar-Tal (2013, p.141) remarks that when a society relies on the past chronically and centrally, collective memory directs the focus on the past without providing an ability to evaluate properly the present and plan the future. It clouds judgement and evaluation of the present and preparation for the future. Irwin-Zarecka (1994, cited by Cairns & Roe 2002) once said that time collapses in a context in which historical accounts have not been settled. The passage of time in this case may actually serve to increase the sense of grievance especially in societies involved in conflict.
• **Conflict ethos:** When the past memory is manifested as narratives about the present, this is called ‘ethos’ (Bar-Tal 2000a, 2000b, 2007, 2013; Bar-Tal et al. 2009). Ethos provides the epistemic basis for the hegemonic social consciousness of society. In conflict-inflicted societies, ethos supplies orientation, direction, and meaning for the in-group members. To make society members capable of dealing with protracted conflict, Bar-Tal et al. (2009a, p.95) argue, ethos functions as an ideology that constitutes a basis for the perception and interpretation of reality. This also suggests it influences the policies and decision-making processes of society leaders and institutions.

Bar-Tal (2000a, 2007, 2013; Bar-Tal et al. 2009a/b) identified eight themes that characterise conflict ethos: justness of one’s goals; security; patriotism; unity; positive collective self-image; one’s own victimisation; de-legitimising the opponent; and peace. Each one of these themes has a unique content and adds to the holistic orientations about the conflict. Nevertheless, it may be proposed that some of Bar-Tal’s ethos themes can be codependent depending on the context of study and the nature of conflict. It also stands to reason to assume that in different contexts different themes are more dominant or interrelated than others. As it will become evident in Chapter Six, security is dealt with as a manifestation of victimisation and not an independent theme by itself. Throughout, victimhood is approached as a primary driving force for social cohesion and unity, and patriotism is seen as defined by threat and therefore an extension of the security ethos. Bar-Tal did not propose a specific order in which these themes emerge, which possibly suggests that their temporal, physical, and psychological interconnectedness is bound by context.

• **Collective emotional orientations:** In intractable conflict, explains Bar-Tal (2007), emotions can be collectively experienced and may add to the conflict complexity. Mitchell (1989) explicitly refers to emotions as a primary factor in conflict’s aggravation, and Bodtker & Jameson (2001) maintain that to be in conflict is to be emotionally charged. This has led Halperin and Pliskin (2015) to emphasise that there is indeed such thing as ‘emotional reality’ that drive people’s actions and perceptions in a conflict situation.
Subject to context, like memory and ethos themes, some emotions are more salient than others. In the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Bar-Tal identified collective fear as a primary aversive emotion (2007). In an
earlier paper, “How Fear Overrides Hope…” (2001), Bar-Tal explained that Israeli-Jews, because of their
collective memory of trauma and the current conflict ethos, tend to share an acute collective awareness of
threat, which has led to an almost permanent aggressive defensive posture. It is suggested that when the
emotions of fear are too strong, they act as a filter for information processing (Clore & Huntsinger 2007).
This notion has led Schwarz & Clore (2013) to formulate the feelings-as-information theory to describe
how emotions are used as ‘perceptual filters’ (Wendt et al. 2012) for social reality.

What distinguishes Bar-Tal from the crowd of social psychology is that his socio-psychological infrastructure
is quite versatile and encompassing that it allowed for the development of the concept of collective
victimhood. His current work is a development of an earlier conceptualisation that he called the Masada
Syndrome (1986, in: Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992b). It is a societal belief stating that the rest of the world has highly
negative behavioural intention toward the in-group. In 1992, when the study of collective victimhood was
limited and sporadic, Bar-Tal and Antebi introduced the notion of ‘siege mentality’ in order to explain the
historical context and implications of Jewish victimhood. ‘Siege mentality’ is a collective state of mind
whereby a group of people think of themselves as constantly attacked, oppressed, or isolated by the negative
intentions of a hostile world (Christie 2011, p.997). These beliefs are given a high validity and considered to
be as true (Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992a, 1992b). Attributing it to the Jewish collective memory and the current
conflict, Bar-Tal maintained that the expressions of ‘siege mentality’ are so rooted in the Israeli-Jewish society
that they can be found in almost all forms of narrative: academia, literature, films, journalism, and the Israeli
educational system (Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992b). To him, being isolated and, by default, feeling victimised have
serious emotional and behavioural implications for the society involved in conflict as well as the international
community. Distrust, biased information filtering, and hyper sensitivity to criticism are amongst these
implications (ibid., pp. 265-269).
In 2009, Bar-Tal cooperated with Chernyak-Hai, Schori, and Gundar (2009b) to publish a socio-psychological study specifically focused on the conception of collective victimhood. It was presumably the most detailed account to date. The study titled: “A Sense of Self-Perceived Collective Victimhood In Intractable Conflicts,” for the most part drew from and built on Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological framework of collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations (Bar-Tal 2000a; 2004; 2007; 2013). Victimhood, the study argued, emerges as a major theme in the ethos of conflict and is a fundamental part of the collective memory thereof, and is typically reflected in society’s emotional and behavioural responses. The study mentions that victimisation can indeed be the product of physical harm or be experienced on the individual level (see above), but in many cases it is rooted in the realisation of harm experienced. This means that numerous aspects of victimhood emerge as a cognitive construction of the situation in which the harm is inflicted, hence ‘self-perceived.’ Bar-Tal and colleagues suggested that the personal perception of being a victim is not usually enough; it requires social recognition (see next chapter: status givers). Once one has been perceived as victim by society members or its institutions, she/he becomes an official victim. In intractable conflict this is a collective process (see also: Rimé et al. 2015; Bouchat et al. 2017; Noor 2017). More importantly, being of psychological and political benefits, groups usually seek to maintain or even instrumentalise their victim status.

As a socio-psychological construct, explained the authors, perceiving one’s group as a victim in conflict has serious impacts on how groups view the conflict in which they are involved. Societal beliefs about victimhood (see also: Bar-Tal 1998, 2001, 2007, 2013) help society members cope with and make sense of the conflict, strengthen convictions about justness of one’s goals, deepen siege mentality, inculcate egocentrism, superiority and lack of empathy, influence information processing, reduce group-based guilt, and provide moral justifications. These impacts are largely similar to those found in Bar-Tal’s conflict ethos themes. This is probably due to the interrelated aspects in conflict’s socio-psychological foundations. Bar-Tal does not
suggest a certain order for these impacts or elaborate on the causal relation between, say, siege mentality and victimhood, or why group-based guilt is an impact by itself and not part of egocentrism and lack of empathy.

As far as this study is concerned, there are a few things that require our attention in regard to Bar-Tal and colleagues’ study of victimhood and — by extension — Bar-Tal’s conceptualisation of collective memory, conflict ethos, and emotional orientations:

• Bar-Tal and colleagues’ paper (2009b) is new and ambitious. It capitalised on Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological framework and to some extent drew from Volkan’s conceptions of ‘chosen trauma’ to explain victimhood as a conflict attractor (see: Coleman 2003; Vallacher et al. 2010, 2013). Resultantly, the conceptual specifics — and difficulties — of victimhood itself, as well as the examples used were introductory at best. The conceptual difficulties of victimhood are elaborated on and analysed in the next chapter.

• Intractable conflicts, as it was hypothesised by Bar-Tal (e.g. 2001, 2007, 2013) and re-emphasised by Bar-Tal and colleagues (2009b), share similar socio-psychological characteristics, but each conflict is different. So it stands to reason to assume that the victimhood narratives (and manifestations) that emerge in these conflicts are, too, different. In this study, by focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict— in addition to examining victimhood narratives’ role in intractability — the aim is also to highlight the contextual specifics and perceptions of victimisation in this conflict.

• Importantly, Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological framework [also in: Bar-Tal & colleagues 2009b] approaches collective victimhood as a major theme in the ethos of conflict (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001, 2007, 2013). This implies two things: first, that victimhood is only a symptom of intractable conflict and, second, that victimhood is a self-contained unit. This study suggests that indeed victimhood is a significant theme in the conflict ethos but is not always a mere symptom. Jews came to Palestine already burdened with traumatic memories, history of persecution, and a sense of insecurity. The conflict with the Palestinians did not
instigate the Israeli-Jewish sense of victimhood, but it rather — repeatedly — confirmed and added to it and over time perpetuated it as a pronounced conflict ethos. The second argument is that victimhood is a fluid phenomenon expressed in multiple manifestations — which themselves are narrative expressions — and not necessarily a self-contained, closed unit. This study suggests that in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israeli-Jewish security, fear, guilt, shame, and Palestinian feelings of humiliation, notions about martyrdom and muqawama, and the fear of being forgotten are all — to varying degrees and subject to circumstances — manifestations of victimhood. These manifestations may exist in other conflicts, but in the Israeli-Palestinian context they appear to be more pronounced possibly because of the unique geo-political and psychohistorical dimensions of the conflict itself (see: Bar-Tal and Rouhana 1998).

• Bar-Tal provided a good insight into emotions in intractable conflict and the emotional components of victimhood as a result. But there seems to be some categorical separation between the three socio-psychological infrastructure themes of which emotional orientations is part. This can be found in many of Bar-Tal's publications (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001, 2007, 2013; Bar-Tal et al. 2009; Halperin et al. 2008). In a paper titled: “Collective Memory as Social Representations” (2014), Bar-Tal attempted to address the issue of categorical separation by highlighting the connection between collective memory and emotions. He argued that collective memory serves as a foundation for shared emotions, and therefore may invoke collective emotional orientations. This endeavour, however, was very brief.

One of the points of departure in this study is that Bar-Tal’s three infrastructure themes should be viewed as closely and tightly intermingled. Approaching victimhood as a socio-psychological product requires that the relationship between collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations be further utilised and unpacked. The connection between collective memory and emotions is of a particular importance in the development of this work’s argument. Inspired by some of the thoughts common in the ‘appraisal tendency framework,’ this study assumes that each emotion is defined by a core appraisal (Han et al. 2007; Keltner & Lerner 2010), or, in other words, defined by a specific context (Halperin et al. 2011).
A group involved in intractable conflict would appraise whether an event or situation is congruent or incongruent with their current societal beliefs (that steer their collective emotional orientations) (Keltner & Lerner 2010; see: e.g. Bar-Tal 1998, 2001, 2007, 2013) and then — accordingly — form a corresponding emotional response. Primarily ascribed to Jewish collective memory, fear is a powerful force in Israel’s ‘emotional climate’ (De Rivera 1992) and is therefore quickly evoked and heightened when Israeli-Jews are faced by what they perceive as threatening cues in the conflict with the Palestinians or in relation to the surrounding countries or the world (Bar-Tal 2007). The above should contribute to the analysis of the relationship between Israel’s ‘hyper security’ and Jewish collective memory (of victimisation). Also, based on the assumption that specific emotions give rise to specific cognitive and motivational processes, the study argues that each emotion has a certain effect upon judgement and decision-making (Keltner & Lerner 2001, 2010; Han et al. 2007), and can shape beliefs (Frijda et al. 2000). Fear influences judgement of certainty and risk, and may create ‘cognitive distortions.’ Practically, this should lead to anxious, fight-or-flight decision-making process, a response tendency characterised by avoidance and the desire to create a safe environment (Bar-Tal 2001; Halperin et al. 2011). Israel’s extreme security and preemptive military actions are the result (see Chapter Six).

• A critical limitation in Bar-Tal work and perhaps the majority of studies on victimhood (Bar-Tal et al. [2009b] included) is the insufficient attention to the context of power structure (Rouhana & Fiske 1995). Rouhana (2004) observes that conflicts are often analysed regardless of the power relations of the parties’ involved in them. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a prototypical example of a visibly asymmetrical type of intractable conflict (Elcheroth & Spini 2015), one that defines Israel’s relationship with the Palestinian in terms of dominance and control (Rouhana & Bar-Tal 1998; Rouhana 2004; Galo & Marzano 2009; Baukhol 2015). Typically, the two parties have differential access to resources and formal institutions and use different societal mechanisms to maintain the conflict (Bar-Tal 2013). In practical terms this means that, at least on one level, Israel has had the advantage of controlling the narratives of history, effectively placing the Palestinians as victims outside the public discourse (Desjarlais 2014). After all, Memmi (1967)
points out, memory is not self-reliant but rests upon the state’s power and institutions. There is also the argument that disregarding the impact of asymmetrical power relations may prejudice our ‘moral evaluation’ and weaken our sense of responsibility towards the weaker party in conflict — against whom most of the violence is directed and against which they have little defence (Skitka & Mullen 2002; Skitka 2010; Morgan & Skitka 2012).

The study assesses Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian narratives on their own and against one another. It examines Israel’s victim self-image and analyses how and why as a discourse the asymmetry against the Palestinians is denied or ignored, looking — among other things — at the Jewish historical claims to Palestine and the very denial or support of the occupation. For the same purpose, this study also explains the specifics of Palestinian victimhood and how they differ from Israel’s. The general argument is that victimisation is by definition an exercise of power by one group over another (Nadler & Shnabel 2008; Shnabel & Ullrich 2016) and that studying victimhood without taking into account the power relations is likely to produce erroneous or inaccurate understanding of the socio-psychological dynamics of intractable conflict. Here emerges the important fact that being on either side of power comes with certain perceptions, expectations, and ways of coping with and responding to the conflict. This study’s assessment of Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish victimhood(s) takes this fact seriously and analyses victimhood narratives accordingly, not least because power structure influences which manifestations of victimhood are most salient.

- Finally, there appears to be little focus on the temporal dimensions of victimisation. Bar-Tal and the majority in the field do not seem concerned with the differences in effect between victimisations that happened in the past — think of ‘chosen trauma’ (Volkan 2001, 2004, 2013a/b) — and ones happening in the present. In this study the Nakba is not seen only as a traumatic collective memory with psychohistorical reverberations like the Shoah, but as a continuously physical event in the present, evident in the occupation, the refugee problem, and the Palestinian Diaspora.
CONCLUSION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

As a humanities-based study, the aim was to explore, describe, and critique how the narratives of victimhood in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may have aggravated the conflict and eventually contributed to the deadlock in settlement. The current chapter scanned some of the most relevant literature, starting at the very top by looking at intractable conflicts in general, both as a geo-political reality and a dynamical socio-psychological system. This paved the way for the discussions of the contexts in which victimhood narratives were likely to emerge. It was proposed that the feelings of victimisation in intractable conflict may have indeed started as a result of physical harm or deprivation, but as the conflict raged on, it became difficult to separate the geo-political from the cognitive-emotional.

Traumatic past is vital to the rationalisation and justification of today’s conflict, even if this conflict is not directly related to that past (e.g. Bar-Tal 2007; Volkan 2001). In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the case was made that the narratives of victimhood have been particularly salient as a socio-psychological dynamic and, accordingly, presented a possible barrier to settlement. It was also emphasised that the focus in this study would be on the subjective aspects of victimhood. The literature was scanned and analysed on this basis and several important socio-psychological concepts were introduced (e.g. Kelman 1987; Volkan 2001; Halperin & Schwartz 2010). The most important of which was Bar-Tal’s tripartite socio-psychological infrastructure of collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations (Bar-Tal 2007, 2013).

Generally, Bar-Tal’s work draws on and develops several scholarships on the socio-psychological structure of intractable conflict (e.g. Sherif & Lewin 1936, 1947, cited by Jost et al.; Kriesberg 1991, 1998, 2005; Coleman 2003; Vallacher et al. 2010, 2013). His socio-psychological framework, nevertheless, remains broad and versatile enough to encompass a variety of issues such as beliefs, security, oppression, occupation, trauma, stereotyping and political narratives. Of most importance for this study is his work on collective memory,
conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations. Together, these represent a socio-psychological infrastructure, and — complemented by other scholarly works (e.g. Volkan 2001, 2004; Halperin et al. 2011) — form the conceptual framework that guides this study throughout. Approaching victimhood in relation to memory, ethos, and emotions allows for a multi-angled exploration and critique of victimhood not only as a stand-alone phenomenon, but more importantly, as a multi-faceted socio-psychological product with multiple manifestations (see: fig. a.1.0). The manifestations may not on the surface appear closely related or relevant, but the usage of this conceptual framework should weave them together seamlessly.

To ensure that the framework provides a good understanding of victimhood, especially bearing in mind victimhood’s various manifestations, narrative research will be the chosen methodology. Its focus on experience and/or experiential knowledge makes it suitable for the examination of the subjective aspects of victimhood. It allows for the usage of a broad array of narrative sources that include but is not limited to scholarship, news, films, fiction, and arts. Narrative analysis is done by examining the latent content in the narrative sources. Reflexivity is used as a form of narrative and as an additional analytical tool.

Finally, before closing this chapter it is worth providing a summary of what comes next. The very next chapter highlights the conceptual dilemmas surrounding victimhood. It should act as an extension of this chapter and smoothen the transition to the core argument. Chapter Three is dedicated to the methodology. It is followed by a chapter on the history of the conflict. Israel’s victimhood is discussed next over two chapters, Chapters Five and Six. Chapter Five examines victimhood through the Jewish collective memory, focusing especially on the Shoah, then on the conflict ethos with collective memory’s reverberations in mind. The next chapter is almost entirely dedicated to the discussion of fear as Israel’s dominant emotional orientation and the core motivator for hyper security. Hyper security is seen as the physical most destructive manifestation of Israel’s victimhood. Chapter Seven discusses Palestinian victimhood. In this chapter the effect of power asymmetry on the salience of certain victimhood narratives becomes particularly evident. For Palestinians, being the weaker party in the conflict, collective memory became a struggle against memoricide and
therefore remembering turned into a process of victimisation. The Nakba loss and the current occupation made humiliation a dominant emotional orientation, and that triggered an overemphasis on the ethos of muqawama (resistance). Chapter Eight discusses the counter-narratives in the conflict, focusing primarily on Israel’s counter-narrativists. The chapter also highlights the reasons why Palestinian counter-narrative is almost non-existent. The Conclusion chapter includes the findings and final thoughts.

**Thesis Visualisation (Fig. a.1.0)**
CHAPTER TWO

VICTIMHOOD: CONCEPTUAL CONUNDRUMS
OVERVIEW

As it has been established in the literature review, victimhood is not only a physical component of intractable conflict, it is also an inseparable part of the ‘human factor’ that makes up the conflict’s psychology (Kuriansky 2006). However, despite the growing volume of literature on the socio-psychological dynamics of intractable conflicts and, by default, the narratives of victimhood (Coleman 2011a; Bar-Tal 2007, 2013; Bar-Tal et al. 2009; Bar-Tal & Halperin 2009, 2013; Volkan 2006, 2013a; Vollhardt 2012; Rimé et al. 2015; Noor et al. 2017; Bouchat et al. 2017), the specifics and the contextual appraisals on what it means to be a victim in social conflicts remain under-explored. Jacoby (2015) suggests that victimhood is an idea like any other that takes on contextual characteristics. Some people might define themselves as ‘victims’ in contexts that many others would regard as part of their everyday life (Garkawe 2004; Bar-Tal et al. 2009b). Three-quarters of Republicans and Trump supporters, for example, believe they are subject to religious discrimination — so did nearly eight out of ten white evangelical Protestants (Green 2016). In certain social contexts victimhood is also used as a metaphor for perpetrators (Confino 2005). In the early years following World War II, for instance, Germany focused on ‘German victimhood,’ depicting the German public as Hitler’s first and main victims and preferring a narrative of the war that emphasised civilian war-trauma (Schmitz 2007). Similarly, the post-war Japanese assigned the role of victimiser to the militarist state or the vaguely defined entity called simply ‘the system’ (Orr 2001). In today’s conflicts, especially with the emergence of non-state actors and the war on terror, the already fuzzy victim-perpetrator dyad has become even fuzzier. Complementing the literature review, this chapter discusses the conceptual difficulties surrounding the notion, definition, and contexts of victimisation. It begins by exploring the social and philosophical nuances of victimhood, then moves on to address the political side. Inspired by Bar-Tal et al. (2009b) and the literature on collective victimhood (Vollhardt 2012; Schori-Eyal et al. 2014; Noor et al. 2017) and intergroup dynamics and identities (Kelman 1999, 2001; Volkan 2001 2006, 2013b), it looks at how a victim status is acquired and what makes

11 In the recent years this narrative was abandoned in German public life. This change brought with it what Levy and Sznajder (2005) call the ‘de-nationalisation’ of German war memories.
PHILOSOPHICAL CONUNDRUMS

In her philosophical study of victimhood *Victims and Victimhood* (2015), Govier observes that in a process of victimisation, there is usually an actor and an acted upon — a perpetrator who is distinct from the victim. With a straightforward distinction a clear-cut moral evaluation is formed and responsibility assigned. A perpetrator, being an active agent and subject, is responsible for his actions and guilty of wrongdoing, and a victim, who has done nothing is seen as innocent. Bayley (1991) suggests that the victim must not only be acted upon but be acted upon by an identifiable agent. ‘Innocence,’ Bayley believes, should be deserved. Loss, harm, or self-inflicted misfortune do not automatically create victimhood. A burglar harmed by a householder is not a victim; simply because an innocent victim must not be guilty of having contributed to their loss.

However, this portrayal of the perpetrator does not provide a satisfactory explanation in a real conflict scenario. What about individuals who brought misfortune upon themselves not through perpetration per se, but through miscalculation? Does the intention separate victimisation from perpetration? Is a burglar by nature a villainous character and the householder an honourable one?

These questions are as old as the concept of victimhood itself. In Greek tragedy, for instance, there is a clear distinction between a villainous person whose fall is seen as an appropriate punishment and does not arouse pity or fear — as in Bayley’s burglar — and the virtuous person whose fall is due to misfortune — as in the Shakespearean tragic hero. Although, unlike the classic tragic hero, today’s innocent victim needs not be of a
significant stature to invoke empathy and fear. Aristotle brilliantly captured the in-between scenario where the ‘victim’ is neither virtuous nor villainous, but rather someone who succumbs to victimisation through miscalculation, *hamartia* (see: Vernant & Vidal-Naquet 1988). In the Aristotelian rationale, the victim must have flaws that balance his otherwise good character (Liang 2015); that is to say, an imperfect personality that allows the audience to relate to him/her, hence arousing empathy.

The burglar may deserve to be punished by the householder, but would he be considered a victim if the burglary was provoked by hunger? Does motivation define or justify victimhood? Assuming the burglary is ‘justified,’ does that make the householder a perpetrator? Questions like these raise concerns that too much focus on the victim’s guilt can be misused for victim blaming (Van Dijk 2009). In this case, the householder is ‘guilty’ because he did not secure his home or because he harmed the burglar. Others, however, warned that extended victim rights would eventually lead to the demonisation of the offender (Buruma 1994, in: Van Dijk 2009). A burglar in this case is identified through wrongdoing only, not through circumstances or motivations. This is particularly problematic when the burglar’s actions are driven by injustice. It is significantly more problematic when the victimisation or perpetration in question are the product of an intergroup social conflict and are collectively experienced or exercised. This gives rise to further questions about the standards or frameworks that may control the victim defining criteria. If victimhood is subjective and context dependent (Hoffman and Graham 2006), can a structured political or legal framework be more neutral? This possibility is explored next.

**POLITICAL CONUNDRUMS**

*Recognition and Status Givers*

In his seminal work, Christie (1986) presents the idea of ‘the Ideal Victim,’ an individual or a group who, when hit by crime, most readily are given the complete and legitimate status of being a ‘victim’ (Schwobel-
Patel 2015). This victim must be innocent and incapable of threatening the interests of the offender. Otherwise, Schwobel-Patel (2015) comments, if she displays agency which goes beyond asserting their identity as an ideal victim, say by taking up arms against the aggressor, they may quickly lose their ‘ideal’ status, if not the recognition of their victim status altogether. In reality, however, agency does not represent a block to ‘victim status’ as long it is recognised and acknowledged by a ‘status giver’ (McGarry & Walklate 2015). Unlike the case in conventional crimes where victims have little difficulty publicising their fate, the victims of international crimes need to ‘sell’ their suffering to the international community and media to gain a victim status.

Viano (1989), places recognition as the last of the four stages of victimisation. First, a person experiences harm, second, the harm is perceived as undeserved, unfair, or unjust, then social validation is provided. The last stage is the external recognition, which enables the victims to gain some political and legal rights. It is at this stage that the concept of 'status giver' becomes salient.

However, ‘status givers’ are almost always partial and subject to a range of dominant societal beliefs (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001, 2004, 2007, 2013). In all conflicts these beliefs create certain affiliations that would determine whether the collective or individuals in society support or disregard certain victim groups, irrespective of their vulnerability or the justness of their cause/goals. Van Wijk (2013) shows that in the realm of international crime, the victim status may be subject to the project in which the victim is engaged in, whether or not this victim is vulnerable. In the 1980s, for example, murdered Polish priests opposing communism were readily granted victim status in the US, while in countries of Latin America of that era, priests standing against US-backed dictatorships were not (Herman & Chomsky 1988, in: ibid.).

The US involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for instance, shows that the common interests, cultural, religious, and socio-economic affiliations apply a different meaning to who should be granted a victim status. The consecutive American administrations variably put more emphasis on the Jewish casualties,
although significantly less than those of the Palestinians, and stressed Israel’s security over Palestinian ongoing suffering under the occupation. An inevitable result was that the peace process, in which the US was a chief broker, became severely unbalanced. Khalidi (2013) discussed this topic at length in *Brokers of Deceit*, describing America as a dishonest broker whose identification with Zionism made her Israel’s lawyer in the negotiations with the Palestinians.

Much of the US identification with Israel’s victimhood claims is also driven by the American collective memory of the *Shoah*. In addition to Israel and Germany, the *Shoah* in the United States has since 1960s become a significant part of the country’s popular culture and historiography (Niroumand 1995). The ‘Holocaust’ museums in the United States, the country that along with Israel received the largest number of Jewish *Shoah* survivors (Carignan 2012), are hugely diverse and often on permanent exhibition. The result of this interest in the US has been the ‘Americanisation of the *Shoah*,’ so much so the that *Shoah* has become, as Shandler points out (in: Cole 1999), a ‘master paradigm’ in America’s national consciousness. Faber (2005) comments that seemingly ‘the Holocaust had become as American as apple pie.’ Cole (1999) sees that the *Shoah* is now considerably less important in Europe where it physically took place than it is in America where it has been embraced as a statement of faith. It was incorporated into the country’s fundamental mythos of pluralism, tolerance, democracy, and human rights (ibid.). The *Shoah* left America with a profound sense of moral responsibility to ensure that what happened to the Jews under Hitler never happens again. This notion was expressed by John McCain who wrote that, “The Holocaust underlined the moral basis for Israel’s founding…In standing with Israel, we are merely being true to ourselves.” This political narrative extends to a large section of the American public who view Israel’s interests as part of their nation’s moral principles.

When asked about assisting Israel in the event of an Iranian attack, the majority of Americans supported aids and sending troops. A similar majority also opposed foreign aid to the Palestinians (Rynhold 2015).  

12 As of the time of writing this, the Trump administration has recognised Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the occupied Golan Heights as part of Israel, cut off funds to Palestinians, and presented its own Deal of the Century. Palestinians have since deemed the US a representative of Israel and no longer a mediator in the so-called peace process.

It might also be debated that while Israel’s victimhood is unconditionally upheld by the United States, Palestinian victimhood is embraced and represented by many Arab and Muslim governments who, like the US, may provide logistical and moral support for Palestinian acts. Although, for many Arab regimes, the Palestine cause is only a tactic for personal gains and to uphold their legitimacy amongst their people. Consider for example the recent Saudi pressure on the Palestinian leadership to accept Trump’s ‘peace plan’ (Al Jazeera Arabic, Nov. 2017). By ‘settling’ the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Saudis seek legitimacy and moral acceptance in any future open ‘normalisation’ with Israel. The primary goal is to ally with Israel against Iran, not to help the Palestinians.14

In summary, the key to victim status, despite agency, is mainly political recognition. However, in many cases, political recognition draws more from affiliation than actual victimisation, which in turn begs the question if a political victim is indeed a reflection of ‘true’ victimhood. The problem does not end there; even with the existence of a recognised ‘true political victim,’ the level of identification and therefore assistance can vary depending on the method of victimisation and media coverage. This is what I label ‘hierarchal recognition.’

Hierarchal Recognition

Not all harm regardless of its intensity is equally guaranteed to make the sufferers universally recognised. Cohen (2001, pp.210-211) maintains that, “…in the eyes of the observing audience the method of victimisation is more important than the actual number of victims.” In one study run against common-sense expectations, American and Australian undergraduate students, when presented with various scenarios of human rights violation, showed more interest in the manner of violation rather than the number of casualties. The sheer number of deaths seemed less important and inspired no greater empathy than the

14 Seeing in Israel a potential ally against Iran and Daesh, some Arab countries went as far as attacking Palestinian political movements such as Hamas, accusing them of ‘terrorist’ links. Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister Adel Al-Jubair, for instance, made a precedence when he called upon Qatar to “Refrain from supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.”[see: Al Jazeera Arabic, June 2017]
death of far fewer people from bloodier methods. As a matter of fact, Cohen argues, “It made little difference whether the victims were innocent or political dissidents taking calculated risks.”

This brings to mind the recent debate about the US actions regarding the conflict in Syria. President Obama threatened to intervene in Syria after reports of Assad using ‘chemical weapons’ against civilians, hence crossing Obama’s ‘red line’ (Wolfgang 2015). The daily victimisation of Syrians by conventional weapons did not invoke the same level of reaction. Because chemical weapons have a special status in international agreements, their victims must have had a special type of suffering. There seems to be a similar rhetoric regarding the Shoah; that is, more emphasis is put on the genocide methods than the sheer number of victims.

During Nazi occupation of Russia's Leningrad, the region lost around a quarter of its population. There was also more than three million Russian prisoners of war who died in German camps (Berkhoff 2001; Poltonowicz 2014; Barber & Harrison 2006). The Nazi crimes in Russia caused a much higher death toll than the Shoah, but to many, the Shoah ranks higher in the victimhood hierarchy due to its methods of implementation.

The unorthodox methods of victimisation are likely to draw more media attention and that would further perpetuate the victim recognition hierarchy. There is also the fact that media coverage itself can create a victim hierarchy even when the methods of implementations are not in question. This suggests that victims of conflict are as recognised as the media exposure they receive. Hawkins (2008, cited by van Wijk 2013) notes that that death toll from conflict in the DRC is literally one thousands times greater than that in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, yet it failed to be the object of a greater media coverage.

LEGAL CONUNDRUMS

The legal Victim
To circumvent the philosophical and political conundrums of victimhood, a legal definition is usually presented as more neutral, at least in theory (Saeed 2016).

Although victimhood traditionally did not receive the sufficient international attention, or was placed within legally clear frameworks, a panorama of recognition gradually began to change globally and international norms related to victims and victimhood were progressively introduced (de Casadavente Romani 2010). The ‘victim’ managed to come out of the psychiatric clinics and the classic schools of victimology into the international arena of conflict studies. Psychologists and other mental health practitioners became aware that the trauma suffered by victims of crime was on several levels similar to that suffered by victims of wars and intergroup conflicts (Garkawe 2004). This became particularly evident in the growing international rights movements, especially the feminist movement (Dignan 2005), which established that there were similarities between suffering of victims of conventional crime and victims of state oppression and discrimination.

Arguably, the scope of victimology was boosted, among other things, by the adoption of the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice (DBPJ) by the UN General Assembly in 1985. It aimed to establish minimum international standards to regulate how states treat citizens and non-citizens who suffered harm or abuse within their jurisdictions. Garkawe (2004) maintains that in order to specify these minimum standards it was essential that they define which victims were to be included in the international obligations of states.

The Declaration presents a broad legal delineation of what constitutes a victim. It divides victims into two categories: victims of crime and victims of abuse of power, stating that victims are those who suffered physical or mental harm, economic loss or impairment of their fundamental rights. It also stipulates that there can be both direct and indirect victims, such as family members or dependents of direct victims; and that persons can suffer harm individually or collectively. Both categories are defined very similarly except that the victims of crime are viewed in the light of criminal law and victims of abuse of power are given a political dimension and are defined via internationally recognised norms relating to human rights.
The DBPJ is not the only legal instrument that sets broad rules for who is a victim. Various other legal instruments have been created to eliminate or at least alleviate the grievance of victims. These instruments view victims and victimhood through the principles of human rights treaties. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (1950), for example, set the basic principles and guidelines for state behaviours and the remedies for gross human rights violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law.

Although the UDHR, for instance, does not explicitly mention ‘victims’ or ‘victimhood’ within its set of thirty rights, the outcome is nevertheless the protection of ‘victims’ or possible ‘victims’ of human rights violations. The ECHR differs slightly in being more explicit on the rights of ‘victims.’ It even encourages member states to design their domestic policies and courts to view the rights of victims as human rights. The UK, for example, has introduced the Human Rights Act (1998), which enables the victims of the Convention violations to take their case to domestic UK courts. This, in effect, means that security and legislative bodies of the country, at least in theory, are under the duty of acting in accordance with the ECHR. After all, victims’ rights, like human rights, are only meaningful if they confer entitlements and obligation on people (Wemmers 2012). This refers us back to the notion of ‘status givers.’

The rapid growth of human rights bodies meant that in various ways the abuse of someone’s human rights qualified them to be victims, leading to the view that since suffering is a violation of human rights, it needed to be legitimised and codified (Humphrey & Valverde 2007). Nowadays, victims are at the centre of human

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15 Article 34

16 In principle, Brexit may not affect certain rights under the ECHR, as this comes from the Council of Europe, not the EU. The impact of Brexit on our British equality and human rights will depend on the laws that are passed to deal with leaving the EU. Although, the British Government published a White Paper on a Great Repeal Bill on 30 March 2017 clarifying how equality and human rights concerns will be addressed, the final vision of what the status of current rights will be after Brexit is still not completely clear. [see: Equality and Human Rights Commission, July 2017]
rights thinking, and no other group of individuals has a more sacred place in human rights law (Klug 2003), so much so that Garkawe (2005, in: Wemmers 2012) suggested that a specialised UN Convention on Victims’ Rights be created. Garkawe’s initiative suggests that notwithstanding the cultural differences between victims across the world, they tend to share common characteristics that may make a victim-specific legal framework a possibility. Many theoretical and empirical studies conducted in nearly all the regions of the world indicate that victims of human rights violations share some common features: to begin with, they want to be treated with due respect by criminal justice system actors. They require access to legal instruments for remedy and, above all, seek recognition of their plight (Ochoa 2013).

**Critiquing the Legal Victim**

Theoretically, a legal framework seems without significant problems; it creates rules to be followed internationally and can be an instrument for reparations, remedy and transitional justice. In reality, however, the legal scene may not be as straightforward.

Neither the UDHR nor the ECHR differ from the DBPJ in the exclusive, uninterrupted fashion of viewing the victim. The overall impression is that the taxonomy of victims and perpetrator through a human rights perspective suggests that victims and perpetrators are always two completely separate and homogeneous sets of people (Borer 2003). Neither one of the two treaties suggests that a victim can also be a perpetrator, and assumes that all victims are morally equal, and their victimhood is comparable. It is an assumption that most Palestinians, Israeli-Jews, Hutu or Tutsi might contest (Enns 2007). The other obstacle is that both the DBPJ and the UDHR are ‘soft laws’, which means they are non-binding and only serve as guidelines for governments. The DBPJ, for instance, makes it clear that its purpose is to “assist Governments and the international community in their efforts to secure justice and assistance for victims of crime and victims of abuse of power.”
The legal conceptualisation of victimhood also suffers from contextual relativity. The legal systems emerge and evolve within certain cultural contexts and therefore vary significantly. It is almost unachievable to sever the relation between society and law (Arfman et al. 2016). Criminal justice expert Lucia Zedner (2004, in: Arfman et al. p.02) maintains that criminal justice can be seen as the symbolic construction of social order, and the law is the instrument through which this social order is imposed. This means that by the power of law this social order with all the socio-economic, inequalities, injustices, and prejudices, stays in place. Pemberton (2015, in: ibid.) argues that a strictly legal approach of victimhood might conceal how the law itself victimises people.

Building on the notion of ‘status givers,’ it can be suggested that there is also the problem of political influence over the legal system. The law is only a means serving the end determined by politics. Politics as a purpose needs to use means, which is the legal system. This broadly means that human rights law needs politics, perhaps more than other bodies of the legal system. Human rights require states’ political power to be effective (Thouvenin & Weiss 2015). Even though law and politics complement each other, this still does not negate that the delicate law-politics balance could be disturbed to serve political interests, compromising human rights in the process. Under such politically motivated legal systems, the criteria of victimhood become selective and biased.

It can also be suggested that similar acts of victimisation under the same legal system may vary in their validity based on racial, political and religious grounds. Take for example the Israeli Law of Return of 1950. It declares that every Jew has the right to come to Israel and be granted Israeli citizenship upon arrival. From a Zionist point of view, a Jew in Israel is safe from anti-Semitic victimisation elsewhere. Ergo, a law was necessary to ensure this ‘right’ will provide the state of Israel with the legal power to protect the Jews by bringing them to the newly established state. However, the enactment and implementation of this Law was only possible through the ethnic cleansing of the indigenous population. Jewish victimhood, in this case, was
embedded into a legal framework, while the catastrophe that was brought upon the Palestinians was kept outside the Israeli-Jewish narrative and, inevitably, the legal system.

The disenchantment with the ‘legal victim’ occasionally spiralled to criticism of the legal bodies themselves. Take for example the case of the International Criminal Court. Since its inception in July 2002, the ICC has faced two primary critiques. First, it has been inefficient, and second, it has preoccupied itself with Africa and failed to equally investigate other conflicts elsewhere (Bassiouni & Hansen 2016).

Most recently Gambia withdrew from the ICC, accusing the Tribunal of the “persecution and humiliation of people of colour, especially African” (The Guardian 2016). Gambia is one country in a queue of African countries that pledged to quit the Tribunal (BBC Oct. 2016; Kuo 2016). Regardless of whether the ICC is in the habit of legally and politically discriminating against African nations, the Africans perhaps feel that the ‘international’ legal system is swayed by the political interests of non-Africans, particularly Caucasian nations. Many Africans may think of themselves as victims of human rights violations in their conflict-torn countries and also victims of the biased international legal systems. This is how the law becomes a tool of victimisation — cynically, in some cases, in the name of rooting victimisation and establishing human rights.

CONCLUSION

Scholars have increasingly recognised that victimhood is largely a socio-psychological product, especially in intractable conflict. But little was written about the variable specifics of victimhood and how their fluidity and interpretability have affected the very definition of victimisation in different social contexts. Almost every discipline has had its views of what indeed constituted a victim, but none is yet to fully agree with the others on a unified definition. By looking at the philosophical, political, and legal views of victimisation, this chapter, albeit exploratory and brief, aimed to contribute to the growing discussion that almost every aspect of
victimhood is contested and challenged (Ferguson et al. 2010). By doing that, it added other dimensions to the socio-psychological framework on victimhood discussed in the literature review.

Applying this framework to the idea of ‘affiliations’ that drives the victim ‘status givers,’ for example, allows us to see the politics of victimhood in a three-dimensional lens: filtered through memory, ethos, and emotions. Using the US-Israel relationships as one example, it was proposed that apart from the US geo-strategic interests in the region, the US’s almost unconditional support for Israel has also been swayed by America’s affiliation with Israel. This affiliation can be explained through the American collective memory of the Shoah, which in turn shaped much of the American public’s beliefs and emotional identifications (characterised mainly by guilt, shame, and emotional moral reasoning) regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts.

Affiliation makes the notion of a victim without agency and incapable of inflicting harm irrelevant, it nevertheless takes away privileges and statuses from certain, possibly more deserving vulnerable groups in favour of the group with whom one may share certain commonalities. This has been known to establish a political hierarchal recognition that would influence what otherwise be deemed a ‘neutral’ legal system.

Guided by the socio-psychological framework and cognisant of the conceptual conundrums surrounding victimhood, the present study continues for the most part to assess victimhood as a subjective experience. This assumption is carried along to the next chapter where the methodology is presented. The fact that victimhood is a multi-faceted phenomenon with multiple social representations, and is characterised by experiential factors and contextual considerations, meant it could be tackled effectively through a narrative research methodology.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY
OVERVIEW

The study seeks to examine the extent to which victimhood narratives add to intractability and therefore hinder settlement. These narratives are often expressed explicitly or implicitly through multiple forms of textuality. This chapter explains narrative as a research methodology, beginning with narrative place in qualitative research and why it was used as a research method, and what constitutes narrative and narrative 'data' in this study. Next, it describes the primary approach to narrative analysis. Acknowledging the fluidity of narrative research, the chapter elaborates on the issue of researcher's positionality and bias, and shows how reflexivity — as a social self-critique and an auto-ethnographic endeavour — can address that.

SECTION ONE: NARRATIVE RESEARCH

Qualitative Research and Narrative

Qualitative research is broadly based on the methodological pursuit of understanding the ways that people view, approach, and experience the world and make meaning of their experiences as well as specific phenomena with it (Ravitch & Carl 2016). Its principal advantage is that the generation of data, context, interpretations, and understanding are reasonably flexible. This produced a variety of standardised, non-standardised, and mixed research strategies and methods. Despite their differences, these methods share the common ground that the social context in which the human experience emerge is explorable and interpretable (ibid.; Denzin & Lincoln 2005; Given 2008; Gilbert 2008; Blaxter et al. 2010; Patnaik 2013).

The boundaries amongst some of these methods are fuzzy and their purposes overlap (Clandinin & Connelly 2000). Narrative research is one of the methodological tools that intersect with different disciplines and research strategies. The overlap between narrative research and phenomenology, for instance, is particularly salient. Both methodologies are focused on the lived experience and both are constructionist and use similar
data collection apparatuses. But what distinguishes phenomenological research from narrative research is the context and how one chooses to call what s/he is doing and the literature used to ground one’s work. Wertz et al. (2011) refers to narrative research as phenomenological, and Smith et al. (2009) argues that interpretive phenomenological analysis draws on narrative. Depending on the research question and needs, one can approach, say, Anna Frank’s diary phenomenologically or as a narrative of her lived experience and the socio-historical context of her time.

To avoid confusion, this study describes what narrative research is, presents a specific definition of narrative in relation to the studied phenomenon, and explains how to expand its usability. It also highlights how narrative acts as both a phenomenon and a methodological instrument (Clandinin & Connelly 2000).

**Narrative Definition(s)**

Narrative is an illusive term and owing to its cross-discipline nature, each field of study brings slightly different ways of understanding to narrative study. In anthropology and social history, for instance, narrative refers to life study, observations, and documents. In social linguistics it is considered a discrete unit of discourse. And, in psychology and sociology, narrative usually encompasses long sessions of talks and therapeutic conversations (Given 2008). Narrative is also seen as a ‘universal mode of thought’ and a ‘form of thinking’ (Bruner 1986; in Gilbert 2008; Nelson 2006, in: Gravis 2015). Hakkarainen et al. (2013) consider that from a cultural-historical perspective, narrative is a psychological tool formalising and unifying human thought and knowledge. Adding a sense of causality, Andrews et al. (2000) and Berger (1997) see narratives as a sequence of events in time.

Different approaches to narrative, nevertheless, share the common understanding that narrative — as a phenomenon and a method — is based on the human experience. Dewey’s theory of experience is often cited as the philosophical underpinning to narrative studies. Experience, stated Dewey, has an individual and
social context; that is, individual’s experience cannot be understood without the social context it happens within and vice versa (in: Clandinin & Connelly 2000). These experiences, according to Gilbert (2008), are shared by a number of individuals that tell us something about the nature of society. Collective entities in society (governments, organisations, or ethnic/racial groups) transform the individual and overall collective experiences into a diverse body of narratives, and perhaps as a result, into social codes (Caine et al. 2013). To achieve that, explains Riessman (2005, 2008), events are selected, organised, connected, and evaluated as meaningful for a particular audience or, occasionally, purpose. This fits Bar-Tal’s conception of ethos (e.g. 2004, 2007, 2009, 2009a, 2013), the network of societal beliefs that weave together the past, present, and the future to provide the collective with meanings, justification, and purpose.

**Narrative Definition in this Work**

Narrative in this study is viewed as the expressions of the in-group’s collective lived experience or chain of experiences, where meanings and realities accrue (Andrews et al. 2000). It is a social construct that may require that the researcher be positioned between the story and the people in order to capture its nuanced understandings (Etherington 2011, 2004). Narrative is also seen as a mediational tool for the construction and reconstruction of the group’s collective memory, attribution of meaning to the present in the form of ethos, and production of the emotional orientations concerning the in-group's future and relationship with the out-group (see: Bar-Tal 2000a, 2004, 2007, 2013; de Luna & Rosa 2012). Broadening the definition, as it will be further discussed, narrative is a tool of social representation that can be expressed through multiple forms of textuality — written, spoken, or visual.

**Why Narrative Research?**

Narrative is inherently agentive and is used by individuals and groups to communicate several layers of their experience (McAlpine 2016). Any attempt to simplify its complexity, therefore, does not do justice to the
richness of approaches and insights it has to offer. It provides the researcher with a multi-levelled outlook on
the studied phenomenon, as well as complements the structural stance (common in applied and social
science) by providing alternate ones (ibid.). By using narrative research in the study of victimhood, it is
possible to examine and bring to focus different and sometimes contradictory layers of meaning units that
exist in the phenomenon. Additionally, since there are no self-evident categories that strictly specify what a
narrative is (Andrews et al. 2013), this presents an opportunity to develop and expand its parameters.

What Constitutes Narrative data?

Narrative research offers no overall rules about suitable materials or modes of investigation, or the best level
at which to study stories. It does not specify whether to look for stories in everyday speech, interviews, diaries,
TV programmes, novels, poetry, or newspaper articles; or how to analyse them (Andrews et al. 2013).
However, it seems that the operative word in narrative research is ‘story.’ Humans are storytelling organism,
according to Connelly and Clandinin (1990), and to Gottschall (2013), ‘storytelling animals.’ The focus is
usually on the production and analysis of qualitative data which can be understood as processes whereby
different groups of people engage in ‘story telling’ and by doing so produce narrative accounts of their lives
(Gilbert 2008).

Traditionally, stories and by default the lived experience embedded in them are usually generated and
collected through collaborative dialogic interactions with individual participant(s) or small group(s) of
individuals. This includes but is not limited to structured or semi-structured interviews, field notes, journal
records, letter and autobiographical writing, transcripts/text of own observations, procedural documents,
and pictures (Connelly & Clandinin 1990, Clandinin & Connelly 2000; Moen 2006). The shared ground
amongst most of these approaches is that the data are generated primarily through direct contact with either
the subject or the phenomenon.
Upon reviewing several narrative-based approaches, it became clear that the traditional narrative data collection methods suffered from certain limitations especially in terms of the type and volume of data. The inability to do interviews or fieldwork, for instance, meant that the researcher’s exposure to lived experience was limited, depriving him/her of valuable knowledge. On the plus side, the fluidity of narrative provides plenty of room to develop and expand what is deemed narrative data. For the purpose of this study, narrative data are not limited to direct interactions or oral utterances. Rather, they be can found almost in every form of social representation: oral, verbal, or visual — secondhand or otherwise.

**What Constitutes Narrative 'data' in this Work?**

This study considers that *every form of representation has a type of textuality* and such textuality is narrative because of the meanings — and experiential meanings — it conveys. ‘Text’ here — not in the traditional sense as words on a page — is deemed data. The moment we start thinking about experience, we are then using narrative. This usually begins internally then is sent outwardly through several forms of ‘textual’ representations. One may say that in narrative research, the studied phenomenon is embarked upon with the belief that there are individual, internal representations of events, thoughts, and feelings to which narrative gives external expression (Andrews et al. 2013).

If narrative is elevated into a broad range of textual representations delivered as external expressions and by which the human experience is made meaningful (Bamberg 2012), then perhaps it makes sense to argue that even performative and fine arts can be considered a sort of narrative. The ‘textuality’ in performative arts, for example, is expressed through the artist’s bodily movements. Riessman (2005, 2008) calls this ‘stage metaphor.’ Consider, for instance, Palestinian Dabkeh (folklore dance). *Dabkeh* translates Palestinian experience of victimhood into yet another expression of identity narrative and is considered a form of ‘cultural resistance.’ Historical data, which is frequently used in this study to add a historiographical dimension to
collective memory, can too be a form of narrative. Despite the apparent structuralism, historical text remains descriptive and can therefore be influenced by the author’s experience.

Most of the narrative data in this study are acquired through an array of secondary, contextualised sources. This means a larger set of data and flexible selection of methods and approaches, which will, for instance, facilitate the incorporation of quantitative data (mostly third-party surveys, questionnaires, and polls) to supplement qualitative data and provide them with more precision (Blaxter et al. 2010).

Nevertheless, given this is a humanities oriented study, it is very important to note that the terms 'data' or ‘data collection’ are used only for the sake of clarity and to adhere to the widely accepted terminology in social research. The word 'data' is used to identify what is collected, and ‘collect’ refers to how that 'data' comes to me, and ‘comes to me’ is to confirm that for most part the collected 'data' come from secondary sources where this author did not have an active role in making.

In this study data collection has a free, less structured form, which allows various narrative data to interact with each other without a rigid system that would dictate the when and where of their usage. Data collection occurs simultaneously with analysis. Some data are collected then analysed, then more data are collected and analysed, and so on (inductive reasoning). Each stage generates new ideas that would lead to or perhaps dictate a certain trajectory of more data collection and analysis. Typically, the weight of evidence from a selection of cases on Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian victimhood permits a logical generalisation of the initial hypothesis. As the research advances, initial analyses and findings are elaborated on, deepened, and confirmed by seeking further evidence in new cases from the wide range of related narrative textuality.
Narrative data in this study come from a wide range of sources. Most of which fall under one or more of three broad ‘categories’: a) scholarship, b) media, and c) arts, signs and symbols. None of these categories is mutually exclusive or heavily structured, but are viewed as containing various layers of textuality that form meaning units which can be approached and expanded as narrative. They are not organised or named as just that, ‘categories,’ but what matters is the data they contain. Such data are selected purposively and used strategically so they are relevant to the research question and reflective of the themes of memory, ethos, and emotions (e.g. Bar-Tal 2007, 2013).

A) **Scholarship:** Mostly academic publications which include but are not limited to books and monographs examining scholarly topics, edited books, journal articles, book chapters, book reviews, and conference proceedings. Also, albeit less frequently, the study benefits from the writings for the public that share the results of research or scholarly understanding. That includes op-eds, blogs and other informed online writing, columns, and other non-peer-reviewed publications such as independent self-publishing.

The sole purpose of scholarship in this study is to support and guide the conceptual and theoretical, as well as the critical, philosophical, and historical outlook on victimhood and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The academised form of writing can be a narrative source in the sense that it can include layers of descriptiveness, criticality, and persuasiveness, which implies that the personal may interfere with the allegedly ‘objective.’ Scholarly works carry within them the personalities, and the individual and collective experience of their authors and reflect the social contexts in which they were produced and conceptualised.

That said, it is the prospect of ‘close to home’ experience/story that makes the cultural texts and artefacts present in the next two categories a narrative textuality intimately reflective of society. Benziman (2011) calls such texts ‘more real than reality.’ They can tell us more about the experience/story than do many
scholarly narratives, and can also illuminate a range of academic questions, ideas, and themes (Sucharov 2019). Themselves byproducts of the in-group's national narratives, cultural texts and artefacts play a great role in shaping and maintaining the ethos of conflict (e.g. Bar-Tal 2013).

B) **Media:** A highly, if not the most, salient form of social representation. This study is based on the conviction that one function of media is to inform about certain events, phenomena, and processes in society, and to warn of impending danger. This should provide a picture about society’s collective experience by highlighting its fears, concerns, aspirations, and thoughts. It should also reflect the process of selection, transmission and reconstruction of certain events or issues (e.g. Adoni & Mane 1984) in light of this society's collective memory, emotional orientations, and ethos. Additionally, because media reflects society, it is viewed as providing real-life representations of the conceptual and theoretical frameworks present in scholarship.

The most important source of media information in this study is news. News comes in multiple forms and shapes, it includes news reports, articles, stories, commentaries, opinions, and official statements. These should reflect the general mode and experience of society. The study uses news sources from across the political spectrum in both Israel and the Palestinian territories, as well as globally. It, for example, acquires news from Israeli centre-right papers such as the the Jerusalem Post and Yedioth Ahronoth, and centre and left-wing ones like The Times of Israel and Haaretz. These papers share common concerns regarding Israel's victim identity, the notion of external threat, and the position toward the Palestinians. But they vary in the severity of their views of and identifications with these issues. Palestinian media sources, on the other hand, from the left to the right are more or less monolithic in their views of the occupation and by default Israel. The tone and expressions concerning the Palestinian collective memory, the dissemination of the conflict ethos, and the concomitant emotional orientations remain for the most part similar (see: Bar-Tal *et al.* 2009). This is also found in the majority of Arabic news outlets, such as Al-Jazeera, which is frequently used as a source of narrative in this study.

C) *Arts, Signs and Symbols*: This is a broad and variegated category and tends to overlap with the previous one. It typically includes: 1) arts: such as novels and memoirs, poetry, authors’ opinions and insights, music, images, visual arts, and even religious texts and wills, and 2) signs and symbols: like national symbols, slogans, ceremonies, rituals, commemorations, national anthems, and speeches. These components are not mutually exclusive. A song can be both an art form and a national symbol — as in the case of national anthems. Films can be both a literary work and a visual medium — Kanafani’s novella *Returning to Haifa* (1969), for instance, has a film adaptation.

These sources reflect experience mainly through the content hidden meanings, imagery, metaphors, and symbolism. By way of illustration, the symbolism in the novel *Bab Al-Shams* (*Gate of the Sun*) (1998) goes beyond simply narrating the Palestinian collective memory; it examines its most salient, if not at times most unacknowledged, emotional reverberations such as shame and humiliation (see Chapter Seven). In a novelised narrative — same as in memoirs, authors’ opinions, insights, and statements — the storyteller does not tell the story, so much as she/he is told by it. The interpretation of symbolism or intertextual signs in such literary works can be subject to the reader’s positionality. A non-Palestinian may read Ghassan Kanafani’s *Returning to Haifa* (1969) as a tragic story, but probably only a Palestinian can see through it his/her lived experience and identify the symbolism or latent meanings accordingly.
Narrative, especially in the case of arts, signs, and symbols, can reflect a political process that alerts to the power mechanism (Gilbert 2008). Bruner (1986, in: Gravis 2015) argues that not only does that narrative exhibit the structures of meaning or negotiate both individual and collective identity, it also reveals the structures of power. In Palestinian novels, poetry, paintings, and even films, it is easy to see that the Palestinian is almost always presented as the underdog. Because narrative highlights the power mechanisms, it also serves as a mode of resistance to the existing structures of power (see: Andrews et al. 2013; De Fina in: De Fina et al. 2015). What distinguishes Palestinian literary narratives, as it is clear in the works of Ghassan Kanafani, is its muted politicised nature; partly because of Israel’s censorship and not less because of Palestinian sense of guilt and shame over the loss of a homeland.

Same as in films and news and to a lesser degree scholarship, the perspectives generated and developed in arts, signs and symbols can become cultural values. Consider, for example, the Israeli-Jewish slogans: “Never again” or “the Masada shall never fall again.” On the surface, Zionism defines them in terms of sacrificial heroism, but embedded in them are representations of victimhood. The same applies to national anthems. Both Israeli and Palestinian anthems are about ‘rising from the ashes.’ They are however expressed differently. Israel’s national anthem, *ha tikvah* (the hope), still speaks of the ‘oppressed’ Jew who ‘seeks hope’ from victimisation (Grosbard 2003). The anthem is a narrative textuality that repeatedly revives the trauma associated with collective memory, and consequently continues to cement the collective’s adherence to the country’s master narrative (Bar-Tal 2007, 2013). The Palestinian anthem, on the other hand, has a revolutionary tone which keeps with the Palestinian notions about honour and shame, as well as approach to victimhood.

Signs and symbols can also have a ‘visual textuality’ that captures certain experiences/stories and conveys their meanings. *Handhala* (fig. 1.1) is an example. He is a cartoon character created by the late Palestinian satirical cartoonist Naji Al-Ali, and is depicted as ten-year-old boy turning his back to the viewers and
clasping his hands behind his back. He has a cactus-like head, wears ragged clothes and is barefoot. He exists in all of Al-Ali’s cartoons. Handhala exceeds being a form of art to being a sign and a symbol for the whole Palestinian experience — by being a tenacious witness to the Palestinian suffering, which he is part of, and a keeper of memory, which he like other Palestinians struggles to protect. Nowadays, Handhala is as visually representative of the Palestinian struggle as the Palestinian kuffiyeh (traditional headgear).

SECTION TWO: NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

Narrative data are interpretable based on the social/political context in which they emerge. While some of the data sources above can provide straightforward social representations regarding the studied phenomenon, they — perhaps for the most part — contain experiential clues, hints, and signals that require that the researcher look beyond what is obvious. In order to achieve a good understanding of victimhood and its various manifestations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, narrative analysis in this study focuses on the latent content and meaning units in the narrative textuality, and is supplemented and enhanced by self-reflexivity.

Gauging the latent meaning is seen as combining the categorical unit of analysis and the content focus of analysis — making it a categorical-content approach. Categorical is usually concerned with shared experience and content focuses on the ‘content’ of the story/experience/narrative and the underlying [latent] content. It asks questions such as: what are the author’s motives and intentions? What might particular items/words/themes/phrases symbolise for the narrator and others? What are the meaning and importance of the story? The attention here shifts from ‘what actually happened’ to ‘how to make sense of what happened and to what effect’ (Bryman 2015) — from the ‘story’ to the experience of that story.

In other words, this kind of analysis involves looking for and interpreting hints, clues, symbols, and references in the news, films, novels, poetry, scholarly works, and other forms of narrative textuality. Narrative interpretation is influenced by several factors: what the researcher wants to find out or prove (in relation to
the research subject-matter and question), the researcher’s positionality and personal convictions, and the narrative context and background. The film *Lebanon* (2009), for example, depicts the Lebanon War as seen from the inside of an IDF tank (see Chapter Five). The latent meaning might be inferred from the experience of the tank crew. Given the study's subject-matter, the notion of ‘enclosure’ (being trapped inside the tank) can be viewed as a reflection of Israel’s siege mentality, which is a manifestation of Israel’s victimhood narratives.

To further illustrate, consider an academic article on victimhood — say by Bar-Tal (e.g. Bar-Tal et al. 2009b) — if the unit of analysis is categorical and our focus is the content, then the purpose is to look closely at the latent content in that article — well beyond the conceptual or theoretical framework. By focusing on the latent content, more information, patterns, and themes that might not be readily discernible emerge. Reading Bar-Tal beyond the scholarly structure (as a scholarship narrative) may uncover the author’s biases, belief orientations, and reveal some of the limitations in his scholarship — at least from a Palestinian perspective. Bar-Tal remains part of his society’s narratives of collective memory and ethos, and his emotional orientations may to some extent be in tune with the majority of society members.

When seeking the latent content or trying to understand the meaning units in a narrative textuality, it is important to pay attention to the narrative context and background. It might be taxing to understand the latent content in news stories or cultural texts and artefacts without placing them against their political, social, or historical context/background. One instrument for doing that is scholarship. Scholarly works can, among other things, provide background/context in the form of historical data or socio-psychological conceptualisations. Context and background are considered based on the assumption that individuals or groups cannot construct their identities and worldview(s) in a void; rather, they do so by using the social and cultural scripts and norms available to them as a repertoire from which they choose (Tuval-Mashiach 2014). To view humiliation as a primary part of Palestinian victimhood narratives, it is important to interpret it
against the backdrop of the Palestinian social and political context where the concepts of patriarchy, masculinity and gender identity overlap with the notion of patriotism, resistance, dignity, and self-sacrifice.

Narrative analysis is supplemented and enriched by reflexivity. Being a member of the Palestinian collective, I utilises my ‘insider involvement’ to cast lights on some of the hows and whys of the Palestinian conflict dynamics. My personal experience, memories, and collective-based emotional orientations play a role in determining the conclusions of my observations. This is particularly evident in Chapter Seven.

**REFLEXIVITY**

Researchers come to research with *priori* knowledge and assumptions, effectively influencing their selection and prioritisation of certain narrative understandings over others. Narrative analysis ergo becomes a means to convey a mood as well as a specific argument (Gombrich 1972). To come to terms with that, a reflexive outlook becomes important. In order to understand the logic behind this study’s utilisation of reflexivity, it is useful to start by discussing positionality and bias.

*Researcher’s Positionality*

In assessing positionality a first starting point is to be aware that in this work ‘neutrality’ is not seen as a statement of fact (Witkin 2014), and to acknowledge, as a result, that the social research is subjective. Therefore, while remaining faithful to research rigour and methodological standards, the cloak of ‘objectivity’ — the rigid, highly regulated and dispassionate examination of social life — needs to be reevaluated (Akhtar 2017; Hamby 2018).

Even when in certain social fields such as journalism data is deemed ‘facts,’ the fashion in which they are gathered, interpreted, and presented may be subjective. The BBC (BBC Academy, updated 2013), for
instance, instructed its journalists to use what it deemed ‘neutral terms’ to describe ‘reality on the ground’ in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. ‘Reality on the ground’ was not defined and journalists were free to assess it. That proved tricky especially when the said journalists were from or originally from Israel or the Palestinian Territories. The conflict to an Israeli-Jew or a Palestinian is largely a lived experience, a qualitatively determined and narratively structured one. Krieger (1991) likens this to a pot that carries its maker’s thoughts, feelings, and spirit. Put differently, in a social context ‘facts’ are part of ‘narrative knowing.’ The reality of lived experience is determined by one’s reflexive awareness of it (Wolfson 2005).

A second starting point is to be aware that before one can know what we are looking at, one has to know where we are looking from (Markham 2017). Finlay (2002) describes this as a ‘dialectic conversation between experience and awareness,’ and Gergen (2009) sees it as the ‘relational interaction’ between the self and its social context. Similarly, Gough and Madill (2012) propose that an individual is inextricably linked to other people and tied to sets of social, cultural, and political contexts that influence and often constrain human action. In “Zionism from the Standpoint of its Victims” (1979), Said positioned himself dialectically between Zionism as viewed by many Jew — an emancipatory movement — and Zionism as a colonial enterprise as viewed by Palestinians. As he investigated Zionism — one might say: dispassionately and systematically — Said remained true to the fact that to a Palestinian there was almost no alternative but to see Zionism as a tool of victimisation. In this study Zionism is thoroughly investigated and attempts to mentally identify with its narratives are made. But like Said, I continue to be conscious that my position as a Palestinian influences how I see or, more importantly, feel about Zionism. This sets the tone for the study’s interpretive and analytical approach.

**Researcher's Bias**

Positionality gives rise to the issue of bias. Our ontological and epistemological positioning, methodological and theoretical perspectives, and the adoption of particular research methods are all bound up not only by
intellectual concerns or curiosity, but also by our personal values and ideologies (Mays & Pope 1995; Gergen & Gergen 2000; Mauthner & Doucet 2003; Kaptchuk 2003). The researcher identity is in this case not very detached from the lived identity, a position that Mantzoukas (2005) called the ‘I-witness paradigm.’

Norris (1997) concurs that because of that, there is no paradigm solution to the elimination of error and bias. But it may be argued that a researcher’s position is not always an artificial imposition or a conscious effort. Rather, it is perhaps an unavoidable result of how or what things are. Coming to the research with certain assumptions and values is not the same as bias, unless the researcher fails to mention them from the outset and reflexively throughout (Malterud 2001). I choose to see my close proximity to the conflict as an opportunity and a legitimate benchmark for good research. At a minimum level, as Andrews et al. (2000) note, it is a medium where the self can be located as a psychosocial phenomenon and subjectiveness seen as a discursively constructed yet still active and effective. The goal is not to fully eliminate ‘bias,’ but to use the closeness to the studied phenomenon as a focus for more intense insight (Frank 1997, cited by Finlay 2002).

**Implementing Reflexivity**

Through reflexive thoughts the ‘situated self’ is explored and exploited while to do so remains purposeful (Finaly 202, 2015). In analysing narrative a researcher must remain reflexively conscious of his/her positionality and — as a basic requirement for reflexivity — to analyse the self recursively and critically against the backdrop of own experience and relative to the object, context, and process of inquiry (Mauthner & Doucet 2003; Markham 2017). Incorporating the self into the research and reflecting inwardly would bring to consciousness some of the author’s epistemological, ontological, and methodological premises, as well as the personality embedded in the writing (Humphreys 2005). This can be viewed as an integration of the scholarly and personal voices in the researcher’s textual representations (Maguire 2006).
Connecting the personal to the cultural and the experiential to the political, the reflexive undertaking in this study has two levels of consciousness: the social and the personal. The social focuses on the self as a participant/member of one’s own community, whereas the personal views the self as an autonomous subject and an object of inquiry — usually framed through auto-ethnographic accounts from the researcher’s experience (Spry 2001; Foley 2002).

In the ‘social’ I use reflexivity to examine critically the Palestinian collective as a member of that collective with a close knowledge of it. The pronoun ‘we’ (and its variants: us, ourselves, our) is the operative word in making the ‘insider’ researcher visible to the reader and emphasising his role as an active agent in the knowledge production and construction.

In the ‘personal’ I focus the reflexive lens ever more closely on the personal self. Framed auto-ethnographically, I use stories or glimpses from my personal experiences beyond the collective meta-narrative discourses to highlight my position relative to the research and to establish an analytical or interpretative connection with the research topic (see: Witkin 2014; Bochner & Ellis 2016; Lumsden 2019).

The auto-ethnographic accounts try to answer questions such as: what led me to that perception? How did I get to this point? How did I know that? So what? Why am I interested in this and to what end/effect? As self-narrating, I write in the first-person using the auto-ethnographic ‘I’ or its variants: ‘me,’ ‘myself,’ and ‘my.’ The use of ‘I’ acknowledges that knowledge is contextual, situational, and specific. Auto-ethnography is after all a reflexive form of textual representation that makes the researcher’s experience a topic of investigation; ergo, nothing is more involved than using the first-person account (Lumsden 2019). The goal is to be visible, to ‘show’ — not ‘tell,’ and to seek own voice as a means to move from the inside of the author to outward expression and vice versa (Maguire 2006). That helps the author make sense of own and other people’s experience in a new and different light (Etherington 2004).
Also, engaging in auto-ethnographic self-narratives and applying them to the studied phenomenon may be seen, as Markham (2017) states, like looking at oneself looking in the mirror. It is about achieving a profound insight of the social context through understanding ourselves beyond our own personal experience. Ellis and Bochner (2016) refer to this process as transforming the private troubles into public knowledge, which can be both therapeutic and pedagogical. Not to mention that sharing personal accounts help enhance the author’s authenticity and trust, which would reflect positively on the research validity.

**RESEARCH VALIDITY AND ETHICS**

Narrative represents lived experience and can therefore be subjective and interpretable. For this reason, the first step in ensuring validity and rigour is to be transparent: acknowledging — as it was done in the first chapter — that the study’s analysis has been influenced by particular discourses, personal convictions, and experiences. This enables the researcher to, first, dismiss validity criteria based on realist assumptions, and, second, to acknowledge that different approaches can yield different analyses. The second step is to be aware of the ethical dilemmas surrounding narrative research. In this study, the author’s close connection to the research raised questions about ‘relational ethics.’ Addressing that required implementing a reflexive approach. This included handling research with an introspective eye, turning inwardly to critically explore and increasingly understand one’s own experience (auto-ethnographically) and the self as a product and interpreter of the social context. This helps ensure that the researcher’s biases and subjectivities continue to be assessed throughout.

**CONCLUSION**

Narrative in this study is included in all types of textuality that is explicitly or implicitly related to the lived experience [of victimhood or/and its manifestations]. It derives data from a wide range of sources, which
can be — as a way of explanation — put under one or more of three broad categories: 1) scholarship, 2) media, and 3) arts, signs and symbols. Neither one of these categories is mutually exclusive. Narrative data are analysed primarily through a categorical-content approach, focusing on the latent content or ‘the meaning units.’ Part of the analysis is seen as a product of the researcher’s positionality, which raises practical and ethical issues, not least is the possibility of bias. To address these issues, provide more depth, and ensure research validity and trustworthiness, reflexivity is used to critique the ‘situated self’ both as a member of the collective and auto-ethnographically through personal accounts.

**Fig: a.2.0 Methodology Visual Map**

![Methodology Visual Map](image)
CHAPTER FOUR

ON HISTORY AND INTRACTABILITY
THE JEWISH QUESTION

He was a young man of 35 when he entered the public life, promoting what he called ‘the Jewish cause’ (Avineri 2014). Like many Jews of his time, Theodor Herzl adopted a lifestyle, customs, mentality, and appearance that meant to make him socially indistinguishable (Kamczycki 2013). His early pictures show him with characteristically modelled sideburns and pointed, slightly raised, moustache tips, and a centre parting — resembling the style of Franz Joseph (1830-1916), the Emperor of Austria-Hungary at the time (see: Kozuchowski 2014). Beyond embracing the Viennese cultural values, Herzl appears to have sought to assimilate into the lifestyle of the non-Jewish and to conceal his Jewish identity. He also distanced himself from the Jews whom he thought were old-fashioned or even looked different (Kamczycki 2012, 2013).

Although the eighteenth-century Enlightenment changed the general attitude towards the Jews, it did not completely eradicate anti-Semitism (Beller 2007). The emancipated Jews had given up their old Jewish characteristics because anti-Semitism made them loathe it, but they did not become Germans or French. They lost the home of the ghetto without obtaining a new home (Laqueur 2003). Likewise, Herzl’s assimilation did not fully hide his “Jewish physiognomy” or stop him from being insulted in the streets of Munich and Vienna (Kamczycki 2012). It was however the Dreyfus Affair17 that motivated Herzl to seek a real solution to the ‘Jewish question.’

His thoughts on the ‘Jewish question’ and the need for a ‘Jewish homeland’ were not very different from those proposed several years earlier by Pinsker and Hess. They both advocated a ‘Jewish homeland’ to escape discrimination and anti-Semitism.18 Herzl, nevertheless, was different in thinking in radical terms (Laqueur 2007). His political vision was initially expressed in his book Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) and later

17 Following his conviction in a public ceremony in Paris, Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish French officer, was stripped of his military insignias and sword and was paraded before a crowd that shouted, “Death to Judas, death to the Jew.” To see how the accident affected Herzl, see: Theodor Herzl’s The Jewish State, pp.11-12

18 For more info, see: Leo Pinsker — Encyclopedia Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/biography/Leo-Pinsker, and Moses Hess — Encyclopedia Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/biography/Moses-Hess
became the core idea for the first Zionist Congress. The Congress was held in Basle, Switzerland in August 1897 and decided that in order to free the Jews from the galut (diaspora), Zionism would seek to establish a homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine. The movement encouraged and financed European Jews to immigrate to Palestine and build settlements there (Cohen 1989; Al-Messiri 1999). At the time, little did Herzl know that his radical solution to the Jewish question was going to redefine the Jewish identity and mark the beginning of the world’s most complex intractable conflict.

**THE ROAD TO PALESTINE, NATIVISATION AND ERASURE**

To most early Zionists, the demographic realities of Palestine were opaque. They initially saw Palestine as the European imperialists did, as an empty territory, 'a land without a people for a people without land' (Garfinkle 1991). They did not think in terms of ‘the natives' who were overlooked or expected to passively accept the plans made for their land (Said 1979). The first waves of Jewish immigrants to Palestine began in the late nineteenth-century and there they established settler communities, the Yishuv. From the outset, the Zionist Movement considered the Yishuv as a territorial political entity, and a united and autonomous community (Barnavi 2003).

During the British Mandate beginning in 1920, the Zionists intensified their efforts to secure the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Witnessing the large influx of European Jews into their country and apprehensive about the growing militarisation of the Yishuv, Palestinians felt that their natural and inalienable rights to the land were in danger. They also viewed the British support of Zionism (the 1917 Balfour Declaration as an example) as an infringement of assurances of independence given by the Allied Powers to Arab leaders in return for their support during the war. The result was mounting resentment and, eventually, resistance against the Mandate authorities, followed by violent clashes between the Palestinian Arabs and European Jews (see: Sayegh 1965; Al-Messiri 1999; Pappé 2006; Sabbagh 2008; Masalha 2012).
To counteract the ‘foreign settler’ label and legitimise the concept of ‘Jewish nation,’ Zionism ‘reclaimed’ the land as their own and sought to create an ‘authentic’ *nativised* identity. They claimed to represent an indigenous people returning to their homeland after two thousand years of exile. It is an ironic claim, as Masalha remarks (2015), considering the hard core of Zionist activism was formed from Russian or Ukrainian nationals. These European Jewish nationalists had to re-invent their identity to match their state-building goals. This gave rise to terms like *sabra* (from Arabic *sabar*, cactus), referring to “the New Jew” who was born in Ottoman or Mandatory Palestine. He was imagined as tenacious and strong as a cactus and free from the contaminations of the *galut* (Apel 2012). Continuing the process of indigenisation following Israel’s establishment in 1948, many Zionists changed their names from Russian, Polish or German to Hebrew-sounding names. For instance, David Ben-Gurion was David Gruenin, and Golda Meir was born Golda Mabovitch (Masalha 2015).

The process of *nativisation*, and inevitably state building, could not have been fulfilled without mentally erasing the natives. In *My Promised Land*, Shavit (2014) explains that denial was part of the Zionist project from the very beginning. He describes his great-grandfather’s tour in Palestine in 1897 and asks why Herbert Bentwich, then founder of the British Zionist Federation (1899), did not see the native Palestinians. Shavit remarks that he did not really see that Ramleh was a Palestinian town…he did not see the Palestinian town of Lydda. There were more than half a million Arabs in Palestine in 1897, twenty cities and towns, and hundreds of villages. There was a need not to see. Because seeing would have forced the settlers to turn back, Shavit explains.

Mental erasure of Palestinians facilitated their physical displacement and replacement. Israeli historian Benny Morris claims that Ben-Gurion was right, Palestinians had to be uprooted for a ‘Jewish State’ to arise. He admits that ethnic cleansing took place and many Palestinians were expelled from their homes, but he

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19 Palestinians, too, have embraced cactus as a symbol of rootedness, steadiness, and resistance.
follows with a justification, saying that “…there are circumstances in history that justify ethnic cleansing” (Shavit 2004a). In the words of Masalha (2011), first they took the land, then they made the ethics.

COLONIALISM AND RESISTANCE

Herzl’s Zionism is still viewed by most in Israel as an extension of the tradition of democratic national liberation movements in Europe. In reality, from the perspective of the native Palestinians or even through the framework of post-colonial scholarship, Zionism is an old-fashioned turn-of-the-century colonialism. It is clear from Herzl's thinking that the realisation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine could not have been done unless there was a prior European inclination to view the natives as irrelevant to begin with (Said 1979).

The Zionist Europeans supposed, without formulating any thought, that the Palestinian Arabs were passive and without national consciousness. Herzl, and not only Herzl, famously refused to acknowledge the violent force of Zionism’s own nationalism and the Arab nationalism it would provoke (Rose 2007). In To the Promised Land (1994), Rabbi David Goldberg writes: “The practical demands of creating an autonomous Jewish society in Palestine ready for eventual statehood took precedence over theoretical ruminations about coexistence with the Arab majority” (Goldberg 1996, in: Brownfeld 1998, pp.29-31).

In a typical out-group versus in-group negative identity formation (e.g. Kelman 1991; Volkan 2006; Bar-Tal 2013), Jewish nationalism heightened Palestinian self-identity and national consciousness. Some of the Israeli historians claim that “the Zionist movement started with the aim of forming one national group, and it ended with forming two” (Nasser 2010; Pappé ed., p.220). While there might be some truth to this claim, it however views the Palestinian history from a Zionist perspective. It is not a recognition of Palestinian nationalism as much as it is an affirmation of Zionist legitimacy.
Unlike the Zionists, the Palestinians could anchor their political struggle in an existing society that had its own language, culture, and a history that was deeply intertwined with the entire region. However, due to objective reasons, such as the disorganised and divided Palestinian elite and the British political and military support for the Zionist project, Palestinian nationalism was doomed to fail.

In 1936, for instance, what started as minor Palestinian-Jewish clashes quickly flared into a widespread revolt that lasted virtually until the outbreak of World War II. There were attacks on British troops and Jewish settlements, and sabotage of roads and railways. The British authorities responded with curfews, reinforcements, mass arrests, collective punishment, and executions (Sayegh 1965; DPR 1978; Masalha 2012). The revolt, nevertheless, did not develop into a unified political movement or held out a vision that spoke to and could deploy the various sectors of society (Pappé & Hilal 2010). Israeli historian, Anita Shapira (1999), explains that during the revolt, the Jewish side conducted its own retaliations and reprisals. The Zionist leadership legitimised the use of terror against Palestinians, and later, against the British. It was a Machiavellian step-up in tactics that would eventually lead to a number of massacres and systematic expulsions of the natives during and after the 1948 war.

THE STATE

Seeking a solution to the ‘Palestine problem,’ the British government proposed, in place of the independence pledged two decades earlier, a plan to partition Palestine. In November 1948, the United Nations recommended that Palestine be partitioned into an Arab State and a Jewish State (with an international status for Jerusalem), allocating a larger percentage of the land to the smaller Jewish population (United Nations 2008). The Plan was rejected by the Palestinians opposing to being forced into having their land divided with those they viewed as foreign invaders. On the day Britain officially relinquished its Mandate over Palestine and disengaged its forces, the Jewish Agency declared the establishment of the State of Israel.
Fierce hostilities immediately broke out between the Arab Palestinian and Jewish militias. The next day, regular troops of the neighbouring Arab States entered the territory to assist Palestinian Arabs. (ibid.).

The hostilities effectively provided the Zionist leaders with political coverage and allowed their militias, soon to become the IDF, to commence mass expulsions and ethnic cleansing against the indigenous population. Nowadays, with the exception of a small elite of new historians who emerged in the 1980s, the mainstream Israeli-Jews still adhere to the official Zionist narrative which is either silent on the 1948-49 atrocities, admits some but justifies them, or denies them altogether. One fact still stands, nevertheless, the 'Jewish State' had led to the destruction of the Palestinian society. At least 80% of the Palestinians who lived in the major part of Palestine upon which Israel was established— more than 77% of Palestine’s territory— became refugees (Sa’adi & Abu-Lughod 2007).

AFTER THE STATE

With the significant shift in power, the two peoples’ narratives began to take shape. Israeli-Jews justify the establishment of a Jewish homeland, among other things, by the need for a safe haven for Jews. Today, the Jewish collective memory, especially the Shoah, is used as an evidential basis for this claim. Here, much of the legitimacy of a ‘Jewish homeland’ is seen through a victimhood perspective. This is clearly expressed in Israel’s 1948 ‘Declaration of Independence.’ Had there been a ‘Jewish State’ in the 1930s, goes the argument, the Shoah would not have been allowed to happen (Goldberg 2006). Palestinians on the other hand see in Zionism a settler-colonial endeavour. The fact that so far no Palestinians from across the political spectrum have been willing to reconcile themselves to Zionism, shows how deep-seated the Palestinian narratives are. To those Palestinians that Zionism displaced, it cannot have meant anything by way of sufficient cause that the Jews were victims of European anti-Semitism (Said, 1979).
It would take over a decade however after the state for the clashing of victimhood narratives to take proper roots and move to a higher level of intractability. The 1967 Occupation and the rise of Palestinian armed resistance were main components of that change. As Palestinians have sought the mantle of victimhood, and indeed as Israel’s role as victimiser has become more apparent, so the attachment to the Jew-qua-victim trope has intensified (Navon 2009).

In 1967 Israel occupied the rest of historical Palestine and the Palestinian refugees who resettled in Gaza and the West Bank after the Nakba found themselves under a military occupation by the same party that had driven them out of their homes nineteen years earlier. Whilst 1967 was viewed as a continuation of the ‘original sin’ of 1948, it also added another layer of victimisation to Palestinian lives.

The 1960s was also the decade of the coming of age of the first Palestinian exile generation and who would later represent the core of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). This generation would transform their parents’ sense of humiliation and passive victimisation into an alternate ego in the form of the fedayeen (singular: fedayi), the honourable freedom fighters. Somewhat analogous to the Zionist notion of the ‘New Jew,’ fedayeen gave rise to a new type of identity based on the dichotomy of victimhood and muqawama (see: Chapter Seven). Even though the concept of fedayeen is no longer in common use, the very notion behind it continues to define every Palestinian act of dissidence today.

For Israel, the euphoria that followed the 1967 victory (see: Chapter Six) was short lived. Six years later the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal marking what was known as the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The war eventually led to a peace agreement with Egypt and Israel's withdrawal from the Egyptian Sinai which Israel captured during the Six-Day War. But the post-war trauma and existential angst, enhanced by the Shoah memory, did not recede. This mindset would continue to define Israel’s self-image in all of Israel’s regional conflicts (see: Segev 1993).

20 Also known as the October War or the 10th of Ramadan War.
In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon. The invasion was preceded by a series of Israeli attacks and limited incursions into Lebanese territories since the 1970s. Operation ‘Peace for the Galilee,’ as it was called by the IDF, was a full-scale military invasion that ultimately reached Beirut and resulted in tens of thousands of Lebanese and Palestinian causalities, and finally the eviction of the PLO from Lebanon. While this was a textbook war of choice, the dominant narratives continued to mark the war as ein breira (no choice), as was the case for all of Israel’s previous wars. The sense of persecution and ethos about the IDF innocence, prevailed (see Chapter Five) (Matar & Harb 2013). This pattern would continue to influence Israel’s behaviours during the two Palestinian Intifadas in 1987 and 2000 and the sporadic peace attempts in between, and later during the three Gaza onslaughts between 2009 and 2014.

INTRACTABLE VICTIMHOOD

Looking at the whole picture, since Herzl envisioned a Jewish homeland in Palestine the clash between the initially European Jewish immigrants and Palestinians had gone through multiple phases, each with its own complexities. These complexities have now accumulated, locking Israeli-Jews and Palestinians into a severe form of intractable conflict. What began as a political-colonial project developed into geo-political claims and then narratives to justify them. This prolonged process was eventually inundated with psychology.

The essence of Herzl’s vision, and of Zionism, was to rid the Jews of victimhood and passivity. However, these narratives were given more power in the name of collective memory and have been employed to legitimise and justify Israel’s wars and policies against the Arabs and Palestinians, as well as to gather international support. Similarly, Palestinians use victimhood narratives to entertain Palestinian interests, justify Palestinian actions against both the Israeli army and civilians, and to win the international community. That said, qualitative and quantitative indicators of victimisation weigh heavily towards the Palestinian. Since the first Intifada (1987-1993), the Nakba narratives began to circulate around the world and the news of
Palestinian suffering under the occupation increasingly found room in the world’s media. Satellite channels and, later, the internet have made it possible for Palestinians to convey their story to the world. Threatened by the loss of the victim status, Israel had to step up her diplomatic efforts. The Shoah has been a key component in those efforts. The message was generally, although implicitly, that the l’olam lo od (never again) metaphor also applies to the Palestinians. In other words, the Shoah will not be allowed to happen again at the hands of the Gentiles, the Palestinians this time. Reference to the Shoah victims became a discursive instrument of political legitimacy, used specifically to justify military operations and to argue for Israel’s right to “security” on its own terms (Ochs 2006) (see: Chapters Five & Six).

These competing narratives became the weapons in a fierce battle over public opinion21 and moral validation. This situation was best illustrated during the 2004 ICJ deliberations on the segregation wall at the Hague. Haaretz painted a cynical picture of the scene: “On the one side, a gutted bus belonging to the national public transportation monopoly, and posters of Israeli victims of terrorism; on the other side, two processions of Palestinians who have been hurt by the occupation” (Bar’el Feb 2004). Israel claims that the wall was meant to stop Palestinian attacks, but Palestinians argue that it is another device to appropriate Palestinian land. Depending on where one stands, both arguments may be valid. But beyond the geo-politics what stands out is the conflict psychology and particularly the emphasis by both sides on own suffering as instruments for legitimacy.

Layers upon layers of historical accumulations made the political essence of the conflict no longer conceivable. Much of the historical geo-politics had been reconstructed as subjective narratives. Yet, most of the conflict resolution approaches in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are still primarily centred on geo-political considerations. The failed Israeli-Palestinian peace attempts attest to the fact that geopolitics is only one part of the issue.

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21 In the thesis context, ‘public opinion’ mostly means people’s collective preferences on matters related to government and politics and also the expressions influenced by their psycho-political experience.
What began as a series of secret meetings between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators hosted by Norway eventually produced the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords, a plan stipulating the elements and conditions for a future Palestinian state on the 1967 Israeli-occupied territories. The Oslo Accords and the related ‘peace talks’ that followed, up to the 2000 Camp David Summit, have now reached a stalemate (Peleg 1997; Barari 2004). Despite the early atmosphere of optimism, cynicism and gloom ultimately prevailed in both societies. While there was initially a burgeoning over-all reconciliatory attitude in Israel towards the Palestinians, Israel’s day-to-day security measures and sanctions in the Occupied Territories were still tightly upheld. Also, Palestinians plunged into further despair following unfulfilled expectations of prompt relief and economic improvements (Peleg 2015).

At the time, not many observers foresaw that the agreement(s) was doomed to fail because most trauma-based grievances of the past, especially those of the Palestinians, were not considered. The failure of the Camp David Summit later in 2000 showed that both parties were incapable of achieving a ‘psychological leap.’ Faced by Israeli rejection of the return of Palestinian refugees, Palestinians might have believed that the psychological cost of renouncing the right of return would be greater than the physical and economic deprivations they suffer under the Israeli occupation (Rosenberg 2011).

In reality, however, the return of the Palestinian refugees will turn the Jews in historical Palestine into a minority and eventually the Zionist Jewish identity will probably weaken or altogether vanish. But, in our defence, we, Palestinians, cannot judge the situation free of our collective memory. In our minds, we are the sole victims. Not only do most of us find it incomprehensible that many Jews in Israel cannot see our suffering or reconcile themselves to our story, but also more unfathomable is the fact that they think they are the victims in this conflict. Some of us do not even know that Israeli-Jews have victimhood claims. How can the occupier be a victim?
This brings to mind what happened at a conference at York University in Toronto in 2009 called “Israel/Palestine Mapping Models of Statehood and Paths.” An Israeli academic talked about the fear that overwhelmed his fellow Israeli-Jews. Palestinians were angered by ‘the audacious attempt to ask them to understand Israel’s security needs when they are living under this country’s military occupation.’ They found it outrageous that the Israeli occupiers could portray themselves as a victim nation bobbling in precariously in a sea of Arab hostility (Enns 2012, pp.57-58). Many of us do not feel we bear any moral responsibilities towards the ones who oppress us. After all, it is us whose land is shrinking, our dignity and honour are violated, and our basic freedoms are confiscated. The list goes on. These perceptions are never independent of the Palestinian collective experiences, which many of us have trans-generationally internalised without having physically experienced all of them. The stories and imagery associated with the events of 1948, 1967, and the Intifadas, and the unbroken series of suffering in between, have galvanised and sustained political energy, even among the Palestinian refugees in the Diaspora (Matar & Harb 2013) (see Chapter Seven).

Similarly, many Israeli-Jews struggle to part with the ‘bleak’ identification with the Jewish past, which is usually activated in order to rationalise or justify the present. For some right-wing ideologues, the Palestinians are the last generation of the Biblical Amaleks determined to annihilate the Jewish nation. For the general public, the Shoah cannot only be a universal moral compass but also a confirmation of Jewish victimhood and, subsequently, a vindication for a powerful ‘Jewish State.’ In this light, Palestinian attacks are blown out of proportion and the threat they pose is rarely appraised without the existential implications in mind. The Israeli retaliation, as a result, becomes severely disproportionate and is often depicted as an Israeli retaliation against Palestinian aggression (ibid., p.165). The asymmetrical military power of Israel vis-à-vis the Palestinians is almost never mentioned, neither is the correlation between Israel’s policies and Palestinian dissidence. Even Palestinian non-violent resistance is sometimes seen as new anti-Semitism. Consider Israel’s reaction to the BDS Movement. Netanyahu said that BDS was reminiscent of Nazi Germany’s campaign against Jews (i24 News 2015), and Lapid, the former Finance Minister, drew a direct line between BDS’s activities and the Mufti’s collaboration with the Nazis in the 1940s (Shalev 2015a) (see: Chapter 5). Such worldview often
includes the claims for innocence and that society is being unfairly criticised by intentional organisations or states. This is maybe a ‘coping strategy,’ according to Oren and Bar-Tal (2014), which involves ‘modification in the process of evaluation by challenging legitimacy of other evaluation.’

CONCLUSION

Since the late nineteenth-century, the situation between Zionism/Israel and the Palestinians has gone through several phases. The intractability that was produced also created intermingled and hierarchal victimhood narratives and counter-narratives. The Palestinians see themselves as dispossessed, oppressed, and disenfranchised. Israeli-Jews see Palestinians as terrorists and aggressors and themselves as victims of terrorism. Palestinians see Israeli-Jews as all-powerful conquerors, and themselves as helpless victims. Israeli-Jews look at their soldiers and see in them their precious little children. Palestinians look at the same soldiers and see nothing but instruments of oppression and victimisation (Schimmel 2004). Israel insists that Israeli-Jews have to be completely secure from victimhood before the Palestinian demands, and Palestinians see that such logic only defeats the very purpose of a peaceful solution (Smulders 2013).

The next chapter discusses Israel's victimhood starting by focusing on collective memory and then the conflict ethos. The following chapter continues the endeavour by developing the concept of collective emotional orientations of fear to reflect Israel's ‘hyper security’ as one of the most important manifestations of Israel’s victimhood. Chapter Seven is dedicated to the discussion of Palestinian victimhood.
CHAPTER FIVE

VICTIMHOOD IN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT:

The Case of Israel in Relation to Collective Memory, Conflict Ethos, and Collective Emotional Orientations
OVERVIEW

The examination of Israel’s victimhood is spread over two chapters. The current chapter seeks to describe and evaluate the fundamentals of Israel’s self-perceived victimhood mainly in relation to collective memory and conflict ethos (Bar-Tal 2007, 2013; Bar-Tal et al. 2009b). The next examines Israel’s collective emotional orientation, focusing on fear as a primary dynamic in the country’s security policies (Bar-Tal 2001, also: 2007, 2013).

This chapter first looks at collective memory. It opens up with the film Waltz with Bashir, highlighting the Shoah as a chosen trauma (e.g. Volkan 2004, 2006) and a method of remembering. Next, the argument is broadened by placing the Shoah memory within the larger context of Jewish history. The focus then shifts to describing and critiquing the Shoah narratives in the wake of Israel’s inception. It is argued that in the beginning the Shoah memory was inconsistent with the Zionist ideals of heroism and that the Eichmann Trial was in fact the launching-pad for a new memory paradigm. Developing the argument further, the chapter explains how the new paradigm became a defining factor in Israel’s current conflict ethos, turning trauma into a negative identity (e.g. Kelman 1999) and subsequently reconfiguring the perception of Jewish history itself. Discussing the reverberations of memory and ethos, the chapter, among other things, examines Israel’s nazification of Arabs and how that became an important psychological as well as instrumental factor in Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians. Using Bar-Tal’s concept of ‘freezing of beliefs,’ another analytical dimension is added to Israel’s societal beliefs about victimhood. This leads to the discussion of the interactive relation between memory, ethos, and Israel’s collective emotional orientations. Paving the way to the next chapter, this chapter briefly discusses the emotional orientations of guilt and shame and their manifestations, which are identified as: the fear of normality, guilt and shame displacement, and identification with the aggressor. Fear being the most dominant emotional orientations is discussed extensively in the next chapter. In the conclusion, the chapter highlights how Israel’s collective memory and ethos, and the related emotional orientations, fuel Israel’s victimhood narratives and thus determine Israel’s approach to settlement.
The chapter benefits from a range of narrative sources. Whilst scholarship establishes the conceptual framework (e.g. Bar-Tal 2007, 2013; Volkan 2006; Halperin et al. 2011), it also facilitates the understanding of Jewish experience. This experience, nevertheless, is more discernible in the historical and political input than it is in the conceptual or theoretical (e.g. Arendt 1963; Evron 1981; Falk 1993; Novick 2000; Finkelstein 2003; Grosbard 2003; Rose 2005; Benbassa 2010; Cohen 2014; Lustick 2015). History especially — as in the discussion of Biblical history or the Eichmann Trial — is not seen as mere chronology, but also as a conveyor of the human story/experience of the time (e.g. Zerubavel 1991; Segev 1993; Al-Messiri 1999; Zertal 2000; Massad 2005; Sand 2009).

It remains the enduring conviction in this work, however, that the narrative textuality in media and arts, signs, and symbols provides a more intimate outlook at experience. Not only do news articles, reports, commentaries, and statements present events/stories, they also reveal society’s thoughts, feelings, fears, and aspirations (e.g. Fisk 2006; Eldar 2012; Yadid 2015; Bishara 2015; Al-Hadidi 2015; Shalev 2015b; Goldberg 2015b; Maan News 2017; Pfeffer 2019). Visual media in the form of films, TV programmes, and advertisements is the core experiential representation in this chapter. The film *Waltz with Bashir* (2008) adds significant experiential dimensions to Israel’s collective memory and the ethos associated with it. *Lebanon* (2009) delivers a similar concept but largely from the angle of siege mentality. And the TV thriller *Fauda* (2015) reveals the power of ethos in shaping Israel’s victim hierarchy regarding the Palestinians. The chapter also examines the latent content in a couple of ads (Omega News 2011; Maor 2011), which reveal the power of collective memory, ethos, and the general societal emotionality. The novel *See Under Love* (1989) is utilised in the conclusion to sum up and bring the reader through symbolism closer to the experience of *Shoah* remembering. Analysing the narrative sources, especially media, is largely done using a categorical-content approach, deciphering the latent content and meaning units. The analysis is done against the political and historical background of the target phenomenon, and is potentially influenced by the researcher positionality and research question. Reflexivity is used as both an additional analytical device and another form of
narrative. It is deployed when tackling the issues of suicide, victim hierarchy, and identification with the aggressor. The auto-ethnographic ‘I’ and the collective ‘we’ are used as the instruments of delivery.

WALTZING IN BEIRUT

Outside the camp, journalist Ben Yishai sees a group of women, old people, and children escorted by Lebanese Phalangist soldiers. Among them there was “a kid holding up his hands in the air.” The scene is familiar, it was “unreal, resembling the Warsaw ghetto.” “Stop the shooting, everybody go home,” IDF commander, Amos Yaron calls out through a megaphone in English. The massacre comes to an abrupt end (Levy 2009). Suddenly, the animated scenes give way to the real footage of the massacre, the last scene of Waltz With Bashir (2008).

In the film, the protagonist, director Folman himself, interviews fellow veterans of the 1982 Lebanon invasion to reconstruct his own memories of his service in Lebanon. Folman discovers that he cannot recall much from that period, especially regarding the Sabra and Shatila massacre. Waltz is not a film with an undeviating patriotic narrative traditionally associated with the genre; it is more of a representation of memory conveyed through a filmed reality (Bazin 1967). Examining strands of memory, Yosef (2011) claims that the film critiqued Israel’s responsibility for Palestinian suffering and avoided acting out the Jewish-Israeli victimhood discourse by challenging the exclusivity of the Shoah. However, memory as a method of conveyance is problematic in its fidelity. It can be psychologically loaded, and is therefore vulnerable to questioning especially when what is remembered is related to a collective trauma.

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22 The Phalanges Party (Al-Kataeb in Arabic, the battalions) is a Lebanese Christian political party, mainly supported by Maronite Christians.

23 On September 16, 1982, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Phalange militia stormed the Palestinian Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in West Beirut and began a massacre which ended in the deaths of hundreds of mostly Palestinian civilians. The IDF surrounded the camps and provided the militia with coverage, or at least turned a blind eye to what was happening [Mohamad 2017]. For more details on the massacre, see Bayan Al-Hour’s book Sabra and Shatila: September 1982 [2004].
It is convenient to make an ‘anti-war’ film about a long-gone war with an ostensibly ‘redemptive’ message (Levy 2009). But unlike what Yosef (2011) claims, the IDF soldier in Waltz is viewed as going through a process of sacrificial victimisation that overshadows the true role of the perpetrator (Morag 2012). The focus on the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre shifts the trauma memory from perpetration to just simply witnessing. After all, it was the Phalangists who executed the massacre, and as Israeli Jews, the message is ‘our hands are clean of blood’ (Al-Hout 2004).

Talking to his therapist, Ori Sivan, the trauma-haunted hero quickly learns that his obsession with the massacre is not because of the IDF’s involvement in it, but rather because it ‘stems from a previous massacre.’ We learn that his parents were in Auschwitz and he had been exposed to the Shoah memories since he was six [01:05]. The therapist explains that the guilt experienced by the hero is because he has been “cast in the role of the Nazi against his will.” As if to say, it is because of the Nazis, we are what we are (Levy 2009). The therapist continues, “We lit up the camps, but did not perpetrate the massacre.” This is a statement of innocence and an implied emphasis that IDF is, as always, ‘the most moral army in the world.’ It is also a suppressed ‘perpetrator trauma’ (Even-Tzur 2016).

Waltz hardly takes advantage of the well-known ability of animation to stretch the boundaries of reality and challenge the common perceptions. Despite its critical examination of Israel’s collective memory, imagination remained within the scope of the victimised Jew. Viewed as media narrative loaded with latent meanings and analysed from a Palestinian perspective, Waltz tells us that an IDF soldier’s guilt and responsibility are symbolically redeemed through the intimate attachment to an imagined reality of a long-gone ‘chosen trauma’ and the detachment from the current physical reality. Consider, for instance, that upon receiving the Golden Globe for the film in 2009, director Ari Folman did not mention the war in Gaza which was at its peak at that point (Yudilovitch 2009). The images of the massacre in the camps and the ones coming out of Gaza were eerily similar.
THE SHOAH AS A REMEMBERED TRAUMA

Drawing on Bar-Tal’s conceptions of collective memory (2007, 2013) and supplemented by Volkan’s ‘chosen trauma’ (e.g. 2004, 2006), it might be suggested that *Waltz* is a reconceptualisation of an old logic. It tells us about the past in a fashion functional to the society’s present existence. It constructs a narrative that has some basis in actual events but is biased, selective, and distorted in ways that meet the society’s present needs (Bar-Tal 2007). In the film, the traumatic event, although real, took place outside the parameters of ‘normal’ reality. The historical context is lost, giving way to an old trauma to be reembodied and to fit in Israel’s current reality. The Lebanon War led the IDF soldier to self-discovery, but the process only made sense through collective memory. This memory authorised a state of over-dramatisation and invoked powerful emotional and psychological reactions (Benbassa 2010), that instead of invoking grief for the massacred Palestinians, it made the viewers feel sorry for the soldier. Israel in this case, Lentin (2010) remarks, mourns itself rather than its Palestinian victims.

*Waltz* is not unique in this respect, other films of the era that set on challenging Israel’s memory paradigm ended up reaffirming the country’s master-narrative. Like in *Waltz*, the soldiers in Samuel Maoz’s film *Lebanon* (2009) are depicted as both victims and witnesses in a conflict that was obtruded upon them. The story takes place mostly inside a sweaty and claustrophobic tank, in which four young soldiers are trying to survive in an extremely hostile environment. Their only communication with the outside world is through the tank gunsight. The gunsight is important because it emphasises the soldiers’ victimhood: first, as with the usage of animation in *Waltz*, it creates a barrier between the inside and the outside of the tank, hence dissociating and separating the soldiers from their actions, and second, through the concepts of enclosure and isolation.

In the first case, the infamous saying ‘shooting and crying’ attributed to the IDF in the first Lebanon War takes a life on its own. In many scenes the trauma is presented through the soldiers’ tears. Yigal, the tank driver, for example, is seen sobbing near the end of the film. The gritty, ultra-realistic, and claustrophobic
scenes from inside the tank encourage the viewers to see the world through the soldiers’ eyes. They are meant to identify with the soldiers’ anxiety and claustrophobia and, by extension, their victimhood. Yosef (2011) explains that, the very narrow view of the world through the gunsight creates a certain distance between the viewers and the invading soldiers, on one side, and the horrors of war endured by the Lebanese population, on the other. He further elaborates (p. 148) that the soldiers’ victimisation “… is heightened through the association of the Arab enemy with murder: in one episode, Arab soldiers, their faces and heads covered, threaten a Lebanese mother and daughter at gunpoint and use them as a human shield. Despite the commander’s orders to open fire on them, Shmulik [the artillerist who represents Moaz’s personal experience] refuses to do so.” The real sadist in the film, however, is their guide, the Christian Phalangist Ashraf who threatens to tear the Syrian captive’s body apart. In Waltz, the Phalangists massacred Palestinians and ‘we were innocent.’ In Lebanon it was the Phalangists who wanted to torture the Syrian captive and, once again, ‘we had nothing to do it.’ Like Waltz, Lebanon — through dissociation and separation — seeks to redeem Israel’s troubled conscience. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that the only tank member to die was Yigal, whose Hebrew name literally means ‘he will redeem’ (ibid.).

In the second case, the limited perspective that the tank gunsight provides means that everyone outside the tank is seen as an enemy (Benziman 2013). The sense of enclosure and isolation here is perhaps a reference to Israel’s siege mentality. From this perspective, collective memory is reconstructed, as in Waltz, to see the Jewish past as a continuation of the present, not least through depicting the war as an imposed battle for survival. The reference to the Shoah is not clearly present in the film as it is in Waltz, but the act of remembering and acting out the Jewish past is very similar.

In a way, the above cinematic representations reflect how changes in the conflict change society’s perception of it. Unlike the pre-1990s films, which chiefly focused on the heroic Zionist model (Ben-David 2009), several modern films did not shy away from challenging the dominant ethos about Israel’s past (also see: Beaufort
[2007] in the next chapter). The problem remains, however, that these films still found a way to provide the components that a society in conflict so desperately needs to maintain the in-group’s positive self-image and beliefs about the justness of the cause and goals (Benziman 2013; see: Bar-Tal 2007, 2013). Even though Folman and Maoz sought to challenge Israel’s dominant narratives, their films variably confirmed that collective memory still steered and gave meaning to today’s reality.

Bar-Tal and others (Bar-Tal 2000a, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2013, 2014; e.g. Lentin 2010; Ofer 2013) have long suggested that collective memory has several important functions, such as justifying the outbreak of conflict, providing a positive image of the in-group, delegitimising the opponent, and presenting the in-group’s society as victims of the opponent. As a ‘chosen trauma,’ (Volkan 2004, 2006) the Shoah in today’s Israel fits this pattern almost perfectly. Being a victim of the opponent, however, is maybe the most salient and at times most defining of these functions, so much so it became a collective identity in itself.

As early as the 1950s the Shoah memory started to be used as a ‘political facilitator’ in Israel’s wars with the Arabs and the conflict with the Palestinians. Zertal (2005) maintains that almost every war in Israel’s history from 1948 until the present has been conceptualised in terms of the Shoah. The Shoah narrative also came to explain, to stand for, and to predict Israeli-Jewish anxiety and fear in the two Palestinian Intifadas, showing that the current actualities of Israel’s military might did not necessarily bring about a parallel decrease in existential fear (Ochs 2006). Moreover, as it will be discussed later, the Shoah memory has been used as a political tool for justifying Israel’s actions and to gather support — Margalit (2002) calls this ‘Operation Holocaust Memory.’

BEFORE THE SHOAH

There is the argument that the significance of the Shoah memory also stems from being part of a continuum of suffering (see: Benbassa 2010, Falk 1993) or what Salo Cohen labelled the ‘lachrymose’ Jewish history.
(Steinfels 1989). Falk argued in several studies (1993, 1996, 2008) that Jewish history has been characterised by the inability to mourn the past, which trapped the Jews in a time bubble. Falk also thinks that today's myths are in fact reproductions of yesterday's miseries despite the difference in context and circumstances. Myths like the ‘chosen people’ were invented to act as a coping mechanism in the midst of uncertainty and anxiety which characterised the last 2000 years of Jewish history. This evaluation is in line with Bar-Tal’s hypothesis (2007, 2013, 2014) that in a conflict situation mythical inventions are indeed required as (transferrable) coping tactics: to bolster the in-group’s positive self-image by showing they have coped successfully against the opponent.

Adding to the existing literature on memory (e.g. Falk 1993; Bar-Tal 2000b, 2007, 2013; Volkan 2004, 2006), it may be proposed that perhaps as the Shoah memory took a grip on the Israeli-Jewish collective, it did so on the back of already established thinking patterns in Jewish history. These patterns acted as a quick launching-pad for the production, reproduction and dissemination of the Shoah memory. This may be attributed to the fact that, unlike most of their contemporaries, ancient Jews were not particularly interested in historiography in the sense of exploring the past (Sand 2009); rather, they focused on ‘remembering’ and assigned a decisive religious significance to history (Niroumand 1995). Before the Shoah, the Bible served as the most powerful constitutive myth of the new collectivity (Kimmerling 2001, p.117). The word zachor (remember) appears in the Hebrew bible no less than 169 times, most often in the unconditional command and usually with Israel or God as the subject. The word is complemented by its obverse, forgetting. “Since Israel is enjoined to remember, so is it adjured not to forget” (Yerushalmi 1982, p.5).

In the lives of many Jews — religious and secular — the Biblical zachor is translated into repetitive rituals during the Jewish festivals of the year. The Jewish holiday cycle commemorates the past while separating it from aspects of history and chronology (Hagman 2016). This generally falls under the concept of commemorative memory. But part of this memory may be non-commemorative because the past can
infiltrate the present through the use of culturally loaded phrases or unconscious association with particular past events (Schudson 1997, in: Zandberg et al. 2012).

Invoking a distant memory such as the Passover may be consciously manipulated for political gains, a deliberate attempt to shape collective memory (Mazzoleni 2015). But that can only be facilitated when the past is already viewed as part of a larger mythical continuum that defies the constraints of realism and immediacy. It suggests that history repeats itself and Israeli-Jews today, just like Diaspora Jews in the past, are victims whose very existence is constantly threatened (Zandberg et al. 2012). In this sense, collective anxiety can never be the product of an elite invention or manipulation by itself. Rather, discursive manoeuvres of this kind become effective only when they respond to deep and genuine social concerns (Zertal 2000).

The liberation of the Hebrew slaves from Egypt, which is commemorated on Passover becomes a reminder of the victimhood memory of the galut (exile/diaspora). Every year on Passover, in many Jewish homes the famous passage from Haggadah is read, “In each and every generation they rise up against us to destroy us” (Seeberg et al. 2013). As a narrative textual, the Haggadah informs and confirms that ‘in every generation emerges a Pharaoh who would come after us.’ Be it Haman, Nebuchadnezzar, Hitler, Nasser, or Ahmadinejad, all similar from a psychohistorical point of view. It is not difficult, in this light, to understand how this idea repeated each year, at what is still the most widely observed Jewish festival, has profoundly shaped the cognitive and emotional orientations of Israel’s Jewish imagination. Cohen (2014) comments that many Jews leave the Seder (festive) table convinced, once again, that they are the eternal victims, outsiders, never accepted, forever threatened. In this victimhood discourse, collective memory is used to reconstruct the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a linear historical continuation of the Exodus from Egypt, the Passover, the hostile Amalekites, and everything in between — all the way to the Shoah.

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24 The Haggadah (telling) is a book that Jews read on the first night of Passover. It tells about the Jews’ slavery in Egypt and God’s intervention to free them.
REVERSE-ENGINEERING THE SHOAH MEMORY

Whilst ancient history provided certain patterns for remembering, it is through the Shoah that the Jewish narratives of victimhood has been confirmed and enhanced. As it will be later highlighted in the discussion on the Eichmann Trial and the Nazification of Arabs, ancient Jewish history developed a new, more profound meaning in the light of the Shoah. Contrary to the common belief, this did not happen simultaneously with Israel’s establishment or immediately after.

With the establishment of a Jewish homeland the Jews were meant to forget the past and live as a renewed people: independent, capable, and free from the galut. This notion represented a diaspora that had to be destroyed and forgotten (Young 1993). The Shoah was initially looked at as the climax of centuries of the galut but was yet to be deemed a ‘chosen trauma’ that redefined the core structure of collective memory and identity of the newly established state (Volkan 2004, 2006, Bar-Tal 2007, 2014; Kelman 1999). In those early years, Israel’s founders found little reason to remember the Shoah beyond its geo-political link to the newly established state (Young 1993.). Auschwitz and Treblinka were conceived as the Jewish political and cultural alternatives to Zionism and the remembering of the Shoah, when it took place at all, became a justification for the ideals of Zionism. This remembering was based mainly on the militant and power-oriented dimension of the Biblical zachor (Zertal 2005).

Zerubavel (1991) tells us that it was especially important for Zionism to present certain events in ancient and pre-state histories as victories, regardless of their actual outcomes. National pride and the notion of revolt was central to the Zionist thought because it symbolised the ancient Hebrews’ stands that led them to defend

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25 It is argued, though, that given that Zionism predated the Nazi era by about four decades, the grand assumption that Israel’s existence was conditional on the Shoah must be called into question (Ellis 1990). Should a Jewish State had been established before the Shoah, chances are the genocide would have happened regardless. In the beginning of the Nazi persecution, Jews experienced hardships, expulsions, some murders and pogroms, but no-one envisaged such an extreme outcome. Unlikely, the leaders of such a small state would have been able to forecast the destruction of European Jewry (Oz 1983).
their nation’s freedom. Because much of the outcome of these events was questionable, the Zionist multiple forms of narrative shifted the focus almost exclusively to the acts of rebelling and heroism.

They emphasised the initial successes, but downplayed the defeats that eventually led to the *galut*. It is no surprise then that the new established Jewish State sought to endow upon itself a transcendental and meta-historical character that established a quasi-official divorce from the close memory, namely the annihilation of a third of the Jewish people. The thousands of *Shoah* survivors who arrived in Israel in the years 1945-55 were the ‘absent presentees’ since it was heroes, not victims, that Zionism celebrated. It was the *Sabra*, ghetto fighters and partisans that represented the values of the Jewish states, not those who were viewed as passive in the Nazi death camps (Ofer 2013; Zertal 2005; Segev 1993).

It might be argued that in the process of searching for roots, the Jewish past was reconstructed to transcend its function as a chronological phenomenon and was instrumentalised to fulfil psychological and political requirements. The events selected for this purpose were not all evaluated in the same way (Schwartz *et al.* 1986). Possibly influenced by the ancient Biblical approach to historiography, the emphasis was placed on memory and remembering. But as it was established, memory is hardly a reliable source of history (e.g. Falk 1993/96, 2005; Bar-Tal 2001, 2007, 2013/14; Volkan 2004; Kelman 2007/8; Lentin 2010). This practically meant that in order to achieve certain political purposes, history’s epistemological claims were devalued in favour of memory’s meaningfulness (Olick & Robbins 1998). Myths were then invented and new but more suiting historical narratives were created (Flapan 1987).

The battle of Masada (73 A.D.), for example, was one of the least significant and least successful events in ancient Jewish history, yet it was utilised to emphasise the Jewish settlers’ ‘struggle’ in the pre-Israel Palestine (Schwartz *et al.* 1986). Egyptian thinker Abdul-Wahhab Al-Messiri (1999, 2001) explains that Zionism historiography was selective; it said almost nothing about the other Jewish fortresses — such as *Herodium* — that at the time (70 A.D.) chose surrender to the Romans over suicide or fighting to death. Al-Messiri
particularly criticises the Zionist ‘glorification of suicide.’ But, busy critiquing Zionism, he disregarded the fact that suicide has been glorified in Palestinian revolutionary thoughts too. We attributed suicide attacks to power asymmetries and argued that everyone in Israel was a soldier. We even drew analogies between suicide bombers and the Japanese *kamikaze* (see: Bishara 2001). On a self-reflexive note, during my undergrad years at the height of the second Intifada the idea of a Palestinian *Kamikaze*, the intellectualisation and heroisation of suicide, appealed to me. In hindsight, however, I feel my prior experience and assumptions continue to haunt my current mindset. While I question the morality of suicide bombing, I still feel that questioning the motives is unsettling for the notion of Palestinian justice. In a similar vein, Al-Missiri, although an authority on Israel and Zionism, may have struggled to draw a clear line between his consciousness as an Egyptian who witnessed Israel’s aggression against Egypt firsthand and his scholarship. His argument as a result came out as an expression of duality: our suicide is legitimate and heroic, theirs is not. This duality may stop us from seeing that the difference between the Jewish slogan: “Masada shall not fall again,” and the Palestinian: “We shall die standing like the trees” is mere semantics.

Similar mythologisation was applied to the Bar Kokhba Revolt against the Romans (132 A.D.) and, later in mandate Palestine, to the so-called battle of Tel-Hai in 192026 (Zerubavel 1991, 1995). The themes of active heroism, although in principle meant to counter-balance the themes of victimisation, remained closely tied to the notion of sacrifice. It is, in other words, victimhood without the ‘passivity’ — the warrior-victim model. This idea would evolve to represent and formulate the concept of an Israeli army — a powerful army, yet ‘on the defence,’ hence the Israeli Defence Force (IDF).

By linking the Shoah and Jewish history to the post-state events, a new psychological continuum of suffering was established. As Israel commemorates and deepens the societal representations of the Shoah, the list of Shoah victims increases every year. Every time Israeli-Jewish lives are lost to Palestinian attacks, the Shoah

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26 A 1920 brief yet fatal battle between Palestinian Arabs and Jewish settlers that took place at the Jewish settlement of Tel Hai in Northern Galilee. See: Zerubavel’s “The Politics of Interpretation: Tel-Hai in Israel's Collective Memory” (1991)
becomes more pronounced and the entirety of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict becomes — increasingly — part of the Jewish continuum of suffering. As in Waltz, many in the Israeli-Jewish collective fail to see a cause and effect in the “conflict.” Israel’s actions are viewed as protective, redemptive, or justly retributive and Palestinian ones are unjust or nothing but mindless terrorism directed at Jews qua Jews (see next chapter: terrorism as perception). This approach to memory, as it will be elaborated in the coming sections, has created certain conflict ethos and collective emotional orientations that served to prolong the conflict and deepen the in-group’s sense of collective victimhood (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001, 2007, 2013; Bar-Tal et al. 2009a/b).

THE EICHMANN TRIAL

It took a few years after the state for Zionism to embrace the Shoah as the chief definer for the nation’s collective memory. It is believed that when Nazi SS officer, Adolf Eichmann, stood trial in Jerusalem in 1961, the silence around the Shoah was broken (Arendt 1963; Evron 1981; Segev 1993; Loshitzky 1997; Lustick 2015). The Israeli public were exposed to a multitude of testimonies which brought to light the magnitude of trauma of the Shoah survivors (Alexander & Dromi 2011). The trial worked as a medium between the post-Shoah young generation and the Shoah, psychologically binding them with the Shoah survivors and their suffering. Segev (1993, p.361) comments that “…the Eichmann trial marked the beginning of a dramatic shift in the way Israeli-Jews related to the Shoah.”

The broken silence did not, however, mark a complete shift from the ‘New Jew’ to the post-Zionist Jew (Ben-Ami 2010), neither did it present a memory entrepreneurship completely separate from what Yerushalmi (1982) called the ‘traditional Jewish memory.’ The fact that the Shoah was only partially spoken about (at least officially) did not mean it was not silently, but powerfully, at work. The trial, in reality, renewed the national attention to the Shoah (Rose 2005). The inclusion of Shoah survivors provided the concretisation needed for nurturing the memory of the Shoah as an essential component in Israel’s victimhood (Amir 2012). Yablonka (cited by Macumber 2013) reflects that the Eichmann Trial led to a processing of the Shoah information into a
new kind of identity-based ‘knowing.’ It propelled an entire nation to undergo a process of self-reckoning (Loshitzky 1997).

Moreover, the Trial proceedings were used as a form of narrative for the uniqueness of the Holocaust, privatising its memory to officially become the Shoah, deeply and exclusively Jewish. The Shoah would become a central component of Jewish identity and a linchpin of Jewish unity and solidarity. It would act as the unifying factor for the socially divided Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews; allowing Oriental Jews into the Israeliness and the monolithic collective memory which European Jews represented (Shohat 1988; Segev 1993; Oppenheimer 2010). It also became the ‘social glue’ that bonded Israeli-Jews and the world Jewry together (Bar-Tal et al. 2009a/b).

THE SHOAH ETHOS

It might have been easier for the Mossad to simply kill Eichmann in Argentina, but the psychological and political value of the Trial was perhaps more important. It was a needed group therapy or a posthumous moral triumph for a society inundated with Shoah survivors (Cebulski 2007). In contrast to the Nuremberg Trial which took a human rights approach, Israel decided that the central focus of their presentation should be the entirety of the Shoah, not as narrated in documentary proof but through victim testimonies (Levy & Szaider 2006; Mertens 2005). They wanted a trial that emphatically highlighted the Jewish victimhood through the personal stories/narratives of the victims. Those stories were legally irrelevant to Eichmann, but as the case for narrative, they were meant to reflect the subjective experience of the survivors and therefore invoke emotional and psychological reactions. This also aimed to transform the world’s view of the Shoah and Israel (Landsman 2012)
What started as individual narratives of the Shoah memory soon became a crucial signifier for Israel’s distinct collectivity and, as a result, evolved into ethos, an epistemic foundation for hegemonic social consciousness (Bar-Tal 1998, 2000a, 2007, 2013).

The core ethos that the new belief paradigm on the Shoah established was (and still is) that Zionism was the only replacement for the galut and Israel the only safe haven for Jews. Today, this notion can be found almost in all types of narrative (scholarship, media, arts, signs and symbols) in Israel and amongst many Jews abroad. Media seems to be leading the way. Following the shootings in Copenhagen in February 2015, Netanyahu echoed remarks he made after the Paris attacks on Charlie Hebdo in January that year, urging European Jews to emigrate to Israel, potentially to escape ‘anti-Semitic and murderous attacks’ (Beaumont 2015). The calls for European Jews to ‘come home’ was based on the assumption that Jews outside Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel) are still a galut community and will always be at risk, and that only Israel can guarantee their security and well-being.

A similar message was also directed at America’s Jewry. In 2011, after criticism by many American Jews, the Israeli government withdrew a controversial ad campaign that was running in the US. The ad urged Israeli-Jewish expatriates not to marry American Jews or raise their children in the United States, and implored them to return to Israel (Omega News 2011). The subtext was about the fragility of Jewish existence and the maintenance of Israeli Jewishness as the true Jewish identity. The advertisement features an Israeli-Jewish girl, Dafna, observing Israel’s Memorial Day, while her American boyfriend, Josh, looks on vacantly. “They will always remain Israelis,” says the voice-over. “Their partners won’t understand what this means.” While Memorial Day is officially a commemoration of ‘Israel’s fallen soldiers and victims of terrorism,’ it includes in its entirety the grand narrative of victimhood. So much so that the Israeli Ministry of Defence, which records the ‘fallen Jewish soldiers,’ goes in its records as far back as the late 1800s when a ‘Palestinian Jew’ was killed by other Palestinians in a robbery attempt. Although a non-political criminal offence, the accident was deemed part of the Jewish struggle in Palestine long before the actual political clashes between Zionism
and the indigenous population took place (Bar-Tal 2013). American Jews, Israel’s most prominent supporters, are conceived in the advertisement as not Jewish enough since they do not literally share Israel’s Zionist-Jewish perception of the Shoah memory, the eternal suffering and victimisation, or fully identify with the Israeli-Jewish worldview. Moving to America, the message implies, leads to the erosion of Jewish consciousness (Kershner & Berger 2001). The concern is that American Jews will always be second-class American citizens and third-rate Jews. To be an Israeli-Jew, a true Jew, is to be associated with trauma and victimisation and to make aliyah (literally: ascent, to immigrate) to Israel, because anywhere outside Israel is a galut (Rejwan 1999; Barnett 2016).

The post Eichmann Shoah memory also served to (and continues to do) confirm the established ethos about Israel being uniquely moral and innocent, emphasising the country’s positive self-image as being a ‘targeted and vulnerable’ community. This in other words intensified the old siege mentality (Bar-Tal Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992a/b). The Shoah gave this siege mentality a new, deeper meaning and a sense of immediacy, especially as the Trial came at the height of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Nazi crimes were cast not in terms of international aggression, but exclusively as a crime against the Jewish people. In a way, it “disconnected Nazi criminality from the issue of world order;” (Meierhenrich & Pendas 2017, p.224) and merged it into the continuum of Jewish suffering (see: Benbassa 2010). At the time, Hannah Arendt (1963) insightfully observed that Israel would conduct the Trial for calculated political purposes. The new Israeli-Jewish generation would be readied to see certain things with a purpose in mind.

What Arendt actually foresaw was that the post-Eichmann new (or modified) system of ethos would take over the Israeli-Jewish society and be used in the reconstruction of collective memory and the redefinition of Israel’s perception of and response to the Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflict(s). It seems that Israel

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27 In Righteous Victims (2001), Morris begins to attribute the killings of the Jews to nationalistic circumstances only at the start of the the 20th century when Palestinian Arabs protested against the Jewish immigration to Palestine.

28 Most recently in July 2019, Israeli education minister and orthodox rabbi, Rafi Peretz, described in a cabinet meeting the integration and intermarriage of Diaspora Jews, especially in North America as a ‘second Holocaust.’ Peretz’s comments received a storm of criticism in Israel and abroad. See more: [Pfeffer, A., Haaretz, 11 July 2019, Chernick, I. The Jerusalem Post, 11 July 2019]
needed a new, more psychologically and politically fitting belief system (ethos) to establish a “coherent and compressive systematic pattern of knowledge” that would orient the behaviour of society members, the structure and functioning of that society, and guide its leaders’ decision-making process (Bar-Tal 2013, p. 174-75). Initially, this ethos focused on the themes of justness of the Jewish goals and the victimisation of the Jewish people. Both themes gave rise and were themselves enhanced by themes about positive self-image and identity. For this to work effectively, certain beliefs that aimed at delegitimising and demonising the opponent had to emerge. Almost immediately it became nearly a policy that the Arabs and Palestinians be depicted as hand in glove with the Nazis. For the new Shoah survivors and many others in the new state, the ‘Arabs’ were a continuation of what they fled from in Europe. Bishara comments (2015), — and as it will be discussed in the next section — that these survivors suffered serious vertigo and thought of the Palestinians as Nazis in kuffiyehs.

NAZI ARABS

During the Trial, rarely was there a mention of Eichmann and other Nazi criminals without adding the Arab-Nazi dimension to it: first, by massive references to the presence of Nazi scientists and advisors in Egypt, and second, by pointing out the ongoing connections between Arabs and Nazi leaders, and the ‘Nazi-inspired’ Arab intentions to annihilate Israel. The most interesting was the continuous mentioning in the media of the Mufti of Jerusalem’s connection with the Nazi regime (Zertal 2000). Massad (2006, p. 132) observes that the Mufti “provided the Israelis with their best propaganda linking the Palestinians with the Nazis and European anti-Semitism.” The obsession with linking Palestinians to the Shoah also led the editors of the Encyclopedia of the Holocaust to give the Mufti a master role: “The article on the Mufti is more than twice as long as the articles on Goebbels and Goering, longer than the articles on Himmler and Heydrich combined, longer than the article on Eichmann — of all the biographical articles, it is exceeded in length, but only slightly, by the entry for Hitler” (Novick 2000, p.158). Nowadays, at Yad Vashem the tour of remembrance in the museum is concluded by a wall dedicated to the Mufti’s connection with the Nazis.
Segev (1993, p.425) comments, “The visitor is left to conclude that there is much in common between the Nazis’ plan to destroy the Jews and the Arab enmity.”

Perhaps that very belief is what encouraged Netanyahu recently to frame the Mufti as the primary inciter behind the Final Solution (Rudoren 2015, Richards 2015). Haaretz (Shalev 2015b) described Netanyahu’s comments on the Mufti as ‘madness.’ However, as far as the conflict ethos is concerned, it might be argued that there is a systematic method involved, a build-up of the storyline that he has been pushing since the start of the recent eruption of violence in late 2015 [referring to the stabbing Intifada]. First Netanyahu spoke of Abbas’ “Big Lie,” alluding to the term most identified with Nazi Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels; then he sent Minister Yuval Steinitz to compare Abbas’ incitement directly with Nazi agitation against the Jews, and then the Mufti-Hitler liaison story. And most recently he described the Palestinian opposition to settlements as ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Tobin 2016). According to i24 News (Oct. 2015), 53% of Israeli-Jews disagreed with Netanyahu’s Mufti comments. The News, however, did not tell us how many of those surveyed were ‘Israeli Arabs’ nor sounded any alarms about that fact that over a quarter of those surveyed did, in fact, agree with Netanyahu — not by any means a tiny section of the Israeli-Jewish society.

Such analogies are convenient as they reduce the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a mere Palestinian hatred of Jews (see next chapter: terrorism as perception). Playing to a political culture so quick to associate Arabs and Palestinians with impending Auschwitz (Qureshi & Sells 2003). Palestinians and Arabs are motivated by nothing more than an irrational anti-Semitism, and that is why they refuse to accept Israel as a Jewish state in their midst. Commenting on the wave of stabbings in 2015, Goldberg (2015b) wrote in The Atlantic that one of the tragedies of the settlement movement, a known reason behind Palestinian resentment, is that it obscures what might be the actual root cause of the Middle East conflict: “the unwillingness of many Muslim Palestinians to accept the notion that Jews are a people who are indigenous to the land Palestinians believe to be exclusively their own.” Goldberg concludes that the Palestinian youth are inevitably carrying on a tradition of anti-Jewish sentiment, motivating them to stab anyone who is remotely Jewish. The occupation
and oppression are never mentioned. In a world that is opposed to both colonialism and anti-Semitism, Israel uses one in defence of the other (Massad 2012).

Nasser and Arafat were subjected to a similar narrative (Massad 2006). Nasser was depicted as the Arab Hitler, associated with Nazi type of activity and ideology. His book *Philosophy of the Revolution* was portrayed as the equivalent of Hitler’s *Main Kampf* (Sharvit & Halperin 2016). Given Egypt’s military and political influence at the time and Nasser’s anti-colonial ideology, nazifying Nasser might have been a convenient political hyperbole, a method of demonisation. It was also part of a global tendencies in the wake of World War II to label ‘the enemy’ as a Nazi. The Daily Mail, in the wake of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, for example, referred to Nasser as ‘Hitler of the Nile’ (Alteras 1993). At the time, Eden compared Nasser to Hitler, and Winston Churchill remarked in a conversation with Eden, that he “never knew before that Munich was situated on the Nile” (Renshon 2007). Israel’s daily *Ma’ariv* justified the 1956 invasion of Egypt by claiming that it prevented Nasser from becoming ‘Hitler of the East.’ Meanwhile, Israel insisted, in correspondences with foreign leaders, that the invasion was a form of self-defence and invoked the *Shoah* memory as a time when no-one defended the Jews (Massad 2006). The Nazi rhetoric was also remobilised after the 1967 War. Abba Eban, Israel’s foreign minister at the time, referred to the conquered territories as the ‘Auschwitz lines.’ By defining the return to the pre-1967 borders as ‘something of a memory of Auschwitz,’ he was evoking the temporal persistence of the *Shoah* into the present, and indirectly labelling Israel’s enemies, Egypt especially, in Nazi terms (Perugini & Gordon 2015). Later, in the wake of the Lebanon invasion, the Arab Nazism was brought up again by historian Bernard Lewis, who devoted an entire chapter in his short history of anti-Semitism to Arab Nazism (Finkelstein 2003).

Mainly due to geopolitics and the power structure, the Israeli Nazi narrative directed at the Palestinians is particularly questionable. This ‘tactic,’ while part of Israel’s conflict ethos that aims to demonise the

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29 For more information on the joint British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956, see: [Aljazeera Feb. 29 2008](http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabunity/2008/02/200832517304630655.html)

30 *Semitic and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice* (1986)
opponent and preserve a positive self-image (e.g. Bar-Tal 2007, 2017), is also — in the Palestinian case — a
desire to displace the guilt of perpetration upon the victim (see next section: displacement). Fisk (2006) recalls
cynically how Ariel Sharon repeatedly called Arafat a ‘mass murderer’ — a term with genocidal inferences
— at a time when Israeli jets were raining bombs on Beirut. Israeli PM Menachem Begin also called the PLO
a ‘neo-Nazi organisation,’ and later, likened his decision to go after Arafat in Beirut to attacking "Hitler in his
bunker" (Pfeffer 2014).

Begin did more than build a simple analogy between the Lebanon War and the Shoah. He used the Shoah and
related terms, like Hitler and Nazi, as both epistemological and moral instruments, what Ilan Peleg (2015)
calls ‘analytical devices.’ In his reductionist symbolism, Begin viewed the world as full of new Nazis ready to
annihilate the Jewish people (Rowland & Frank 2002). That included the PLO which did not at any point
qualify as an existential threat to Israel. Lang (1996) quotes Begin's justification to the Israeli cabinet on the
eve of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982: "The alternative is Treblinka, and we have decided there
will be no more Treblinkas.” This frame of mind may have led to the worst of self-defence and security
ethos, ‘if we do not kill, we will cease to exist’ (Enns 2012). Avraham Burg (2008, p.24) argued that, “…a state
that lives by the sword and worships its dead is bound to live in a constant state of emergence, because
everyone is a Nazi, everyone is an Arab, and the entire world is against us.”

THE SHOAH ETHOS TODAY

Since Begin much changed in the conflict and so did some of Israel's conflict ethos. Under the conditions and
experiences of the prolonged intractable conflict with the Palestinians the Shoah ethos has evolved to become
ever more salient. Bar-Tal (2013) points out that ethos, similar to collective memory and to which it is
inherently linked, is not stable and adapts to new conditions and situations. It changes when it ceases to
reflect the reality of society or becomes invalid (Oren & Bar-Tal 2014). Put different, like collective memory,
ethos is reactive and reconstructable. It may represent a new set of [shared] beliefs that emerge due to new
developments in the conflict, or be built upon existing ones. Either way, the sole purpose of the conflict ethos is to provide a clear picture of the conflict - its goals, conditions, and requirements (Bar-Tal 1998, 2000, 2007, 2013).

Nowadays, as the conflict reached an unprecedented deadlock, not only did the old shared beliefs evolve but new ones also emerged. To exemplify, Bar-Tal has long argued that societal beliefs about peace have been a significant part in Israel’s conflict ethos (e.g. 1998, 2007, 2013). But as the peace process failed (and this for Israeli-Jews was an unprecedented development), old beliefs like ‘Palestinians want to destroy the Jews’ became more pronounced, and new beliefs like ‘there is no Palestinian partner’ were embraced. The old ethos facilitated and confirmed the new ethos, and vice versa. As far as the Shoah is concerned, this dynamic meant that as the conflict developed, the initial politically specific ethos that followed the Eichmann trial became indistinguishable from the collective socio-psychological infrastructure of the conflict today. That made the Shoah a comprehensive force that further defined Israel’s identity as a victim identity (see: Kelman 1999, 2001). Against this identity most other identities, especially that of the Palestinians, are measured and evaluated, and through it the entirety of the conflict is appraised. This, among other things, translated into a process of social integration; that is, to be full members of society, Israeli-Jews are expected to have at least a basic identification with the Shoah ethos (Oren & Bar-Tal 2014).

Jaspal and Yampolsky (2011) found in their study of eleven Israeli-born Jewish students that the Shoah knowledge was perceived as an intrinsic part in being considered a real Israeli and to experience a sense of acceptance and inclusion in the Israeli-Jewish society. And, according to Cohen and Medovoy (2013), in Israeli high schools, three-quarters of students and nearly all the teachers (96%) considered the Shoah to be a primary component of their worldview. The Shoah is not an event to be studied per se; students are meant to feel an obligation to remember — to meet Judaism’s demands for zachor. In Oron’s study (1993, in: Klar et al. 2013), most of the respondents, college students, endorsed the statement that ‘all Jewish people must see themselves as Shoah victims.’ Whilst the study goes back to 1993, there are little indications that the Israeli-
Jewish consciousness towards the *Shoah* is weakening, especially as the conflict has reached another level of intractability. Recently, 98.1% of the respondents in a 2009 survey of the Jewish–Israeli adult population (Arian 2012, in: ibid.) stated that remembering the *Shoah* was a guiding principle in their life; in fact, more important principle than other guiding principles such as ‘feeling part of the Jewish people,’ ‘feeling part of Israeli society,’ ‘living in Israel’ or even ‘having a family.’

Another study by Rinkevich-Pave (2008, in: Klar *et al.* 2013) looked at media as an indicator of Israel’s identification with the *Shoah* belief system. The study found that media’s repetitive reference to the *Shoah* and its variants has been essential in inculcating the conflict ethos, especially one related to collective victimhood and the justness of the goals (see: e.g. Bar-Tal *et al.* 2009b; Vollhardt 2012; Schori-Eyal *et al.* 2014; Nour *et al.* 2017). The study calculated how often the word *Shoah* and *Shoah*-inspired vocabulary appeared in a twelve-month period (October 2007–September 2008) in *Haaretz*. The author compared this historical event with the number of mentions of the term Israeli–Arab conflict. ‘*Shoah*’ appeared 132 times, on average, every month, and ‘Israeli–Arab conflict’ appeared *grosso modo* the same number of times (140 times being the monthly average).

With the onset of the Second Intifada, a study by Israeli-Jewish political scientist Uriel Abulof showed that in the six years after 2001, the number of articles in *Haaretz* focusing on the existential threats to the country increased by sixty-five percent (Blumenthal 2013). The findings seem to support Bar-Tal’s claims (2007, 2013) that collective memory and ethos evolve in order to adapt to new conditions. The changes in the usage and intensity of certain terms in the media and other sources of narrative reflects this fact. When the media recalls *repeatedly* at periodic intervals the Jewish genocide, this ‘trauma rehearsal’ acts to ‘reset’ the strength of the otherwise decaying memory trace (Bower & Sivers 1998). Unlike direct exposure to a collective trauma, which may end when the acute phase of the event is over, media exposure keeps the acute stressor active and alive in one’s mind (Holman *et al.* 2014). Even when the media approach to the *Shoah* is critical or trivialising,

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31 244 mentions of the *Shoah* and existential threats a year.
it is still a form of exposure to trauma. The Israeli satirical TV programme *Ha-hamishia Ha-kamerit* (The Chamber Quintet - 1992-97), for example, made several comical sketches about the *Shoah* ethos and memory. Despite their humorous nature, the sketches can also be viewed as a superimposition of new memory agents over the traditional *Shoah* memory (Zandberg *et al.* 2012). While humorously critiqued the *Shoah* repertoire, the sketches like most media narratives helped further inculcate the *Shoah*’s presence in the collective psyche and consequently emphasised its salience in the conflict ethos. Not to mention, the relationship between the *Shoah* and its social representations is circular; there would not be a large media representation if the *Shoah* narratives had not been salient to begin with.

This salience is perhaps what led the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman (1989) to call Israel a *Yad Vashem* with an air force. Like many others but perhaps one of the first, Friedman saw that the *Shoah* ethos over-imposed itself on almost all facets of Israel’s Jewish society. Not only was it an ideological/political instrument or an experiential element in cultural texts and artefacts like films and memoirs, it also made a strong presence even in the most mediocre of social representations. To illustrate, in 2011 at a bus stop in Tel Aviv, an Israeli company, HighQ, specialised in preparing students for the matriculation exams, put up an advertising poster titled “Don’t leave us behind,” and “Education is our future” (see: fig. 1.2). Ostensibly, the poster is nothing uncommon and its message is mediocre. The text in the middle, however, apparently attributed to ten-year-old Maya, reads in Hebrew: “Yesterday, they said on the news that Israel has the most advanced missiles in the world, they said that our technological progress is the only reason we have not been thrown in the sea…I am scared, I do not know how to swim very well” (Maor 2011). The poster’s latent meaning is that education is purposed to prevent the annihilation of the Jewish people.

From a collective memory perspective, the poster draws the attention to the fear of annihilation associated with the *Shoah*, and as ethos it emphasises the common themes around victimhood and justness of the goals. The ‘technological advancement’ might also emphasise ethos themes like self-reliance and positive self-image (as an independent and capable group). The emphasis on threat is also a latent reference to security and
patriotism (see next chapter). As in Waltz (2008) and Lebanon (2009), the poster message takes the contradiction between military strength and victimhood with no scrutiny. Today, Israel has nuclear warheads, but the core conflict ethos is still around vulnerability and victimhood. In order to reconcile the ethos about victimhood with that of military power, it is important to look at what can be described as ‘stubborn ethos’ — or what Bar-Tal terms the ‘freezing of beliefs’ (2001, 2012).

FROZEN BELIEFS

Generally, the freezing of beliefs implies a motivation to continue to hold certain beliefs as truthful, and a reluctance to search and process information that may refute them (Bar-Tal et al. 2012). In theory, such beliefs create a feeling of security by providing society members with a sense of readiness, control over their fate, solidarity, and act as an effective method of mobilisation (Bar-Tal 2001). Instead of providing a true sense of security, however, Israel’s growing military strength becomes a reminder of the country’s vulnerability. ‘Advanced missiles’ in this case serves to further freeze the ethos about victimhood and threat. It becomes nearly impossible — especially as the conflict continues and military prowess improves — for society members to reconsider their adherence to such ethos, which in turn obstructs any penetration of any information that may facilitate development of a peace process (Bar-Tal et al. 2012). Maya in the poster still hung on to same ethos that emerged as a response to Israel’s wars with the Arabs decades ago. At the time Israel marketed herself as vulnerable and surrounded by millions of antagonistic Arabs who plotted to annihilate the Jewish people. So, it was necessary to invest heavily in arms and education to deflect that possibility. The changes in the conflict brought about some changes in the societal beliefs. But some of the old beliefs lingered on and in time became almost cultural components.

To further illustrate, the 1960s alleged slogans about ‘throwing the Jews into the sea’ are still echoed today. The peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan and the recent rapprochement with several Arab countries do not seem to have unfrozen such beliefs. In 1989 prior to the initial peace talks in Madrid (1991), the late
Israel PM Shamir described the Palestinian self-determination proposal as a more sophisticated version of the ‘Jews into the sea’ rhetoric (Handelzalts 2012). In 1996, following the Oslo Accords, Shamir stated that “The sea is the same sea, and the Arabs are the same Arabs” (Aronoff 2014). Upon Shamir’s death in 2012, Netanyahu eulogised him, saying, among other things, that although it is possible that Shamir’s "statements about [Israel's] neighbours, about the distinction between the sea and the land ... unleashed a torrent of criticism at the time...today there are of course many more people who understand that this man saw and understood basic and genuine things” (Handelzalts 2012).

Frozen beliefs are particularly stable and tend to linger on even when the event that gave rise to them no longer existed. Shamir, as explained, could not see the Arabs in any other light but being genocidal, that despite the geopolitical changes and new flow of information that made such belief invalid. Nowadays, Palestinian ‘suicide bombing’ seems to have achieved a special place in Israel's list of frozen beliefs. The wave of suicide attacks during the Second Intifada (2000-2005) remains a buzzword in Israel’s ethos about victimhood and security even though such attacks ceased completely around 2005 (the Guardian 2006).

On a personal self-reflexive note, at the Japanese-Israeli-Palestinian Student Conference (JIPSC) in 2015 the ‘suicide bombing’ topic was brought up several times by the Israeli-Jewish participants. The Palestinian participants, myself included, were initially astounded by what felt like an irrational clinging to a trauma that in comparison to what they did to us was only minor. ‘Suicide attack versus nuclear warheads,’ a Palestinian participant remarked. Pointing out that suicide attacks ceased over a decade ago, I was met with a barrage of accusations of being insensitive to Jewish suffering. My initial thought was, does the occupier even have the right to complain about being a victim of the occupied?

32 In early 2002, PM Ariel Sharon explained that suicide bombings had necessitated the invasions of Palestinian cities in the West Bank (Operation Protective Shield) because these attacks posed an existential threat to Israel. He said, “This is a battle for survival of the Jewish people, for survival of the state of Israel.” [see: Bishara 2013, pp.89-90]
In hindsight, however, like the other Palestinian participants, I might have been frozen in Palestinian ethos. Our point of departure was only through the occupier-occupied dynamic, where we viewed ourselves as the only righteous victims in the conflict. Being given (or accused of) agency — the ability to inflict harm, which goes beyond our ‘ideal victim’ status (see Chapter Two) — was perhaps the most intimidating of all. But to many of us, it was almost unknown that a similar psychological process, although different in its specifics, was taking place on the other side.

Using that reflexive thought as an analytical device, it might be proposed that perhaps for Israeli-Jews the frozen ethos on suicide bombings was a convenient way to maintain the continuum of suffering as a moral and psychological buffer against the sins of the occupation. ‘Bombarded’ with the negative image of the occupation at the JIPSC by the Palestinian participants, the Israeli-Jewish participants saw their long-held ethos challenged. Their defensive strategy accordingly was to reluctantly admit Israel’s unfair policies but without compromising that ethos. Like in Waltz (2008) and Lebanon (2009), guilt was utilised as a means for redemption without actually having to bear responsibility for or act on it.

Unable to deny Palestinian suffering or ‘unfreeze’ the ethos about Israel’s positive and victim self-image, the only way out was perhaps to add a sense of hierarchy to victimhood. As if to say, ‘you might be victims, but but we are righteous, more deserving victims.’ Ellis (2002) once remarked that admitting wrongs is only viewed within the reclaiming of Jewish victimhood, so that Jews could retreat to the more comfortable sense of Jewish innocence. A study by Pilecki and Hammack (2014) showed that by emphasising their own ‘righteous’ victimisation, the Israeli-Jewish participants in the study — similar to ones at the — sought to reestablish their moral status outside the role of the perpetrator. In the process, Palestinian victimhood was acknowledged, but Israel’s aggression against the Palestinians was constructed within the moral framework of self-defence, which is one of Israel’s frozen beliefs. In other words, if acknowledging the other’s victimhood is inescapable, it becomes critical to further freeze the ethos about one’s own victimhood — hence the victim hierarchy.
This victim hierarchy is evident in *Fauda*, Israel’s Netflix hit series (2015). *Fauda* (Arabic for ‘chaos’) was credited for being perhaps the first series to break new grounds for Israeli-Jewish audience. It shows Palestinian narrative in a new light and does not shy away from depicting the ‘average Palestinians’ as victims. But *Fauda* is overwhelmingly an Israeli-Jewish production and its views of the conflict are somewhat symmetrical: IDF counter-terrorism units versus Palestinian terrorists. Ergo, the right and wrong are erased, the illegality of the occupation is not mentioned (almost non-existent in Season 2), and the assassinations are only action-packed adventures modelled on the US spy thriller *Homeland* (2011). *Fauda* re-emphasises the all-too-common Israeli narrative about the conflict being too complicated or a complicated ‘war zone,’ as described by *Fauda* creators. That serves to marginalise and silence narratives that offer, from Israel’s point of view, a threatening moral clarity (White 2018). It becomes easy from this perspective to present an ‘imagined symmetry,’ which makes both the occupier and the occupied victims, but with significant moral differences. The protagonist Doron, the lead Shabak operative, is a perfect embodiment of Golda Meir’s visualisation of Israel’s victimisation. He is a victim because he has to kill for the state of Israel - an ein breira (no choice) doctrine. The more he kills, the more victimised he becomes.33 The same privilege is not granted to Walid El-Abed, the head of Hamas’ military wing. The average Palestinian on the street is a victim as long as they stay ‘good’ and not resist. The operatives of the Israeli counter-terrorism units are flawed because of their personal mishaps and human shortcomings, but Palestinians are flawed on the national level: they are vulnerable to intimidation and easily fall prey to collaboration. The space for empathy is only reserved to those Palestinians who are neither ‘terrorists’ nor ‘collaborators,’ as well as to the Palestinian wives, Nisrin and Sherin, who betrayed their ‘militant’ husbands. In the end, there is the Israeli-Jewish Aristotelian tragic hero-victim and then there is the lesser Palestinian victim. Both are victims, but one is more righteous than

33 Golda Meir said that Israeli-Jews were not going to “forgive the Arabs for forcing them to kill their sons [the Arabs]” [Yadid 2015]. Meir’s reasoning also seems to imply that the more Palestinians the IDF kills, the more wronged and victimised Israel feels. This belief also entails a sense of moral superiority, in fact, a ‘moral isolation’ in the aggressive, backward ‘Middle Eastern muck,’ as described by Ian Lustick (2008).
Unlike Waltz, Fauda did not use the Shoah memory as a framework, it was nevertheless influenced by the ‘frozen’ conflict ethos in which the collective memory of the Shoah has been the primary denominator.

COLLECTIVE EMOTIONAL ORIENTATIONS

In addition to being a byproduct of mainly the Shoah collective memory and is enhanced and perpetuated by the conflict ethos, victimhood is also an emotional orientation. In this study's framework, collective memory and conflict ethos are the cognitive part of the socio-psychological infrastructure which provides the narrative/stories that cause “…the arousal of particular emotions” (Bar-Tal 2013, p. 214) and are themselves interactive with and reinforced by these emotions (ibid.). Bar-Tal (2007) sees that society provides the context, information, cues, models, and guidelines against which the emotions of its members arise. And because these cultural frameworks are shared by society members and have influence on them, their emotional responses to them become a collective emotional orientation. The assumption is that each society is defined by a number of particular emotions. Bar-Tal identified fear as Israel’s most dominant emotion (2001). The next chapter extensively discusses and builds on this notion, looking at fear as one of the main drives in Israel’s victimhood narratives and, subsequently, a significant force behind Israel’s hyper security. This chapter, however, will briefly discuss the ‘softer’ emotions of guilt and shame. This should provide some insight into the emotionality of collective memory and ethos, and that will help better understand the role of fear in the next chapter. Emotions are rooted in appraisal, and guilt and shame have, among other things, the cognitive appraisal of acknowledging one’s in-group responsibility for the victimisation of the out-group (e.g. Lazarus 1991; Fridja et al. 2000; Keltner & Lerner 2001, 2010; Halperin & Schwartz 2010; Halperin et al. 2011). Theoretically, this should lead to positive outcomes, namely, the rectification of wrongdoing. But in Israel, guilt and shame seem to reinforce the negative perceptions of collective memory and further freeze the conflict ethos. Guilt and shame are not as dominant or readily discernible as fear, but their subtle, indirect reverberations can be felt in some of Israel’s behaviours. This chapter identifies four of these behaviours: the fear of normality, displacement of guilt, past shame displacement, and identification with the aggressor.
Fear of Normality

Israel has long used the international guilt about the Shoah as a basis for gathering support (Evron 1981). She, in other words, shaped her foreign policy in terms of ‘narcissistic victimhood’ (Hage 2010) and used it as a signifier for the country’s legitimacy and policies. After the Eichmann Trial, Gold Meir confidently remarked: “Now, when everyone knows what they did to us, we can do anything we want and no one has the right to criticise us or tell us what to do.” Similarly, before the bombing of Beirut Begin said the World War II countries had no right to criticise Israel since they did nothing when the Jews were exterminated (Eldar 2012). This worldview has become part of Israel’s diplomatic protocols so much so that nowadays every important non-Jewish visitor to the country is taken, as a matter of course, to Yad Vashem and, sometimes, the ‘Ghetto Fighters’ Kibbutz’ as part of the ‘familiarisation process,’ aiming at making the visitor experience guilt (Evron 1981). Today, this is Israel’s perception of normality.

The early Zionists assumed that establishing a Jewish homeland was going to normalise the status of the Jews and make Israel an equal member of the international community within the framework of the global economic and political system. This was the basis of the ‘New Jew’, one who is independent and free and no longer living in the shambles of past victimhood (see Chapter Four). But according to Ellis (2002), it seems that the old prophetic norms that grew up in situations of powerlessness still apply in modern Israel.

To break away from the past will mean that Israel acknowledges that the Jews today wield power and that makes Israel a regular nation with moral and legal responsibilities. Which also means that Israel will have to admit her guilt towards the Palestinians and act on it through a series of political and financial remedies. But the fear of being a normal nation runs deeper than that. At the very least, it will expose Israel’s to its negative self, to the terrifying prospect of being a perpetrator which would fly in the face of most things that the country holds dear about her identity. By admitting Palestinian victimisation, Israeli-Jews admit they had become a mirror image of their worst nightmare (Pappé 2010). Marc Ellis (1990, pp.40-42) insightfully
explained that by “ending Auschwitz” — ending the Shoah memory as a guilt device — Jews will be compelled to ‘think the unthinkable’...that the future of the Jewish people is “bound up in an essential solidarity with those whom we [Jews] have displaced, a solidarity with the Palestinian people.”

This means that Israel will have to reach a new paradigm where the concept of guilt is shifted away from the external world and then directed internally. However, it seems that the conflict ethos about victimhood is still solid in place to condition the Israeli-Jewish collective consciousness to avoid or minimise the responsibility of historical injustices towards the Palestinians (Ferguson & Branscombe 2014). To deflect any possibility of guilt associated with the Palestinians, to avoid violating the ‘boundaries of Auschwitz’ (Ellis 2002), Israel often resorted to guilt-neutralising mechanisms such as guilt displacement.

**Guilt Displacement**

In the *Seventh Million* (1993), Segev reports how the Shoah survivors were recruited to appear as ‘living witnesses’ before the students visiting the Death Camps in Poland. By being there, he suggests, the survivors helped materialise the existential fear of contemporary Israel. The students are meant to witness Jews in a world without Jewish power. But in the absence of physical Nazis, those students — in a classic case of psychological displacement (redirection of — usually — aggression onto a powerless substitute target) — tend to transfer the blame of the Jewish suffering to the discernible, easier to understand, physical enemy in the present time. Projecting some aspects of the image of the Nazi onto the Palestinians becomes an outlet for the suppressed psychic energy (Newman & Ralph 2002).

The IDF also organises similar trips for thousands of its officers. One of the prime goals of this project, titled ‘Witnesses in Uniform,’ is to strengthen the sense of commitment to Israel as a democratic state and to the Jewish people (Savir 2013). While it is common for most of the world’s armies to familiarise their soldiers
with their country’s history, the emphasis on historical trauma in the IDF produces a misplaced transference of aggression. Similar to the students who had to hate somebody since the Nazis did not physically exist anymore, the officers’ exposure to trauma and victimisation becomes a facilitator for abuse in the Occupied Territories where many of them serve.

It is noteworthy that guilt displacement can also manifest as victim-blaming. Imhoff and Banse (2009) showed that suffering can cause or amplify negative attitudes toward the victims. Reminders of ongoing Jewish suffering after the Shoah facilitated implicit anti-Semitic resentment among Germans, allowing prejudice to serve as a strategy to distance oneself from the in-group responsibility for historical wrongs. Similarly, by blaming Palestinian victimhood on Palestinians, Israel effectively projects its sense of guilt onto her victims to protect herself and, especially, to preserve her self-perceived victimisation. While “the Germans will never forgive the Jews for Auschwitz,” as put by Adorno (Falk 2008, p.169), Israeli-Jews, by the same logic, will never forgive Palestinians for Deir-Yassin.34

Past Shame Displacement

Shame, too, can lead to displacement. Shame, like guilt, is an emotion characterised by separation and distancing from the shame-inducing event (Evron 1981; Lickel et al. 2011). In the early days of the state, for the ‘veteran generation’ that was raised on the heroic myths of the Masada and Tel-Hai, it was shame at the Shoah, not the event, which choked the nation’s soul (see: Roy 2002; Rose 2011). The assumed ‘shameful’ passivity of the Shoah victims taught many Israeli-Jews to redeem themselves by embracing aggressive security policies (see next chapter). Levy (2009) saw the dynamic of shame-turned-aggression as detrimental to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He argued that instead of consciously feeling the pain and vulnerability of the Palestinians, Israeli-Jews, haunted by past shame, are hellbent on destroying anyone who reminds them of it.

34 For more information on the massacre of Deir Yassin, see: Hogan’s “The 1948 Massacre At Deir Yassin Revisited” (2001). Also see http://www.deiryassin.org/mas.html
Today what is being acted out is psychological attempts to eliminate Israel’s own feelings of vulnerability and weakness. Intrinsic to trauma is the double-bind of having to deny what cannot be forgotten. Palestinians are now paying the price of Israel's shame through humiliation, their worst offence (Rose 2011) (see Chapter Seven).

Like guilt, shame was shifted from the Shoah Jewish victims to the world as a whole, which was divided into perpetrators, Nazi collaborators, and bystanders (Dowty 2004). Perpetration in particular was broadened to include all the others: sympathisers, passive bystanders, or the Goyim in general, hostile in actuality or potentiality (Al-Messiri 1997) — a belief that Leibowitz (1989) objected to, and criticised defining Jewish identity in terms of the harm the Goyim caused the Jews. Usually, this belief, along with presenting the Jews as the Shoah exclusive victims, cuts the Jews off from humanity and its laws (Evron 1981). Interestingly, the disconnection might cause certain Jews when in a position of power to mistreat non-Jews, and sometimes — in a case of identifying with the aggressor — to repeat or imitate some Nazi attitudes (ibid.).

Identifying with the Aggressor

As it was alluded to in Waltz, because of the guilt and shame associated with the past trauma, victims may end up in a dissociative trance, resulting in a fragmentation of the personality (Howell 2014) and then becoming a mirror image of their former victimisers. Identifying with the aggressor leads to a compulsive repetition of traumatic events, so much so that the victims become addicted to their victimisers (van der Kolk 1989) and engage in activities that mimic those victimisers’ practices (Sout 2004; White 2010). Grosbard (2003) sees that Israel's identification with certain Nazi policies (such as segregation and racist laws) and applying them to the Palestinians is a mechanism to suppress and divert the anger and bitterness associated with memory. Perhaps it is to prove to oneself and possibly to the oppressor that one is worthy. This becomes a motivation to transform personal suffering into control and domination over others (Berman 2010), partly to have the freedom to anticipate and prevent further victimisation.
What makes the identification with the aggressor detrimental to the conflict is not only Israel’s depositing of unresolved traumas onto the Palestinians, but also Palestinians identifying with and depositing Israel’s aggression onto weaker subjects, themselves included. Such identification is evident among the Palestinian citizens of Israel who vote for Zionist parties and the Palestinian collaborators who identify with the Zionist objectives. The problem has institutional dimensions as well. Some of the practices of the Palestinian Authority, for example, are modelled on Israel. When the PA replaced the IDF in some Palestinian cities in 1994 following the Oslo Accords, there were abuses almost identical to ones exercised by the IDF. Torture methods in the PA prisons were by-the-book Israeli. Some of the Palestinian security heads who were involved in torturing other Palestinians were former political detainees in Israel and themselves victims of torture. This is why the Palestinian security bodies were described by some as Israeli-Jews speaking Arabic (Al-Hadidi 2015). According to Volkan (2009), when oppression lasts long enough, it becomes internalised as a ‘shared external ego,’ and it does not disappear automatically when the oppression is somewhat lifted.

On a self-reflexive note, for many of us, afresh outside Israel’s direct control straight after Oslo, the Palestinian Authority (PA) — although warmly welcomed in the beginning — was perceived as a replacement for the IDF. Therefore, rebellious attitudes and disrespect for authority gained foothold in society. In hindsight, it felt that the occupation became a cultural value that we had to maintain. Even though I knew those new armed men on the streets of Gaza were our people, the feelings of dread and intimidation which the IDF soldiers had instilled into our psyche did not seem to phase away. Many of us, kids, felt some pride challenging and teasing those Palestinian policemen like we did the Israeli soldiers. I may say that like Israel, we might have grown addicted to our oppressors and were afraid to embrace a new paradigm of normality and, therefore, needed to compensate by projecting the ‘authoritarian object’ (Sebek 1996) upon the PA. It meant, among other things, to ensure a sense of continuity in the perpetrator-victim dyad, a familiar and safe state of mind and the only mode of control or lack thereof that we knew.
CONCLUSION

In the novel *See Under Love* (1989), Grossman sums up the enduring power of Israel’s collective memory. The first chapter tells us about Momik, a son of *Shoah* survivors in Israel who never tell him about what really happened to them ‘over there’ by the ‘Nazi beast.’ The boy secretly grows a Nazi animal in the cellar. This beast is an imagined figure that he creates in order to have an enemy he can visualise and overcome. An important latent content in the novel is the pathology of the boy who is haunted by the ghosts of the past, which is revealed as a monstrous distortion in the process of repression and denial. Living the *Shoah* vicariously and incomprehensibly through his parents, Momik, like Waltz’s protagonist, represents the collective powerful fixation on memory and the resulting ethos that leave little space for mourning and empathy in the post-*Shoah* Israel.

By adhering to collective memory, the Jews are meant to remember the past victimisation in order to deflect any future victimisation. Fackenheim (1994) saw that for Jews to forget Hitler’s victims would be to grant him a ‘posthumous victory.’ However, as Folman, Maoz, and Grossman tells us symbolically, it would be an even greater posthumous victory for Hitler when Jewish memory becomes the most defining factor in Israel’s worldview. It is not about forgetting, which Jews should not, but rather about drawing different conclusions and place the memory in the right historical and political context (Miller 2014).

Today, collective memory seems to fuel hostility and paranoia. As Bar-Tal suggested (2007, 2013), collective memory justified the outbreak of the conflict, preserved society’s positive self-image, demonised the opponent and perpetuated the in-group as the conflict victims. Because of it, the Arabs were nazified, Israel's launched a preemptive attack against Arab countries in 1967, and Begin ordered the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear plant in 1981 (see next chapter: preemptive warfare). Because of collective memory, Israel had the exclusive moral right to inaugurate a nuclear weapon program (Blumenthal 2013) and, because of it, the belief that Jewish existence depended solely on military power became almost a secular religion. Most importantly,
collective memory shaped, or rather distorted, the ethos and emotional mindset regarding the conflict with the Palestinians.

Against the Palestinians, Israel has assumed a contradictory position of victimhood and power. Not only has this led to and justified the aggressive policies against them, it also allowed Israel to approach negotiations with them as a bargaining match between equals (Golan 2014). In the process, the dichotomy of victimhood and power saw the ‘equal Palestinian partner’ being constantly and conveniently shifted between being inferior and weak, and therefore not equal, and being an existential threat, which made Israel feel vulnerable and weak. Between a ‘partner’ who is willing to accept the superior occupier’s dictations or one who is not a ‘true partner’ for peace when the demands of justice are raised (see: Haaretz Editorial 2013; Maan News 2017).

In an ideal scenario, in order to reach a settlement with the Palestinians, Grosbard (2003) reflects, Israel needs to feel safe to move forward in the growing up process in order to recognise the needs of others. In reality so far, trapped in the past, Israel remains incapable of functioning as a normal nation. In the international community Israel is almost the personality-disordered member who sits in the group and everyone always picks on him, and everyone has to deal with him, and he think he is always right and innocent (ibid.). Richards (2017) sees such attitude in terms of narcissistic disorder, where a person is absorbed in himself and in his own grandiosity — probably as a defence against profound insecurity. In December 2016 when the UN unanimously condemned the Jewish settlements in the West Bank (UNSC 2334, 2006), Danon, Israel’s UN representative, immediately fell back on Jewish memory and ethos to condemn the resolution. He drew an unobstructed connection between Hanukkah when king Theo banished the Jews from the Temple in Jerusalem and the UN resolution on settlements.35 The resolution was perceived as a denial of the Jews’ right to self-determination and a continuation of centuries of Jewish persecution. It also confirmed Israel’s negative identity (Kelman 1987, 1999), one that makes sense only when measured against others as potential

35 See full speech: https://youtu.be/hPxSx8qdpWA [December 23 2016]
aggressors. In this continuum of suffering the occupation does not exist (or apply), and criticism directed at Israel is nothing but anti-Semitic antagonism from which Palestinians — the ones Israel persecutes — are not excluded. Any peace effort that does not part with such societal beliefs is probably doomed to fail. And, at the same time, peace offers that do not take into account Israel’s perceived victim identity, her approach to memory and remembering, the resulting ethos, and the emotions that steer it and are steered by it, may also lead nowhere.

In the next chapter it will become apparent that Israel’s narratives of victimhood do not end at the boundaries mentioned in this chapter. They become more complicated when it comes to the emotions and ethos about security. The argument is taken a step further by focusing on Israel’s perception and implementation of what is termed ‘hyper security.’ Especially focusing on the collective emotional orientations of fear, security is discussed and analysed as the most important physical manifestation of Israel’s victimhood and one of the most significant obstacles to settlement. This should provide a broader scope of understanding that will help answer the research question on the extent to which the narratives of victimhood contribute to the conflict intractability, and consequently the impasse in peacemaking.
CHAPTER SIX

VICTIMHOOD IN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT:

The Case of Israel’s ‘Hyper Security’ as an Outcome of Israel’s
Fear Orientations
OVERVIEW

The previous chapter examined Israel’s victimhood through collective memory, conflict ethos, and, finally, collective emotional orientations. This chapter continues from where the last chapter ended. Using the same framework but with special focus on the emotional orientation of fear, the attention now shifts to the what could be the most important yet understudied manifestation of Israel’s victimhood: security. Building on the assumption that victimhood is a socio-psychological product and therefore subjective (e.g. Vallacher et al. 2010; Coleman 2011a; Kelman 2007; Bar-Tal 2013; Bar-Tal & Halperin 2009; Halperin & Shavit 2015; Bar-Tal & Jacobson 1998; Bar-Tal & Rouhana 1998; Volkan 2001), this chapter examines security largely as a perception. Given Israel’s extreme security measures, security is here described as ‘hyper.’ Hyper security also points to the gap between security as a geo-political assessment and as a perception.

First, the chapter highlights how the cognitive appraisal of fear has shaped Israel’s fight-or-flight attitude to security and blurred the difference between security as a reality and as a perception, leading to and strengthening the defensive posture and the ghetto mentality. These issues are discussed with the conflict’s historical, psychohistorical, and political circumstances in mind. Second, the chapter examines the destructive outcome of hyper security: first by looking at Israel’s preemptive warfare doctrine (using the Six-Day War and Iran as case studies), and second, by examining the country’s views on terrorism, especially Palestinian ‘terrorism.’ The claims that Israel’s preemptive wars had been based solely on geo-political calculations are questioned and the labelling of Palestinian dissidence as terrorism is argued against. Next, the chapter examines how security now defines the very concept of patriotism among Israeli-Jews. The chapter concludes by highlighting how hyper security has affected Israel’s approach to settlement.

Narrative sources in this chapter vary. Scholarship provides and consolidates the conceptual, political, and historical argument (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001, 2007; Keltner and Lerner 2010; Halperin et al. 2011; also: e.g. Shalit 1995; Dowty 1999; Shlaim 2001; Ochs 2006; Sand 2009; Svirsky 2014; Del Sarto 2017; Lentin 2018). The
historical narratives are especially important in adding an experiential [psychohistorical] dimension to the understanding of Israel’s security. The polarised historical narratives around the Six-Day War is a good example (e.g. Finkelstein 2003; Dershowitz 2003; Kurtulus 2007; Aaron 2007). Cultural texts and artefacts, which media, arts, signs and symbols represent provide a close outlook on the experience related to fear, security, and the overarching narratives of collective victimhood. Media in particular is a primary source of narrative textuality in this chapter. Not only do news articles, reports, commentaries, opinions, and statements mark events/stories, they also reflect — implicitly or explicitly — society’s ethos and emotional orientations (e.g. Fein 1999; Shavit 2001b; Al-Sukkari 2002; Goldberg 2009; Rosen 2014; Fisk 2016; Karram 2017; Fisher 2017; Maan News 2019). Visual media serves a similar function. The documentary *Sheshet Ha-Yamim* (1967), for example, was made to celebrate Israel’s victory and heroism in the Six-Day War, but the analysis of its latent content revealed it still emphasised the link between security and the Jewish collective memory. The documentary *The Gatekeepers* (2012) has a similar pattern except with a focus on Palestinian dissidence. Literary works also convey, though more intimately, the Israeli-Jewish experience regarding security (e.g. Shamir 1947; Appelfeld 1971; Chayut 2010; Peled 2016). Appelfeld’s *The Hunt* (1971), for example, communicates Jewish fear by creating a sense of alienation between the story characters and the reader. The analysis of latent content (categorical-content) is influenced by the author’s positionality and the research question. Reflexivity in this chapter is presented along with the discussion on the *mechabel* narrative, and is deployed auto-ethnographically using personal experience.

**FIGHT-OR-FLIGHT RESPONSE**

Bar-Tal (1998, 2001, 2007, 2013) claims that collective emotional orientations are usually a response to and themselves influence the perception of collective memory and the formation of conflict ethos. He argues that societies involved in intractable conflict tend to be dominated by a number of collective emotions that serve as coping mechanisms to the conflict challenges. In his article “How Fear Overrides Hope…” (2001), Bar-Tal notes that just as individuals may be characterised by one particular dominant emotion, so also societies may
develop collective emotional orientations, with an emphasis on one or more particular emotions. He argues that in Israel fear seems to be the dominant emotional orientation.

Before becoming actionable security policies, fear should have cut deeply into the psychic fabric of society to become a crucial part of its culture (Bar-Tal 2001, also see: 2007, 2013). In Israel, this can be seen in most cultural texts and artefacts. The work of Israeli novelist and Shoah survivor Aharon Appelfeld, for example, is one of many that signify fear in the light of the Jewish collective memory. Hinting at the major sights of suffering, Appelfeld conveys the psychological uneasiness of the Jewish collective throughout history. In *The Hunt* (1971, translated by Le Lang 1989), Appelfeld employs the element of alienation to deliver this notion. He keeps the place, time, and psychology of the characters vague, coupled with an avoidance to assign even a shred of feelings to the Jews in the story, in order to create a sense of distance and alienation (Shiffman 2005). Through alienation Appelfeld expresses the persecution and fear that accompanied the Jews throughout history. Bar-Tal (2001) sees that ‘the hunt’ represents anti-Semitism, and like hunting it is a very old practice.

Fear has triggered changes in Israel’s cognition and actions. These changes were originally tailored to help regulate the response tendencies to the threatening situation, allowing the collective to feel in control of its fate and create a sense of certainty (Lazarus & Folkman 1984; Lazarus 1991; Frijda et al. 2000; Bar-Tal 2001; Matthieu & Ivanoff 2006; Keltner & Lerner 2010; Halperin & Schwartz 2010; Halperin *et al.* 2011). But this often persisted beyond the emotion-eliciting situation (Lerner & Keltner 2007). Traditionally, the appraisal of fear leads to action tendencies such as avoidance and reduced willingness to take risks (distrust of peace initiatives, as an example) (Keltner & Lerner 2010; Halperin *et al.* 2011), but in Israel the cognitive appraisal of fear has also resulted in emotional and action tendencies in the form of extreme security culture. This culture is hyper in its attention to threat cues, hyper in the selection and processing of information, and above

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36 A story of young boy, Yankek, who while being rowed across the river by a fisherman, the two notice Jews on the riverbank. The fisherman, teaches the boy how to hunt them. As he watches the Jews bleed, not only does Yankek realise how much he hated them, but also — secretly — knows he has the same blood.

37 For example, Barak’s intransigence at Camp David was primarily justified on security grounds [Masalha 2000]
all, hyper in its response to the perception of danger. This is Israel’s ‘hyper security’ — an almost permanent fight-or-flight state.

The assumption is that under ‘normal’ security measures judicious and balanced concerns about danger are perfectly justified (Mueller & Lustick 2008). But with ‘hyper security,’ instead of viewing threat with sober assessment, it is usually seen in existential terms. This process creates an extreme sensitivity to threat cues, severely narrowing attention to select classes of stimuli that may or may not resemble the original cause of victimisation (i.e. chosen trauma and collective memory). It becomes an effective tool for mobilisation, depicting the country as locked in a permanent battle for survival with its Arab neighbours — that a major military defeat would mean annihilation (Oren et al. 2015).

In practical terms, this preoccupation with security became the pillar of the state’s infrastructure, so much so it even created an interesting class of democracy where the judicial system have become tied up to the country’s overall perception of security. The Israeli Supreme Court, for example, made it almost a rule not to interfere with the military government when its actions were based on ‘security reasons’ (Aronson 1978).

The lively and pluralistic Israeli media, especially the press, too has been subject to security views. The laws stipulate that any journalist working for Israeli media outlets must submit articles and all other items related to Israel’s security and foreign relations to the Israeli Military Censor before publication. Lately, this has been extended to include social media postings by journalists (Salhani 2018). In 2017, for instance, out of 83 books submitted to the military censor, 53 were partially redacted or edited (Ahronheim 2018). Media is a significant source of narrative on security and by extension acts as a mirror to the country’s a sense of collective victimhood. But occasionally it is not what Israeli media says about the conflict that reflects the country’s security culture, but rather what it does not say (or not allowed to say).
The government’s censorship on the media is also helped by the willingness of many Israeli-Jews to practise a wide-range of self-censorship. Bar-Tal (2017a) argues that the moment society members feel their individual or collective security threatened, the more they practice self-censorship. It may be that the readiness of many Israeli-Jews for self-censorship is governed by their adherence to the conflict ethos (see: Bar-Tal 2000, 2007, 2013). This would block whatever information that may contradict the validity of Israel’s national security beliefs (Bar-Tal 2017a). Another factor in strengthening these beliefs is the fact that emotions can be contagious. Society members are likely to reinforce each other’s fear and the perception of risk, which can also encourage them to self-censor (Goodwin et al. 2005; Weinberg et al. 2012).

The preoccupation with security can also be seen in Israel’s economic infrastructure. The country, for example, has burgeoned into a high tech epicentre built around cyber security and other cyber defence technologies (Suciu 2015). She is also one of the world’s top powerhouses for manufacturing and developing military drones (O’Sullivan 2012; Sadot 2016). There is the additional fact that much of the high-tech defence pioneers emerge from the heart of the IDF. The army Military Intelligence Unit 8200 — comprised of the best and brightest cybersecurity elite — is arguably the hub that offers veterans a fast track into the country’s tech and defence industry (Senor & Singer 2009; Tender 2015).

HYPER SECURITY AS PERCEPTION

The destructiveness of Israel’s hyper security, nevertheless, lies in the blurred distinction between threat as a reality and as a perception. Fear gives rise to a relatively perceptual assessment of threat, a process loosely labelled ‘national security’ and falsely portrayed as fully sober and rationally calculated. Security in this case becomes more about the underlying appraisal tendency to reduce the anxiety associated with uncertainty and low control over the possibility of a threat and less with the actual threat (Keltner & Lerner 2010). Under such circumstances, security also becomes comprehensive; that is, regardless of their proximity to threat,
most of society members see fear (and insecurity) as “...just their obvious way of existing in their world” (Svirsky 2014, p. 6). Their judgments and actions are largely determined by that.

In a study conducted by Bar-Tal, Jacobson, and Freund (1995) to find out whether the feelings of insecurity and other related reactions are influenced by the experience of living in a settlement in the OT, or whether they are shaped by personal factors. The findings indicated that contrary to the common beliefs, living in the settlement did not in itself affect the settlers’ feelings of insecurity. There was no significant difference in the fear factor between the settlers and Israeli-Jews inside Israel. The study was conducted during the relatively calm period before the eruption of the 2000 Intifada. However, long after the Intifada as the security situation dramatically improved, the support for settlements did not actually decrease. Those who believed that settlements helped security increased from 31% of the population in 2013 to 42% in 2015 (Starr 2017).

It might be a rule of thumb that the escalation of violence enhances fear and the feelings of insecurity. But as the above poll showed, Palestinian violence may not be the only factor in those feelings. Because fear is associated with an appraisal of low control and uncertainty (Halperin et al. 2011), settlements, in addition to being a strategic depth (Harel 2017), provided Israeli-Jews with a feeling of control over their destiny and a sense of self-reliance. In 2002, a video aired by Israeli media and was picked up and translated by the Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Manar TV (Al-Sukkari 2002) showed settlers from the Nablus area in the PT hysterically lamenting and screaming at then PM Ariel Sharon allegedly for failing to secure them. The fear on those settlers’ faces was very telling. This was triggered after Gilad Zar, a settlement security officer, was killed in a road ambush by Palestinian gunmen near Nablus.38 Violence usually triggers high-level anxieties, but the settlers hysteria could also be attributed to their sense of having lost control over their security and by default their lives. Israel’s failure to protect them made those feelings worse. Their extreme fear may have also been coupled with a sense of violation not only by the attackers, but also by what they saw

38 In March 2017, the Israeli Cabinet unanimously decided to begin the construction of a new settlement in northern West Bank to accommodate the Jewish settlers who were evacuated from the already evacuated outpost of Amona. The settlement is expected to be named after Gilad Zar. [source: Abu-Ellaan, Madaar News 2017]
as an unquestionable right to live in peace on an occupied land. Any opposition to this right was viewed as a violation of their legitimacy and therefore any harsh security measures to quell this opposition was not only necessary but also righteous. Any harm or distress that occurred in the process of ‘quelling’ became an affirmation of Jewish victimhood.

MENTAL GHETTO

The settlers today see themselves as Sharon once saw them, as the *avant-grade* of Zionism (Goldberg 2004). They are in many ways the physical and psychological extension of the early twentieth-century’s first Jewish settler communities in Palestine, the *Yishuv*. Their emotional orientations, security beliefs, and views of the local population are similar to those of the *Yishuv*. The *Yishuv* believed they were pioneers and warriors and on the path to complete a struggle against anti-Semitic prejudice that goes back more than a thousand years (Turkel 2015). Their victimhood nationalism was an integral part of the so-called *Yishuv* heroism — the righteous, eternal victim little David versus the Goliaths of human history (Assmann & Conrad 2010).

The *Yishuvists* formed their settler identity directly against the local population. Like today’s settlers, they saw the locals as something to fear and be separated from, so they erected psychological and physical barriers. They, Shlaim (2001, p. 570) explains “…turned the Palestinians into aliens on their own soil.” For all its marginality, explains Shlomo Sand (2009, pp. 252-56), “…Zionism was part of the last wave of nationalist awakening in Europe” and “…borrowed many elements from the nationalism in which it was embedded.”

The colonial outlook it inherited made it possible to establish the *Yishuv* culture as a culture of the ‘whitened Jew’ set against the backward and dangerous indigenous population (Kayyali 1977; Gerber 2003; Samman 2005; Mandour 2015). By creating this distinction and in contrast to the original Zionist goal to normalise the state of the world’s Jewry (see previous chapter), the *Yishuv* Zionists recreated the ancient conditions as a ‘beleaguered minority.’ They reestablished the feelings that survival of the Jewish community meant being separate from the outside world (Dowty 1999).
It was Henry Kissinger who, many years ago, observed the irony of this predicament: Intended to solve the ‘Jewish problem’ by taking the Jews out of the ghetto, Israel had instead become the largest ghetto in Jewish history (Fein 1991). What appeared like a triumph to begin with was short-lived for the “New Jew” who somehow brought the *galut* mentality along with him (Wein 2000). Kissinger had in mind not only Jewish vulnerability, but Jewish neurosis. This sentiment was also shared by former Israeli president Ezer Weizman, who called Israel’s fear a ‘ghetto mentality’ (Perlmutter & Frankel 1996). Yaron Ezrahi (in: Del Sarto 2017) pointed out more than two decades ago that “Jews who built their homes in the midst of heavily populated Arab towns and villages, among Arabs enraged by the forced confiscation of their lands, were able to preserve, and even reinforce, a well entrenched ghetto mentality by producing the conditions and feelings of being surrounded by hostile enemies.”

In an interview with *Haaretz* (Shavit 2004b), author Aharon Appelfeld said: “We tried to escape from the fate of a persecuted minority, but the fate of a persecuted minority pursued us here, too.” Appelfeld implies that Israel has become the same exact image of the ghetto that Zionism tried to escape. This theme exists in a large range of cultural texts and artefacts. The Israeli TV drama *Hu Halach b’Sadot* (He Walked Through The Fields) (1967) is an example. It is an adaptation of the 1947 Moshe Shamir’s novel with the same title. It tells the story of a pre-state *sabra* and *Palmach* fighter, Uri, who is in the midst of a broken family and unstable community, and is torn between his love and the duty to his country. The protagonist suffers from alienation and searches for belongingness. Uri’s desire to rid himself of the burden of the *galut* (symbolised in the question of belongingness and duty) cannot be redeemed even in Israel, or on the battlefield.

Collectively, Israel became locked in feelings of alienation from the region, its peoples and its cultures and an urge to escape (Lustick 2008), in a way regressing to the old patterns of siege mentality (see: Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992a/b). Fencing, concrete walls, barbed wire, trenches and embankments, and heavy militarisation of the country’s fault lines (Saddiki 2015) had been so normalised that security became a mindset more than a

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39 Notice how Ezrahi uses the term ‘Arab’ to describe the Palestinians.

40 The elite fighting unit of the *Haganah*, the pre-state Jewish terrorist organisation.
preventative procedure. The ghetto mentality comprises not only an objective assessment of Arab attitudes towards Israel, but also the national consciousness that derives reference from the broader historical predicaments of the Jewish people (Mikaelian 2007). Eventually, this mentality turned into belligerence. The hyper preoccupation with security, in other words, was externalised, sometimes established as a form of ethos, finding an outlet in an equally hyper military doctrine, namely preemptive warfare.

**Preemptive Warfare**

Responding to fear, people usually appraise whether an event is congruent or incongruent with their situation. They tend to consider causal attributions to the event, potential responses, and future consequences of different causes of action (e.g. Lazarus 1991; Keltner & Lerner 2010; Halperin et al. 2011). Bar-Tal (2001 - citing Elon [1971]) explains that the lingering Shoah collective memory made any Arab threats of annihilation plausible. One way to counteract the fear of annihilation, Shalit (1994) argued, was by extreme aggression. Under favourable conditions, aggression is a life force that enables the integration of the basic fear of annihilation into the self without being overwhelmed by it (ibid.). In Israel, the collective fear orientation (Bar-Tal 2001, 2007, 2013) was compensated for by over-reliance on military strength. Israel Tal (2000, pp.121-122 ) maintained that amongst the major lessons that were learned from the 1948 experience was the importance of “offensive as a basic strategy, reliance on assault power, and eventually the doctrine of preemptive attack and taking the fighting into enemy territory.” Shalit (1994) insightfully noted that under these circumstances military strength became aggression that actually evolved into the existential anxiety it was supposed to prevent and protect against. What materialised was, in fact, externalisation of psychological drives projected onto any level or type of threat. The capacity to assess the enemy’s hostility, intentions, or military strength thus diminished.

In the early days, Israel was able to promote the idea of *ein breira* war (war of necessity) in her confrontations with the Arab states. But having signed a peace agreement with Egypt, invaded Lebanon three years later,
and then set out to fight an entire population in the first Intifada five years after that, she grew unable to
market her case in the international arena as being exceptional or existential. The overall sense of threat,
nevertheless, remained almost the same, only the semantics changed. The ‘war of necessity’ became the ‘war
of choice’ (Kurtulus 2007), yet still favoured initiating attacks and taking the fight to the enemy’s territory
without seeing it in any other other light but ‘defensive.’ A war with preemptive dimensions (Mikaelian 2007).

A preemptive attack is one that is launched based on the expectation that the adversary is about to attack. In
most cases an imminent threat is thought of in terms of visible mobilisation of armies, navies, and air forces
(Krzeczunowicz 2005). If the evidence is incontrovertible that the enemy is about to attack, striking first
becomes an option. Slager (2012) sees that a preemptive attack should be subject to certain boundaries in
order to prevent rampant violence and to be legitimate. This raises the question whether Israel’s preemptive
wars were justified as a response to a truly eminent attack or they were an extension of the fear-oriented and
victimhood-based security perceptions. To answer the questions, the next section examines the 1967 Six-Day
War and Israel’s attitude towards Iran.

**The Six-Day War**

Mueller *et al.* (2007) claims that the Six-Day War was the ‘only unambiguous preemptive war in the last
century.’ The authors assume that at that critical point of Israel’s history nearly all acts of aggression were
defensive in nature. This is unsurprising considering that the politics of that era regarding Israel was
dominated by the emerging Shoah narratives, especially after the Eichmann Trial (see previous chapter).
Western acceptance and mainstreaming of Israel’s narrative of the War may have partly been influenced by
the sense of guilt regarding the Jewish genocide. In the aftermath of the World War II, the belief that the
Allies have fought a righteous war contributed, Kemp (2015) claims, to the determination to stand up to the
political incorrectness of the 1930s, which was believed to have triggered the conflict. The Shoah was

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41 The Six-Day War is also known as the June War, the 67 (or) 1967 War, 1967 Arab–Israeli War, or the Third Arab–Israeli War.
considered to be a catastrophic result of the conjunction of destructive ideologies at that specific, critical point in history (Bell 2004, cited by ibid.). The sense of guilt it impinged upon many Western governments drove them to support Israel militarily and economically (Olick 2003). Israel’s creation was seen as ‘victims’ justice’ and the country’s military doctrine and wars were legitimised accordingly.

It may be suggested that such support was further consolidated by the Western negative perception of Arab nationalism at the time. Egypt’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956 was perhaps a critical factor.\(^{42}\) It was viewed as threatening to the British Empire’s oil shipping routes. The possibility of blackmail by Egypt was exacerbated by the then growing depiction of Nasser as a ‘mortal enemy’ and on occasions a Nazi (see previous chapter). Furthermore, the pan-Arab nationalism that the nationalisation provoked, according to \textit{The Economist} (2006), may have completed the transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute into an Israeli-Arab one, effectively, widening Israel’s circle of potential enemies, and by default perpetuating the image of Israeli-Jewish vulnerability.

Promoting the war as an existential threat to Israel also triggered an unprecedented wave of solidarity by American Jews. Before 1967, those Jews did not identify passionately with Israel or Zionism. The \textit{Shoah} was not seen as a primary subject of many large-scale Jewish American organisations nor a core element in American Jewish identity (Navon 2015). The 1967 crisis changed that. American Jews responded with fundraising, activism, volunteering and general interest and support on a whole unprecedented scale (Navon 2016). The \textit{Shoah} reverberations that the war trigged ignited a value in Jewishness amongst the majority of Jewish Americans. As a young man, Alan Dershowitz remembers the Six-Day War as a factor that made Jewishness his most important value. He mentions the fear of another \textit{Shoah} as a determining factor. In \textit{the Case for Israel} (2003), he implies that the perceived Arab invasion was intended to finish what \textit{Shoah} had not fully achieved. “Israel defended itself against a genocide war of extermination,” Dershowitz writes (p.74).

\(^{42}\) For more information see: BBC On This Day, \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/26/newsid_2701000/2701603.stm}
After the war, the lesson for many American Jews was that Israel is existentially endangered and the world would not intervene to save the Jews — yet again (Weiss 2017b). Nowadays, many of them embrace the Zionist worldview where anti-Semitism, which culminated in the Shoah, observes Finkelstein (1997), both justified the necessity of Israel and accounted for all hostility directed at it: the Jewish State was the only safeguard against the next outbreak of homicidal anti-Semitism and, conversely, homicidal anti-Semitism was behind every attack on, or even defensive manoeuvre against, the Jewish State.

The Six-Day War as Perception

Depicting Israel as being ‘vastly outnumbered’ and existentially threatened by Arab troops amassed and ready to attack made the preemptive attack not only justified but also righteous and legitimate (Nikles 2013). This has been the official narrative not only of the state but also in scholarship and cultural texts and artefacts. Consider the IDF-commissioned film Sheshet ha-Yamim (the Six Days) (1968), which was made to celebrate Israel’s victory in 1967. In his critique of the film, Ben-David (2009) observes that the film is by definition propaganda, but such films should not be seen as merely providing insight into the state’s ideology, but also as a reflection of the general mode and experience in society. Sheshet ha-Yamim tells us that Israel attacked because Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran, expelled the UN observers from the demilitarised zone, and advanced forces into Sinai. Israel’s victory, we are told, was because the IDF fought fearlessly, motivated by a sense of mission and willingness for self-sacrifice, understanding that “there was no choice.” Using footage, images, and commentaries, Israel in the film is depicted as helpless, vulnerable, and at the risk of annihilation. To enhance this sense, the narrator also repeatedly brings up the Arab-Nazi links, Arab anti-Semitism, and the Shoah (see previous chapters: Nazi Arabs). The continuum of suffering in the film is clear, unreservedly linking Jewish collective memory with the current situation.
Similarly, an audio documentary written and narrated by IDF general (and later Israel’s sixth president) Chaim Herzog (1968) opens up with the following: “For twenty years, the intransigence of the Arab leadership had fomented blind hate on the part of the Arab World toward Israel, a hate which called for the destruction of Israel and the annihilation of its inhabitant.” Before learning how the events of the War unfolded, the listener is given a strong indication of Israel’s war as a fight for survival. Throughout, the Arab ‘hatred’ of Israel is hardly elaborated on as a political issue. The impression is that the newly established state is hated and this is how Jewish history has always worked, a situation which Sherman (2014) cynically but in a rather self-lamenting fashion called the ‘mortal sin of existence.’

To this day, this narrative continues almost unchallenged, not least in media and many scholarly works. In 2017, on the 50th anniversary of the War, the New York Times (Fisher 2017) gave this description: “This year marks half a century since the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, in which Israel defied annihilation by its Arab neighbours.” This is the official story adopted by AIPAC, and the version of history that Michael Oren (2003) in the Six Days of War and Alan Dershowitz (2003) in The Case for Israel militantly defended, as well as the same line of narrative Shavit (2014) promoted in My Promised Land.

Recently, however, several scholars began to challenge this narrative (e.g. Finkelstein 2003; Kurtulus 2007; Aaron 2007). Kurtulus (2007) argued that evidence shows that despite the rough strategic parity between Israel and the Arab states in the mid-1960s, the latter’s quantitative superiority was compensated for by Israel’s qualitative superiority in the form of modern fighter and attack planes, which were on high alert long before the war. The Israeli offensive weapons, like fighters and ground attack-aircrafts, were not vulnerable to an eventual attack by the neighbouring Arab states. Israeli airspace was also generally impenetrable for the mostly Soviet-made Arab aircrafts. By contrast, by December 1966, Israeli jet-fighters were penetrating Egyptian airspace up to the Suez Canal on daily basis and even had flown over Cairo on several occasions (ibid.).
Finkelstein (2003) argues, contrary to the common belief, Israel prior to the War was not passive. She repeatedly and often disproportionately attacked Arab neighbours. One year before the War, for instance, Israel carried out a comprehensive attack — perhaps the largest since the Suez invasion in 1956 — on the West Bank town of Samu’a, killing 18 Jordanian soldiers and destroying over one-hundred homes. Some reports even discussed a decade-long Israeli plan to attack Egypt. A 2017 Israeli Channel 10 report by Alon Ben David which included interviews with pilots who participated in the War, and based on newly released military documents, revealed that between 1956 and 1967 the IAF pilots trained intensively on low-altitude and silent flying. The goal from day one was to cripple mainly Egypt’s potential to present any threat to Israel.

Aaron (2007) shows in his painstakingly researched book, *The Six Day War*, that Israel’s intelligence, with the help of the CIA and British intelligence, knew that the Arab nations were not militarily on par with Israel and the Arab anti-Israel rhetorics were merely an exaggerated bluster. The Mossad had high-level spies operating inside Cairo and Damascus and possessed an excellent knowledge of what was going on on the other side of the border. Avi (2012) shows that the army generals and many of the decision makers did not feel that there was an existential danger to Israel, although they feared a high number of casualties if war broke out.

Despite the clashes of narratives between those who believe Israel fought a war for survival and those who refute that claim, the facts remain that striking first gave Israel ‘a wide leeway’ (Kretzmer 2013b). It gave her the advantage of controlling the place and time of battle and led to a sweeping victory which eventually provided the Jewish state with more land and the strategic depth she had long coveted. But the war also deepened the intractable conflict with the Arabs and Palestinians. The death anxiety related to an anticipated Shoah outweighed all other variables in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even though information showed that Egypt was not able or willing to attack Israel, Israel, possibly falling back on the Shoah memory, was not willing or able to gamble by living with the anxiety and fear of a future Arab attack no matter how minuscule it was.
The fact that she was militarily superior did very little to soothe the feelings of vulnerability. It seems that certain cognitive beliefs can become so reified, even in the face of conflicting information (Renshon 2007) — this is what Bar-Tal (2001) describes as ‘freezing of beliefs’ (see previous chapter).

These beliefs have dangerously armed hyper security (and its implementations) with a profound sense of legitimacy. Legitimacy is governed by perceptions and in Israel’s case, this is a very critical factor. Many of Israel’s military operations were criticised by the international community and more often than not were deemed illegal. Israel, like many states, is not particularly concerned with legality when forming policies (Mueller et al. 2007). The aim is often the formation of policies they believe will ensure the best interests of the state. Unlike most states, however, much of Israel’s sense of legitimacy regarding the country’s military and espionage activities was justified based on the historical events when the world stood silent when the Jews were led to their death. A clear implication of that has been Israel’s frequent suspension and violation of international norms.

When Israel bombed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear plant in 1981, for instance, Begin challenged the UN Security Council’s unanimous condemnation of the attack, saying: “There won’t be another Holocaust in history… never again, never again” (Shipler 1981). The attack would become known as the Begin Doctrine, one aimed at undermining any nuclear potentials of countries hostile to Israel. Examples of this worldview are found in numerous narrative textuality. Consider Raid on the Reactor (2006), a History Channel documentary directed by Steven Feld. It describes the attack on Iraq’s nuclear plant, aka Operation Opera, as the ‘mission that would determine the very fate of Israel.’ The documentary, like Begin, legitimises the attack through the Shoah narrative. In the documentary, IAF pilot Lt. General Shafir says: “many of us are grandsons and sons of people who’d been through the Holocaust…we’d been part of a mission to prevent another Holocaust” [02:31]. “I felt I was flying for my grandfather who died in a Concentration Camp” [25:33].
In a zero-sum thinking (Bar-Tal 2007, 2013), Begin probably saw the world as divided into two camps, good and evil, implying that as the primary victims of Nazi crimes, Israel was in the good camp and therefore her actions were justified on solid moral grounds. This would become a trend amongst almost all Israeli leader to see the world in absolute moral dichotomies, good and evil or right and wrong (Glad 1983). Like the Six-Day War, there was probably no or little evidence that Iraq was intending to attack Israel. Also like the Six-Day War, there was enough collective memory to make the perceptions about the Iraqi threat terribly real. Perhaps it was the fear of the possibility of Iraq’s having nuclear capabilities that triggered Israel’s fight-to-flight mode, and once again, Israel's fear had to be put under control by being acted out in the form of a preemptive strike. Today, this thinking paradigm seems to continue with Iran.

**The Iranian Threat**

In 2012, a survey revealed that 77% of Israeli-Jews believed that Iran represented an existential threat (Yair & Akbari 2014). At the time, Netanyahu said that Israel was not willing to accept “a world in which the Ayatollahs have atomic bombs” (Weinthal 2012). In 2015, the nuclear deal did very little to change this belief, “…even after the signing of the nuclear agreement, Iran has not relinquished its aspiration to obtain nuclear weapons,” stated Netanyahu (Ahren 2016). In 2017, as the Trump administration debated the nuclear deal, the reference to Iran’s as an existential threat became louder. The same year, the Education Minister Naftali Bennet described Iran as “…the number one existential threat to the state of Israel” (Kranish 2017). Israel fears a first strike should Iran acquires nuclear capabilities. Netanyahu also argued that even if Iran does not

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43 Under the statement of intent Iran will reduce its installed enrichment centrifuges from 19,000 to 6,000, only 5,000 of which will be spinning. All of them will be first-generation centrifuges: none of its more advanced models can be used for at least 10 years, and R&D into more efficient designs will have to be based on a plan submitted to the IAEA. The heavy-water reactor at Arak will be redesigned and its original core will be removed and destroyed. No other heavy-water reactor will be built for 15 years. [source: The Economist 2015]

**The Trump Administration on May 2018 withdrew from the deal, following the decision by an unprecedented tightening of the economic sanctions on the Islamic Republic [Aljazeera English, May 8 2018]. In a step unfamiliar in international relations, the Administration also declared the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation [Aljazeera English, April 8 2019]. As of the time of revising this chapter (July 2019), Iran has declared its intentions to abandon her obligations and gradually go back to enriching uranium if the sanctions have not been lifted [Aljazeera English, July 23 2019].**
bomb Tel Aviv, “Iran’s militant proxies would be able to fire rockets and engage in other terror activities while enjoying a nuclear umbrella” (Goldberg 2009).

Such security belief is almost a common denominator among all Israeli leaders, including the seemingly ‘dovish’ ones like Shimon Peres. Just one day before Israel’s general election, Peres ordered an attack on Lebanon.44 His military action was a bid to win more votes to become the Prime Minister (Fisk 2016). He did what Netanyahu had always done, winning Israeli-Jews through their fears and insecurities. Chances are, if he were the prime minister today, Peres’ position towards Iran would have been similar to Netanyahu’s. In fact, both the Peres and Netanyahu governments threatened Iran with preemptive attack in the mid 1990s (Porter 2015). One can only speculate that because Peres’ government was short-lived, Iran did not become one of his known benchmarks. Answering the questions about the lessons he learned from the Jewish history, Goldberg in 2009 quotes Peres saying that: “If we have to make a mistake of overreaction or under-reaction, I think I prefer the overreaction.” Similarly, Ehud Barak, viewed as a moderate and a rationalist (Aronoff 2014) and who repeatedly warned against Netanyahu’s reckless conduct undermining Israel’s security (see: Barak 2016), pushed for a pre-emptive strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities when he served in the Netanyahu government (Caspit 2015; Linde 2016).

Undoubtedly, the statements by Iranian leaders to ‘wipe Israel off the map’ are troubling, but as it stands today, the likelihood of an Iranian attack is much more ambiguous and without empirical accuracy (Nili 2011). Iran will probably be happy in a world without Israel, but this sentiment does not reflect the Iranian intentions to actually ‘do it themselves’ (Slager 2012). The Iranian leadership may be theocratic, full of aggressive anti-Semitic rhetoric resembling that of Hitler’s Reich, as remarked by Peter Beinart (2015), but given their history and their long war with Iraq in the 1980s, they are certainly not psychopathic or suicidal

44 On April 18, 1996, the IDF shelled a UN compound in Qana, Lebanon, killing over 100 civilians and wounding hundreds more. Approximately 800 civilians had sought refuge in the compound while their villages became the stage of a conflict between the IDF and Hezbollah. The massacre was part of the IDF’s Operation “Grapes of Wrath,” intended to pressure the Lebanese government to disarm Hezbollah. During the operation, the IDF bombed, strafed and shelled small towns and villages in southern Lebanon, forcing approximately 400,000 civilians to flee their homes. [see: Armstrong 2016; Abu-Shaqra 2017]
(Fallows 2015). There is also the fact that Iran’s Jews are a prosperous community (Sengupta 2016). If Iran were similar to Nazi Germany, as once described by US presidential candidate Mike Huckabee (Heller 2015), they would have probably started with their own Jews.

Parsi (2017) claims that Israel’s allegations about Iran’s genocidal intent only began more than a decade after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. They occurred not due to change in Tehran’s rhetoric or views of Israel, but rather due to the change in the regional scene. The collapse of Iraq’s military power cleared the deck for Iran to be seen as an existential enemy. Similarly, Israeli Brigadier General Shlomo Brom stated, “Nothing special happened with Iran, but because Iraq was removed, Iran started to play a greater role in the threat perception of Israel” (ibid., p.27).

Cynically, in the post-Arab Spring it is becoming clear that Iran is more occupied with the Arabs than it is with Israel. Iranian intellectual, Sadiq Zeiba, attributes what he calls ‘Persian sense of supremacy’ and ‘hatred’ towards the Arabs to the 14-century-old trauma of the Persian defeat by the Arabs at Al-Qadisiyya in 636AD (Al-Zahed 2011). Iranians do not have a ‘chosen trauma’ (see: Volkan 2001, 2004, 2006) against the Jews, but against the Arabs, especially the Sunni Muslims amongst them. It may be even more intolerable for the Arabs especially in the Gulf — none of which with nuclear capabilities — to have a nuclear-armed Iran than it is for Israel. Iran repeatedly threatened Arab countries as it did Israel. After Saudi Arabia had initiated military actions in Yemen in April 2015, Iranian General Fairuz Abadi threatened to “wipe the Kingdom out of existence” (Sputnik Arabic 2016). A sentiment reminiscent of Ahmadinejad’s threats to ‘wipe Israel off the map’ (Charbonneau 2012).

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45 Al-Qadisiyya was a decisive battle between the Arab Muslim army and the Sassanid Persian army during the first period of Muslim expansion. The Arab army, although smaller, prevailed.
The Iranian Threat as Perception

*The Atlantic’s own* Jeffrey Goldberg (2015a) said: “If, in the post-Shoah world, a group of people express a desire to hurt Jews, it is, for safety’s sake, best to believe them.” Goldberg is probably building on the idea that collective memory is an intrinsic signifier in Israel’s security reasoning, and this might blur the difference between threat as a perception and as a true geo-political possibility. Either way, the fear is real. Fear and anxiety are normal adaptive reactions to threatening situations, and identifications of these situations (or stimuli) activates cognitive, psychological, and behavioural processes that foster survival (Bar-Tal 2001; Halperin *et al.* 2001; Dibbets *et al.* 2015). However, when collective memory becomes a critical part in the identification of threat cues, these processes become over-activated and no longer adaptive (Dibbets *et al.* 2015). Subsequently, as highly anxious individuals, many Israeli-Jews — leaders included — grow ever more inclined to selectively search for and absorb information that confirms the validity of their fears about Iran and ignore the information that does not (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001; 2013).

This results in reinforcement and maintenance of the fear orientations (ibid.), substantiating the feelings of collective victimhood and further validating experience as a reliable memory agent. Netanyahu probably needs/ed the anti-Semites in Tehran in order to justify and rationalise Israel’s fear and to consolidate her own positive image and moral superiority. With such thinking, many Israeli-Jews may fail to see that the enemy is perhaps ‘like us,’ and not necessarily ‘pure evil’ hellbent on annihilating the Jewish State. Iran is maybe provocative and militarily threatening, but she is also, perhaps, a needed ‘new enemy’ that may keep Israeli-Jewish views of a hostile, Amalek-ruled world intact. After all, the views of Israel as a vulnerable oasis surrounded by enemies long preceded the emergence of Iran as an existential threat. Up until late 1980s, Israel saw in Iran a potential future ally against the Arab World. It was Rabin in 1993 who broke away from this view and began the construction of Iran as a threat (Porter 2015). After Rabin, the Netanyahu government did not feel that Iran represented an existential threat. Uzi Arad, then the head of the Mossad, advised Netanyahu that Iran’s missile programme was never directed at Israel but had emerged in the
crucible of the war with Iraq (ibid.). In retrospect, the security needs at the time were different, and Israel was more engaged with her traditional enemies. As those threats receded, Israel required a new enemy. Iran basically replaced Iraq as Iraq replaced Egypt a decade earlier. In Israel’s ethnically divided society, the need for an enemy outside of one's group also helps create internal cohesion (Moses 1995). This cohesion is proportionate to the threat; the more security is challenged by the out-group, the more society becomes internally united (Landau et al. 2012; also see: Bar-Tal 2001, 2007, 2013). Volkan (1995, p.243) explains: “…As long as the enemy group is kept at least at a psychological distance, it gives us aid and comfort, enhancing our cohesion and making comparisons with ourselves gratifying.”

In sum, investing militarily and logistically in the Iran problem may be a sound preventative security measure, but banking on collective memory as the major tangible evidence to explain Iran’s behaviours may not be a wise course of action. Given Israel’s history — this often led to further escalation and paradoxically compromised the very purpose of ‘security’ that the Jewish state claims to have been seeking. It repeatedly reproduced a psychology characterised by hyper-vigilance of the haunted (Dowty 1999). The next section discusses how Israel’s perception of security is not only limited to inter-state disputes, but also came to define the very concept of terrorism.

HYPER SECURITY AND THE WAR ON TERROR

Terrorism and Security

Since her inception, Israel dealt with a large number of Palestinian attacks, from the cross-border Fedayeen raids to the suicide bombings in the post-Oslo era and during the second Intifada, and most recently, the rockets from the Gaza Strip. The common belief now is that those attacks, especially the suicide attacks, were a factor in tightening Israel’s security policies and turning them into winning cards in Israel’s general elections (see: Bar-Tal 2001, 2017). It was suggested that the suicide attacks in the early 1990s, for example,
were behind Netanyahu’s victory in the 1996 general election. The same reason contributed in the beginning of the second Intifada to the election of Ariel Sharon (Newman 1997; Del Sarto 2006). In the latest 2018 general election, security concerns over Iran, Syria and the growing Palestinian military strength in Gaza kept Netanyahu in power, hence becoming the longest serving prime minister in Israel’s history (Keinon 2019). Netanyahu, like all Israeli PMs, knew that Israel would ultimately vote on security (Pollard 2015). His political campaign reflected specifically that. He marketed himself as protector of Israel’s security, which he declared, goes beyond politics in the midst of the battle of Israel’s survival (Kershner 2018). The corruption charges against him and his family did not seem to sway many voters away from him (Maan News, March 2019).

The final analysis for many Israeli-Jews was that Palestinian ‘terror’, especially suicide attacks, had killed the peace process and continues to represent a serious threat to the state of Israel. Another dimension to that is that not only did those attack deepen the sense of insecurity, but also violated the Israeli-Jewish ethos about peace. Ethos about peace serves to maintain the in-group’s positive self-image, the justness of their goals, and proves their status as the victims in the conflict (Bar-Tal 2000, 2007, 2013). The loss of peace — usually promoted as being the ultimate Jewish objective — is multi-levelled and far-reaching and therefore existential. It proves that the Palestinians are not interested in settlement and the societal beliefs over their ‘sinister intentions’ become a nonnegotiable fact. Any ‘concessions,’ in this light, are viewed as an extreme risk, probably bordering on the existential (Schulz 2004).

From this angle, Israeli-Jews do not differ from other peoples in voting for security when the personal and collective wellbeing is perceived at risk. In this context, Netanyahu, described by the Jerusalem Post as ‘Mr. Security’ (Hoffman 2017) — or any other Israeli PM — is not very different from America’s Trump or Egypt’s Sisi in the way they employed fear for political purposes. Also from this angle, Israel’s counter-terrorism approach may not appear different from most of other sovereign states. Like other states, Israel utilises her epistemological power to freely distinguish between state violence, calling it ‘security’ or
preserving the status quo, and that of the non-state actors, often unequal in power and influence (Gordon 1999).

Terrorism as Perception

Unlike most sovereign states, however, Israel's views of terrorism do not start and end with the traditional geo-political assessment. The ghetto mentality that characterises hyper security also determines how Israel interprets Palestinian dissidence. When the Yishuv planted the seeds of modern Israel's hyper security, they also planted an equally hyper definition to the acts of violence directed at them from the local population. In Traces of Racial Exception (2018), Lentin defines Israeli settler-colonialism as a combination of white supremacy (typical of European colonialism) and Jewish supremacy. It is different from European colonialism only in terms of not involving a ‘mother-country’ to go back to, but rather a more deadly notion of a ‘mother-country’ to create and settle in. Lentin's thesis, it may be suggested, helps explain some of the roots of modern Israel's understanding of terrorism.

First, the white supremacist worldview allowed Zionism to see the native resistance to Jewish emigration almost in the same fashion as European settlers saw Native Americans. Historian Peter Silver (in: Lender 2016, p.109) explained how the attacks by native Americans on settler communities imbued them with a sense of victimhood and resentments against the indigenous population. That matured into aggressive measures and eventually into a racist conception of the native Americans as subhumans. To the Zionist settlers, Palestinian opposition was not legitimate not least because Palestinians were seen in Orientalist terms, lacking sufficient mental and political capacity to be more deserving of the land than the more advanced, educated, and, above all, victimised European Jews.

Second, unlike conventional colonialism, the ‘mother-country to create and settle in’ induced in the settlers a profound sense of legitimacy. The Yishuwists saw their emigration to Palestine as a return to their ancestral
land and therefore a legitimate right. This belief is not confined to historical Palestine, but increasingly becoming about the lands occupied in 1967 as well. A recent survey by the Peace Index, published by The Israeli Democracy Institute (2017; Maltz 2017) found that close to 62% of Israeli-Jews are either “sure” or “think” that Israel’s control of the West Bank should not be described as ‘occupation.’ Opposition to that right was perhaps viewed as an attack on Jews qua Jews. The Tishuv collective memory of European anti-Semitism coupled with the Biblical zachor made them hyper sensitive to any form of opposition. It was perceived as a violation to their right to be safe, ironically, in a situation that they themselves instigated (see previous section: settlers’ insecurity).

Today, the phrase ‘Palestinian terrorism’ conjures up most Palestinian dissidence, violent or otherwise. The difference now, however, is that Israel can ‘legally’ define terrorism and the identity of those who qualify as terrorists, which for the simple reason of being against the occupation, most Palestinians may be perceived as potential ‘terrorists.’ Amongst many Israeli-Jews this idea is very salient, the word mechabel (Hebrew for ‘terrorist,’ literally: saboteur) has become almost synonymous to the word Palestinian or Arab. In *The General’s Son* (2016, p. 70), Mike Peled explains that “…like most Israelis, [he] learned the term Fedayeen, infiltrators and terrorists long before [he] knew they were Palestinians.” In his memoirs *The Girl who Stole my Holocaust* (2010), Chayut reflects that he and his fellow soldiers all though that the word ‘Shaheed’ (martyr) — referring to Ramallah’s Shaheed Street where their armoured vehicles stationed — meant ‘terrorist.’ In their mind, a killed Palestinian possibly meant he/she was a ‘terrorist.’ I call this phenomenon ‘the mechabel narrative.’

In the Israeli documentary *The Gatekeepers* (2012), the mechabel narrative seems to steer the dialogue. In the film, six Shabak former directors come together to speak about their experience fighting Palestinian ‘terror.’ The film has been cheered for being brutally honest. The interviewees, each in his own way, criticised the morality, tactics, and lack of strategy of the Shabak operations. Some bluntly noted that the Palestinian issue eventually became a security issue. Bendor (Shabak director 1981-86) [12:50], for instance, said that as Palestinian ‘terrorism’ increased, “… [we] eventually forgot about the Palestinian problem.” The film,
however, hardly highlights the narrative behind the Shabak practices. Rather, in its own way, it seems to substantiate the mechabel narrative.

The first thing to notice is the ease with which the term mechabel is used. Granted the film does not seek to provide epistemological explanations to terrorism, but like other forms of narrative textuality, it provides an insight into the general mode and experience of society. The film uses footage and images to add dramatic effects to the speakers’ words. We mostly see random footage/images of seemingly primitive Palestinians in rundown towns and villages, young men staring confusingly or angrily at the camera, or being inspected or escorted blind-folded by the IDF. Regardless of what is being said, The visual representations substantiate the mechabel narrative, not least in the manner of emphasising the parity between Israel, civilised and defensive, and the Palestinians, backward and mindlessly violent.

In the film, the Shabak former directors grapple with the moral implications of their actions and admit that their security tactics proved to be a strategic failure (also see: Bergman 2018). The concerns, however, are expressed post factum, after the situation was over. This sterilises the criticism, makes it seem obsolete and irrelevant, and prevents any application of critical insights to other problematic situations (Benziman 2013) which Israel’s idea of security has created. Here also, not only does the mechabel narrative create disassociation and separation between the Shabak directors and their actions, it also legitimises their actions before the Israeli-Jewish public, whose majority sees in Palestinians nothing but potential mechabelim (terrorists).

On a personal note, this narrative, I noticed, was always present in all the discussions I had with Israeli-Jews — most of whom were highly educated. At the JIPSC in 2015, mechabel and other related words were thrown around nonchalantly by the Israeli-Jewish participants to describe any Palestinian actions they disapproved of. As far as I remember, it was perhaps one of the most frustrating parts in the discussion. The mechabel

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46 Ronen Bergman explores in his book *Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations*, how Israel security apparatus has been extremely effective at picking up Israel’s enemies. What initially started as tactical success, however, eventually become a strategic failure. As an example, Bergman shows how Israel’s assassination of Hamas’ spiritual leader sheikh Ahmed Yassin did in fact strengthen the links between the Palestinian movement and Iran.
narrative was so intense, in fact, it both angered and frustrated the Palestinian participants. Cynically, I wondered if they saw us anything other than a pair of eyes peeking through a mask and brandishing an AK-47, like we saw them as nothing but an oppressive military figures. To many of us, especially as for some it was the first face-to-face discussion with ‘the enemy,’ it felt like a level of entitlement we never experienced before. There was also the occasional patronising tone by some of the Jewish participants, which we saw as their inability to transcend the power relations. At times, as one of the Jewish participants raised his voice, I could not help but see in him an image of a soldier at a checkpoint shouting orders. Maybe it was not his intention, maybe it is our hyper sensitivity to such power relations. In hindsight, perhaps a built-in sense of power superiority was what made the accusations of ‘terrorism’ a sufficiently believable narrative on their part. This may explain why officially the concept of self-defence against ‘terrorism,’ Del Sarto (2006) maintains, is used unreservedly against the very people Israel controls. Bishara (2017) argues that by enthusiastically bludgeoning her enemies with the label of “terrorism,” Israel hopes to obscure its true role as an occupying power, supporting the division of the world into “terrorist” and “anti-terrorist” camps.

It may be further argued that Israel’s security bodies may have been handling modern threats with the same ‘vigilance of the haunted’ mentality (Dowty 1999) that prevailed amongst the Yishuvists. With such mentality, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict became part of the history of Jewish suffering (see previous chapter). Ochs (2006) describes this as ‘allusive victimhood’ that deflects the culpability and context of the present, attributing it to experiences and legacies of the past.” Palestinian dissidence, in other words, was detached from the occupier-occupied causality and historical context, redefining any rejection of the occupier’s policies as an act of terror. Deploying the Yamam, one of Israel’s elite counter-terrorism units, to suppress peaceful Palestinian protests in Jerusalem recently (Karram 2017), is just one example of how Israel perceives Palestinian dissidence. For Israel, “…it is not the occupation that creates terror but terror that prolongs the occupation,” explains Halevi (2018, p.14). Finkelstein (2005) notes that this rationale dictates that resolving

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47 After two IDF soldiers had been killed inside the Old City of Jerusalem, Israel installed electronic gates at the entrances of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. The Israeli measures enraged Palestinian Muslims and Christians who refused to pass through these gates for nearly two weeks and instead prayed outside as a form of protest. The situation escalated to clashes with the Israeli police. Due to protests and international pressure, the gates were removed.
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict begins by ending the Arab ‘irrational hostility’ towards the Jews, not by ending the occupation that caused the hostility in the first place.

Moreover, because Israel’s perception of Palestinian dissidence ignores the power relations, it sometimes leads to narratives of ‘equal accountability’ which in turn leads to narratives of ‘equal justice’ between the occupier and the occupied. Amos Oz, for instance, framed the conflict as “…a clash between total justice and total justice.” Oz presents himself as a voice of reason willing to look beyond the conflict stereotypes and aspires for Zionism and Palestinian nationalism to see the equal validity of their conflicting claims (Ramraz-Ra’ukh 1989). However, the claim for equal justices is problematic; its philosophical root has the connotation of a natural catastrophe (Khoury 2012). It also implies that Israeli-Jews and Palestinians should be held equally accountable in a largely asymmetrical conflict characterised by settler-colonial dimensions.

Relieving Israel of any type of accountability, Netanyahu in his book Durable Peace (2000) argues extensively against what he terms ‘the Palestinian Centrality.’ The general impression in his argument is that it is not Israel’s policies that ignite extremism and ‘terrorism,’ but rather the built-in internal and historical dynamics of the region. Some of Netanyahu’s argument is rooted in the belief that the disapproval of Israel’s policies stems from the hatred of Jews and Israel being the default mode in the region (see: Shapira 2006).

Likewise, Israel’s foreign ministry’s website (2002) describes the relationship between Palestinian ‘terrorism’ and the occupation as ‘historically flawed.’ It explains that ‘Arab’ and Palestinian terrorism existed long before the Six-Day War when Israel ‘took control’ of Gaza and the West Bank. The website also mentions that “…deplorable violence can be traced back to the beginning of the renewed Jewish settlement of the Land of Israel over a century ago.” As it stands, this is the narrative that characterised the pre-state Yishuv and by definition the state of Israel today. That is to say, colonising Palestine was a reconquest of Eretz Israel and therefore Palestinian opposition, even in response to repressive policies, is irrelevant in the grand scheme of Jewish right to be free from anti-Semitism and victimhood. With Jewish collective memory in mind,
Palestinian opposition is also a violation to the Jewish right to exist — thus nothing but irrational anti-Semitism.

The Israeli foreign ministry applied this argument almost to all of Israel’s encounters with the Palestinians, especially during Israel’s three Gaza onslaughts between 2009 and 2014. During Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012, the ministry (2012) repeatedly emphasised the concept of self-defence against ‘Palestinian terrorist organisations.’ During Operation Protective Edge in 2014, self-defence was invoked on every occasions, in most cases over the footage of dead Palestinian civilians and flattened neighbourhoods. At the height of the onslaught, the Jerusalem Post (Rosen 2014) claimed that Hamas’s Charter, public statements and actions all provide a textbook case for self-defence, implying a war with existential dimensions. The JP does not explain how Hamas in reality could jeopardise Israel’s existence. The newspaper, nevertheless, exhibits a classic case in the Israeli-Jewish thinking where the difference between a mere rhetoric against Israel and actually having the ability to ‘destroy the Jewish State and its people’ is fuzzy (see previous section: Israel’s position toward Iran). In the most recent major confrontations in November 2018, Israel bombed the Hamas-affiliated Al-Aqsa TV station on charges of ‘terrorist incitement.’ Four months later Netanyahu declared the same station a ‘terrorist organisation’ (Maan News, March 2019). It is not clear how or on what basis a media institution can be a ‘terrorist organisation’ nor what kind of security measures, after the stations had been bombed repeatedly, can be taken against it. Described by Palestinians as ‘a joke,’ the decision, for the reasons explained above, is part of the same mechabel narrative that allows any Palestinian act of dissidence to be readily labelled a terrorist act.

Additionally, the mechabel narrative has grown so rooted in the Israeli-Jewish psyche that it removed the once existed yet subtly admitted difference between the acts of dissidence inside the OT and those inside Israel. To many in Israel, Palestinian attacks on settlers or military personnel inside the OT are no longer seen different from a suicide attack in a café in Tel-Aviv. They are both attacks on Jewish legitimacy and both should be met with harsh measures. Consider, for instance, a recent survey published by the Israeli Peace Index (Ya’ar &
Hermann (2017) which showed that 70% of the Jewish public supported the death penalty to Palestinian ‘terrorists’ involved in the death of civilians. This may be fathomable in a conflict situation, but the survey also showed that a majority of 66% supported the penalty against Palestinians accused of killing soldiers. It basically says that Israeli-Jews perceive any Palestinian act of resistance even if fully protected by international law as a criminal act, one that deserves the death penalty.

It may also be suggested that Palestinian dissidence — like the Iranian threat — may have been the answer, the justification many Israeli-Jews wanted in order to rationalise and validate what otherwise be considered an unbearable existential fear. To blame own insecurity on the others may provide Israeli-Jews with a needed relief that distrusting the peace process, at least as a tangible and realistic possibility, is not only justified but rather the natural thing to do given Israel’s exceptional place amongst the nations. It is what Cohen (2009) refers to as the ‘the perpetual state of exceptionalism’ whose source resides in what he terms, ‘the annihilation psychosis.’ Ochs (2006) shows how during the course of the Second Intifada which in the early years witnessed a high number of suicide bombings, Israeli-Jews gave meaning to their experience through the allusive memories of the Shoah. Generally, for many Israeli-Jews, there is a little need to embrace new security measures, less strict or less hyper, since in effect the old threat of annihilation has merely shape-shifted, regardless of whether this new threat is tangibly superior, equal or inferior. To embrace the Shoah as a source memory, or a ‘chosen trauma’ (see: e.g. Volkan 2001, 2004, 2006) makes all the events from different time periods and regimes mesh together into a single menace of politicide (Nili 2011).

**HYPER SECURITY AND PATRIOTISM**

Fear is important not only because it steers many of Israel’s belligerent policies, but also because it carries with it an enormous sense of urgency that often redefines community’s sense of belonging and one’s identification with own country.
In one of his early works Bar-Tal (1993; also see: Bar-Tal & Staub 1997) describes patriotism as a cognitive-motivational response reflected in beliefs and emotions. It gives meaning to the group membership, belonging and identification in the society in which they reside. In his more recent socio-psychological framework (2007, 2013), Bar-Tal places patriotism as one of the eight themes of societal beliefs that comprise the conflict ethos. He mainly links patriotism to the societal beliefs about solidarity and unity, assigning a positive value to patriotic feelings. In his discussion of fear and hope (2001), Bar-Tal highlights the proportionate relationship between patriotism and threat; explaining that when a conflict escalates so do patriotic feelings. In 2009, for instance, a survey conducted by the University of Tel-Aviv few days after the first Gaza onslaught showed that 88% of Israeli-Jews considered themselves patriotic and proud to be Israeli (Ynet News 2009). In its fundamental form patriotism is genuine; it is about the attachment to a certain geographical place and the provision of a basic foundation for the nation’s life (ibid.; Bar-Tal & Staub 1997). This attachment, which reflects motivational forces and is associated with positive evaluation and emotion, is expressed in beliefs connoting contents of love, loyalty, pride or care (Bar-Tal 1993, p. 48).

Bar-Tal (1993) however warns that patriotism may bring about negative consequences if certain contents are added to it. It maybe suggested, accordingly, that while it shares the general positive features of other forms of patriotism, the negative content of Israel’s patriotism lies in its being tightly tied to hyper security. Drawing heavily from the collective memory of victimisation, hyper security created a situation where the fear orientations became mixed with the positive patriotic feelings. This has resulted in fear — as the stronger emotion in the mix — becoming a constant factor in how Israeli-Jews relate to Israel as a home. Fear, in other words, came to define the notion of ‘Israeli patriotism.’ Arad & Alon (2006) argue, Israeli-Jews have grown to base much of their emotional attachment to the country, or at least the idea of a Jewish homeland, on the grounds of perceived threat.

The above may also be attributed to the tendency of many Jews to identify Zionism with patriotism. This means that nationalism and patriotism, the ideological worldview of one’s country and the love for that
country, are perceived as one. In identifying with the Zionist narratives where Jews are perceived as dwelling alone and fighting enormous odds, it is likely that the average Israeli-Jew would not separate the love of the country from perceiving it under threat. The commitment to the Zionist ideals, Israeli professor of business Bernard Avishai explains, produces a feeling of attachment to the land just enough to render most Israeli-Jews oblivious to the fact that someone else has been living on the land for the last 1500 years (Morgan 2017). This is a type of patriotism that feeds from an ideological siege mentality and causes society to remain on a constant high alert (see: Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992a/b; Bar-Tal 2007). It leads to hyper mobilisation, one that would facilitate the collective’s support for a possible preemptive strike against Iran and further substantiates the mechabel narrative as an integral part of the conflict ethos.

CONCLUSION

Bar-Tal (2001) hypothesised that fear represented Israel’s most dominant emotional orientation. Building on this notion, this chapter explained that mainly because of the collective memory of victimisation and based on the current conflict, fear contributed significantly to Israel’s perception, design, and implementation of security. Its outcome mostly manifested in the country’s preemptive attacks, understanding of terrorism, and definition of patriotism. Despite the changes in regional security, many Israeli-Jews still persist in maintaining that Israel’s security environment is not malleable — that the regional hostility is so pervasive and extreme as to preclude any ability to materially alter the nation’s circumstances through either military or diplomatic means (Nili 2011). This resulted in the production of societal beliefs regarding the country’s boundless right of self-defence, relying primarily on the notion of legitimacy rather than legality. This legitimacy springs from personal and subjective worldviews almost unique to the Jewish experience, ones that only a small minority in the international community seem to share. In 2004, for example, Israel invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter to justify the segregation wall as a legitimate form of self-defence. The International Court of Justice dismissed the argument as it ‘had no relevance’ in an occupier-occupied situation (Leas 2012). Israel took the verdict as yet another sign of the UN animosity to her right to exist.
Because of the fear of another Shoah; that is, the fear of being victimised again, Israel’s security has become as hyper and intense as the collective memory that has formed the grounds for it. A fight-or-flight mode emerged that endowed Israel with the perception of a right to preemptively attack Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 1967 and invade Lebanon in 1982. It was a critical part in the legitimisation of Jewish settlements and land confiscation, the annexation of the Golan Heights, the attack on Iraq’s reactor in 1981, and the bombing of Syria’s potential nuclear facility in 2007.\footnote{After nearly a decade of silence Israel admitted responsibility for the strike on a potential Syrian nuclear programme in 2007 [see: Ahronheim 2018; also see: Follath & Stark 2009; Makovsky 2012]} It also provided Israel with the moral and political grounding to consider launching a preemptive strike against Iran.

But because much of Israel’s security is influenced by the country’s collective emotional state, it did not provide the country with a sense of safety. Rather paradoxically, it created more insecurity and as a result more belligerence. The territorial expansions that resulted from the 67 War, the first Lebanon War, and the settlement activities did very little to cure Israel’s siege mentality. Only a few in Israel sobered up to this fact. Yosef Sider’s film Beaufort (2007), for instance, shows this predicament in a rather symbolic way. The film shows us the last days of the IDF’s Beaufort outpost in Southern Lebanon in early 2000. The soldiers are sleepless, anxious, and on high alert. The post looks like a concrete maze of underground corridors — claustrophobic and depressing. Because they cannot see the enemy, the soldiers do not understand what they are protecting or from whom. The Beaufort outpost reinforces the Israeli national and ideological order (Yosef 2011), and one of the film’s latent meanings is that Israel invaded Lebanon, as she did Egypt and Syria, to create a new security order there, but gradually found out that territorial expansion does not liberate one from the sense of siege. In many respects, Ben-David (2009) observes, the visual images in the film constitute a frightened and depressed version of the Masada myth.

The most controversial of all is that hyper security formalised the occupier as the victim in a severely asymmetrical conflict. Because of that, Israel perhaps felt justified — and motivated — to normalise most Palestinian acts of dissidence as mindless terrorism directed at Jews qua Jews. Palestinians in this context can
commit ‘diplomatic terror,’ like the PA joining UN bodies and treaties, ‘popular struggle terror,’ which includes all forms of physical resistance from rock throwing to armed attacks; ‘BDS terror,’ which seeks to pressure Israel’s to end the occupation; and then there’s ‘literary terror,’ writing about the Palestinian struggle is nothing but an attack on Jewish legitimacy (see: Bisharat 2019).

With such anxious mentality, every action usually triggers disproportionate reactions — Palestinian stone throwers are met with live bullets and rockets with air bombardment and collective punishment. Those reactions are rationalised on the ground of ‘teaching the enemy a lesson’ or ‘acting as a strong deterrent.’ This mentality has fuelled some of Israel’s most controversial security measures like the assassination policy, or what Israel calls ‘targeted killing.’ Assassinations were used extensively against Palestinian and non-Palestinian activists, militants, politicians, and intellectuals. Bergman (2018) maintains that Israel assassinated more people than any Western country since World War II. The Israeli intelligence agencies successfully eliminated a large number of the Palestinian key figures. The tactical successes, however, yielded much strategic failure (ibid.). The killings created more security challenges than it had resolved. They, among other things, showed that Israel’s hyper security was effective only momentarily. It also — repeatedly — showed that hyper security has been perhaps more concerned with overcoming the anxiety related to the fear of annihilation than the actual possibility of annihilation. Cohen (2015) explains that Israel’s actions have never been about security — at least not in the narrow sense of security from the local population and neighbouring states. The security that Israel has always been about is an existential security, a somatic conviction that if Jews do not control their own state, they will unfailingly face a new genocide. In this context, it is probably not far-fetched to visualise a group of Mossad agents taking an oath to ha-shoah l’olam lo ‘oud (the Shoah, never again!) before setting off on a mission. Their fear, anger, and vengeance are directed at what they see as a Nazi replacement, and in the absence of real Nazis, everyone else who presents a threat to the state of Israel may be seen as one (see previous chapter).

49 Notice how Bergman sees Israel as part of the Western world, despite the country’s continuous attempts to establish a native identity to itself in the region.
Importantly, hyper security is a reflection of how the combination of power and victimhood can be disruptive to settlement. Without understanding the intricacies of Israel's collective memory, it is frustrating, if not infuriating, perhaps for the majority of Palestinians that Israeli-Jews cannot see the contradictions in their worldview and practices. Photos that recently emerged on social media give a glimpse of such contradictions.

In the photos (fig 1.3) appear a group of IDF soldiers standing solemnly as the sirens of *yom ha-shoah* (Holocaust Remembrance Day) sounded. The soldiers were actually in the middle of demolishing Palestinian residential tents in Susiya, Hebron, but had to stop briefly to pay homage to the Shoah victims. When the sirens stopped, the troops resumed the demolition ([unknown author] May 2019). Responding to the photos, activists asked: do they [Israeli-Jews] see the irony? The answer to this question is not as straightforward or as simply incriminating as many of us would like it to be. In *After Israel* (2014), Svirsky raises similar concerns and rhetorically wondered, why despite all the incriminating archival evidence, statistical indicators and new understanding of power relations, the perpetrators’ minds still manage to accommodate every piece of information detailing their participation in the production of oppression? He speculates that even though some Israeli-Jews are concerned, society in general seems to have successfully inoculated itself against the moral and political reflection; thus owing its existence to Israel’s acts of oppression on the ground. Drawing from Bar-Tal’s thoughts on the freezing of beliefs (2001), it might be feasible to assume that people erect mental, emotional, and discursive walls to protect themselves from having to own up to their guilt and to live in peace with the misery they cause. As long as this belief system persists and the state of fear and with it the uncompromising state of militaristic security is maintained, and as long as the reliance on reductionist versions of history continues, only short-term sedatives to the present-day challenges will be the answer. The likely outcome is further intractability.

In the next chapter, continuing to draw on collective memory, ethos, and emotional orientations, the study argues that similar contradictions and controversies also plague the Palestinian narratives of victimhood, and they too contribute to the impasse in peacemaking.
CHAPTER SEVEN

VICTIMHOOD IN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT:

The Case of Palestine in Relation to Collective Memory, Conflict Ethos, and Collective Emotional Orientations
OVERVIEW

Israel’s victimhood was discussed over the past two chapters. The first chapter focused on Israel’s collective memory and conflict ethos, and then on some of the emotional manifestations of that collective memory. The next one expanded the discussion on emotional orientations, focusing on fear as a primary dynamic in Israel’s security policies. In this chapter the focus shifts to Palestinian victimhood but continues to be guided by Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological infrastructure of collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations.

As an Israeli-Jew, Bar-Tal provides an excellent insight into Israel’s socio-psychological infrastructure(s). His closeness to the subject, however, means that his views, especially regarding the Palestinians, may be subject to the researcher positionality. This manifests in two ways: first, Bar-Tal seems to deal with both peoples’ victimhood narratives as equally valid despite the severe power asymmetry, which he admits exist but never discusses at length (see: Bar-Tal 2007, 2013, 2014; Bar-Tal et al. 2009b). Second, like most Israeli-Jewish scholars, he takes the question of Israel’s legitimacy in the wake of the 1948 war without much scrutiny. His interest in Palestinian narrative is largely confined to the post 1967 era.

Nevertheless, Bar-Tal’s framework remains robust, flexible and broad enough to provide the grounding for common understanding of Palestinian victimhood. The fact that the socio-psychological foundations are similar for both Israeli-Jews and Palestinians makes the framework implementation in some instances straightforward (Bar-Tal 2007, 2013). The chapter does not merely build on those similarities but also seek to discuss what makes Palestinian victimhood different. It focuses on the socio-psychological aspects specific to Palestinians such as memoricide, humiliation, and resistance.

The chapter starts off by discussing the Palestinian collective memory, arguing that while Israel's memory draws strength from the _Shoah_ and therefore the fear of genocide, Palestinian memory is largely centred on
the fear of memoricide (see: Pappé 2006). The continuous occupation makes the preservation of memory a daily existential struggle and accordingly a continuous source of victimisation. One result of that is the Palestinian tendency to put the Nakba against the Shoah in order to discredit Israel’s narratives and emphasise Palestinian victimhood. Next, the chapter turns to the dominant emotional orientations amongst Palestinians. While fear is the dominant emotion in Israel (see: Bar-Tal 2001), humiliation is what most defines Palestinians’ emotional state. The discussion of humiliation leads to the discussion of Israel’s comprehensive occupation and the resulting Palestinian societal beliefs about self-esteem, dignity, honour, and revenge. Focusing on the conflict ethos next, it is argued that as Israeli-Jews coped with conflict with ethos about the Shoah and the development of hyper security measures, Palestinians responded to humiliation by focusing on the development and glorification of ethos about muqawama (resistance) and isteshhad (self-sacrifice). In conclusion, it is argued that some of the Palestinian victimhood manifestations may have contributed to the impasse in settlement.

Narrative sources in this chapter vary. A rather extensive source is scholarship. Having studied much of the scholarly literature, the theme of victimhood and its manifestations seem to have a major presence in that literature. Scholarship provides much of the conceptual, theoretical, philosophical, historical, and socio-political context/background to the studied phenomenon. Reading beyond the conceptual and theoretical, the content may also reveal the authors’ belief orientations and social context (e.g. Said 1992; Pappé 2006; Bar-Tal 2007; Halperin et al. 2010; Ra‘ad 2010; Toukan 2013; Jabr 2016). Cultural texts and artefacts, which media, arts, signs and symbols deliver can perhaps tell us more about society than trying to analyse what we think reality is conceptually or theoretically (Benziman 2011). News articles, opinions, commentaries, and statements, for instance, mark certain events and highlight the modes/experiences in the Palestinian society (e.g. Fayyad 2011; Wadia 2017; Yediouth Ahronoth 2018). Novels, art, short stories, poetry, and memoirs convey the intimate aspects of the Palestinian experience of victimhood (e.g. Kanafani 1969; Darwish 1973; Khoury 1998; Al-Asadi 1999; Amiry 2005; Natour 2009; Haddad 2019). By looking at its latent meaning units, Kanafani’s Men in the Sun (1963), for example, reveals the emotional orientations of shame and
humiliation and the sense of disorientation that dominated the Nakba generation. Khoury’s *Bab al Sham* (1998) captures such dynamic through critiquing the concepts of heroism. Visual media in the form of films, such as *Paradise Now* (2009) and *Omar* (2010) convey the Palestinian experience of humiliation, pursuit of masculinity and reveal the complexities and contradictions of the Palestinian ethos about *muqawama*. Reflexivity — in the form of personal stories (deployed using the auto-ethnographic ‘I’ or through the collective ‘we’) — is used as a supplementary narrative source that further communicates the Palestinian experience/story. In addition to the latent content, reflexivity functions as another analytical tool.

**COLLECTIVE MEMORY**

*My Grandfather’s Village*

Cutting through Israel bound for to the West Bank. My grandfather, Israel’s safe choice as the ‘trip chaperone,’ asked the Palestinian driver to stop near my grandfather’s old village which happened to be on the way. Excited, I joined in the request and immediately began to summon all the magical stories of that paradise village. In the middle of nowhere, surrounded by open fields, the driver hesitantly pulled over and my grandfather immediately disembarked and walked into a nearby field. All I can see was old ruins, random lines of cacti, sporadic citrus and olive trees, and an out-of-place power transformer. Dragging me deeper into the field and looking increasingly disorientated, my grandfather asked if I could help find his father’s grave and the ruins of his old house. As time passed fruitlessly, frustrated and seemingly tired, my grandfather collapsed on a small rock and began to weep. Uncomfortable and unsure what to do, I convinced him to halt the search. Then, strangely feeling like intruders, we rushed back to the taxi before the Israeli authorities arrived.

Where I grew up men are taught not to cry: it is unmasculine, a weakness and, above all, one is always reminded, “fighters do not cry.” But when they do, my grandfather would tell us, it is because ‘the weight on
one’s shoulders was heavier than mountains.’ It would take me a few years to feel the weight of those proverbial mountains. I often wondered how harrowing it must have been for my grandfather to wait and wait only to discover that there is no longer a door to the old key that he had anxiously guarded for decades. 

Up until his death, my grandfather continued to speak of that paradise village, of his Palestine. As if what he saw on that summer day was only a fleeting thought. His memories were perhaps more real than the physical ruins of what used to be his village.

My grandfather was not unique in his sentiment, he, as Ghalayini says (2019), was like every other Palestinian: a nomad travelling across a landscape of memory. Like all others, his memory was premised on three main motifs: praise of the lost, lamentation of the present, and depiction of an imagined return (Matar 2010). He carried his village in his heart, like an internal compass where ‘north’ is always Palestine (Ghalayini 2019). Lamenting our lives today, he wanted us to pass down the compass and continue to be the memory nomads. Because if we did not, we would lose our most powerful proof of being. The longer we clung to the memory the closer we felt we become to the day of return. As if memory was a purpose in itself, as Kanafani 50(1981) said: “…even though we know tomorrow will be no better, we remain here on the shore eagerly awaiting the boat that will not come.” Same as my grandfather who chose to ignore the seemingly new power transformer and the Hebrew signs in and around his village, one must disregard that we have been mentally and physically erased and replaced. As though to force ourselves to feel that our current state— and theirs — is only temporary. We continue to see the ruins of our long-lost villages and towns across the concrete walls, fences, barbed wires, and borders, and that keeps reminding us that the Nakba never came to an end. As painful as it might sound, a continuous Nakba nevertheless proves that history is yet to come to a halt and can still be reversed. The spaces that Israel now occupies are the same ones to which we organically attach our memory and on which much of the meaning of our existence relies. We are still there in spirit, goes the

50 Ghassan Kanafani was a renowned Palestinian author, assassinated by the Mossad in 1972.
comforting thought. Some of those spaces, however, are more haunting than others and they do portray the complexity and irony of Palestinian collective memory.

Today, in a tragic irony, the Israeli museum commemorating the Shoah victims, Yad Vashem, sits on top of a hill overlooking the village of Deir-Yassin, the symbol of Palestinian catastrophe. There are no markers, placards or memorials, and no mention from tour guides in the museum regarding what their visitors see from where they stand (Toukan 2013). This is not a case of absence of remembering or ignorance, but a certain kind(s) of active forgetting that is selective and misleading (Douglas 2007, cited by Ram 2009). One that makes the Jewish memory a means to conceal the hierarchies and constellations of power and deny perpetration (see: Svirsky 2014), as well as to justify and protect the prevailing social order (Even-Tuzur 2016). Toukan (2013) points out that a distinct feature of such forgetting is its banality. In The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (2006, p.231), Pappé calls the phenomenon memoricide, an erasure of one people from history in order to write that of another people’s over it. Because of memoricide, Palestinians’ struggle for memory is not confined to the commemoration of the Nakba and its reverberations under the occupation, it is also a struggle against the attempts on Palestinian capacity to remember and be remembered.

The Fear of Being Forgotten

Bar-Tal (2013) suggests that Israeli-Jews and Palestinians use both popular and official memory in support of their narratives. Popular memory refers to “the narratives of collective memories held by society members in their repertoire” (p. 138) and official memory is usually delivered through formal channels. He points out that in Israel’s case the two types of collective memories can correspond or be in divergence but are always in continuous interaction and communication. In the Palestinian case, both are closely entwined with popular memory being more dominant. This can be attributed to the state of disorientation of the Nakba generation

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51 Said reminds us that Palestine is a state of ‘consciousness,’ a representation of ‘a vast collective feeling of injustice [which] continues to hang over our lives with undiminished weight’ [Turner 2003, cited by Lentin 2008, p.173].
and due to the lack of official Palestinian bodies that could compete with the Israel’s institutional and archival power. That resulted in much of the collective memory being transmitted trans-generationally using oral channels (Abdul-Jawwad 2005). Assmann (1995) calls this ‘communicative memory.’ It may also be called autobiographical memory. After all, despite the increasing institutionalisation of memory since the early 1990s, the Palestinian collective emotional orientations and much of the conflict ethos are still intimately tied to oral transmission of vivid ‘firsthand’ information about the Nakba and similar events (ibid.). That said, not only did that oral transmission make Palestinian memory vulnerable to Israel’s state narratives, striving to withstand its ferocity, but also to the test of time.

It is perhaps feasible in this light to assume that unlike Israel’s collective memory which was premised on the fear of physical annihilation (Bar-Tal 2001), much of Palestinian memory was premised on the fear of being forgotten. This is an existential fear in its own right and serves certain socio-psychological functions same as Israel’s collective memory (see: Bar-Tal 2007, 2013). Sonia Nimr (2008) explains, Palestinian collective memory is the only link to the past of a lost homeland, it is passed down with as many details as possible to protect younger Palestinians from alienation and insecurity, and to ensure that they receive at least part of their inheritance of the land. Nimr found that Palestinians in refugee camps especially outside Palestine seem to have more detailed, vivid recollections of the past, while people who remained in their villages and towns and were not subjected to radical exile, tended to remember fewer details. Put differently, the more victimised Palestinians felt, the more existential their collective memory became. This is particularly apparent in the fact that the residents of refugee camps appear more keen on preserving many of their habits, costumes, customs, folk stories and songs, and cuisine than those who remained in their towns and villages (ibid.). It is also seen in the simple daily communications such as asking someone where they are from. Many Palestinian refugees and their progeny today would answer by saying they are from, say, Jaffa, Majdal, Haifa, Akko, and other places in what became Israel.
As children in Al-Shati refugee camp in Gaza, we often referred back to our grandparent’s villages or towns whenever that question was posed. Ironically, that was also used as an ‘internal’ negative identity (see: Kelman 1987, 1999) vis-à-vis other non-refugee Palestinians, namely the native Gazans. Their Palestinianism, as it were, was not as profound and well-earned as ours. As Israeli-Jews used victimhood to tell themselves apart from non-Israeli Jews as the ‘true Jews’ (see Chapter Five), we, too, saw in our refugee status, our label of victimhood, a core characteristic of being the ‘true Palestinians’ who are spiritually superior to other non-refugee Palestinians. Being the second generation of refugees born and raised in Gaza, we rarely spoke of Gaza as our home. In practice, it was, but perhaps being the memory nomads that our grandparents wanted us to be, we were encouraged to look at Gaza as only a transitional phase. Like all other refugees, we preserved our village habits and customs, and sometimes — sustaining a sense of continuity — some of us even hung on to old intra-village or inter-clan grudges and stereotypes. Simply put, we created a parallel Palestine in the camp, one that would — at least temporarily — prevent us from succumbing to memoricide. After all, as Said in The Question of Palestine (1992) points out, Palestine today exists as an idea, a political and human experience, and an act of sustained popular will. As if to say (or prove) that so long as Palestine is remembered, it will continue to exist (Abunimah, in: Hammer 2005).

The fear of being forgotten always defined most of Palestinian cultural scene, in literary and artistic narratives. Several Palestinian poets, novelists, and artists saw in themselves the guardians of memory. Think of Al-Ali’s cartoon character Handhala as the witness over Palestinian victimhood, of the Palestinian film makers whose films were intricately tied to the Palestinians’ displacement and the desire to return to Palestine (Alawadhi 2013), or of the Palestinian poets who romanticised and simplified the past in order to maintain it. Almost all of them acted out their fear of being forgotten, as a people and as a cause.

The ‘idyll’ poems of Saud Al-Asadi, for example, preserve memory through a romanticised and nostalgic yet very reductionist approach to history. He speaks through the shepherd, the olive trees, and the open skies. Like most Palestinian poets, the land is his inspiration. Al-Asadi establishes Palestinian legitimacy through
building a continuum with the idyllic past, one that preceded Zionism. But reconstructing the past as a ‘paradise lost’ is also an escape from the burden of the memory of the defeated, today’s occupation and hardships, and the immense sense of desperation. In one of his colloquial poems (1999) he says: *I wish you and I would return, truly return - to that land…even if we’re stripped of our clothing and starved.*

Palestinian cinema conveys a similar message, although more critically. It is often tied to Palestinian sense of displacement and the burning desire to return to the pre-1948 Palestine. It must be therefore understood specifically in this context: not as a luxury pursuit or as a medium to address philosophical questions, but as a means of survival, to stand against invisibility and to make the invisible visible (Alawadhi 2013). Elia Suleiman’s film *The Time That Remains* (2009) takes us on a journey with a Palestinian refugee who returns to Palestine to live what is left of his life there. In the film Palestinian history is portrayed through the memories of the Director’s family over three phases of Palestine since the Nakba. In a rather dark yet cynical fashion, Suleiman shows us a contradictory, existentially puzzling homeland where the nostalgic memory does not match reality. The film highlights the notion that the transient state of complete mobility gave Palestinians a [romantic] feeling that the only state of permanency is the one of anticipation of the return to the homeland and with it re-immersion in the individual and collective time (Sanbar 1997, in: Gertz & Khleifi 2008).

In *Returning to Haifa* (1969), Kanafani combines nostalgia with the sobriety and complexity of the present. The novella describes the journey of a Palestinian couple who after the 1967 War return to their hometown Haifa to look for their child, Khaldoun, whom they lost during the 1948 exodus. They find that their old home is now occupied by a European Jewish family — Shoah survivors. It turns out that their lost son was found and raised by this family. He was raised Jewish and now serves in the IDF. Kanafani focuses on the sense of guilt and helplessness that overtook the Nakba generation. He subtly condemns the situation, but in this condemnation there remains a sense of longing, anger, frustration, and, above all, an unbearable burden that Palestinians have to come to terms with. Like my grandfather who was lost for words and felt out of
place at the sight of his old village, Kanafani tells us that the couple were overwhelmed with silence upon seeing Haifa again, they felt out of place in a place that remained familiar. The sense of alienation was disheartening, the mother who spent the past twenty years echoing the name of her lost son is now crushed by reality. The son is no longer theirs and neither are the house, the land, or the landscape. Like every Palestinian refugee, the couple were left with only memories and these memories acted as a proof for their very existence, as a means to fight off being forgotten. Now all they need to do is keep talking about that long-gone place in order to achieve a sense of continuity — as though what happened never happened.

This is the very notion that Natour (2009) conveys through his character Fadwa in the short story Safar ala Safar (Travel and More Travel). Lamenting her old house in Bisan (now Hebrewised to Beit Jann) Fadwa says (p. 169): “I’ve cried over my house a lot, but what use is crying? Sometimes it seems to me as if the house continues to hurt us only to make us let go of it. It’s tired of me bringing its memory back. It’s very painful to bring back the memory of a place. But it’s the only way to prove your loyalty to it. Yes, precious house, I’m going to continue inflicting pain on you. I’m going to talk and talk.”

In remembering and being remembered we hope for liberation and decolonisation both physically and psychologically. Edward Said once said that to write truthfully about the *Nakba* is not merely to practise professional historiography; it is also a profoundly moral act of redemption (Masalha 2012). The problem with this redemption, however, is that it clashes with another redemption. Many Jews see Israel as an act of redemption and usually ignore or are unaware of the impact this redemption has had on Palestinian existence. They fail or fear to acknowledge that Palestinian redemption means that Israel acknowledges the suffering she inflicted upon the Palestinians. In keeping with Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological argument (2000, 2007, 2013), it may be suggested that as a coping mechanism collective memory is formed in such a way that it provides a black-and-white picture of the conflict; it presents a simplistic justification for the eruption of the conflict, maintains the in-group’s positive self-image and, above all, portrays the in-group as the conflict’s victim. This helps explain the Israeli-Jewish need to erase, suppress, or simply ignore Palestinian history, and
also explains the need to create victim hierarchies where the Shoah is the only measure of worthiness of the Other’s suffering. For the mainstream Israeli-Jews, Palestinian catastrophe is not a real event with objective, universal implications but as an event that is only viewed as a catastrophe from the narrow Palestinian perspective, part of ‘their’ story (Stav 2012). The Nakba, if ever mentioned, is appropriated within the Israeli-Jewish story. It is diminished and turned into an internal event of Jewish history, an extension of the process of Jewish redemption (ibid.). In other words, the Nakba is only small part in the much larger catastrophe of the Jewish genocide (Thomas 2015).

Because of that, many Palestinians see in the Shoah a formidable threat to the credence of their memory narratives and a distraction from their claims and demands for justice. To withstand and counteract the ‘Shoah super victimhood,’ those Palestinians, knowingly or unknowingly, and perhaps reactively and impulsively, developed societal beliefs aimed at disregarding, dismissing, or outright denying the Shoah. This is elaborated on below.

**Our Collective Memory Versus Theirs**

Palestinian popular and official memories are constructed around the notion of Israel as a foreign colonial power. For the majority, it is maybe impossible to view Israel outside the parameter of their own subjugation. This resulted in a zero-sum depiction of Israel, one that does not allow the Jewish victimhood narratives, especially the Shoah, into Palestinian lives. As mentioned earlier, a primary reason for that is the socio-psychological need to protect the collective memory from memoricide. Dissimilar to Israel’s collective memory, however, the Palestinian one is characterised by a sense of urgency mainly because of the continuous aftereffects of the Nakba in Palestinian society and due to the fact that Palestinians bear no responsibility for the Shoah. There is no need nor desire, goes the majority’s ethos, to accommodate the occupier’s historical trauma. When the Shoah is brought up, nevertheless, the Palestinian public discourse goes on the defence. It does not usually attempt to silence or erase the Shoah history, although sometimes some of
it borders on denial. Instead, it focuses on the political implications of the Jewish immigration to Palestine and how upon the establishment of the state of Israel, the Shoah became the instrument of legitimacy. Sometimes, one can get a sense of the average Palestinian’s mood (or rather uneasiness) about the Shoah by looking at the Palestinian media narratives about the subject, whether as press releases or statements by politicians and key figures.

In August 2009, it was revealed in the Gaza Strip that the UNRWA planned to include in the eighth-grade curriculum run in its schools in the Strip a section on the Shoah and Jewish history in World War II. Although the UNRWA eventually denied, this did not stop the media from repeatedly circulating the news or the angry responses of Palestinian key figures and organisations from pouring into the UNRWA’s headquarters in Gaza. In a letter to the UNRWA, The Popular Committee for Gaza Refugees described the Shoah as “the Zionist manufactured and exaggerated lie which was popularised by the Zionist-controlled Western media.” The Committee added “the human rights curriculum should focus on the Nakba and the continuous Zionist crimes against the Palestinian people.” The Palestinian Education Ministry responded by saying that Palestinians will study the Shoah when Israeli-Jews study the Nakba. Hamas-affiliated daily Falastin acknowledged “Hitler’s crimes against the Jewish people,” but added: “The Zionists have committed heinous crimes against the Palestinian people” (MEMRI 2009; Al-Hayat Al-Jadida 2009; Najjar 2009; The Independent 2009). Two years later the same issue came back when the UNRWA renewed the plans to include the Shoah in the human rights curriculum in the Palestinian refugee camps in the PT and Jordan. Expectedly, the Palestinian reaction was not welcoming. While the PA issued no comments, Hamas and other Palestinian factions criticised the decision and vowed to stop it. Ibrahim Radwan, a Hamas spokesman, described the UNRWA plans as an "uncrossable red line," accusing the organisation of “attempting to make Palestinians sympathise with their oppressors” (Fayyad 2011).

In the above instances, the Palestinian ambivalence about the Shoah was partly influenced by the Palestinian self-perception as victims of the victims — recognising, but not acknowledging that the Jews were once
victims. For the average Palestinian, it may be hard to see that those in the powerful Merkava tanks were at some point nearly annihilated. Some recognise the Shoah to shame Israel as a victim turned victimiser, emphasising the tragic irony of being oppressed by those who suffered from multiple forms of persecution. What matters is the practical consequences of the Israeli-Jewish victimhood for the conflict, the large-range of daily hardships of living under the occupation.

The ambivalence could also be attributed to the insufficient or ideologically motivated knowledge of the Shoah amongst Palestinian scholars. This is maybe related to the Arab anti-Zionist stance which defines the Shoah primarily in terms of the Zionist instrumentalisation of the Jewish genocide. Rosenfeld (2011) argues that because of this linkage between the Shoah and Israel, the media in Arab countries are so intent on erasing the Shoah or exposing its history as a myth. The Zionist as conspiratorial, manipulative, and/or ill-intentioned foreigner is still a familiar theme in many Arabic narratives: films, TV, or books. The Egyptian TV espionage thriller Alzeibaq (2017), for example — although somewhat balanced — still depicts the Zionists as inherently manipulative, and the Arabic version of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion remains a popular choice for readers interested in Israel or the conflict (see: Al-Messiri 2003). It is not surprising then that the things associated with Israel’s claims of legitimacy are looked at with suspicion, the Shoah included. This also explains why Arabic scholarship is lacking when it comes to the psychological aspects of the “conflict.” Looking up the ‘psychological dimension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Google Arabic, for instance, yields results regarding the ‘morale/psychological’ warfare of Israel and the Palestinians, Israeli-Jewish psyche in response to suicide bombing, post-traumatic stress disorder amongst Palestinian children, suffering of Palestinian prisoners, and, occasionally, Israel’s ‘siege mentality.’ The majority of these results that fall within the psychological framework are confined to clinical psychology or psychiatry.

Additionally, the Arab public’s views of Shoah is substantiated, or perhaps justified, by the fact that the Arabs and Palestinians have nothing to do with the Nazi genocide of European Jews. The Shoah is only relevant in
Arab/Palestinian history inasmuch as it played a key role in the production of the 
Nakba. Otherwise, the Shoah would bear no more relevance for the Arabs than it bears for the South-East Asians (Achcar et al. 2014).

The fact remains however that the Shoah represents a serious challenge to presenting the Palestinian victimhood narratives to the world. How can one compete against the ‘super-victim’ of the most appalling genocide in modern history? Margalit (in: Alexander 2017, p. 96) comments cynically: “Against the weapon of the Holocaust, the Palestinian are amateurs…As soon as operation ‘Holocaust Memory’ is put into high gear, the Palestinians cannot compete.” Edward Said (Said & Hitchens 1988, p.06) explains that, among other things, the Shoah “…was a uniquely powerful narratives with which to garner support, and the Palestinians had no equivalent.”

By downplaying or denying the Shoah Palestinians seek to strip Israel of the virtue of innocence that usually comes with victimhood and to demolish Zionism’s moral-historical basis. This is also accompanied by the Palestinians’ attempts to reconcile the helplessness of the Jews during the Shoah and Israel’s victory over the Arabs only three years later in 1948 (Litvak & Webman 2003). On several levels, the Palestinian position toward the Shoah seems emotionally driven and is far less structured or institutionalised than Israel’s denial of the Nakba, mainly because Palestinians are not responsible for the Jewish genocide, while Israel actively denies an act of ethnic cleansing she herself carried out. Both parties, nevertheless, negate each other’s suffering to preserve one’s own. This perception is largely framed because accepting the narrative of the other side is seen as undermining one’s own national story, which is founded on notions of moral superiority and ultimate suffering (Bar-Tal et al. 2009b; Thomas 2015).

This was evident in the uproar against the Palestinian university students’ trip to Auschwitz in 2014. Professor Muhammad Dajjani of Al-Quds University, the trip organiser, emphasised that by visiting Auschwitz Palestinians learn where Israeli-Jews come from and, accordingly, understand how to engage them. Fearing backlash, Al-Quds University disowned the students and Dajjani resigned shortly afterwards. Some of
Dajjani’s critics accused him of "trying to brainwash Palestinian youth" (Booth 2014; Ghert-Zand 2015). The criticism directed at Dajjani reflected the Palestinian psychological block against bestowing the virtue or morality upon some aspects of Jewish history, which many people by virtue of Israel’s ‘Jewish identity’ associate to Israel and Zionism. In his defence, Dajjani told the Guardian (Black 2014): “When we look at the Shoah we impose it on our own suffering...We see Nazi towers and we think of Israeli guard towers and barbed wires.” Dajjani — it seems — understood the Palestinian need to maintain an ‘ideal victim’ status. This is one of our coping mechanisms that acts to protect and insulate our narrative from psychological damage. Only through such victimhood does our harsh reality make sense.

It is specifically this harsh reality that makes our identification with the Jewish genocide an ambivalent endeavour. Haunted by the daily hardships under the occupation, the Shoah is usually of little importance in the lives of many Palestinians. But once invoked in certain political contexts we feel it is somehow directed aggressively against us, attempting to confiscate and replace our ‘well-earned’ suffering. The Shoah puts us on the defence and we respond with denial, suppression, projection, and justification. Although the average individuals amongst us do not know a great deal about the Shoah, not much beyond the fact that ‘Hitler killed the Jews,’ they are still capable of feeling the Jewish history filtered through our experiences, which in almost all scenarios is existentially unsettling for our dearly held collective memory.

Wrapped up in our own trauma, we feel that readily accepting the Jewish genocide as a manifestation of Jewish and, by default, Israeli-Jewish victimhood, we risk losing our posture as the underdog. Like the Jews who selectively filter the information of Arab media to confirm their vulnerability and victimisation (see: Bar-Tal & Halperin 2013; Bar-Tal 2013), many of us filter the information regarding the Shoah only within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian “conflict,” making the Jewish genocide a political instrument (and it surely is in certain situations) that only legitimises the occupation and jeopardises our very legitimacy as the victims of the conflict. This is largely why some of us celebrate key figures like Roger Garaudy when they deny the Shoah, or when Norman Finkelstein (2003), as one of them, exposes the political agendas in the ‘Holocaust
industry.’ This proves to us, that we are right; not only are we victims of the oppressive Israeli governments, but also victims of being threatened in our own victimhood.

Lebanese author Hazem Saghiya (1997, cited by Litvak & Webman 2003, 2008) argued that the Palestinians of today were jealous of the Jews who became the ‘ideal victims’ and of their profitable tragedy. The notion is correct, however, the details are lacking. The Jealousy is existentially based, hardly detached from our desperate need for the world to recognise our suffering. Maybe, as Mahmoud Darwish (Yeshurun 1996) once remarked, Palestinians are famous because of the world’s interest in the Jewish problem, in the Shoah. But because of this fame, we were lost in the grim details of the Jewish genocide. We, as Said reflects (1986), have no Shoah to protect us with the world’s compassion. We feel that as victims we are entitled for sympathetic recognition and by default the world must understand why we lash out violently against Israel. In the 1960/70s, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked civilian airliners to ‘make the world aware of the Palestinian suffering’ (see: Irving 2012; Eshtiyeh 2011), and today underage Palestinians, boys and girls, wield knives against armed Israeli soldiers and civilians partly for the same reason.

Impaired by our biased information processing, we struggle to look beyond the armed-to-the-teeth Israeli soldier to see the bigger picture. We fear that by accepting their story we endanger our own. Some of us feel a sense of super-legitimacy by over-delegitimising our enemy. In reality, however, for Palestinians to feel comfortable with acknowledging the Shoah does not change the occupied-occupier asymmetrical relationship, neither does it endorse Israel’s right to act out her traumas. It is not a statement of guilt, as it is case with Israel’s relation with the Nakba. Instead, it is about transcending the unconscious fear into the more rational, calculated realm of hope and understanding (see: Bar-Tal 2001). It is not about simple identification that seeks to blur the distance between the ‘I’ and the ‘other’. But rather, a type of engagement that is built on weak identification — the difference between empathy and full identification (Goldberg 2016). If anything, downplaying the Shoah weakens the legitimacy of the Palestinian struggle.
Our collective memory may explain the ambivalence about the Shoah. But, unlike the Shoah, it is not only a memory perpetuated by the Death Camps in Poland or in the rituals and museums around the world, or requires triggers to be felt or remembered. It is an ongoing experience in every aspect of Palestinian lives. It is the force behind today’s shataat (diaspora) for the Palestinians in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. It bears multiple meanings for many Palestinians in the OT, the double irony of being a refugee under occupation. And, it represents a forbidden struggle for identity and equality for the Palestinian citizens of Israel. And for all, it is a lack of control over one’s present and future. It is seen in the dynamics of active subjugation and continues to be felt in the myriad forms of daily humiliation. The next section discusses humiliation as a primary emotional orientation in the Palestinian victimhood narratives.

COLLECTIVE EMOTIONAL ORIENTATIONS

In his framework (e.g. 2001, 2007, 2013), Bar-Tal discusses certain emotional orientations in intractable conflict such as fear, anger, hatred, shame, and guilt. Some are discussed in details, others are glossed over. He (2001) pays special attention to the emotion of fear, marking it the most dominant in Israel’s Jewish society (see previous chapter). Bar-Tal’s focus on fear can also be understood in terms of the author’s being part of the Israeli-Jewish collective. He conceptualises what he might have experienced first-hand or vicariously in that collective. Bar-Tal’s thoughts on emotions can provide a guide to understanding the Palestinian emotional state. But because a Palestinian author has a different experience to Bar-Tal's, the focus may change. This author acknowledges that all the emotions discussed above by Bar-Tal exist in the Palestinian society, some as profoundly. But because of the hierarchy of power, which Bar-Tal did not sufficiently discuss or perhaps experience, and reinforced by a collective memory tainted by defeat and loss, an experience almost opposite to that of Israel, it is suggested that humiliation is perhaps the most dominant collective emotional orientation among Palestinians. It represents a significant dynamic in the Palestinian victim self-identity. It can be as simple as lack of control over freedom of movement or as complex as being a source of society-wide emasculation possibly leading to an endless and destructive pursue of dignity and self-worth.
Counting the Calories

The Israeli advocacy group Gisha, which aims to protect the rights of Palestinian residents, waged a long court battle to release a document, in which it was revealed that Israel calculated the calorie needs for Gaza's population. The aim was to keep Gaza residents from malnutrition at a time when Israel was tightening its restrictions on the movement of people and goods in and out of the Strip, including food products and raw materials. The document states that Health Ministry officials were involved in drafting it (Hass 2012; the Guardian Oct. 2012; Cole 2012; Cook 2012). The average worked out to be 2,279 calories per person per day, which could be supplied by 1,836 grams of food, or 2,575.5 tons of food for the entire population of Gaza (Hass 2012).

Major Guy Inbar, an Israeli military spokesman, said the calculation, based on a person's average requirement of calories a day, was meant to identify warning signs to help avoid a humanitarian crisis, and that it was never used to restrict the flow of food (The Guardian Oct. 2012). As it stands, the caloric count is more or less in line with the World Health Organisation's guidelines (see: WHO et al. 2004). However, the policy was advised and implemented by the very party that deliberately created the emergency situation in Gaza, and that effectively controls both the territory and its population (Hass 2012). It is the almost absolute control over Palestinian lives, or what Halper (2000) calls ‘Israel’s matrix of control,’ that is of concern here. Behind the calorie count stands a systematic attack on dignity. It transcends the ‘pragmatic’ need of the occupier and extends into crushing Palestinian very psychological existence.

Humiliation does not necessarily involve violence or direct coercion. It can be inflicted passively through means of control and deprivation. Palestinian human rights lawyer Raji Sourani pointed out that the occupation and the absolute closure is an ongoing attack on the human dignity, emphasising that it is a systematic degradation, humiliation, isolation and fragmentation of the Palestinian people (Chomsky 2012, 2013). Jabr (2016) observes that the omnipresent acts of humiliation against Palestinians are not simply
collateral byproducts of the occupation, but its core policy. They mean to undermine every facet of Palestinian identity, especially those aspects of identity that are a source of pride for the emerging intellectual and moral development of a Palestinian nation.

Goldman and Coleman (2005) explain that humiliation as a broad concept is generally thought to occur in relationship of unequal power in which the humiliator has control over the victim. The mere show of power and the inability to counter-act by the weaker party could be seen as humiliation. In Our Harsh Logic (2012) — a book that contains testimonies by IDF soldiers who served in the OT — Israeli organisation ‘Breaking the Silence’ explains that there is a large disparity between the declared purpose of military activities in Palestinian territories and what actually happens on the ground. The testimonies show how the IDF is primarily purposed to ‘demonstrate presence’ or a show of power that, according to some soldiers, is unconnected to the tactical, military, or security needs.

The occupation provided Israel with a convenient system of control that allowed her to hold on to the territory itself without extending political rights to its inhabitants (Kretzmer 2013a). The post-Oslo agreements as well made it possible for Israel to leave the Palestinian residential centres but maintain full control over what went in or out. This meant that the costly and physically involved boots on the ground were replaced by the morally and emotionally detached remote-control occupation (Bellal 2015). It also meant that the systematic attack on dignity was further removed from much of its guilt-producing mechanism, which some of the face-to-face interactions provided.

Humiliation of Palestinians is also justified through ideological convictions. There is still a general feeling amongst many Israeli-Jews that Jews have exclusive rights over all the territories. The territories are ‘liberated,’ not occupied. Israel’s ambassador to the UN, Danny Danon, made that abundantly clear when he waved the Hebrew Bible at the Security Council, calling it the ‘land deed’ for the entirety of Eretz Yisrael (Jerusalem Post Staff 2019a). There is also a group who see that the occupation is well justified for security
and existential reasons. Magal et al. (2013, p.174) point out that “The view of the OT has a determinative influence on the Israeli-Jewish approach to the Palestinians and the so-called peace process.” It is not surprising then that Israeli-Jewish leaders and the public do not easily support a complete withdrawal from the OT or dismantlement of settlements. The answer would often be ‘managing’ the occupation, not ending it — a method, among others, to maintain the occupation without guilt or accountability.

Managing the occupation also aims to normalise and morally justify it — and with it its abusive policies like humiliation. The concept of ‘occupation’ is negative and is characterised by violence and wrongdoing, and also involves a large degree of empathy towards the occupied and a negative image of the occupier. These facts challenge the ethos about positive self-image related to democracy, equality, and the IDF as the world’s most moral army. It also shatters the self-perception of being the victim in the conflict (Halperin et al. 2010).

In this light, it is plausible to assume that since many soldiers are ideologically or socially conditioned to accept the grand Zionist narrative, the IDF behaviours in the OT are reflected accordingly. Palestinians are not only a potential threat, but also without the right to exist in these territories. Most of the Nakba-generation Palestinian refugees remember the time when they were driven out of their homes only to be labelled ‘infiltrators’ if they tried to re-enter their towns or villages (Kishawi 2015). The Prevention of Infiltration Law of 1959 meant that Palestinians were transformed from natives into invaders and Jews from invaders into rightful owners. Since Palestinians are trespassers on Eretz Yisrael, the rationale goes, it is dutiful to subjugate and humiliate them. Otherwise, if Palestinians were given plenty of rope, the tables might be turned. If you do not ‘push down’ as in the literal meaning of ‘humiliation’ (Lindner 2001a, 2001b), the Israeli-Jewish logic goes, you will be pushed down yourself.
Humiliate or be Humiliated

It may also be suggested that when Israeli-Jews humiliate Palestinians, they do so not only to keep the proverbial table unturned, but also because they despise the Palestinian weakness which reminds them of their own. The shameful weakness of the Shoah meant that Israel needed to compensate by showing the Palestinians who is in charge. Paradoxically, by projecting the collective memory in the form of repressive policies, the outcome that is meant to be avoided is exactly what is produced. Israel primarily seeds hatred and radicalisation into the Palestinian collective (as do Palestinian attacks to the Israeli-Jewish public). It stands to reason that humiliating others can be seen as a way of dealing with one’s own shame (Varvin 2005)—which raises the question whether Israel is capable of living without the power of humiliation, without the occupation. After all, the occupation provides the country with a psychological cushion, a venting outlet for the past.

There is also the fact that the IDF soldiers on the personal level may become desensitised to what they call ‘daily routine’ in the OT. Disturbing Palestinian lives through abuse and humiliation becomes a matter of doing one’s job, following orders, a precaution to circumvent ‘potential terrorists,’ or outright indifference (see: Our Harsh Logic 2012). In his memoir The Girl who Stole my Holocaust (2010) Chayut describes how, despite their best intentions, most of the soldiers on the checkpoints eventually grew apathetic and turned into automatons who could not see the Palestinians as human beings. “Crowds passing me day in and day out, I did not see humans - or at least not humans equal to myself or the people now sitting around me,” he reflexively explains (p. 232). The systematic policy of humiliation is at a core a psychological conditioning aimed at diminishing the soldiers’ emotional responsiveness to negative or aversive stimulus after repeated exposure to it (McTeague et al. 2010). In clinical psychology ‘desensitisation’ is a process primarily used to assist individuals to overcome certain disorders such as phobias and anxieties. For the IDF, the positive goal of such process is utilised for negative ends. Soldiers are conditioned through constant negative exposures to
unlearn empathy for the sake of propagating positive political outcome regardless of the psychological collateral damage to either the IDF troops or the Palestinians.

Needless to say that the comprehensive form of occupation is in itself an act of humiliation. Embedded in its core are coercion and subjugation, which entail a negation of autonomy, and that creates collective feelings of humiliation and shame (Gilligan 2003). On the group level, humiliation is experienced as a tense collective pain of having dignity and self-respect devalued or depressed; an experience which is intensified in intractable conflicts because humiliation is often made public (Snodgrass & Lamb 2013). Capturing this notion, Nehauser (in: Kaufmann et al. 2011) elaborates that certain forms of humiliation cannot be adequately understood without accepting the idea that dignity of the collective can be violated as well as the dignity of an individual. There is also the fact that the humiliation of certain individuals violate the dignity of the group. When the IDF tanks besieged Arafat inside al Muqata’a (headquarters) in Ramallah in 2004, many Palestinians felt that the attack on Arafat’s person was an attack on the collective Palestinian dignity. Palestinians were reminded once again of their vulnerability vis-à-vis Israel’s military might. The whole military operation was a ‘degradation ceremony’ (Torres et al. 2010) reminiscent of the PLO eviction from Lebanon in 1982 and before that the 1970 Black September clashes between the Jordanian authorities and the PLO. The attack on Arafat represented a deep violation of Palestinian cultural values, not least because the kethiyaar (dignitary reference to Arafat: ‘the old man’), a highly respectable figure in the traditional Arab culture, had his moustache trimmed.52 It was a direct attack on Palestinian masculinity and honour, which represent much of the psychological life force of muqawama, the core conflict ethos and on which much of Palestinian sense of dignity relies.

52 In some Arab cultures, especially in the Levant (Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Jordan), a moustache was considered a macho symbol of manly dignity.
The Enemy Within

Lacey (2011) described Palestinian victimhood as less of a scar and more of a scab. It is continually worried and picked at, and never heals. Living under the occupation keeps fuelling the trauma and with it the feelings of humiliation. The continuous experience of humiliation is pathogenic, it diseases society from within, disrupting its normal functioning and changing the psychological make-up of its members.

Jabr (2016) explains that the emotions of a humiliated person do not stop further humiliation from occurring, quite the contrary. Many humiliated persons become attuned to the feelings and expectations of the perpetrator and vigilantly avoid recognising their own rage. There may be impulses to identify with the perpetrator and to justify the humiliation of others who proudly resist it. We see these dynamics in Palestinians who justify the humiliation of those who dare to resist the occupier. We see them in those who blame others who complain about humiliation, claiming that these victims are merely vulnerable or weak personalities — as if the experience of humiliation had taken place only in their heads rather than in reality. We also see them in the Palestinians who force themselves into apathy to cope with the lack of normality.

Suad Amiry in Sharon and my Mother-in-Law (2005) reflects rather cynically on how when the soldiers “grabbed a thirteen or fourteen-year-old boy and dragged him into a small barricaded room especially installed therefore for ‘troublesome Palestinians,’” She and the others waiting at the checkpoint quickly “forgot about the boy and got back to business: bargaining with the carriage boy about the fifteen shekels he had asked for” (p. 186). Amiry’s cynicism casts serious lights on the contradictions that humiliation has inflicted upon the Palestinian collective. One aspect is the contradiction between the strong societal beliefs about the need to help others —sometimes bordering on the absurd meddling as in many Arab societies — and the circumstancial need to remain neutral for personal safety and dignity. That created a personality split; that is, either one intervenes and possibly gets harmed and humiliated or pretends to be apathetic in order to avoid harm, but still feels ashamed and humiliated.
Palestinian author, Basem Ra’ad (2010) talks about how bearing the brunt of the occupation in Jerusalem has created sadistic predispositions amongst male Palestinian children. In the chapter titled ‘Cats in Jerusalem,’ Ra’ad observes that there seems to be a noticeable cruelty towards cats by male children. He hypothesises that the treatment of cats is indicative of a brutalised community. The behaviour of the occupier toward the occupied is a source of humiliation, where most of the adults in the Old City grudgingly accept as a matter of necessity for the sake of survival. They are aware of the Zionist grand design to empty Jerusalem of its Palestinian population, so they tend to swallow the humiliation in order to remain. The children do not understand such intricacies, but internalise their parents anxieties.

Generally, this phenomenon could also be understood in developmental terms. Children often identify with their parents to some extent, even if to differing degrees. The process of identification is more accomplished with respect to the parent of the same sex (Gilligan 2003). In the Palestinian society, a patriarchal environment primarily governed by family values and honour, it is perhaps unsettling for children, especially male children, when their fathers — traditionally the ‘protectors’ — are not fully able to keep them safe. Most children, at least in early childhood, idealise their parents and take them as their role model of an ideal person upon whom to model oneself (ibid.). When the father fails to live up to his child’s ideals, identification and idealisation may be internalised in the form of disappointment and resentment. Such feelings are externalised as aggressive behaviours. Children do not usually have a rounded understanding of the politics of the occupation. However, they are capable of feeling the consequences through, first, their parents and, second, the daily encounters with the Israeli authorities. Reactions manifest as a misdirected aggression, in this case against cats.

The fact that the male children are the chief culprit in the cat abuse raises crucial questions about male identity and humiliation. It, in other words, brings to attention the role of gender in the formulation and maintenance of the Palestinian collective emotional orientations and, subsequently, conflict ethos. Despite the growing belief that humiliation is perhaps the single most underestimated force in international relations
(Friedman 2003), Bar-Tal’s framework, although conceptually all-encompassing, does not provide a clear picture on the relationship between humiliation as an emotional orientation and victimhood. It is even silent on the role of gender in that. To expand the framework, it is suggested that while humiliation is a critical factor in Palestinian victimhood, it may be better studied with the gender role in mind to further understand its impact in the Palestinian society. Below, some of its aspects are discussed.

**Gendered Humiliation**

Abusing the Jerusalem cats and the national anger over Arafat’s siege are perhaps two sides of the same coin, namely gendered humiliation. Palestine is a patriarchal society, and because of the so-called ‘clan-ism,’ it is perhaps more patriarchal than some other Arab societies on the Mediterranean (Ahmed 2013). Palestinian society expects men to align with gendered norms of hegemonic masculinity, one conceivably dominated by a number of practical expectations such as provision, protection, and modelling (Shumka et al. 2017). But the performance of these three quintessentially masculine acts is often challenged and undermined by Israel’s occupation (Gokani et al. 2015). Hawari (2004) explains that the overall context of Palestinian masculinity is one of political subjugation and coercion. This has added yet another layer of victimhood to Palestinian existence and increased intractability.

The crisis of Palestinian masculinity can be discerned in almost all types of narratives around Palestinian victimhood, whether ones that emphasise the Palestinian tragedy or others that glorify *muqawama* (resistance). Consider for example Kanafani’s famous novella *Men in the Sun* (1963). Kanafani tells us about three Palestinian men who leave Palestine after the *Nakba* to look for a better life in Kuwait. In Iraq they meet a Palestinian tank-truck driver (Abu Khaizaran) whom they pay to smuggle them inside his tank to Kuwait. From the outset, we know that Abu Khaizaran lost his manhood in an explosion during the 1948 war. On the border with Kuwait, busy entertaining the border guards with his colourful yet made up sexual adventure in Basra, the three men inside the tank die from heat and lack of oxygen. Kanafani tells us that they did not
even knock on the tank wall for help. While much can be said about the three men’s victimhood and emasculated fear, the character of Abu Khaizaran, a castrate-turned-weasel smuggler, remains the primary symbol of lost Palestinian masculinity after the Nakba. As if to say that the loss of manhood (physically and symbolically) meant the loss of purpose, sensibility and sense of belonging, which also resulted in crushing humiliation and loss of honour (Hussaini & Safri 2016).

In Palestinian society, the role of masculinity is also made more prominent against the notion of femininity. Analysing the latent content not only in Kanafani’s work but also in much of Palestinian literary narrative, arts, slogans, and even speeches, we find that Palestine (or the land) is often portrayed as a female. For example, in Naji Al-Ali’s cartoon, Handhala’s mother symbolises Palestine. In Mahmoud Darwish’s poetry Palestine is often portrayed as his female lover, or the mother he yearns for. Darwish says: “My land isn't my suitcase, neither am I a passenger, I'm a lover and the land is my lady” (1977). Also, in speeches, media, and oral narratives the loss of Palestine is usually referred to as ightesaab (rape). The Palestinian Authority on its website, for instance, laments the ‘rape of Palestine’ (Amireh 2003). This implies and requires an active role on part of the masculine man to protect that woman [Palestine] whose honour was violated by Zionism.

This conceptualisation of masculinity exists also in language. Most of the Arabic vocabulary related to Palestinian and/or patriotic/revolutionary values are feminine: e.g. thawra (revolution), Intifada (uprising), muqawama (resistance), shahada (martyrdom), and hurriya (freedom). Also, as a grammatical rule, the Arabic verb is conjugated from the masculine form. Aleasa (1996) explains that Arabic views man as the measurement from which the feminine gender is derived. This implies that thawra or muqawama are passive words unless they are put into actions by a masculine doing. In practice, this means that the role of protection, especially of women, and the acts of muqawama are viewed as essential parts of the Palestinian hegemonic masculine standards. Failure to meet these standards, due to lack of power and control vis-à-vis the occupation, is extremely emasculating.
On a personal reflexive note, during the first Intifada my father worked in Tel-Aviv and my mother was left alone to look after us, three children at the time. Occasionally, we had late-night visits by the IDF who would come into our house, then send us outside as they searched and, on one occasion, ransacked some household items. My distressed and terrified mother would tell my father once home of what happened. He would either downplay the situation or remain silent, only nodding in sympathy. In hindsight, I often wonder what my father felt being unable to protect his wife and children. Myself a product of that society and now a father and a husband, I can speculate that the silence was helplessness and perhaps humiliation. Knowing my father, it was also deep resentment and anger. He would not express it, it was simply unmanly. Even if he did, I doubt he had much to say or offer. He probably chose to be ambiguous rather than making promises of protection that he most certainly was not able to fulfil. That was a risk of demasculinisation he was not willing to take. Judging by the vividness and importance of certain memories, it is possible that this dutiful and urgent sense of ‘female protection’ was perhaps induced into us, the family male members. Of all the memories of the IDF abuses, it is maybe the ones that involved female family members that resonated the most with me. Looking back, the day the soldiers dragged my aunt by the hair out of her house after she had challenged them is possibly the day when the conflict became personal.

In these almost daily occurrences in the Occupied Territories — and like my aunt’s husband who helplessly watched as his wife went face down into the sand — men are humiliated and rendered helpless. The husband/father/brother/son in such situation loses his role as a protector, making him equal to the ones he is expected to protect. Naaman (2006) observes that Palestinian men interpret the humiliation as feminisation. They are questioned, searched, ordered around, and in general have little control over their agency. Since they associate lack of power with the feminine position, they feel doubly humiliated. The characteristic of masculinity, goes the general belief, is attributed to the perpetrator and femininity to the victim (Sivakumaran 2007). Ironically and perhaps tragically, Palestinian masculinity is opposed and further crushed by the more superior and well-established Zionist masculine identity. The IDF is the ultimate rite of passage for many Israeli-Jews for manhood — something of a second bar-mitzvah. But because it is defined by control and brute
force, it is also fragile and has to be demonstrated repeatedly and emphatically through abuse and systematic humiliation ‘to show who is boss.’ When Palestinian teenage girl and activist Ahed Tamimi slapped an IDF soldier in 2017, the army institution was outraged (see: Levy & Levac 2018; Kershner 2018). Not only because a Palestinian dared to challenge the IDF; worse, a Palestinian girl did that. Ahed was detained for eight months in a military prison and the slapped soldier — in an attempt to reinstate his dignity — was repeatedly commended for self-restrain or portrayed as a victim of the young girl.

A macro outlook at Palestinian society reveals that humiliation is nondiscriminatory; it is directed at everyone from the carriage boy in Suad Amiry’s diaries (2005) to the academics such as herself, to the most privileged such as the PA president himself. The reaction to such living therefore varies. It manifests in cases of domestic abuse where women are doubly victimised by both the occupation and their occupation-emasculated husbands (see: Holt 2003), and in the repressed and misplaced means of venting to the violent and defiant posture: from the Palestinian workers in Israel who sought an outlet in paid sex to those who embraced muqawama.

On a self-reflexive note, in the camp we occasionally heard stories of Palestinian workers in Israel turning to sex workers. In a conservative, somewhat religious society, extra-marital sex was condemned. Yet, some of the younger workers felt no shame in bragging about their sexual adventures — at least amongst their peers. Interestingly, while prostitution in Israel was dominated by immigrants from the ex Soviet Union since the 1990s (Miller 2012), for those ‘clients’ in the camp ‘scoring’ with knowingly Jewish sex workers was particularly a reason for gloating. This behaviour cannot be severed from the dyad of victimhood and gendered humiliation. In addition to living under the occupation, those workers had to go through a series of daily humiliations upon entering Israel for work: from extreme security checks to being squeezed like sardines for hours in long and narrow corridors. Among other things, they perhaps saw in the Jewish sex workers an affordable way to get back at Israel. Hearing them brag, it often sounded like a victorious conquest. Indeed, for those humiliated men the act of physical penetration seemed like a compensation for the feelings of
feminisation where they are the object of [psychological] penetration. It stands to reason to assume that sex was used as a means to retrieve masculinity and honour. For those men, the need to fulfil the society's hegemonic masculinity was perhaps so strong that it created a moral and religious duality. That is, extra-marital sex is haram (forbidden), but can be forgiven — or hypocritically ignored — if it cured the injured self/ego.

For the average Palestinian, nevertheless, humiliation is repurposed in a more dignified way, namely through the ethos of muqawama. Kanafani believed that muqawama would transform the humiliated refugee into a people and should redeem the emasculated Palestinian man (Amireh 2003). After lamenting the victimised yet passive Palestinians who died in the tank in Men in the Sun (1963), Kanafani, as if shaking off the burden of defeat and dispossession, presents to us the victimised yet defiant Palestinian in All That's Left to You (1966). The novella coincided with the rise of the PLO and armed resistance, so as a narrative it reflected the experience and mode of many Palestinians at the time. It tells us the story of a broken family after the Nakba: the mother is displaced to Jordan and her children to Gaza. The daughter, Merriam, becomes pregnant out-of-wedlock and the son, Zachariah, sets out on an arduous journey to find his mother and to run away from his sister’s shame. The sister symbolises the ‘raped’ Palestine and the mother is the honourable Palestine Zachariah seeks to fight for and retrieve. There is the humiliation, but there is also the will to fight against it.

This is the very dynamic that triggered the transformation from jeel al Nakha (the Nakba generation) to jeel al tahrir (the liberation generation) (see: Matar and Harb 2013). The muted humiliation and unsettling sense of helplessness that followed the Nakba was broken by the first post-Nakba generation. Similar to the period of silence that followed the Shoah, and like a case of childhood abuse, the first decade after the Nakba was characterised by a collective, self-induced psychogenic amnesia. Not in the sense of having forgotten Palestine, but more of an adaptive strategy to cope with the feelings of loss (see: Freyd 1994). Practically as

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53 Partly owing to the significant increase in the numbers of educated Palestinians, thanks to the efforts of the UNRWA (Khalidi 2006).
well, surviving the hardships in the host countries was prioritised over ruminating over a lost homeland. Organising armed resistance against Israel would have been difficult not least because at the time Palestinians lacked the means to carry out attacks on Israel and because they had to answer to the governments of the host countries who wanted to avoid Israeli reprisals on their soil.

In his magnum opus Bab al Shams (Gate of the Sun) (1998), Lebanese novelist Elias Khoury captures the transformation in the Palestinian revolutionary course. Different to Kanafani who depicted the Palestinian experience of his time, Khoury has had the luxury of retrospection. Bab al Shams as a result came out both a tragic anecdote and a disillusioned exploration. Khoury constructs the plot using several yet connected melodramatic stories to reflect the complexities of Palestinian everyday life at multiple points since the Nakba. He introduces a narrative of experience through literature, rather than slip into a clichéd political sloganeering. Instead of spending much time tackling the Palestinian experience from a historical perspective, which the novel makes relatively clear, Khoury chooses to focus on the burden of memory. He introduces the reader to the narrative of the defeated and their shattered sense of identity. The main story of the novel is that of Yunis Al-Asadi. Khoury tells us that after the Nakba Yunis frequently snuck back into Palestine from Lebanon to see his wife Nahila. They usually met in a cave named bab al shams. He left her pregnant after every visit. The latent meaning is that part of Yunis’s resistance was the continuity of his offspring in Palestine. His love story with Nahila symbolises the organic connection to the land. To most, Yunis was a hero, but he now lies helpless in a coma in a run-down hospital in a refugee camp in Lebanon, and is looked after by a doctor, who is not in actual fact a doctor. Khoury here maps the inner conflict about trauma and identity, and is particularly concerned with the Palestinian fear of being forgotten. Through Yunis’s love story, the reader is introduced to an image of people who struggle to remain a people even though they have been separated by exile, ethnic cleansing, several borders and fortifications. Like most stories about Palestine, Bab al Shams is about loss and the futile attempts to reverse the course of history. But the most interesting and perhaps unorthodox aspect of the novel is the re-examination of the concepts of heroism and muqawama. Through the mostly helpless and dreamy characters of the novel, the reader is familiarised with the self-
contradictory dichotomy of heroism and loss, showing how Palestinians have become trapped in a trauma that compels them to endlessly substantiate the victimhood narrative in order to justify the shame of loss and give boost to resistance. Khoury implies that the obdurate production and reproduction of collective memory and with it the constant quest for a lost homeland is perhaps - partly - a narcissistic search for a lost dignity and national masculinity, and an escape from collective humiliation. Carrying on with this insight and supported by Bar-Tal’s framework, the next section discusses how the several dynamics of Palestinian collective memory and the feelings of humiliation made the ethos about *muqawama* particularly salient in both the inner societal workings and the overall perception of the conflict.

**ETHOS ABOUT *MUQAWAMA***

From a cognitive appraisal perspective (Fridja *et al.* 2000; Halperin & Schwartz 2010; Halperin *et al.* 2011), humiliation is generally believed to evoke avoidance and acceptance reactions, such as the inclination to suppress rebellious tendencies. In their study of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, Ginges and Atran (2008) framed the tendency towards inaction as an *inertia effect*. We saw that in the Palestinians who criticised other Palestinians for challenging the occupation and in the workers who found comfort in paid sex. That said, this study concurs with the views of Fernández, Saguy, and Halperin (2015) who claimed that because humiliation is unjust, it also relates to anger. The injustice appraisal is an important variable that links humiliation to anger, because a core appraisal theme underlining anger is injustice (ibid.). In practice, Palestinians developed certain ethos to regulate this anger and reutilise it to alleviate or circumvent the negative impact of humiliation. As extensively discussed in the previous chapters (2, 5, & 6), ethos provides epistemic foundations for society. It supplies the in-group with orientation, direction, and meaning (e.g. Bar-Tal 2007, 2013). Israel’s ethos developed partly to serve as socio-psychological repertoire to counteract the country’s existential fears (ibid., 2001). While Palestinians share similar fears (and needs — varying in complexity, urgency, and prominence), their ethos developed mainly in light of and in response to the asymmetrical power relations with Israel; therefore central to this ethos is the notion of physical and symbolic
resistance — *muqawama*. The ethos of *muqawama*, in other words, aims to ‘correct’ the unbalanced relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. After all, humiliation is made salient through the hierarchy of power, and only through ‘resisting’ can this hierarchy be overcome, or at least reduced. For Palestinians in general, the ethos of *muqawama* is seen as reactive to Israel’s aggression and ultimately geared toward liberation. But at its core lies the burning desire to redeem Palestinian honour and masculinity. With that in mind, the assumption in this study is that the ethos of *muqawama* gives orientation, purpose, and meaning to Palestinians in the conflict in three different ways: a) as a glorified rebellion against the social and political infrastructure, and an insulation against national shortcomings and future uncertainties; b) as an outlet for anger and a means for validation, often through acts of revenge; and c) as a noble goal achieved through martyrdom and self-sacrifice.

**Glorification of Muqawama**

The cat abusing children of Jerusalem had grown up since Ra’ad wrote his book (2010) and with them the sense of shame. Like *jeel al tahrir* (liberation generation) before them, they rebelled against their parents, and the helplessness and daily humiliations they sensed through them eventually materialised into aggression and disorganised acts of revenge against Israel. This was evident in the so-called ‘Knives Intifada,’ or ‘Wave of Terror’ as Israel described it, in the late 2015 into 2016. The *Intifada* was dominated by young Palestinians who were born after Oslo and experienced Israel’s brutality firsthand as children in the Second *Intifada* (2000-05). Many of them went on stabbing sprees against the IDF and Israeli-Jewish civilians, and many lost their lives in the process. Labelled as *muqawama*, the attacks were random and the attackers were not known for being politically affiliated. They all, however, shared the desperation, hopelessness and absence of autonomy which further fuelled their feelings of humiliation and loss of dignity.

Whilst the declared intention was to take revenge against the occupation, to put into actions the ethos of *muqawama*, the Knives *Intifada* was one of those events in Palestinians history which showed that some of the
rage was perhaps internally directed. Not only on the micro family level, but also on the macro level that the Palestinian political system in general and the Palestinian Authority in particular represented. Most Palestinians have become disillusioned with the PA, and because of its shortcomings and security liaison with Israel, it is viewed as ‘misrepresenting the Palestinian national interests’ (Hever 2013). As it stands, in modern Palestinian history, there had never been a Palestinian leadership more willing to achieve some sort of independent state as the current leadership headed by Mahmoud Abbas. Abukhater (2017) accurately describes the Palestinian general mood when he says that despite every sign of non-cooperation, intransigence, and continued violations of agreements and international law by the Israeli governments, the ‘myth’ of the peace process survived, thanks to the efforts of the PA. It is, after all, the main reason it exists. Like the helpless father figure, the PA adds rather than alleviates the sense of humiliation. Lacking autonomy and being an authority under occupation makes it appear like a servant to the oppressor. The concept of ‘servant’ in some Arab cultures is often derogatory and suggests coercion and humiliation.

Closely related to the above is the fact that the political and social system that the PA has grown to represent accentuates the Palestinian general struggle with own shortcomings and nationalistic failures. Karma Nabulsi (2013, in: Johnson & Shehadeh [eds.] 2013, p. 188) points out that almost “…every institution or overarching structure that once united Palestinians has now crumbled and been swept away. The gulf between Gaza and the West Bank, between Hamas and Fatah, between Palestinians inside Palestine and the millions of refugees outside it now seem unbridgeable. This situation is aggravated by Palestinians being trapped into a historical moment that, as far as the world is concerned, belongs to the past. No one cares any longer for talks of liberation: in fact, people flinch at the sound of it. It is unfashionable, embarrassing, and reactionary to speak of revolution today. Many Palestinians are aware of that, but they remain stubbornly, almost wilfully, anchored in that moment of history (ibid.). This is a complex situation that requires a delicate adjustment to the conflict ethos in such a way that it meets today’s demands without compromising the accepted goals and worldview that sprang out of that ‘revolutionary moment.’ To willingly admit that the Palestinians goals have not been met partly because of Palestinian deficiencies contradicts, at the very least, the ethos about the
positive self-image and the notion of being the ‘ideal victims’ in the conflict. By extension, it casts a doubtful light on the beliefs and methods of *muqawama*. Bar-Tal (2013) observed such dynamic among Israeli-Jews; many of them were conditioned to block any flow of information that challenged Israel’s established ethos about the self and the conflict (see Chapter Five). Likewise, to maintain the ideal victim status and justify the ethos about *muqawama*, many Palestinians tend to block the information that signals Palestinian responsibility for some of the Palestinian failures. As a result, it has become almost a culture, today and in retrospect, to blame almost every problem in the Palestinian society on Israel. It is distracting and requires very little scrutiny to be accepted as part of the societal beliefs (e.g. Bar-Tal 2007, 2013).

In several surveys where Israel wasn’t listed as a possible culprit; Palestinians assigned blame to their government and key figures and parties, or to society as a whole. But when Israel was offered as an option, more Palestinians passed responsibility to Israel than opted for any other answer (Polisar 2015). Israel’s comprehensive occupation indeed restricts Palestinian livelihood, but it is not totally omnipresent. The Paris Agreement of 1994, for instance, which broadly sets the financial and economic dynamics of the Palestinian Authority in relation to Israel, allows Israel to have a nearly full control over the Palestinian economy (Palestinian Return Centre 2012). It may be convenient in this light to blame the occupation for all the ailments in the Palestinian economy. But sometimes the PA’s economic policies and various degrees of structural corruption are, too, blamed on Israel.

Being the ‘professional sufferers’ as Volkan (2013a, p.61) describes us, our glorification of the ethos of *muqawama* helps us fulfil some of our psychological needs for security, but in the process it also exposes us to the fragility of our existence. Not only are we in a constant fear of being forgotten and our collective memory being obliterated from history, we also struggle to keep sense of the present. To most Palestinians, we stand against enormous odds. We live in a constant fear and anxiety of tomorrow because very little can we do to control what tomorrow might bring. This breeds an anxious anticipation for the worse, a fight-or-flight daily living. When we laugh hard, we apprehensively wonder what might come next to spoil the moment. Leading
a life of this sort inhibits the cognitive ability to view the future in a brighter colour. You see this mindset not only in the daily interactions but also in almost all types narratives. There is always fear and uneasy uncertainty about tomorrow. Darwish, for instance, communicates this fear in his poem “We Fear for dreams” (1993), saying that we [Palestinians] are afraid of dreams and for dreams. Another Palestinian poet (and writer), Taha Ali (2005), manifests how Palestinian fear of the future has become almost a second nature and a way of life. He writes: *Fear which accompanies me like my pen, lives with me, surprises me like an earthquake, haunts me, but I don’t know what it is.*

Fiction, too, has in most cases a similar tone. Rarely do we find stories with an optimistic views of the future. In *Palestine 100+* (2019), a collection of short stories taking place a hundred years from the *Nakba*, Basma Ghalayini (ed.) remarks that Palestinian authors usually write about the past, and often through the hardships of the present. It is perhaps for this reason the genre of science fiction has never been particularly popular amongst them. It is a luxury most Palestinians feel they cannot afford to embrace. The few attempts to visualise the future typically assumed a dystopian outlook. In Haddad’s short story *Song of the Birds* (in: Ghalayini 2019 [ed.]), we learn about Aya’s memories of her brother Ziad who committed suicide in the year prior. Ziad visits Aya in her dreams to tell her that he killed himself to escape the prison of collective memory. She tells him that Palestine was liberated and justice was realised. In the end, in a terrifying revelation, Ziad tells Aya that her reality was not real; Palestinians were made to live in a computer simulated reality. The memories about liberation and everything else in Palestinian existence were mere algorithm. In that future, Israel extended her control even over Palestinian subconsciousness. Ziad killed himself to be real, to escape the memory of victimhood only to wake up (literally) to a more draconian reality. In the story and others there are multiple signs of a collective mindset characterised by severe pessimism, one designed to cushion the fall should we have high expectations in a very fragile and paranoid environment.

On the ground, this is evident in the Palestinian highly paranoid views of Israel’s intentions and behaviours. Many of us are convinced that the entire peace process is a ruse. When Arafat came back from Camp David
in 2000, he was received as a hero simply because many of us viewed Israel’s process of negotiations as a big game that we were forced into with our hands tied behind our backs. Many felt that Arafat may have actually managed to reinstate some of the Palestinian masculinity and honour — which Oslo had shattered — simply by voicing some ‘NOs’ to Barak and Clinton. Arafat’s ‘symbolic victory’ was viewed as a continuation and implementation of the ethos of muqawama in the sense that he, first, transcended the severe power asymmetry and, second, withstood the enormous pressure and intimidations that came with it. The Second Intifada that soon followed saw that revived dignity and the rejuvenation of collective victimhood fuel resistance. But as Israel’s brutality escalated, humiliation increased and the need to reinstate dignity turned into a series of violent acts of revenge. The ethos of muqawama then shifted slightly from the broad prospects of liberation to the goals of hurting Israel.

I Revenge, Therefore I Am

Humiliation leads to feelings of weakness and inferiority and that leads to what Gilligan (2003) calls ‘the death of self.’ The self, a vulnerable psychological construct, becomes more tormenting than the physical death of the body. Fighting this vulnerability is what may save the humiliated person from the death of the self. A person who was humiliated as a child, and then encounters humiliating situations in adulthood, may become obsessed with humiliation and the plan to remedy it, usually by revenge (Lindner 2001). Varvin (2005) sees that revenge is usually designed to ‘protect’ the group’s integrity and honour.

Nowadays, it seems that for many Palestinians, especially the younger generation who experienced acts of humiliation by Israel tend to prioritise vengeance over peace. Their narratives and ethos about muqawama are often unsophisticated; anger seems to be the dominant active emotion and violence the outlet. Following a wave of attacks by young Palestinians in 2018, a Yedioth Ahronoth’s investigative report (Mar. 2018) speculated that the young attackers lacked political sophistication; they were not attacking Israel with orders from Hamas or the Islamic Jihad or because they felt offended by Trump’s naming Jerusalem Israel’s capital,
or even because of social media incitements. Many of them, the report quoting officials in the Shabak, made
the decision to attack upon seeing the IDF, with no or little planning. The report added that the attacks were
acts of revenge resulting from frustration, hopelessness, and extreme rage. Targeting the Palestinian ‘terror
infrastructure’ or leadership, accordingly, was not going to alleviate those young Palestinians’ hatred to Israel
or change their views that the peace process was a fiasco. According to Lindner (2001), individuals who are
highly stressed and threatened as a result of exposure to war are less likely to support diplomatic negotiation
and peace. The occupation is viewed by the majority as a continuous warfare on identity and very existence.
Exposure to such intensive stimuli produces high levels of psychological stress and threat perceptions, which
in turn may lead to distrust in peace.

Palestinians cannot beat Israel’s systematic attack on dignity by deploying systematic counter-humiliation
measures. They cannot, for instance, blindfold or strip Israeli soldiers at checkpoints. Muqawama by definition
is subject to the balance of power, and is therefore dependent on opportunities. Whilst Israel can retaliate at
will, Palestinians for the most part resort to what can be best described as a ‘sting technique’ to strike back at
Israel. This means an attack can take place only when circumstances allow, and in most cases the physical
effect on Israel is minimal. Palestinians gamble on achieving a psychological impact on Israel’s morale that
may outweigh the physical damage that the attack had caused. The ‘sting technique’ is not meant to
completely undo the harm caused by humiliation given the current power hierarchy. Its essential goal is to
establish ‘a balance of suffering’ (Fria 1994, cited by ibid.) — or, ‘a balance of fear’ — and through that a
semblance of dignity. This balance is often emphasised by one’s ability to hurt Israel — and against all odds.
After all, muqawama is about restoring dignity by challenging the superior power.

That said, there are signs that the emphasis on one’s ability to cause suffering to Israel also reflects an
external narcissistic desire for recognition and validation (Crow et al. 2018). Many Palestinians take pride in
being acknowledged in Israeli media as the ones who hurt Israel. If Israel’s news networks lament a certain
Palestinian attack, then this means we have hurt them and the act of muqawama was a success. As children, we
learned Hebrew terms such as *harogim* (wounded) *fago'ım* (dead) from the Israeli media. When we gathered around the TV to watch Israel's media coverage of a Palestinian attack, it was those particular words that we looked for. What stood out was not only the satisfaction of revenge, but also the pride that our enormous ‘feat of heroism’ has been recognised by our formidable enemy. This is particularly true because in Palestinian popular culture — much of which has been shaped by the ‘culture of conflict’ (Bar-Tal & Halperin 2009; Bar-Tal 2013) — Israel’s capabilities have been exaggerated and even mythologised. The conflict-supporting narratives have permeated all strata of the social structure and allowed for such exaggerations to take root and be seen as culturally valid (ibid.). There is, for instance, a common Palestinian proverb that goes: “when a Jew dies.” It is a reference to rarity, and can be used in numerous social situations. But it stems from a societal belief that Israel is very powerful and the chances of an Israeli-Jew being killed in a Palestinian attack are extremely rare. On one hand, this is a confirmation of Palestinian helpless victimhood against Israel’s military might, and on the other, an exaggeration of the achievements of *muqawama*. This — once again — reflects the Palestinian tendency to adjust the conflict ethos about *muqawama* in a way that emphasises and glorifies Palestinian agency, but without compromising the overarching societal belief of being the ‘ideal victim’ in the conflict.54

Seeking validation from Israel points toward a deep psychological crisis in the Palestinian self-identity vis-à-vis Israel. If Israeli-Jews discuss what *we* did, they by default discuss *us* — which makes us present, if not important. We draw self-validation from what we assume as Israeli-Jewish acknowledgement of our presence and agency — often misinterpreted as validation of our independent identity. This is unsurprising given that much of the Palestinian struggle is about being *remembered* as a people. In a way, this dynamic is similar to Israel’s constant pursue of Palestinian validation of Israel as a ‘Jewish state.’ Rogers (1959, in: Schimel et al. 2001) suggested that people whose acceptance from others depends on meeting others’ ‘conditions of worth’

54 In Chapter Five (pp. 125-26) it was noted that at the JIPSC, Palestinians were offended when Israeli-Jewish participants brought up the issue of suicide bombing. It was speculated that Palestinians felt that giving them agency — the ability to inflict harm — clashed with their self-image as the ideal victims. This happened mainly because ‘agency’ came as an accusation rather than a confirmation from the Israeli-Jewish participants. In the case of *muqawama*, agency is glorified as long as it does not clash with the Palestinian victimhood narratives.
may experience reality ‘secondhand,’ feel valuable only to the extent that they are living up to such standards, and are prone to defensiveness. Consider this, in a survey conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre JMCC in 1999, the majority of the Palestinian participants rated Israel as ‘intelligent.’ This was balanced out by giving Israel a high score in both violence and dishonesty (Polisar 2015). Admitting that Israel is a ‘clever enemy’ raises the par for the type of ‘validation’ Israel may deliver regarding Palestinian successes. A qualified opinion, as it were.

Furthermore, consider the documentary *Gaza War: An Israeli Perspective*, which was produced by Al-Jazeera in September 2015. It focused on the war from the point of view of Israel’s military leaders and soldiers. The speakers admitted Israel’s failures throughout the war and the IDF’s ‘surprise’ at Palestinian fighting skills and tactics. The film was immediately picked up by many Palestinian media outlets as a testimony of the ‘resistance outstanding performance’ during the war. There is something to be said about that. But this study is more concerned with the psychological need for acknowledgement, even in the negative sense, to prove that we, Palestinians, can impose our existence against Israel’s will, yet feel a boost of ego if Israel acknowledges what we, even slightly, aim(ed) to achieve. When the capable and clever yet brutal and violent enemy says we are good, even if not admirably, they feed our narcissistic self-image. We utilise their narratives to give credence to our *muqawama* narratives.

To view it from a different but relevant angle, it may also be argued that this need of validation falls within what Noha Mellor (2009) describes as the masculinisation of war discourse. Whilst Mellor’s context is the media coverage of the Iraq war and even though the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not a war (at least not in the traditional sense), the conceptualisation of masculinity as a discourse still applies. Mellor explains that in some Arabic newspapers the role and effectiveness of Iraqi resistance to the US presence was emphasised, using words like ‘fierce battles’ and ‘defend,’ which gave the impression that it was a fight between foes of equal power. In those papers, the narrative of ‘fighting against superior power’ was also present. Here, nationalist masculinity is presented in two ways: strength and the ability to withstand enormous odds.
Withstanding enormous odds probably scores higher on the *muqawama* scale as it stresses both victimhood and bravery. The Palestinian ethos of *muqawama* are delivered in a similar fashion — with the addition that the Palestinian search of Israel’s validation is also a search for affirmation of Palestinian masculinity, which, too, is geared toward resolving the humiliated self or — as in Gilligan’s reflection (2003) — to ‘revive the dead self.’

**Ethos of Muqawama and Self-Sacrifice**

Bar-Tal (2007) notes that during intractable conflicts, collective life is marked by continuous confrontation that requires mobilisation and sacrifice of the society members. Certain adaptation strategies are required to fulfil the physical and psychological needs of society members. *Muqawama* as noted earlier is one of the adaptation mechanisms which fulfils some of psychological needs of the Palestinian collective. Mainly due to the power hierarchy, it is typically discernible in the dialectical relationship between humiliation and revenge. With the interaction between the two, however, a third manifestation of victimhood appears: *shahada* or *isteshhad* (martyrdom), otherwise known as self-sacrifice. It is the psychological readiness to suffer and sacrifice one’s life for a cause (Bélanger et al. 2014). Most Palestinians can identify with the self-sacrificing figure, the *shaheed* (martyr). Insomuch that the notion of *shahada* (martyrdom) has made normal, non-sacrificial, non-political death a less dignified end of life. In this study the concepts of martyrdom and self-sacrifice are seen as ‘functionally equivalent’ (ibid.) and are used interchangeably. Though, it is important to point out that in the Palestinian context martyrdom is a broad term that includes both passive and active types of dying. By passive it means being killed without being involved in political activities or dying due to procedural issues related to Israel, such as cancer patients who die in Palestinian hospitals after they have been denied permission to be treated in Israeli hospitals. The focus in this section is on the active form of self-sacrifice as part of the societal beliefs about *muqawama*.

55 *Isteshhad* and *shahada* are used interchangeably, except *shahada* also means ‘testimony’ or ‘bearing witness.’

56 *Shaheed* or *shahid* (martyr) in Arabic literally means ‘someone who bears witness [before God] to the injustice he/she had suffered.”
In a society characterised by abnormal and anxious existence, it is almost necessary to add an element of meaningful heroism to death. Dying is associated with struggle, especially political struggle and by definition with the occupation. Shaheed is an individual who through physical death seeks to beat the psychological death of the self. The death of the physical body may provide the victim with control over own life and strip the oppressor of the means of abuse. Therefore, defying death or eliminating the fear of it through martyrdom is a way to overcome humiliation and re-establish an honourable self-esteem (Salama 2015). Furthermore, shaheed represents the victim’s absolute moral superiority. The number of martyrs, suggests Danneskiold-Samsoe (2014), bolsters the value of moral economy of victimhood, as it reflects the extent of suffering and human losses, which may attract attention and recognition. Looking at the cases of four bereaved families, Palestinian journalist Maha Wadia (2017) sees that Palestinian media narratives have become over-occupied with the stories of the dead. As soon as a Palestinian is killed, Palestinian journalists flock to the victim’s home and shower the grief-stricken family, rather insensitively, with questions about sacrifice and the message they would like to convey to Israel. Wadia explains that Palestinian media knows what resonates well with the audience, they know that death scores very high on the scale of collective victimhood and the sense of heroic sacrifice, or more heroically: self-sacrifice. The higher the death toll, the more validated the narrative becomes. Because of what shaheed represents, however, the few stories that do not fall within the overall narrative are rarely written about or filmed. Wadia wonders why the media did not, for instance, write about the bereaved mother who shouted at the journalists: “damn you…and damn Palestine, I want my son back!”

The societal beliefs about martyrdom are perhaps motivated more by themes about the justness of the goals, and less by themes about the delegitimisation of opponent, positive self-image, security, patriotism, unity, and peace (see: Bar-Tal 2007, 2013). Justness of the goals provides a justification based on sacred values and ‘moral mandates’ (Skitka & Houston 2001) that help to keep the collective mobilised. Society members thus are expected to adhere to these goals stubbornly and try to achieve them even with violence (Bar-Tal 2013). Israeli-Jews and Palestinians are not drastically different in this regard. But as Bar-Tal (2013, p. 175) claims,
“...ethos reflects the society members’ accumulated and continuous experiences in conflict.” This practically means that certain ethos themes are case/context specific. What makes Palestinian goals particularly different from Israel’s is that they almost completely fall under the concept of ‘supreme goals.’ Citing Skitka (2002), Bar-Tal (2013) sees that self-determination, equality, freedom and justice are supreme goals. These define almost every aspect of Palestinian existence, and are emphasised in light of three key narratives: Nakba, a history of defeat and loss; occupation, present-day weakness and aggression; and pessimism, hopelessness and existential fear of the future. Combined, they represent an unceasing and profound sense of collective victimhood, of which humiliation is a significant factor. This results in an urgency for a solution — for a way out, which is achieved either through the muqawama sting techniques or, if not possible, through the ultimate exit of martyrdom. In other words, if the goals are of supreme, existential value and the available means of resistance are marginally effective given the existing power hierarchy, then what is required is a special kind of measure: martyrdom, or in extreme cases, self-sacrifice. Self-sacrifice here assumes a proactive role in the form of isteshhadi (self-sacrifier, e.g. suicide bomber), someone who actively and meticulously anticipates and plans a version of victory through their physical death.

During the second Intifada, helpless and overwhelmed by Israel’s military power, Palestinians resorted to ‘suicide bombings.’ Self-sacrifice was weaponised and the unequivocally sinful nature of ‘suicide’ was justified through the concept of ‘glorious martyrdom.’ Religious interpretations played a significant part in that. The obvious central goal of suicide attacks was to harm others assumed to be inimical to the goals of the cause (Bélanger et al. 2014). That included almost every Israeli-Jewish adult. As the attacks resulted in civilian casualties, Palestinian ‘self-sacrifice’ was framed as terrorism mainly by countries in the West. The motivational underpinning of political self-sacrifice was traditionally attributed to individual characteristics, situational circumstances (socio-economic and political factors), or psychopathological reasons (ibid.).
addition to attributing Palestinian suicide bombings to the religious, ideological, or socioeconomic factors, Israel also interpreted them in terms of mindless hatred of Jews (see previous chapter: the mechabel narrative).

With that said, self-sacrifice in the form of suicide attacks remains an extreme, if not a destructive, manifestation of the dichotomy of victimhood and muqawama. As it stands, a Palestinian suicide bomber’s mission cannot only be understood as punitive to those inimical to the goals of the cause, or analysed solely on political or socio-economical basis, it should also be viewed as a reformative measure, same as the other aspects of muqawama. By punishing the enemy, one regains control and in the process reforms the shattered self-esteem, sharaf (honour), and masculinity. The absence of these values represents the symbolically dead self (Gilligan 2003), which isteshhad seeks to revive. Isteshhadi Muhammad Al-Ghoul, for example, who blew himself up in a bus carrying Jewish settlers in Jerusalem in 2002, wrote in his will: “It is glorious to turn my bones into fragments, not because we love to kill, but because we want to live.” (Banat 2010). He saw in death a means to reform a flawed situation. It was both an escape and a noble path to a dignified life.

A similar notion can be found in several forms of narrative: media, fiction, signs and symbols. In visual media, the film Paradise Now (2005) tells us the story of two friends from Nablus, Khaled and Said who decide to join the resistance and become suicide bombers. Khaled, an Isteshhadi-to-be sees that Palestinians under the occupation are already dead and only physical death can bring salvation. The second Isteshhadi-to-be, Said, represents the dilemma of humiliation and dignity. Like Zachariah in Kanafani’s All That’s Left to You (1966) who tried to wash away his sister’s shame with muqawama, Said believed that dying as a shaheed would restore his family’s sharaf which was stained after his father was killed years earlier over charges of collaboration. A similar idea is present in Omar (2013), another Palestinian film that tells the story of a Palestinian muqawem (freedom fighter) who is coerced to collaborate with the Shabak to protect his and his girlfriend’s sharaf. Shooting his Israeli recruiter in the end is shown as a way to cleanse his soul even if that meant his physical

57 Berrebi (2007), nonetheless, finds that Palestinian suicide bombers have substantially higher education and better economic backgrounds than average Palestinians. It seems the higher the level of education the acuter one’s awareness of own victimisation.
death. The film also emphasises the masculinisation of *muqawama* and the feminisation of humiliation; that is, Omar's job is to protect ‘his woman’ and in the process protect the female collectivity that is the notion of Palestine.

Importantly, *Omar* also shows that the notion of *isteshhadi* is a fluid one. It is not always a description of a premeditated self-sacrifice, as someone strapped with an explosive belt ready to die. Rather, it can also mean an anticipation and acceptance of the high likelihood of death in the process of resisting. Given the steep asymmetrical power relations, many Palestinian attacks often lead to the death of the attacker. Therefore, most attacks regardless of the method are essentially *isteshhadi* operations. This, among other things, gave rise to the notion of ‘living Shaheed.’ The term has religious connotations and is used by almost all resistance groups in the region. But because the odds for Palestinians are notably high, the term has become an essential part of the ‘culture of conflict’ (Bar-Tal & Halperin 2009; Bar-Tal 2009). The tradition requires that a *muqawama* activist (*muqawem*) write or video-record his/her will in case or in anticipation of death. The will usually highlights the *muqawem*’s reasons for getting involved in the fight. More often than not, these reasons act as a mirror for society’s conflict ethos and dominant emotional orientations. The will is usually initiated or concluded/signed with the *muqawem* referring to him/herself as the living *shaheed*. It usually goes as follows: “…your brother/sister [name], the living *shaheed*.” The ‘tradition’ is so rooted — one might say ‘fashionable’ — that it found its way even among many non-affiliated teenagers, who took to social media as a modern alternative to wills to declare their desire to die as *shaheeds* for the cause. As one among many, seventeen-year-old Qutaiba Zahran from Tulkarem posted his desire for *shahada* on Facebook. Mere minutes later, he was lying in a pool of blood having attempted to stab a soldier on Za’atara checkpoint in Nablus (Wattan News, Aug. 2017).

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58 The term originates in Islamic theology and has been used by both Sunni and Shia Muslims: Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, Fatah, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Yemeni Houthis, the Iraqi Hashd Al-Sha’abi, the Syrian Free Army, and others.

59 City in northern West Bank.
The ‘living shaheed’ notion in the ethos of *muqawama* may be understood as endowing *istesbbad* with a transcendental power, one assumed superior to Israel’s military prowess. This is evident in the *Shaheed* burial rituals. Kissing and caressing the *shaheed’s* face may not only be a mere ritualistic farewell, it is also a show of defiance. By treating the *shaheed’s* body as a living body, Palestinians perhaps try to prove to themselves and Israel that the struggle is never abolished by death. When Israel released Qutaiba’s body (after nearly a month), Avichay Adraee, the IDF’s Arabic spokesman, tweeted that ‘today we make Qutaiba’s family weep.” The family responded with a selfie showing their son’s body surrounded by the male family members [across three generations] expressionless or slightly smiling (Wattan News, Sept. 2017). Whilst a controversial message of defiance, the selfie emphasised the element of continuity in the concept of *istesbbad* and with it the perpetuation of a righteous struggle.

Qutaiba’s family manifested a Palestinian experience so profound that it has become part of almost all types of narrative textuality. Not only in sophisticated social representations such as films and novels, but also in the particularly emotional cultural expressions like slogans and revolutionary songs. It is common in Palestinian demonstrations or funeral processions, for example, for the crowds to shout the slogan: “To *Al-Quds* (Jerusalem) we shall go, martyrs in the millions.” In Hamas’ demonstration, these slogans acquire a religious undertone, where the demonstrators shout: “Our best wishes is to die for the sake of God.” To the Islamists, there is almost no separation between the political act of *muqawama* and being a religious duty under the label of Jihad. Thus, to die for the noble and righteous cause of liberation is also to die for God. Either way, the sloganeering emphasises *istesbbad* as the highest value in *muqawama* and the means of defiant continuity of the Palestinian collective. This sentiment is also quite common in the revolutionary songs. One song, for example, goes (2015):

*Oh mother, sing and rejoice! Your son is a hero, he never died.*

*Tell my father and siblings, never shed tears.*
The latent content here is that *isteshhad* is a glorified mission and instead of grieving, the *shaheed* should be celebrated as a hero. Looking at death as only another plane of existence, the song, like the slogans and Qutaiba’s family, emphasises the element of continuity in the struggle.

That said, despite the social and psychological comfort they provide, the societal beliefs about *muqawama* and with it the notions of self-sacrifice and martyrdom have a dark side which, like the internalisation of humiliation, can burden society from within.

**The Struggle Within**

Ethos in general provides the collective with positive orientations and views about the conflict and the self. But this process also entails certain negative attitudes toward the out-group. It seems that the more positive the in-group’s collective self-image is, especially as victims, the more negative the perception of the rival becomes (e.g. Bar-Tal 2013). Hence the claim that a defining component of conflict is ‘negative identity’ (Kelman 1987, 1999) (see Chapter Two). One of the assumptions in this study is that the negative reverberations of the conflict ethos whilst normally directed at the out-group, can have a negative impact internally. As in the overall ethos of *muqawama*, the notion of *isteshhad* provides orientation and purpose, and acts as a coping mechanism against the enormous odds of the conflict. This is viewed as generally positive to the in-group. But having been constructed as a cultural belief in itself, *isteshhad* has a negative side which psychologically drains the Palestinian collective from within. It might even be said that the societal beliefs about *isteshhad* have done to Palestinians as much psychological damage as did the notion of ‘lachrymose history’ to Israeli-Jews.

On a personal note, as a young man in Gaza, I marched in several funeral processions for people I knew or in solidarity with others I did not. Observing the funeral dynamics, four themes seemed prominent. The first theme was victimhood, usually the backdrop and the overarching umbrella of the three other themes. The
second was the calls for revenge. The third was the glorification of *isteshhad*, and it took a celebratory nature.

The fourth theme was grief. The first two themes are perhaps dominant in all forms of *muqawama*. The dilemma, however, occurs in the contradictions between the third and the fourth themes. This is where the split-personality of the Palestinian collective can best be discerned.

As we marched the shaheed to his/her final resting place, people and children as young as ten competed to take part in carrying the coffin. At the front, sometimes there were armed men who fired in the air in defiance. At the back, occasionally there were women, including the shaheed’s mother, sounding zaghareet.60

The rest of people shouted slogans for Palestine and vowed for revenge. Ironically, these ‘rituals’ are more or less present in a traditional Palestinian zaffeh (wedding march/procession). The shaheed is replaced with a groom, family and friends compete to carry him on their shoulders. At the front walks the father, sometimes surrounded by armed men who would shoot in the air in jubilation. At the back, women sounded zaghareet.

Darwish captured such moment in his poem “Praise to a Thing that Never Came” (1973). He wrote: *This is the endless wedding, on the endless stage, in an endless night, this is the Palestinian wedding where only through martyrdom and displacement lovers can meet and embrace.* Darwish uses ‘wedding’ as an allegory for the Palestinian struggle. In this struggle death is a defiant continuation and through death [in the struggle] life can be created and the homeland salvaged. Darwish’s words channel out much of the Palestinian consciousness without needing to indulge in psychological analyses.

As a coping mechanism, the psychological barriers between sorrow and joy, between death and life are suspended. One might argue that establishing a sense of ‘eternal continuation’ between life and death — partly influenced by religious beliefs about the prospect of an afterlife — serves to suppress grief and provide a sense of comfort. However, as the conflict continued, our coping mechanisms regarding death became

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60 Singular is *zarghrounta*, best described in English as “Ululation”. It is a form of a long, wavering, high-pitched vocal sound representing trills of joy. It is produced by emitting a high pitched loud voice accompanied by a rapid back and forth movement of the tongue.
increasingly normalised as a collective state of mind, something of a culture. So much so that Palestinian poet Wafa’a Rabai’a once wondered whether the Palestinian glorification of martyrdom was a destiny or simply a choice (Ouf 2014), whether the daily casualties forced us to transform grief into a proud culture so we can survive. It may be suggested that we are not different from our oppressors in this respect. To draw again on Falk’s psychoanalysis of the Jewish collective (1993, 1996, 2004), we, like many Jews, may have lost our ability to mourn our losses properly. Not only because of collective memory as is the case for Jews, but also because of the harsh present — which in many ways is a repetitive shadow of our collective memory.

While not completely hegemonic, in the semi-festive rituals of shaheed burial, in trying to eliminate the boundaries between life and death, many bereaved families became trapped between their pride and sense of defiance and their instincts as grieving parents and siblings. We saw that in the fathers who praised their heroic sons/daughters but dipped into severe depression immediately after, and in the mothers who could not reconcile their social role as the ‘producers of heroes’ and their inability to cope with the death of a child. Pressed between the occupation and what might be viewed as radical coping techniques, Palestine is now a psychologically fatigued collective. Nearly 40% of Palestinians suffer from clinical depression and anxiety, making it the highest percentage in the world. In Gaza the problem is particularly acute (Afana et al. 2004; Hoyle 2017). This is indeed a closed vicious bubble with little there is to burst it. Muqawama might be a most needed ethos that orients society, provides it with meaning and strength and acts as a reformative measure, but it is also a destructive force when it becomes an end in itself. Because of that, Palestinian society today has to bear the brunt of the occupation and the contradictions it created to cope with that occupation.

CONCLUSION

Guided by Bar-Tal’s views on collective memory, emotional orientations, and conflict ethos (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001, 2007, 2013), and using several narrative sources and narrative analysis, as well as supported by this author’s insider observations and self-reflexivity, three motifs appeared: 1) Palestinians collective memory is largely based on the fear of memoricide; 2) humiliation dominates as a collective emotional orientation, and
in response to humiliation; 3) *muqawama* seems to occupy a central position as a conflict ethos. Together, the three motifs shape much of the Palestinian victim identity, which defines most aspects of Palestinian day-to-day living.

The majority of Palestinians alive today were born under Israel’s occupation and continue to live as memory nomads as did their grandparents. These facts act as filters though which many Palestinians perceive and experience reality. Because of that and despite the glorification of the ethos of *muqawama*, there are signs that many Palestinians have become trapped in the status quo, so much so that they cannot effectively visualise what life without Israel’s control could or should be like. The absence of a frame of reference has been detrimental to any risk-taking necessary to settle the conflict. What eventually materialised was a set of beliefs that served as blockers to any information that may challenge the Palestinian worldview (Bar-Tal 2001, 2013).

If the information reveals that our worldview is incompatible with facts or invalid, most Palestinians - same as Israeli-Jews - would construe a situation or reconstruct the facts, rather than modify their worldview (Mack 2003). There seems to be a tendency to keep the status quo unchecked, not only because victimhood has political benefits, but also because it is a familiar environment that justifies our situation. In a way, Israel’s control helps us come to terms with the guilt and shame associated with our collective memory, and gives grounds for our current shortcomings and the inability thus far to reach our supreme goals of self-determination and freedom. Because of that, our right to resist has perhaps transcended its intended goal as an instrument for liberation and became an open-ended purpose in itself. In the process, we became immune to self-reflection, and our the ability to see contradictions in our victimhood narratives has diminished.

Depending on victimhood to rationalise and cope with the conflict has also locked us in an almost permanent negative identity mode (Kelman 1987, 1999) against Israel. Because modern Palestinian identity is about a hundred years old (see: Khalidi 1997), it has always been connected to Zionism. We have now grown reliant on Israel as a negative reflection of ourselves, as a measure for self-validation, and above all, we might have become addicted to Israel's ability to inflict pain. To remove this pain means to compromise our self-
perception as the ideal victims (see: Christie 1986) and what we celebrate the most, namely the Palestinian ability to endure pain (see: Joffe 2015). That came to define our perception and approach to the possibility of settlement with Israel. In the peace talks with Israel, for example, Peleg (2015) talked about the Palestinian ‘overpowering demands for justice’ which, to him, ‘cocooned’ the Israeli-Jewish team in a defensive mode. Our negotiators, like the rest of us, assumed that pain and suffering were a way to provoke the Other to redefine their relation (Kovacevic 2011). By overwhelming the opponent with ‘the outcome’ of their own wrongdoings, it was possible — some of us believed — to narrow the power gap and reduce the humiliation of weakness that the occupation has inflicted upon us. Ultimately, suffering needs an audience — and there is no better audience than the one who inflicted it in the first place. This is the ‘demonstrative feature’ (Reik 1941, cited by Rathbone 2001) that indicates a masochistic behaviour.

Despite the fact that political realism may provide some solution in the form of a one-state or two-state, it will always be socio-psychologically lacking as long as most of the core beliefs about the conflict are in a ‘frozen state’ (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001). As it stands, much of Palestinians victimhood narratives have become a mindset, thus it is unlikely that removing the current physical causes of victimisation or settling the clash in the geopolitical interests will necessarily lead to immediate psychological salvation. Not least because we may remain trapped in our collective memory where Israel continues to be viewed as a de facto foreign entity on Palestinian land. Our emotional orientations and the conflict ethos might continue to respond to and reflect that conviction. This is coupled with the assumption that as long as Israel continues to live ‘by the sword’ as Netanyahu says (Ravid 2015), Palestinians will continue to view any peace attempts with Israel, as Kanafani puts it, like “the kind of conversation between the sword and the neck” (Carleton 1970).

It remains the enduring conviction in this study however that despite the grim prospects of peacemaking at the moment, the road to settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict begins with being receptive to cognitive dissonance (see: Festinger 1957) and willing to challenge the existing narratives. Though they may appear as the first mile of the thousand mile journey, attempts to reexamine and revise the dominant societal beliefs
mainly in Israel and among some Palestinians do exist. The next chapter explores some of the emerging counter-narratives.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CHALLENGING VICTIMHOOD AS A DRIVING FORCE IN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT:

The Case of Counter-Narratives
OVERVIEW

Guided by Bar-Tal’s thoughts on collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations, the previous three chapters examined the impact of the narratives of victimhood and their multiple manifestations on intractability and settlement. The fundamental thesis was that as far as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is concerned, many aspects of Israel’s victimhood have little credibility. It was also found that certain aspects of Palestinian victimhood required further scrutiny. The two victimhood narratives to varying degrees contributed to the impasse in peacemaking. To avoid potential binaries mainly in the discussion on Israel — owing perhaps to this author’s positionality — this chapter seeks to focus on the exceptions to the rule, namely the counter-narratives to what otherwise be deemed a hegemonic narrative.

In the first section, the chapter examines Israel’s counter-narratives, starting with the scholarly work of Israel’s New Historians. After that the focus shifts to the social and peace movements/activism such as Neve Shalom, Shalom Achshav, and Zochrot (remembrance). Next, the chapter looks at the individual counter-narrativists, that includes but not limited to film maker Samuel Maoz and musician Gilad Atzmon. This is followed by a critique of Israel’s counter-narratives in the light of collective memory and conflict ethos. In the second section, the chapter examines the circumstances that hindered the emergence and development of Palestinian counter-narratives and also explains why the critique of Palestinian victimhood in this study can be a form of counter-narrative.

COUNTER-NARRATIVES IN ISRAEL

Background

Previously, it was explained that collective memory has been the primary culprit in mainstreaming the victimhood narratives in Israel today. Greilsammer (2012) argues that these narratives were not only accepted
as accurate representation of history during the first forty years, incorporated in the school system, disseminated in the media and youth movements, but were also considered a ‘sacred tale’ that no one dared to question.

It is argued that the 1973 Yom Kippur war which left the Jewish public in shock led to accusing the government of lies and deception as they did not anticipate the Egyptian and Syrian attacks. The disillusionment with the political institutions and army opened the door to questioning the country’s accepted ‘fundamental truths’ (ibid., also see: Shlaim 2001). That grew intenser during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Some Israeli-Jews saw in the atrocities committed by the IDF — especially as the Sabra and Shatila massacre came to light — a reason to question the ‘accepted narratives’ about the morality of the IDF in 1948, and with it Israel’s collective victimhood orthodoxies. Additionally, by the end of the 1980s Israel was no longer a third-world country or existentially threatened; the IDF was the strongest army in the Middle East and the economy was booming (ibid.). That created extra social mobility and more relaxed attitudes to unorthodox ideas. The period also saw the declassifications of some of the archival materials from the 1948 war (Abu Sha’ar 2010). In such environment a small group of Israeli-Jewish academics and intellectuals, typically from the left, emerged. The new movement would later be called “the New Historians” (*ha historyonim ha chadashim*) (see: Levine 1996; Pappé 1997; Rashed *et al*. 2014).

**The New Historians**

Blomeley (2005) remarks that the intellectual and moral impetus of the New Historians rests on the following assumption: if Zionism can be maintained to be an ideology born of humanism and liberal values then its history is just and its future in its present form assured, yet if Zionism is unmasked as a colonial movement, then its past, present and future must somehow be reconciled (see Chapter Four). This is momentous because Zionism is not a mere set of ideas, it is a hegemonic order that constitutes a ‘common sense’ moral universe and a system of privileges for most Israeli-Jews and many Jews worldview. As in any society, this hegemonic
order is supported, defended, and disseminated by state apparatuses, of both civil and repressive institutions, as well as by non-state groups (Turner 2015). In practice this means that excavating Zionism — which goes well beyond the mere critique of the state policies, politics, or measures — can represent a challenge to the very soul of the nation and would put the counter-narrativists on a collision course with the full force of the existing social order.

Harkabi’s book *Israel’s Fateful Hour* in 1986 (English translation came out in 1989) was one of the early attempts to question Israel’s established system. In the book Harkabi launched a blistering attack on the expansionist policies of the Begin and Shamir governments. He advocated negotiations with the PLO to establish an independent Palestinian state. Harkabi’s book represented what may be called a practical solution through self-critique and, by directly deconstructing Israel’s system and policies, he indirectly shed lights of doubt on the core societal beliefs, much of which revolved around the group’s victimisation. Harkabi nevertheless did not thoroughly examine Israel’s foundations or Zionism’s political and philosophical infrastructure. This could be due to the socio-political situation at the time of writing the book not being fully ripe for radical paradigm shifts, and/or because Harkabi did not perceive his group victimisation as personally relevant or consciously identified with the dominant interpretations regarding collective memory (see: Vollhardt 2012). Harkabi was a realist with good knowledge of Arabic and Arab culture, so there is the possibility that he was mainly concerned with the geo-political side of the conflict.

Simha Flapan’s book *the Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities* (1987) was perhaps the first academic exercise to challenge the traditionalist views of Israel’s history where Israel was portrayed as a vulnerable small country surrounded by millions of aggressive Arabs. Flapan discussed seven fundamental myths surrounding the establishment of the State. He debunked the claims that the Zionists accepted the UN partition plan of 1947 and the Arabs rejected it, that the Arab armies set out to annihilated the Jews, that Israel was vulnerable, and, most importantly, that the ‘War of Independence’ was a war of self-defence. He repeatedly argued that the 1948 war was an aggression and ethnic cleansing. In effect, Flapan’s work was an unapologetic excavation of
the almost sacred tenets of Zionism and by extension the held beliefs about Israel's victimisation in the conflict. That makes the book perhaps the first actual spark that ignited the emergence of the New Historians movement as we know it today. The movement would be headed by Benny Morris, Ilan Pappé, and Avi Shlaim, each with his special revisionist take on history.

It was Benny Morris, however, who coined the term ‘New Historians.’ In his painstakingly researched book *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem* (1988 [2004 reprint]), Morris argued that the Palestinian exodus was largely due to military attacks, fear of attacks, and expulsions. The author, however, denies there were centralised expulsion policy or systematic plans for transfer. Despite the bone-chilling detailed accounts of the Nakba, Morris comes to a surprising conclusion that the Palestinians were ‘victims’ of war and not by design or premeditated effort. This conclusion was reiterated later in an interview titled “Survival of the Fittest” with Haaretz (Shavit 2004 — also refer to chapter 4). He commented that the ethnic cleansing of Palestine was a necessity in order for a Jewish state to be established. Morris added: “I don't think that the expulsions of 1948 were war crimes. You can't make an omelet without breaking eggs. You have to dirty your hands.” In a fashion reminiscent of Begin, Shamir, and Netanyahu, Morris also said: “A society that aims to kill you forces you to destroy it. When the choice is between destroying or being destroyed, it's better to destroy.” Morris may have critiqued the core myths of Zionism, but ultimately failed to detach himself from the Zionist grand-narrative and collective memory. Sayegh (2005) said that Morris’s book reads like a scholarly work, but it coldly glosses over the war crimes of 1948 as though they were mere statistics. To Sayegh, Morris’s scholarship was detached from his morality.

Ilan Pappé goes a lot further than Morris in criticising Israel's historical ethos (Blomeley 2005). In *The Making of the Arab/Israeli Conflict* (1992, in: Blomeley 2005) he challenged several of Israel's founding myths, looking at the Zionist collusion with King Abdullah of Transjordan to prevent the establishment of an Arab state in Palestine and Israel’s intransigence at many peace offers by Arab states before and during 1948. In an article in 1997 Pappé (1997) presented a counter-narrative regarding even the Israeli terminology about the war of
1948. He explained that the terminology was carefully constructed in order to “confer upon Zionism the equivalent status of a third world liberation movement.” The Palestinians are missing from the story, and this can be found implicitly in the terms used for the 1948 war: *azma’ut* (independence) from the British, and *shihrur* (liberation) from the *galut*. In his later book *the Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (2006), Pappé expanded the argument from earlier years, mainly challenging Morris’ conclusions and emphasised the existence of Planet *Dalet* (Hebrew for ‘D’). It was a master plan for the expulsion of as many Palestinians as possible. In the book, Pappé dismantled Zionism as a settler-colonial movement and by extension raised a few serious questions about his country’s claims of victimhood. In a later work with Hilal (2010) he employed his historical revisionism to directly critique Israel’s victimhood narratives.

Shlaim’s earliest contribution to the revisionist history debate was a book titled *Collusion Across the Jordan* (1988 — book review: Sheffer 1990). In it he revealed that the early Zionists, with the blessings of the British, colluded with the Hashemite rulers of Jordan to divide Palestine. The book, among other things, debunked the official story that the Arabs were all determined to destroy Israel. Shlaim’s more recent book *The Iron Wall* (2001) is a continued effort in new historiography. From the outset (p. xii) Shlaim declares that his aim is to offer a revisionist interpretation of Israel’s policy towards the Arab world during the fifty years following the achievement of statehood. The book challenges the dominant orthodoxies about Israel being a vulnerable country against the Arab armies. He questions whether the Arab armies really represented a David versus Goliath scenario in 1948. To Shlaim, the portrayal of Israel facing enormous odds is nothing but a nationalistic heroic-moralist narrative. The Zionist militias, Shlaim claims, were larger in number and significantly better equipped than the attacking Arab armies combined.

It is now believed that Israel’s new historiography made a significant headway on the societal level, peaking in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Shlaim (2004) argues that the new history presented a shift toward more moderate attitudes in the political arena, boosted awareness of the complex historical roots of the conflict, and increased sympathy for the suffering of the Palestinians. Self-righteousness and habitual blaming of the
Palestinians for their own misfortunes began to give way to a better understanding for the part played by Israel in causing the conflict and more constructive attempts to heal the wound of this conflict. These attempts manifested in a variety of progressive social groups/movements and individual activism with the mission to challenge the state narratives and societal beliefs, and to promote mutual dialogue, peace negotiations, a two-state solution, and Palestinian human rights.

**SOCIAL COUNTER-NARRATIVES**

According to Turner (2015), opposition to hegemonic orders comes from social movements from below, not [through] an outright, violent assault on the established order, but [through] a gradual process of disarticulation and re-articulation. The author resembles the process to a war of attrition in the redoubts and trenches of civil society, and describes it as “…a battle of ideas, a struggle to win further supporters to the cause of change: it is an active and dynamic process of creating and extending opposition” (p. 554). The fact remains that the challenge to the hegemonic narrative varies in its goals and convictions and therefore the counter-narrativists differ in their missions and worldview(s). Counter-narrativists come in two forms, a) group efforts: organisations and movements like the Parents Circle, Zochrot, Neve Shalom, and Shalom Achshav, and b) individual efforts: largely through personal activism as in the case of filmmaker Samuel Maoz and musician Gilad Atzmon. While there are no organisations that officially focus on examining Israel’s victimhood narratives; it remains the enduring conviction in this thesis that the act of challenging the dominant societal beliefs, from whichever angle and for whatever purpose, ultimately casts light on the controversies surrounding Israel’s victim self-image.

**Group Efforts**

Founded in 1996, the Parents Circle - Families Forum (PC-FF) is a grassroots organisation for the bereaved families on both sides of the conflict. Its primary goal is to challenge the mainstream narratives in Israel and
Palestine by creating empathy through recognising mutual suffering. The organisation also introduces the participants to the narratives of the Other with the aim of achieving mutual understanding and the hope for future reconciliation. By creating a common narrative through mutual suffering, the organisation also aims to reduce the monopoly over victimhood claims. It seems that the group has a bottom-up trajectory, in the sense that it starts off by looking at the outcome of the conflict and then builds bridges from there. It begins with emotions and moves up to ethos and possibly collective memory - somewhat similar to a group therapy.

A different organisation, Zochrot has an opposite trajectory. Zochrot is an Israeli non-profit organisation dedicated to the promotion of the Nakba to Israeli-Jews. The organisation is less than two decades in age and is unique in its daring approach to Israel's collective memory. Whilst PC-FF aims to challenge the mainstream through emotional bonding, Zochrot starts from the top by challenging Israel's official and popular collective memory by putting it against the Nakba narratives. Zochrot organises trips to the ruins of Palestinian villages in Israel and document testimonies from Palestinian refugees and Israeli-Jewish war veterans who fought in the 1948 war.

Zochrot shares its views with possibly a more radical counter-narrative organisation, Israel's own BDS group — Boycott From Within (BFW). BFW was founded by Israeli-Jews to offer solidarity and support from within Israel for the Palestinian BDS. The organisation is more recent than Zochrot but was established as a response to the same circumstances that emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo peace paradigm of a two-state solution and the decline of mainstream Israel's peace organisations (Turner 2015). While Zochrot assumes an educational role towards the Jewish public, BFW — following the same strategy as BDS — focuses on external constituencies to exercise pressure on Israel. Zochrot and BFW locate the origins of the conflict in the nature of Zionism as a settler-colonial movement, the creation of Israel and the Nakba. Hence they suggest that a process of de-Zionisation and decolonisation is needed to end the conflict (ibid.). Such effort, especially by Zochrot, helps raise questions about Israel's ethos about victimhood. It also challenges the rooted ethos about the justness of the Zionist cause and goals and
the demonisation of the Palestinians by providing a causal context to the conflict. It gives meanings and reasons to Palestinian grievances, and through that disrupts the flow of Israel’s master-narrative.

Disruption of narrative is also an effective method for mutual co-existence. For reasons related to historical anti-Semitism, the official Zionist narrative sees the Jews as ‘the people who dwell alone,’ establishing anxious perception of the goyim, especially the Arabs and Palestinians, and hindering co-existence (Ravid 2015 — also see Chapters 5 & 6). Neve Shalom (Oasis of Peace) was perhaps one of the projects that sought to disrupt that narrative. The idea was to establish a socially and culturally harmonious community of both Israeli-Jews and Palestinians (mainly from inside Israel) (Montville 1998). Despite the various challenges it faced, the village today has a population just shy of three-hundred people, roughly half of which are Jews and the other half are mostly Palestinians with Israeli citizenships ([Israel] Central Bureau of Statistics 2018). Even though Neve Shalom started in the late 1960s, the emergence of new historiography and the change in the political climate that preceded and followed the peace process in the early 1990s gave it a significant boost both in effectiveness and population.

During (and because of) the peace talks between Egypt and Israel in 1978, an Israeli organisation named Shalom Achshav (Peace Now) came out. Enraged by the Lebanon War four years later especially in the wake of the Sabra and Shatila massacre, Shalom Achshav organised the largest mass protest in Israel’s history at the time calling for an investigation into the massacre and demanding the resignation of the then Minister of Defence Ariel Sharon. The organisation was particularly active during the first Intifada and the Oslo negotiations between Israel and the PLO. Today, it is the largest and most important liberal ‘peace movement’ in Israel. It promotes a two-state solution and campaigns against the occupation and settlement activities (see website: https://peacenow.org.il/en).

Other peace groups such as Gush Shalom (Peace Bloc) and New Israel Fund emerged in the 1990s and were similar in goals and agendas (although smaller in size) to Shalom Achshav. Along with Shalom Achshav, these
groups did not produce counter-narrative in the full sense of the word. They initially used activism to promote the acceptance of the Palestinian existence as an independent identity, and used that as a vehicle for mutual understanding and later peace talks. During the first Intifada, for example, Shalom Achshav lobbied intensively for mainstreaming the recognition of the PLO as the one and only representative of the Palestinian people (Fleischmann 2016).

The eruption of violence that mainly started in the first Intifada and reached unprecedented levels in the second Intifada brought to light the extent of the IDF’s human rights violations in the Occupied Territories. Several human rights groups like B’tselem and the Israeli Committee Against House Demolition (ICAHD) spearheaded the efforts in exposing these violations to the Israeli-Jewish public and the world. Through documents, news articles, videos, reports, statistics, and photos, these organisations shook Israel’s Jewish collective to the core by showing them the conquering power of the State they have long viewed as vulnerable and victimised.

Today’s most significant anti-occupation group comes from within the IDF itself. Breaking the Silence (www.breakingthesilence.org.il) is an nonprofit organisation established in 2004, and is composed of veteran combatants who have served in the Occupied Territories since the start of the second Intifada, and have taken it upon themselves to expose the public to the reality of everyday life under Israel’s occupation. The organisation collects soldiers’ testimonies, holds lectures and meetings, and publishes print materials and visual media with the aim to raise public awareness (also see: Chayut 2010; Our Harsh Logic 2012; Peled 2016). On a basic level, the veterans’ testimonies disrupt the dominant narrative built around the ‘morality of the IDF,’ which is a critical part of Israel’s positive ethos about the self and the conflict. They also raise questions about Israel’s victimhood narratives. Same as the majority of Israel’s peace and human rights groups, however, Breaking the Silence is a mission-driven organisation; which means it focuses on the present-day violations and does not incorporate collective memory or historical debates in its advocacy policies.
Individual Efforts

The counter-narrative does not end with group activism. Since the New Historian’s work became known, several Israeli-Jewish individuals, using their technical and professional skills, set on challenging Israel’s dominant narratives. Much of their work was delivered through popular culture channels, such as films and music. Chapter Five, for example, discussed extensively Folman’s *Waltz with Bashir* (2008) as a counter-account to Israel’s official narrative of the Lebanon War and a challenge to the dominant victimhood narrative. *Waltz* is one of several visual media narratives in the past few decades to deal with the notion of Israel’s collective memory and the accepted ethos about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Chapter Five also discussed Samuel Maoz’s film *Lebanon* (2009) which criticised Israel’s self-perception of being a beleaguered community. At the time, the film was deemed controversial, but most recently, Maoz stirred a yet larger controversy with the release of his new film *Foxtrot* (2018). The film is a metaphorical triptych that highlights the complexities and absurdities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The film cynically calls the attention to the social bubble of Israel’s average civilians. It also depicts the banality of prejudice, boredom, and utter absurdity of the soldiers on the front line — mainly in the Occupied Territories. Maoz in the film questions Israel’s self-image as a liberal, multi-cultural, and democratic society. With the intentional absence of Palestinians in the film, he criticises what might be considered a self-induced collective denial. Like *Waltz*, *Foxtrot* holds the mirror up to Israel’s society. Having suffered from PTSD following his tour in Lebanon, Maoz wanted to tell the story not only to individuals who suffered a similar fate or lost loved one in the war, but to a country that — to him — lacks the means of processing her collective memory and decades of conflict (Einav 2019). Perhaps expectedly as with most narratives that challenge the state’s official narrative, the film became the target of severe criticism. Israel’s Culture Minister decried the film calling it ‘disgraceful’ and ‘intolerable,’ adding that the state “will not fund films the smear the name of Israel” (Spiro 2017).
A recent documentary film titled *Advocate* (2019) received a similar barrage of anger and criticism. The documentary tells the personal history of renowned Israeli-Jewish lawyer Lea Tsemel. Tsemel made a lifelong career representing Palestinians in Israeli courts and being a staunch critic of the occupation and a devoted campaigner for Palestinian human rights. Tsemel’s dedication to the Palestinian cause made her a pariah in her society. The documentary came as a daring attempt to stand up to the country’s increasingly right-wing establishment. As did with *Foxtrot*, Minister Regev attacked the film calling it ‘annoying and infuriating.’ She added: “no movie special effects [referring to the documentary’s semi-animated nature] can mask” the work Tsemel is doing “against the State of Israel and those living it” (Jerusalem Post Staff 2019b).

In another attempt to counter-narrate the conflict, Jazz musician (and author) Gilad Atzmon used music as a means for resistance. According to Abi-Ezzi (2015, p. 94) “…Atzmon’s music challenges Zionism and its inherent ideology which is premised on creating an exclusively Jewish state for Jewish people.” Like Maoz, serving in Lebanon during the war was a turning point for Atzmon. In “Primacy of the Ear” (2010), Atzmon describes his shock when he visited the IDF’s South Lebanon’s internment camp *Ansar*. For the first time, he explains, he felt the full force of being the perpetrator. Walking around the camp and looking at the detainees, he — like the hero in *Waltz* — came face to face with the Jewish collective memory. He could not shake off the feeling that the internment camp was a concentration camp and he was a ‘Nazi.’ That was his most significant revelation; he reflects (p. 73): “This was enough for me. I realised my affair with the Israeli State and with Zionism was over.” Upon returning to Israel he set out on a journey of relearning Israel’s history and the Palestinian *Nakba*. That substantiated his disillusionment with the system and the country’s established narratives. He has since moved to the UK and renounced his Israeli citizenship. In Abi-Ezzi’s view (2015), although most of Atzmon’s music does not include lyrics, his anti-Zionism struggle can be discerned in some aspects of his music, such as the band or album names or in the fashion through which he peppers his live performances. Additionally, by merging Arabic-Palestinian with Israeli-Jewish music, Atzmon’s music challenges the dominant conflict resolution trends in the conflict (ibid.).
In the recent years, there have also been several academic works that challenged Israel’s master-narrative. Shlomo Sand’s *The Invention of the Jewish People* (2009) is perhaps one of the most cited works on the subject. While this is generally a work in historiography that draws heavily on the new history and post-Zionist posits, Sand is not considered in the same league with Israel’s New Historians since his book did not vigorously seek to excavate the underlining structures of Zionism (see: e.g. Zertal 2000, 2005; Zerubavel 1992, 1995) and its recent history as did historians like Morris (1988) or Shlaim (2001). But — as put in Sand’s own words — the book is ‘a synthesis of counter-narrative.’ It discusses the contradiction between the common understanding of Jewish history and the actual history of Jews as a people and a religious group. By deconstructing the notion of Jewish peoplehood, Sand raises an array of questions about Israeli and Jewish identity, the lachrymose depiction of history and, although indirectly, Israel’s collective memory and self-image as the historical victim.

Sand’s books has a political tone, but perhaps politics is what makes his historical account interesting. It reflects the process of disillusionment — and resentment — an intellectual may go through in his own society and provides an idea of the socio- and psycho-political dynamics in that society. Picking up on this notion and rejecting Sand’s account, Penslar (2012) argues that the most notorious critiques of Israel come from intellectuals who do not offer, as did New Historians like Morris or Shlaim, an archive-based, carefully documented counter-narrative of Israel’s political and military history, but rather a polemical attack against the very concept of Jewish peoplehood.

Perhaps one of the most known and possibly most hated counter-narrativists in Israel today is Haaretz’s own Gideon Levy. Levy sees him as a ‘patriotic Israeli’ by being the voice of morality. He mainly seeks to bring to the public minds the horrors of Israel’s occupation (Round 2010). He frequently — directly or indirectly — casts doubtful lights on Israel’s victim self-image (e.g. Levy 2013).
Of a similar calibre is Amira Hass. She reported from the OT for years and became one of the prominent Israeli-Jewish defenders of Palestinian human rights. Israel’s brutality against the Palestinians in the first Intifada was her turning point. Her book *Drinking the Sea at Gaza* (1999) in particular presented chilling accounts unfamiliar to the majority of Israel’s Jews about the humiliation and occupation in the OT. The book re-humanises Palestinians and paints a grim picture of the post-Oslo outcome and discourse. By examining Palestinian lives in Gaza, Hass perhaps gave early warnings for the second Intifada which erupted a year after the book was published. In a clear challenge to the dominant mechabel narrative (see Chapter 6), she defended Palestinian stone-throwers’ right to resist the occupation (Hass 2013) and most recently she described Israel as an apartheid state similar to apartheid South Africa (Cohen 2019). She supports a binational state for all.

Discussing Israeli-Jewish counter-narratives would not be adequate without a brief mention of Uri Avnery. Avnery’s life was one of radical changes; from a decorated war hero in the 1948 war to being the first Israeli-Jew to meet with Arafat during the siege of Beirut in 1982 (Fisk 2018). He was the founder of *Gush Shalom* (see above) and, modelled on Israel’s peace movements, he opposed settlement, the occupation and was amongst very few Israeli-Jews who called the Israeli government to ‘talk with Hamas.’ In his obituary of Avnery, Robert Fisk (2018) described him as ‘one of the few Middle Eastern heroes,’ someone who dedicated a life time for peace and suffered much for campaigning for Palestinian rights and a two-state solution.

There are several other counter-narrativists whose viewpoints on Israel were used throughout this work (e.g. Burg 2008, 2014; Lentin 2010; Chayut 2010; Peled 2016). Discussing all the available counter-narratives, however, remains well beyond the scope of this work. Focusing on the aforementioned cases, it is suggested that Israel’s counter-narratives are not without weaknesses. With the study’s conceptual framework in mind (Bar-Tal 2007, 2013), some of these weaknesses are discussed below.
CRITIQUE OF ISRAEL’S SELF-CRITIQUE

This study shares Greilsammer’s views (2012) that indeed new historiography has had a serious impact upon Israel’s political thinking. Before their publications most Israeli-Jews were absolutely unready to acknowledge Israel’s responsibility for the Palestinian Nakba, let alone acknowledge the existence of such a thing as a Palestinian people. The publications pumped fresh blood into the nascent peace activism at the time. It also prompted larger acceptance for a two-state solution. Only four years after Morris’s published his book, Rabin and Arafat were on the verge of signing the Oslo Accords (Greilsammer 2012). The wider acceptance of counter-narratives in the wake of Oslo could be credited for influencing Ehud Barak’s policies on education. In 1999, Barak’s Minister of Education Yossi Sarid decided to include some of the New Historian’s narrative into the country’s high school textbooks (Ezrahi 2000).

The question remains whether the trajectory of counter-narrative has kept direction and momentum or veered off and dwindled — and to what effect. Despite its relative success, Israel’s counter-narratives have serious limitations. These limitations are both external and internal. The external limitations are due to the struggle between the counter-narrativists and the state power. The internal limitations are due to conscious and/or unconscious ideological tendencies primarily related to the Zionist understanding and reinterpretation of collective memory, as well as to the present-day conflict ethos and its concomitant emotional orientations.

External Limitations

It has virtually become something of a majority vote that in the past decade Israel has increasingly become right-wing (Sarid 2011). The liberal values believed to have given boost to counter-narratives are now weakening. Consider, for example, the series of controversial laws in the past two decades. According to Adalah, the Arab Minority Rights Centre in Israel (2017), there are 65 laws that discriminate directly or
indirectly against Palestinian citizens of Israel and the OT. Half of these laws were passed since 2000 only. In 2011 The Nakba Law was passed; it authorises the Finance Minister to reduce funds to institutions if they hold an activity that rejects the existence of Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state” or commemorates “Israel’s Independence Day or the day on which the state was established as a day of mourning” (Adalah 2011). In 2018, the Knesset voted to uphold the ‘Jewish Nation-State Law.’ The law makes the right to the land exclusive to Jews, encourages settlements as a right, and downgrades Arabic — spoken by 20% of the population — to a ‘special status’ language (Berger 2018; Horovitz 2018; Lis & Landau 2018; Hoffman 2018).

These laws are in effect an attack on both the revisionist views of Israel’s collective memory and the very notion of Palestinian collective memory. Coupled with and perhaps encouraged by the impasse in the so-called peace process, the State has been attempting to reverse or curb the counter-narrative progress that was made since the late 1980s. So far, the picture appears grim. Today, the Israeli left, the core source of counter-narrative, is becoming a pariah group (Hari 2010). ‘Leftist’ and ‘peacenik’ are now widely used as dismissive slurs against an ever-embattled section of society who are increasingly on the fringe and perceived as traitors (Holmes 2019). In the Jerusalem Post’s own words (Harris & Lazimi 2016), the New Israel Fund’s index for online violence in 2012 and 2014 found that the left-wing is the most hated group in Israel’s cyberspace. The Peace Index survey in 2016 (Ya’ar & Hermann) found that the public continue to hold attitudes that favour the current right-wing government. 48% of Israeli-Jews did not believe leftists were loyal to the country.62 Most recently, another survey by the Peace Index (Ya’ar & Hermann Dec. 2018) found that while 54% of Israeli Jews were strongly or moderately in favour of negotiations with the PA, nearly 75% were pessimistic

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62 A survey conducted by Israel’s daily Yisrael Hayom, found that 59% of Jewish Israeli youths call themselves right-wing. Twenty-three percent self-define as centrist, while only 13 percent are left-wing. [see: Sales 2016b]. Also, In a poll commissioned by the same newspaper and conducted on 11th and 12th grade high school students exclusively from the Jewish sector, showed that nearly 60% of those questioned described themselves as being politically right-wing, with 23% saying that they were centrists and only 13% saying they were left-wing. An overwhelming majority, 82%, said that they believed there was “no chance” or “barely a chance” for peace deal with the Palestinians. [see: Sommer 2016]
about the prospect of peace. Effectively, this means that the support for the left is at a historic low, and that peace has almost disappeared from the Israeli-Jewish public discourse (Holmes 2019).

Furthermore, the State’s grip on the activities of the peace movement has grown increasingly tighter and the attempts to stifle any further challenge to the country’s collective memory is becoming almost a state policy. In 2011, for instance, Netanyahu’s Education Minister Gideon Sa’ar disallowed meetings set up by PC-FF within the school system for cases that involved the relatives of Palestinians he described as terrorists who had been killed in the conflict. Resorting to the narratives of victimhood the minister said: “Drawing a comparison between bereaved Israeli families and Palestinian families is inconceivable, as such discussions legitimise acts of terrorism” (Trabelsi-Hadad 2011).

In an extensive Haaretz investigative report (Shezaf 2019) it was revealed that the Israeli Defence Ministry’s secretive security department (Malmab) have been scouring Israel’s archives and removing historic documents regarding the Nakba and the 1948 war. The report asserts that beginning in the early 2000s Malmab began removing historical documentation illegally and with no authority, and at least in some cases has sealed documents that had previously been cleared for publication by the military censor and extended the confidentiality seal on others for more years. Some of the documents that were placed in vaults had already been published. Asked about the point of removing documents that have already been published, Yehiel Horev, former Malmab director for two decades, explained that the objective is to undermine the credibility of studies about the history of the refugee problem. This practically means that the New Historians’ allegation cannot be backed up with the original documents and would therefore be disproved and refuted. This could be considered a counter-counter-narrative that better fits the goals, purposes, and ideologies of the ever growing right-wing. The outcome of counter-narratives under such circumstances will either be frozen or, worse, reversed. Palestinian collective memory will be further assaulted, the conflict ethos will be further consolidated, and above all, the feelings of existential fear will be further enhanced. Under such circumstances, the collective victim self-image will only be further perpetuated.
Internal Limitations

Since day one, counter-narratives were confined to small fringes within the Israeli-Jewish society. Svirsky (2010, pp. 6-7) maintains that there have been Israeli-Jews who at times reflected on their Zionist beliefs. Others are truly aware of the oppressive character of their beliefs and their practices, yet they embrace them as their preferred way of existing. Only a small minority opt to exit the Israeli-Jewish collective way of life. This small minority is what makes up today’s counter-narrativists, groups and individuals. There is, however, weaknesses in their approach.

The weakness exists mainly in their take on collective memory. It is true that the New Historians made breakthroughs in that regard, but the social movements and organisations that capitalised on their findings for political purposes, such as peace activism and anti-occupation campaigning, did so in a conscious or unconscious selective manner.

Looking at Bar-Tal hypotheses (e.g. 2001, 2007, 2013, 2014; Bar-Tal et al. 2009b), we find that whilst he discusses elaborately the socio-psychological repercussions of Israel’s collective memory, his discussion of Palestinian collective memory is limited. This could probably be justified on three bases: a) Bar-Tal is an Israeli-Jew, b) Palestinian socio-psychological literature is scarce or underdeveloped, and c) Bar-Tal does not speak Arabic. But as they stand, these bases do not satisfactorily explain Bar-Tal’s tendency to focus most of his analysis of the Palestinian collective memory and ethos on the post-1967 period. He would, for example, examine Israel’s conflict ethos in relation to the Palestinians through the lenses of the ‘illegal occupation’ and the daily violation of human rights in the lands occupied in 1967. Like Morris who made headlines regarding the Palestinian refugee problem without consulting a single Palestinian or Arabic source or dialogue (Masalha 1999), Bar-Tal built his framework without much consulting the Palestinian worldview that sees, among other things, that the occupation began with the Nakba in 1948 and that the 1967 occupation was a mere completion of the Zionist settler-colonial project. In Bar-Tal’s socio-psychological analysis, the Israeli-Jewish
collective memory was substantiated during the events of 1948. Israeli-Jews’ sense of nationhood sprung from the memory of their initial fight for survival against insurmountable odds, and the perpetual struggle for survival ever since (Blomeley 2005). Palestinian collective memory on the other hand may have sprung out of the notion of military occupation, which to most Israeli-Jews, began in 1967.

This has been the approach of the majority of Israel’s peace movements and human rights organisations. Palestinian collective memory to them begins and ends with the injustice that began with the 1967 occupation. Their activism framework — for procedural, ideological, or political reasons — is dependent on the status quo. It does not reach far back into Palestinian history as is the case for most Israeli-Jewish historical narratives. The acknowledgement of Palestinian suffering in this case is legitimised through half-history narratives, one that does not directly clash with Israel’s master-narrative. Neve Shalom, Shalom Achshav, Gush Shalom, Breaking the Silence, or IP-CC as well as the individual efforts through films and documentaries mostly deal with the Palestinian ‘what is’ and rarely with ‘what was.’ They challenge the occupation, promote Palestinian human rights, and more importantly seek to deconstruct or alleviate the conflict ethos built around the 1967-occupation. But rarely do they excavate Zionism’s roots as most New Historians did or question Israel’s legitimacy or lack thereof. In practice, most of these organisations aim to achieve settlement through the same practices and are legitimised by the same Zionist ideology that was mobilised in the creation of the state of Israel in the first place (Turner 2015). One practical outcome is that the ethos closely related to Israelis’ collective memory such as the group’s historical victimhood and the justness of the cause and goals may go unchecked.

Of all the counter-narrative groups, Zochrot stands out as the one that commemorates the Palestinian collective memory of the Nakba in Hebrew vis-à-vis Israel’s official and popular collective memory. But like the others, it is not without flaws. Lentin (2010) raises important questions with regard to Zochrot practices. She seems to think (pp. 139-140) that “perpetrators using victim testimonies goes beyond historical accuracy.”

“Refracting Palestinian refugee testimonies through the voices of members of the colonising collectivity, often
in mediated or attenuated format so to make them palatable to a hostile Israeli-Jewish public, runs the risk of perpetuating their victimhood, and separating the *Nakba* past from present Palestinian reality.” There is also the risk that presenting Palestinian memory by members of the colonising collectivity may turn into a classical orientalist situation in which the victims are incapable of representing themselves.

Finally, it is worth noting that Israel’s counter-narrativists could benefit greatly from a parallel Palestinian counter-narrative. That would help narrow the narrative gap between Israel and the Palestinians. But the Palestinian near-absent counter-narrative represents an additional weakness to Israel’s counter-narrativists’ approach.

**PALESTINIAN COUNTER-NARRATIVES**

Whilst there have been organised and non-organised waves of counter-narratives in Israel, this study suggests that Palestinian counter-narrative is still in its infancy and yet to achieve what can be considered an influential role. The search for revisionist literature on or around the Palestinian master-narrative written by Palestinians has yielded very limited results. They were either revisions of the revolutionary thoughts in the past or critiques of the factional performances and *muqawama* in the present (e.g. Said 2001; Sayegh 2002; Hilal 2003).

There are/were plausible reasons behind the lack of a serious Palestinian revisionist movement. The social, political, and economic circumstances of the Palestinians are radically different from those in Israel. These circumstances hindered the emergence of effective tendencies for self-skepticism, self-referentiality, epistemological relativism, and pluralism — all are characteristics usually associated with the liberal and post-modern thinking which had facilitated the emergence of Israel’s counter-narratives. Below some of the obstacles to Palestinian counter-narrative are discussed.
**Obstacles**

Socially, Palestine is a relatively conservative society and subject to patriarchal standards (see previous chapter). The margin of social flexibility that would facilitate some free flow of thoughts is therefore restricted. This is coupled by the fact that, dissimilar to Israel’s ethnic diversity, Palestinian society is largely ethnically hegemonic. This seems to create a high level of conformism among society members and subsequently increase resistance to new thinking paradigms.

Politically, most Palestinians are dispossessed, stateless, and forever threatened by physical and psychological oblivion. Their lives are determined by a military occupation and much of their resources are employed for national survival. Engagement in serious intra-society counter-narratives is maybe seen as a sort of intellectual luxury.

Additionally, a healthy economic infrastructure gives boost to the emergence of new ideas. This is not the case in the Palestinian territories. Dissimilar to Israel’s booming economy, Palestinian socioeconomic indicators show a near breaking point. One of three Palestinians is unemployed, the average is nearly 50% in Gaza, and the poverty level has reached 53% in 2018 (UNCTAD 2019). The economic deterioration coupled with a complex social and political situation also put many restrictions on the Palestinian civil society institutions. Although the situation of these institutions is better than in several Middle Eastern countries, it is still significantly worse than Israel’s civil society in terms of funding, freedom, experience, prevalence, and effectiveness (see: Alashqar 2018). Palestinian civil society institutions mainly promote liberal values and human rights such as women’s rights and gender equality. But with their limited economic resources, political power, and social influence, it is hard to imagine they can effectively implement their policies or disseminate their beliefs.
It is also difficult for counter-narratives to emerge when there are tight restrictions on the freedom of expression. In the OT, freedom of expression has increasingly fallen victim to what Soloway (2018) calls ‘trinity of oppression’: Israel’s draconian physical and cyber censorship of Palestinian social media activities, press, and publications; the PA’s monitoring of press in the West Bank; and Hamas’s intolerance of opposite views in Gaza.

There are also methodological and academic obstacles. Palestinian scholar Saleh Abdul-Jawwad (2005; also see: Ghanem [ed.] 2009), argues that apart from the almost hegemonic belief that we are the victims and they are the victimisers, Palestinian narratives about the Nakba are sporadic. He maintains that what makes the emergence of Palestinian revisionist historiography particularly difficult is that Palestinians have three narratives of the Nakba. The ‘official narrative’ of Hajj Amin Al-Husseini (see Chapter 5); the narrative of the Palestinian middle class and is represented by scholars like Aref Al-Aref and Walid Khalidi (e.g. Khalidi 1997, 2006); and the oral narrative which exists amongst the majority of Palestinians. Nahhas (in: Ghanem [ed.] Dec. 2009) sees that Palestinian scholars have become dependent on Israel’s new historiography to prove the legitimacy of Palestinian narrative. In her views, Palestinians are better equipped to narrate their own history depending, for example, on the wealth of information such as oral memory which was never available to scholars like Benny Morris.

The lack of bona fide Palestinian counter-narratives can also be ascribed to the rise of religious nationalism. The rise of Israel’s right-wing religious Zionism has been detrimental to the development and dissemination of Israel’s counter-narratives. Religious Zionism interprets the establishment of Israel as an act of redemption from God for the Jewish people and the Palestinians as intruders in Eretz Yisrael. This means they reconstruct history solely through the messianic lenses of the old-testament, the Talmud, and the ancient rabbinic teachings (Don-Yehiya 2014). Likewise, in the recent decades, almost parallel to the rise of Israel’s religious right-wing, Palestinian political discourse moved towards Islamisation. With the rising power of Hamas, the second largest Palestinian party [after Arafat’s Fatah], the Islamised discourse provided an almost
comprehensive framework for the conflict. In her examination of the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Islamisation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Mellor (2017) explains that the Islamic discourse provided a new narrative to reshape and reframe the perception of the conflict as being religious rather than political in nature. As an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas has placed the Palestinian narrative within the broader narrative of Islamic history and appropriated religious texts from the Quran to redefine the struggle with Zionism as a sacred struggle, or Jihad. To them, as the case for the Brotherhood, Zionism is an extension of the crusades, Western colonialism, and the conspiratorial attacks on Muslims. Citing Litvak (1998), Mellor (2017) shows that Hamas, for instance, compared the Palestinians to the early Meccan Muslims who had to migrate to Medina with the Prophet because of their religious beliefs. The *Nakba* in this case became comparable to *hejra* (the Prophet’s migration), giving it a sense of messianism. Similar to the Jews who saw in the *Shoah* a test for the Jewish people by God, the Islamists saw the 1948 exodus as a punishment for Muslim sins. Liberation in this case became a redemption.

The near-absence of Palestinian counter-narratives can also be imputed to education. In theory, the distinctive Palestinian approach to education could establish the basis for a healthy and daring counter-narrative. Palestinians lead the Arab Middle East on key educational indicators such as literacy among adults and youths, and are a role model for number of years in school and literacy rates among women. As a matter of fact, the Palestinians’ educational achievements are on par with developed countries and are better than developing countries in Africa, Asia, and South America (UIS [UNESCO Institute for Statistics] 2018).

In practice, however, Palestinian education has been limited by the political and socio-economic factors discussed above. Like everything else in Palestinian life, education has been mostly geared towards national survival more than it has toward self-development. On a brief personal note, as children we were taught both at home and school that education was our ultimate weapon against Israel. The school system was rigid, largely rote-based, but it was also strictly purpose oriented. The fact that most of the schools during the first *Intifada* were run by UNRWA (many still are) made them a manifestation of the Palestinian refugee
problem and victimhood, and by default education was seen as a means of *muqawama*. Education is so embedded in the collective societal beliefs that it has turned into a culture. I can remember many of my peers being dragged to school by their illiterate grandparents, who despite their illiteracy were well engrossed in the culture that valued education above all. They, too, saw it as a means for survival.

Palestinian focus on education, however, failed to train students to self-critique. It may even have consolidated the oral narratives as official collective memory. Before the PA, Palestinians students in Gaza studied Egyptian curriculums and in the West Bank schools used Jordanian ones. For political reasons, those curriculums did not contain much on Palestinian history. In Gaza, we learned a lot more about the Pharaohs than we did about the Canaanites or the Phoenicians, and more about Nasser’s fight against Zionism than we did about the PLO. Our everyday, and uncensored, access to Palestinian history was mainly through the oral accounts of the *Nakba* generation, our grandparents in particular. The scholarly works on the topic, typically conducted by Palestinian intellectuals and historians abroad and by the PLO study centres, were banned in the Occupied Territories.

With the arrival of the Palestinian Authority in the wake of Oslo in 1993, all-Palestinian curriculums were introduced. Special focus was placed on Palestinian history and geography. Palestine’s geography for instance was introduced without Israel in mind, it focused on the entirety of historical Palestine. These curriculums aimed to consolidate the Palestinian master-narrative as well as formalise and intellectualise Palestinian oral memory. It also aimed to fuel the nationalist awareness and with it, it seems, heighten the sense of collective victimhood. With the impasse in the peace process, the growing desperation in the late 1990s, the constant political and economics embargo, and the eruption of the second *Intifada* in 2000, it was perhaps a form of luxury for the majority of Palestinian scholars to engage in serious efforts to examine and critique the Palestinian master-narrative, let alone raise the issue in school textbooks. The majority were over-occupied with withstanding and refuting Israel’s narrative, and so were the textbooks.
The Palestinian version of counter-narrative today can be seen in sporadic critiques of the status quo, Palestinian human rights reports, self-reflexive accounts in memoirs or novels (see previous chapter), discussions of the value and effectiveness of muqawama, and also in cross-faction vitriol. Not much, to my knowledge, has been written about the validity or lack thereof of Palestinian collective memory, let alone about the ‘idealism’ of Palestinian victimhood. Below, recalling the argument in the previous chapter, it is explained how this work represents a form of partial counter-narrative.

**This Work**

The previous chapter in particular capitalised on the limitations in Bar-Tal’s assumptions regarding the Palestinian case, but used his conceptual framework as a guide. The critique of Palestinian society focused on some of the manifestations of victimhood that were seen as inconsistent with the ‘ideal victim’ mentality. This critique is considered a partial departure from the mainstream and therefore a form of counter-narrative. It can be summarised in four main points:

- Contrary to the common belief, Palestinian collective memory is not only a means of historical legitimacy vis-à-vis Israel or a chosen trauma (e.g. Volkan 2006) in the traditional or Israeli-Jewish sense, it also represents a profound anxiety about the physical and psychological memoricide, about the fear of being forgotten. As far as Palestinians are concerned, the problem with this claim is that it might portray the Palestinian national identity as fragile; and that collides with the established ethos about the justness of the cause/goals, positive self-image, and the delegitimisation of the opponent’s identity and victimhood (see: Bar-Tal 2007, 2013). It also challenges the societal beliefs about the [historical] deep-rootedness of this identity. The fragility however neither confirms nor negates the deep-rootedness of Palestinian identity; rather, it simply signifies the enormous odds it has withstood. In other words, it reflects the severe power asymmetry in the conflict.
The ostensibly uncompromising societal beliefs about collective memory have hindered Palestinian openness to Israel’s collective memory, especially the Shoah. The previous chapter challenged the Palestinian ambivalence about the Shoah and highlighted its psycho-political impact upon Palestinian collective memory and the overall Palestinian appraisal of the conflict. The vitriol to Dajjani’s visit to Auschwitz and the UNRWA’s intention to include the Jewish genocide in Palestinian textbooks revealed the rigidity of Palestinian master-narrative and the risks of challenging it.

By viewing humiliation as the critical, most important emotional manifestations of the Palestinian victimhood narratives, the study may have challenged the patriarchal values around masculinity, honour, and pride. Bringing up humiliation — as unapologetically as it was presented in the previous chapter — was an attempt to bring to light one of the least talked about, if not most silenced, manifestations of victimhood that govern much of Palestinian reactions, behaviours, and impulses. Other Palestinian figures, too, saw in this phenomenon a serious negative impact upon Palestinian society. Although not counter-narratives in the full sense of the word, films like Paradise Now (2005) and Omar (2013), and fiction such as Men in the Sun (1963) and All That’s Left to You (1966) were amongst the very few attempts to bring humiliation to the forefront of Palestinian debate. They effectively challenged the deep-rooted societal beliefs about honour and heroism.

Given the social and political sanctity of the ethos of muqawama, critiquing some of its aspects was perhaps the most sensitive part in the examination of Palestinian victimhood. It was not a traditional attempt to revise the tactics, goals, and methods of the Palestinian resistance or the performance of the PLO, Fatah, or Hamas as it has been the case with many other works (e.g. Said 2001; Sayegh 2002, Hilal 2003); rather, the chapter attempted to excavate some of its underlining socio-psychological factors. Depicting Palestinian muqawama first and foremost as an instrument for self-esteem and honour, or as momentary bursts of anger and revenge, runs the risk of appearing as portraying the overarching goal of liberation as marginal. This might also be viewed as doubting the effectiveness, let alone the nobility and purpose
oriented-ness of the entirety of the Palestinian national liberation project. What makes the critique of
muqawama controversial is that muqawama has become an intrinsic part of Palestinian culture. Stirring a
debate about it means raising questions about the culture itself. Additionally, appraising the element of
isteshhad purely through socio-psychological or sociological lenses presents an unacceptable challenge to the
nearly and perhaps increasingly hegemonic religious ethos associated with the ‘divine reward’ and
‘spiritual continuation’ of the shaheed. To some, this might be considered an encroachment upon society’s
collective moral values.

CONCLUSION

Starting with the New Historians and ending with the peace movements, Israel’s counter-narrativists set a
precedence in bringing to the Israeli-Jewish public the plight of Palestinians and Israel’s responsibility for the
Nakba. Israel’s counter-narratives challenged the almost hegemonic belief about the Israeli-Jewish
victimhood. Despite their positive impact upon the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel-Jewish counter-
narrativists remain a small group of mainly leftist intellectuals and activists. Their work, though not without
flaws, continues to create cracks in Israel’s master-narrative. But with the rise of Israel’s right-wing to power
and what seems to be an emerging counter-counter-narrative, the future seems uncertain.

Across the fence, Palestinian counter-narratives are almost absent. Despite few individual attempts, society
remains resistant to different thinking paradigms regarding the conflict. The occupation has created a broad
array of obstacles to the emergence and maintenance of a Palestinian counter-narrative. Objective reasons
such as the islamisation of the Palestinian narrative, the complexity and variety of the Nakba related
narratives, and the purpose-oriented educational system also contributed to the problem. Palestinians still see
themselves as the ideal victims and any attempts to raise the slightest of doubt about it is usually met with
aggressive resistance. This was seen in the Palestinian approach to the Shoah and also in the culture of
muqawama.
Partially a form of counter-narrative, this work through the lenses of collective memory, emotional orientations, and conflict ethos, put several aspects of Palestinian victimhood under scrutiny.

In the next chapter, the thesis is summarised and the findings are discussed.
CONCLUSION
OVERALL SUMMARY

The study asked to what extent do the narratives of victimhood in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict hinder settlement. Answering the question proved to be a convoluted and multi-angled process, and generated a few more questions than initially anticipated. The answer required starting at the very top by looking at victimhood within the context of intractable conflict. Generally, intractable conflicts share certain attractors that make them hard to resolve (Coleman 2003; Vallacher et al. 2010). But depending on the historical background and political circumstances, some attractors may dominate in some conflicts but are considered secondary in others. The assumption was that since victimhood narratives emerge in a conflict environment, they should follow a similar trajectory to the conflict in which they emerge. This particular assumption brought to the forefront questions about the manifestations of victimhood and the most salient of them in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Considering the available literature on intractable conflict (e.g. Northrup 1989; Bar-Tal & Jacobson 1998; Bar-Tal & Rouhana 1998; Kriesberg 2005; Bar-Tal & Halperin 2009; Vallacher et al. 2010; Bar-Tal 2013; Halperin & Shavit 2015), it was suggested that the narratives of victimhood represented a socio-psychological attractor that surpassed the commonly accepted geo-political ones (see: Coleman 2003; Bar-Tal et al. 2009b). That is not to deny the tangible, geo-political events that initiated the feelings of victimisation, but rather to focus on victimhood as a mindset or an experience-based dynamic (Bouchat et al. 2017). A few scholars saw the potential of framing intractable conflicts in socio-psychological terms, and that substantiated victimhood as a socio-psychological product. Even though most of these scholars’ approach to victimhood was indirect, limited or vague, it still allowed victimhood — although in a limited capacity — to be viewed as one of the forces that determined the conflict flow. Kelman (e.g. 1987, 1999) viewed victimhood in terms of negative identity, hence emphasising victimhood as an in-group’s positive signifier against the out-group. Volkan (e.g. 2001, 2004, 2013a) saw victimhood through the concept of ‘chosen trauma,’ discussing the transferability of trauma across generations and alluding to the power of collective memory in the formation of the present
conflict. Bar-Tal developed an encompassing and versatile socio-psychological framework, introducing the three concepts of collective memory, conflict ethos, and collective emotional orientations as defining factors in the study and analysis of intractable conflict. Together, these provided a broad socio-psychological infrastructure which greatly benefited the study of victimhood and its multiple manifestations (e.g. 2001, 2007, 2013, 2014; also: Bar-Tal et al. 2009a; Bar-Tal et al. 2009b).

Largely due to unwonted historical circumstances, victimhood has become one of the most dominant socio-psychological forces in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Also, because the conflict is multi-levelled and changing, and especially because Israeli-Jews and Palestinians experience and respond to the conflict differently, it was expected that the two parties’ victimhood narratives would not be identical. That called attention to the ways in which victimhood in the conflict manifested, and which aspects of it were particularly salient. To understand the manifestations of victimhood, it was important to look separately and in details at how Israeli-Jews and Palestinians defined and appraised their victim identities amongst themselves and in relations to each other. One goal was to find out how the victimhood narratives of both peoples came to be and where their worldview(s) converged and diverged.

Examined against the backdrop of collective memory, ethos, and emotions, as well as in relation to the concept of ‘chosen trauma,’ it became clear that Israel’s victimhood was perceived by many Israeli-Jews as having a transhistorical character. The conflict with the Palestinians, as a result, was seen as part of the Jewish continuum of suffering. This effectively meant that the conflict was partly removed from its political and geo-political context. Israel’s victimhood narratives manifested in such a way to reflect that worldview. On account of collective memory, especially the Shoah, Israel’s sense of collective victimhood manifested as aggressive ethos glorifying militarism, or emotional orientations primarily characterised by fear, particularly the fear of annihilation or a second Shoah. Fear materialised as extreme security policies which were indiscriminately and rather disproportionately applied to all aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was therefore proposed that as far as the Palestinians were concerned, many of Israel’s victimhood claims were
misplaced and occasionally invalid. Not least because the depositing of Israel’s traumatic past onto the Palestinians and the over-vigilant military and security measures against them was partly steered by perceptions rather than reality.

The examination of Palestinian victimhood revealed that certain aspects of Palestinian victimhood, such as the belief that Palestinians are the ideal victims and Israel is to be blamed for absolutely everything in Palestinian lives, were questionable. Because of the power hierarchy, nevertheless, certain Palestinian victimhood manifestations grew more salient than others. Whilst Israel’s victimhood was characterised by melancholic views of the past and fear of the future, Palestinians were locked in a romantic nostalgia for a lost homeland in a past that preceded Israel’s existence. Collective memory as a result became about the fear of and struggle against memoricide. This, among other things, resulted in victimhood manifesting as collective feelings of humiliation, and the unceasing attempts to overturn such feelings through muqawama came to play a critical part in the formation and dissemination of the conflict ethos.

Each in their own way, the Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian victimhood narratives locked the conflict parties in a set of societal beliefs, perceptions and misconceptions about the self, the opponent, and the conflict as a whole. Together, the two victimhood narratives clashed and negated each other, creating an overarching socio-psychological reality to represent what otherwise be considered a geo-political conflict with defined boundaries and concerns. This resulted in the conflict becoming increasingly intractable and the prospects of settlements growing more difficult to achieve. But the general conviction remains that given the power asymmetry, the occupier-occupied relations, and because of the fundamental psychohistorical dynamics in Israel’s collective memory, it was perhaps plausible to suggest that Israel’s victimhood claims contributed far more to that intractability than did the Palestinians.

From the outset, the research question, the subject-matter, and the author’s positionality helped shape the study’s overall approach and the choice of methodology. Narrative research was perhaps the most suitable
method for the purpose. Narrative in this study included all types of textuality that directly or indirectly reflected experience or experiential ‘stories.’ This broadened the range of narrative sources significantly and with it the levels of analysis. Academic journals, stories, news, documentaries, films, novels, political statements, and other forms of narrative were analysed by looking at their latent content and against the backdrop of their historical, political, or psychohistorical backgrounds. Taking into account this author’s closeness to the topic, it was also important to engage in self-reflexive processes as another source of narrative and an additional mode of analysis.

DISCUSSION

This study was influenced by the fundamental Palestinian convictions that the occupation is a fact, Zionism is a form of settler-colonialism, and Israel is a foreign oppressor. These convictions however do not deny that the feelings of victimisation — no matter how debatable — are valid for the said victims. The study acknowledges that for some Israeli-Jews the existence of the occupation is debatable and the Occupied Territories are deemed ‘disputed’ territories (MFA 2003, 2015). It also acknowledges that for the majority of Israeli-Jews and many non-Israeli Jews worldwide, Zionism is a political movement for Jewish emancipation and Israel is the physical outcome of that emancipation. The discussions and findings reflected these convictions.

Israel’s Victimhood

The overarching premise was that Israel is the product of Jewish history and the Shoah. This, as it was explained, received a fair amount of attention from scholars and authors, and from several angles (e.g. Zerubavel 1991; Falk 1993; Zertal 2005; Bar-Tal 2013). Bar-Tal’s thoughts on collective memory were particularly important (2001, 2007, 2013). This study aimed to capitalise on the existing literature but with special focus on what was deemed a transcendental relationship between Israel’s collective memory and the
myriads of manifestations of Israel’s victimhood claims. This was referred to as the ‘continuum of suffering,’ and it highlighted the assumptions about the unbroken link between the ancient Jewish history, the Shoah, and today’s conflict. It was argued that while the Shoah represented the core example of a chosen trauma (e.g. Volkan 2001, 2004), it might have been inaccurate to see it as the only factor in the formulation of Israel’s collective memory. The Shoah would not have had its current powerful effect had it not been for the long tradition of Jewish zachor, dwelling on remembering ‘the ancient feeling of insecurity’ (see: Gratch 2015).

It was also found that collective memory endowed Israel’s modern enemies with a transhistorical character. The siege mentality from the Jewish past was applied to the current conflict (see: Bar-Tal & Antebi 1992 a/b), and certain ethos themes were readapted and new ones produced to meet today’s challenges. Chapter Five showed that in the early years of the State, the Arabs were Nazified and the Palestinians were (and still are) persistently depicted as the new Amalek set on destroying the Jewish people. It was suggested that this psychohistorical dynamic was one of the factors that made Israel’s victim self-image and identity particularly unique.

One of the interesting points that the examination of Israel’s victimhood revealed was the tendency of many Israeli-Jews to use victimhood as a measure of ‘true Jewishness.’ From a socio-psychological perspective, this was found to be in line with Kelman’s thoughts on negative identity (e.g. 1999) and Bar-Tal’s thoughts on the ethos themes of positive self-image, patriotism, and unity (2007, 2013). It was also found to be consistent with Volkan’s thoughts on chosen trauma (e.g. 2001, 2004), considering that for many in Israel the Shoah historical trauma has been an essential definer for the country’s Jewish identity and against which other identities were appraised. The study showed that many Israeli-Jews denigrated American Jews for not being ‘Jewish enough’ because they did not identify with Israel’s standards of suffering or saw in the victim identity a comprehensive or exclusive Jewish identity. This revealed a prospect of Israel’s victimhood rarely studied: the struggle between Israeli-ness and Jewishness with victimhood as a definer.
The initial impression was that a transcendental collective memory froze the Israeli-Jewish society in rigid beliefs that may have prevented many Israeli-Jews from seeing the Palestinians in a different light separate from the lachrymose perception of Jewish history.

The ‘frozen beliefs’ (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001, 2013) manifested in a variety of emotional orientations. The fear of normality appeared as a common manifestation; it blocked the potential of realising the initial Zionist goal to make Israel into a normal nation with normal responsibilities and subject to international accountabilities. As it stands now, the ‘frozen beliefs’ about the past seem to have placed Israel in an almost permanent aggressive defensive posture, one that has justified and normalised the violations of international laws. It was also found that the guilt associated with Israel’s practices, ironically to overcome another guilt related to a passive history, was alleviated and justified by depositing it upon the Palestinians. This was referred to as ‘guilt displacement.’ Another argument was that the past shame was, too, displaced and therefore translated into aggressive policies. Today’s Israel may have been aggressive to Palestinians partly because they reminded her of a Jewish collective memory largely characterised by weakness. It was further suggested that acting out the past traumas had caused Israel to embrace some aspects of the role of the Jewish people’s previous oppressors, mainly the Nazis. Drawing on the scholarship in psychoanalysis, the phenomenon was attributed to the victim’s unconscious desire to identify with their victimiser. The argument also applied to the Palestinians’ relationship with Israel.

Drawing on Bar-Tal’s conceptualisation of fear (2001) and aided by the literature on cognitive appraisal (e.g. Keltner & Lerner 2001; Halperin & Schwartz 2010; Halperin et al. 2011), the study sought to advance the knowledge on the relationship between Israel’s fear and her understanding and implementation of security. It was argued that what was termed ‘hyper security’ had been the most discernible and most felt manifestations of Israel’s victimhood.
Even though it has been long established that security can sometimes be based on beliefs, much of the scholarly discussion still dealt with Israel's security as an independent geopolitical dynamic of the conflict. Only few writers analysed Israel's security from a psycho-political perspective (some even theorised that security was an expression of Israel's existential fear (see: e.g. Bar-Tal & Jacobson 1998b)). However, not many, if any, examined victimhood as a direct motivator behind Israel's security beliefs. This was seen as a gap in knowledge and addressed accordingly.

It was further suggested that contrary to the common belief, Israel's hyper security was not a direct result of the country's establishment in 1948. Its roots could not be separated from the overall conceptualisation of the Jewish collective memory. By examining the pre-State period, it was found that the practices and mindset of the Yishuv culture may have planted the seed for Israel's modern security mentality. What motivated the Yishuv to surround themselves with fortifications and feel victimised by the indigenous population continues to define the inner workings of today's security policies, although in a more sophisticated manner.

Measuring Israel's hyper security with reference to Bar-Tal's socio-psychological hypothesis on emotions (2001, 2013) and against the geo-political situation, the study came to question the validity of much of Israel's security claims, let alone practices. As a manifestation of victimhood, it was argued that Israel's hyper security fell into the gap between calculated geopolitics and mere perceptions. That led to destructive policies that may have hindered the prospect of peace. Three byproducts of hyper security were introduced: preemptive warfare; war on terror; and the concept of patriotism. The study challenged Israel's claims that preemptive warfare was based on bona fide geopolitical considerations. By looking at the 1967 war and the Iranian threat, it was proposed that fear was the primary culprit. Much, in other words, was based on perceptions, not actual physical threats. Expanding this notion further, it was found that Israel's developed and normalised a unique definition of terrorism mainly to frame Palestinian dissidence as illegitimate. That was called ‘the mechabel narrative.’ The sense of legitimacy regarding preemptive warfare and terrorism redefined many Israeli-Jews' sense of belongingness to the country. Patriotism, it appeared, has transformed...
from being a term to describe the love for one’s country to a term describing one’s attachment to that country based on perceiving it under threatened.

Key Points

- Israel’s collective memory and chosen trauma(s) provide historical explanations to today’s conflict, and today’s conflict confirms the ethos about Jewish victimhood that dominated collective memory.
- Israel’s victimhood narratives are a significant measure around which many societal beliefs are constructed, and against which other identities are appraised.
- The relationship between Jewish history and the present conflict is viewed as a ‘continuum of suffering,’ and Palestinians as an extension of the Jewish people’s ancient enemies.
- Because collective memory is used to justify the conflict and the conflict is rationalised in relation to the past, Israel has grown unable to mourn her historical losses and traumas.
- The inability to mourn the past deepens the sense of collective victimhood and substantiates the conflict ethos.
- Memory and ethos influence and are themselves influenced by certain emotional orientations in Israel’s society.
- Emotional orientations are seen in the fear of normality, guilt, shame, and identification with the aggressor.
- The most dominant of these emotions is fear.
- Fear is closely connected to collective memory and is a primary drive in Israel’s hyper security.
- Hyper security represents the gap between geo-politics and perceptions, and is the most important and most destructive physical manifestations of victimhood.
- Hyper security legitimises preemptive warfare, produces unique views of terrorism, and redefines patriotism.

Results: Israel’s victimhood narratives add to intractability and hinder settlement.
Palestinian Victimhood

Three main themes emerged in the Palestinian victimhood narratives: collective memory as a means to resist memoricide; humiliation as the overarching emotional orientation; and *muqawama* as the most prominent conflict ethos. The overall impression is that the three themes emerged largely in response to the asymmetrical power relationship with Israel.

Bar-Tal’s thoughts on Israel's collective memory provided good guidance for the examination of Palestinian collective memory (2007, 2013). But these thoughts were found to be limited as they viewed Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian memories almost on an equal footing. This study found that the power asymmetry between Israel and the Palestinians foisted fundamental differences both in terms of the nature of collective memory and the fashion in which it was perceived, manifested, and disseminated. Palestinian collective memory was found to be particularly fragile against Israel’s master-narrative. For reasons mainly related to its large dependency on oral history and the present-day occupation, the preservation of this memory became an existential struggle in itself. The overall impression was that Palestinian collective memory surpassed its traditional historical role as a chosen trauma (e.g. Volkan 2006) or an identity extension to become a representation of the ever-growing fear of being forgotten as a people. The process of remembering, therefore, became a process of victimisation. In a way, Palestinian memory turned into a proof of being and Palestinians accordingly into memory nomads.

It was also found that in order to preserve Palestinian memory and keep it resolutely aligned with the ‘ideal victim’ narratives, ethos about the delegitimisation of the opponent’s memory were cemented. The *Shoah* was placed against the *Nakba* and that led to ambivalence toward the former, ranging from indifference to outright denial. At the core of this ambivalence, as Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish reflects, lied a ‘contest’ over who was the greater victim (Helit 2012; see also: Noor *et al.* 2012). Signs showed that any counter-narratives looking at the *Shoah* as a *bona fide* Jewish grievance were met with fierce resistance. That,
among other things, proved that for the most part Palestinian society is more concerned with maintaining the ideal victim status than exploring the prospects of settlement that would require revising the victim self-image.

The repercussions of collective memory and the present-day occupation came to define the Palestinian collective emotional orientations. Dissimilar to the scholars who focused on fear and anger in intractable conflict to explain the Palestinian collective emotional state (e.g. Bar-Tal 2001, 2013; Halperin et al. 2011), this study identified humiliation as the most dominant emotion amongst Palestinians. Painting much of the Palestinian emotional state in terms of humiliations may have posed a challenge to the existing societal beliefs about honour, pride, and masculinity, as well as the accepted ethos about muqawama.

It was found that humiliation is triggered chiefly by Israel's control, and that Israel's control was not a mere security measure, but also a method for Israeli-Jews to avoid being humiliated themselves. Jewish collective memory is key in the development and implementation of this rationale. Practically, for Israeli-Jews this meant managing the occupation and maintaining the status quo. As an afterthought, it may be suggested that there is perhaps a link between control and the preservation of Israel’s victim self-image. Israel's control of Palestinians provided control over the Palestinian narrative and that enfeebled its effect on the legitimacy of Israel’s victim claims. By silencing different events, Israel has managed to construct history in such a way to allow collective amnesia that erased the Palestinian counter-narrative (Thomas 2015). It is also an illustration of the complex relation between truth and politics where the powerful often controls how the story should unfold, and to what end. Arendt (1961, p. 231) explains that, “…The chances of factual truth surviving the onslaught of power are very slim indeed…” Similarly, in the Wretched of the Earth (1967, p.51), Fanon says: “It is the settler who makes history and he is conscious of making it.”

One of the important contributions to knowledge was the discussion (and expansion) of the adverse effects of humiliation on the Palestinian collective. Initially, and concurring with other scholars (e.g. Varvin 2005;
humiliation was found to be a constant signifier of Palestinian victimhood. Further research revealed that rarely was humiliation examined, especially by Palestinians, as a comprehensive behavioural dynamic in the conflict. Humiliation imposed a variety of (often negative) coping mechanisms, which over the course of the conflict has scarred the very fabric of society. This was referred to as ‘the enemy within.’ In keeping with Bar-Tal’s thoughts on the normalisation and routinisation of conflict (2013), it was suggested that some Palestinians in their attempts to deflect the heavy-handed impact of humiliation resorted to normalising and routinising the situation either through self-denial or by trying to suppress anyone who dared challenge the status quo. Others were found to displace their frustration and lack of autonomy onto others, like the children of Jerusalem who sought self-esteem in the abuse of cats. On the whole, that led to the assumption that since humiliation was a dominant emotion, then pursuing its antithesis in the form of self-esteem, honour, or dignity became a purpose. This pursuit produced various — sometimes misdirected — remedial practices.

Adding another level of analysis, part of the argument was that the effect of humiliation was amplified due to the patriarchal nature of Palestinian society. In this society, masculine values around honour and dignity are most glorified. Stifling the expression or practice of these values is in a way an assault on Palestinian masculinity. This was called ‘gendered humiliation.’

Generally, much of the conflict ethos themes between Israel and the Palestinians are similar. Think for example of ethos themes such as the justness of one’s goals, positive self-image, or the delegitimisation of the opponent (see: Bar-Tal 2007, 2013). It was however suggested that ethos can also be case specific and circumstantially bound (see Chapter Two). Because of the dominance of the feelings of humiliation, the Palestinian ethos themes developed to reflect that fact. While Israeli-Jews hid their shame of past humiliation behind ethos about military strength and the IDF morality, humiliation for Palestinians gave rise to ethos about muqawama, one purposefully designed to boost self-image and pride. Challenging the common beliefs, it was argued that muqawama was/is not in its basic form directed at national liberation; rather, it was purposed
as a powerful tool to reinstate and preserve Palestinian masculinity and honour. The pattern of anger and retaliatory destructive responses were seen as reflections of that purpose (Aquino & Byron 2002). In the heat of the moment, the liberation of Palestine might not be most visible or conscious goal for a fighter set out to attack Israeli troops. This is why it was argued that the conflict could sometimes be personal and is fought for personal reasons.

Rarely a topic of discussion amongst Palestinians, the study argued that the dichotomy of victimhood and muqawama created serious contradictions in Palestinians society and led to a society-wide psychological fatigue. The nearly hegemonic adherence to both the conflict ethos and collective memory set a specific ideological trajectory for most researchers and intellectuals to follow, restricting in the process the prospect of constructive and daring internal reflections. The fluid notions of  истэшхад and self-sacrifice stood out as particularly critical in the way Palestinians appraised the conflict and resisted the occupation. It was suggested that for some, resisting became an end in itself, locking society in a closed cycle of narcissism and masochism. This was evident in how Palestinians valued Israel’s validation of Palestinian ability to hurt Israel, but simultaneously glorified the ability to endure the pain she inflicted. That revealed a pattern somewhat similar to Israel’s warrior-victim identity; that is, we aspire to be strong, but at the same time we embrace the weakness that the ‘ideal victim’ status entails. It was also explained why the physical death through шахада represented a revival of the ‘dead self’ which humiliation created. As one example, it seemed that through the ritualistic and occasionally celebratory nature of шахидов’ funerals, Palestinians created a powerful parallel reality where the perceived spiritual continuation acted as a triumphant posture against Israel and heightened the sense of moral superiority associated with being a victim. These dynamics can be seen as part of the belief mechanisms that a society develops to cope with and rationalise the conflict (Bar-Tal 2001, 2007, 2013). For Palestinians, the odds are enormous, and perhaps unexpectedly, so are the ethos set to defeat them.
Since Oslo, there have been several major clashes, significant land grabs, numerous failed agreements, several West Bank incursions, and three destructive Gaza onslaughts. As a result, the final conclusion among many Palestinians nowadays is that the two-state solution is officially dead. With all that, the feelings of victimisation have become more rooted. As I conclude this study, the thirteen-year-old blockade is turning Gaza into an uninhabitable land (see: UNTAD 2015). Gazans have been marching every Friday since March 2018 to the Gaza border with Israel trying to break the blockade. Many died and thousands were injured and yet, so far, the protests do not seem to lose momentum. Recently, youngsters started sending incendiary kites into Israel with the message “We shall not suffer alone.” In a surreal fashion, however, the protests are slowly

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**Key Points**

- Palestinian collective memory is largely premised on the fear of being forgotten.
- The struggle to maintain the memory is existential and the process of remembering is victimising.
- Palestinians views of the conflict are filtered through the ‘ideal victim’ self-image.
- Such self-image sometimes serves to insulate Palestinians against own shortcomings and failures.
- While the emotion of fear defines Israel, humiliation most defines Palestinian lives.
- Humiliation is mostly a destructive force that breeds negative coping mechanisms among Palestinians.
- Humiliation may have locked Palestinian struggle in an endless pursuit of dignity and national masculinity.
- This pursuit gave rise to overcompensation, mostly evident in the ethos about *muqawama*.
- *Muqawama* may not be entirely focused on the final goal of liberation, it is also used as a means to vent anger and frustration, and in the process re-instate Palestinian self-esteem.
- The ethos about *muqawama* created contradictions which led to a society-wide psychological fatigue.

**Results:** Palestinian victimhood narratives add to intractability and hinder settlement.

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**FINAL WORDS**

Since Oslo, there have been several major clashes, significant land grabs, numerous failed agreements, several Western Bank incursions, and three destructive Gaza onslaughts. As a result, the final conclusion among many Palestinians nowadays is that the two-state solution is officially dead. With all that, the feelings of victimisation have become more rooted. As I conclude this study, the thirteen-year-old blockade is turning Gaza into an uninhabitable land (see: UNTAD 2015). Gazans have been marching every Friday since March 2018 to the Gaza border with Israel trying to break the blockade. Many died and thousands were injured and yet, so far, the protests do not seem to lose momentum. Recently, youngsters started sending incendiary kites into Israel with the message “We shall not suffer alone.” In a surreal fashion, however, the protests are slowly
taking on some of the habitual *muqawama* approaches, once again making this new form of resistance a goal in itself. It appears that the protesters are perhaps heading for yet another masochistic episode of Palestinian history, where suffering is routinised and normalised. I hear repeatedly from many young protesters, “I am going to the border to be a *shaheed* (martyr).” Only this way they can be both victims and heroes. This comes at a time in Palestinian history where Palestinians are bearing the brunt of both the occupation which is becoming yet harsher and tighter and the internal Palestinian division, which is freezing Palestinian society in a state of domestic despair and painful feelings of nationalistic shame. Much faster and more than ever, the layers of victimhood are building up and getting thicker and more complex.

Across the fence, Israel, with President Trump’s unconditional support, has been acceleratingly expanding the settlements, confiscating Palestinian funds, raiding Palestinian residential areas, passing racist laws, upping the segregation measures against the Palestinian citizens of Israel, and most recently pushing the US to cut funds to the UNRWA. The pretext is always security. However, as Israel’s measures get harsher, the feeling of victimisation and the concomitant sense of entitlement grows yet stronger amongst many Israeli-Jews. The response to minor threats, as a result, has become yet more excessive. Palestinian stone-throwers, for example, are now treated as ‘terrorists’ and as stipulated in an overwhelmingly supported bill, stone-throwing is punishable by up to 20 years in prison (Reuters 2015). Hyper security is becoming more hyper; more walls and fences are being erected on the borders with Jordan, Lebanon, and Gaza (Wootliff 2016). In what seems like a vigorous revival of the Begin Doctrine, hyper security has been justifying Israel’s bombing of the heart of Syria and areas in Iraq to curb, as they say, the Iranian threat in the region. Once again, we are faced by the chicken-or-egg question, which comes first, peace or security?

Most of the above developments happened only in the past few years. This shows how convoluted and unpredictable the nature of the conflict is, and, as a result, how complex the examination of victimhood has been. Painting a clear picture of Israel’s and Palestinian victimhood narratives beyond the visible geo-political conflict dynamics revealed that the issue of victimhood is yet to receive the attention it deserves.
Consequently, much of scholarship on the subject was found to be limited or underdeveloped. Like other studies, this study could only tackle certain aspects of the conflict and was not by any means comprehensive.

As discussed in the introduction chapter, because of the logistical and political obstacles, mostly secondary sources were used. Interviews or archival materials that could have enriched the study further were not easily or at all accessible. The study was also prone to the limitations normally associated with qualitative and narrative research. The usage of some statistical representations, trying to identify with the Other’s position, and engaging in self-reflexive critique meant, among other things, to keep the researcher positionality and the study’s credibility and reliability in check. This seemingly unavoidable limitation could be further alleviated in future studies with the employment of more statistical data, interviews, and field work. Palestinian victimhood in particular was found to lack sufficient statistical data.

In contrast to the scholarship on Israel’s collective memory, the scholarship on Palestinian collective memory was found to lack certain psychohistorical perspectives. Several scholars placed Israel’s collective memory within the wider context of ancient Jewish history and that helped provide it with a psychohistorical perspective (e.g. Zerubavel 1991; Falk 1993; Zertal 2005). Future researchers could place Palestinian collective memory within the wider Arab/Muslim historical context. For many Arabs, the collapse of what was perceived as a prosperous civilisation still evokes nostalgia and resonates as a collective feeling of humiliation and victimhood. In this context, Palestinian victimhood may not only be about the humiliation of a ‘paradise lost,’ it can also be about Andalusia lost.

Initially in this study, the role of fear in Israel’s security was partly examined from a cognitive appraisal perspective. The argument was that fear leads to behaviours such as the avoidance of factors causing the fear, and this can turn into aggressive behaviours towards these factors (Rosler 2013; also see: Bar-Tal 2001; Halperin et al. 2011). This was viewed as closely related to Israel’s collective memory. But as an afterthought, there might be other factors that can heighten the fear generated by collective memory.
Conference in New York, which I attended in 2017, Danny Halutz, former IDF Chief of Staff, emphatically warned that in any future attack on Lebanon, “[Israel] will destroy Lebanon.” Halutz’s threat was not new. But what caught my attention was the long round of applause and enthusiastic cheering that followed. Given that most of the audience were American Jews who did not physically experience the conflict, I began to wonder about their reasons for such an aggressive posture beside the identification with Israel and Zionism. One of the thoughts was whether the aggressiveness was also connected to the human fear of mortality (see: Becker 1973), and if that actually enhanced the negative reverberations of collective memory — and vice versa. This thought was inspired by the Terror Management Theory (Greenberg et al. 1986), which stipulates that when mortality is made salient, people tend to intensify aspects of their worldview and bolster their self-esteem (ibid., Greenberg & Arndt 2012). They learn to ‘manage’ the potentially paralysing terror resulting from the awareness of mortality (Solomon 2009). This probably what Amos Oz (1983) meant when he said, quoting a right-wing Israeli-Jew, “Better a living Judeo-Nazi than a dead saint.” The human tendency to fear mortality is natural, but there could be an overlooked correlation between it and how a society views and identifies with collective memory. The works of Becker (1973) and Greenberg et al. (1986) are well established and could add a whole new psychological dimension that would enrich the studies on traumatic memory and, by extension, victimhood.

Religion is perhaps one of the most defining factors in the conflict. In this study there were several references to the Biblical zachor and Jewish religious rituals/holidays, as well as to Palestinian religious understanding of istishhad. But these references were minor. The role of religion was not expanded on because a reasonable discussion would have surpassed the study’s capacity and diffused its focus. Still, it will be interesting for future researchers to examine the role of religion in the formation and maintenance of victimhood narratives. The role of the Bible and the Quran, for instance, in justifying the conflict and perpetuating the victim identity remains an undiscovered area.
The very recent changes in Israel could also be incorporated in future studies. As of late 2019, Israel is heading for the third election in one year for the first time, Netanyahu is so far Israel's longest serving PM and facing serious corruption charges, and most importantly, Israel is more than ever polarised and divided. There are signs that populism and identity politics are taking hold. This is coupled with a growing tendency to define Israeliness, Zionism, and patriotism in ethnic, secular, or religious terms. Traditionally, the Shoah acted as a unifying factor amongst Israel’s Mizrachi and Ashkenazi Jews, but the formation of new divisive identities (emphasising plural) within an already ethnically divided society may signal upcoming changes. It is hard to tell for sure how this will unfold, but what is certain is that the narratives of victimhood will change. But how and to what extent? That remains for future researchers to consider.

I would like to conclude by saying that because the conflict kept on changing shape, it was tricky staying up-to-date and precise. Sometimes, the periods of calm forced me to slightly revise my initial impressions and assumptions, but only to be brought back into the loop as another wave of escalation struck. I started writing this study only two years after the Gaza onslaught in 2014. Emotions then might have been running high. But I have had sufficient time since to look back and reflect. This work allowed me, or rather pushed me, to step outside the circle and try to fathom what actually happened in 2014 and how things led to such a catastrophic development. From the outset, I constantly shifted between looking outwardly at the conflict history and present and inwardly into my personal experience. While that provided a better understanding of the Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian experiences, it was nevertheless a struggle against the re-traumatisation that came with the constant reminder that the conflict has been building up ever since I knew what it was. There was also the struggle against the emotional influence of memory on how I saw or approached this study. Occasionally, I felt that I, too, was a memory nomad like the rest of the society that I sought to critique. What I saw as an out-of-the-circle vantage point gave me perhaps a clearer perspective on the conflict than many Palestinians inside the circle in Palestine. But this did not completely sever the umbilical cord with the collective. As I journeyed through this study I could not help but sometimes feel that I was carrying Palestine as a burden on my shoulders. Not only from an academic perspective, but also because it was not clear
whether that burden was caused by the Palestinian need to be visible, to make a stance by writing about Palestine, to fulfil a moral obligation to a homeland, to preserve and pass on an inheritance, or simply because it was only a habit to cling on to the conflict. On the positive side, the burden made me hyper aware of my positionality as a researcher. But, on the negative side, having learnt more about the dark sides of victimhood in conflict, pessimism about the conflict future gradually set in. This is was made possible partly because pessimism is one of those emotional characteristics that I have acquired by being part of the Palestinian collective. But in the Palestinian case, I came to realise, pessimism was also a powerful tool for survival. Only this way can one be immune to the likelihood, or rather certainty, of further future setbacks. After all, the conflict has proved elusive and repeatedly showed that any glimpse of hope soon turned into yet another element for fear, hatred, polarisation, and desperation. Despite all of that, this study was written not only to understand and explain, but also because of some faint hope that it will add to the understanding of the power of beliefs and perceptions in the conflict. The examination of victimhood was not a conflict resolution endeavour. But one of its implications, I hoped, was to add another dimension to the existing socio-psychological approaches to conflict resolution. Even with the illusive facade of manageability or normality, the conflict remains unsustainable, and will continue to deteriorate. My main hope that someday, no matter how far away that might seem, we will all run out of fuel. This is not a hope for an idealistic, perhaps naive visualisation of peace, but rather a hope that more of us will realise that neither Palestinians nor Israeli-Jews are going to give up, and the only way out is to meet somewhere in between. One step at a time.
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(fig. 1.1) Handhala

Naji Al-Ali was a Palestinian political cartoonist, born in 1938 in Palestine and assassinated in London in 1987. Al-Ali said Handhala was born as a ten-year-old and will remain as such until Palestinians have returned to Palestine. The laws of nature did not apply to him, exactly like the loss of a homeland.

(fig. 1.2) An Educational Ad Captures Israel’s Culture of Fear (Moar 2011)

“Don’t leave us behind,”
“Education is our future”
“Yesterday, they said on the news that Israel has the most advanced missiles in the world, they said that our technological progress is the only reason we have not been thrown in the sea…I am scared, I do not know how to swim very well.”
Photos recently emerged on social media showing a group of IDF soldiers standing solemnly as the sirens of *Yom Ha-shoah* (*Shoah Remembrance Day*) sounded. The soldiers were in fact in the middle of demolishing Palestinian residential tents in Susiya, Hebron but had to stop briefly to pay homage to the *Shoah* victims. When the sirens stopped, the troops resumed the demolition.