

**Facebook affordances and citizen engagement during elections: European political parties and their benefit from online strategies? <sup>1</sup>**

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## **Abstract**

This paper examines how Facebook is used by political parties during elections to extend or accelerate their reach within the electorate and how successful these efforts are. Specifically, we compare the content and style of parties' Facebook posts during the 2014 European parliament elections, and how this affects followers' responses in terms of liking, sharing and commenting on the posts. Our findings reveal while that the timing and visual content of posts are important in increasing voters' attention, interactivity matters most. Responsive party posts on Facebooks are significantly more likely to be shared, liked, and commented on by users. Given that follower reactions, particularly sharing, helps to increase the visibility of party communication through indirect or two-step flow communication (online and offline), these findings are important in advancing our understanding of how and why social media campaigns are able to influence voters and thus affect election outcomes. For parties themselves the results provide some useful insights into what makes for an 'effective' Facebook campaign in terms of how they can accelerate the reach of their communication.

Keywords: affordances, Facebook, social media, political communication, electoral campaign, interactivity

## **Introduction**

A wealth of literature has examined the way in which political parties use the online environment in election campaigns, and particularly whether the more interactive mode of communication that platforms offer is utilised to connect parties with those they seek to represent (Gerodimos and Justinussen, 2015; Lilleker et al, 2017). To date, there is broad consensus that digital technologies have had minimal effects on the nature of political communication. Parties are typically seen as following a more ‘normalized’ ‘top down; approach that limits meaningful engagement and enforces “controlled interactive” experiences for those who visit their websites or follow them on social media (Stromer-Galley, 2014). Users asking questions, seeking to clarify policy details or attempting to influence policy is often seen as an unwelcome by-product of social media usage, and, as evidence suggests, user comments are unread or ignored by the host (Vaccari, 2014; Zurutuza-Munoz & Lilleker, 2018). Given this general consensus, the question of how far party strategies that are more interactive actually work in terms of increasing their reach within online networks has to date gained very little attention. It is this gap that this paper seeks to fill.

While Facebook, like all forms of media, is used by political parties to gain an electoral advantage (Lilleker et al, 2014), one of its key affordances in a campaign is the way in which it helps parties to extend their reach by mobilizing their activist base to spread their message more widely, and bypass the often critical mainstream media. This two-step flow of communication, while a benefit of internet communication in the pre-social media era, has gained significant prominence with the arrival of social networking platforms. (Norris & Curtice, 2008). Facebook in particular allows election campaigns to mobilize their supporters to become opinion formers within their networks, and to take an active role in parties’

message distribution (Gibson, 2015). The precise mechanism through which this process works i.e. how parties encourage their supporters to like and share their content and thereby achieve this *accelerated reach* through their follower networks has so far not been a focus of extensive study. Our research seeks to fill that gap by more systematically measuring and examining the parties' Facebook communication during an election and the extent to which it is actively responded to in terms of likes, shares or comments from users. We do so using a database that contains over 16 thousand Facebook posts from 279 political parties in 28 EU nations that campaigned during the 2014 European Parliament. Ultimately our goal is to measure both how strategic party communication is on social media, and to what extent these activities work in terms of accelerating a party's reach (Karlsen, 2015; Lilleker et al, 2015; Bene, 2016).

### **Understanding Facebook Affordances**

Research to date has demonstrated that significant electoral benefits can accrue to political organizations as result of their use of social media (Cvijikj & Michahelles, 2013; Kruike-meier, 2013; Ceron et al, 2014; Sianpetro and Ordaz, 2015; Jungherr, 2016; Bright et al., 2019). While it remains unclear precisely how these electoral benefits are gained, attention is increasingly focused on the networked nature of social media communication and the role of two-step communication flow in extending or accelerating the reach of political messages to voters (Vergeer et al, 2013; Fowler and Hagar, 2013; Auter & Fine, 2018). Facebook, as one of the most widely used social networking platforms, is seen as a highly cost-effective way to distribute content in elections. Its capacity for sharing and spreading messages at scale very quickly has provided an alternative channel for campaigns to use to mobilise supporters to help increase the reach of messages and 'get out the vote'. As such Facebook offers valuable 'affordances' for a party to exploit during elections. Below we

expand on the notion of affordance in general, and its more particular application to the communication context relevant to this study.

An affordance, in generic terms, constitutes an opportunity to perform an action that may be of benefit to a given actor. Affordances are actual but also perceived, and exist only “when the properties of an object intersect with the ability of a social agent” (Cabiddu et al, 2014: 177). In the context of social media communicative action researchers have identified several key affordances – behaviour visibility, persistent conversation, editability, the capacity for developing associations that enable community building, and for average users, providing access to expertise (Treem & Leonardi, 2012). The first, second and especially the fourth of these affordances –behaviour visibility, persistent conversation, and developing associations – would appear most aligned with the activities parties undertake in the context of an election campaign to maximize voter support (Kalnes et al, 2017). Through Facebook, parties can raise the visibility of their campaign events, rallies and supporter events, build a supportive and active community of followers, and build a dialogue with those supporters and voters more generally. A key component of all these activities is the extent to which they can encourage followers to engage in liking and sharing their content. Such activities allow them to build relationships that can result in greater loyalty, reciprocity and directed activism (Kizgin et al, 2019; Majchrzak et al (2013; Cabiddu, 2014).

### **Party communication strategies**

To date while there is an expectation that parties would seek to make their social media content more appealing to encourage supporters’ to engage with it, by liking, commenting and sharing there has been very little work that has compared the extent to which parties engage in this activity, and the benefits parties receive. In this section we set out some of the

communication strategies that evidence or logic suggests may help to enhance these types of supporter engagement.

**Interactivity:** Despite the apparent benefits of interactivity for increasing the reach of parties' messages on social media, the evidence suggests it is not extensively used, with parties typically preferring to rely on a more functionalist, broadcasting approach, i.e. sending out text messages accompanied by pictures or video. This is particularly notable among the major parties who fear becoming involved in extended and potentially damaging public dialogue. Such parties typically opt for a more bespoke targeted and customized experience using big data solutions to inform their communication strategy (Lilleker et al, 2015; Fulgoni et al., 2016).

Such an approach, however, arguably conflicts with best practice in terms of building a loyal base of online activists who will engage in the type of sharing, commenting and liking behaviour that will effectively extend the parties' reach. Committed party supporters claim to desire interaction with their party (Jackson and Lilleker, 2007), and regardless of commitment levels the increased opportunities for interactions afforded by social media might lead followers to expect the more "personalized and mediated forms of engagement" which underpin connective (interactive), collective action (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013: 147). Thus, followers may seek the reciprocity that platforms afford and in turn are more likely to award a party accelerated reach when comments are responded to in public (Steinberg, 2017). Arguably therefore parties may gain higher benefits if they offer a reciprocal communication experience as opposed to restricting their communication strategy due to fears of the risks associated with interactive communication (Stromer-Galley, 2000).

**Vividness:** Communication form might also be a factor that mobilises followers to engage. Cvijikj and Michahelles (2013) suggest the vividness of communication, how eye-catching it is, makes content more likely to be seen, and in turn to be liked and shared; hence by using more vivid content parties might earn greater reach as users appear keen to share content that will be liked by their network. Research has found videos and pictures receive most likes and shares, with videos most likely to be viewed on Facebook (Bene, 2016; Bossetta, 2018); textual posts tend to gain less traction among followers. The argument or logic here is that the visual form of the post, as opposed purely to text, opens up a range of interpretations of *likes*, beyond their being a basic expression of support for the party. Peyton (2013: 117) considers a *like* to be a black box of semiotic and semantic meaning, ranging from a simple bookmarking or tracking device to an expression of amusement, and even a statement of political identity and solidarity. Of course, while we assume a *like* affords the user an opportunity to show their support, likes can also be manufactured through automation via bots or artificial accounts. Certainly, there is increasing evidence that some parties' do see this type of virtual inflation or amplification of their popularity and appeal as a legitimate tactic (Klinger, 2019). However, in 2014 the problem of automated likes and 'digital astroturfing' via Facebook was considerably less severe. This was in part due to the requirement for users to have a minimal public profile which acted as a deterrent against mass scale orchestration of accounts through bots (Marechal, 2017). As such our analysis arguably presents something of a unique opportunity to address questions about the real impact and benefits of parties' Facebook campaigns.

**Timing:** Alongside producing vivid content, posting at key times might also afford parties greater benefits. Marketing research (BuddyMedia 2012) suggests differences in communication posting strategy may earn higher levels of community responsiveness (e.g.



posting during weekends was found beneficial for non-profit organizations). One report (York, 2018) indicates substantial differences in the success of posting strategies depending on the industry (e.g. with non-profit organizations significantly differing from commercial use of Facebook). In addition, the frequency of posting may impact engagement levels with parties who over-post finding their communication gets lost. However, we recognise that there is interection between the outcome of time-related variables and follower engagement levels. Because the Facebook algorithm promotes posts popular within a network, the greater engagement a post receives the more likely it will appear in a follower's timeline even if they log into Facebook somewhat later than when the post was originally published. Therefore, the form of the post, with video offering the most vivid experience, and the time of posting could be determinants that drive follower behaviour, if correct this opens up an array of more complex analytical questions<sup>2</sup>.

Drawing these arguments together, the logic of affordances and the relevant empirical literature to date suggests that parties are most likely to benefit from the higher or accelerated reach and visibility offered by social media (and particularly Facebook) if their communication strategies include: 1. Interactivity with users; 2. Images and visual content; 3. Shorter posts; and 4. Careful timing. We convert these expectations into a series of hypotheses:

H1. Interactive communication will encourage follower engagement to a greater extent than if parties **do not respond** to follower comments.

H2. **A more vivid communication strategy** (images or videos) will increase follower engagement.

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<sup>2</sup> We partially control for this by collecting the data on the daily basis and producing a final archive of data the day after the election.

H3. Shorter messages will increase follower engagement.

H4a. Parties that leave longer gaps of time between posts will see a steady increase in engagement over time.

H4b. Parties that communicate too frequently will earn lower levels of follower engagement.

## **Research Context**

We test these hypotheses using data from parties' Facebook pages during the European parliamentary (EP) elections of 2014. Specifically, we collected the number of likes, shares and comments from parties' Facebook posts within all 28 EU member states during the campaign. In total 279 parties had a Facebook profile. The EP elections provide an excellent opportunity for researchers of political campaigns to analyse the strategies of parties and their effectiveness due to their concurrent nature and focus. Previous studies have frequently utilised data from these contests to explore commonalities across campaigns as well as to highlight how party or national variables influence the design, implementation and impact (Lusoli, 2005; Stromback et al, 2011). Elections to the European parliament are typically defined as second order contests (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Maier et al, 2011), in that they are a lower priority for parties than first order national parliamentary and Presidential elections. This means in practical terms that they have fewer resources devoted to them, and both media and voters pay less attention to the campaign. Despite their lower profile, the outcomes of EP elections have increasingly been seen as indicators of future support for parties in first order elections, and evidence is mounting that parties may now be taking these contests more seriously (Vergeer et al, 2013). Furthermore, some nations have seen parties innovate to a degree at EP elections, employing these second-order contests to experiment with new techniques and tactics (Jackson and Lilleker, 2010). Finally, EP contests also represent an opportunity for parties to gain greater visibility, particularly smaller parties seeking to build

support. Therefore, we expect EP elections to provide a meaningful arena for parties to focus on waging credible social media campaigns.

In addition to the growing importance of EP elections, the 2014 EP election were of particular significance for voters across most member states compared with previous contests. These were the first elections following the signing of the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon which had substantially increased the powers of the parliament. More generally the EU now enjoyed higher visibility due to the 2008 global economic crisis and the enhanced role for supra-national powers in fiscal management. These economic crisis in particular intensified the debate about the future direction and powers of the EU and its relationship with member states (Van den Berge, 2014). Parties with a strongly Eurosceptic stance had become a stronger voice in many country's national elections, thereby raising the prominence of the EU as an issue for voters in their decision-making. Finally, the 2014 EP elections were also concurrent with national elections in three member states - Belgium, Ireland and Lithuania. Given this backdrop to the contest, we would expect parties to take the occasion seriously and campaign with the express intention of maximizing their vote.

The election results showed a small but largely uniform shift away from traditional parties of government and an increase in support for parties belonging to far left and Eurosceptic groupings as well as the non-aligned parties which tend to inhabit the far right of the political spectrum. It also marked the first contest where the majority of parties were using the Facebook platform. This meant our analysis was able to encompass parties from across the ideological spectrum. Given that 2019 saw an unprecedented surge in a range of new parties challenging the status quo and the dominance of the traditional Conservative and Social Democrat groupings, it is likely that 2014 was the last EP elections of the pre-populist era

and the first step toward the fragmentation of the parliament. As such it allows insight into what we might deem as the more standardized use of Facebook between the major, minor and fringe parties.

## **Methodology**

The data is drawn from the Facebook profiles of 279 political parties standing for election to the European Parliament across the 28 EU states. Of this total, 264 party profiles were recorded as active during the two weeks before the Election Day. Data was collected<sup>3</sup> during the two weeks before election day, in most countries 25th May 2014, with the exception of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (22nd), Ireland and the Czech Republic (23rd), and Slovakia, Malta and Latvia (24th) where the two week period was adapted accordingly.

16,218 party posts were captured, and relevant data on each post was extracted (date, hour, format, length of the text), these constitute our independent variables. We also extracted data on follower responses, this allows us to measure community engagement and constitutes our dependent variable. We exclude posts on Election day itself from our analysis as in many countries communication was forbidden until polling stations closed and so including these would skew the data.

## **Variable Operationalisation.**

Our *dependent variable* was broadly defined as *community engagement*. We measured this in terms of three types of user response – the number of *likes*, *shares* and *comments* made by social media users in response to each post by the political parties. During the electoral

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<sup>3</sup> Sotrender.com is an academic-led company running the application analyzing social media. For the purpose of the project the data delivered is a real time archive of the posts and reactions to them by the public. The data were archived just after the election, thus any changes made after the campaign are not taken into account (e.g. additional likes clicked after the campaign). Sotrender does not control for the possible bots or so called 'likes farms' but makes a scan of official party profiles as they are visible to the follower.

campaign we recorded a total of 5,036,916 *likes* ( $M=283$ ;  $SD=954$ ), a total of 1,083,657 *shares* ( $M=61$ ;  $SD=413$ ) and a total 546,754 *comments* ( $M=30.7$ ;  $SD=142$ ) across all posts by parties standing across the 28 member states.

The main independent variables in our model were designed to test the hypotheses specified above:

- (1) Interactive posts were measured as a binary variable, whereby political party posts that showed a party had responded to comments left by visitors in the comments section under the original post were coded as 1. 1,137 posts were identified as demonstrating interaction occurred ( $M=.13$  ( $SD=1.17$ )). Only replies posted under the party name were counted. Although research argues that this may not represent dialogue in the true sense (Lane & Kent, 2018), a conversation between the party representative and one of their followers (Kent & Theunisson, 2016), it gives the perception the ‘party’ reads comments and willing to acknowledge communication from their followers while also accelerating the reach of the post commented on.
- (2) Vividness of posts was measured using binary variables that indicated if the post contained a Video, Photo, Link or a text only Status.
- (3) Length of posts was measured as a count variable that was logarithmically calculated. The count was based on number of characters in the post, which ranged from zero for no text upwards to 17,442 characters ( $M=212$  ( $SD=497$ )). We also created an interaction term that combined the length of a post with a measure of vividness (i.e. Video, Photo Link, Status) \* text length).
- (4) Timing of posts was measured as a count in seconds between posts. As with length, the counts were then logarithmically calculated, and transformed to a log squared version of the count. The logarithmic calculation was undertaken to control for the impact of posting

frequency. If posts are made within seconds of each other, one would expect more responses to the last post in a sequence than the first<sup>4</sup>. Two variations were tested in order to examine our expectation (H4) that posting in a more linear manner, i.e. leaving gaps between posts to allow for reading and responding, may have a positive impact on community activity, as opposed to an exponential posting strategy.

As well as our substantive variables of interest we included a range of control variables that were likely to affect our findings. These were:

1. Follower engagement with the preceding post - here we are controlling for any heightened attention that a post receives due to the preceding post or thread having gone viral, either naturally and/or from any automated promotion via the Facebook algorithm. This was measured as a continuous logarithm of likes, shares and comments performed for a preceding post.
2. Campaign stage – this measures the number of days since the campaign started. This allows us to factor in the role that development or maturity of the campaign plays on supporter engagement and particularly the influence of campaign intensity. It is measured as a count variable based on days, with 0 used to indicate the start of the campaign up to 13 indicating the final day prior to the vote.
3. Campaign silence - in some countries there is an official period of electoral silence that can be up to 48 hours before the end of voting. This was measured using a dummy with 1 indicating a silence period was in operation and 0 that no restrictions applied.
4. Timing of the election – we included a dummy to measure if the election occurred on a weekend (coded as 1) or weekday (0)

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<sup>4</sup> As a robustness check of the time slots we also propose to look at a measure that counts the number of posts by the party within a 1 hour window (measured backward and forward in time). The variable is again logged and squared. See Appendix Table A1 for the full results.

5. Timing of post – controls for hour of the day (dummy) when the thread was posted.
6. Party characteristics –we added dummies for parties to capture the extent to which any fixed effects such as ideology, size or country location, might influence their levels of *likes*, *shares* and *comments*. The findings relating to these variables are omitted from the main results table, but are available in Appendix B Table B3. Additional information on party and country are available in Appendix B Table B1 and B2.

The models were tested using negative binomial regression. We do so because count data are used as our dependent variable, i.e. the number of likes, shares and comments per post. Standard linear regression is not suitable for this type of distribution. While we could also have used Poisson regression, given that our data demonstrates dispersion, a negative binomial model was found most appropriate (Hilbe, 2011).

## **Analysis**

### ***Basic trends***

The most common strategy European political parties used on their Facebook profiles was to offer a vivid experience for users, and to direct followers to websites to reinforce their arguments. Of the 16,218 posts from the two-week campaign, the majority contained pictures (7271). The next most common approach was to include hyperlinks (6490). Overall, just 17% of posts (1061) were text-only (for the breakdown by country and party see Appendix B). Overall parties in Italy, Malta and Romania posted most frequently (relative to the number of parties present in the election), while the least active were Latvian parties. Parties from Italy and Hungary also had the most active followers, while the least active were somewhat predictably in Latvia but also somewhat more surprisingly in France (also see (Koc-Michalska & Lilleker, 2020)).

In terms of the timing of activity, the trend was clearly toward a peak of activity in the final few days of the campaign, with a dip in activity in the day before elections, and then a mini-peak on election day (Figure 1). The reduced activity is likely due to the obligatory campaign silence in most EU countries, although the restrictions are not as specific for social media campaigning as they are for campaigning via traditional media or offline<sup>5</sup>.

Some variation was observed in the type of posts that appeared in these two peak periods with photos proving most popular. This would suggest parties were making strategic decisions in their posting behaviour to ensure they produced more commonly shared content at key points in the campaign when the accelerated reach afforded by Facebook could be most beneficial.

#### **Figure 1 about here please**

In terms of patterns in the dependent variable as Figure 2 shows there is a clear increase in liking and commenting, two days before the end of the campaign followed by a one-day decrease in activity likely caused by the period of campaign silence prior to election day itself. Notably party posts gain most likes and comments on Election Day, shown by the spike in Figure 2. Sharing activity is more variable across the campaign but seems to be somewhat lower in the first week compared to the second.

#### **Figure 2 about here please**

### **Communication strategies for community engagement**

Table 1 shows the results for our statistical models predicting the extent of liking, sharing and commenting on party posts within the Facebook user community. The data shows support for our hypotheses, specifically: the main drivers of supporter engagement with party posts are

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<sup>5</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections-2014/en/in-the-member-states> (accessed 06.05.2015)



interactivity (H1), post type (H2 and H3) and timing (H4). Party interaction with users and reciprocity of posting is particularly important and earns the highest dividend in terms of increasing the amount of *comments* as well as accelerating reach by gaining *likes* and *shares*. This finding thus confirms H1 suggesting interactivity is a key driver of follower engagement (Lewis et al, 2015). Reciprocal communication (the engagement of the political party in the discussion within the 'comments' section of the post) has a substantial (and statistically significant) impact on receiving all forms of reaction from the community. A response by a political party brings in 40% more likes, 70% more shares and 150% more comments in comparison to posts with no reciprocal communication (Appendix Table B3). Whether this is due to followers being more supportive of parties who enter into reciprocal communication (Lewis et al, 2015) or whether a party responding simply makes a post more visible is an open question, and one that we are not able to answer from these data. Overall, however, it does seem clear that parties are rewarded with accelerated reach for their posts when they engage with their followers on Facebook.

A second main finding is that format and content matter for increasing the levels of engagement and reach for party posts. The inclusion of images typically boosts all forms of engagement, however, videos are particularly important for increasing *shares*. This means that H2 is broadly confirmed, but we find different types of post can be used to encourage different responses from followers. In terms of text length, we find little support for H3. All things being equal, followers do not engage more with short, text-only posts (Zurutuza-Munoz & Lilleker, 2018). Actually, the longer the post the more impact it appears to have. This effect is further strengthened when it is linked with a particular type of post. In particular it seems that a longer post associated with a status update (Status\*Length of thread) has a positive effect on levels of sharing and commenting on that post. While closer content

analysis (not performed for this study) is needed to unpack precisely why this might be the case, our data does offer some basis for speculation. Specifically, smaller parties are more likely to write longer posts<sup>6</sup>, presumably in a bid to exploit the equalising properties of the medium and articulate their views at greater length than they are normally able to do in the traditional media. If this the case then it appears their tactics are working, and that minor parties are managing to increase the impact and reach of their message within their user community.

### **Table 1 about here**

Finally, our expectations for post timing (H4a and 4b) are broadly supported. A higher frequency and intensity of posting is positively associated with all forms of community responses over the course of the campaign and, the closer to election day, the more supporters engage with content posted by the party they follow. The results from the last section of Table 1 also show that timing between posts is influential with the strongest effect found for *time since last post*. Specifically, the number of likes, shares and comments increases with the time from the last post (linear) but at a declining rate (squared). In practical terms this means that the time between the two posts must be sufficiently long in order to give followers a chance to react. Posting frequently in a short period of time makes all but the most recent posts invisible. However, if the time between posts is too long, engagement starts to decline exponentially. This finding is validated through an added variable - *number of posts within hourly window* - which is negatively quadratic and also declines exponentially (see Appendix TableA1). Finally, our results show that there are also optimal times of the day for parties to post if they want to encourage more engagement from their audience, with 6-7 a.m. or 6-7 p.m. windows being the most likely to produce a response.

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<sup>6</sup> Among the ten longest posts, five originated from the non-parliamentary German party BüSo.

One additional finding of interest is found when controlling for prior community activity, the finding is statistically significant, but only within the same activity. We found the number of *likes* awarded the previous post has a significant impact on the *likes* for the following post but not on the extent of shares or comments it receives. Similar exclusivity is found for sharing and commenting, i.e. shares accelerate shares and comments accelerate comments.

In summary our analysis confirms that a more interactive and relational communication style on Facebook is beneficial for online community building and accelerating the reach of campaign messages. Furthermore, while more vivid forms of communication also help to engage followers, video is particularly important for extending reach. Somewhat surprisingly, long-form text messages are more likely to engage followers than short text updates. Lastly, the timing of message is important with a period of time being needed in order to maximize the responsiveness from a parties' audience.

## **Discussion**

Our results are interesting in that they show Facebook constitutes a significant additional platform that parties can use during election campaigns to engage and mobilize their followers and perhaps most importantly to extend or accelerate their reach beyond their committed support base. Not all content is created equal, however. Some types of post are more likely to provoke a response and / or go viral than others. Posts that are more vivid in terms of containing visual content such as photos and video prove to be highly popular with the latter proving to be particularly shareable among Facebook users. Text-only posts can prove engaging, if they are extensive in length. However, the strongest finding is that when a party engages in a more conversational approach and engages in dialogue relating to a post this is a clear driver of engagement and increases its popularity and visibility. If parties

increase the frequency of their posting closer to election day this can also have some benefit, although they need to maintain a steady pace in their activity and not overload users with messages.

Beyond the findings about the strategic use and ‘return on investment’ of Facebook posting by parties during campaigns, our results are also interesting in terms of what they reveal about follower behaviour. In particular, we find a path dependency emerging in terms of likes, comments and shares predicting further likes, comments and shares respectively. Essentially, followers appear to cluster around one type of activity in response to a post. Whether this is simply contagion or a ‘copycat’ type of effect or because some posts or posts by a party are intrinsically more likely to be *liked*, *commented on* or *shared* than others is not clear from our analysis. The former explanation is perhaps more likely for likes and shares due to them being simple click responses. Comments which require some degree of reflection or mental processing. The differences in volume of each type of response provides further support for the idea of patterns of response. Likes far exceed shares (by 3 to 1) and comments were the least popular form of response. Overall, therefore, the data suggests that most followers are performing one, fairly low effort form of engagement, mostly clicking like, while a minority of highly engaged followers regularly post comments. Once that chain of response begins, however, it builds a momentum of its own, attracting further similar responses. While these dynamics require further exploration, our findings clearly show a relationship between the content and form of a post and the reactions it receives. However, the relationship appears more complex than previous research has suggested.

One further aspect of this relationship that our findings suggest requires closer scrutiny is the impact of text length. Specifically, we find that more elaborated textual posts gain a higher

levels of follower engagement in all respects – likes, comments and shares. One might hypothesise this is due to the fact some posts are intrinsically more likely to elicit comments, perhaps due to their more controversial or provocative nature. Alternatively, a longer post may have a broader appeal in terms of having ‘something for everyone’ and so may draw more community members into the discussion. A richer textual analysis of posts than was possible for this paper is required to investigate the mechanisms of influence at work here. While we do not examine the impact of parties’ Facebook posting on levels of voter support and election outcomes, our findings do provide some useful insight into the potential ‘real world’ benefits of these strategies. Prior research has pointed to the vote dividend for parties in having a network of the highly engaged followers (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2015).

Our research suggests a possible mechanism for how this may be occurring. Through strategic use of posting, parties are able to extend their reach into their followers’ networks. While this may simply increase the visibility of party posts within a largely partisan echo chamber (Messing and Westwood, 2014), it is also possible that it increases exposure to more vivid and dynamic content among those within the networks of supporters, but who are undecided (Weeks et al, 2015). While these numbers are likely to be very small, our results suggest that longer term party networks could grow if parties adopt a more interactive visual posting strategy. Such activity is likely to increase the size of their active followership, which in turn will accelerate their reach into the wider (undecided) electorate. Given that as of 2014 parties were more likely to avoid interaction than to engage in it (as demonstrated by the fact that only 1,000 of the over 16,000 posts were classified as reciprocal), we argue that while parties are clearly missing opportunities to mobilize their base, they may also be missing out on wider electoral gains. It seems that party fears of straying off message by engaging in dialogue with the public online (Stromer-Galley, 2000), may be imposing a cost on their

capacity to fully exploit the organizational and electoral affordances of Facebook campaigning.

## **Conclusions**

Overall, our analysis has confirmed that social media use can have positive effects on parties' online visibility, and furthermore that differing tactics can yield different responses and types of engagement. For mobilizing the base in terms of sparking comments and likes interaction is important as well as visual cues. However, for provoking wider sharing of party campaign content and two-step flow of communication, video is particularly helpful. The relationship between differential strategies and follower reactions appears to be platform driven with a uniformity emerging across countries and parties with regard to these results. Contextual effects appear to be marginal.

## **Limitations**

While these findings may be due in part to the uniformity in the level and timing of the campaigns studied i.e. the European parliamentary elections, the very fact they are 'second order' implies they are a stage for the contestation of first order or national issues. Thus, while there may be a case for lower contextual effects than if one were comparing General election campaigns, one would not expect local factors to be entirely irrelevant or eradicated. A second and arguably more important qualifier, however, is the limitations of our data and an acknowledgement that our methods rely on quantitative measures and metrics for categorizing parties' posting style and form, rather than nuances of content. Notably, however, our findings are in accordance with several smaller scale studies that have employed more granular methods to understand the behaviour of party followers on Facebook (Bene, 2016; Heiss et al., 2018). A third potentially confounding element or

challenge to our findings that we should recognize in drawing out any broader conclusions is the extent to which they may be driven or affected by the algorithms that operate behind the scenes of Facebook to promote content and accounts. As with bots, however, these invisible actors have arguably become more sophisticated and influential since the period studied here. While this might seem to skate over the problem or surrender to it, our inability to unpack this particular ‘black box’ we regard as an endemic or intractable problem faced by all studies of this nature.

We do take comfort in the fact that our key findings have face validity in a political context and align with previous research on patterns of Facebook user behaviour. Essentially, the desire uncovered by our research for reciprocity and a close, more interactive, relationship with a party is one that has emerged from other comparative and single nation studies over the same time period (Gibson, 2015; Bene, 2016; Karlsen, 2015, Heiss et al, 2018). Our findings go beyond observing this inclination, however, and show that parties that interact with their communities of interest stimulate higher levels of engagement among those groups. Whether parties are bold enough to accept the challenge to shift from the typical cautionary stance and embrace a reciprocal style of electoral communication is a question to return to in future national and comparative studies of social media campaigning.

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**Table 1. Negative binomial regressions results for follower engagement**

	Likes		Shares		Comments	
Reciprocal communication	.379	***	.607	***	1.048	***
	(.055)		(.087)		(.079)	
<b>Thread characteristics (ref. hyperlinks)</b>						
Photo	.767	***	.597	**	.257	**
	(.116)		(.253)		(.108)	
Status	-1.029	***	-3.000	***	-1.281	**
	(.375)		(.666)		(.601)	
Video	.120		.661	***	.039	
	(.153)		(.221)		(.195)	
Length of the thread (ln)	.028	*	.136	***	.065	***
	(.015)		(.030)		(.016)	
Photo*Length of thread (ln)	-.063	***	.002		-.002	
	(.025)		(.048)		(.023)	
Status*Length of thread (ln)	.146	**	.408	***	.209	**
	(.058)		(.110)		(.090)	
Video*Length of thread (ln)	.006		-.010		.020	
	(.030)		(.046)		(.040)	
<b>Previous activity</b>						
Likes for last post (ln)	0.109	***	.018		.008	
	(.019)		(.026)		(.029)	
Shares for last post (ln)	-.018	**	.039	**	-.019	
	(.009)		(.016)		(.012)	
Comments for last post (ln)	-.002		.025		.099	***
	(.016)		(.023)		(.023)	
<b>Time specificity</b>						
Time since last post (ln)	.211	***	.261	***	.218	***
	(.063)		(.064)		(.050)	
Time since last post (ln) squared	-.011	***	-.014	***	-.012	***
	(.003)		(.004)		(.003)	
Time till next post (ln)	.188	***	.162	**	.063	
	(.057)		(.067)		(.061)	
Time till next post (ln) squared	-.009	**	-.004		.003	
	(.003)		(.004)		(.004)	
Number of posts within a 1 hour window	.002		-.001		-.009	
	(.011)		(.016)		(.022)	
Number of posts within a 1 hour window squared	-.001	***	-.002	***	-.002	***
	(.000)		(.000)		(.000)	
Weekend (dummy)	.051		-.057		-.042	
	(.034)		(.051)		(.058)	
Day of campaign	.025	***	.028	***	.024	***
	(.004)		(.007)		(.005)	
Campaign silence 48h	-.098		-.339	***	-.215	
	(.089)		(.112)		(.158)	
Campaign silence 24h	-.171	**	-.257	**	.106	
	(.078)		(.131)		(.127)	
<b>Hours &amp; Party fix <sup>§</sup></b>						
Constant	.949	**	-3.810	***	-.971	**
	(.401)		(0.551)		(.453)	
Number of observations	16218		16218		16218	
Dispersion	1.1366		1.0993		1.0277	
Dispersion - Pearson	1.899		1.9184		1.7394	

Stat significance \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Note: <sup>§</sup> hours, party fixed effects are omitted from the output due to place constrain (available upon request). We use party fixed effects in order to control for party characteristics, ideology etc, as well as the Facebook community size.

Coefficients on dummy variables such as “response owner” give the effect on the outcome of switching the value of that variable from 0 to 1. For variables with interactions, such as “Photo”: i) the coefficient on “Photo” at zero of the interacted variable “Length of thread (ln)” gives the intercept difference in the outcome variable from the reference content (hyperlink); ii) The coefficient on the continuous “Length of thread (ln)” is the slope for the case when Photo, Status and Video are set to zero (post contains a hyperlink); iii) interaction Photo\*Length of thread (ln) gives the additional difference for the outcome variable when Photo = 1 that can be interpreted i.e. at the mean of “Length of thread (ln)”.



**Figure 1: Post and type of post by parties by day of campaign**





Figure 2: Engagement performed by day of campaign



## ONLINE APPENDIXES

### Appendix A

**Table A1. Negative binomial regressions results for follower engagement with hour time slots**

	Likes		Shares		Comments	
Reciprocal communication	0.3795 (0.0554)	***	0.6069 (0.0860)	***	1.0478 (0.0780)	***
Photo	0.7692 (0.1278)	***	0.5633 (0.2658)	**	0.2570 (0.1128)	**
Status	-0.9926 (0.3708)	***	-2.9576 (0.6605)	***	-1.2519 (0.5938)	**
Video	0.1180 (0.1578)		0.6442 (0.2280)	***	0.0249 (0.2056)	
Length of the thread (ln)	0.0269 (0.0160)	*	0.1311 (0.0322)	***	0.0622 (0.0176)	***
Photo*Length of thread (ln)	-0.0635 (0.0266)	**	0.0099 (0.0505)		-0.0011 (0.0232)	
Status*Length of thread (ln)	0.1414 (0.0582)	**	0.4020 (0.1100)	***	0.2065 (0.0894)	**
Video*Length of thread (ln)	0.0074 (0.0316)		-0.0055 (0.0471)		0.0228 (0.0421)	
Likes for last post (ln)	0.1098 (0.0206)	***	0.0271 (0.0301)		0.0188 (0.0290)	
Comments for last post (ln)	-0.0054 (0.0109)		0.0210 (0.0231)		0.0890 (0.0207)	***
Shares for last post (ln)	-0.0168 (0.0099)	*	0.0423 (0.0174)	**	-0.0167 (0.0144)	
Day of campaign	0.0286 (0.0038)	***	0.0329 (0.0063)	***	0.0280 (0.0054)	***
Time since last post (ln)	0.1736 (0.0532)	***	0.3004 (0.0743)	***	0.2177 (0.0454)	***
Time till next post (ln)	0.1968 (0.0477)	***	0.1988 (0.0717)	***	0.1195 (0.0427)	***
Time since last post (ln) squared	-0.0109 (0.0033)	***	-0.0171 (0.0045)	***	-0.0134 (0.0027)	***
Time till next post (ln) squared	-0.0091 (0.0030)	***	-0.0060 (0.0044)		-0.0002 (0.0029)	
NB of posts in last 10 min	-0.1069 (0.0265)	***	-0.0373 (0.0447)		-0.1022 (0.0563)	*
NB of posts in last 1h	-0.0438 (0.0205)	**	-0.0479 (0.0229)	**	-0.0820 (0.0409)	**
NB of posts in last 3h	-0.0141 (0.0083)	*	-0.0105 (0.0082)		-0.0168 (0.0063)	***
NB of posts in last 6h	-0.0228 (0.0053)	***	-0.0153 (0.0100)		-0.0130 (0.0084)	
NB of posts in last 12h	-0.0219 (0.0119)	*	-0.0227 (0.0081)	***	-0.0249 (0.0046)	***
NB of posts in last 24h	-0.0048 (0.0036)		-0.0022 (0.0032)		-0.0084 (0.0030)	***
NB of posts in last 48h	0.0003 (0.0034)		-0.0056 (0.0041)		-0.0020 (0.0015)	
Weekend (dummy)	0.0225 (0.0315)		-0.0858 (0.0495)	*	-0.0720 (0.0493)	
Campaign silence 48h	-0.0566 (0.0905)		-0.2754 (0.1067)	***	-0.1740 (0.1478)	

Campaign silence 24h	-0.1788 (0.0808)	**	-0.2530 (0.1411)	*	0.1201 (0.1397)	
Time of the day						
h1_2 a.m.	0.1726 (0.1986)		0.1374 (0.3070)		0.3433 (0.3104)	
h2_3 a.m.	-0.1392 (0.3624)		1.2971 (0.8882)		-0.4387 (0.4580)	
h3_4 a.m.	-0.2642 (0.2341)		-0.1209 (0.3997)		0.1641 (0.3771)	
h4_5 a.m.	0.1185 (0.2660)		0.7832 (0.4159)	*	0.5557 (0.3084)	*
h5_6 a.m.	0.1413 (0.2041)		0.6956 (0.3366)	**	0.5055 (0.2640)	*
h6_7 a.m.	0.2790 (0.1963)		0.7533 (0.3149)	**	0.7550 (0.2572)	***
h7_8 a.m.	0.0987 (0.1892)		0.6246 (0.3070)	**	0.5820 (0.2507)	**
h8_9 a.m.	0.1101 (0.1849)		0.7114 (0.3050)	**	0.6401 (0.2518)	**
h9_10 a.m.	0.0556 (0.1871)		0.6415 (0.3015)	**	0.5554 (0.2507)	**
h10_11 a.m.	0.1454 (0.1912)		0.6809 (0.3008)	**	0.6488 (0.2507)	***
h11_12 a.m.	0.2003 (0.1759)		0.7391 (0.3136)	**	0.5973 (0.2600)	**
h12_1 p.m.	0.1645 (0.1840)		0.6854 (0.2985)	**	0.6564 (0.2545)	***
h1 2 p.m.	0.2031 (0.1878)		0.6291 (0.2937)	**	0.6938 (0.2571)	***
H 2_3 p.m.	0.1458 (0.1772)		0.6671 (0.2999)	**	0.5679 (0.2484)	**
H3 4 p.m.	0.1623 (0.1644)		0.6491 (0.3135)	**	0.7760 (0.2689)	***
H4 5 p.m.	0.1394 (0.1920)		0.6301 (0.2995)	**	0.6686 (0.2620)	**
H5 6 p.m.	0.2006 (0.1729)		0.6871 (0.3190)	**	0.5955 (0.2418)	**
H6 7 p.m.	0.2222 (0.1746)		0.6356 (0.3030)	**	0.6877 (0.2502)	***
H7 8 p.m.	0.3534 (0.1869)	*	0.6908 (0.3065)	**	0.6457 (0.2538)	**
H8 9 p.m.	0.3294 (0.1734)	*	0.6313 (0.3046)	**	0.7046 (0.2536)	***
H9 10 p.m.	0.3549 (0.1782)	**	0.6338 (0.3054)	**	0.8074 (0.2571)	***
H10 11 p.m.	0.3236 (0.1672)	*	0.6902 (0.3554)	*	0.5653 (0.2491)	**
H11 12 p.m.	0.2280 (0.1907)		0.7079 (0.3540)	**	0.3415 (0.2303)	
CONSTANT	1.2489 (0.3371)	***	-4.0734 (0.5936)	***	-0.9872 (0.3858)	**
Party fix						
N	16218		16218		16218	
Dispersion	1.1370		1.1032		1.0265	
Dispersion - Pearson	2.0109		1.9435		1.8095	
Stat significance * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01						

## Appendix B.

**Table B1. Information per party**

Party name	Party ideology	EU position	Party born	Party size according to last national. election	Nb photos	Nb videos	Nb posts	Nb links	Nb LIKES	Nb COMM	Nb SHARE
OVP AU	RIGHT	neutral	1945	Major Parl.	22	3	0	4	2430	340	73
NEOS AU	RIGHT	pro_EU	2012	Minor Parl.	18	16	3	10	5752	1049	324
SPO AU	LEFT	pro_EU	1888	Major Parl.	33	7	4	15	19979	2299	1997
Grunen AU	LEFT	pro_EU	1986	Minor Parl.	35	9	2	4	17975	1059	1386
Tstronach AU	RIGHT	anti_EU	2012	Minor Parl.	14	4	7	13	2079	565	298
BZO AU	RIGHT	pro_EU	2005	Major Frin.	59	6	1	16	572	73	350
REKOS AU	Sing.Issue	anti_EU	2013	Minor Frin.	9	9	15	39	1269	210	344
CD&V BE	CENTER	pro_EU	2001	Minor Parl.	25	10	2	12	3765	176	931
Vlaams Belang BE	RIGHT	anti_EU	2004	Minor Parl.	4	3	3	43	5803	1348	566
Groen BE	LEFT	pro_EU	1981	Minor Parl.	102	11	6	34	28640	975	4202
N-VA BE	RIGHT	pro_EU	2001	Major Parl.	27	7	0	20	35875	4123	7673
Open Vld BE	RIGHT	pro_EU	2007	Minor Parl.	10	4	0	17	6741	391	1103
sp.a BE	LEFT	pro_EU	1978	Minor Parl.	28	11	2	14	20532	1045	6884
Ecolo BE	LEFT	pro_EU	1980	Minor Parl.	35	8	4	25	2888	177	2804
CDH BE	Sing.Issue	pro_EU	2002	Minor Parl.	7	7	4	4	1282	59	798
LCR_SAP BE	LEFT	anti_EU	1956	Minor Frin.	18	21	6	90	714	84	1627
Pro Brussel BE	Sing.Issue	pro_EU	2008	Minor Frin.	34	4	1	15	713	53	441
socialisme.be BE	LEFT	anti_EU	1992	Minor Frin.	3	3	1	53	232	11	136
PVDA BE	LEFT	neutral	1979	Minor Parl.	40	23	1	45	7221	353	2338
Parti Pirate BE	Sing.Issue	neutral	2009	Minor Frin.	15	2	1	11	1649	116	689
PS BE	LEFT	pro_EU	1978	Minor Parl.	18	6	2	2	14200	933	6769
MR BE	CENTER	pro_EU	2002	Minor Parl.	23	10	3	34	7130	495	2807
NDSV BG	CENTER	neutral	2001	Major Frin.	30	8	0	46	1700	61	169
DPS BG	RIGHT	pro_EU	1990	Minor Parl.	1	0	0	0	99	9	4
ATAKA BG	RIGHT	anti_EU	2005	Minor Parl.	5	3	1	20	12411	1612	1282
UoR BG	RIGHT	neutral	1989	Major Frin.	18	7	1	25	819	21	89
GERB BG	RIGHT	pro_EU	2006	Major Parl.	12	21	0	25	1926	67	183
DISY CY	RIGHT	pro_EU	1976	Major Parl.	9	28	0	45	645	22	48
AKEL CY	LEFT	anti_EU	1926	Major Parl.	37	30	28	51	5029	93	556
EDEK CY	LEFT	pro_EU	1969	Minor Parl.	16	16	2	4	1824	60	172
GREEN CY	LEFT	pro_EU	1996	Minor Parl.	0	0	1	4	1	0	0
NEDACY CY	LEFT	neutral		Minor Frin.	1	0	0	11	1	0	1
ERASCY CY	LEFT	anti_EU	2011	Minor Frin.	42	12	24	7	1412	76	437
PSM CY	LEFT	pro_EU	2011	Minor Frin.	9	14	2	557	13979	4906	2995
MoH CY	Sing.Issue	neutral	2014	Minor Frin.	0	3	22	10	1686	99	377
CSSD CZ	LEFT	pro_EU	1999	Major Parl.	37	4	0	4	6115	1879	3081
ODS CZ	RIGHT	pro_EU	1991	Minor Parl.	25	3	1	10	3895	1042	568
TOP 09 CZ	CENTER	pro_EU	2009	Minor Parl.	57	8	2	31	21658	3946	1636
KSCM CZ	LEFT	neutral	1990	Minor Parl.	11	12	2	14	1415	245	171
VECIVEREJNE CZ	LEFT	anti_EU	2001	Minor Frin.	19	4	0	42	594	121	132
SNK CZ	RIGHT	neutral	2006	Minor Frin.	3	1	0	6	44	4	12
KDU CZ	RIGHT	pro_EU	1919	Minor Parl.	31	2	2	13	3260	697	623
ANO CZ	CENTER	pro_EU	2012	Major Parl.	41	2	7	22	0	0	0
SVOBODNI CZ	RIGHT	anti_EU	2009	Major Frin.	17	8	1	23	27887	2845	6842
PIRATI CZ	Sing.Issue	pro_EU	2009	Major Frin.	45	2	3	25	77	2	42

Strana zelenych CZ	CENTER	pro_EU	1989	Major Frin.	37	10	4	27	1209	263	92
Hnutu Usvit CZ	RIGHT	pro_EU	2013	Minor Parl.	42	13	14	24	5343	1138	849
CDU DE	RIGHT	pro_EU	1945	Major Parl.	31	12	3	13	25227	5945	5198
CSU DE	RIGHT	pro_EU	1946	Minor Parl.	15	4	3	10	6685	884	798
SPD DE	LEFT	pro_EU	1875	Major Parl.	62	14	1	16	38833	6388	8110
FDP DE	CENTER	pro_EU	1948	Major Frin.	11	8	1	17	6476	880	773
BUNDNIS 90/DIE GRUNEN DE	LEFT	pro_EU	1980	Minor Parl.	18	2	0	0	13932	2405	8018
Piratenpartei DE	LEFT	pro_EU	2006	Major Frin.	57	10	2	35	13909	1405	5628
Die Linke DE	LEFT	pro_EU	2007	Minor Parl.	28	4	2	2	37489	2299	5652
AfD DE	CENTER	pro_EU	2013	Major Frin.	37	3	1	6	122975	16180	19370
NPD DE	LEFT	anti_EU	1964	Major Frin.	68	9	7	80	131856	20695	28641
DIE REPUBLIKANER DE	RIGHT	anti_EU	1983	Minor Frin.	18	1	0	17	8950	2756	2310
Tierschutzpartei DE	LEFT	pro_EU	1993	Minor Frin.	48	10	4	23	12820	1437	5427
ODP DE	LEFT	pro_EU	1982	Minor Frin.	10	1	2	28	1287	133	304
Die PARTEI DE	Sing.Issue	neutral	2004	Minor Frin.	19	9	2	25	95393	3608	7465
Bayernpartei DE	RIGHT	neutral	1946	Minor Frin.	4	1	1	0	605	52	162
MLPD DE	LEFT	anti_EU	1982	Minor Frin.	0	0	2	0	5	4	0
Rentner Partei DE	Sing.Issue	neutral	2002	Minor Frin.	8	1	0	4	24	1	1
PBC DE	Sing.Issue	neutral	1989	Minor Frin.	11	1	0	3	18	0	0
BuSo DE	Sing.Issue	neutral	2007	Minor Frin.	14	13	9	23	572	41	234
Familien-Partei DE	CENTER	pro_EU	1981	Minor Frin.	78	1	5	13	2003	367	410
PSG DE	LEFT	pro_EU	1997	Minor Frin.	0	2	0	20	148	14	43
Venstre DK	RIGHT	pro_EU	1910	Major Parl.	5	12	0	11	4709	1282	484
Socialdemokraterne DK	LEFT	pro_EU	1871	Major Parl.	12	2	0	3	4780	585	1019
Dansk Folkeparti DK	RIGHT	anti_EU	1995	Minor Parl.	4	1	0	20	3227	303	699
SF DK	LEFT	pro_EU	1959	Minor Parl.	23	5	0	19	6501	571	548
Radikale Venstre DK	LEFT	pro_EU	1905	Minor Parl.	5	2	0	20	2334	316	250
Enhedslisten DK	LEFT	pro_EU	1989	Minor Parl.	18	7	1	13	11446	676	2078
Liberal Alliance DK	CENTER	pro_EU	2007	Minor Parl.	10	2	1	2	4958	396	435
Reform EE	RIGHT	pro_EU	1994	Major Parl.	24	9	1	15	2797	125	201
Keskerakond EE	CENTER	pro_EU	1991	Major Parl.	10	7	0	2	359	44	69
IRL EE	CENTER	pro_EU	2006	Major Parl.	13	3	0	35	1195	131	88
SOTSDEM EE	LEFT	pro_EU	1990	Minor Parl.	9	8	0	13	876	38	70
Erakond EE	LEFT	pro_EU	2005	Major Frin.	1	1	11	12	105	38	36
PP ES	RIGHT	pro_EU	1989	Major Parl.	73	15	33	58	107870	12465	16704
PSOE ES	LEFT	pro_EU	1879	Major Parl.	45	19	1	20	52776	6694	18717
Izquierda Unida ES	LEFT	pro_EU	1986	Minor Parl.	6	0	0	2	20	0	41
UPyD ES	CENTER	pro_EU	2007	Minor Parl.	15	9	2	23	15080	769	3238
CIU ES	Sing.Issue	neutral	1978	Minor Parl.	17	4	0	0	12516	1133	5890
AMAIUR ES	Sing.Issue	neutral	2011	Minor Parl.	54	94	1	5	8146	282	6202
EAJ-PNV ES	Sing.Issue	neutral	1895	Minor Parl.	186	27	0	32	4281	69	379
Esquerra ES	Sing.Issue	neutral	1931	Minor Parl.	104	11	0	15	49417	1901	14212
Coalicion Canaria ES	Sing.Issue	neutral	1993	Minor Parl.	37	5	16	20	666	19	189
ICV-EUiA ES	LEFT	pro_EU	1998	Minor Parl.	35	0	0	14	1479	39	933
Coalició Compromís ES	Sing.Issue	neutral	2010	Minor Parl.	61	16	2	22	49518	2136	16722
Foro Asturias ES	Sing.Issue	anti_EU	2011	Minor Parl.	0	9	1	58	1152	55	231
UPN ES	Sing.Issue	neutral	1979	Minor Parl.	3	0	0	1	31	2	1
Podemos ES	LEFT	pro_EU	2014	Minor Frin.	20	7	2	12	126461	6565	53485

Vox Espana ES	RIGHT	neutral	2013	Minor Frin.	33	5	19	14	11401	584	2730
Kokoomus FI	CENTER	pro_EU	1918	Major Parl.	27	7	0	49	5669	312	236
KD FI	LEFT	neutral	1958	Minor Parl.	2	4	0	22	850	61	113
Keskusta FI	CENTER	pro_EU	1908	Minor Parl.	79	2	4	19	5767	264	574
SFP FI	Sing.Issue	pro_EU	1906	Minor Parl.	22	5	1	16	4191	156	509
SDP FI	LEFT	pro_EU	1899	Major Parl.	35	1	5	22	5498	376	365
Vasemmisto FI	LEFT	pro_EU	1990	Minor Parl.	18	2	7	33	4629	121	438
Vihreat FI	LEFT	pro_EU	1987	Minor Parl.	61	4	1	66	8954	414	1244
Itsenaisyyspuolue FI	Sing.Issue	anti_EU	1994	Minor Frin.	0	2	3	15	498	39	39
SKP FI	LEFT	neutral	2006	Minor Frin.	11	0	1	35	444	45	113
Piraattipuolue FI	LEFT	anti_EU	2008	Minor Frin.	4	1	1	29	1019	77	159
Muutos 2011 FI	Sing.Issue	anti_EU	2009	Minor Frin.	1	5	1	20	149	31	46
PCF FR	LEFT	anti_EU	1921	Minor Parl.	5	6	0	7	1337	77	1192
PdG FR	LEFT	anti_EU	2008	Minor Parl.	22	32	0	164	9550	749	2345
PS FR	LEFT	pro_EU	1969	Major Parl.	86	19	1	29	18598	1401	5098
PRdG FR	LEFT	pro_EU	1998	Minor Parl.	2	2	27	20	181	4	42
EE FR	LEFT	pro_EU	2010	Minor Parl.	0	0	0	3	139	72	60
MoDem FR	CENTER	pro_EU	2007	Minor Parl.	0	1	0	9	330	18	89
UDI FR	RIGHT	pro_EU	2012	Minor Parl.	12	5	0	17	2374	158	636
UMP FR	RIGHT	pro_EU	2002	Major Parl.	9	5	6	26	15142	1991	3058
CNIP FR	RIGHT	neutral	1951	Minor Parl.	1	0	0	0	7	0	4
MPF FR	RIGHT	anti_EU	1994	Minor Parl.	0	2	2	5	72	4	7
FN FR	RIGHT	anti_EU	1972	Minor Parl.	7	2	8	58	49857	6358	3706
NC FR	RIGHT	neutral	2007	Minor Parl.	0	0	4	11	42	1	26
Parti Radical FR	LEFT	neutral	1901	Minor Parl.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NPA FR	LEFT	neutral	2009	Minor Frin.	14	4	0	37	452	55	131
MRC FR	Sing.Issue	anti_EU	2003	Minor Parl.	4	1	0	10	264	26	533
ND GR	RIGHT	pro_EU	1974	Major Parl.	37	16	1	2	23687	2487	1910
SYRIZA GR	LEFT	neutral	2004	Major Parl.	72	16	0	33	61188	1653	6789
PASOK GR	LEFT	pro_EU	1981	Minor Parl.	12	10	24	38	2910	144	284
Anexartitoiellines GR	RIGHT	neutral	2012	Minor Parl.	1	0	4	57	1255	26	164
DIM-AR GR	LEFT	pro_EU	2010	Minor Parl.	3	23	0	16	157	8	44
To Potami GR	LEFT	pro_EU	2014	Minor Frin.	23	27	13	36	12330	670	1558
ECOGREENS GR	LEFT	pro_EU	2002	Minor Frin.	13	3	0	13	365	7	106
Demokratski Centar HR	RIGHT	anti_EU	2000	Minor Parl.	0	0	0	3	3	0	0
HMDK HR	Sing.Issue	neutral	1993	Minor Frin.	1	0	0	3	32	1	3
HDSSB HR	Sing.Issue	pro_EU	2006	Minor Parl.	27	2	5	10	2652	107	479
SDP HR	LEFT	pro_EU	1994	Major Parl.	1	1	0	3	461	56	82
HNS HR	LEFT	pro_EU	1990	Minor Parl.	38	3	3	21	1568	68	203
IDS HR	Sing.Issue	neutral	1990	Minor Parl.	28	1	3	14	2853	116	150
HSU HR	Sing.Issue	neutral	1991	Minor Parl.	4	0	0	3	40	10	13
HDZ HR	RIGHT	pro_EU	1990	Major Parl.	15	6	0	30	9562	291	903
Hrvatski laburisti HR	LEFT	pro_EU	2010	Minor Parl.	8	10	5	35	3342	457	423
SDSS HR	LEFT	neutral	1997	Minor Parl.	0	2	5	0	32	6	3
ORaH HR	LEFT	pro_EU	2013	Minor Frin.	17	6	21	36	4721	308	438
MSZP HU	LEFT	pro_EU	1989	Minor Parl.	19	24	1	24	36275	3265	12335
JOBBIK HU	RIGHT	anti_EU	2003	Minor Parl.	48	18	0	1	146709	9887	53351
KDNP HU	RIGHT	neutral	1989	Minor Parl.	20	3	0	50	6402	170	594
Fidesz HU	RIGHT	pro_EU	1988	Major Parl.	32	5	0	44	172922	10685	20064
DKP HU	LEFT	pro_EU	2011	Minor Parl.	91	42	12	78	70765	4308	15650

Parbeszed HU	LEFT	pro_EU	2013	Minor Parl.	40	6	1	3	15652	1139	4295
LMP HU	LEFT	pro_EU	2009	Minor Parl.	74	13	1	25	9977	552	2267
Labour Party IE	LEFT	pro_EU	1912	Major Parl.	9	4	1	16	516	284	61
Fianna Fail IE	RIGHT	pro_EU	1926	Minor Parl.	0	2	6	0	594	128	175
Sinn Fein IE	LEFT	anti_EU	1905	Minor Parl.	9	12	0	12	23993	1155	5384
United Left IE	LEFT	neutral	2013	Minor Frin.	0	4	0	5	22	3	0
Socialist Party IE	LEFT	anti_EU	1996	Minor Parl.	0	1	0	3	20	1	2
People Before Profit IE	LEFT	neutral	2005	Minor Parl.	13	22	4	42	748	75	273
Green Party IE	LEFT	pro_EU	1981	Major Frin.	17	7	0	15	1190	116	267
RSF IE	Sing.Issue	neutral	1986	Minor Frin.	14	1	12	16	1177	21	140
EIRIGI IE	LEFT	pro_EU	2006	Minor Frin.	43	0	1	2	2066	61	442
Movimento Cinque Stelle IT	Sing.Issue	anti_EU	2009	Minor Parl.	269	14	6	21	138914	11995	28047
Partito Democratico IT	LEFT	pro_EU	2007	Major Parl.	331	9	0	1	124458	25324	34389
Forza Italia IT	RIGHT	pro_EU	2013	Minor Parl.	22	4	0	86	74014	6372	11862
Scelta Civica IT	CENTER	pro_EU	2012	Minor Parl.	33	11	0	6	2576	946	1003
Matteo Salvini IT	RIGHT	anti_EU	1989	Minor Parl.	110	41	113	4	718503	102910	86457
Sinistra Ecologia Liberta IT	LEFT	neutral	2010	Minor Parl.	54	11	6	5	45634	2511	29647
Nuovo Centrodestra IT	RIGHT	pro_EU	2013	Minor Frin.	17	8	54	74	8013	384	2633
Popolari per l'Italia IT	CENTER	pro_EU	2014	Minor Frin.	0	0	4	25	89	2	107
Fratelli d'Italia IT	RIGHT	pro_EU	2012	Minor Parl.	147	49	1	90	71807	2521	18287
LSDP LT	LEFT	pro_EU	2001	Major Parl.	9	5	2	67	2124	110	227
TS LKD LT	RIGHT	pro_EU	1993	Major Parl.	10	3	0	45	1340	45	79
Darbo partija LT	CENTER	pro_EU	2003	Major Parl.	3	1	1	12	679	44	115
Liberalai LT	RIGHT	pro_EU	2006	Minor Parl.	27	17	1	9	11571	825	653
Tvarka LT	RIGHT	pro_EU	2002	Minor Parl.	3	0	0	0	6	0	1
AWPL LT	Sing.Issue	pro_EU	1994	Minor Parl.	2	4	1	34	758	24	118
LVLS LT	Sing.Issue	neutral	2001	Minor Parl.	11	3	0	5	446	15	162
LZP LT	Sing.Issue	neutral	2011	Minor Frin.	16	3	0	27	401	6	53
ADR LU	RIGHT	pro_EU	1987	Minor Parl.	0	4	0	6	47	8	10
CSV LU	RIGHT	pro_EU	1944	Major Parl.	40	5	0	12	3810	254	386
DP LU	CENTER	pro_EU	1955	Major Parl.	13	8	2	14	785	23	60
dei greng LU	LEFT	pro_EU	1983	Minor Parl.	11	0	0	3	1977	172	366
Dei Lenk LU	LEFT	pro_EU	1999	Minor Parl.	7	9	0	8	833	26	435
LSAP LU	LEFT	pro_EU	1902	Major Parl.	28	12	0	8	1221	104	78
Piratepartei Letzebuerg LU	LEFT	pro_EU	2009	Minor Frin.	12	1	0	4	510	46	57
Saskanas Centrs LV	LEFT	pro_EU	2010	Major Parl.	2	0	2	2	45	0	17
VIENOTIBA LV	RIGHT	pro_EU	2011	Major Parl.	30	3	0	10	393	45	114
PCTVL LV	Sing.Issue	pro_EU	2007	Minor Frin.	4	4	0	13	63	7	5
PN MT	RIGHT	pro_EU	1926	Major Parl.	4	2	1	107	2954	1522	552
MPL MT	LEFT	pro_EU	1921	Major Parl.	24	39	1	2	7627	656	1255
Alternattiva Demokratika MT	CENTER	pro_EU	1989	Minor Frin.	96	24	21	63	1435	72	138
VVD NL	RIGHT	neutral	1948	Major Parl.	5	3	0	1	3393	2008	947
PvDa NL	LEFT	pro_EU	1946	Major Parl.	13	1	0	0	6491	1929	1529
PVV NL	RIGHT	anti_EU	2004	Minor Parl.	0	0	0	22	1616	356	330
SP NL	LEFT	neutral	1972	Minor Parl.	10	2	1	5	9734	1634	3737
CDA NL	RIGHT	pro_EU	1980	Minor Parl.	12	3	0	3	1751	259	655
D66 NL	Sing.Issue	pro_EU	1966	Minor Parl.	15	1	0	0	9628	907	2235
Christen Unie NL	RIGHT	neutral	2001	Minor Parl.	7	1	0	2	1217	67	230



Groen Links NL	LEFT	pro_EU	1991	Minor Parl.	18	6	0	3	6059	559	2193
Partij voor de Dieren NL	Sing.Issue	anti_EU	2002	Minor Parl.	36	22	8	51	44165	3383	8594
PO PL	CENTER	pro_EU	2001	Major Parl.	34	6	1	3	25951	4679	4466
PiS PL	RIGHT	pro_EU	2001	Major Parl.	4	0	0	2	2447	728	101
Twój Ruch PL	LEFT	pro_EU	2011	Minor Parl.	19	18	0	14	10113	2387	1414
PSL PL	CENTER	pro_EU	1990	Minor Parl.	3	3	0	14	105	45	22
SLD PL	LEFT	pro_EU	1999	Minor Parl.	111	37	19	107	14835	1169	1730
Polska Razem PL	RIGHT	pro_EU	2013	Minor Parl.	18	17	2	11	4130	1637	1169
KNP PL	RIGHT	anti_EU	2011	Major Frin.	37	40	7	16	185629	10401	33004
PR PL	RIGHT	neutral	2007	Minor Frin.	13	10	7	16	1779	180	1037
UPR PL	RIGHT	anti_EU	1990	Minor Frin.	56	16	8	54	651	148	252
Solidarna Polska PL	RIGHT	anti_EU	2011	Minor Parl.	12	15	3	39	2414	532	814
MAS PT	LEFT	anti_EU	2000	Minor Frin.	23	13	2	29	1721	35	765
Esquerda Net PT	LEFT	pro_EU	1999	Minor Parl.	23	4	0	220	6626	217	4161
Coligacao Democratica Unitaria PT	LEFT	anti_EU	1921	Minor Parl.	66	22	5	60	7639	100	3262
PCTP/MRPP PT	LEFT	anti_EU	1970	Major Frin.	5	10	7	28	350	10	41
Os Verdes PT	LEFT	pro_EU	1982	Minor Parl.	19	26	23	90	1051	25	213
PS PT	LEFT	pro_EU	1973	Minor Parl.	87	9	1	40	22916	1122	4264
A Nossa Europa PT	CENTER	neutral	1979	Minor Frin.	112	18	6	15	1266	45	226
PSD PT	CENTER	pro_EU	1974	Major Parl.	15	5	9	1	4213	151	442
PSD RO	LEFT	pro_EU	2001	Minor Parl.	173	3	0	21	33433	787	1181
PNL RO	CENTER	pro_EU	1990	Minor Parl.	70	13	0	47	40899	2009	4570
PDL RO	RIGHT	pro_EU	1993	Minor Parl.	115	28	1	77	58783	1602	13606
RMDSZ RO	Sing.Issue	pro_EU	1989	Minor Parl.	53	14	1	63	17149	517	6552
PMP RO	RIGHT	pro_EU	2013	Minor Frin.	82	23	1	28	38761	3045	4573
Fora Civica RO	RIGHT	pro_EU	2004	Minor Parl.	52	16	6	31	8507	611	1387
Socialdemokraterna SE	LEFT	pro_EU	1889	Major Parl.	34	4	3	15	75487	2689	6902
Nya Moderaterna SE	RIGHT	pro_EU	1904	Major Parl.	14	3	2	17	23451	1806	3554
MP SE	LEFT	neutral	1981	Minor Parl.	24	4	0	2	63356	2157	4825
Folkpartiet SE	CENTER	pro_EU	1934	Minor Parl.	87	13	1	38	9514	459	833
Centerpartiet SE	CENTER	pro_EU	1913	Minor Parl.	13	12	4	31	15967	1158	2210
Piratpartiet SE	LEFT	pro_EU	2006	Minor Frin.	23	11	3	34	33530	2139	5118
Kristdemokraterna SE	RIGHT	pro_EU	1964	Minor Parl.	29	2	1	9	5723	266	628
Vansterpartiet SE	LEFT	neutral	1917	Minor Parl.	24	4	0	28	59537	2145	5535
Feministiskt initiativ SE	LEFT	neutral	2005	Major Frin.	69	10	0	51	203338	5417	16399
Pozitivna Slovenija SI	LEFT	pro_EU	2011	Major Frin.	44	10	3	24	1565	272	114
SDS SI	RIGHT	pro_EU	1989	Major Parl.	99	18	0	82	12678	692	535
SD SI	LEFT	pro_EU	1992	Minor Parl.	58	0	0	4	4812	361	346
SLS SI	RIGHT	pro_EU	1988	Major Frin.	36	13	1	59	613	34	30
Most-Híd SK	CENTER	pro_EU	2009	Minor Parl.	11	8	0	45	92	5	21
Strana TIP SK	RIGHT	pro_EU	2014	Minor Frin.	29	12	1	8	1839	205	527
Igor Soltes SI	LEFT	pro_EU	2014	Minor Frin.	34	10	7	6	6957	912	228
Zdruzena levica SI	LEFT	pro_EU	2014	Minor Parl.	52	9	4	18	3480	327	1214
Solidarnost SI	LEFT	neutral	2013	Minor Frin.	26	5	4	20	1681	187	273
KDH SK	RIGHT	pro_EU	1990	Minor Parl.	5	16	0	4	484	26	78
Obyčajní ľudia SK	RIGHT	pro_EU	2011	Minor Parl.	4	3	0	7	245	45	33
SDKÚ-DS SK	RIGHT	pro_EU	2000	Minor Parl.	3	4	1	8	678	113	46
SNS SK	RIGHT	anti_EU	1990	Major Frin.	9	0	2	36	2058	165	579

Magyar Koalíció Partja SK	LEFT	pro_EU	2009	Minor Parl.	29	4	2	61	2114	136	222
NOVA SK	RIGHT	pro_EU	2012	Minor Frin.	10	6	0	10	1584	381	419
Conservatives UK	RIGHT	pro_EU	1832	Major Parl.	21	3	1	8	19434	8759	4214
The Labour Party UK	LEFT	pro_EU	1906	Major Parl.	33	7	0	8	36526	20563	24085
Liberal Democrats UK	LEFT	pro_EU	1988	Minor Parl.	19	4	0	13	6994	4772	3531
UKIP UK	RIGHT	anti_EU	1993	Major Frin.	30	3	10	17	333732	65979	69158
BNP UK	RIGHT	anti_EU	1982	Major Frin.	58	18	44	12	134081	21410	107255
SNP UK	LEFT	pro_EU	1934	Minor Parl.	37	4	0	115	71499	9330	16402
Green Party UK	LEFT	pro_EU	1990	Minor Parl.	10	8	0	65	65346	5466	17661
DUP UK	RIGHT	anti_EU	1971	Minor Parl.	5	1	0	0	381	51	153
Plaid Cymru UK	Sing.Issue	pro_EU	1936	Minor Parl.	72	17	0	53	4799	174	1612
English Democrats UK	LEFT	anti_EU	2002	Minor Frin.	67	21	31	84	5728	818	1980
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland UK	LEFT	pro_EU	1970	Minor Frin.	36	1	2	6	1043	120	184
Respect Party UK	LEFT	anti_EU	2004	Minor Frin.	19	3	3	13	619	48	174
Christian Party UK	LEFT	neutral	2005	Minor Frin.	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
Scottish Green Party UK	LEFT	pro_EU	1990	Minor Frin.	19	2	0	26	4027	188	1415
National Front UK	LEFT	anti_EU	1967	Minor Frin.	109	10	8	109	3289	296	2320
Socialist Labour Party East of England Region UK	LEFT	pro_EU	1996	Minor Frin.	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
The Liberal Party UK	RIGHT	pro_EU	1988	Minor Frin.	0	0	0	3	12	1	6
Christian Peoples Alliance UK	Sing.Issue	neutral	1999	Minor Frin.	0	1	1	2	18	35	7
Mebyon Kernow UK	LEFT	pro_EU	1951	Minor Frin.	6	1	1	21	302	32	93
Green Party in Northern Ireland UK	LEFT	pro_EU	1983	Minor Frin.	28	10	3	16	957	51	197
Scottish Socialist Party UK	LEFT	anti_EU	1998	Minor Frin.	10	1	2	3	452	24	233
Pirate Party UK	Sing.Issue	neutral	2009	Minor Frin.	71	1	106	54	2549	176	749
Communist Party of Britain UK	LEFT	anti_EU	1988	Minor Frin.	2	2	0	16	236	14	41

**TableB2 . Information per country**

Cou ntry	Nb of parties in EP electio n	NB of seats in EP 2014	EP 2014 Turno ut	Comp ulsory voting	Limits on campaign spending	Voting system **	NB of Internet users	Inte rnet pen etra tion rate	NB of FB users per country	NB of FB fans on all parties profiles (beginnin g of campaign A)	NB of FB fans on all parties profiles (end of campaign B)	Change in number of Facebook users during the campaign (B-A)	NB of POST *	NB videos	NB photos	NB links	NB text post	NB Likes	NB Comments	NB Shares
AU	7	18	45.39	no	yes	P	6629433	.81	2915240	194991	200177	5186	315	45	185	64	20	47366	6020	4513
BE	18	21	89.64	yes	yes	P	8586240	.82	4922260	187552	196451	8899	934	123	383	394	34	140571	14489	38507
BG	5	17	36.1	no	yes	P	3674254	.53	2522120	52292	59032	6740	223	39	66	116	2	16386	1707	1638
CY	9	6	43.97	yes	no	P	767374	.66	582600	56508	59854	3346	980	103	112	686	79	24027	5261	4546
CZ	12	21	18.2	no	no	P	7876002	.74	3834620	377243	399734	22491	440	46	255	130	18	76108	12231	13483
DE	21	96	48.14	no	no	CL	69779160	.86	25332440	735562	801353	65791	1024	106	538	335	45	526358	71402	100468
DK	7	13	56.32	no	no	P	5270018	.95	3037700	142923	145925	3002	198	31	77	88	2	39678	4886	5512
EE	6	6	36.52	no	no	P	1006337	.80	501680	16528	17030	502	177	29	57	78	13	4999	361	446
ES	16	54	43.81	no	yes	CL	35705960	.75	17590500	375797	446752	70955	1267	219	679	294	77	442392	34794	136165
FI	13	13	40.98	no	no	P	4821478	.92	2287960	53273	55672	2399	639	32	258	325	24	35137	2026	3116
FR	18	74	42.43	no	no	CL	55221000	.83	25624760	391938	402044	10106	692	79	163	402	48	104455	9379	16834
GR	10	21	59.97	yes	yes	P	6451326	.60	3845820	143161	149859	6698	466	85	161	180	40	96751	4531	10308
HR	12	11	25.24	no	no	P	3167838	.71	1595760	47733	49369	1636	370	31	139	158	42	24727	1324	2671
HU	6	21	28.97	no	yes	CL	7205255	.73	4265960	521059	525463	4404	587	106	285	181	15	279140	20460	89435
IE	11	11	52.44	no	no	STV	3781639	.78	2183760	59507	64561	5054	293	53	105	111	24	31252	2002	6689
IT	10	73	57.22	no	yes	P	36058199	.59	23202640	796942	846181	49239	1618	144	979	311	184	1191945	158890	171039
LT	8	11	47.37	no	yes	P	2399678	.69	1118500	30336	32711	2375	307	34	79	189	5	15258	1181	1393
LU	7	6	85.55	yes	no	P	488286	.94	227520	16891	18391	1500	207	39	111	55	2	9521	711	1426
LV	5	8	30.04	no	yes	P	1628854	.75	414520	1650	1731	81	70	7	36	25	2	507	64	136
M T	3	6	74.8	no	no	STV	284361	.69	217040	46296	47739	1443	370	65	111	172	22	10807	2399	1888
NL	9	26	37.32	no	no	P	15857959	.94	7554940	173113	182390	9277	243	39	113	85	6	73119	10239	19409

PL	10	51	23.82	no	yes	P	24940902	.65	9863380	323368	381727	58359	792	162	307	276	47	245860	24457	45094
PT	10	21	33.67	no	yes	CL	6715390	.62	4663060	179990	182411	2421	983	110	343	482	48	45756	2014	13048
RO	6	32	32.44	no	yes	CL	10812784	.50	5374980	78047	115036	36989	738	71	440	220	7	180235	9380	30022
SE	9	20	51.07	no	no	P	9216226	.95	4950160	296083	325735	29652	495	53	254	174	14	271470	13716	23997
SI	8	8	24.55	no	yes	P	1445091	.73	730160	17642	24245	6603	560	58	302	179	21	29580	3321	2041
SK	10	13	13.05	no	yes	P	4337868	.79	2032200	83964	85273	1309	268	43	84	135	6	8884	1005	1767
UK	26	73	35.4	no	yes	CL	57266690	.90	32950400	784341	860723	76382	1627	119	649	645	214	661066	138755	245206
*Number of posts (video, photo, link, text)2 weeks before Voting day **P=Preferential, CL=Closed list, STV=Single transferable vote																				

**Table B3. Negative binomial regressions model with party fixed effects (full print)**

	LIKES		SHARES		COMMENTS	
Reciprocal communication	0.379 (0.056)	***	0.607 (0.087)	***	1.048 (0.078)	***
PHOTO	0.767 (0.117)	***	0.597 (0.253)	**	0.257 (0.108)	**
STATUS	-1.030 (0.376)	***	-3.000 (0.666)	***	-1.281 (0.601)	**
VIDEO	0.121 (0.153)		0.661 (0.221)	***	0.039 (0.195)	
Length of the thread (ln)	0.029 (0.015)	*	0.136 (0.030)	***	0.064 (0.016)	***
Photo*Length of thread (ln)	-0.064 (0.025)	***	0.002 (0.048)		-0.002 (0.023)	
Status*Length of thread (ln)	0.146 (0.058)	**	0.407 (0.110)	***	0.209 (0.090)	**
Video*Length of thread (ln)	0.007 (0.031)		-0.010 (0.046)		0.020 (0.040)	
Likes for last post (ln)	0.110 (0.019)	***	0.018 (0.026)		0.008 (0.029)	
Comments for last post (ln)	-0.002 (0.016)		0.025 (0.023)		0.099 (0.022)	***
Shares for last post (ln)	-0.018 (0.009)	**	0.039 (0.016)	**	-0.019 (0.012)	
Day of campaign	0.025 (0.004)	***	0.028 (0.007)	***	0.024 (0.005)	***
Time since last post (ln)	0.212 (0.063)	***	0.261 (0.064)	***	0.218 (0.050)	***
Time till next post (ln)	0.188 (0.057)	***	0.162 (0.067)	**	0.063 (0.061)	
Time since last post (ln) squared	-0.012 (0.004)	***	-0.014 (0.004)	***	-0.012 (0.003)	***
Time till next post (ln) squared	-0.009 (0.004)	**	-0.004 (0.004)		0.003 (0.004)	
Number of posts within a 1 hour window	0.003 (0.011)		-0.001 (0.016)		-0.008 (0.022)	
Number of posts within a 1 hour window squared	-0.002 (0.000)	***	-0.002 (0.000)	***	-0.002 (0.000)	***
Weekend (dummy)	0.051 (0.034)		-0.057 (0.051)		-0.042 (0.058)	
Campaign silence 48h	-0.098 (0.089)		-0.339 (0.112)	***	-0.215 (0.158)	
Campaign silence 24h	-0.171 (0.079)	**	-0.257 (0.131)	**	0.106 (0.127)	
h1 2 a.m.	0.252 (0.189)		0.220 (0.326)		0.485 (0.319)	
h2 3 a.m.	-0.044 (0.355)		1.373 (0.893)		-0.328 (0.472)	
h3 4 a.m.	-0.170 (0.219)		-0.016 (0.412)		0.296 (0.393)	
h4 5 a.m.	0.270 (0.214)		0.935 (0.401)	**	0.690 (0.297)	**
h5 6 a.m.	0.279 (0.171)		0.847 (0.339)	**	0.633 (0.275)	**
h6 7 a.m.	0.419 (0.176)	**	0.878 (0.330)	***	0.900 (0.273)	***
h7 8 a.m.	0.253 (0.162)		0.766 (0.319)	**	0.754 (0.268)	***
h8 9 a.m.	0.275 (0.165)	*	0.877 (0.319)	***	0.799 (0.266)	***
h9 10 a.m.	0.190 (0.163)		0.757 (0.314)	**	0.712 (0.269)	***
h10 11 a.m.	0.280 (0.159)	*	0.798 (0.317)	**	0.811 (0.265)	***

h11 12 a.m.	0.289		0.814	**	0.748	***
	(0.176)		(0.331)		(0.276)	
h12 1 p.m.	0.278	*	0.786	**	0.811	***
	(0.162)		(0.316)		(0.270)	
h1 2 p.m.	0.290	*	0.709	**	0.821	***
	(0.173)		(0.310)		(0.267)	
H 2 3 p.m.	0.245		0.737	**	0.703	***
	(0.159)		(0.318)		(0.267)	
H3 4 p.m.	0.232		0.698	**	0.888	***
	(0.161)		(0.332)		(0.300)	
H4 5 p.m.	0.246		0.726	**	0.829	***
	(0.163)		(0.326)		(0.277)	
H5 6 p.m.	0.298	*	0.758	**	0.728	***
	(0.158)		(0.340)		(0.263)	
H6 7 p.m.	0.283	*	0.661	**	0.780	***
	(0.158)		(0.323)		(0.267)	
H7 8 p.m.	0.404	**	0.715	**	0.733	***
	(0.171)		(0.330)		(0.272)	
H8 9 p.m.	0.360	**	0.648	*	0.777	***
	(0.160)		(0.331)		(0.274)	
H9 10 p.m.	0.400	**	0.645	**	0.886	***
	(0.165)		(0.321)		(0.271)	
H10 11 p.m.	0.364	**	0.676	*	0.651	**
	(0.160)		(0.357)		(0.272)	
H11 12 p.m.	0.280		0.702	**	0.437	*
	(0.171)		(0.354)		(0.249)	
AU BZO	reference					
AU Grunen	2.892	***	1.406	***	2.748	***
	(0.075)		(0.078)		(0.084)	
AU NEOS	2.205	***	0.117		2.589	***
	(0.074)		(0.094)		(0.085)	
AU OVP	1.990	***	-0.827	***	2.483	***
	(0.082)		(0.097)		(0.091)	
AU REKOS	1.213	***	0.870	***	1.663	***
	(0.050)		(0.074)		(0.059)	
AU SPO	3.525	***	1.905	***	3.587	***
	(0.088)		(0.101)		(0.109)	
AU TStronach	1.798	***	0.374	***	2.195	***
	(0.061)		(0.074)		(0.088)	
BE CD&V	2.082	***	1.169	***	1.069	***
	(0.050)		(0.072)		(0.065)	
BE CDH	1.795	***	2.296	***	0.893	***
	(0.065)		(0.112)		(0.079)	
BE Ecolo	1.769	***	2.095	***	1.152	***
	(0.039)		(0.049)		(0.051)	
BE Groen	3.070	***	1.456	***	1.576	***
	(0.164)		(0.062)		(0.079)	
BE LCR SAP	-0.067	*	1.764	***	-0.241	***
	(0.037)		(0.063)		(0.046)	
BE MR	2.406	***	2.176	***	2.108	***
	(0.071)		(0.074)		(0.071)	
BE N-VA	3.926	***	3.251	***	3.832	***
	(0.109)		(0.106)		(0.134)	
BE Open Vld	3.146	***	2.186	***	2.229	***
	(0.089)		(0.108)		(0.096)	
BE PPirate	2.159	***	2.015	***	1.716	***
	(0.086)		(0.111)		(0.087)	
BE PS	3.555	***	4.010	***	3.382	***
	(0.127)		(0.172)		(0.125)	
BE PVDA	2.142	***	1.857	***	1.234	***
	(0.068)		(0.077)		(0.077)	
BE Pro Brux	0.423	***	0.217	***	-0.294	***
	(0.020)		(0.050)		(0.038)	
BE SPA	3.342	***	2.823	***	2.466	***
	(0.094)		(0.090)		(0.113)	
BE Socialisme	-0.235	***	-0.181	***	-1.576	***
	(0.042)		(0.069)		(0.052)	
BE Vlaams	2.767	***	1.097	***	2.761	***
	(0.077)		(0.093)		(0.079)	
BG ATAKA	4.113	***	2.786	***	4.269	***
	(0.105)		(0.167)		(0.131)	

BG GERB	1.402	***	-0.098		0.240	***
	(0.090)		(0.128)		(0.079)	
BG NDSV	1.095	***	-0.346	***	-0.071	
	(0.046)		(0.055)		(0.046)	
BG UoR	0.978	***	-0.357	***	-0.613	***
	(0.067)		(0.096)		(0.073)	
CY AKEL	1.493	***	0.153	**	-0.079	
	(0.051)		(0.064)		(0.059)	
CY DISY	0.429	***	-1.300	***	-0.618	***
	(0.052)		(0.079)		(0.066)	
CY EDEK	1.613	***	-0.005		0.042	
	(0.043)		(0.071)		(0.084)	
CY ERASCY	0.718	***	0.425	***	-0.135	**
	(0.055)		(0.095)		(0.065)	
CY GREEN	-2.305	***	-15.111	***	-16.079	***
	(0.141)		(1.025)		(1.011)	
CY MoH	2.163	***	1.562	***	1.321	***
	(0.079)		(0.132)		(0.113)	
CY NEDACY	-3.670	***	-16.381	***	-25.302	***
	(0.070)		(1.007)		(1.005)	
CY PSM	1.961	***	1.412	***	3.168	***
	(0.054)		(0.095)		(0.086)	
CZ ANO	-23.583	***	-34.873	***	-43.398	***
	(1.003)		(1.004)		(1.003)	
CZ CSSD	2.697	***	2.315	***	3.468	***
	(0.086)		(0.096)		(0.113)	
CZ Hnutu Usvit	1.938	***	0.533	***	2.539	***
	(0.045)		(0.075)		(0.078)	
CZ KDU	2.047	***	0.877	***	2.568	***
	(0.056)		(0.071)		(0.091)	
CZ KSCM	1.623	***	0.144	**	1.871	***
	(0.047)		(0.071)		(0.067)	
CZ ODS	2.492	***	1.229	***	3.200	***
	(0.075)		(0.086)		(0.112)	
CZ PIRATI	-1.522	***	-1.612	***	-3.377	***
	(0.059)		(0.101)		(0.053)	
CZ SNK	-0.259	***	-0.438	**	-1.053	***
	(0.085)		(0.196)		(0.100)	
CZ SVOBODNI	3.873	***	3.215	***	3.764	***
	(0.108)		(0.112)		(0.127)	
CZ St. Zel.	-1.254	***	-1.964	***	-1.292	***
	(0.086)		(0.130)		(0.082)	
CZ TOP 09	3.191	***	1.430	***	3.731	***
	(0.097)		(0.133)		(0.110)	
CZ VECI	0.572	***	-0.043		0.940	***
	(0.051)		(0.072)		(0.061)	
DE AfD	4.948	***	3.388	***	4.487	***
	(0.134)		(0.147)		(0.185)	
DE BUNDNIS	3.935	***	3.751	***	4.091	***
	(0.105)		(0.119)		(0.152)	
DE Bayernpartei	2.224	***	1.418	***	1.529	***
	(0.107)		(0.151)		(0.123)	
DE BuSo	0.445	***	0.251	***	-0.502	***
	(0.036)		(0.049)		(0.054)	
DE CDU	3.559	***	2.497	***	4.411	***
	(0.102)		(0.107)		(0.123)	
DE CSU	3.218	***	1.783	***	3.189	***
	(0.087)		(0.105)		(0.100)	
DE Die Linke	4.457	***	3.204	***	3.909	***
	(0.089)		(0.113)		(0.111)	
DE Die PARTEI	4.912	***	3.528	***	3.945	***
	(0.105)		(0.119)		(0.131)	
DE FDP	2.715	***	1.296	***	2.666	***
	(0.084)		(0.096)		(0.079)	
DE Familien Par	1.274	***	0.452	***	2.283	***
	(0.126)		(0.102)		(0.143)	
DE NPD	4.335	***	3.885	***	4.792	***
	(0.102)		(0.142)		(0.117)	
DE ODP	1.226	***	0.740	***	0.719	***
	(0.047)		(0.073)		(0.063)	
DE PBC	-1.628	***	-16.012	***	-46.587	***
	(0.088)		(1.013)		(1.006)	

DE PSG	0.381	***	-0.350	***	-0.105	
	(0.051)		(0.080)		(0.065)	
DE Piraten	2.505	***	2.187	***	2.308	***
	(0.059)		(0.061)		(0.078)	
DE REPUBLIKANER	3.135	***	2.102	***	3.501	***
	(0.094)		(0.101)		(0.109)	
DE Rentner Par	-1.214	***	-3.115	***	-29.654	***
	(0.094)		(0.148)		(1.006)	
DE SPD	3.541	***	2.913	***	4.225	***
	(0.088)		(0.130)		(0.105)	
DE Tierschutz	2.586	***	2.387	***	2.246	***
	(0.066)		(0.077)		(0.100)	
DK Enhedslisten	3.369	***	2.200	***	2.417	***
	(0.066)		(0.093)		(0.086)	
DK Folkeparti	3.221	***	2.562	***	3.108	***
	(0.075)		(0.122)		(0.097)	
DK LA	3.541	***	1.437	***	2.921	***
	(0.099)		(0.132)		(0.144)	
DK Radikale	2.379	***	0.464	***	2.223	***
	(0.071)		(0.079)		(0.086)	
DK SF	2.683	***	0.947	***	2.486	***
	(0.067)		(0.084)		(0.088)	
DK Socialdemo	3.087	***	2.316	***	3.287	***
	(0.093)		(0.136)		(0.112)	
DK Venstre	3.144	***	1.326	***	3.854	***
	(0.104)		(0.115)		(0.116)	
EE Erakond	-0.167	**	-0.927	***	0.033	
	(0.065)		(0.094)		(0.087)	
EE IRL	0.917	***	-0.800	***	1.032	***
	(0.046)		(0.065)		(0.051)	
EE Keskerakond	0.982	***	-0.409	***	0.852	***
	(0.044)		(0.088)		(0.074)	
EE Reform	1.820	***	-0.100		0.868	***
	(0.052)		(0.091)		(0.066)	
EE SOTSDEM	1.290	***	-0.601	***	0.292	***
	(0.053)		(0.080)		(0.067)	
ES AMAIUR	1.928	***	2.357	***	0.687	***
	(0.049)		(0.111)		(0.067)	
ES CCanaria	0.334	***	-0.143	***	-0.984	***
	(0.027)		(0.045)		(0.035)	
ES CCompromÃ-s	3.664	***	3.267	***	2.768	***
	(0.084)		(0.091)		(0.114)	
ES CIU	3.820	***	3.709	***	3.662	***
	(0.092)		(0.115)		(0.123)	
ES EAJPNV	1.216	***	-0.387	***	-0.246	***
	(0.083)		(0.098)		(0.061)	
ES Esquerra	3.109	***	2.545	***	2.054	***
	(0.080)		(0.089)		(0.097)	
ES ForoAsturias	1.178	***	0.309	***	0.199	***
	(0.051)		(0.067)		(0.058)	
ES ICV EUiA	1.159	***	1.292	***	-0.372	***
	(0.035)		(0.056)		(0.058)	
ES Izquierda U	-0.545	***	0.368	***	-17.773	***
	(0.112)		(0.123)		(1.004)	
ES PP	4.239	***	3.455	***	4.406	***
	(0.104)		(0.130)		(0.122)	
ES PSOE	4.184	***	3.838	***	4.385	***
	(0.107)		(0.114)		(0.125)	
ES Podemos	5.069	***	5.137	***	4.180	***
	(0.115)		(0.136)		(0.142)	
ES UPN	0.184		-1.891	***	0.047	
	(0.145)		(0.182)		(0.135)	
ES UPyD	3.311	***	2.395	***	2.432	***
	(0.082)		(0.096)		(0.114)	
ES Vox Espana	2.988	***	2.425	***	2.173	***
	(0.067)		(0.097)		(0.093)	
FI Itsenaisyy	1.343	***	-0.844	***	0.873	***
	(0.068)		(0.107)		(0.088)	
FI KD	1.477	***	-0.110		0.839	***
	(0.061)		(0.098)		(0.070)	
FI Keskusta	2.102	***	0.503	***	1.390	***
	(0.067)		(0.067)		(0.075)	



FI Kokoomus	1.904	***	-0.258	***	1.863	***
	(0.050)		(0.087)		(0.065)	
FI Muutos2011	-0.051		-0.610	***	0.322	***
	(0.050)		(0.083)		(0.064)	
FI Piraatti	1.226	***	0.055		0.316	***
	(0.066)		(0.102)		(0.071)	
FI SDP	2.238	***	0.196	***	1.882	***
	(0.057)		(0.073)		(0.074)	
FI SFP	2.039	***	1.091	***	1.278	***
	(0.063)		(0.103)		(0.066)	
FI SKP	0.602	***	-0.296	***	0.344	***
	(0.043)		(0.056)		(0.059)	
FI Vasemmisto	2.060	***	0.776	***	0.816	***
	(0.065)		(0.081)		(0.073)	
FI Vihreat	2.050	***	0.588	***	1.223	***
	(0.044)		(0.067)		(0.064)	
FR EE	1.822	***	2.287	***	2.646	***
	(0.141)		(0.175)		(0.150)	
FR FN	4.789	***	3.239	***	4.341	***
	(0.111)		(0.158)		(0.132)	
FR MPF	0.236	***	-1.350	***	-1.180	***
	(0.069)		(0.093)		(0.094)	
FR MRC	1.012	***	2.077	***	0.684	***
	(0.059)		(0.084)		(0.073)	
FR MoDem	1.774	***	0.981	***	0.398	***
	(0.068)		(0.094)		(0.089)	
FR NC	-0.505	***	0.015		-32.429	***
	(0.076)		(0.101)		(1.005)	
FR NPA	0.353	***	-0.610	***	0.287	***
	(0.035)		(0.069)		(0.044)	
FR PCF	2.380	***	2.884	***	1.612	***
	(0.087)		(0.100)		(0.098)	
FR PRdG	-0.111	*	-0.691	***	-1.924	***
	(0.061)		(0.099)		(0.084)	
FR PS	2.799	***	2.243	***	2.535	***
	(0.062)		(0.084)		(0.084)	
FR PdG	2.063	***	1.464	***	1.693	***
	(0.074)		(0.107)		(0.075)	
FR UDI	2.101	***	1.504	***	1.380	***
	(0.065)		(0.082)		(0.074)	
FR UMP	3.642	***	2.578	***	3.647	***
	(0.097)		(0.100)		(0.124)	
GR Anexartittoi	1.596	***	0.420	***	-0.059	
	(0.083)		(0.115)		(0.089)	
GR DIMAR	-0.345	***	-0.806	***	-2.026	***
	(0.065)		(0.098)		(0.070)	
GR ECOGREENS	0.679	***	0.666	***	-0.585	***
	(0.081)		(0.107)		(0.132)	
GR ND	3.678	***	1.926	***	3.739	***
	(0.092)		(0.110)		(0.131)	
GR PASOK	1.714	***	0.190	***	0.800	***
	(0.054)		(0.070)		(0.062)	
GR SYRIZA	3.886	***	2.518	***	2.745	***
	(0.102)		(0.104)		(0.116)	
GR To Potami	2.734	***	1.481	***	2.087	***
	(0.073)		(0.077)		(0.090)	
HR DC	-13.131	***	-15.530	***	-14.571	***
	(1.025)		(1.022)		(1.017)	
HR HDSSB	1.917	***	1.152	***	0.897	***
	(0.049)		(0.087)		(0.073)	
HR HDZ	3.164	***	2.157	***	1.944	***
	(0.100)		(0.162)		(0.099)	
HR HL	2.027	***	0.768	***	1.819	***
	(0.070)		(0.086)		(0.073)	
HR HMDK	0.410	**	-1.141	***	-15.670	***
	(0.162)		(0.255)		(1.013)	
HR HNS	1.042	***	-0.269	***	0.050	
	(0.040)		(0.045)		(0.045)	
HR HSU	-0.095		-0.880	***	0.211	***
	(0.082)		(0.106)		(0.070)	
HR IDS	1.999	***	-0.224	***	0.907	***
	(0.055)		(0.067)		(0.072)	

HR ORaH	2.190	***	0.835	***	1.706	***
	(0.074)		(0.092)		(0.080)	
HR SDP	2.408	***	0.032		1.540	***
	(0.085)		(0.128)		(0.109)	
HR SDSS	0.233	**	-0.857	***	-0.958	***
	(0.109)		(0.145)		(0.145)	
HU DKP	3.517	***	2.977	***	3.142	***
	(0.093)		(0.106)		(0.100)	
HU Fidesz	5.238	***	3.942	***	4.843	***
	(0.141)		(0.137)		(0.152)	
HU JOBBIK	5.096	***	4.620	***	4.719	***
	(0.115)		(0.126)		(0.159)	
HU KDNP	2.285	***	0.927	***	0.975	***
	(0.081)		(0.086)		(0.081)	
HU LMP	2.365	***	1.550	***	1.851	***
	(0.061)		(0.066)		(0.073)	
HU MSZP	4.029	***	3.605	***	3.926	***
	(0.107)		(0.102)		(0.122)	
HU Parbeszed	3.355	***	2.576	***	2.922	***
	(0.076)		(0.090)		(0.120)	
IE EIRIGI	1.673	***	0.590	***	0.499	***
	(0.042)		(0.071)		(0.083)	
IE FF	2.239	***	1.696	***	2.264	***
	(0.137)		(0.159)		(0.150)	
IE GP	1.400	***	0.575	***	0.850	***
	(0.050)		(0.089)		(0.070)	
IE LP	0.912	***	-0.461	***	1.911	***
	(0.069)		(0.082)		(0.063)	
IE PBP	1.164	***	0.905	***	1.052	***
	(0.084)		(0.101)		(0.095)	
IE RSF	1.487	***	0.184	***	-0.341	***
	(0.048)		(0.071)		(0.061)	
IE SF	4.217	***	3.291	***	3.400	***
	(0.107)		(0.116)		(0.137)	
IE SP	-0.951	***	-1.747	***	-0.498	***
	(0.067)		(0.106)		(0.092)	
IE UL	-0.762	***	-16.589	***	-1.863	***
	(0.060)		(1.007)		(0.082)	
IT FI	4.801	***	3.856	***	4.599	***
	(0.133)		(0.150)		(0.155)	
IT FdI	3.590	***	3.697	***	3.009	***
	(0.107)		(0.158)		(0.127)	
IT MCS	3.696	***	3.018	***	3.857	***
	(0.109)		(0.112)		(0.106)	
IT NC	2.227	***	2.193	***	1.382	***
	(0.077)		(0.102)		(0.085)	
IT PD	4.063	***	3.748	***	4.903	***
	(0.115)		(0.160)		(0.120)	
IT PPI	-0.361	***	0.490	***	-2.216	***
	(0.056)		(0.084)		(0.063)	
IT SC	1.800	***	1.050	***	3.045	***
	(0.038)		(0.048)		(0.041)	
IT SEL	3.942	***	4.090	***	3.388	***
	(0.089)		(0.099)		(0.130)	
IT Salvini	5.796	***	4.943	***	6.094	***
	(0.167)		(0.202)		(0.225)	
LT AWPL	1.168	***	0.296	***	-0.383	***
	(0.073)		(0.100)		(0.082)	
LT DP	1.833	***	0.451	***	0.999	***
	(0.057)		(0.082)		(0.075)	
LT LSDP	1.645	***	0.473	***	1.054	***
	(0.067)		(0.111)		(0.083)	
LT LVLS	1.089	***	0.812	***	-0.119	
	(0.058)		(0.085)		(0.087)	
LT LZP	0.382	***	-0.926	***	-1.592	***
	(0.037)		(0.059)		(0.041)	
LT Liberalai	2.939	***	0.869	***	2.512	***
	(0.080)		(0.081)		(0.097)	
LT TS LKD	1.298	***	-0.781	***	0.172	**
	(0.049)		(0.063)		(0.073)	
LT Tvarka	-15.116	***	-17.079	***	-15.185	***
	(1.008)		(1.020)		(1.009)	

LU ADR	0.109	*	-1.466	***	0.029	
	(0.060)		(0.082)		(0.073)	
LU CSV	1.766	***	0.042		1.013	***
	(0.041)		(0.062)		(0.079)	
LU DP	1.354	***	-0.006		0.004	
	(0.065)		(0.113)		(0.076)	
LU Dei Lenk	1.554	***	1.281	***	0.223	***
	(0.050)		(0.076)		(0.083)	
LU LSAP	1.251	***	-0.511	***	1.167	***
	(0.045)		(0.080)		(0.061)	
LU PL	1.035	***	-0.600	***	0.642	***
	(0.050)		(0.103)		(0.111)	
LU dei greng	2.838	***	1.660	***	2.523	***
	(0.065)		(0.078)		(0.088)	
LV PCTVL	-0.611	***	-2.020	***	-0.686	***
	(0.078)		(0.130)		(0.083)	
LV SC	0.839	***	0.683	***	-16.580	***
	(0.113)		(0.149)		(1.008)	
LV VIENOTIBA	0.597	***	-0.186	***	0.668	***
	(0.087)		(0.066)		(0.073)	
MT AD	-0.001		-1.566	***	-0.863	***
	(0.041)		(0.063)		(0.060)	
MT MPL	2.724	***	2.015	***	2.838	***
	(0.144)		(0.196)		(0.139)	
MT PN	1.603	***	0.672	***	3.054	***
	(0.057)		(0.067)		(0.060)	
NL CDA	2.233	***	1.860	***	2.152	***
	(0.083)		(0.103)		(0.097)	
NL CU	2.214	***	0.147		0.703	***
	(0.069)		(0.114)		(0.115)	
NL D66	4.039	***	2.986	***	3.751	***
	(0.086)		(0.097)		(0.117)	
NL GL	3.029	***	2.551	***	2.758	***
	(0.072)		(0.090)		(0.091)	
NL PDieren	3.430	***	2.804	***	3.014	***
	(0.092)		(0.098)		(0.106)	
NL PVV	2.573	***	1.812	***	2.905	***
	(0.082)		(0.119)		(0.096)	
NL PvDa	3.604	***	2.295	***	3.845	***
	(0.125)		(0.132)		(0.143)	
NL SP	3.866	***	3.923	***	4.445	***
	(0.145)		(0.165)		(0.129)	
NL VVD	3.604	***	2.472	***	4.639	***
	(0.122)		(0.136)		(0.151)	
PL KNP	4.858	***	3.852	***	4.346	***
	(0.119)		(0.123)		(0.141)	
PL PO	3.727	***	2.518	***	3.973	***
	(0.114)		(0.114)		(0.143)	
PL PR	1.639	***	1.713	***	1.456	***
	(0.050)		(0.062)		(0.065)	
PL PSL	0.469	***	0.230		1.950	***
	(0.124)		(0.179)		(0.128)	
PL PiS	3.678	***	1.267	***	4.430	***
	(0.112)		(0.152)		(0.120)	
PL Polska Razem	2.195	***	1.463	***	2.930	***
	(0.077)		(0.071)		(0.093)	
PL SLD	2.086	***	0.844	***	1.802	***
	(0.060)		(0.079)		(0.079)	
PL SP	1.792	***	1.305	***	2.418	***
	(0.059)		(0.062)		(0.061)	
PL Twórczy Ruch	2.937	***	1.815	***	3.704	***
	(0.086)		(0.114)		(0.091)	
PL UPR	-0.141	***	0.252	*	0.479	***
	(0.040)		(0.139)		(0.057)	
PT CDU	1.821	***	1.676	***	-0.289	***
	(0.051)		(0.072)		(0.073)	
PT Esquerda	1.801	***	2.849	***	0.802	***
	(0.085)		(0.176)		(0.084)	
PT MAS	1.537	***	1.620	***	-0.117	
	(0.065)		(0.107)		(0.097)	
PT Nossa Europa	0.199	***	-0.797	***	-1.049	***
	(0.031)		(0.051)		(0.052)	

PT Os Verdes	0.782	***	0.342	**	-0.596	***
	(0.094)		(0.136)		(0.099)	
PT PCTP/MRPP	0.206	***	-1.306	***	-1.310	***
	(0.046)		(0.062)		(0.053)	
PT PSD	2.682	***	1.505	***	1.692	***
	(0.073)		(0.116)		(0.136)	
RO Forta Civica	2.214	***	1.655	***	1.863	***
	(0.088)		(0.116)		(0.098)	
RO PDL	3.436	***	2.843	***	2.445	***
	(0.091)		(0.118)		(0.101)	
RO PMP	3.701	***	2.086	***	3.304	***
	(0.027)		(0.046)		(0.033)	
RO PNL	3.548	***	2.062	***	2.778	***
	(0.084)		(0.100)		(0.112)	
RO PSD	3.295	***	1.137	***	2.470	***
	(0.138)		(0.182)		(0.158)	
RO_RMDSZ	2.765	***	2.367	***	1.526	***
	(0.064)		(0.067)		(0.077)	
SE CenterP	3.234	***	1.699	***	2.332	***
	(0.087)		(0.087)		(0.106)	
SE FemIni	4.635	***	2.659	***	3.072	***
	(0.089)		(0.090)		(0.117)	
SE Folkpartiet	2.107	***	0.372	***	1.105	***
	(0.045)		(0.057)		(0.063)	
SE Kristdemo	2.443	***	1.065	***	1.359	***
	(0.067)		(0.075)		(0.102)	
SE MP	4.252	***	2.471	***	2.825	***
	(0.103)		(0.116)		(0.150)	
SE NM	4.101	***	2.770	***	3.702	***
	(0.101)		(0.106)		(0.128)	
SE Pirat	3.703	***	2.689	***	3.099	***
	(0.096)		(0.099)		(0.104)	
SE SD	4.808	***	3.038	***	3.354	***
	(0.125)		(0.133)		(0.153)	
SE VansterP	4.470	***	3.019	***	3.538	***
	(0.109)		(0.127)		(0.133)	
SI Igor Soltes	2.408	***	-0.131		2.333	***
	(0.065)		(0.083)		(0.076)	
SI Pozitivna	0.916	***	-1.040	***	1.344	***
	(0.037)		(0.038)		(0.040)	
SI SD	2.010	***	0.277	***	1.898	***
	(0.061)		(0.107)		(0.080)	
SI SDS	2.071	***	-0.197	***	1.657	***
	(0.061)		(0.071)		(0.076)	
SI SLS	-0.045		-2.176	***	-0.732	***
	(0.041)		(0.067)		(0.043)	
SI Solidarnost	1.382	***	0.113	*	1.236	***
	(0.030)		(0.061)		(0.044)	
SI ZL	1.418	***	0.890	***	0.792	***
	(0.028)		(0.045)		(0.048)	
SK KDH	0.952	***	-0.500	***	0.347	***
	(0.090)		(0.071)		(0.103)	
SK MOST	1.843	***	0.960	***	1.595	***
	(0.091)		(0.133)		(0.111)	
SK Most-HÅ-d	-0.956	***	-1.636	***	-1.893	***
	(0.050)		(0.081)		(0.058)	
SK NOVA	1.937	***	1.241	***	2.326	***
	(0.065)		(0.082)		(0.087)	
SK OL	0.982	***	-0.272	**	0.822	***
	(0.063)		(0.115)		(0.079)	
SK SDKU-DS	1.992	***	0.167		2.338	***
	(0.082)		(0.108)		(0.102)	
SK SNS	1.970	***	1.446	***	1.661	***
	(0.078)		(0.099)		(0.071)	
SK Strana TIP	1.383	***	0.643	***	1.151	***
	(0.046)		(0.063)		(0.062)	
T PS	2.962	***	2.261	***	2.340	***
	(0.067)		(0.100)		(0.102)	
UK ALLIANCE	1.166	***	0.173	***	1.081	***
	(0.047)		(0.064)		(0.075)	
UK BNP	4.517	***	4.672	***	4.877	***
	(0.093)		(0.112)		(0.111)	

UK CPoB	0.791	***	-0.049		0.142	**
	(0.053)		(0.100)		(0.067)	
UK ChPA	-0.067		-1.741	***	1.707	***
	(0.099)		(0.154)		(0.121)	
UK Con	3.911	***	3.121	***	5.124	***
	(0.123)		(0.124)		(0.157)	
UK DUP	2.080	***	1.178	***	1.664	***
	(0.110)		(0.153)		(0.144)	
UK ED	1.380	***	0.962	***	1.535	***
	(0.049)		(0.067)		(0.064)	
UK GPiNI	0.879	***	0.124	**	0.160	***
	(0.041)		(0.055)		(0.055)	
UK Green Party	4.268	***	4.094	***	4.254	***
	(0.106)		(0.115)		(0.120)	
UK LP	-0.129		-0.392	*	-14.977	***
	(0.151)		(0.222)		(1.014)	
UK Labour	4.163	***	4.240	***	5.710	***
	(0.127)		(0.148)		(0.157)	
UK LibDem	3.073	***	2.973	***	4.637	***
	(0.092)		(0.083)		(0.110)	
UK Mebyon	0.270	***	-0.204	***	-0.387	***
	(0.065)		(0.077)		(0.061)	
UK NF	1.033	***	1.923	***	1.524	***
	(0.081)		(0.163)		(0.154)	
UK Pirate	0.545	***	0.160	**	0.067	
	(0.054)		(0.065)		(0.087)	
UK Plaid Cymru	1.569	***	1.077	***	0.615	***
	(0.039)		(0.052)		(0.055)	
UK RP	0.579	***	-0.327	***	0.085	
	(0.044)		(0.080)		(0.060)	
UK SGP	2.028	***	1.667	***	0.877	***
	(0.059)		(0.057)		(0.079)	
UK SNP	4.036	***	3.384	***	4.264	***
	(0.102)		(0.108)		(0.118)	
UK SSP	1.226	***	1.188	***	0.640	***
	(0.054)		(0.088)		(0.073)	
UK UKIP	6.031	***	5.379	***	6.656	***
	(0.171)		(0.190)		(0.198)	
CONSTANT	-1.041	**	-2.983	***	-3.454	***
	(0.438)		(0.546)		(0.476)	
N	16218		16218		16218	
Dispersion - Pearson	1.8945		1.9220		1.7351	
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01						

**Table B4. Effects of main independent variables on Dependent variables**

Likes	Margin	Std. Err	z	[95% Conf. Interval]	% of base value
At means of all variables	262,028	2,94316	89,03	256,2595	
<b>Reciprocal communication</b>					
<b>Response owner = 0</b>	251,0762	2,831665	88,67	245,5262	-4%
<b>Response owner = 1</b>	366,9024	19,47205	18,84	328,7379	40%
Min of Photo*Length of thread (ln)	310,5233	22,12592	14,03	267,1573	19%
(Mean + Sd) of Photo*Length of thread (ln)	239,6098	7,878405	30,41	224,1684	-9%
<b>Min of Status*Length of thread (ln)</b>	251,324	3,302792	76,09	244,8507	-4%
<b>(Mean + Sd) of Status*Length of thread (ln)</b>	318,7594	28,50402	11,18	262,8926	22%
Min of Video*Length of thread (ln)	261,1119	4,898849	53,3	251,5103	0%
(Mean + Sd) of Video*Length of thread (ln)	264,8048	12,94462	20,46	239,4338	1%
Min of Day of campaign	218,2974	6,47313	33,72	205,6103	-17%
(Mean + Sd) of Day of campaign	287,02	5,466806	52,5	276,3053	10%
Min of Number of posts within a 1 hour window	261,1266	5,239448	49,84	250,8575	0%
(Mean + Sd) of Number of posts within a 1 hour window	266,5106	19,03832	14	229,1962	2%
Min of Sq Number of posts within a 1 hour window	268,8618	3,076406	87,39	262,8322	3%
<b>(Mean + Sd) of Sq Number of posts within a 1 hour window</b>	184,4727	8,397022	21,97	168,0149	-30%
Shares	Margin	Std. Err	z	[95% Conf. Interval]	% of base value
At means of all variables	61,04201	1,325498	46,05	58,44408	
<b>Reciprocal communication</b>					
<b>Response owner = 0</b>	56,63484	1,192263	47,5	54,29805	-7%
<b>Response owner = 1</b>	103,8718	8,692628	11,95	86,83456	70%
Min of Photo*Length of thread (ln)	60,70187	8,222956	7,38	44,58518	-1%
(Mean + Sd) of Photo*Length of thread (ln)	61,18393	3,94666	15,5	53,44862	0%
<b>Min of Status*Length of thread (ln)</b>	59,04758	1,385223	42,63	56,33259	-3%
<b>(Mean + Sd) of Status*Length of thread (ln)</b>	114,4727	21,3079	5,37	72,70995	88%

Min of Video*Length of thread (ln)	61,5599	2,685347	22,92	56,29672	1%
(Mean + Sd) of Video*Length of thread (ln)	60,28737	3,612316	16,69	53,20736	-1%
Min of Day of campaign	49,99196	2,585944	19,33	44,9236	-18%
(Mean + Sd) of Day of campaign	67,69742	2,431112	27,85	62,93253	11%
Min of Number of posts within a 1 hour window	61,13194	1,694196	36,08	57,81138	0%
(Mean + Sd) of Number of posts within a 1 hour window	60,47274	6,311192	9,58	48,10303	-1%
Min of Sq Number of posts within a 1 hour window	62,45144	1,378786	45,29	59,74907	2%
(Mean + Sd) of Sq Number of posts within a 1 hour window	40,69565	2,415101	16,85	35,96214	-33%
Comments	Margin	Std. Err	z	[95% Conf. Interval]	% of base value
At means of all variables	29,48062	0,6296103	46,82	28,24661	
<b>Reciprocal communication</b>					
<b>Response owner = 0</b>	25,94851	0,5226597	49,65	24,92412	-12%
<b>Response owner = 1</b>	73,98986	5,546374	13,34	63,11917	151%
Min of Photo*Length of thread (ln)	29,63926	1,65609	17,9	26,39339	1%
(Mean + Sd) of Photo*Length of thread (ln)	29,38087	1,327408	22,13	26,7792	0%
<b>Min of Status*Length of thread (ln)</b>	27,25951	0,5574548	48,9	26,16692	-8%
<b>(Mean + Sd) of Status*Length of thread (ln)</b>	38,2711	5,546309	6,9	27,40053	30%
Min of Video*Length of thread (ln)	29,15118	0,8236854	35,39	27,53679	-1%
(Mean + Sd) of Video*Length of thread (ln)	30,40059	2,007638	15,14	26,46569	3%
Min of Day of campaign	24,82421	1,039844	23,87	22,78615	-16%
(Mean + Sd) of Day of campaign	32,09517	0,970441	33,07	30,19314	9%
Min of Number of posts within a 1 hour window	29,76754	1,179964	25,23	27,45486	1%
(Mean + Sd) of Number of posts within a 1 hour window	27,89991	3,790819	7,36	20,47004	-5%
Min of Sq Number of posts within a 1 hour window	30,27978	0,5721419	52,92	29,1584	3%
(Mean + Sd) of Sq Number of posts within a 1 hour window	18,9881	1,417404	13,4	16,21004	-36%

Table B5. Negative binomial regression model with instrumental variable (in response to Heiss et al 2018 model)

Explanation for Table B5 For instruments to model the current owner response, the functional transformations of: average daily length of posts, average number of comments per post, average number of owner responses daily, and the number of posts in the last 12 hours, were used. All were calculated based on previous values in comparison to the current post. The negative binomial regressions with instrumental variables is run by using the qvf command in STATA

	LIKES		SHARES		COMMENTS	
Reciprocal communication	<b>2.044</b>	**	<b>3.687</b>	**	<b>3.595</b>	**
	<b>(1.033)</b>		<b>(1.707)</b>		<b>(1.539)</b>	
PHOTO	0.873	***	0.741	**	0.371	**
	(0.161)		(0.357)		(0.145)	
STATUS	-0.797	*	-2.786	***	-0.887	
	(0.465)		(0.737)		(0.693)	
VIDEO	0.342	*	1.203	***	0.214	
	(0.176)		(0.356)		(0.224)	
Length of the thread (ln)	0.037	*	0.131	***	0.068	***
	(0.020)		(0.044)		(0.023)	
Photo*Length of thread (ln)	-0.086	**	-0.043		-0.050	
	(0.034)		(0.068)		(0.031)	
Status*Length of thread (ln)	0.111		0.371	***	0.149	
	(0.074)		(0.122)		(0.104)	
Video*Length of thread (ln)	-0.049		-0.136	*	-0.033	
	(0.037)		(0.071)		(0.047)	
Likes for last post (ln)	0.067	***	-0.058	*	-0.015	
	(0.017)		(0.032)		(0.035)	
Comments for last post (ln)	-0.010		0.053	**	-0.017	
	(0.010)		(0.021)		(0.016)	
Shares for last post (ln)	-0.002		0.032		0.069	**
	(0.014)		(0.031)		(0.027)	
Day of campaign	0.022	***	0.021	**	0.019	***
	(0.005)		(0.009)		(0.007)	
Time since last post (ln)	0.077		0.171	*	0.172	**
	(0.049)		(0.088)		(0.067)	
Time till next post (ln)	0.083	*	0.083		0.071	
	(0.048)		(0.093)		(0.056)	
Time since last post (ln) squared	-0.004		-0.010	*	-0.010	**
	(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.004)	
Time till next post (ln) squared	-0.003		-0.003		0.000	
	(0.003)		(0.006)		(0.004)	
Number of posts within a 1 hour window	0.019		-0.045		-0.024	
	(0.012)		(0.033)		(0.022)	



Number of posts within a 1 hour window squared	-0.003 (0.001)	***	-0.001 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.001)	
Weekend (dummy)	0.065 (0.041)		-0.052 (0.067)		0.029 (0.069)	
Campaign silence 48h	-0.173 (0.128)		-0.387 (0.153)	**	-0.340 (0.214)	
Campaign silence 24h	-0.314 (0.113)	***	-0.448 (0.183)	**	-0.065 (0.147)	
h1_2 a.m.	0.805 (0.245)	***	0.581 (0.326)	*	1.038 (0.320)	***
h2_3 a.m.	0.599 (0.386)		1.972 (0.952)	**	0.377 (0.368)	
h3_4 a.m.	-0.207 (0.422)		-0.457 (0.654)		0.299 (0.695)	
h4_5 a.m.	0.630 (0.272)	**	1.206 (0.410)	***	1.155 (0.292)	***
h5_6 a.m.	0.566 (0.241)	**	1.085 (0.338)	***	1.037 (0.270)	***
h6_7 a.m.	0.813 (0.249)	***	1.089 (0.328)	***	1.256 (0.270)	***
h7_8 a.m.	0.580 (0.220)	***	0.913 (0.307)	***	1.082 (0.274)	***
h8_9 a.m.	0.573 (0.222)	***	1.000 (0.316)	***	1.132 (0.268)	***
h9_10 a.m.	0.499 (0.225)	**	0.788 (0.288)	***	1.052 (0.279)	***
h10_11 a.m.	0.589 (0.226)	***	0.918 (0.313)	***	1.149 (0.266)	***
h11_12 a.m.	0.637 (0.229)	***	0.917 (0.337)	***	1.158 (0.281)	***
h12_1 p.m.	0.616 (0.218)	***	1.014 (0.299)	***	1.205 (0.267)	***
h1 2 p.m.	0.666 (0.222)	***	0.810 (0.297)	***	1.219 (0.267)	***
H 2_3 p.m.	0.596 (0.222)	***	0.923 (0.305)	***	1.041 (0.277)	***
H3 4 p.m.	0.531 (0.219)	**	0.797 (0.301)	***	1.146 (0.269)	***
H4 5 p.m.	0.578 (0.219)	***	0.906 (0.300)	***	1.211 (0.240)	***
H5 6 p.m.	0.651 (0.220)	***	0.881 (0.318)	***	1.131 (0.260)	***
H6 7 p.m.	0.611 (0.227)	***	0.919 (0.307)	***	1.161 (0.259)	***
H7 8 p.m.	0.818 (0.246)	***	1.044 (0.304)	***	1.142 (0.283)	***

H8 9 p.m.	0.703 (0.217)	***	0.888 (0.282)	***	1.300 (0.278)	***
H9 10 p.m.	0.761 (0.231)	***	0.917 (0.300)	***	1.362 (0.275)	***
H10 11 p.m.	0.718 (0.230)	***	0.961 (0.317)	***	1.148 (0.310)	***
H11 12 p.m.	0.595 (0.248)	**	0.841 (0.270)	***	0.887 (0.269)	***
CONSTANT	1.578 (0.460)	***	-2.540 (0.770)	***	-0.740 (0.675)	
N	10831		10831		10831	
df	10632		10632		10632	
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01						