TITLE: Field-Configuring Events as Temporary Sites for Institutional Change in Sport: A Case Study of The Lausanne Conference on Anti-Doping

RUNNING HEAD: LEGITIMACY AND FIELD CONFIGURING EVENTS

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Abstract

Research question: Institutional work by actors (e.g., organisations or individuals) to create, maintain or disrupt institutions requires redefining what is considered legitimate behaviour. Furthermore, research indicates that field-configuring events (FCE), such as conferences, which temporarily unite actors, are important junctures for institutional processes. Research is yet to address how FCE *intersect* with the effectiveness of institutional work. The aim of this paper is to explore how (i) the legitimacy of an actor at the time of an FCE, and (ii) the co-location of actors at an FCE impact institutional work effectiveness.

Research methods: The 1999 Lausanne Conference is used as a case study because it led to significant institutional disruption in the field of anti-doping through the creation of the Lausanne Declaration. To analyse these institutional processes, a qualitative thematic analysis of 624 newspaper articles and archival documents from the conference was conducted.

Results and Findings: Firstly, we demonstrate that institutional maintenance can fail if an actor's legitimacy is under challenge at the time of an FCE. Secondly, the co-location of likeminded actors can create a consensus that acts as a cue to enable institutional disruption.

Implications: Based on the findings, suggestions are made to inform decision-making processes about institutional work**.** Initial categorisation of FCE conditions are presented and five propositions are made for future exploration.

Key words: Legitimacy, field-configuring event, institutional work, anti-doping, World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA).

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Introduction

Developing from repeated social interactions and the inter-generational transmission of meaning, institutions are taken-for-granted, physical and non-physical social structures that govern what is appropriate behaviour and, thus, facilitate order (Greenwood et al., 2008; Jepperson, 1991; Zucker, 1977). Institutional work, then, is 'the purposive action of individuals and organisations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions' (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 215). Research addressing institutional work in sport has predominantly studied the effectiveness of actors attempting to create or maintain institutions. However, there is less research into how actors disrupt institutions (McSweeney et al., 2019) and how maintenance work can fail (Nite & Washington, 2017). Previous research has indicated that legitimacy, viewed as the perceived appropriateness of an actor's behaviour within a 'socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions' (Suchman, 1995, p. 574), is a key variable in institutional work effectiveness (Hemme & Morais, 2019). Further, research is yet to address the influence of field-configuring events (FCE) (Lampel & Meyer, 2008) on institutional work. FCE are important features of institutional analysis as they provide junctures that temporarily co-locate field members (e.g., conferences) with an opportunity to debate institutions. These junctures may lead to a change in 'trajectory' of institutional processes influencing the long-term evolution of fields (Leca et al., 2015; Schüssler et al., 2014). Additionally, FCE provide a bounded context to study how actors engage in institutional work (Möllering & Müller-Seitz, 2018).

In this research, we aim to explore how the legitimacy of actors engaging in institutional work at the time of an FCE and the co-location of actors at an FCE impacts institutional work effectiveness. To do so, a case study of the 1999 Lausanne Conference on doping is utilised. Leading up to the conference, governmental efforts to regulate anti-doping had been developing but remained geographically fragmented limiting global co-ordination

(Houlihan, 1999; Waddington, 2016). By co-locating stakeholders, the conference became a 'unique opportunity for the most powerful governments in Europe, North America and Australasia – who also represented some of the most successful Olympic nations – to come together to challenge the IOC' (Waddington, 2016, p. 86). Together, government actors vetoed the proposed Olympic agency and instead forced the IOC to concede partial control. This change represented a significant disruption in anti-doping governance from largely private regulation by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and International Federations (IF) to a cross-sector regulatory model involving governments (Toohey & Beaton, 2017). Lausanne was a historic turning point in anti-doping regulation as it changed the trajectory of institutional processes in the anti-doping field and paved the way for the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (Hanstad et al., 2008; Hunt, 2011; Dimeo & Møller, 2018).

Hanstad et al. (2008) concluded that the IOC failed to maintain control of anti-doping following Lausanne because they failed to manage the complex group of stakeholders that attended the conference. Therefore, it provides an ideal case to analyse an FCE and explore the relationship between timing, legitimacy, co-location and institutional work on institutional processes (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). This paper primarily seeks to contribute to extant knowledge on institutional work and FCE by demonstrating that the perceived legitimacy of an actor at the time of an FCE influences the effectiveness of institutional work strategies and institutional outcomes. Further, the ability to stage a consensus between actors at an FCE debate can improve the effectiveness of institutional disruption.

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Theoretical Position and Framework

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Social Judgements Approach to Institutional Work

The study of institutions has a rich history in sport management (e.g., Silk & Amis, 2000; Slack & Hinings, 1994; Washington & Patterson, 2011) and anti-doping research (e.g.,

Hanstad & Houlihan, 2015; Wagner, 2010, 2011; Wagner & Hanstad, 2011). We use Greenwood et al's. (2008) seminal definition of institutions as 'more or less taken-for-granted repetitive social behavior that is underpinned by normative systems and cognitive understandings that give meaning to social exchange and thus enable self-reproducing social order' (p. 4–5). If institutions are the physical (e.g., governing bodies) and non-physical (e.g., the idea of fair play) social structures that guide behaviour (Jepperson, 1991), legitimacy is the feature of institutions that enables their acceptance (Suchman, 1995). Suchman suggested that an institution's legitimacy was evaluated on pragmatic (i.e., self-interest judgements), moral (i.e., sociotropic judgements) and cognitive (i.e., comprehensibility and familiarity) criteria. This seminal work has informed the social judgements approach to legitimacy that theorises that actors in a field evaluate the legitimacy of an organisation and on the basis of their evaluation confer or withhold the grant of legitimacy to an institution (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Suddaby et al., 2017; Tost, 2011). This aligns with previous research that has emphasised that institutional work can be conducted to legitimate organisations and gain behavioural acceptance and support (e.g., Edwards & Washington, 2015; Nite, 2017, Nite & Nauright, 2020).

Haack and Sieweke (2020) propose two forms of judgement. "First-order judgements" refer to an individual's personal and private evaluation about the legitimacy of a physical or non-physical institution, such as how an individual privately judges the legitimacy of complying with anti-doping regulations. "Second-order judgements" refer to an individual's evaluation about who is expressing a first-order legitimacy judgement and which judgement is collectively dominant in the field or another reference group, such as an organisation. To continue our example, the same individual may read the news or ask colleagues to attain cues about the collective legitimacy of complying with anti-doping regulations in the field or their organisation. This distinction is important as second-order

judgements are more likely to predict social behaviours than first-order judgements (Haack & Sieweke, 2020). Therefore, institutional stability is characterised by the presence of: (1) a dominant first-order judgement about what constitutes legitimate behaviour, (2) a perception from other actors that this judgement is dominant (second-order judgement) based on cues from the environment, and (3) negative repercussions for opposing the dominant first-order judgement about what constitutes legitimate behaviour. Consequently, the dominant legitimacy judgement, at a point in time, determines institutional pressures of legitimate behaviour and this is how isomorphism occurs (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

The social judgement approach to legitimacy also offers a solution to the agency versus embeddedness paradox (Seo & Creed, 2002): 'How can actors change institutions if their actions, intentions, and, rationality are all conditioned by the very institution they wish to change?' (Holm, 1995, p. 398). Suppressor factors (Bitektine & Haack, 2015), such as fear of reputational damage for voicing a deviant judgement, ensure field-members conform to isomorphic processes (symbolically or substantively) in keeping with the roots of institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Further, diversity among suppressed first-order legitimacy judgements among actors arising from contradictions and tensions between institutional logics as well as social position (Seo & Creed, 2020; Sherer, 2017) offers a source of institutional disruption. These suppressed judgements can be expressed following a jolt (i.e., exogenous shocks), for example, changes in concussion policy in American Football have been partly driven by the tragic exogenous shocks of post-mortems revealing chronic traumatic encephalopathy associated with concussion in former players that challenged the legitimacy of the National Football League's existing policies and stimulated further debate (Heinze & Lu, 2017). Such jolts can lead individuals who passively accept an organisation's legitimacy during periods of stability to actively judge, evaluate, and debate (i.e., invest effort in thinking and speaking about) the degree to which an organisation's aims and actions are

appropriate in relation to pragmatic and moral dimensions of legitimacy (Bitektine, 2011; Lock et al., 2015; Suchman, 1995).

From an institutional work perspective, actors can engage in strategic action to maintain or disrupt the institutional order (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Hampel et al., 2017) by targeting first and/or second-order judgements (Haack & Sieweke, 2020). Bitektine and Haack (2015) suggest four strategic categories actors can use to influence first and second-order legitimacy judgements. Rhetorical strategies that rely on the content of a message (e.g., rationalisation), credibility strategies where organisations try to attain a position of power in the field (e.g., being recognised as an expert), staging consensus between actors to give the perception that one judgement is commonly held (e.g., protests and demonstrations), and coercion and inducement to persuade other actors to give their support. Institutional entrepreneurs are change agents that successfully initiate, create and actively implement divergent institutional conditions that support a new logic (Battilana et al., 2009). Together, institutional entrepreneurs can directly manipulate how other field-members judge the legitimacy of an organisation or how other field-members indirectly perceive the legitimacy of the actor to comment on the issue.

Adopting this social judgement stance, institutional change occurs because a different first-order legitimacy judgement achieves dominance within a field, which creates new behavioural pressures on organisations. If an organisation previously judged as legitimate is subject to a scandal, it may be subject to scrutiny and re-evaluation. A negative legitimacy judgement may achieve dominance, other field-members are suppressed into conforming to this judgement for fear of reputational damage, and accordingly withdraw their support for the organisation. From this perspective, micro-level institutional work can be linked to macro-level institutions in a manner that satisfactorily answers the paradox of embedded agency.

Recent sports management literature has highlighted how institutional entrepreneurs can individually or simultaneously create institutions (e.g., Dowling & Smith 2016, Edwards & Washington, 2015; Pizzo et al., 2019), maintain institutional orders (e.g., Agyemang et al., 2018; Nite, 2017; Nite et al., 2019; Riehl et al., 2018; Woolf et al., 2016), or disrupt institutions (Heinze & Lu, 2017; McSweeney et al., 2019). Related to the current research, institutional work has previously been applied as a theoretical framework to understand the supremacy of certain sporting institutions within their institutional fields such as Nite et al's (2019) study of how 'the NCAA [National Collegiate Athletic Association] learned to maintain control over the field of college athletics by learning how to control boundaries, practices, cognitions of the institutional properties' (p. 380). However, less attention has been paid to how institutional maintenance can fail. Nite and Washington (2017) have demonstrated how the NCAA failed to maintain control of college football broadcasting as innovations in television acted as exogenous shocks to the field. Equally, Wagner and Pedersen (2014) argued that the IOC-constructed discourse in the 1990s of fighting a war on drugs to combat doping failed to institutionalise the organisation's anti-doping efforts inadvertently establishing the conditions for institutional change. To date, however, there is less research into (i) how institutional maintenance can fail and (ii) why some institutional disruptions are more effective in comparison to other institutional work scenarios.

Given that the Lausanne conference re-oriented the trajectory of institutional processes in anti-doping through the IOC's failed maintenance and government disruption, it provides an excellent case to address these gaps.

Field Configuring Events and Work

Temporality has been demonstrated as an important factor in institutional processes through the concept of FCE (Lampel & Meyer, 2008; Meyer et al., 2005; Hardy & Maguire,

2010). Lampel and Meyer (2008) define FCE as 'temporary social organizations such as trade shows, professional gatherings, technology contests, and business ceremonies that encapsulate and shape the development of professions, technologies, markets, and industries' (p. 1026). FCE temporarily bring physically and cognitively distant field-members together in one space. In doing so, such events facilitate the generation, expression, debate, and collusion of different opinions in a short, contained time period (Anand & Jones, 2008). This presents opportunities for institutional work through symbolic (e.g., public rhetoric) and relational (e.g., diplomacy) work that are not normally available. FCE can then maintain institutional stability (Gibson & Bathelt, 2014; Henn & Bathelt, 2015; Schüssler et al., 2014) or re-orient institutional processes on another trajectory which may lead to long-term change (Hardy & Maguire, 2010; Leca et al., 2015; Oliver & Montgomery, 2008). Given their potential for disruption, FCE are significant events in long-term institutional processes (Lampel & Meyer, 2008). FCE are particularly likely to disrupt institutions in emerging organisational fields (Garud 2008; McInerney, 2008) because they act as discursive spaces (Zilber, 2011) where micro-level processes can take place (Nissilä et al., 2014; Zilber, 2007) and legitimate technologies, industries and ideas at a macro-level (Garud, 2008).

There is a lack of research applying FCE specifically to sport. The little research that has been conducted has focussed on hosting mega-sports events as FCE (Bakos, 2018). The Olympic Games have been conceptualised as an FCE that can trigger disruption in host cities as new actor networks are created and legacies are embedded in the history of local communities (Glynn, 2008). Addressing the 2012 Olympic Games, Thiel and Grabher (2015) suggest that hosting the Olympics is a singular opportunity for re-configuration across multiple fields as hosts prepare different requirements. Equally, hosting the 2018 Gold Coast Commonwealth Games functioned as an FCE that led to local legislation being passed and the expansion of the institutional field to enable the diffusion of sustainability practices

changing the institutional trajectory of sport in the Gold Coast (Bakos, 2018). The limited

literature in sport is interesting as it highlights how mega-events serve as unique critical

junctures in institutional processes, the complex temporalities involved in hosting mega-

events as well as the institutional work that occurs before the FCE. Given the literature

indicating the importance of institutional work to the regulation of sport (e.g., Nite, 2019),

there is value in studying how the features of an FCE, such as the Lausanne Conference, may

influence the trajectory of institutions in sport.

Thus, FCE provide a temporary period with multiple channels (e.g., presentations,

informal conversations, seminars) in which field-members can engage in institutional work to

influence the legitimacy judgements of others. Further, they provide an opportunity for

individuals to take cues from other field members to determine the dominant legitimacy

judgement. Equally, field-members at an FCE may perceive – through these cues – that there

is an opportunity for institutional disruption as deviant opinion expression may not lead to

negative consequences. This relates to the broader point that micro-level processes do not

occur in a vacuum, and FCE provide an opportunity for actors to debate and assess an

organisation's legitimacy.

Blending Timing, Legitimacy and Institutional Work

Combining the research strands of institutional work, legitimacy judgements and

FCE, timing becomes particularly salient to the effectiveness of institutional work strategies

at an FCE. Because perceptions of the legitimacy of an actor engaging in institutional work

may vary over time due to jolts (Bitektine & Haack, 2015), an FCE may occur when an

organisation's perceived legitimacy is challenged. Further, by co-locating actors with the

opportunity to debate institutions (Hampel & Meyer, 2008), there is an opportunity to

influence first and second-order judgements. Consequently, the perceived legitimacy of a

field-member at the time of FCE, the co-location of actors with the opportunity to debate institutions, and the effectiveness of institutional work may be linked.

Research Context

This study adopted an exploratory qualitative case study design (Merriam, 2009) as the focus of the study is about the diffusion of socially constructed legitimacy judgements during FCE. Organisational case studies are common in institutional research (e.g., Dowling & Smith 2016; Heinze & Lu, 2017; Nite et al., 2019) and beneficial when research is exploratory in nature which stimulates propositions for future research in different contexts (Merriam, 2009). Single case studies can be vulnerable to specific contextual details that limit transferability (Shenton, 2004), therefore, it is critical to provide detailed description of the context to allow future comparison.

Anti-doping efforts began to emerge after World War II as sports medicine and performance rapidly developed (Waddington, 1996). Anti-doping regulation from this point through to the 1980s was characterised by fragmentation and low coordination between emerging key policy actors: IFs, the Council of Europe, select activist governments and the IOC (Houlihan, 1999). By the 1990s, the field of anti-doping was becoming increasingly turbulent as the Ben Johnson scandal in 1988 brought attention to doping in sport. The 1990s were further punctuated with high-profile doping cases that implicated systematic structures rather than individual athletes (Hoberman, 2001). Certain governments began to coordinate anti-doping activities, but this was geographically localised hindering global coordination to challenge the IOC (Waddington, 2016). Concern peaked at the 1998 Tour de France, when French customs officials arrested professional cycling managers, soigneur's and medical staff from Team Festina for the possession and administration of performance enhancing drugs. In a decade characterised by doping scandals and increasing coordination between select activist governments and the Council of Europe, the Festina Affair demonstrated that doping was

widespread in the Olympic Sport of cycling and plunged the IOC into a legitimacy crisis (Hanstad et al., 2008; Wagner & Pedersen, 2014).

The crisis was intensified by IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch's comments that the definition of doping could be re-evaluated which was interpreted as conceding the 'war on doping' (Patrick, 1998, July 28). In response, the IOC arranged the Lausanne Conference in February 1999 to propose a new IOC anti-doping agency (Patrick, 1998, July 28) to address the problem of doping thereby re-establishing its legitimacy (Hanstad et al., 2008; Hunt, 2011; Wagner, 2011). The IOC did not consider that the conference offered geographically fragmented governments concerned with doping the conditions to launch a collective challenge (Waddington, 2016). Between announcing and hosting the conference, in December 1998 it was revealed that IOC executives had taken bribes to vote for Salt Lake City to host the 2002 Winter Olympic Games (Wenn, 2011). The scandal was particularly difficult for the IOC as more stories of bidding-based corruption emerged (Wenn & Martyn, 2006) that conflicted with the Olympic Movement's self-proclaimed ideological identity of fairness and equality (Glynn et al., 2012). This combination of escalating anti-doping failings, co-locating geographically fragmented governments, Samaranch's comments, the Salt-Lake City scandal, and the IOC's suggestion of change in anti-doping were all features of Lausanne that presented an opportunity for disruption.

The Lausanne Conference lasted two and a half days, consisted of 580 attendees including representatives from the IOC, IFs, athletes, national Olympic committees, governmental organisations, pharmaceutical industry, sponsors, and sporting goods manufacturers (Ferstle, 2001). Attendees at the Lausanne conference were responsible for deciding on the acceptance of either: (1) the proposed IOC controlled Olympic movement anti-doping agency (OMADA) that maintained the institutional order, or (2) an independent anti-doping agency proposed by governments that disrupted the institutional order. The

decision between the two options was localised to the conference, therefore, conference attendees had an opportunity to enact institutional maintenance or disruption. The outcome of the conference led to the Lausanne Declaration on Doping in Sport (1999) which stated that an 'Independent International Anti-Doping Agency' (p. 2) should be formed constituting both sport and government representatives to regulate anti-doping. This represented institutional disruption as anti-doping was 'partially nationalised' (Casini, 2009). Furthermore, it can be considered a case of successful institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009) at an FCE as the partial nationalisation represented a new organising logic by introducing government perspectives on doping.

In terms of our analytical frame, Lausanne satisfies the six features of FCE (Lampel & Meyer, 2008). Firstly, actors were assembled in one location. Secondly, the duration was limited to three days. Thirdly, attendees were able to communicate informally. Fourthly, there were dramaturgical activities such as the conference speeches (Goffman, 1959). Fifthly, there were opportunities for information exchange during the conference and collective sense-making in the drafting of the Lausanne declaration (1999). Finally, it created reputational resources for governments to use in the future development of anti-doping.

Methodology

Data sampling

The research drew from two documented sources of primary data appropriate to studying FCE (Lampel & Meyer, 2008). The first was archival sources drawn from British Olympic Association (BOA) archives. These archives included:

- Four IOC working group reports on prevention, protection, legality and finance provided to each delegate beforehand, as well as the draft versions.

- One BOA copy of the Lausanne Declaration and their official response.

- One conference regulations document provided beforehand to attendees and the transcribed remarks of select attendees.

- All the documents submitted by national Olympic committees, governments, IF, IOC scientists, Olympic games organising committees, international organisations (the Council of Europe, UNESCO, the International Anti-Doping Arrangement [Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom]) prior to the conference.

- One IOC document on the agreed definition of doping from the preparatory meeting between the IOC, IF, and national Olympic Committees on November 27, 1998.

- One letter from the UCI and FIFA to Samaranch detailing their rejection of the agreement.

- One survey of initiatives related to the fight against doping around the world.

- One summary of rules governing doping and drug trafficking in countries and sports.

These archival sources provided insight into the perspectives of different actors (e.g., why a government was concerned about doping in sport) to understand the contextual features that influenced patterns in institutional work (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Published articles in newspapers offer access to primary data due to their use of direct quotations (Brundage, 2017). In analysing the legitimacy debate around the FCE, newspaper reports provide direct quotes from actors through which we can identify micro-level attempts to express and debate first-order judgements. Through these comments and the connected debate, we can classify the different legitimation strategies actors used in the debate around anti-doping policy. Further, the retrospective assessment we adopt in this manuscript allows us to identify the source of a judgement that became dominant as well as the actors that were suppressed.

To find newspaper reports, the search engine Nexis was used. Nexis searches archived newspaper reports globally, which we used to retrieve different perspectives on the issue. The initial search criteria filtered articles published in English that contained the words "Olympic" AND "Doping" AND "Conference" at least once and excluded website articles. The search included articles published between July 26th, 1998 when IOC President, Juan Antonio Samaranch, called for a change in the definition of doping, and January 1st 2000, the start of the year WADA became active.

The search returned 1504 results of which 738 were from Europe, 529 were from North America, 459 were from Oceania, 156 from Asia, 41 from the Caribbean Islands, 39 were from Africa, 38 from the Middle East, 28 from Latin America and the origins of the remainder were not disclosed. These were then screened for relevance and articles were excluded if they did not mention the Lausanne conference. This resulted in 624 articles for analysis. We then used these articles in a snowball sampling approach to identify other relevant documents and articles not included in the search results (e.g., press releases). It is important to note that newspaper articles are also constructions of reality influenced by editorial discretion, political ideology, format, readership and market position, therefore, research trustworthiness must be considered in the analysis.

Data Analysis

Thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was used with a mid-range coding schematic to generate inductive second-order themes from the initial first-order deductive data coding within our theoretical framework. Competing legitimacy judgements during the Lausanne Conference were identified from the newspaper articles using different strategies. Based on a literature review of institutional work, rhetoric and legitimation strategies, Bitektine and Haack (2015) suggest four types of strategies a proponent can use to influence

the first and second-order judgements of others: (1) Rhetorical appeals to propriety

judgements, (2) Rhetorical appeals to validity belief, (3) increasing speaker credibility, (4)

staging consensus, and (5) coercion or inducement (see additional file - codebook). These

strategies formed *a priori* codes for analysing the competing judgements that were advanced

during the conference. The deductively coded data then informed the inductive 'search for

themes'. Theme generation involved analysing patterns in the coded data to transition from

descriptive deduction to latent induction by identifying *features* that gave deductive codes

their "particular form and meaning" (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 84). Identification of features

included who were the key actors, what was the relationship between actors, what strategies

did actors use, what were actors motivations and what contextual variables were important.

Theme generation then occurred through refinement of pattern identification as the research

team iteratively discussed the data in regular meetings.

To ensure our analysis and findings were robust, we followed Guba's (1981)

conceptualisation of qualitative research trustworthiness which consists of credibility,

transferability, dependability and confirmability (Guba, 1981). Accordingly, credibility was

ensured in four ways. First, we used data triangulation between diverse newspapers sources

and archival sources. Second, by adopting a document-based methodology well-established

in retrospectively analysing institutional processes (e.g., Nite et al., 2019; Washington &

Ventresca, 2008). Third, we presented thick descriptions of the context in the methodology to

make sense of the social system in which Lausanne occurred. Fourth, the research team

engaged in frequent debriefing sessions to debate the explanations arising from the analysis.

Although transferability of qualitative contextual research remains contentious, this current

article provides thick description to enable comparison, draws theoretical rather than

empirical generalisations and details the data collection and coding methods (Shenton, 2004).

Lastly, dependability and confirmability (i.e., objectivity) has been developed by providing a clear methodology.

Our analysis following the guidance provided for thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) and qualitative research trustworthiness (Guba, 1981) led to three themes: (1) IOC legitimacy, (2) Western Government Consensus, and (3) International Federation Opportunism.

Findings

In the analysis we consider three groups of actors that promoted first-order legitimacy judgements and engaged in institutional work during the conference. The first was the IOC Executive Board who argued that an OMADA institution was an appropriate response to the Festina crisis. This is an example of maintenance work as changes would have ensured the IOC retained control of anti-doping. The IOC argued that doping had been poorly managed and underfinanced, but that greater funding could solve the problem. The IOC suggested that the OMADA should be Chaired by the head of the IOC Medical Commission Alexandre de Merode, and IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch should be the inaugural President. The main opposing first-order judgement was proffered by government ministers from the 15 EU nations, America, and Canada as institutional entrepreneurs that collectively advocated for an independent anti-doping agency. This evaluation was based on pragmatic and moral evaluations (Bitektine, 2011; Suchman, 1995) that the IOC's performance in regulating anti-doping was unsatisfactory and violated the normative sporting values held by each governments' constituents. Lastly, there was disruption from FIFA and the International Cycling Union (UCI) who argued that the proposed mandatory two-year suspensions were illegitimate. The three themes are now discussed individually.

IOC legitimacy

The first theme, titled IOC legitimacy, demonstrates that the IOC lacked perceived moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) to comment on anti-doping issues due to the timing of Lausanne after the Festina scandal and Salt Lake City scandal. The combination of the bidding scandal and the Festina Affair undermined the perceived moral legitimacy of the IOC heading into Lausanne (Hunt, 2011). This is reflected in attendees comments, for example, USA representative and Director of the USA Drug Policy Office General Barry McCaffrey stated 'I've watched with enormous dismay *the loss of legitimacy of the IOC over this issue*. I really believe it's outrageous that collectively they failed to recognize they have a trust, not a tenure [italics added for emphasis]' (Fish, 1999). British Sports Minister Tony Banks also expressed negative judgement on the IOC's legitimacy at the time of the conference: 'We believe in the principles of the Olympic movement, but at the moment it is looking rather sad, and rather soured, and rather sullied' (Rowbottom, 1999). The German sports minister Otto Schily echoed this judgement,

> The IOC can only play a leading part if it becomes more transparent and deals thoroughly with the allegations of corruption. In my view the IOC cannot discharge the functions which go with its role unless the instrument is completely overhauled and its finances are laid open (McCullough, 1999b).

This evidence and previous research (Ferstle, 2001; Hunt, 2011) supports the assertion that the IOC was undergoing a legitimacy crisis at the time of the conference.

Before the conference, the IOC had symbolically invited government ministers but did not expect them to challenge the IOC. This is epitomised by IOC Vice-President Dick Pound's comment before Lausanne: 'We don't want governments running sport. We prefer that governments provide support for our anti-doping programmes' (Myers, 1998). The five-minute period government ministers were allotted to talk at Lausanne and Samaranch's

overall control over who could speak (IOC, 1999a) supports a position that the IOC wanted to give governments a voice, but with minimal capacity to promote alternatives or influence attendees. Further, by locating the conference at the IOC headquarters in Lausanne, the IOC was able to draw upon the symbolic power of their headquarters and their historical precedent of defining how anti-doping should be regulated (Hunt, 2011).

Despite the Lausanne conference predominantly taking place because of the IOC's anti-doping regulation failures, they still wished to maintain control of anti-doping by installing Samaranch as OMADA Chairman and de Merode as OMADA Director. Our analysis reveals that the Festina and Salt Lake City scandals appear to have shaped the IOC's strategies to portray itself as a credible organisation and the effectiveness of its institutional maintenance work at the conference. Taking advantage of the localisation of its supporters in the field at the conference, the IOC engaged in valorisation (i.e., providing positive examples of its organisations norms) emphasising the IOC's previous strong moral stance on doping, as well as the continued commercial growth of the Olympic Games as reasons to support OMADA. For example, IOC President Samaranch explained to conference attendees:

> The International Olympic Committee was the first to recognize the threat of doping, and in 1968 it established a medical commission. We want to send a clear message to athletes, governing bodies and organising committees that we are committed to doing all we can to eradicate doping, which is poisoning the world of sport (Jie, 1999).

This comment presents a direct attempt to promote the IOC's judgement to conference attendees and their legitimacy to regulate the issue. In addition, the IFs who were committed to the IOC proposals expressed their endorsement thus creating a public cue in support of the OMADA (Wilson, 1998). IOC Officials also tried to make the inclusion of the IOC a

necessary component through valorisation. For example, IOC Vice President Dick Pound asserted:

> We've been in it from the start, where 99 percent of the progress in doping has been
> as a result of the IOC involvement. And, in fact, without our involvement in
> something like that, without our willingness to put in money, it's not going to exist
> (Edwards, 1999).

Moreover, the IOC was quick to use the presence of ministers at Lausanne to demonise governments (i.e., providing negative examples about competition) that expressed judgements challenging an OMADA. For example, in response to suggestions of a lack of public trust in the IOC; rather than a rationalised defence, de Merode argued, 'Why should we trust politicians? They have financial problems of their own' (Wilson, 1999). Similarly, French Olympic Committee President Henri Serandour declared 'they should not take the others for being naive and small people. They should stop giving us lessons. They want to appear whiter than white' ("US Criticized", 1999). This demonization sought to directly undermine the legitimacy of the government ministers at Lausanne, and in doing so the credibility of an independent anti-doping agency. However, by deflecting criticism, the IOC failed to satisfy the conference attendees concerns. The problem with IOC members constructing government ministers as the enemy is that their narrative lacked specificity to actual incidences where their competition had acted negatively to offset the issues created by Salt Lake City and Festina.

It appears that the IOC utilised a dualism of demonization and valorisation to promote OMADA. Yet their attempts to discredit their rivals were vague and their self-promotion ignored the reality that the conference was due to IOC failings that were fresh in the mind of attendees, which further undermined perceptions of the IOC's moral legitimacy. Further, the

IOC's choice of strategies to legitimate OMADA and maintain the institutional order was undermined by its lack of legitimacy to comment on the issue at the time due to the recent Salt Lake City scandal. Consequently, the conference acted as an opportunity for field members to disrupt the institutional order whilst the IOC was temporarily weakened. In summary, it appears that because the FCE occurred at a point when the IOC lacked perceived moral legitimacy, the effectiveness of their institutional work was undermined.

Western Government Consensus

The second theme, Western Government consensus, focusses on the IOC's primary competition from North American and European governments. Motives for government interest in anti-doping differed and created tensions (Seo & Creed, 2002) with the IOC that enabled potential institutional disruption. For example, the USA treated drug use in sport as part of a wider social drug problem evidenced by their concerns over marijuana (Executive Office of the White House, 1998), Canada prided itself on a tough anti-doping stance since the Ben Johnson scandal (Canadian Olympic Association, 1998), and EU nations valued sport as a social tool (Council of Europe, 1998). Although these government actors had different reasons for evaluating anti-doping after the Festina scandal jolt, all reached a consensus that any anti-doping agency should be separate from the IOC, because the IOC had failed to control anti-doping and was viewed as morally questionable after the Salt Lake City scandal. The result was that these governments had access to attend the Lausanne Conference in Switzerland and perceived that the IOC Executive Board lacked legitimacy to regulate anti-doping via OMADA.

Prior to the conference, there is evidence of collusion between these parties. Three examples demonstrate this; first, officials from the USA met with EU and Australian government ministers to determine shared aims (Executive Office of the White House, 1999); second, a meeting between EU ministers in January 1999, resulted in eight direct

recommendations for the IOC to consider, these recommendations were supported by all 15

EU nations ("EU ministers", 1999); and finally, the seven nations from the International

Anti-Doping Arrangement submitted suggestions for an independent, international anti-

doping agency (International Anti-Doping Arrangement, 1998 November). The analysis

demonstrated how the temporary co-location of government ministers at Lausanne

contributed to long-term institutional change in anti-doping. The FCE allowed government

ministers to present one after another about each of the conference's four themes (IOC,

1999a). Therefore, the strategies used by government ministers to promote their judgement

that an independent anti-doping agency was most appropriate were supported by an apparent

consensus. This created a strong cue to influence the second-order judgements of other

conference attendees that an independent anti-doping agency was the dominant judgement.

The circumstances around the conference facilitated the expression of this

government consensus. For example, Belgium representative Phillippe Topagne spoke for the

EU stating, 'The European ministers stress they have the strongest reserve over the

composition of the international anti-doping agency as presented in documents we have seen'

(McCullough, 1999a). There are consistent examples of government ministers suggesting that

an IOC controlled agency would be inappropriate because of the IOC's lack of legitimacy.

For example, British Sports Minister Tony Banks commented on behalf of the EU that, 'it is

our unanimous opinion that we cannot at present accept the composition of the agency'

(McCullough, 1999d). Francisco Villar, Spanish Secretary of State for Sports argued, 'The

agency must not depend on the IOC. It must be independent' (Fish, 1999), echoed by Italian

Sports minister Giovanna Melandri, 'The agency should be truly independent from the IOC'

(Casert, 1999). It is noted that communication and cooperation between actors is not enough

to change institutions, but, in the context of an FCE where opinions are debated, co-location

and staged consensus can be powerful tools for institutional disruption.

This staged consensus strategy was supported by rhetoric that sought to legitimise governmental representatives. In support of this, Banks added, 'It has become increasingly evident during this conference that the involvement of governments will be crucial if we are to have an effective and accepted anti-doping policy' (McCullough, 1999c), thereby suggesting that government representatives were legitimate actors in the field of anti-doping. Likewise, General McCaffrey stated, 'The Olympic anti-drug and doping programme should be overseen by a separately established drugs testing and oversight agency' ("European Community", 1999). These comments clearly indicate these actor's intentions to insert themselves in anti-doping regulation, and the opportunistic timing of the FCE and ability to stage a consensus at the FCE supported the effectiveness of the government's institutional disruption.

International Federation Opportunism

The third theme, international federation opportunism, relates to the activities of FIFA and the UCI, two powerful IFs in the field of Olympic sport that had both suffered doping-related problems to differing extents (Wagner 2010, 2011). Both organisations presented competing judgments and disruption to the IOC at Lausanne. Prior to the Conference and Salt Lake scandal, the IOC held a meeting with the Olympic IFs to gain support for OMADA and threatened non-supporters of the anti-doping body with Olympic expulsion. For example, IOC executive board member, and current IOC President, Thomas Bach stated,

> I don't think we will have to threaten (the federations), but if the organizations refuse to cooperate and the world conference isn't a success, they will feel pressure from the IOC. Federations, who refuse, could lose their part of Olympic TV money. Sports, or at least some disciplines, could disappear out of the Olympic program ("IOC official", 1998).

Using coercion as a form of institutional work to legitimate and ensure support for OMADA (Bitektine & Haack, 2015), the IOC sought to suppress the alternative judgements of IFs through loss of Olympic status and resources (e.g., broadcasting revenues). The agreement signed between the IOC and Olympic IFs stated: 'the sports included on the programme of the Olympic Games must be governed by International Federations which agree to comply with the above-mentioned principles and provisions' (IOC, 1998) which included the IOC retaining authority over its anti-doping procedures. This partly explains why the Conference was divided between government representatives and the IOC Executive Board's strategy.

This agreement was insufficient to suppress FIFA and the UCI, who both rejected OMADA on the basis that they were against mandatory two-year suspensions for first offence anti-doping violations. Utilising 'problematising', the rhetorical strategy of highlighting the ineffectiveness and injustice of an institution, the Presidents of FIFA and the UCI wrote to Samaranch prior to the conference to argue against mandatory suspensions and dispute their legality under employment laws (Blatter & Verbruggen, 1998). Both IFs were dismissed by the IOC. At the conference, FIFA and the UCI maintained the problematising rhetoric that the specific career lengths of footballers and cyclists made mandatory two-year suspensions unenforceable. For example, FIFA's Communications Director, Keith Cooper stated, 'we feel it is important for each sport to have the latitude to fix its suspension of offenders according to the rhythm of its own competition' ("Doping summit impossible", 1999). Equally, UCI President Hein Verbruggen argued 'A uniform suspension brings discrimination of one sport against the other because a suspension of one year or even less will hit one athlete more severely than a suspension of four years in another sport' (Magnay, 1999).

Throughout the conference, the two federations continued to contest the IOC's judgement. FIFA and the UCI expressed arguments based in employment law, for example,

FIFA President Sepp Blatter stated, 'Any sanction we adopt has to be fair, applicable, enforceable, defensible and reasonable, and it has to be acceptable also to civil courts' (Marshallsea, 1999). Like the staged consensus presented by government representatives, the consensus between FIFA and the UCI created an additional cue to the field that the IOC lacked legitimacy to comment on anti-doping issues. The temporary opportunity to present a united front against mandatory suspensions to fellow attendees reinforced their argument. Further, both organisations were able to draw from the other's legitimacy; FIFA as the largest Olympic IF and the UCI's Verbruggen as a prominent member of the IOC working group on the Legal and Political aspects of doping (IOC, 1999b). This strategy was ultimately successful as the IOC agreed to an exceptional circumstances' clause disrupting the goal of harmonised sanctions. Considering that Samaranch had dismissed the same argument portrayed in the earlier letter, through attendance at the FCE FIFA and the UCI were able to legitimate this clause. indicating the importance of FCE timing. The IOC's failure to control major IFs at the conference presented an additional cue undermining the organisation's legitimacy to conference attendees. As International Triathlon Union President Les McDonald claimed, 'The rest of the bloody world backed down from soccer and cycling' (Christie, 1999), highlighting the role of FCE in micro-level processes.

Discussion

The analysis supports previous conclusions that the IOC seeks to portray itself as winning the battle against doping (Wagner & Pedersen, 2014). Ultimately, the IOC recognised their institutional maintenance work had failed. They revised the Lausanne declaration at the last minute so that conference attendees could ratify an agreement stipulating the creation of an independent anti-doping agency validating the judgements expressed by governments. This shifted anti-doping regulation from the IOC towards national

governments setting a new trajectory for the field of anti-doping that led to WADA's creation.

Pivotal to the success and failure of the institutional work discussed is (1) the timing of the FCE alongside the IOC's legitimacy crisis, and (2) the ability to influence second-order judgements via a staged consensus. Our analysis indicates that the timing of Lausanne during the IOC's moral legitimacy crisis was critical. The conference timing not only acted as an opportunity to express negative judgements, but in turn may have suppressed other actors because of the potential loss of legitimacy they may have suffered by supporting the IOC. This coalesces with Schüssler, Rüling and Wittneben (2014) who demonstrated that the outcome of United Nations climate conferences could not be separated from preceding events in the field. We develop this finding to argue that the perceived legitimacy of an actor proposing a judgement at the time of an FCE appears critical in institutional work. Consequently, the proposed OMADA lacked legitimacy because the IOC lacked legitimacy at the time. Government representatives were able to capitalise on this weakness and use the FCE as a forum to present a staged consensus. Government representatives supporting and reinforcing each other's arguments created a validity cue to other attendees that their judgement was widely shared and most appropriate. This also illustrates how institutional entrepreneurship can emerge due to conflicting social positions and logics (Sherer, 2017).

The findings of the present analysis can inform decision-making processes about how and when sports practitioners as well as general business executives should look to engage in institutional work at FCEs to maintain or disrupt institutions. Recognising the limitations of generalising from a single case study research design, we offer these suggestions appreciating the need for further assessment. Firstly, our analysis illustrates that managers looking to engage in maintenance work at an FCE must firstly consider how their own legitimacy is perceived. If the organisation is experiencing a legitimacy crisis, avoiding open forums and

debates is advisable (as long as this does not worsen perceived legitimacy). Building on Nite and Washington's findings (2017), who identified that the NCAA's maintenance work failed partly due to the decision to contest legitimacy judgements with its most powerful members. Therefore, we would suggest that organisations attempt to break up any strategic alliances and co-opt (Oliver, 1991) their most powerful opposition into limited decision-making positions to nullify threats at an FCE. Nite (2017) has suggested that organisations can use discourse to undermine opposition and the findings here suggest that this is only advisable when the organisation retains perceived legitimacy when presenting such arguments.

Secondly, if leaders decide to use an FCE for maintenance work from a position of weak perceived legitimacy, they must ensure that they have enough coercion or inducement capabilities over potential opposition. Although the IOC was able to coerce the support of most IFs prior to the conference, the inability to compel FIFA and the UCI through potential loss of Olympic status and funding contributed to the IOC's failed maintenance work. This aligns with Agyemang et al's (2018) suggestion that if actors benefit from the existing institutional order, change is unlikely. Developing Agyemang's point, if members no longer see benefits in the institutional order, they may become a challenger (Seo & Creed, 2002).

Lastly, turning to advice for sports leaders trying to disrupt institutional orders, it has become apparent that leaders should target legitimacy crises of dominant field-members as opportunities for institutional change and target FCE forums. Further, it is advised that leaders establish strategic alliances with other field-members who would benefit from institutional change in preparation to take advantage of legitimacy crises. Nite and Washington (2017) demonstrated how the NCAA's maintenance work failed as the College Football Association was able to unite and disrupt the institutional order. Therefore, it is apparent that the ability to stage a consensus via alliances during FCE debates is advantageous to achieving institutional disruption. The importance of staging consensus is

27

consistent with Garud (2008) who offered the term "meta-race" (p. 1081) to describe how firms attending cochlear implant conferences were less focused on providing information and instead concentrated on dramaturgically presenting their perspective as dominant to favourably configure the field. However, agreeing a single legitimacy judgement to promote within a strategic alliance may be difficult. Finding a *lowest common denominator*, in this case, that the IOC should not retain control of anti-doping, may be an appropriate way to start forming strategic alliances to disrupt institutions at an FCE.

Our findings are significant as sport is characterised by short-term, geographically-localised FCE such as competitions (e.g., the Olympic Games), conferences (e.g., the Sport Accord Convention), and transnational headquarter meetings (e.g., the FIFA Congress) which provide an opportunity for institutional disruption. Accordingly, Figure 1 visualises the chance of institutional disruption at an FCE based on the contextual factors identified in this analysis: incumbent legitimacy and judgement congruence. Incumbent legitimacy refers to perceptions of the dominant actor in a field before an FCE (e.g., the IOC) and judgement congruence is the extent to which there are contradicting logics presented that create tension (Seo & Creed, 2002). Based on these two dichotomies, the chance of disruption can be discerned. If the incumbent has high legitimacy their institutional work is more likely to be effective; therefore, congruence will have less influence on the chance of disruption. If incumbent legitimacy is low, but there is high congruence in judgement, the chance of disruption is low. However, if congruence is low and there are multiple competing judgements, the chance of disruption is higher, and other factors may then become relevant (e.g., actor unification).

----- insert Figure 1 about here ------

The present study was limited to addressing institutional disruption via a single case study meaning our recommendations may be vulnerable to contextual nuances of the Lausanne Conference. Future studies comparing and categorising the different conditions under which FCE can lead to different institutional outcomes (i.e., creation, maintenance, disruption) using multiple cases can provide further theoretical clarity and guidance to practitioners. To facilitate theoretical development, propositions are provided based on relevant concepts from the analysis.

The first proposition is to examine how the coercive ability of a dominant organisation interacts with the potential for institutional disruption. It is hypothesised that as coercive power increases, the potential for disruption would decrease, but it is unclear to what extent an incumbent's legitimacy and congruence influence this relationship. Secondly, differences in the legitimacy of challengers should also be studied in other scenarios. For example, how important is the perceived legitimacy of the challenger(s) and the incumbent under different levels of field congruence and conflict? As Ansari, Wijen and Gray (2013) demonstrated, actors at an FCE may seek legitimacy by arguing for perspectives they previously discredited if they perceive their current position lacks support to remain in future discussions. Thirdly, the adeptness of institutional entrepreneurs should be considered as highly experienced change agents may be able to overcome typically less favourable conditions (Battilana et al., 2009). Further, the current study only addressed short-term entrepreneurship, and future work may examine the effectiveness of actor's strategies at following events. Fourthly, how impactful is challenger unification in other scenarios, for example, when congruence is low but incumbent legitimacy is high, can unification overcome a strong incumbent? Lastly, the dichotomous nature of Figure 1 applied for simplicity negates the multifaceted aspects of legitimacy judgement (Suchman, 1995). Future research could look at how different aspects of legitimacy influence the chance of disruption.

In addition to the theoretical propositions, there is a need to study FCE using different methodologies. The current study was limited by a reliance on data from documented sources. The short-term nature of FCE provide interesting methodological directions to collect other complementary forms of data. For example, ethnographic methods such as fieldwork and observations would be well-suited to capturing non-verbal micro-level behaviours at an FCE. Through applying a diverse array of research methods to FCE, sport management as a discipline can enhance organisational theory development.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have made two contributions that, we hope, stimulate further research into FCE. Firstly, our analysis extends previous research into the role of FCE in institutional change to demonstrate that the timing of an FCE is important to whether institutional disruption occurs. The Lausanne Conference occurred during a period when the IOC's legitimacy was in crisis, which reduced the effectiveness of their institutional work. Secondly, we build on previous work into the dramaturgical aspects of FCE to argue the co-location of complementary but physically distant actors with the opportunity to reinforce each other's strategies enables the construction of staged consensus providing a strong cue to other actors. Our initial model is significant for sport management research and practice as sport tends to be controlled by long standing sporting institutions, such as IFs, that maintain hegemony over their sport (Nite, 2017). Explaining the lifecycle of institutions in sport remains a critical question and FCE can add further depth to our understanding.

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