

2 Reflections and Projections on a decade of climate 3 science

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31 *To mark the 10th anniversary of Nature Climate Change, we asked a selection of researchers*
32 *across the broad range of climate change disciplines to share their thoughts on notable*
33 *developments of the past decade, as well as their hopes and expectations for the coming years*
34 *of discovery.*

35 **Veronika Eyring: Data-driven yet physics-aware climate modelling**

36 Over 20 years ago, the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP) of the World Climate
37 Research Programme (WCRP) started with the coordination of a handful of early-generation
38 atmospheric models coupled to a dynamic ocean, a simple land surface, and thermodynamic
39 sea ice. Across the years, climate models have continued to be developed, and the number of
40 CMIP models has substantially increased. In the past decade, many have been extended into
41 Earth system models that in addition to physical climate simulate interactive carbon and other
42 biogeochemical cycles important to climate change. Compared to earlier generations, CMIP6
43 models have increased spatial resolution (horizontal resolution of about 1° latitude and
44 longitude) and improved physical process representation (like clouds and land
45 biogeochemistry), and they include additional Earth system processes (for example, nutrient-
46 limitations on the terrestrial carbon cycle) and components (such as ice sheets). Benchmarked
47 with an increasing wealth of observations, the simulation of recent mean climate has improved
48 in CMIP6 compared to previous CMIPs.

49 Nevertheless, uncertainties in climate projections remain. For example, the range of simulated
50 effective climate sensitivity - the change in global mean surface temperature for a doubling of
51 atmospheric CO₂ - has not decreased since the 1970s. It is still between 2.1 and 4.7°C, even
52 increasing in CMIP6. A major cause of this is differences in how models simulate clouds and
53 other processes occurring at spatial scales smaller than the model grid resolution. Simulating
54 these processes explicitly is too computationally intensive, so they are approximated in global
55 models through parameterizations, which are simplified mathematical representations of more
56 complex behaviour. Additional uncertainty arises from the carbon cycle's response to climate
57 warming and to increased atmospheric CO₂. This impacts models' ability to accurately project
58 global and regional climate change, climate variability, extremes and impacts on ecosystems
59 and biogeochemical cycles.

60 New approaches are required that exploit opportunities from increasing computational power
61 while building on and expanding the knowledge gained from theory and observations in past
62 decades. I expect breakthroughs in particular from the combination of three research areas:
63 high-resolution simulations that can resolve small-scale and fast processes, the wealth of
64 observational data, and machine learning (ML) techniques.

65 Combining multi-disciplinary expertise in ML and process-based modelling has huge potential.
66 High-resolution, cloud resolving models (horizontal grid resolution of a few km) alleviate many
67 biases of coarse-resolution models for deep clouds and convection, wave propagation and
68 precipitation, but they cannot be run at climate timescales (multiple decades or longer) due to
69 computational costs. And even these simulations still use parameterizations for smaller-scale
70 processes like shallow clouds, turbulence or microphysics, which are key to Earth's energy
71 balance and climate. Short simulations from high-resolution models together with observations
72 can serve as information to develop ML-based parameterizations that are then incorporated into
73 Earth system models. This can drive a paradigm shift in current Earth system modelling and
74 analyses towards a new data-driven, yet still physics-aware, science. The key goal is a hybrid
75 modelling approach that maintains physical consistency and realistically extrapolates to unseen

76 climate regimes while reducing climate projection uncertainties and improving Earth system
77 understanding.

78 The application of ML to better understand and model the Earth system is still in its infancy. It is
79 a promising field that requires a new generation of scientists being trained at the interface of
80 climate science and artificial intelligence. I cannot wait to see their contribution!

81 Vimal Mishra: Hydroclimate and its changing extremes

82
83 A warmer atmosphere holds more water vapor, and this thermodynamic relationship is
84 important for understanding the global hydrological cycle's response to warming. The past
85 decade of research has confirmed that global water vapor is increasing at ~7% per °C, but that
86 global precipitation increases less, around 1–3%. Research aimed at understanding this
87 discrepancy has afforded some of the most robust and theoretically supported predictions for
88 hydroclimate: at the global scale, these moisture changes make the tropics and polar regions
89 wetter and the subtropics drier. As a result, subtropical dry zones are expanding and pushing
90 the adjacent extratropical storm tracks poleward.

91
92 The past decade has also highlighted that at the regional scale, hydroclimate changes are still
93 highly uncertain, mainly driven by climate model disagreement in how regional climates respond
94 to warming. Placing better constraints on future circulation patterns and storm systems will
95 alleviate some of this uncertainty. Particularly important at these scales are precipitation
96 extremes; the heaviest rainfall events are exponentially more sensitive to warming, and this is a
97 product of changes to both temperature (thermodynamics) and regional circulation (dynamics).
98 Understanding how local precipitation will change or intensify with warming relies on continued
99 improvement in observations and climate modelling.

100
101 Another important aspect that has come out of the last decade of research is a more
102 fundamental understanding of and appreciation for land–atmosphere interaction, including the
103 response of vegetation to higher temperatures and atmospheric CO₂. This is exemplified by
104 prolonged droughts that impact local water availability. Several regions, including the intensively
105 irrigated Indo-Gangetic Plain, have witnessed frequent droughts in the past decade; continued
106 work on the connections between the biosphere and atmosphere is necessary to more
107 accurately estimate future water availability and demand.

108
109 The past decade has also seen important advances in understanding the impact of hydroclimate
110 on the land surface. Flash floods, particularly in urban regions, can affect transportation,
111 infrastructure, and local economies. Atmospheric rivers and prolonged wet spells cause large-
112 scale floods that impact agriculture. Land surface conditions, including soil moisture, play an
113 essential role in these outcomes, and the role of climate change on flood extremes is better
114 understood thanks to improved hydrological modelling and observational networks. An
115 important next step here is constraining the sensitivity of streamflow and surface water to
116 warming, particularly in mountain regions where seasonal runoff can comprise a large fraction of
117 local water resources.

118
119 Reflecting on this last decade, three advances typify the gains that I find most exciting in
120 hydroclimate research. First, new in situ and satellite-based measurements of the hydrological
121 cycle have helped the field more comprehensively understand the hydrological cycle's
122 sensitivity to warming. The Gravity Recover and Climate Experiment (GRACE) and the follow-
123 on (GRACE-FO) mission, for example, have allowed researchers to see underground and

124 measure changes in groundwater storage. Second, a recent and growing focus on urban
125 hydrology has enabled researchers to better describe and study the interactions between
126 hydroclimate and the built environment. Third, ongoing developments related to improvements
127 in physical processes and resolution in global climate and impact models have helped answer
128 some of the most challenging questions on changing risks to hydrological cycle extremes in a
129 warmer world. Together, these areas will continue to progress understanding of regional
130 hydroclimate change, and its impacts, in the decade to come.

131 Gary Griffith: Coming to recognize marine ecosystems as 132 complex adaptive systems

133 The last decade has seen revolutionary advances in understanding how climate change impacts
134 - including ocean warming and acidification, sea level rise and the intensification of extreme
135 events - affect marine ecosystems and the essential services they provide to human society.
136 The encouraging advance that resonates with me is that marine ecosystems and human
137 interactions with them are becoming increasingly recognised as complex adaptive systems in
138 which small changes from climate change threats and human stressors can be magnified
139 through non-linear interactions that scale-up and play out across space, time, ecological and
140 social organization. This calls into question the fundamental paradigm of a stable linear world
141 that guides current conservation and sustainable marine management. Instead, in the changing
142 world, the possibility of sudden and unexpected shifts in marine resources, an increased
143 potential for tipping points, alternative stable states, and the emergence of novel adaptation and
144 evolutionary strategies can be expected.

145 During this next decade, a big question for me is how to evolve the complex adaptive systems
146 perspective to understand how to increase the resilience of marine ecosystems that provide
147 critical sustainable (e.g., fisheries) or conservation (e.g., marine protected areas) ecosystem
148 services. Resilience in this context is the emergent adaptive capacity of the ecosystem to
149 absorb the cumulative effects of global climate change and human stressors. Key questions
150 remain on how resilience scales in time and space with the complex interactions of both climate
151 change (e.g., ocean warming, ocean acidification, sea level rise) and local human stressors
152 (e.g., fisheries, pollution and human-induced introduction of alien species). Can some of the
153 exciting data-driven causal inference methods and developments from network science be
154 sensibly applied to tease out those key causal interactions? It remains to be understood which
155 of those causal interactions will result in amplified or mitigating effects, whether they are stable
156 or dynamically changing, and how that impacts on positive feedback interactions. Continuing
157 advances in ocean robotics and the combination of remote and in situ observations combined
158 with research initiatives such as the Decade of Ocean Science will provide the quality and
159 amount of data for the sophisticated mathematical approaches needed to consider dynamic
160 complexity.

161 I also see that the complex adaptive systems framework and its evolving techniques can help us
162 understand questions related to difficult “triage” decisions on the allocation of finite resources to
163 preserving critical ecosystem services. A feature of anthropogenic climate change realised from

164 the last decade of research is that previous strategies to escape climate change effects through
165 evolutionary adaptation, refugia and migrations may not work. Understanding whether many of
166 our current and planned conservation strategies such as “safe operating spaces” or “climate
167 refugia” are appropriate is a critical question.

168 I am excited that in the next decade it seems increasingly possible to step out of our comfort
169 zone and focus on addressing the complex changes. In my own area of research, I anticipate
170 that changing our conservation and sustainable management paradigm to also include dynamic
171 complexity will help us develop realistic strategies to avoid further erosion of marine biodiversity
172 and to help rebuild critical marine life.

173 Lei Chen: Phenology and climate change, looking back and 174 moving forward

175 Phenology is the study of the relations between climate and periodic biological events. Because
176 phenology is especially sensitive to climate variations, changes in phenology – including shifts
177 in flower and leaf opening in plants, and changes in animal migration timing- has provided the
178 first clear visible signals of how global climate change influences living organisms.

179 Over the past decade, one of the most notable developments has been the increasing numbers
180 of phenological data networks all over the world. It is exciting to see local citizens sharing
181 numerous timely phenological observations online via notebooks or mobiles. These site-
182 monitoring observations provide detailed insights into organisms’ phenological responses to
183 climate change from small to broad spatial scales. For example, by 2020, citizen scientists have
184 contributed more than 24 million phenological records of plants (e.g., leaf-out and flowering) and
185 animals (e.g., bird migration and frog calling) to the USA National Phenology Network.

186 In addition, phenological records are far more diverse and comprehensive than previously
187 expected. For instance, automatic digital pheno-cameras and camera traps are increasingly
188 being used over a broad spatial scale, improving data reliability and quantification. Advances in
189 remote-sensing technology over the past decade have enabled more detailed and
190 comprehensive (global-scale) monitoring of land surface phenology. Historical patterns of
191 phenology across species and geographic regions are also being incorporated by using
192 specimen-based data. The micro-core sampling method has been extensively used to detect
193 the intra-annual growth dynamics of tree stems in response to climate change.

194 Despite these technological advances and expansions of data sources, many key questions
195 related to climate-phenology relationships remain unanswered and it remains unclear how
196 phenology will continue to change under future climate warming. For plant species in temperate
197 forests for example, warmer temperature in spring may stimulate earlier leaf-out or bud break.
198 However, as many plants must first experience sufficient cold temperature before they break
199 dormancy, the effects of warmer winters may delay spring leaf-out or flowering. In this context,
200 will spring phenology continue to advance under future climate warming scenarios? Similarly,

201 both advances and delays in autumn phenology of plants have been observed during the past
202 decade.

203 A core issue is that the multiple stimuli and mechanisms involved in phenology remain poorly
204 understood. There are therefore urgent needs to elucidate how biotic and abiotic stresses, such
205 as temperature, photoperiod, snow cover, water and food availability, habitat loss and
206 fragmentation, influence the phenology of plants and animals. In addition, phenological
207 responses to climate change may vary between sexes, populations and species, and little is
208 known about ecosystem-level consequences of such phenological mismatches. More studies
209 are also needed to understand variations in climate-phenology relationships among multiple
210 phenological stages in different taxa and seasons, effects of phenological changes on
211 organisms' fitness, trophic interactions, as well as phenological effects of genomic variations
212 and their interactions with environmental changes.

213 On the one hand, global warming has led to the shifts in phenology across multiple taxa. On the
214 other hand, changes in phenology - particularly that of plant producers- may in turn drive further
215 climate change. However, we have limited knowledge of potential feedback effects of warming-
216 driven shifts in changes in phenology on the climate system. Therefore, increasingly deep and
217 integrated multi-disciplinary co-operation in phenological studies is both required and
218 anticipated in coming decades.

219 Trevor F. Keenan: The terrestrial carbon sink and its feedback to 220 climate

221 It is said that there are decades where nothing happens, but for those focused on the terrestrial
222 carbon sink and its feedback to climate this past decade certainly has not been one of them.
223 The fields involved have dramatically changed over the past ten years, driven by a confluence
224 of technological advances, theoretical developments, and the widespread embrace of open
225 science practices. The result has been a deluge of observations and derived products, and a
226 more holistic understanding of the role of the terrestrial biosphere in the Earth System.

227 Technological and data science advances, combined with the recent move toward open science
228 practices (such as depositing data and code in repositories), have colluded to vastly increase
229 the amount and quality of observations available for public use, and have lowered the barrier for
230 researchers around the world to advance the science. Large national research initiatives such
231 as the National Ecological Observatory Network (NEON) and the AmeriFlux Management
232 Project in the US, and many others globally, were funded in the past decade with a mandate to
233 provide harmonized and quality-controlled observations from 100s of carbon cycle
234 measurement sites for broader public use. In tandem, technological advances are making novel
235 sensors more widely available, such as methane flux sensors based on optical spectroscopy,
236 forest structural measurements from LiDAR, airborne hyperspectral measurements of canopy
237 characteristics, and fluorescence sensors that provide information on photosynthesis. Not to
238 mention the expanding constellations of Earth observing sensors from both the worlds space
239 agencies and a growing private industry.

240 The resulting data deluge has led to a more holistic understanding of the terrestrial carbon sink,
241 by facilitating the integration of theory with observations of different components of ecosystems
242 and their feedbacks to the climate system. For example, plants and microbes were previously
243 examined primarily in isolation, but their interactions are increasingly recognized as important
244 for understanding whole-ecosystem regulation of the carbon sink. We are learning that
245 individuals and ecological communities adapt to change, particularly through advances in eco-
246 evolutionary optimality theory, and that they work together to sequester a large proportion of
247 emissions. Much remains unknown however about the degree to which ecosystems can adapt
248 to ameliorate the impacts of a rapidly changing climate, how long they will continue to sequester
249 carbon, or how long-term ecological change will feed back to the climate system.

250 The increased accessibility and diversity of available data has also created challenges. The
251 ease with which complex statistical approaches can now be applied to large datasets means
252 that collaborations must include the right expertise to avoid misinterpretation of results. This is
253 important, as the resulting data products typically lack real-world ecophysiology and often, by
254 design, have incorrect assumptions embedded (e.g., photosynthesis is commonly and
255 incorrectly assumed to not respond to CO₂). The challenges involved are more than offset by
256 progress resulting from the holistic understanding provided for understanding long-term
257 changes in the terrestrial carbon sink, but the new data paradigm emphasises the need for
258 graduate training focused on both ecophysiological theory and data science skills.

259 Merritt R. Turetsky: Permafrost Thaw

260 The past decade of research on permafrost thaw has been a community effort, with research
261 networks around the world changing the way we do science. Long described as the “glue of the
262 Arctic”, permafrost creates the literal foundation that affects most life in the Arctic and its
263 presence regulates water, energy, and nutrient cycling. Storing more than twice as much carbon
264 as is currently held in our atmosphere, permafrost is a legacy of past climate but almost
265 certainly will play a role in shaping our climate future. When I began my research career 20
266 years ago, we knew just enough to be concerned about the uncertain fate of permafrost carbon.
267 Because we knew little, the value of every new study was high. Over the past decade, enough
268 data became available that research networks took up a synthesis charge. These efforts have
269 improved our confidence on some issues, but have opened up new questions and uncertainties.

270 We have learned that permafrost emissions are unlikely to occur as a carbon or methane
271 “bomb” but rather will be more sustained. While they will remain smaller than anthropogenic
272 emissions, permafrost emission could impede our ability to achieve emission reduction targets.
273 Future research is thus likely to focus on global and regional permafrost change hotspots –
274 related to both the pace of thaw and the magnitude of emissions. To achieve this, we need to
275 move beyond temperature as the core of permafrost monitoring, assimilating for example new
276 spatially-explicit information on ground ice content or Yedoma carbon stocks. Several other
277 challenges await- multi-scale measurements of atmospheric carbon dioxide and methane have
278 created heightened awareness of cold season emissions; no longer can we rely solely on
279 understanding from summertime studies. Global models are powerful tools, but none deal with

280 permafrost complexity. These models need to tackle the challenges of representing fine-scale
281 thaw mechanisms and reducing uncertainties related to Arctic vegetation, which could offset
282 thaw-related carbon losses. Earth history provides an actual record of past climate and
283 permafrost change, yet we currently lack a framework for how to use permafrost responses to
284 previous interglacials as an analogue to today's rapid warming. Innovation will come from
285 merging understanding from paleo-permafrost reconstructions, modern observations across
286 spatial scales, and future projections of permafrost change.

287 The next decade of permafrost research will be even more convergent. We need to translate
288 permafrost knowledge for community planning and to make projections over more policy-
289 relevant time frames. Permafrost is shaped not only by climate but also by human behavior and
290 land use. Placing permafrost thaw in a socio-ecological framework will move our questions into
291 the realm of adaptation and management. We must stay focused on using broader climate
292 policy to keep as much permafrost as possible frozen. But where we know permafrost is likely to
293 thaw in the near-future, can anything be done? Can we, or should we, modify surface
294 conditions or alter fire management to slow thaw rates? Can we modify soil microbes or
295 vegetation to minimize carbon loss or maximize ecosystem carbon uptake? These questions
296 feel uncomfortable now, but because we know so little in this context the value of every new
297 study will be tremendous.

298 **Sally Brown: Be prepared to expand and retreat to adapt to sea-** 299 **level rise**

300 Pioneering a new product can take years of development. In the last decade, we have
301 witnessed the birth of climate services and improved methods for adapting to rising sea-levels.
302 In this product life cycle, we have shifted from the 'introduction' to 'growth' stage, as damage
303 from sea-level rise increases. This may make adaptation sound like a business opportunity, but
304 the willingness to adapt has been recognised: The Bangladesh Delta Plan, a giant sea-wall
305 proposed around Jakarta, climate-smart developments through community and ecosystem
306 resilience in Palau and other small islands, and storm surge barriers under construction world-
307 wide are a few examples.

308 In ten years, our knowledge of sea-level has become more targeted. Instead of numerous
309 projections with large uncertainties, we have come to understand what is important surrounding
310 uncertainty, such as high rates of melt from the Greenland Ice Sheet. Big data in both climate
311 and socio-economic development have enabled more detailed and local impact assessments.
312 Society has gained an appreciation for nature based solutions to sustain and improve resilience
313 of vulnerable communities – solutions that mitigate climate change and help reverse the
314 ecological crisis.

315 Big questions for the future fall under the themes 'expand' and 'retreat'. As population and blue
316 growth in towns and cities has expanded, the amount of reclaimed land, especially in Asia, has
317 been growing. But will this reclaimed land offer protection against sea-level rise? Can atolls be
318 artificially raised? Are there sufficient sand resources for reclamation and nourishment? Can

319 nature based solutions expand sufficiently to protect coastlines? Can we expand the resolution
320 of digital elevation data for improved impact modelling? For those experiencing frequent
321 flooding or at threat from erosion, what are the mental health impacts?

322 Retreat offers other challenges: If ice sheets rapidly retreat, will we see a step-change in sea-
323 level rise, and if so when? With rising groundwater, erosion and flooding, how can we prepare to
324 retreat? How will low-lying islands and deltas cope, where there are limited places to retreat to,
325 whilst preserving cultural values? How can the world's poorest areas increase their resilience so
326 their livelihoods are not eroded?

327 Moving into the United Nations Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development and
328 targeting the Sustainable Development Goals, we need to answer these questions around our
329 ecological, sustainable and inclusive values. Inclusivity applies to all scientists across all career
330 stages, but especially for nations that are projected to suffer most. Academic studies are lacking
331 in many African nations, which needs urgent attention. For all nations, new science needs to
332 include education, support for local residents to be able to sustain livelihoods as the coast
333 changes, plus educating politicians that controlled retreat may be essential.

334 Regardless of mitigation, we are committed to adapt to sea-level rise. Over the next ten years,
335 for places that need to adapt but are not yet ready, I would like to see greater open and
336 accessible data that is interpretable for those with a range understanding and skills relating to
337 coastal change and adaptation, and inclusion of new multi-scale coastal change models where
338 appropriate, so the right decisions can be made at the right time. Adapting to sea-level rise
339 takes many guises, and growth and integration in all disciplines and nations is needed to help
340 those at risk adapt.

341 Frank Jotzo: Successes and future of climate policy

342 A decade ago, keeping warming to two degrees seemed all but impossible. The Stern Review
343 instead focussed on three degrees. Global CO₂ emissions grew by 31% over the century's first
344 decade. Things look better now. Emissions grew by about 10% from 2010 to 2019. Net zero
345 emissions has become a rallying point, and the "below 2 degrees" ambition seems no longer
346 outlandish. What has changed? One major factor is technology. The cost of important zero-
347 emissions technologies has fallen far faster than any mainstream projection anticipated. Solar is
348 now the cheapest form of energy in many places of the world, and wind power not far off.
349 Energy storage is becoming much more affordable and electric car technology has made leaps
350 that were unimaginable a decade ago. Low-carbon pathways are open to all countries.

351
352 The other is that businesses now see the shift to zero-emissions systems as an opportunity, and
353 in any case see it as inevitable given observed climatic changes. Many governments view
354 climate action as a way to reap macroeconomic benefits from a new investment drive. We can
355 see it in some of China's growth strategy, Europe's 'green deal', and President Biden's agenda.
356 Good climate policy now ranges over multiple objectives and many dimensions of policy.
357

358 Add to this the practical experience that emissions reduction policies typically don't hurt. Much
359 analytical effort has gone into designing policies to minimize economic costs, and ways to avoid
360 making politically influential players worse off. Governments have implemented them, and they
361 work. Carbon pricing is effective, and emissions trading schemes have typically performed at
362 lower prices than expected. Many other policies are in place, from process regulation to
363 innovation support and demand side measures. They are usually effective and don't seem to
364 affect economic growth. There are other benefits, from cleaner air to industrial modernization.

365
366 The research community needs to make sure that analysis, and the advice that flows from it, is
367 not hobbled by outdated assumptions. Too many of the models used for climate policy
368 assessment have economic and technological pessimism baked into them, by low-balling
369 substitution options and future technology improvements. Too often modellers use outdated
370 technology cost assumptions and omit co-benefits of cutting emissions. And too rarely do
371 modelling scenarios cover a truly broad range of future possibilities.

372
373 Research is needed on how to bring about decarbonization of heavy industry, trade in zero-
374 emissions energy, emissions reductions in agriculture, carbon uptake on the land, and how to
375 prepare for technological carbon dioxide removal. More knowledge is also needed on how
376 policies can support effective climate change adaptation across the spectrum.

377
378 A huge policy challenge ahead is the decline of coal, oil and gas. As these industries shrink, we
379 will see economic and social disruption, concentrated in some regions and countries. It is a
380 breeding ground for political polarization which fossil fuel lobbies and opportunistic politicians
381 can stoke. Research on how policy can make transitions smoother will become more important.
382 Finally, we need to keep in mind that climate change is deeply integrated with development.
383 Transformations to zero emissions systems will be made only if they help people achieve a
384 reasonable standard of living. And they will take place while climate change already affects a
385 large share of the world's population.

386 Frances C. Moore: The Expanding and Maturing Field of Climate 387 Change Economics

388 When I began my PhD a decade ago, climate change economics was an extremely niche area.
389 Just a few topics dominated – especially discounting and the relative merits of different climate
390 policy instruments– and the number of researchers was small, incommensurate with the scale
391 of the environmental, economic, or policy challenges that climate change presents. However
392 since then the field has broadened, deepened and strengthened links to climate science.

393 Notably there has been an explosion of studies documenting the sensitivity of social and
394 economic systems to temperature. This literature, using statistical approaches designed to
395 identify causal relationships in non-experimental data, has uncovered the effects of temperature
396 across a wide range of outcomes: conflict risk, pre-term birth, classroom learning, as well as
397 overall economic productivity across many sectors. This discovery of pervasive and, in some

398 cases, large temperature impacts, even in wealthy countries, is a sharp break with previous
399 work which understood effects to be mostly limited to a few highly-exposed sectors such as
400 agriculture and coastal infrastructure.

401 Important advances have come from questioning assumptions underlying the cost-benefit
402 assessment of climate policy. Ten years ago, conventional wisdom held that substantial
403 emissions reductions by 2050, required to limit warming to less than 2°, could not be justified on
404 a cost-benefit basis. Many studies now show that this finding is overturned under alternate but
405 justifiable models of how climate change affects the economy and human welfare. Two
406 prominent examples are the question of whether climate change affects the underlying growth
407 rate of the economy, and disentangling risk and time preferences in the utility function.

408 A welcome development has been growing interest across the entire economics discipline, with
409 scholars from labor, development, macro, health, and financial economics working on questions
410 of weather and climate. Even more important has been recognition of systemic climate risk
411 within major financial institutions. Central banks, institutional investors, and credit-ratings
412 agencies direct capital investment flows and manage economic risks and will play a critical role
413 structuring future adaptive transitions. Markets, communities, households, and businesses will
414 have to adapt both to a continuously changing climate and to a low-carbon economy. Forward-
415 looking regulations and investments that anticipate these changes will lower the costs of these
416 transitions.

417 I see several important areas still in need of substantive work. Firstly, an assessment of
418 alternative policy instruments that better incorporates the political and technological feedbacks
419 that will accompany major climate policy. Economists tend to favor carbon pricing because of its
420 cost-effectiveness. But how do pricing policies perform given a richer representation of other
421 relevant market failures or real political constraints? Examples include subsidy-driven declines
422 in technology costs or strategic interest group dynamics, where policies themselves create or
423 undermine powerful interest groups and therefore alter the space of political possibility.
424 Collaboration with engineers and political scientists can help address these questions. An
425 expanded focus on desirable policies for low- and middle-income countries, essential to meet
426 ambitious decarbonization goals and which present distinct challenges, is also critical.

427 More work is needed on understanding climate damages, particularly those that fall outside of
428 traditional market measures, such as losses of cultural heritage, conflict risk, or biodiversity loss.
429 These are extremely difficult to value and are not adequately incorporated into current estimates
430 of aggregate climate damages such as the social cost of carbon. Also critical is understanding
431 the transition and adjustment costs associated with a continuously changing climate. Too many
432 studies estimate equilibrium damages or assume cost-less adjustment. But infrastructure is
433 long-lived and natural-hazards are already under-priced in many property markets. In this
434 context, climate change risks creating stranded assets, price bubbles, and unsustainable
435 liabilities for local or even national governments, all of which could add substantially to climate
436 change cost estimates.

437 Sander van der Linden: Behavioural Insights

438 Acceptance of anthropogenic climate change varies widely around the world. From perception
439 to action, there has been tremendous progress over the last ten years in our collective
440 understanding of the social, cultural, political, and psychological factors that shape individual
441 views about climate change. For example, an important advance has been our ability to
442 combine high-resolution geospatial data with survey data on human cognition. This has helped
443 answer questions such as whether people are accurately perceiving local and global
444 environmental changes, the extent to which perceptions of extreme weather patterns impact
445 climate change concern, and how prior beliefs about the world impact understanding of climatic
446 change. More generally, through large meta-analyses, we have accumulated a wealth of
447 knowledge on key determinants of people's belief in climate change, such as public perceptions
448 of the scientific consensus on climate change.

449 At the same time, the chasm between belief and action remains. Medium-sized correlations
450 between climate change beliefs and individual and collective action to mitigate the problem has
451 led some scholars to suggest that scholarly work on beliefs should be abandoned, and focus
452 shifted toward interventions that can change behaviour directly. I remain hesitant about such
453 recommendations. For example, consider that whilst behavioural interventions that directly
454 target social norms have seen relative success, what underlies the efficacy of many of these
455 interventions are changes in beliefs about what others believe. In other words, second-order
456 normative beliefs. Attempting to change behaviour without understanding the beliefs and
457 motivations that underpin people's decision-making risks short-term success over long-term
458 failure.

459 Looking to the future, one of the most exciting and important areas focuses on how to sustain
460 changes in beliefs and behaviours over time. Despite some progress, very little is known about
461 the long-term effectiveness of interventions as most studies do not include longitudinal
462 measurements. Do people forget climate information over time because of real-world
463 interference or do they lose motivation to sustain belief and behaviour change? I look forward to
464 research which better integrates such cognitive and motivational explanations and moves
465 beyond single-dose exposure in a controlled laboratory setting to evaluate the effect of repeated
466 campaign messages in real-world environments.

467 In addition, I hope for more engagement from colleagues who conduct neurophysiological
468 research. Although they might not see the immediate relevance of their work to climate change,
469 the next frontier needs to answer difficult questions such as, do fearful messages about climate
470 change actually elicit differential neural activity? What physiological changes are experienced
471 when people engage with climate change stimuli? Are risk-reward centres of the brain active
472 when people evaluate climate change risks? Existing work in other areas, such as health, has
473 already started to look at how survey and neuroimaging data diverge in predicting people's
474 responses to persuasive messages.

475 Lastly, there is a need to shift from intention-based research to more policy-relevant and
476 impactful behaviours that have the technological potential to mitigate climate change. Although

477 those behaviours are more difficult to study and change, our theories need to explain how
478 people make costly mitigation and adaptation decisions in ecologically-valid settings across
479 diverse cultures. Doing so will not only advance the behavioural sciences but also make our
480 insights more integral to climate policy.

481 Box 1 Contributors

482

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484 Aerospace Center (DLR) Institute of Atmospheric Physics, and she is Professor and Chair of Climate
485 Modelling at the University of Bremen. She served as Chair of the CMIP Panel during 2014–2020 through
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497 China. His current research mainly focuses on how global climate change influences plant growth and
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503 **Merritt R. Turetsky** is an ecologist and carbon cycle scientist who has worked in permafrost landscapes
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507 **Sally Brown** researches coastal change and climate change adaptation at Bournemouth University, UK
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509 global to local scale issues across different geomorphic settings.

510 **Frank Jotzo** is a professor of climate change economics at the Australian National University. He is
511 contributing to the IPCC's Working Group III and the 6th Assessment Report, and has played roles in
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514 **Frances C. Moore** is an assistant professor in the Environmental Science and Policy Department at the
515 University of California Davis. Her research helps quantify the risks climate change poses for human

516 wellbeing, and informs the design of adaptation and mitigation policy. Her training and research bridge
517 the fields of climate science and environmental economics.

518 **Sander van der Linden** is a social psychologist who studies human judgment, communication, and
519 decision-making, especially in the context of climate change attitudes and behaviours. He is currently
520 Professor of Social Psychology in Society, and Director of the Cambridge Social Decision-Making Lab at
521 the University of Cambridge.

522

523 Images (in order of appearance)

524

525 Storm over ocean:

526 [https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/photo/stormy-beach-royalty-free-](https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/photo/stormy-beach-royalty-free-image/136506526?adppopup=true)
527 [image/136506526?adppopup=true](https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/photo/stormy-beach-royalty-free-image/136506526?adppopup=true)

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529 Frost on leaf: [https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/photo/frosty-ice-leaves-gooseberry-in-winter-](https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/photo/frosty-ice-leaves-gooseberry-in-winter-royalty-free-image/1193030715?adppopup=true)
530 [royalty-free-image/1193030715?adppopup=true](https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/photo/frosty-ice-leaves-gooseberry-in-winter-royalty-free-image/1193030715?adppopup=true)

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532 Tundra:

533 [gettyimages.de/detail/foto/ice-under-permafrost-soil-in-spitzbergen-lizenzfreies-](https://www.gettyimages.de/detail/foto/ice-under-permafrost-soil-in-spitzbergen-lizenzfreies-bild/184936479?adppopup=true)
534 [bild/184936479?adppopup=true](https://www.gettyimages.de/detail/foto/ice-under-permafrost-soil-in-spitzbergen-lizenzfreies-bild/184936479?adppopup=true)

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536 Turbines:

537 [https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/photo/solar-panels-and-wind-turbines-in-field-royalty-free-](https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/photo/solar-panels-and-wind-turbines-in-field-royalty-free-image/1138398599?adppopup=true)
538 [image/1138398599?adppopup=true](https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/photo/solar-panels-and-wind-turbines-in-field-royalty-free-image/1138398599?adppopup=true)

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540 People in a crowd:

541 [https://www.gettyimages.de/detail/foto/human-crowd-surrounding-three-people-on-white-](https://www.gettyimages.de/detail/foto/human-crowd-surrounding-three-people-on-white-lizenzfreies-bild/1181760380?adppopup=true)
542 [lizenzfreies-bild/1181760380?adppopup=true](https://www.gettyimages.de/detail/foto/human-crowd-surrounding-three-people-on-white-lizenzfreies-bild/1181760380?adppopup=true)

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