



“We’re Not That Gullible!” Revealing Dark Pattern Mental Models of 11-12-Year-Old Scottish Children

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Deceptive techniques known as dark patterns specifically target online users. Children are particularly vulnerable as they might lack the skills to recognise and resist these deceptive attempts. To be effective, interventions to forewarn and forearm should build on a comprehensive understanding of children’s existing mental models. To this end, we carried out a study with 11- to 12-year-old Scottish children to reveal their mental models of dark patterns. They were acutely aware of online deception, referring to deployers as being ‘up to no good.’ Yet, they were overly vigilant and construed worst-case outcomes, with even a benign warning triggering suspicion. We recommend that rather than focusing on specific instances of dark patterns in awareness raising, interventions should prioritise improving children’s understanding of the characteristics of, and the motivations behind, deceptive online techniques. By so doing, we can help them to develop a more robust defence against these deceptive practices.

CCS Concepts: • **Security and privacy** → **Human and societal aspects of security and privacy**; **Social aspects of security and privacy**;

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Children, dark patterns

ACM Reference format:

Karen Renaud, Cigdem Sengul, Kovila Coopamootoo, Bryan Clift, Jacqui Taylor, Mark Springett, and Ben Morrison. 2024. “We’re Not That Gullible!” Revealing Dark Pattern Mental Models of 11-12-Year-Old Scottish Children. *ACM Trans. Comput.-Hum. Interact.* 31, 3, Article 33 (August 2024), 41 pages.

<https://doi.org/10.1145/3660342>

We thank SPRITE (EP/S035869/1) and REPHRAIN (EP/W032473/1) for funding this research.

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ACM 1557-7325/2024/8-ART33

<https://doi.org/10.1145/3660342>

1 Introduction

The UK COVID-19 pandemic lockdowns and school closures¹ increased children's online hours [46], often without direct adult supervision [52], which means that children now increasingly operate as autonomous agents when online. At the same time, parents are concerned about online risks to their children. Many doubt that the benefits of their child being online outweigh the risks (55% in 2020, down from 65% in 2015) [56].

Parental concerns about children's online activities are well-founded. Similar to the physical world, the unscrupulous, the immoral and the dishonest, i.e., 'bad actors', operate in the online world to carry out their nefarious and exploitative activities, using deceptive techniques to manipulate online users [10, 34]. The internet frees these actors from the constraints of time and space so that they can now target millions of users, including children, across the globe. One of their favoured techniques is the so-called 'dark pattern', which Brignull defines as '*tricks used in websites and apps that make you do things that you didn't mean to*' [10].

Dark patterns pervade the online world. Consider that Di Geronimo et al. [21] found that 95% of popular free-to-use mobile apps available on Google Play Store, spanning categories of photography, family, shopping, social, music and audio, entertainment and communication, contained one or more dark patterns. Kowalczyk et al. [39] detected pervasive dark patterns in popular Internet of Things home devices, such as speakers, doorbells and cameras, and Nouwens et al. [54] found that they are prevalent in online consent management controls.

Children, given their youth and immaturity, might not yet be adept at spotting and resisting dark patterns. Yet, they should be able to do this, especially 11- to 12-year-old children approaching the threshold age for digital consent, a context where dark patterns are particularly common [54]. Ensuring that children are able to detect online deception is therefore pivotal for reducing their online vulnerability and thereby preventing harm.

Interventions to forewarn and forearm are most effective when they build on a comprehensive understanding of children's mental models, which encode existing internal thought processes and beliefs [16]. At present, 11- to 12-year-old children's mental models of deceptive online techniques are poorly researched and imperfectly understood [65]. As such, we do not know how best to target interventions to ensure that children develop the ability to detect and resist online deception. The study we report on in this article is one of the first to elicit and report on 11- to 12-year-olds' mental models of online deception.

The contributions of this study are as follows:

- (1) An ethically informed mixed-methods approach for eliciting Scottish 11- to 12-year-old children's mental models related to dark patterns and, by implication, online deception. The approach was carefully designed to elicit, but not alter, existing mental models.
- (2) Insight into Scottish 11- to 12-year-old children's mental models of online dark patterns and deception. The findings reveal an awareness of bad actors and their techniques but a lack of ability to distinguish between dark patterns and genuine warnings.
- (3) Suggestions for future work informed by these insights to help 11- to 12-year-old children to develop more accurate and nuanced mental models of dark patterns/deception.

This study's findings can inform **human-computer interaction (HCI)** researchers and practitioners. Gray et al. [31] explain that user experience designers '*could easily become complicit in manipulative or unreasonably persuasive practices*' (p. 1) and argue for the HCI field to have a

¹The restrictions imposed by governments around the world during the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in different levels of restriction of personal movement. Over time, these changed from interaction just within one's own household to later levels which allowed two other people and then small groups of people to interact.

debate about applied ethics informing practitioners' design activities. Gray et al. [32] also consider deception in the context of consent banner design, where they pervade [54]. They argue that studying deception in the design of these banners offers opportunities for bringing legal and ethical considerations into HCI scholarship.

The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews related research in this area. Section 3 outlines the methodology of the study we carried out to reveal the mental models of 11- to 12-year-old Scottish children, as well as the way we ensured ethical practice during the workshops. Section 4 reports on our results. Section 5 discusses the findings, and Section 6 concludes.

2 Related Research

COVID-19 lockdowns drove a sharp increase in home technology usage by children [30]. Technology was used for leisure and also for structured activities such as remote schooling [43]. Ofcom reports that 71% of UK 8- to 11-year-olds and 94% of 12- to 15-year-olds use a smartphone to access the internet [58]. Based on the same report, 58% of children aged 3–15 use social media such as YouTube, TikTok and Snapchat. Children are also likely to be particularly vulnerable to maliciously targeted adverts and privacy risks from 'smart' toys [19].

In Section 2.1, we explore related research about legal approaches to the protection of children. We then explain the nudge concept, its exploitation as 'dark patterns' and research into dark patterns exploiting children in Section 2.2. Section 2.4 concludes with a discussion of the nature and measurement of mental models with particular application to children.

2.1 Legal Approaches to Children's Online Protection

It is important to acknowledge the ongoing efforts to create a safer internet for children and adults alike. In UK, the controversial Online Safety Bill aims to make social media companies legally responsible for keeping children and young people safe online by making the risks and dangers posed to children on social media platforms more transparent and putting in measures to prevent children from accessing harmful and age-inappropriate content. The UK Council for Child Internet Safety, a group of more than 200 organisations across government, industry, law, academia and charity sectors, publishes regular guidance to help keep children safe online. The UK's Information Commissioner released 'Children's code design guidance' that sets out how online services that will be accessed by children should protect them online [35] while United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) released a report on ethical artificial intelligence for children [84]. Finally, the UK government recently proposed the Online Safety Act 2023,² an Act of Parliament to control online speech and media. The act creates a duty of care for online platforms, requiring them to take action against potentially harmful content. In October 2023, the bill received Royal Assent [36], but we do not yet know how it will inform online child protection efforts.

2.2 Nudge

The concept of a choice architecture first emerged in Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein's 2008 book, *Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness*, which explains all dimensions of the physical micro-environment within which decisions are made [48]. Thaler and Sunstein [79] also introduced the concept of the 'nudge', a deliberate manipulation of this choice architecture designed to gently coax people to make wiser decisions. By definition, a nudge has to benefit the nudgee and have their implicit agreement to be nudged. Nudge examples include displaying the most secure WiFi at the top of the list on a smartphone [82] or using visualisation to encourage

²<https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/50/contents/enacted>

stronger passwords [69]. The use of secure WiFi will prevent eavesdropping, and stronger passwords protect personal accounts. Both provide clear benefits to the nudger. However, although nudges can benefit users, the technique can also be used for nefarious purposes when these principles are not respected [18, 45]. In these cases, they are termed ‘dark’ or ‘deceptive’ patterns, which are explained next.

2.3 Misuse of Nudging to Deceive

Harry Brignull originally coined the term ‘dark patterns’ in 2010 [10]. In 2023, he published a book where he argued for the use of the alternative term ‘deceptive patterns’, citing a definition proposed by Lisa Blunt Rochester referring to them as ‘*intentionally deceptive user interfaces that trick people*’³ [11, p. 1]. Whatever the terminology, these deceptive techniques seek to persuade people to take some action to their own detriment. We shall use the term ‘dark patterns’ to refer to the concept in this article.

Dark patterns can compromise legal requirements, especially when they persuade the online user to grant consent unwisely, to click on links, to divulge information or to make ill-advised purchases. Kahneman [37] suggests a dual system of thinking: System 1 and System 2. System 1 thinking is automatic and fast requiring little effort. System 2 thinking is effortful, slow and deliberate. Because nudges often target System 1’s automatic processing [6, 83], they do not engage the user’s conscious attention, which might help them to spot deceptive attempts. This means that nudges are unaware of their presence and influence [5].

A number of websites are dedicated to dark patterns, including Brignull’s *hall of shame* [10], Shopify’s dark patterns⁴ and Thomas Mildner’s Dark Pattern Cheatsheet [51]. Mathur et al. [50] reviewed 11K shopping websites and then developed a taxonomy of dark pattern features as well as the cognitive biases they exploit. None of the identified patterns benefit the *nudger*, the core requirement of a genuine nudge [79]. On the contrary, they are deployed to benefit the *nudger*. We used Mathur’s taxonomy to create the dark pattern scenarios used in this study (see Table 1).

2.3.1 Experiments with Dark Patterns. Dark patterns come in various forms, with some designed to coerce gently (e.g., Confirm Shaming [10, 51]) and others designed to force users into taking some action (e.g., Coercion [17]). The former is ‘mild’, the latter ‘aggressive’. Luguri and Strahilevitz [45] carried out an experiment using mild and aggressive dark patterns embedded in a user interface that sought to persuade participants to purchase an identity theft insurance policy. The mild shame-based dark pattern required people to choose pre-defined reasons for declining the policy: e.g., ‘*Even though 16.7 million Americans were victimized by identity theft last year, I do not believe it could happen to me or my family*’ (p. 62) (‘Confirm Shaming’ [10, 51]). The aggressive dark pattern forced users to read information about identity theft and prevented them from proceeding and showing a countdown timer while they read the text. Mild dark patterns were somewhat effective, with aggressive dark patterns being almost four times more effective at prompting desired behaviours. However, aggressive dark patterns generated a powerful backlash, unlike mild dark patterns. Importantly, both demonstrate the destructive power of these techniques in the hands of bad actors, with the mild pattern being more insidious because users are less likely to notice them or detect their influence.

2.3.2 Children and Dark Patterns. Children are certainly being exposed to deception online. Research by Ofcom in 2021 [57] found that 37% of 12-year-old children reported having seen

³Rep. Lisa Blunt Rochester on DETOUR Act—<https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2021/12/lawmakers-reintroduce-bipartisan-bicameral-legislation-to-ban-manipulative-dark-patterns>

⁴<https://www.shopify.com/partners/blog/dark-patterns>

Table 1. Dark Pattern Scenarios under Study

Name	Description and Consequences	Scenario Image
<p>Scenario 1: Privacy Zuckering In terms of Mathur et al.'s [50] taxonomy, this one is: Asymmetric, exploiting the Framing Effect.</p>	<p><i>Description:</i> The children are given the option to scan their eyes for free gems in the game. With this scenario, you can be tricked into publicly sharing more information about yourself than you really intended to. <i>Consequences:</i> Eye iris captured and possibly leaked to other third parties. Possible cybersecurity consequences if the eye biometric is used for authentication.</p>	
<p>Scenario 2: Bait and Switch: In terms of Mathur et al.'s [50] taxonomy, this one is: Covert exploiting the Scarcity Effect.</p>	<p><i>Description:</i> The children are offered free Robux but should expect to be redirected to a fake website. So, you set out to do one thing, but a different, undesirable thing happens instead. <i>Consequences:</i> Drive-by download or loss of credentials if the fake website is convincing enough to elicit these. Potentially severe cybersecurity consequences.</p>	
<p>Scenario 3: Confirm Shaming: In terms of Mathur et al.'s [50] taxonomy, this one is: Asymmetric exploiting the Bandwagon Effect.</p>	<p><i>Description:</i> The children are shown a YouTube video with a message daring them to skip the ad. The option to decline is worded in such a way as to shame the user into acting to benefit the dark pattern deployer. <i>Consequences:</i> In this scenario, the children might see an advert and be persuaded to buy something. No cybersecurity consequences.</p>	
<p>Scenario 4: Genuine Browser Warning No dark pattern</p>	<p><i>Description:</i> A genuine browser warning to test for false positives. <i>Consequences:</i> If the warning is ignored, the risk is continuing to a fake website that the warning is related to. Potentially severe cybersecurity consequences.</p>	

misleading news online or while on social media. About 33% of the 12-year-olds were unsure, and only 29% did not think they had seen fake media, which does not reliably point to the absence thereof. Moreover, it has been reported that children experience difficulties identifying fake media. For example, Statista reported that when a sample of UK children were asked whether a news story on social media was true, 43% found it quite difficult, with 9% finding it very difficult [77]. During October 2023, a number of US States sued Meta over children’s mental health and privacy. They specifically mention dark patterns that are harmful to children’s well-being (such as ‘likes’ and haptic notifications) [85].

Although researchers have gained insights into the specific risks to children in online settings [68], very little literature has explored the extent to which children themselves understand specific threats, what their risk management approaches are or, indeed, details of their underlying mental models. The latter are likely to impact their coping mechanisms when faced with online threats. A few studies demonstrate the positive potential of training children to avoid threats such as phishing [41] and promising outcomes of security awareness training [2]. However, crucially, we do not yet know whether children are aware of dark patterns and online deceptive attempts more generally.

Recent reviews, such as those of Vissenberg et al. [89] conclude negative online experiences impact young people’s well-being negatively but are also essential to developing cyber resilience. The systematic review by Livingstone et al. [44] demonstrated that children with greater digital skills were more likely to be exposed to online risks. However, establishing specific links to consequent harms⁵ proved to be challenging without dedicated follow-up research. Nevertheless, this literature base is growing rapidly, with the impetus for understanding children’s cybersecurity knowledge increasing [26, 65]. Below, we discuss how mental model studies offer a possible route to exploring this knowledge.

2.4 Mental Models

Mental models are defined as ‘*A concentrated, personally constructed, internal conception of external phenomena (historical, existing or projected), or experience, that affects how a person acts*’ [72, p. 16]. In essence, mental models reflect our understanding of topics and inform our choices [7] and online decision-making [90]. In the following sections, we discuss cybersecurity mental models, which are composed of structures generated by non-expert users to understand complex topics such as cyber threats [91].

2.4.1 Cyber-Related Mental Model Research. Previous research has discovered that people develop their mental models based on stories from friends and colleagues [91] or media stories [13]. This has disadvantages. In the first place, there is a tendency for people to focus on more newsworthy risks [14], a manifestation of the availability heuristic [28]. Coverage of online deception is likely to be patchy and might focus on sensationalism rather than the more mundane yet prolific deceptive techniques. In the second place, recent research has reported that this reliance on entertainment media has led to the formation of inaccurate or incorrect mental models [29]. A good example is the James Bond movie *Skyfall* which shows an expert connecting a suspect laptop to a secure intelligence network. If people consider this credible, this might lead to risky behaviours.

Wash and Rader [92], in a study of adult home computer users, identified two broad partially overlapping groups of folk models (non-expert theories): (1) virus models and (2) hacker models. Within these groups, they identified models referring to the perceived actors and motivations behind their behaviour. These included the ‘buggy’ model (due to software flaws), ‘mischief’ (due to mischief-mongers), ‘crime’ (intended to obtain sensitive information), ‘burglar’ (stealing financial data),

⁵Examples of online risks include identity theft, Global Positioning System tracking enabling one’s whereabouts to be visible and for them to be potentially followed or located or accidentally downloading illegal content from an insecure file-sharing network [14].

‘vandal’ (causing damage for showing off) and ‘big fish’ (targeting rich or important individuals for attacks). Mischief and vandal are seen as types of virus and hacker models, respectively, but are very similar in that the motivation of the actor is seen as to show off rather than to commit an identity or financial crime. Wash and Rader [92] argue that these folk models tend to be inaccurate but may (or may not) lead to positive security decisions. For example, a questionable belief that hackers are young, immature people showing off to friends may nonetheless lead to an appropriate level of caution. Conversely, a belief that hackers only ‘go after the big fish’ may lead people to dangerous complacency about their own vulnerability. A more realistic understanding of the motivations of bad actors would bring perceptions into line with reality.

2.4.2 Eliciting Mental Models. Extracting and understanding people’s mental models is challenging [16, 73], even more so when children are involved [47]. Moreover, the act of measuring mental models risks changing them [74, 90]. Hence, we need to consider carefully how to access them non-invasively [90]. A variety of methods have been used to elicit mental models, e.g., asking someone to draw diagrams [55, 75] or to engage in a participatory design exercise [3]. Alternatively, participants can be asked to arrange cards to reflect internal knowledge structures [47]. A promising technique for eliciting complex mental models is to ask people to create a drawing of a complex topic. The most common form of elicitation involves the ‘teach-back individual interview’ wherein participants explain or teach others as they carry out a drawing task [60]. This allows researchers to observe, minimising the risk of altering the participant’s existing mental model. The next section reviews the use of drawings in this context.

2.4.3 Using Drawings to Elicit Children’s Mental Models. Using drawings to elicit mental models is not a new idea [76, 80, 81], drawings being a viable and familiar way for children to express themselves [88]. Driessnak’s [24] meta-analysis identifies drawing as a robust way of measuring mental models. Denham [20] was one of the first to use drawing methodologies to elicit mental models, arguing that a drawing task is less threatening to children. Moreover, it is also considered an ethical way of carrying out this kind of research [64].

Several studies employed drawings to explore perceptions of electronic systems and digital landscapes. Pancratz and Diethelm [59] used drawings to identify misconceptions related to the functioning of electronic systems. Kodama [38] used drawings to elicit an understanding of Google search, revealing a poor understanding of the underlying mechanisms, which is likely to lead to unquestioning belief in misinformation and disinformation returned in search results. Brodsky [12] successfully used diagrams to compare the mental models of the internet of different age groups (11–15 years and 18–22 years). They conclude that drawings elicit rich data to support qualitative analysis. The participant responses were categorised into four themes: (1) technical components, (2) functions, (3) attributes and (4) feelings. When these were compared for the two sample groups, they mostly did not differ except for the ‘feelings’ category: the young adult participants’ mental models more often cited negative feelings, such as antisocial online behaviour and internet addiction, compared to the adolescents. Both age groups noted the ubiquity of the internet, and Brodsky concludes by suggesting that further research could link these models of internet ubiquity in the lives of young people to further understand privacy and security risks [12].

Although the literature demonstrates the effectiveness of drawing as a methodology for eliciting children’s mental models, there are a number of considerations. One is to be aware of the danger of altering existing models. For example, Prokop et al. [63] demonstrate how the specificity of the instructions can influence drawings, highlighting the need to be aware of how the task is framed in the experimental design. Moreover, working with children in any capacity raises the need for ethical rigour and consideration of safeguarding, and we planned all our activities with this in mind.

3 Study

Our aim was to reveal children’s mental models of dark patterns. As such, we showed them three deceptive patterns and a genuine warning to reveal the depth of their mental models. The use of a combination of drawings and explanations is suggested by Pask and Scott [60]. We thus gathered drawings, as well as transcripts of discussions of the drawings, during workshops, to support analysis of children’s mental models of online deception.

The scenarios we used included dark patterns with consequences ranging from minor (watching an advert) to severe (loss of credentials or privacy), as well as a genuine warning. Due to ethical and pandemic constraints (the inability to be present in person), teachers facilitated the workshops while we listened via a Microsoft Teams call to provide guidance. Our study was designed to answer the following research questions:

RQ1: Dark Pattern Detection: Can 11- to 12-year-old children

RQ1a: detect different dark patterns?

RQ1b: correctly distinguish a genuine warning from a dark pattern?

RQ2: Dark Pattern Actors: How well do 11- to 12-year-old children understand the motivations of the actors who are using dark patterns to deceive them?

RQ3: Dark Pattern Actions and Consequences: What actions are bad actors perceived to take, and what consequences do children imagine will occur if they are deceived by a dark pattern?

3.1 Scenarios

We chose the dark pattern scenarios with great care to deliver insights into the children’s mental models. These are summarised in Table 1. The scenarios were reviewed by Education Scotland⁶ and approved by ethics review boards of all authors’ institutions.

Scenario 1: ‘Privacy Zuckering’—This dark pattern is mentioned by Brignull [10] and by Bösch et al. [6]. We wanted to include a scenario that is related to a privacy dark pattern because (1) these kinds of privacy-invasive patterns are particularly insidious, (2) people can easily lose their privacy, and once lost, privacy cannot be retrieved. Our design was inspired by a real case of a cryptocurrency exchanging free currency for iris readings [42]. The idea was to see whether the children realised that their biometric (eye scan) ought to be preserved and the possible consequence of this information being leaked to other entities. This information leak has possible cybersecurity consequences if the eye biometric is used for authentication.

Scenario 2: ‘Bait and Switch’—In this dark pattern, a deceptive link appears to lead the user to something desirable, while it actually sends them somewhere unpleasant. This pattern is also mentioned by both Brignull [10] and Greenburg et al. [33]. In this scenario, the children are offered free Robux⁷ but redirected to a fake website. A possible consequence of this action may be a drive-by download or loss of credentials if the fake website is convincing enough to elicit these. Hence, the cybersecurity consequences may be potentially severe.

Scenario 3: ‘Confirm Shaming’—It attempts to manipulate the viewer into diverting to the advertisement [10, 51]. This is a relatively mild dark pattern that guilt the user into opting for something. The option to decline is worded in such a way as to shame the user into acting to benefit the dark pattern deployer. We designed this scenario based on children’s reported use of YouTube [23]. The scenario does not offer a particularly enticing bait and has no real cybersecurity consequences.

⁶ National body for supporting quality and improvement of learning and teaching in Scottish education (<https://education.gov.scot/>).

⁷A very popular game amongst 10- to 12-years-olds in the UK [22].

Table 2. Numbers of Participants in Each **Workshop (WS)**

WS1	WS2	WS3	WS4	WS5	WS6	WS7
14	8	32	28	30	16	24

In reality, they might see an advert or be persuaded to buy something, but their device and/or information will not be breached.

Scenario 4: ‘Genuine Browser Warning’—It is included to see whether children would raise false positives by being suspicious of this warning instead of realising it was actually legitimate. A possible consequence of misclassification is visiting the fake website the warning is related to, and this may well trigger potentially severe cybersecurity consequences.

3.2 School Recruitment

We recruited primary school classes from Scotland to participate in our workshops via educational authorities, who advertised the research study to all the schools in their districts. Two people from the educational authorities approved the scenarios we used during the workshops. We provided a short training session to participating teachers about the study and how we expected the activities to play out in the classroom. One school was in Aberdeenshire, two were in the Strathclyde area, and the others were in North Lanarkshire.

All schools in Scotland follow the mandated Scottish curriculum: the *Curriculum for Excellence*, which includes ‘Digital Literacy’. The guidance provided for 11- to 12-year-old children includes ‘*I can keep myself safe and secure in online environments, and I am aware of the importance and consequences of doing this for myself and others*’ [25]. While the curriculum is centrally provided, it is up to each school to decide how to teach these principles, which means that there will be some inevitable variability in terms of specific concepts taught.

The recruited classrooms had a varied number of 11- to 12-year-old children. Given that we were not present and did not count the number of students participating in each workshop, we used the number of drawings submitted per workshop as a proxy (Table 2). We carried out seven workshops in seven different classes.

We note that we chose not to capture demographic attributes such as the gender and ethnicity of the participants because we considered it crucial to guarantee their anonymity. Future research should investigate gender and/or ethnicity’s impact on the ability to detect online deception.

3.3 Procedure

We carefully designed the studies to the highest ethical standards, especially since we ourselves had to attend virtually and rely on teachers to facilitate the workshops on our behalf. As such, we developed a rigorous methodology for carrying out research remotely with classes of children. Ethical approval was gained from the ethical review boards of all participating institutions before we commenced. We provide a substantive discussion of ethical considerations and our methods for resolving them in Morrison et al. [53] (summarised in Figure 1). A safeguarder, who had been vetted by the UK’s Disclosure and Barring Service, was present during all workshops to ensure that the children’s safety was monitored and assured.

Figure 1 presents the dimensions of the research. In particular, for each workshop, we followed the protocol below:

- (1) *Consent*. The facilitating teacher ensured that signed consent was obtained from the parents of every participating child. The children themselves assented to participating. Children were




Fig. 1. Research design.

informed that they could withdraw at any time without giving a reason. Teachers, too, signed consent forms.

All participating schools and teacher facilitators received a gift voucher, and every child received a certificate of participation. The certificates were mailed to the school, where the teacher added the children's names. One school received a special certificate for the entire class for being the best class to participate in the research project.

- (2) *Teacher Facilitation.* At each workshop, the teachers facilitated the workshops in the classroom, while two to three researchers, in addition to the safeguarder, joined the Microsoft Teams meeting used for coordination and guiding teachers. The Microsoft Teams meeting used only microphones and no cameras, and therefore, the researchers could not observe the classroom and relied on the teachers to facilitate the activities detailed below.
- (3) *Scenarios and Structured Drawing Activity.* The teacher showed the scenarios depicted in Table 1 to the children, one at a time. The children were asked to draw what they thought would happen in three steps if they clicked on the area highlighted by an arrow shown in the scenarios. All children participated in this activity.
- (4) *Unstructured Interview.* The child volunteers participated in an unstructured audio interview with the remote researcher to describe and discuss their drawings and interpretations of the scenarios [27]. This group was composed of volunteers and children nominated by the facilitating teachers. The researchers did not have any influence on who was chosen to engage with them.
- (5) *Wrap Up.* (a) The teacher mailed drawings to the nominated researcher for anonymisation and consent forms to the chief researcher. (b) The schools received a monetary reward for participation, and the teachers received vouchers in return for their facilitation of workshops. (c) Chief researcher mailed blank participation certificates to schools for teachers to add names and issue to the children.

Due to the remote nature of the workshops and the lack of video footage, the study had several limitations, which we detail in Section 5.2.

3.4 Analysis

Our data collection methodology resulted in two types of data: (1) children's drawings and (2) transcripts of the audio data collected during the workshops when children spoke about their drawings and answered questions from the teachers or the researchers. As outlined in the previous section, we were unable to match the children's drawings to their verbal explanations of their drawings. We thus analysed transcripts and drawings separately before discussing the entire study's findings and implications in Section 5. The analyses are detailed in the next subsections. We had to exclude the first workshop from the drawing analysis due to a number of drawings being missing from the pack sent to the researchers.

3.4.1 Drawing Analysis Method. Framework Analysis (FA) was employed to analyse the drawings. FA is a matrix-based analytical framework that provides consistency and transparency across a dataset [71]. This analytical approach draws inspiration from and aligns with Kodama et al.'s [38] analysis of drawings of mental models. In FA, a framework is developed that classifies and organises data into key themes, concepts or categories. Ritchie and Spencer [70] suggest that FA is useful for analysing data derived from research questions that are contextual (e.g., examining the form and nature of knowledge and experience) and diagnostic (e.g., exploring reasons or influences upon knowledge and experience). Our FA approach consisted of five phases.

Phase 1: Familiarisation. We began our analysis with a more inductive, open description of each drawing, a transcription of the visuals that strove to capture illustrations and how they were represented in textual form. Two groups of two researchers wrote descriptions of the drawings as the data to be analysed; within those groups, each researcher independently read data for initial description, transcription and initial impressions of a drawing, which provided a visual and textual basis for making sense of a drawing, and then discussed potential themes (see Table 3).

Phase 2: Framework Construction. From these initial readings and conversations, we developed a framework through which the data were re-read. The purpose of this was to organise the data in a consistent, manageable and meaningful way across all drawings. This enables speedier retrieval, exploration and analysis during later stages. This phase produced four analytical themes, which were subsequently used to inductively code the descriptions of children's drawings in Phase 3. The themes revealed children's mental models of (1) a tit-for-tat exchange in mirroring the scenario (effectively replicating what was in the scenario image), (2) imagining beyond what was presented in the scenario with bad actor intentions, (3) identification of potential account compromise and (4) leaked sensitive and **Personally Identifiable Information (PII)**, as summarised in Table 3. Potential consequences of the scenario (such as hacking) were also identified as another theme.

Phase 3: Indexing and Sorting. With the framework established, the two groups of researchers re-read the drawings and transcripts of the drawings against the framework, organising the data into the framework categories. The research team systematically applied this across all drawings. Each coding pair was randomly allocated three workshops to code. Then each individual within a pair coded the data independently, and then the pair met via Zoom to compare drawing codes and discuss where there was a disparity to produce an agreed coding. Disparities were infrequent and mainly due to a missing code where more than one code applied to a diagram. Both coding pairs also met via Zoom, discussed their coding and reached a consensus in the presence of other project members. This ensured that the overall coding process was consistent and reliable.

Phase 4: Charting. The charting stage involves summarising the indexed and sorted data into a coherent analytical picture, which is communicated in the results.

Table 3. Drawing Coding Categories

Category 1	<i>Mirroring</i> the depicted scenario directly in the drawing
Category 2	Imagining potential <i>next steps</i> and bad actor actions, more than the presented scenario suggests
Category 3	Identifying <i>potential account compromise</i> (loss of credentials)
Category 4	Identifying sensitive and personal identifying <i>information leakage</i>

Phase 5: Mapping and Interpretation. The final stage in the process moves towards pulling key aspects of data across the dataset to understand and interpret it as a whole. Further description, clarifying concepts, representing the range and depth of data, establishing relationships and developing explanations are all practices relevant for this stage [71].

We note that Phase 3 was iterated a few times to clarify the themes and reach a consensus within and between the researchers. We provide a more comprehensive description of the four themes that emerged from this process in Table 12 in the Appendix. Section 4.1 reports on the outcome of the drawing analysis.

3.4.2 Transcript Analysis Method. Transcript analysis included all workshops and used audio recordings that contain two main types of interaction: (1) children who volunteered to explain their drawings and (2) researcher–child unstructured interviews at the end of drawing sessions.

Not all children participated in unstructured interviews due to time constraints. We could not observe the selection process, as it was teacher-led and cameras were switched off. During the unstructured interviews, children were questioned about their understanding of the scenarios, the perceived consequences of clicking, their familiarity with the scenario context and the sources of their knowledge. Discussions were typically guided by the researcher’s interpretation of what would be meaningful to the child and proceeded with further questions to explore the child’s responses and comments.

The transcript analysis used **reflexive thematic analysis (RTA)** [8, 9, 15] led by one researcher’s interpretive analysis. The initial coding process by the lead researcher was then discussed amongst the research group. Four researchers in total (the lead plus three others) sense-checked ideas by exploring multiple assumptions, interpretations and meanings of the data, following a collaborative and reflexive approach.

The transcriptions were analysed with a paradigmatic framework of interpretivism and constructivism, reflecting on the children’s own accounts of their attitudes, opinions and experiences as faithfully as possible while also accounting for the reflexive influence of researcher interpretations. Our ability to identify what we saw in the data was informed by existing concepts, our own knowledge of the literature and the drawing analysis framework. Hence, while the analysis was dominantly inductive, a degree of deductive analysis was employed to ensure that the open coding contributed to producing themes that were meaningful to the research questions.

Both semantic and latent coding were utilised. No attempt was made to prioritise semantic coding over latent coding or vice versa. Rather, semantic codes were produced when meaningful semantic information was interpreted, and latent codes were produced when meaningful latent information was interpreted. As such, any item of information could be double-coded in accordance with the semantic meaning communicated by the respondent and the latent meaning interpreted by the researcher.

The analysis was carried out following the six phases of RTA:

Phase 1: Familiarisation. The main researcher participated in all the workshops and carried out or listened to all interviews. Some preliminary notes were taken after each workshop in collaboration with all the researchers at the given workshop.

Phase 2: Generation of Initial Codes. The preliminary iteration of coding was conducted using the ‘comments’ function in Microsoft Word. This allowed codes to be noted in the side margin while also highlighting the area of text assigned to each respective code. Multiple comments were used for double coding. The initial codes were discussed with four other researchers.

Phase 3: Generating Themes. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet was established to bring together all codes from all workshops for each scenario. The coded data were reviewed and analysed as to how different codes may be combined according to shared meanings to form themes.

Phase 4: Review of Themes. A thematic map is created from the review of themes.

Phase 5: Definition and Naming of Themes. Four researchers reviewed themes based on the underlying data, following a collaborative and reflexive approach and finalised the names and definitions.

Phase 6: Reporting. Section 4.2 reports on the outcome of the RTA.

4 Results

4.1 Drawing Analysis

In total, we analysed 468 drawings. Our analysis revealed that 144 (31%) mirrored our scenario back to us (Category 1 in Table 3), which indicates a non-intrusive reading of the scenario or the user giving access to information (e.g., an e-mail address or biometrics) in a tit-for-tat exchange. A total of 246 (53%) respondents began to imagine more than what was presented in any given scenario (Category 2). These responses identified that information was being tracked or collected via invasive means without user input (e.g., location services, information accessing). A total of 164 (35%) participants began to identify what might be lost in terms of security or privacy in response to the scenario (e.g., theft of credentials or account details) (Category 3), and 145 (31%) participants depicted worst-case scenarios where sensitive PII (e.g., bank details, postcodes, date of birth or phone number) was leaked (Category 4). In their drawings, 274 (59%) participants mentioned some form of the potential consequence of a given scenario. We can now consider drawings related to each scenario in turn.

The naming convention for drawings specifically mentioned in this Section is ‘Work Shop i’-‘Participant j’: WSi-Pj (see Figures 8–12 in the Appendix for drawings).

4.1.1 Scenario 1—Privacy Zuckering. Table 4 depicts all the coding of the categories in this scenario’s drawings. Figure 2 provides one example of a drawing. Drawing WS3-P23 (Figure 8(a)) illustrates Category 1 as it mirrors the scenario: one screen showing an eye and the text ‘free gems’, ‘scanning...’ and ‘camera opened’. Category 2 applies to drawing WS7-P18 (Figure 8(c)) where there is a strong reference to baiting a trap, including the pricing structure priming user action. The image shows one busy screen, a mid-game scenario with more credits needed ‘oh great do you need gems’, then three price options and free gems for retinal scan, the user clicking yes and finally an image of an unhappy-looking person. Category 3 is applicable to drawing WS4-P10 (Figure 8(d)), which identifies account compromise as it shows a single mobile screen with the text ‘lost connection your phone is being tracked’. Category 4 is reflected in drawing WS7-P08 (Figure 8(e)) where the child is aware of spyware, in a literal sense, as the image shows themselves on a screen with the text ‘they could see you through your camera.’

Multiple categories were often coded for the drawings. Responses to Scenario 1 were coded more frequently in Categories 1 and 2 and less frequently in Categories 3 and 4, across the 133 drawings.

Table 4. Coding of Scenario 1 Responses (n=codes)

n	Workshop	Mirroring Category 1	Next Steps Category 2	Potential Compromise Category 3	Info Leakage Category 4
11	WS2	6	2	2	1
53	WS3	14	16	4	19
35	WS4	8	14	11	2
37	WS5	8	12	4	13
22	WS6	9	6	3	4
30	WS7	11	9	2	8
188	Total	56	59	26	47




Fig. 2. Example Scenario 1 drawing (WS5-P12).

In essence, many children either mirrored the scenario in their drawings or imagined deceptive attempts.

In some drawings, there was a sense of providing more information about themselves to get more gems, e.g., in drawing WS6-P12 (Figure 8(b)), the first image depicted the eye and eyebrow with narrating text ‘*you open your camera and scan your eye for the gems,*’ the second image depicted lips with narrating text ‘*You get the gems, and they offer you more gems for another body part*’ and the final image depicted a head with smiling face and short hair and text written asking questions of user ‘*D.O.B.: ??? Where you live: ??? Hobbies: ???*’. This drawing was coded as illustrating Categories 1, 2 and 4.

Some did imagine undesirable consequences, coded in 85 of the 133 drawings. The nature of these consequences varied considerably, but ‘tracking’ was most commonly cited. Some thought the eye scan could lead to unintended and unwanted consequences, such as ID or card theft or even non-digital crimes (e.g., burglary—WS3-P08—Figure 12(c)). Some expressed safety concerns related to someone being able to identify their school from the scan and coming to their homes with violent intentions (see WS3-P19 in Figure 12(d)). There were six examples where children anticipated that the camera would take face and body images rather than simply an eye scan (WS7-P08—Figure 8 (e)). Many of the children were suspicious but unclear about the nature of the threat (see Table 8 for a full range of mentioned consequences).

Table 5. Coding of Scenario 2 Responses (n=codes)

n	Workshop	Mirroring Category 1	Next Steps Category 2	Potential Compromise Category 3	Info Leakage Category 4
11	WS2	6	2	2	1
52	WS3	8	20	10	14
30	WS4	1	16	5	8
40	WS5	2	7	15	16
17	WS6	3	9	2	3
34	WS7	1	18	13	2
184	Total	21	72	47	44




Fig. 3. Example Scenario 2 drawing (WS2-P06).

Moreover, 22/133 (17%) drawings construed unrealistic consequences, considering this scenario to depict a ‘Bait and Switch’ attack (WS6-P12—Figure 8(b)). The children did not depict any indicators that could be linked to loss of privacy, suggesting they may not have understood the value of their biometric or the risks of giving away their eye scan.

4.1.2 Scenario 2—Bait and Switch. Table 5 depicts all the coding of the categories in this scenario’s drawings. Figure 3 provides an example of a drawing for this scenario. Responses to Scenario 2 were coded most often as in Category 2 (54%—66 of 122). It is clear that the participants could imagine more than what the provided scenario showed. A typical response was noted in drawing WS5-P17 (Figure 9(a)), where the child imagined being forced to download a game before being offered the free Robux. It is clear that the majority spotted this dark pattern.

Imagined consequences included the compromise of accounts (Category 3) and the leaking of personal information (Category 4) (Table 9). Typical drawings included WS6-P08 (Figure 9(c); Category 3), who drew a credentials form (username and password) as a first step after clicking on the scenario, and WS5-P11 (Figure 9(b)), who mentioned their bank details being requested. In general, we note that bank/financial details data collection was a common theme referring to data leakage across Scenario 2.

Category 1, that is, mirroring the scenario back without imagining deceptive practices (see WS7-P19 (Figure 12(g)), WS3-P23 (Figure 8(a)), had the lowest occurrence in Scenario 2, with 16% (20 of 122) participants. We also note that Category 1, when present in this scenario, was followed by Category 3 or 4 or a consequence, such as WS3-P05 (Figure 9(f)), who depicted (1) clicking on free Robux, (2) waiting time for Robux arrival and (3) phone gets hacked.

Table 6. Coding of Scenario 3 Responses (n=codes)

n	Workshop	Mirroring Category 1	Next Steps Category 2	Potential Compromise Category 3	Info Leakage Category 4
9	WS2	1	5	2	1
48	WS3	21	8	11	8
32	WS4	9	12	11	0
31	WS5	2	18	2	9
17	WS6	3	9	2	3
27	WS7	11	8	7	1
164	Total	47	60	35	22




Fig. 4. Example Scenario 3 drawing (WS6-P3).

Consequences across Scenario 2 were named in 76 of the 122 responses (accounting for 62%). Being hacked as a result of the scenario was named most often, across 34 responses, such as WS3-P21 (Figure 9(d)) ‘*you have been hacked*’ and a smiling face, while money theft and/or emptied bank account was in the second position, with 21 instances, such as WS5-P22 (Figure 9(e)) ‘*You have been no money scammed.*’ We note that hacking often referred to bank accounts or Robux accounts with the additional consequence of money theft or Robux (account) theft (see Table 8).

Workshop 3 scored highest in the consequences of hacking and money theft, followed by Workshop 5. These two workshops had the highest number of participants.

4.1.3 Scenario 3—Confirm Shaming. Table 6 depicts all the coding of the categories in this scenario’s drawings. Figure 4 provides an example of a drawing for this scenario. Responses to Scenario 3 were coded most frequently in Categories 1 and 2 and less frequently in Categories 3 and 4. Of 118, 60 (51%) participants recognised or imagined deception-based data access (Category 2), and of 118, 47 mirrored the scenario back (Category 1). Of 118, 35 (30%) illustrated the consequences of a leaked account (Category 3), and of 188, 22 (19%) participants expressed leaked PII (Category 4).

Consequences imagined from the scenario were named in 60 of the 118 samples (see Table 8). The most commonly named consequence was ‘hacking’ (20), followed by ‘financial loss’ (11), ‘virus’ (9) and ‘scam’ (8).

The quantitative analysis showed some variability across workshops, where WS3 shows a disproportionately high number of Category 1 codes (i.e., mirroring back scenario) and fewer Category 2

Table 7. Coding of Scenario 4 Responses (n=codes)

n	Workshop	Mirroring Category 1	Next Steps Category 2	Potential Compromise Category 3	Info Leakage Category 4
6	WS2	0	4	0	2
45	WS3	13	10	11	11
23	WS4	4	7	10	2
20	WS5	2	13	3	2
18	WS6	1	3	8	6
28	WS7	7	7	13	1
140	Total	27	44	45	24




Fig. 5. Example Scenario 4 drawing (WS4-P15).

codes. Other workshops tended to indicate more Category 2 codes than Category 1 codes (WS3-P04—Figure 10(a)). WS5 appears to have had a much larger number of Category 2 coded drawings (e.g., WS5-P05—Figure 10(b)). The trend, overall, seems to be that around half of the children indicated Category 2 codes (where they start to imagine more than what is presented). There were 23 examples in which anticipated requests for further details led to unwanted consequences. In terms of consequences, a quarter of participants identified what is being lost in terms of security/privacy (Category 3), and a quarter identified hacking of other sensitive/personally identifiable data (Category 4)—see WS3-P12 (Figure 10(c)). These indicate that some of the children were cautious, wary and suspicious of unknown situations.

4.1.4 Scenario 4—Browser Warning. Table 7 depicts all the coding of the categories in this scenario’s drawings. Figure 5 provides an example of a drawing for this scenario, where the child imagines that even if the ‘Back-to Safety’ option is chosen, the computer would still be ‘glitchy’. Responses to Scenario 4 were coded more frequently in Categories 2 and 3 (WS7-P16—Figure 8(c)) and less frequently in Categories 1 and 4. Participants recognised or imagined deception-based data access (Category 2) and leaked account consequences (Category 3) more commonly, at 44/98

(45%) and 45/98 (46%), respectively. Mirroring the scenario back was less prevalent for this scenario, with only 27/98 (28%) respondents doing so (WS7-P09—Figure 11(a)).

Imagined consequences included ‘hacked’ (29), ‘virus’ or ‘bug’ (11). Bear in mind that this scenario is not a dark pattern and actually tries to warn the user about a potentially fake or harmful website being accessed if they continue.

4.1.5 Cross-Scenario Comparison. Table 8 lists the consequences mentioned by the children across all scenarios. They demonstrate a familiarity with the terms ‘hacked’ and ‘scam’. In terms of specific losses, they often mentioned credit card theft. Privacy-related consequences were rarely mentioned, and while safety-related consequences were mentioned, these were not widely cited by the children.

Scenario 1 was clearly evocative, with many potential consequences being mentioned, mostly related to cybersecurity. This scenario elicited many imagined consequences, most of which were unrealistic (e.g., an eye scan being used to find the child’s home address (WS3-P08 Figure 12(c)). Amongst all scenarios, Scenario 2 (Bait and Switch) had the highest percentage of participants: (1) imagining next steps beyond what is provided in the scenario (Category 2); (2) mentioning account compromise, which included both compromise of Robux and bank accounts (Category 3) and (3) pointing to personal data loss (Category 4) (WS3-P30—Figure 12(f)).

While Scenario 1 depicted Privacy Zuckering, that is, being tricked into disclosing more personal information than is wise, we found that Scenario 1 had the highest % of drawings overall that merely mirrored the scenario in the drawing (Category 1, 56/133). Furthermore, in Scenario 1, this was followed by participants starting to imagine giving access to more of their own information via the eye scan (Category 2, 60/133). There were fewer depictions of personal data being released and of identification and sensitive types of data being compromised (Category 4) and account information (Category 3).

Children miscategorised most scenarios as ‘Bait and Switch’, even when only one was this kind of dark pattern in reality. Hence, while they were wary, they were not able to distinguish one dark pattern from another nor to identify the one benign scenario in the mix (Scenario 4).

Table 9 demonstrates stark differences between the children participating in the different workshops. WS2 participants only came up with 10 consequences, while WS3’s participants came up with 87. Many factors might be influential here with parental knowledge [62], levels of deprivation [61] and children not yet having developed the required skills [40] being but a few. Still, it is interesting to see such differences even at such a young age, all of which demonstrate the need to ensure that children do indeed receive online deception-related education as they start to operate autonomously online.

4.2 Transcript Analysis

The transcripts from the workshops represented 22–29 different voices for each scenario, which corresponds to roughly 20% of all drawings. In the transcripts, each speaker was given a different participant label. The participant labelling convention for transcripts specifically mentioned in this Section is ‘WorkShop i’ ‘Scenario j’ ‘Child k’ : WSiSjCk. Table 10 lists the labels for each interviewed participant and presents the total interviews at each workshop, as well as the total. However, as we could not observe the classroom while the children spoke, there is a remote chance that some children may have spoken multiple times (the facilitating teacher ensured turn taking, and we were not able to see children). Hence, a single label may not always refer to a distinct individual.

Even though we could not conduct an interview for every drawing, the transcripts provided a useful sample of what children thought of how and why a benign or malicious action would

Table 8. Frequency Analysis of Named Consequences Per Scenario (n=mentions)

n	Consequence	Number per Scenario			
		Mirroring Scenario 1	Next Steps Scenario 2	Potential Compromise Scenario 3	Info Leakage Scenario 4
Non-specific					
100	Hacked	17	34	20	29
33	Scam	8	12	8	5
1	Spam	1			
1	Warning message				1
Specific loss (info/financial)					
4	Info deleted	3			1
21	ID theft	14	1	3	3
51	Account/credit card theft	12	21	11	7
16	Account compromised		10 (Robux account)		6
Device compromised					
34	Virus/malware	9	9	11	5
12	Device shut down/blank screen			6	6
2	Glitch/error				2
Privacy loss					
12	Track location	9	1		2
7	Taking extra camera images	6			1
2	Friends contacted				2
3	Info shared online	2			1
Personal safety compromised					
3	Burglary	3			
5	Physical attack	1			4
Other					
2	Illegible			1	1
Total					
309		85	88	60	76

occur in response to a click. The transcripts were also richer in terms of children's reactions to the scenarios and their expectations of online safety, security and support. Therefore, the sample was useful in revealing the varying views and understandings of privacy and security.

Three themes were produced by organising codes around a relative core commonality interpreted from the data: (1) dark pattern perceptions; (2) online behaviours and (3) security knowledge, which comprised nine sub-themes (see Figure 6). Table 11 in the Appendix presents themes, sub-themes, codes and additional examples from transcripts. The first theme characterises the ways in

Table 9. Total Drawings/Responses Naming at least One Consequence, by Workshop Scenario

		# Drawings naming at least one consequence			
n	n Workshop	Mirroring Scenario 1	Next Steps Scenario 2	Potential Compromise Scenario 3	Info Leakage Scenario 4
10	WS2	2	3	3	2
87	WS3	24	21	19	23
50	WS4	13	13	11	13
78	WS5	28	18	15	17
25	WS6	6	5	5	9
46	WS7	12	16	7	11
296	Total	85	76	60	75

Table 10. Workshops and Participant Labels for Each Child Speaking for a Particular Scenario ('WorkShop i' 'Scenario j' 'Child k')

Workshop	Interviewed Child Participant Labels				Total Labels per Workshop
WS1	WS1S1C1-C3	WS1S2C1-C5	WS1S3C1-C5	WS1S4C1	14
WS2	WS2S1C1-C3	WS2S2C1-C6	WS2S3C1-C3	WS2S4C1-C5	17
WS3	WS3S1C1-C3	WS3S2C1-C6	WS3S3C1-C3	WS3S4C1-C2	14
WS4	WS4S1C1-C4	WS4S2C1-C5	WS4S3C1-C4	WS4S4C1-C3	16
WS5	WS5S1C1-C2	WS5S2C1-C2	WS5S3C1-C5	WS5S4C1-C2	11
WS6	WS6S1C1-C5	WS6S2C1-C3	WS6S3C1-C3	WS6S4C1-C3	14
WS7	WS7S1C1-C2	WS7S2C1-C2	WS7S3C1-C4	WS7S4C1-C4	12
	Total				98

which participants described their drawings in relation to dark patterns. Dark pattern perceptions, unsurprisingly the most substantive points of discussion, illustrate the ways in which participants were found to understand the four scenarios in terms of *nefarious actors*, *actions* and *consequences*. Moreover, participants' discussions on online behaviours were analysed and fell into *cautious* or *risky practices*. Beyond the scenarios themselves, and the initial scope of the project, participants also demonstrated some security knowledge and spoke about the sources of their knowledge. Collectively, these themes paint a picture of the way children in the selected age group at the participating schools viewed the online environment and guide themselves through it.

Theme 1: Dark Pattern Perceptions.

In discussing their drawings of dark patterns embedded within the four scenarios, children included four concepts: (1) leaked data via user interactions or snooping, (2) nefarious actors, (3) actions and (4) consequences. The children gave examples of *different data* they may be giving away either directly, e.g., filling out a form, or indirectly, e.g., through being snooped on. *Actors* relate to participants themselves as well as others within a given scenario. *Actions* pertain to what happens within, and in response to, a scenario. Expected *consequences*, the majority of the time, referred to negative outcomes, although, in some instances, children indicated that they thought nothing would happen.

Leaked Data via User Interaction or Snooping. This sub-theme includes discussions on what data are shared by the user by, e.g., filling in a form versus what data may be leaked even if the child does not enter any information. While children were vague, at times, in terms of what data would




Fig. 6. Thematic map demonstrating three themes and nine sub-themes.

be at risk, resorting to ‘more information’, ‘your details’, and ‘private data’, they frequently pointed to being asked for e-mail, password and bank details. In addition, name, address/postcode, phone number, gender, birth date, photos and important files were mentioned.

However, it was clear that the children did not always know why this information was being requested: ‘*not sure why they want things like your phone numbers, just know that they do*’ (WS4S1C4).

For Scenarios 2 and 4, some children mentioned friends or friend lists, which we assume to be due to social media use triggered by the scenario, e.g., ‘*Then they get access to your friends list and they tell them you’ve gone to the website*’ (WS5S4C1). This demonstrated an awareness of the variety of data that may be at risk (‘personal data’ mentioned by European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation). In addition, they understood that others were likely to be impacted (friends being hacked as well) as a result of their falling victim to a dark pattern-enabled exploit.

Nefarious Actors. This sub-theme includes descriptions of who is involved in the scenario, also the honesty levels and capabilities of hackers. Children spoke about the scenarios through the lens of their own experiences or without pointing to a particular actor. They used statements like ‘I/you allow’, ‘I/you end up’, ‘I/you need to’, or ‘I/you have to’ when describing their drawings of scenarios.

However, when referring to the human behind the scenario or dark patterns, ‘hackers’ was the overwhelming term used. A gendered association was made with hackers, who were often referenced as ‘a guy’ or ‘he’; very rarely ‘she’ was used. In one instance, the offending party was named ‘*people who want Gucci*’ (WS3S3C1). In contrast to human actors, software was referenced as a non-human actor ‘it’. These actors ‘tell’, ‘want’, ‘direct’, ‘pressure’, ‘urge’, ‘guilt-trip’ or ‘bribe’, indicating different levels of manipulation by urging input or action.

Children also imagined different actor capabilities and sophistication. Hackers were understood to be able to use ‘high tech’ strategies motivated by financial gain. For example, one child said, ‘*the hackers have strong technology*’ (WS3S2C6). Motivations were often linked to financial gain. One participant aptly captured the capabilities of hackers when they remarked, ‘*some people saying they’re not putting the details in money is getting taken out anyway*’ (WS5S3C4).

Actions. This sub-theme captures the children's descriptions of different steps involved in the scenario leading to deception. For example, in the Privacy Zuckering scenario, the children imagined different ways a device might 'scan your eye'. Some imagined their torso being scanned, some their face or just their eye, thus demonstrating different levels of privacy invasion. For example, one participant shared, *'They say they want your eye, but then they are going to take your whole face [...] I'm going to have to zoom in so much, and then they can see my whole face'* (WS6S1C2).

One child commented *'He says it's bribing you to take a picture of yourself, and that's all. You won't get the gems it has promised. The game goes as normal'* (WS1S1C2) without mentioning any loss of privacy due to their eye scan being taken. Some children considered the scenario more a 'Bait and Switch'—*'Direct you to take a picture of your eye, and then that will basically hack your phone'* (WS1S1C1), or *'If you click this button a virus gets onto the computer. It will ask for your bank details'* (WS5S1C2).

In the 'Bait and Switch' scenario, children mostly expected to be taken to a fake website and asked to enter a username/e-mail and password, explaining: *'So I clicked it and it took me to this website and it says please enter your Roblox username'* (WS6S2C1), or *'And they click on a website called, notascam dot yay'* (WS7S2C2), which signals the deceit with the name choice in the example given for the website. Some children only loosely identified the scenario without mentioning visiting a fake website but expecting user information to be leaked or Roblox to be stolen (e.g., *'So once you click on it, it will ask you for all your information'* (WS1S2C5) or *'It's a scamming tool. It will steal your Roblox'* (WS4S2C4)).

In the third 'Confirm Shaming' scenario, many communicated they would skip the ad and nothing will happen: *'Just skip that and get your video on YouTube. That always comes up'* (WS6S3C1), *'So what happens is when you click this button, you continue to watch YouTube, and that's pretty much it. And then you'll be happy'* (WS1S3C1), *'nothing would really happen because I skipped a lot of ads before and nothing ever happened'* (WS2S3C2). One child said, *'It's trying to guilt trip you into watching the ad'* (WS7S3C1), describing the dark pattern aptly. However, some also classified this as a 'Bait and Switch': *'I think when you press skip, that'll take you to another tab of YouTube, but it's fake YouTube'* (WS2S3C1).

In the fourth scenario, some children recognised the legitimate warning: *'Just click to safety and not get a malware virus'* (WS3S4C2). Typically, the children assumed 'Advance Anyway' would result in a 'Bait and Switch' style redirection: *'So you click on advance anyway, and this isn't the actual Instagram. It's a knock-off Instagram'* (WS6S4C3).

These descriptions of different actions showed how children assessed a deceptive scenario and the risks attached to it, giving us more insights into RQ1 and RQ2. The children, the majority of the time, assumed malicious intent, even with the legitimate warning, and anticipated a 'Bait and Switch' style exploit behind them.

Consequences. The children mentioned several consequences, which we roughly categorised into five areas: (1) offline harm, (2) leaked data shared with others or used online to scam or spam the victim, their friends or others, (3) bank account hacked and financial loss, (4) web account(s) hacked and (5) device hacked or infected with a virus.

An example of offline harm (1) was communicated in response to the Privacy Zuckering scenario, where one child connected their online behaviour with physical safety and risk to imagine, *'The camera can see your school uniform. Then they will see my badge, and then they can come to school'* (WS6S1C2). Others shared, *'They could track you down and like maybe steal stuff in your house'* (WS3S1C3) or *'[Data leak would be horrible] 'cause you don't really want someone to come to your address'* (WS7S4C1).

One example of the shared or leaked data online to scam the victim (2) was also shared in response to the Privacy Zuckering scenario: one child said, *'They could maybe use your face and*

then just start spreading fake rumours' (WS7S1C2). Another commented, *'When you click that, it will take you to one of their applications and those guys spam you'* (WS4S3C2).

While the Privacy Zuckering scenario yielded more offline harm responses, the other three scenarios overwhelmingly resulted in either a financial loss or account or device hacking. Financial losses (3) were imagined to occur through a bank account being hacked, e.g., *'then you get an e-mail from your bank account. There's been an error, and all your money is being spent'* (WS3S2C5) or *'they can hack into your phone and log into your robux account and use your e-mail to buy a lot of things'* (WS1S2C3).

Accounts were hacked (4) either by entering credentials and having them stolen or simply by clicking the wrong button. Another child discussed this in terms of being conned into entering login credentials to a fake website: *'Then you tried to log back in [YouTube], they would have already changed your password'* (WS2S4C1).

Device hacking (5) was understood to occur in different ways, from taking control of a camera or software or shutting a phone down. In response to Scenario 4, one child (WS3S4C1) imagined that the example URL, 'Instagram.con' would enable a hacker to see their photos, continue using their camera or watch their victims. This child explained: *'If you click on advance anyway, hackers will be able to take over your PC and move your mouse to their advantage, which is not recommended. Then they could be watching you through your phone camera on your phone.'* Most interestingly, a few suspected this scenario to be a 'double bluff' (WS6S4C1): *'The back to safety button would also give you a virus. Either way, you are going to get a virus'* (WS4S4C3).

Theme 2: Online Behaviours.

The behaviours in response to the four scenarios were discussed in two primary ways: cautious and risky behaviours.

Cautious Behaviours. The children exhibited cautious behaviours, such as not engaging, asking a parent or reporting suspicious activity. Several examples were communicated (e.g., leaving a game, not inputting any details, closing/refreshing an app or deleting it). For example, *'I wouldn't put my details in'* (WS5S2C2) or *'I would just close the app and delete it'* (WS7S4C2).

Another common cautious behaviour was to ask a parent, exclusively a mother. Indeed, fathers were not mentioned during the study. One participant said, *'I always ask my mum if I can get games [and that] my mum has to accept'* (WS6S1C5). Mums also put rules in place for online behaviour: *'If it's social [media], I have to ask her'* (WS6S1C5); an alternative was to use family sharing of app and content producers (e.g., *'My mum and I have a thing called family sharing on my devices at home. On the App Store, I have to type in my password and then it says ask and then it sends a notification to my mum's phone and she has to then accept it and type her password in'* (WS6S2C3). The children would report suspicious activity in certain instances. In response to Scenario 2, one child would report the behaviour to a reputable website, *'report like on YouTube'* (WS6S2C3) and another shared, *'the best way to prevent this by reporting in the person or contacting Robux. So he would not be able to scam anyone else'* (WS3S2C4).

Risky Behaviours. Several risky behaviours were mentioned, including not reading the 'Terms of Service', ignoring age-related warnings or brand bias. Similar to adults, these children did not read the terms of service: *'I can't be bothered. Click the accept button'* (WS6S1C4), another providing a rationale: *'Because it's too long. No one wants to read all of it'* (WS2S1C3).

Age-related content warnings were raised as items to ignore, as though barriers to playing a game. One participant said, e.g., *'It's just car racing'* (WS6S4C1) and thus not an important/relevant warning. Finally, some participants exhibited a degree of brand trust that influenced or underpinned risky behaviour. In response to Scenario 2, one child said, *'You might think: it's YouTube. It's a big company. There won't be any problems'* (WS6S3C1).

Theme 3: Security Knowledge.

An important extension of the scenario-based discussion was where children had learned about navigating online risks, the challenges and dangers. While we did not set out to elicit this information, it became a relevant part of discussions and provided insights into knowledge gathering and patterns of online behaviour. Children demonstrated familiarity with terminology and shared two primary sources of information: (1) schools and teachers and (2) parents.

Parental influence. Parents were primary sources of knowledge. Some children asked their parents when encountering certain scenarios online. One child said: *'I have asked my mum if it was like a scam or something; I just ask mum for advice about it'* (WS7S4C3) and another shared a personal experience at home with negative effects: *'My mum was hacked once [...] my mum always told me. Like, don't trust things like that'* (WS7S2C1).

Schools and Teachers. Generally, the children cited their school as the source of their security knowledge. Although they could not give details on definitive programs or training, they did say that they had been taught about online behaviours. This was aptly phrased by one child: *'I can't remember what primary year it was, but we learned about it in school once as well'* (WS6S1C5). Teachers communicated the need for caution while online, which a child explained: *'And my teachers always said that they [don't trust things like that] as well'* (WS7S2C1).

Interestingly, where the children used tablets (often iPads) at school, devices were considered safe. It was assumed that they could not be breached, as one child explained, *'[can they get into it?] not on our school iPads'* (WS6S1C4). Schools clearly informed children's knowledge of internet safety, but there were noticeable gaps. The children and their teachers had less familiarity with the 'Privacy Zuckering' scenario. Hence, a few children questioned the motivation behind the request with queries such as *'why would they want to see you? no app has ever asked to scan my eye'* (WS6S1C1), *'cause they want the little kid's face to do something [else]'* (WS6S1C3).

Familiarity with Terminology. The children had awareness of dark patterns, using phrases, such as 'dodgy', 'sketchy', 'fake', 'scam', 'spam', 'hack', 'virus', 'malware', 'trojan', 'remote PC' or 'dark web', as well as safety icons, like the 'browser lock icon', which one person attributed to safety, as in, *'they're safe websites with the lock at the side'* (WS4S2C5). The children did not mention more recent types of attacks involving, e.g., ransomware or deep fakes.

5 Discussion

With respect to our chosen methodology, we designed the study to gather and analyse drawings as well as transcripts. However, it became clear, as we analysed both of these, that the combination of these gave us much richer insights than drawings on their own [60]. As such, even if we carry out further workshops with children in person, we will continue to collect both drawings and transcripts to explore different dimensions of the children's mental models. By bringing together the findings from the transcript and drawing analysis, we are now able to answer the research questions posed in Section 3.

RQ1a considers whether the children are able to spot dark patterns. There is strong evidence that they are indeed aware of the presence of bad actors and also of the fact that they are 'up to no good'. However, their response to Scenario 3 demonstrates a tendency to classify all 'sketchy' scenarios as the 'Bait and Switch' dark pattern. This might be because they have already encountered this pattern online or because they have heard adults talking about the financial losses they have suffered due to being deceived by 'Bait and Switch' dark patterns.

This misclassification has two potential consequences. *Firstly*, they may miss other kinds of deceptive attempts. For example, those children who focused on 'Bait and Switch' in Scenario 1 would be less likely to realise that their eye biometrics would be captured and possibly sold to others. The *second* consequence is that they may construe unrealistic worst-case scenarios (e.g., WS4-P20

(Figure 12(e)) and WS3-P30 (Figure 12(f))). For Scenario 1, some children envisaged an actor being able to identify their school from the webcam capture and come to their homes (WS3-P19—Figure 12(d)). Similarly, in response to Scenario 3, which pushed users towards viewing an advert with a view to selling products or services, they imagined viruses and their devices being controlled by hackers (WS3-P05—Figure 9(f)).

These findings align with the findings of Oates et al. [55] who found that children of this age were only starting to think about privacy in digital terms: making the transition from exclusively thinking about physical privacy at around age 10. Even so, similar to many adults, they do not seem to realise that their biometrics ought also to be kept private. Thinking that every dark pattern can potentially harm their devices and steal their information suggests that undue levels of anxiety experience while online, and being in a continuous state of suspicion is unhealthy. This is particularly true where the anxiety extends to concerns about their personal safety.

Our findings also confirm the arguments of Barnard-Wills in referring to e-safety education [4, p. 245]: ‘*Safety is a much more prominent concept than privacy, and privacy is never articulated as a stand-alone value, but only as an instrumental methodology or tactic for ensuring broader personal safety*’ (WS3-P08—Figure 12(c)). Moreover, as Marwick and boyd [49] point out, traditional individualistic conceptions of privacy might no longer be appropriate, especially in the social networking era, necessitating more innovation in this space. It is certainly evident that privacy education cannot be neglected [86].

RQ1b queries whether children can distinguish a genuine from a dark pattern scenario. We observed a somewhat excessive wariness that led them to suspect everything, even a genuine warning (WS4-P06—Figure 12(h)). This is evidenced by the surprisingly high number of children drawing Scenario 4 who thought that clicking on the ‘Back to Safety’ button would also lead to them being hacked or getting a virus (e.g., WS2-P01—Figure 12(j)). As such, the answer to *RQ1b* is in the negative.

RQ2 considers how well 11- to -12-year old children understand the motivations of bad actors using dark patterns. The findings suggest that most of the children had superficial and speculative models of bad actors’ motivations. The references to financial theft mirror the ‘burglar’ model identified in the studies of adult users by Wash [91]. The high incidence of references to gratuitous hacking without a clear gainful motive suggests a similar model to the ‘mischief’ and ‘vandal’ models from that study. This is reinforced by several images and quotes in the drawings referencing a gloating or taunting actor.

As such, the answer to *RQ2* is that their understanding of motivations is sometimes incorrect (credential theft instead of privacy invasion) or exaggerated (hackers coming to their homes). This suggests that education design for online safety could usefully include descriptions of typical actors and their associated motivation to provide children with better insights into *what* bad actors are trying to achieve, and not just the *way* they try to achieve it.

RQ3 considers how well 11- to 12-year old children understand the actions of bad actors and the potential consequences. We found that the children frequently could, and did, identify a wide range of potential consequences of dark patterns. Some of these were anxiety-producing (personal safety issues: WS3-P29—Figure 12(i)) or non-specific (scammed/hacked). Yet, as discussed earlier in this section, the tendency to classify all scenarios as ‘Bait and Switch’ dark patterns means that sometimes there is a mismatch between the actual risk and the consequences the children construed.

In talking about consequences, the children in our study often used outdated language: most talking about viruses with very little mention of ransomware. The frequent references to bank accounts being compromised and their money stolen suggests that they may have been listening to adults talking about compromises. Indeed Rader and Wash [66] found that credit card and

identity theft were most widely known by the general public. It is likely that the adults in our participants' lives do not keep up with the latest cybersecurity threats, which is understandable given the complexity and dynamism of the domain.

As such, the answer to *RQ3* is that children have a limited or outdated understanding of actions of bad actors and the consequences of falling for their deceptive attempts.

It is important to note that our findings are relevant to an HCI audience as they demonstrate that design for children online has a significant ethical agenda. Safety of child users is compromised if they are vulnerable to nudging that is counter to their interests or involves deception.

5.1 Future Work

Some insights emerged that can inform future studies:

Children Need More Nuanced Insights. One child said, of Scenario 4: '*It's probably a real warning*' (WS7S4C2). When the researcher asked why, he said: '*It's hard to explain.*' It seems that children have been made aware of the presence of dark patterns but not really given enough information to help them distinguish between dark patterns and genuine warnings. They assume the presence of the one pattern they know a lot about: the 'Bait and Switch' leading to fear-based responses. One possibility would be to co-design card decks or serious games with different stakeholder groups to help develop this ability.

More Realistic Expectations of Consequences. We observed a tendency for children of this age group to conflate cybersecurity risks with threats to personal safety. This seems to infuse cybersecurity with a measure of anxiety, which is bound to hamper their ability to distinguish good from bad. This generation of false positives suggests that while they are aware of threats, they do not have a sense of what cyber criminals might be trying to achieve nor what their motivations might be [78]. We should be educating children to anticipate cyber criminal motivations and deceptions rather than focusing on specific attack and deception types.

We need to do more research to find better ways to educate children rather than scaring them [67] and risking their construing personal safety consequences from cybersecurity threats.

Understanding Exploitation. The children seemed to realise that permitting an eye scan could make them more likely to give more information: '*cause you think like oh they just asked me for my eye you might put in that information anyway*' (WS6S1C4). This child knows about the human need for consistency: having given one piece of information, this human tendency is likely to prompt further divulging of information. However, they did not seem to understand that their biometrics were valuable and that asking for these was another form of exploitation. They should be taught that they have the right to privacy and that their biometrics are personal data which should not easily be divulged.

Building Resilience. The children seemed to have a sense of doom and fatalism, feeling that if they were deceived, there would be no way of recovering. '*He has all your details, and you can't do anything about that because you've agreed to all these terms of services*' (WS6S2C3). Hence, they ought to be given the skills to know how to recover from compromises and reassured that it is not impossible to recover and move on.

The Role of Parents. A number of children mentioned their parents (mums, actually) having given them advice about online deception possibilities. This suggests two directions. The first being that educating parents about dark patterns would be a good way of ensuring that the message is reaching children [62], which is especially beneficial since it would reach more children and also equip parents themselves to detect and resist dark patterns. The second is that it is essential to speak to both parents and their children, to gauge the influence of parents' knowledge and efforts to educate their children in this respect.

5.2 Limitations

The contrived nature of our study, due to pandemic constraints, has led to limitations which we acknowledge. The primary limitation stemmed from the ethical protocols we elected to employ and accommodations we made resulting from COVID-19 (i.e., inability to collect data in person) and ethical sensitivities to online data collection with children. This limited data collection and analysis practices. Our preference for this work, which we suggest for future directions in this area, would have utilised in-person data collection wherein drawings could be matched with individuals and researchers could follow-up consistently and comprehensively with the participants.

Due to the remote nature of the workshops and the decision not to collect video footage, we were unable to directly observe the classroom during the workshops, which had several implications: (1) some children might have spoken multiple times, with others remaining silent; (2) some children may have been able to see each other's drawings while others may not have and (3) children may have discussed their drawings with one another while drawing, while others may not have. Similarly, while it would have added value to the data, we were not able to link the drawings to individual children. We considered this preferable to de-anonymising children, or asking teacher facilitators to issue children with anonymous codes, which could have been an error-prone process. Given our reliance on teachers as facilitators, we did not want to burden them with additional requirements that we would not be able to verify.

The children in Scottish schools mostly sit in groups of four at a single desk, which meant they could see each others' drawings as they drew. An element of groupthink might have influenced the outcomes of particular workshops. Factors such as perceived peer pressure [87] and fear of missing out may be particularly strong in teenage children [1], threatening to override trust considerations.

We presented the scenarios in the order we present them here, which might have biased perceptions. Finally, their teachers' clarifications and instructions (as our facilitators) differed from workshop to workshop, and this, too, might have had an impact on the children's drawings and responses. We also acknowledge that the instructions given to participants may have focused their attention on risk and the presence of bad actors more so than might be the case outside a workshop.

Finally, we do not claim that our findings generalise to other children of a similar age, even in Scotland. This was a snapshot of a few particular classes at a specific point in time. What our study *does* do is point the way forward for future work in this area, and highlights the need for more studies of this kind.

6 Conclusion and Reflection

We set out to reveal 11- to 12-year-old children's mental models of online dark patterns, and more specifically of the motivations of the bad actors who deploy these, and what the consequences would be if they were deceived, i.e. *data lost*, the *actors*, their *actions* and the *consequences*. We carried out this study during pandemic lockdowns, which precluded in-person workshops. We thus recruited teachers to facilitate workshops on our behalf and conducted training sessions to ensure that they understood their role in the workshops. Many of the limitations mentioned in Section 5.2 emerged from this mode of carrying out the research and the constraints we operated under at the time. Even so, the workshops delivered great insights which will inform future research in this space. Moreover, our experiences in carrying out remote workshops will be instructive for those wishing to carry out similar workshops in the future.

In particular, we discovered that children had a heightened awareness of the activities of bad actors online but also demonstrated excessive vigilance. This, in turn, hampered their ability to distinguish between dark patterns and genuine warnings. Importantly, our study identified the

need for specific interventions that will help children develop a more nuanced understanding of online deception and communicate coping mechanisms to recover if they are indeed deceived by these.

Appendix

Table 11. Transcription Themes, Sub-Themes, Codes and Examples

Theme	Sub-Theme	Codes	Examples from Transcripts
Dark pattern perceptions	Leaked data via user interaction or snooping	Web account; personal details; phone number; credit card	'So when you click the button for free Roblox, it says email address, required, password required and bank details required. So you can't claim the free Robux without doing anything' (WS4S2C2)
	Nefarious actor	Scammer; guy behind the computer; hacker capabilities	'Probably like someone who a scammer and tries to sell things and like take money off people' (WS5S2C2) 'but the guy behind the computer that got the information would be ha ha ha' (WS6S1C3) 'I think they might be smart and find a way to kind of get it without you having to enter it like without having to enter in your details' (WS6S4C1)
	Action	Identified correct scenario; things work as normal	'So he clicks on the open your camera and then he ends up going to put in your details and then he sends a message saying get hacked LOL' (WS4S1C1) 'You're going to get hacked because if you read the website name. The website is <i>instagram.con</i> ' (WS3S4C2) (about back to safety button) I think that would probably take you back to your website or close your app. (WS4S4C1)
	Consequences	Nothing bad; offline harm; leaked data shared with others; or used to scam/spam the victim/friends/others; bank account hacked and financial loss; web account(s)/device hacked or infected with a virus	'The back to safety button would also give you a virus. Either way you are going to get a virus' (WS4S4C4) 'See my face and then will come to my house. The camera can see your school uniform. Then they will see my badge and then they can come to school' (WS6S1C2) 'I think it gets your details and streamed online' (WS3S4C2) 'It takes money from your bank account and you get scammed' (WS1S3C2)
Online behaviours	Cautious practices	Leave game; do not input details; close/refresh/delete app; report incident or 'dodgy' site; use fake e-mail	'I would just leave the game' (WS6S1C1) 'I wouldn't put my details' (WS5S2C2) 'And the best way to prevent this by reporting in the person or contacting Roblox' (WS3S2C4)
	Risky practices	Skip ToS; ignore age notice; brand bias;	'One of these games, if you really wanna play. But then the only reason get in is if you accept all terms of service. I can't be bothered. Click the accept button and then yeah, just click not now' (WS6S1C4)

(Continued)

Table 11. Continued

Theme	Sub-Theme	Codes	Examples from Transcripts
Security knowledge	Parental influence	Ask mom; mom's experience	'And I always ask my mom if I can get games' (WS6S1C5) 'Mum was hacked once on email' (WS7S1C1)
	Schools and teachers	School teaches online safety; school blocks harmful content; ask teacher	'We have restrictions on our iPads. So then we can't get into every website comes up, some of them blocked' (WS6S4C3) 'Don't trust things like that. My teachers always said that as well' (WS7S2C1)
	Familiarity with terminology	No knowledge; knows bad links, browser lock, remote PC; malware/virus/trojans/dark web; own/peer experience	'He could not click robux because it would download malware on your computer' (WS3S2C4) 'That when you click the link and you go to a page and then the page says enter your bank details. And they are all required like security code and sort code and they will [say] We won't use your card for any payments. The link is called Twitter.com dot scam dot Mexico' (WS4S2C3)

ToS, Terms of Service; PC, Personal Computer

Table 12. Framework Analysis Coding

Basic Reading	Basic Reading Definition
(1) Input-only data access	Mirrors our scenario back to us; user input (either keyboard or camera); not intrusive; user gives access, e.g., tit-for-tat device access or access with consent, e.g., e-mail address check (without password) or biometrics authentication.
(2) Deception-based data device access and forced downloads	Starts to imagine more than what is presented; information is being tracked or collected via other invasive means without user input, and beyond necessary info, e.g., access to location services that contributes to tracking; camera access for the full photo of the user; forced video viewing; access to an application store and/or request for or installation of (unnecessary applications); or downloads of software that may induce further tracking or installation of malware.
(3) Leaked account credentials	Begins to identify what is being lost in terms of security/privacy. Full account details (non-biometric) e.g., the collection of account login credentials (i.e., username/e-mail and password) to the correct account for the website being visited or to other accounts such as YouTube, Google account.
(4) Leaked sensitive PII	Privacy and security danger; hacking of other sensitive/personally identifiable data; collection of sensitive or PII, e.g., bank details and PII such as an address, postcode, date of birth, age, or phone number.

Ethics

We carefully designed the workshop with the participant children's safety and privacy being the most important consideration. Figure 7 provides a bird's eye view of the workshop.

- (1) The parents sign consent for their children to participate in the workshops and give the researchers licence to use the drawings in future publications.
- (2) A teacher facilitates the workshop and signs a consent form to do this.
- (3) We use Microsoft Teams as the most secure option.




Fig. 7. Bird's eye view of workshop.

- (4) A safeguarder will be in the Teams room—not participating but having the authority to call a halt if anything is considered to be unsafe for the participants.
- (5) The camera is not switched on to preserve the anonymity of the children.
- (6) The researchers record the discussions and the audio files will be stored on the University of Strathclyde's secure servers.
- (7) The lead researcher ensures that children's names, if they are mentioned, are removed before transcription takes place.
- (8) Once transcribed, recordings are destroyed to preserve anonymity.
- (9) Drawings will be sent to a team member to ensure that no identifying information has inadvertently been included. Any that appear will be removed before drawings are made available for analysis to the research team.
- (10) Children receive a certificate of participation—these are printed and sent to the school so the teacher can write the children's names on them (once again to preserve anonymity).
- (11) The school receives a sum of money so that they can buy equipment for their classroom.
- (12) Teachers receive a voucher to thank them for their facilitation of the workshop.

Strathclyde Ethics Approval #1619; Northumbria #39624; Brunel #32792-MHR-Nov/2021-4711-1; the other institutions accepted Strathclyde's Approval. The data were stored on the University of Strathclyde's secure servers. All consent forms and drawings are stored in a locked cabinet and will be retained for 10 years as required by the lead author's institution.





Fig. 8. Scenario 1 drawings.




Fig. 9. Scenario 2 drawings.

(a) Drawing WS3-P04 (Category 1)



(b) Drawing WS5-P05 (Category 2)



(c) Drawing WS3-P12 (Category 4)






Fig. 10. Scenario 3 drawings.

(a) Drawing WS7-P09 (Category 1)



(b) Drawing WS2-P01 (Category 2 & 4)




(c) Drawing WS7-P16 (Category 2 & 3)




Fig. 11. Scenario 4 drawings.


(a) Drawing WS3-P05 (Scenario 3)




(b) Drawing WS3-P01 (Scenario 4)



(c) Drawing WS3-P08 (Scenario 1)



(d) Drawing WS3-P19 (Scenario 1)



(e) Drawing WS4-P20 (Scenario 1)



(f) Drawing WS3-P30 (Scenario 1)





Fig. 12. Discussion drawings (Continued)


(g) Drawing WS7-P19 (Scenario 1)



(h) Drawing WS4-P06 (Scenario 4)



(i) Drawing WS3-P29 (Scenario 1)



(j) Drawing WS2-P01 (Scenario 4)




Fig. 12. Continued

Acknowledgements

We are indebted to the teachers for facilitating the workshops on our behalf—none of this would have been possible without them. We are grateful to our child participants for their enthusiasm and delightful responses. We thank Chelsea Jarvie for being a safeguarder. We thank Kirsty McFaul and Scott Hunter from Education Scotland for helping to recruit schools and supporting our research. Finally, we thank our anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments and suggestions that helped us to improve this article.

Author Statement

The ethical design of these workshops was published in a white article (as required by our funder). However, this was published before the workshops took place. As such, this article reports on our findings and the analysis of the drawings and transcripts, and suggestions for future work based on our new insights. The design and ethical considerations are included for the sake of completeness here.

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Received 23 March 2023; revised 6 February 2024; accepted 11 February 2024