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Rebalancing the board's agenda.

Nordberg, D., 2007. Rebalancing the board's agenda. Journal of General Management, 33 (2), 13 - 23 .

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DOI: 10.1177/030630700703300202

Abstract

Since 2002, the activities of corporate boards have been dominated by the governance agenda. In Europe - to an even greater degree than the United States - governance codes have proliferated. This paper examines the resulting imbalance, where compliance with codes of conduct threatens to overwhelm the board's primary responsibility, i.e. the creation of wealth. We consider a model of board processes that starts with four key roles: setting direction, marshalling resources, controlling and reporting, and evaluating and enhancing for the next cycle. "We must urgently bring back some pragmatism to corporate governance . . . And if we want principles, not detailed rules that try to pre-empt all the eventualities a lawyer can think of." Peter Brabeck-Letmathe, CEO, Nestlé SA. The governance agenda has rightly drawn attention to the work of board committees and the question of the independence of mind directors need to show. But it may have diverted focus from three questions that ought to figure more prominently in the board's work: • How should the board apportion its work between compliance, risk assessment and setting strategic directions? • How do directors become determine when to focus on risk-mitigation and when to encourage strategic risk-taking? • In face of greater personal accountability for governance compliance, where do they draw the line between their role overseeing management and interfering with management's responsibilities? ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR Copyright of Journal of General Management is the property of Braybrooke Press Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.

Item Type:Article
ISSN:0306-3070
Group:Bournemouth University Business School
ID Code:20641
Deposited By: Symplectic RT2
Deposited On:11 Feb 2013 12:17
Last Modified:14 Mar 2022 13:46

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