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Lobbying and the International Accounting Standards Committee.

Kirsch, R.J. and Day, R., 2001. Lobbying and the International Accounting Standards Committee. Working Paper. Poole, UK: Bournemouth University School of Finance and Law. (Unpublished)

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Systems theory and agency theory were employed as the theoretical bases for a study of lobbying and the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) during the years of the Core Standards Programme, 1993-98. External parties made use of formal and informal channels to lobby the IASC. The IASC itself lobbied external parties in efforts to gain support for its activities and proposed standards. Thus, lobbying was multidirectional. The IASC has collaborated with both international and national organisations, such as the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the Accounting Standards Board (ASB), the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), in the development of international accounting standards that can be utilised in cross-border offerings and listings of securities. Thus, a principal / agent model appears too simplistic. Rather, a mutual agency model of collaborative behavior and action appears appropriate.

Item Type:Monograph (Working Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords:Lobbying, IASC, IOSCO, Business Segments, Financial Instruments, Mutual Agency
Group:Bournemouth University Business School
ID Code:3080
Deposited On:11 Jun 2007
Last Modified:14 Mar 2022 13:08


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