

**Democracy Promotion in Reverse? An
Evaluation of the UK and the US's Democracy
Promotion Programmes (2005-2017)**

Meera Patel

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of Bournemouth
University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

January 2020

Bournemouth University

Copyright Statement

“This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with its author and due acknowledgement must always be made of the use of any material contained in, or derived from, this thesis.”

Table of Contents

Table of Tables	5
Acknowledgements	6
Abstract	7
Chapter 1: Introduction	9
1.1 Research Puzzle	9
1.2 Aim	11
1.3 Defining Democracy Promotion in Reverse	12
1.3 The Selection of the UK and the US as Largest Donors	13
1.3 Research Objectives	16
1.4 Limitations of the Research and Expected Outcomes.....	16
Chapter 2: Literature Review	19
2.1 A Brief History of Democracy Promotion.....	19
2.2 What is Democracy Promotion?.....	30
2.3 Democratisation and Democracy Promotion: Emphasising Democracy.....	38
2.4 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy: Understanding Promotion.....	56
Chapter 3: Introducing UK and US Developmental Assistance as Democracy Promotion	77
3.1 The UK	77
3.2 The US	82
Chapter 4: Concluding Remarks of Literature Review	87
Chapter 5: Conceptual Framework	95
5.1 The Benchmarks of Democracy Promotion.....	100
5.1.1 Fundamental Rights.....	100
5.1.2 Participatory Engagement	102
5.1.3 Impartial Administration	104
5.2 UK Democracy Promotion Scenarios.....	109
5.2.1 The UK and Fundamental Rights	109
5.2.2 The UK and Participatory Engagement.....	113
5.2.3 The UK and Impartial Administration.....	117
5.3 US Democracy Promotion Scenarios	121
5.3.1 The US and Fundamental Rights.....	121
5.3.2 The US and Participatory Engagement.....	126
5.3.3 The US and Impartial Administration	129
5.4 Conceptual Framework Summary	133
Chapter 6: Methodology	137
6.1 Research ethics.....	143
Chapter 7: General Findings from the UK and the US Empirical Investigations	148
Chapter 8: Empirical Investigations and Findings for the UK	154

8.1 Fundamental Rights	155
8.2 Participatory Engagement	162
8.3 Impartial Administration	200
Chapter 9: US Findings and Comparison to UK Democracy Promotion	230
Chapter 10: Empirical Investigation and Findings Summary	251
Chapter 11: Thesis Conclusion	256
11.1 Literature Review	256
11.2 Conceptual Framework	261
11.3 Empirical Investigation and Findings	264
11.4 Policy Recommendations and Future Research Challenges	268
11.5 Final Reflections	268
Appendix 1: The IDEA Framework to Democratisation	271
Appendix 2: Participant Interview Guide	274
<i>The Global State of Democracy</i>	<i>274</i>
<i>Promoting democracy</i>	<i>275</i>
<i>Practical democracy promotion</i>	<i>278</i>
<i>Criteria of evaluating democracy promotion</i>	<i>279</i>
<i>Democracy promotion in reverse?</i>	<i>280</i>
Appendix 3: Participant Information Sheet	281
Appendix 4: Participant Agreement Form	286
References	289

Table of Figures

Figure 1: A graph representation of the ascension and slight decline of electoral and liberal democracies between 1974 and 2013 (Diamond, 2015 p. 143).	46
Figure 2: The Global State of Democracy. Source: (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017, p. 10)	67
Figure 3: Flow diagram representing democracy promotion in reverse. Source: Author's own.	92
Figure 4: Democracy promotion as democratisation. Source: Author's own	93
Figure 5: Democracy promotion as foreign policy. Source: Author's own	94
Figure 6: Conceptual Framework: Operationalised democracy promotion	97
Figure 7: UK democracy promotion programme. Source: Author's own (adapted from DFID, UK Aid, FCO and MoD documents).....	108
Figure 8: Democracy promotion through fundamental rights. Source: Author's own	112
Figure 9: Democracy promotion through participatory engagement. Source: Author's own ...	116
Figure 10: Democracy promotion through impartial administration. Source: Author's own....	119
Figure 11: US democracy promotion programmes. Source: Author's own (adapted from USAID documents).....	120
Figure 12: Democracy promotion through fundamental rights. Source: Author's own	125
Figure 13: Democracy promotion through participatory engagement. Source: Author's own .	128
Figure 14: Democracy promotion through impartial administration. Source: Author's own....	132
Figure 15: Research Objectives and how they will be produced through the methodology	147

Table of Tables

Table 1: Main concepts and points discussed relating to democracy promotion through democratisation (Source: Author.)	55
Table 2: Highlighting the key aspects of democracy as a foreign policy. Source: Author.....	76
Table 3: Interview sample	146

Acknowledgements

There are many people who have lent their time and expertise towards the completion of this thesis. I would like to thank Professor Lee Miles for believing in my academic capabilities and supervising me whilst writing this thesis, and to Bournemouth University's Disaster Management Centre for their kind words of encouragement

I would also like to give thanks to my partner, Callum, for his encouragement throughout the years and who has suffered from the time and energy I have spent on this thesis. To Sophie Louise Hyde for sharing her knowledge and providing me with inspiration when I needed it and to numerous other family and friends who have supported me over the past few years.

Most importantly, my greatest gratitude and thanks to my parents, for whom I would not have been able to study for this thesis. Without their absolute support, advice and unconditional love, this would not have been possible to do and I am forever grateful for their exceptional care throughout this journey.

Abstract

This thesis provides an original contribution to knowledge by arguing that UK and US democracy promotion is in reverse. In order to fully understand democracy promotion in an era of democratic decline, this thesis draws upon two dominant theories: democratisation and foreign policy analysis. This thesis critically evaluates applied democracy promotion, thereby transitioning theoretical research into practical democracy promotion and arguing it is in reverse.

Democracy promotion as democratisation can be explained as the process by which developing, or undemocratic nations, use to transition towards democracy. Democracy promotion as a foreign policy has developed from the UK and the US's motives to build relationships with developing nations in order to achieve necessary foreign policy goals. The UK and the US are the two most prominent promoters of democracy, thus have been chosen as donor nations as they use democratisation and foreign policy as a channel to facilitate this.

An unequal relationship between donor states and recipient states has occurred due to a misunderstanding of democracy promotion aims and objectives. This shows democracy promotion is in reverse as donors promote democracy in their own interests and not for the needs of the recipients. More importantly, although democracy promotion is becoming more prevalent than ever, the misalignment of aims and objectives from donors has led to the argument that democracy promotion is in reverse.

The purpose of this research is twofold. Firstly, in order to argue democracy promotion is in reverse, it is necessary to understand *what* democracy promotion is and *who* is promoting it. Secondly, it is crucial to evaluate *how* democracy is promoted. By positing a holistic picture of democracy promotion, this thesis asserts that democracy promotion is in reverse. Alongside the usage of secondary data sources, (including a literature review and document analysis), data was collected through interviews to generate primary data. This thesis offers a comparative analysis of the UK and the US's democracy promotion programmes from 2005-2017, with the timeframe

chosen in order to capture the period of decline in the number of democracies worldwide. The central argument for democracy promotion in reverse is that the UK and the US's, as donors of democracy promotion, reinforce their self-image of democracy at home, into recipient nations, rather than strengthening permanent outcomes of democracy in a form that is best suited to the recipient. This lack of permanent change within recipient states is further enhanced by the lack of universal application of guidelines to UK and US democracy promotion programmes. Consequently, with no universal methodology enforced by the UK and the US to programmes, it has become unclear as to whether it is a successful endeavour and allows space for donors to benefit more from programmes. This thesis is unique in its exploration of this topic as previous scholarship has concentrated on acknowledging that democratisation has stagnated in the past decade, yet has failed to develop a deeper rationale for this. This thesis presents the evidence for this decline in democracy, as democracy promotion in reverse.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Research Puzzle

Democracy has been in decline for over a decade:

‘The reversal has spanned a variety of countries in every region, from long-standing democracies like the United States to consolidated authoritarian regimes like China and Russia.

The overall losses are still shallow compared with the gains of the late 20th century, but the pattern is consistent and ominous. *Democracy is in retreat,*’ (Freedom House, 2019, p. n.p.).

However, democracy promotion is more prominent than ever within international agendas. Democracy assistance and promotion are well established objectives and there has been a rising emphasis on the conditionality of them, where democracy promotion is a pre-requisite for receiving aid. Yet, the evaluation and conceptualisation of democracy promotion (its aims, how it is done and who benefits from it), is less developed. In reality, the trends are in reverse; Chapter 2 and 3 will show evidence of this. There are, presently, a declining number of democracies worldwide (see Figure 1, p. 46), at the very time when funding is growing and even perhaps at an all-time high. With the UK and the US as the West’s largest democracy promoters, they offer sufficient comparability and evidence for this thesis to argue democracy promotion is in reverse. Within this thesis, references to ‘the West’ and ‘donors’ are assumed as the UK and the US, unless stated otherwise.

Three problems have arisen from surveying current literature and researching democracy promotion. Firstly, billions of pounds and dollars are invested in programmes, but there is still a lack of clarity surrounding *how* to promote democracy. Literature tends to use a definition of what criteria is included in promoting democracy, but there is little understanding into how to promote democracy effectively in order to provide long-term outcomes for recipient nations. It has been considered as a Western governed strategy where ‘democracy-promotion groups funnel money to nascent political parties and help train people to run the institutions considered central to

democracy...Western advisers push democratic ideas and try to strengthen local civic organizations...when the opportunity for a new government arises, the wisdom goes,' (Cambanis, 2014, p. n.p.). This links to the idea of democracy promotion in reverse; it is no longer a recipient-based initiative and there is limited information on how to promote democracy universally, so that recipient nations are able to sustain democratisation after donors leave. This leads onto the second research problem.

Secondly, there is a lack of critical analysis and evaluation of democracy promotion programmes. By viewing projects through retrospect, lessons learnt can help enable success for future projects. This could help explain why democracy promotion is in reverse; donor states are protecting and investing in their own interests rather than that of the recipient states. Once this is realised, there is a reduced incentive for donors to study the lessons learnt regarding democracy promotion. Donor states might be successful in their aims, but the overall outcomes of the promotion of democracy does not result in permanent change within the recipient nations. As Huber argues, 'a decline in the power of democracies would necessarily imply a weakening to promote democracy,' (2015, p. 186), highlighting democracy promotion, and democracy as a regime in itself, is currently in crisis. The West reflects their democracy promotion programmes in the image of what they want it to be, rather than what the recipient needs; democracy promotion is in reverse.

Lastly, although there are international frameworks produced to aid donor states to universally adopt a methodology to promote democracy, the UK and the US do not use it. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) framework will be used as a reference in this thesis for universal application and guidance of how to promote democracy. The IDEA State of Democracy aims to:

'guarantee equality and basic freedoms; to resolve disagreements through peaceful dialogues; and to bring about political and social renewal...The democracy assessment framework gives groups of people in any one country a mirror with which they can assess the quality of their democracy,' (Beetham, et al., 2008, p. 17).

The freedom in allowing recipients to assess their own democracy encourages recipients to be less reliant on donors, aiding the process of these states to democratise sustainably. This will also form the benchmarks for democracy promotion that this thesis has created through the Conceptual Framework (see Chapter 5, p. 95). However, both the UK and the US use criteria that they have set themselves, with no uniform way of conducting their programmes. Therefore, projects implemented are not piloted using the same objectives and design structures necessary to create permanent outcomes. This makes it hard to apply a general standard of benchmarks for democracy promotion programmes when both states do not use the IDEA framework. It is important that democracy is promoted using a neutral framework, with uniform guidelines, in order to reduce donor bias and recipient reliance on democratisation assistance. Consequently, there is no consensus on how to promote democracy and this limits the ability for donors to provide impartial democracy promotion programmes.

Ultimately, the problem is that democracy promotion is very reputable in international agendas, however the execution and the tools needed to evaluate the process are not well established. What it does, how it is done and to whom it is being done for, is currently unclear, leading to democracy promotion in reverse.

1.2 Aim

As explained by the research puzzle, the aim of this thesis is to critically evaluate the UK and the US's democracy promotion programmes (focusing on the years 2005-2017). The central argumentation of this thesis is that an unequal relationship between the donors and recipients causes a lack of universal and neutral application of democracy promotion. This has led to a reversal in the way democracy is promoted as the donors benefit more than the recipients and there is little evidence to show long-term outcomes within these nations. The intention is to answer the primary question of why democracy promotion is in reverse. This idea builds upon the conception that donors promote democracy reflecting their own experience of it, leading to reinforcing that image upon recipients, instead of supporting the recipient's need. The

contribution to knowledge will be identifying key factors to why UK and US democracy promotion is in reverse.

1.3 Defining Democracy Promotion in Reverse

This thesis defines ‘democracy promotion in reverse’ as the complex understanding of the implementation of democratic ideologies (by donors) and the outcomes of their aid programmes on recipient nations. The ‘in reverse’ predominantly leads to directly (or indirectly) reinforcing the donor’s own self-image of democracy within the recipient nation(s). Under this definition of democracy promotion in reverse, the donor’s self-image is being promoted, transcending into not achieving the result of greater democratisation and permanent outcomes of democratic principles through such programmes.

This definition of democracy promotion in reverse can be assessed in three ways. First, democracy promotion in reverse is a consequence of donor-centric agenda/goal-setting, where the donor countries prioritise their own interests above the democratisation of the recipient. These interests fall under the concepts of fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration. Alternatively, what the donors are promoting is the idea that their own democracies are the best form of regime to implement. This can be considered as ‘what’ is democracy promotion in reverse.

Second, democracy promotion in reverse can be understood in an operational sense as the process of auditing the application of democracy promotion programmes, in practice. The explicit focus of operationalising democracy promotion is in understanding that it represents an interactive process between donors and recipients. Particular programme objectives, aims and outcomes may be designed to have greater beneficial impact on the donor nations, rather than the recipients. Hence, there is a need for auditing these processes through feedback loops and communication between donors and recipient. This allows for successes and failures to be assessed; this can be considered as the evaluation of ‘how’ democracy promotion is in reverse.

Third, democracy promotion in reverse can be assessed in terms of considering the role of donors in producing particular outcomes within recipient states. In this thesis, certain regions and states receive closer examination primarily because they reflect the interests of particular donors and thus were the primary targets of UK/US developmental assistance. Therefore, this explores the outcomes of the pursuit of donor self-image since the targeting aspect is not neutral and reflects donor bias. This represents the ‘why’ of democracy promotion in reverse.

This thesis argues that the process of democratisation aid from donors to recipients does not facilitate permanent outcomes at present and has become donor-centric. One of the main contributions to knowledge put forward by this thesis is in offering a distinctive emphasis and clear evidence of democracy promotion in reverse. It demonstrates that recipients are not the sole beneficiaries of programmes and do not experience long-term outcomes associated with democracy as a regime. This also links to a wider debates and trends of a reversion away from democracy by non-democratic recipient nations who have no experiences of democracy (democracy in decline/crisis).

1.3 The Selection of the UK and the US as Largest Donors

This thesis focuses on the UK and the US as case studies since they are regarded as key and influential donors engaged in democracy promotion, internationally. This is evidenced in several ways. First, the UK and the US are often regarded as two of the largest donors in terms of the size of their budget allocation to international development and to whom they prioritise as recipient nations. This thesis uses these nations as comparative cases. However, it does not represent a large scale study of all donors; rather it draws upon verification made by other key organisations and studies that the UK and the US are indeed large contributors to democracy promotion. For example, through the work of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (Development Assistance Committee), and assessment of trends within developmental assistance. Second, the selection is further verified by the fact that the expenditure of both countries is expanding. The UK’s expenditure on international development rose from 3% in 2015/16 to

2016/17 in 5.1% (Development Assistance Committee, 2018). This is a substantial rise in spending in an era where the British economy was experiencing austerity, highlighting that the UK prioritises democracy promotion as a forefront issue of foreign policy.

The top five countries receiving aid in 2016/17 were Pakistan, Syria, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Afghanistan with education, health and population being the largest sector of investment (Development Assistance Committee, 2018). The regions the UK chooses to promote democracy in are important. These are areas of geopolitical interest to the UK government. Furthermore, there has been a longstanding presence of UK military and diplomatic efforts to democratise some of these nations for many years. If democracy promotion in the UK works, then these nations should have shown dramatic increases in their levels of democracy. There are some successes, such as Pakistan. According to Freedom House, Pakistan's level of democracy has been stated as 'not free' in 2005 (Freedom House, 2005) to 'partly free' in 2017 (Freedom House, 2017). No change within a volatile region shows that there has not been a reversion away from donor assistance at least. However, Afghanistan for example was rated 'not free' in 2010 and in 2017 was still rated 'not free' (Freedom House, 2010) (Freedom House, 2017). There has been no change in Afghanistan's levels of democracy despite the UK being a developmental facilitator within the nation for over a decade. Syria is another example, showing it was the most undemocratic nation in the world in 2017 (Freedom House, 2017), despite very public media coverage and presence of UK efforts in Syria. Ethiopia is a crucial example of UK democracy promotion not working; in 2010 it was classified as partly free (Freedom House, 2010) to being not free in 2017 (Freedom House, 2017). The UK has also had presence in Africa for decades and democracy is reverting within many nations there such as Nigeria, (used as a case study and explored in more depth in Chapter 8), highlighting that there is something going wrong with UK democracy promotion. These cases show that UK democracy promotion has either created no change or led to nations reversing away from democratisation.

The US has also invested millions of dollars into democracy promotion programmes spanning several decades. Interestingly however, their expenditure has stayed steady at 0.9% and similarly

to the UK the biggest spending was in the area of education, health and population (Development Assistance Committee, 2018); showing that these donors promote under similar motives. The US's top five recipient states for 2016/17 were Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya and South Sudan (Development Assistance Committee, 2018). It is important to highlight that the UK and the US's top priority countries are situated in the same regions. This reemphasises the argument of foreign policy-led democracy promotion.

Afghanistan has a clear foreign policy influence to developmental assistance over the last few decades, but their levels of democratisation in 2017 were the same as they were back in 2005 (Freedom House, 2005). Moreover, South Sudan is also a clear example of US geopolitical motivations for democracy assistance, but that their efforts have made little efforts in democratising the nation. In 2017, the nation was rated 7/7, which in Freedom House terms is the highest level of undemocratic factors resulting in the nation being a complete non-democracy (Freedom House, 2017). The nation became recognised by Freedom House in 2012 and its levels of freedom were rated at 5.5/7. This shows that over the past five years, democracy has declined in the nation despite it being a major recipient target of US aid. Jordan and Kenya are both explored in Chapter 9 through empirical evidence, highlighting the involvement of UK/US democracy promotion. Nonetheless, they have seen similar levels of democracy fluctuating over the last few decades with Jordan's rating in 2005 being 4.5/7 (Freedom House, 2005) and in 2017 being rated as 5 (Freedom House, 2017), (a very undramatic increase). Kenya has also seen little change, going from a rating of 3/7 (Freedom House, 2005) to 4/7 (Freedom House, 2017) in the same timeframe.

Despite the millions of pounds and dollars being spent on programmes, democracy is in more crisis than ever and there is a strong argument (presented by this thesis) that this is due to the way donors promote democracy: in their own flawed self-image, foreign policy motives that are not enduring and there is no universal guidelines to ensure donors are not biased in their promotion of programmes. These are explored in more depth later on, however it is important to explain why the UK and the US have been selected as the donors under critical evaluation.

1.3 Research Objectives

The main objectives will be to:

- 1) Develop a Conceptual Framework (building on fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration as benchmarks for democracy promotion), to assess how democracy is promoted by the UK and the US and to explore whether democracy promotion is a successful and long-term, policy.
- 2) Critically assess the UK and the US's programmes, in order to demonstrate evidence that supports the central argument of democracy promotion is in reverse.
- 3) Identify key aspects of democracy promotion and, in turn, provide evidence that (using interviews and data collection) the process is a donor-centric initiative.

1.4 Limitations of the Research and Expected Outcomes

This thesis looks at the concept of *democracy promotion*, not the concept of *democracy*, and is an indicative study, not as a case study. It does not seek to review the issues of democratisation and foreign policy analysis, but to use these theories to contextualise the operationalisation of democracy promotion. The thesis is, therefore, limited in relation to some theoretical perspectives. It is not possible to review and analyse every document and democracy promotion programme enforced by the UK and the US. This thesis has selected programmes that are relevant to the aims and objectives at hand.

There are also some limitations to the data collection sampling. The selection and criteria of participants was of a specific, representative sample of those who work in the field of democracy promotion. A snowball sample provided a consistency in the knowledge of participants; an open semi-structured interview allowed for depth to the interviews. The data collection does not aim to achieve a high quantity of participants, but to provide a high quality of relevant and experienced interviewees. Therefore, the potential impact of this limitation is that any generalisations on the outcomes of democracy promotion in reverse are from a smaller, representative sample. Though

the quality of the findings is not impacted, the limited sample number and specifications could impact the ability to argue for broad generalities, for example, that all democracy promoters feel that democracy promotion is or is not, in reverse. Although, it does allow for a similarity in the experience and knowledge of participants which means the data collected were of a similar level of importance and validity.

This thesis seeks to address the issues that have arisen surrounding UK and US democracy promotion and so, the expected outcome of this thesis draws out why democracy promotion is in reverse. As outlined on pp. 9, the problem with democracy promotion lays with the way democracy is promoted by the donors and to recipients. There are few studies, currently, on how and what democracy promotion is and by what method it operates in terms of practical implementation. This is one of the first studies to address these issues and to present arguments to answer the question of *why* democracy promotion is in reverse. The hypotheses of the thesis are simple:

- 1) Democracy is promoted in the donor's self-image, thus is promoting a flawed concept of democracy into a developing nation (which contributes to the decline in democracies around the world).
- 2) The lack of uniformity in the UK and the US's democracy promotion programmes leads to no permanent outcomes or lack of democratic sustainability in recipient nations.

These observations provide reasoning behind why democracy is in crisis. The thesis also puts forward a suggestion to practitioners of democracy promotion, to make it a more viable and long-term initiative (see Chapter 5, p. 95 and Chapter 11, p. 268; 256). The specific focus of this thesis is on UK and US programmes concerning fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration (see Figures 8-10 and 12-14). The regions and targeted countries reflect the OECD's top five nations for UK and US developmental assistance. Programmes are focused on African nations predominantly, but also some Latin American and Middle Eastern nations. Nations from Africa, Asia and Latin America have been selected in order to assess UK and US

democracy promotion programmes within those regions as it is crucial to be able to evaluate areas that not only reflect the OECD's analysis of recipient countries, but also to shine a light on the areas that are experiencing the most amount of democratisation. Chapter 5 shows a range of recipient nations spanning these areas and the figures within this chapter show how democracy promotion is in reverse by giving examples of where there are failings from the donors. Moreover, Chapters 8 and 9 show evidence of democracy promotion in reverse within these regions through empirical evidence collected through qualitative semi-structured interviews. As a result, the combined Conceptual Framework and data analysis has confirmed that in the largest regions of democratisation, donors are promoting democracy to benefit themselves; the process is in reverse.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 A Brief History of Democracy Promotion

In order to understand how democracy promotion is in reverse it is necessary to discuss the concept of democracy promotion as it has transitioned from post-World War Two to 2017 and the conceptualisation and literature around it. This chapter will broadly discuss the three waves of democracy promotion. There is an observation that ‘the UK and the US both emphasise what they respectively term ‘rule of law’ and ‘administration of justice’ programmes,’ (Crawford, 2001, p. 143) as objectives and this proves to be fundamental to analysing the progression of the democracy promotion waves. This section therefore highlights the defining moments of democracy promotion as a concept and aligns with Huntington’s waves of democratisation analysis.

1. First wave: 1945 to the early 1970s, democracy promotion as foreign policy containment

After World War Two, it was evident that a dictatorship like the one the Nazis created should never occur in the international arena ever again. The ‘first wave’ of democracy promotion therefore was very fixated on the policy of containment. This was primarily driven by the US as they were the dominant hegemonic power after the war ended and the post-war global order was designed by top US policymakers (Robinson, 1996, p. 14). Crucially, in a world that had seen many withstanding democracies succumb to the War, the US were the ones who drove the process of international development through foreign policy. Furthermore, ‘the historical record shows the principal form was the development of strategic alliances with authoritarian and dictatorial regimes,’ (Robinson, 1996, p. 15). By the time the Cold War was unfolding, there was a much stronger emphasis on US foreign policy-led democracy promotion as the developing South became more vocal against their oppressive regimes, democracy promotion became more relevant. Robinson explains:

‘A ‘democracy promotion’ apparatus was created in the policymaking establishment, including new governmental and quasi-governmental agencies and bureaus, studies and conferences by policy planning institutes, and government agencies to draft and implement ‘democracy promotion’ programs,’ (Robinson, 1996, p. 16).

The dominance the US in particular was showcasing, in reaction to the Cold War intensifying, showed democracy promotion became heavily bureaucratic and focused on donor centric motivations. The containment of Communism was the forefront issue, not democratising undemocratic regimes.

The start of the Cold War presented a lack of clarity in what and where promotion should entail/be. Nonetheless, ‘under polyarchic definitions, a system can acquire a democratic form without a democratic context’ (Robinson, 1996, p. 57). Furthermore, the Cold War era only supercharged the political tensions between the global North and South: ‘the US rode the crest of global power in the decades following World War Two. With its overwhelming military superiority, economic power and political influence, Washington had little difficulty imposing its will on the Third World through ‘straight power relations’,’ (Robinson, 1996, p. 74). Although the political landscape gave scope for nations like the US to assert their promotion of their own democracies abroad, ‘the global US empire was shaken in the 1960s and 1970s by nationalist revolutions in the Third World,’ (Robinson, 1996, p. 74). Highlighted here is the US has been fighting against these ‘waves (Huntington) against democratisation for decades’ and what currently is occurring (2005-2017) is the Third Wave in reverse. However, during the development of democracy promotion through the ‘second wave of democratisation’, there was a clearer focus on *what* to promote: ‘democracy begins with respect for human rights and liberties, the rule of law, and election and includes the outlawing of racial ethnic, gender and other forms of discrimination,’ (Robinson, 1996, p. 58).

Robinson also talks of how:

‘The ‘Reagan Doctrine’ of aggressive support for counterrevolutionary insurgencies and heightened confrontation with the Soviet Union was backed by the biggest peacetime military build-up in US history and a redeployment of US military, paramilitary, intelligence and political forces around the globe,’ (Robinson, 1996, p. 76).

What is occurring from 1945 to the early 1970s is the rise of aggressive US foreign policy, but also clear examples of the politics of bias that occurs within different governments (and ideologies i.e. Democrats vs. Republican governments). Not only do different elected governments have different motives/approaches to democracy promotion, literature showcases that these are orientated around the donors, not the recipients. This constant motivation for international development has led to democracy promotion becoming more about the donors being dominant actors. It is important to show that post-World War Two to the early 1970s, democracy promotion was foreign policy based and as a consequence, donor-centric. This did not change in the decades post-World War Two, if anything, foreign policy became more aggressive through the heightening on the Cold War. The US reacted to this by creating the National Endowment for Democracy.

2. Second wave: the 1970s-1980s and the establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)

After the development from the post-war eras (World War Two and Cold War), a new strategy was developed in order to transition democracy promotion from foreign policy ideas of containment to the promotion of more emphasis on democracies turning away from dictatorships. Thomas Carothers explains:

‘Most US democracy aid of the 1980s has been directed at countries in transition to democracy, or at least openly attempting to move away from dictatorial rule. Democracy aid has been aimed at non-democratic countries, or what US democracy promoters like to call ‘pre-transition

countries,' such as China, Cuba, Sudan, Nigeria, Vietnam, Yugoslavia and several others,'

(Carothers, 1999, p. 94).

Carothers highlights that there has been a shift towards democratisation aid worldwide, rather than concentrating on the Soviet-bloc and 'faint stirrings in Africa and the Middle East,' (Carothers, 1999, p. 39). This is interesting to highlight as both the US and the UK have focused (from 2005-2017) on specific areas predominantly in Africa and the Middle East. However, the most crucial part of democracy promotion in the 1980s is the importance of the NED, which was created in the US in 1983. Robinson outlined that 'since the advent of the Cold War, the United States has worked abroad politically, mainly covertly, with direct government action and secret financing of private groups...this is necessary for protecting US security interests,' (Robinson, 1996, p. 87). The idea that NED focused on covert operations is striking, considering the world was more open in promoting democracy. There was a move away from the idea of democracy promotion as 'the greater good' and encouraging a peaceful global arena (liberal peace theory), to world dominance through some elements considered undemocratic such as covert tactics which is not transparency driven. Therefore, democracy promotion through NED and the 1980s creates a link between the beginnings of the reversion from democracy from recipient states.

On the other hand, Carothers outlined the approach of NED 'is to spread the idea of democracy, to support the development of civil society, and to help open some political space ... NED is the most active American organization in promoting democracy in nondemocratic countries,' (Carothers, 1999, p. 95). Carothers shows more of a focus on fundamental rights based democracy promotion throughout the 1980s, a contrasting view from Robinson. Furthermore, Carothers argues the funding is there and recipients received the aid, therefore democratisation is facilitating through developmental assistance: 'majority of the Endowment's discretionary grants, which currently amount to approximately half of NED grants, go directly to organizations in recipient countries,' (Carothers, 1999, p. 258). However, a weakness of this approach is that 'external project methods in which people from the country providing the aid, dominate every step of the process,' (Carothers, 1999, p. 257). This is crucial in the understanding of the process and role

donors played in this era of democracy promotion. Although the recipients are getting most of the money directly, the donor nation is still dominating the implementation so the process is in reverse; it should be recipients driving their democratisation and the donors supporting.

Moreover, NED's clear purpose was to enhance the democracy of nations that had little to no experience of it, 'role of NED aid in resisting backsliding regimes or in weakening authoritarian regimes [was to] advance democratization. In practice, this 'dictatorship resistance' role results in NED aid allocations to countries with poor or declining democracy scores,' (Scott & Steele, 2005, p. 440). Another key point to be made is the significance of foreign policy in the 1980s and the impact this had in terms of *why* democracy was promoted. Carothers explains 'the 1980s were an essential start-up period. But in those years democracy promotion was deeply and in some sense fatally, entangled with Cold-War politics,' (Carothers, 2006, p. 3). Again, it is important to highlight this because it helps understand *what* and *why* democracy is promoted.

Overall, the issue surrounding democracy promotion in the late 1970s throughout the 1980s is the easily changeable foreign policy motives that drive not only why democracy is promoted but to whom it is being promoted to. The first waves of democratisation focused on political foreign policy, whereas the second wave focused on a wider reach to undemocratic nations, globally.

3. Third wave: democracy promotion in the 1990s, highlighting 'Good Governance'

As explored above, from 1945-1990 the focus was explicitly on political, foreign policy led motives for democracy promotion. However, with more global powers rising (such as the UK) the world was becoming a more open place, with more prominent donors. There was less policies surrounding containment after the collapse of the Soviet Union and now a greater focus on what the World Bank reported as 'good governance'. The 1990s became not just about the Third Wave of democratisation, but a real emphasis now on what democracy promotion includes. It highlighted a 'major change in development discourse is the current emphasis on participation.

Participation was of course also a key pillar of the good governance agenda, but now the World Bank believes elections are not enough,' (Abrahamsen, 2013, p. 243).

The Berg Report from the World Bank outlined 'Sub-Saharan African countries are in a crisis that can only be surmounted by the joint efforts of African governments and the donor community,' (World Bank, 1981, p. 132). The World Bank's primary focus of developmental assistance was therefore directed at Africa: 'the African crisis led to a renewed focus on democracy promotion within the continent, especially as this was not a region of interest until the 1990s,' (World Bank, 1981, p. 7). It is notable that there is a shift from previous notions of donors leading the process of democratisation in previous decades, to the establishments of building relationships between recipients and donors. Furthermore, the report argued 'policy action and foreign assistance that are mutually reinforcing will surely work together to build a continent that shows real gains in both development and income in the near future,' (World Bank, 1981, p. 133). There were hopeful signs for the 1990s of democracy promotion.

There is also a recognition in the 1990s of the differences that are emerging from hegemonies such as the US and UK/Europe. Moss suggests 'the US has high ideological content, especially in comparison with Europe's more openly Machiavellian approach to policy-making and justifications for intervention abroad,' (Moss, 1995, p. 191). Moss's observation is important to take note of because it shows that these different approaches reflect the way democracy is promoted; this could result in inadequate democratisation assistance. Again, this is reiterating the need for universal application that is not donor-centric or bias but from 'many politicians and observers [who] have called for a more rational and less ideological approach to foreign policy based on interests as well as ideals and values, not least as regards the developing world,' (Moss, 1995, p. 191) (see p. 62 'values vs. interests).

Many academics have commented on the World Bank's report changing the role of democracy promotion. For example, Dunn wrote: 'Western forces and international lending agencies- such as the IMF and World Bank- are less concerned with 'democratizing' African societies as they

are in transforming them into open market economies,' (Dunn, 1999, p. 2). The much commented on African crisis begins to highlight the shift away from foreign policy to one focused on institution building and promoting a capitalist society, one that mirrors Western democracies and democracy promotion in their self-image and experiences.

A crucial academic observation of the 1990s era of democracy promotion is:

'The new focus upon governance is based upon a growing consensus in the wider development community that political considerations play a crucial role in determining development. Clearly, though this consensus is itself partially the result of the Bank's own focus on governance...there can be little doubt that the Bank is influenced by Western countries and in particular the United States,' (Williams & Young, 1994, p. 87).

It must be reiterated that the issue surround Western donors being influential on the 'good governance' approach shows how political bias can seep into programmes and then the projects become less about democratisation and more about the ambitions of donors (see 'political bias of democracy promotion' p. 59). The 1990s era shows how the simmering of democracy promotion backwards and the reversion away from democratisation has led to a decline from 2005 onwards in democracies. Most importantly, 'the question ask is what drives this unyielding need in Western culture to promote 'good governance' to others by redesigning them?' (Williams & Young, 1994, p. 99). One answer to this is 'there have always been strings attached to development assistance, but these have been of different kinds, varying with the donor,' (Stokke, 1995, p. viii). A major argument this thesis makes for democracy promotion being in reverse is that donors benefit more which is not how democratisation can flourish. This idea of strings attached is explored in Chapters 8 and 9, but it is important to bear this in mind when assessing the history of democracy promotion. Furthermore, 'for the donor governments, development assistance has been- and still is-an instrument to pursue foreign policy objectives,' (Stokke, 1995, p. 2). The foreign policy argument has always been clear but what this thesis explores is how this

affects the results of democracy promotion in the context of the current decline and crisis of democracies around the world.

Another detrimental element of democracy promotion in the 1990s (and onwards into the 2000s) has been:

‘Donors have always been concerned with the effectiveness and efficiency of the administrative system at the recipient side to the extent that they, in some recipient countries, establish their own administration to implement aid-financed activities, bypassing domestic systems’ (Stokke, 1995, p. 28).

How is this sustainable for the recipients, resulting in a negative impact of the nation’s development if donors are the ones who are implementers, not the recipient governments, NGOs, CSOs etc.? Stokke provides a possible answer to what Williams and Young questions as to what drives donors to promote ‘good governance’ and democracy? A reason for why donors instil their own administrations and processes is told by Howell and Pearce who argued, ‘donors are usually better resourced and provide the material means for local groups to pursue some of their activities and goals,’ (Howell & Pearce, 2001, p. 231), offering a different standpoint on donor influence to Stokke. Even more important to this thesis’s analysis of the idea of reliance on donor’s aid meaning recipient nations cannot democratise autonomously without the donor. Democracy promotion creates ‘this material imbalance [of] relationships of dependency, whereby organizations receiving donor funding lose sight of their programs and objectives to donor requirements,’ (Howell & Pearce, 2001, p. 231). This decades old way of promoting democracy has resulted in the backlash against democracy (Carothers) and rise in hybrid/semi-authoritarian regimes (Zakaria and Ottaway).

An additional important point relevant to this thesis’s observation of the ‘waves’ of democracy promotion comes from the ever increasing argument that as a concept, it was becoming more political, and less ‘facilitative’ and there needed to be frameworks in place to ensure

democratisation was monitored. This is seen throughout this wave through a few key examples. The US intervention in Liberia shows this well: ‘the Americans were coming not to intervene, but to pluck their own people from the midst of impending tribal butchery and leave the country to its fate’ (as quoted by the wife of the American ambassador at the time),’ (Moore, 1996, p. 123). Furthermore, ‘the absence of clear US interests has left Africa at the bottom of foreign policy concerns,’ (Moore, 1996, p. 195). Reiterated is the shift in policy interest has an adverse effect on recipient nations. It shows the reversion from ‘good governance’ from 1990 to the re-emergence of political gains by donors as the 2000s drew closer. Hearn also highlights how the US’s primary interest in another African nation, Ghana, was driven by politics, ‘consolidating democracy lies at the heart of the US aid programme. The maturing of multi-party democracy is a high foreign policy priority for the United States in Ghana,’ (Hearn, 1997, p. 9). Nevertheless, the dynamic aspect of democracy promotion in the 1990s is that the timing of it is complicated and there is a need for frameworks. Hearn argues ‘democratic ‘consolidation’ involves a more profound, transformative level of intervention because it is not simply about putting in place political institutions and a political framework, but it is about creating support for the liberal values that will maintain that framework,’ (Hearn, 2002, p. 106). Although Hearn does not generalise USAID’s work in Ghana to the wider field, the whole point of democracy promotion is to instil long-term outcomes. If Ghana is a case of success because donors have focused on grassroots levels of democratisation, then that should be applicable elsewhere. Both Moore and Hearn highlight how foreign policy overrides the goal of good governance, ‘as the justifications for liberal democracy are becoming more and more flawed, the calls for the betterment of its *techniques* become increasingly harsh,’ (Moore, 1996, p. 127).

The contrast between US and UK approaches during the good governance era however is quite interesting. For example ‘other donors, such as the UK, do not have significant programmes in this area [elections]. The UK, in its democracy and governance assistance, generally emphasises public sector support,’ (Hearn, 1997, p. 14). The different approaches are examined in depth in Chapter 3, however the difference in approaches supports the need for universal application of democracy promotion.

As mentioned earlier, Robinson and Dahl's definition of polyarchy promotes neither democracy nor no democracy, however a criticism of this in the approach to democracy *promotion* comes from Hearn again, 'within this [polyarchy] definition, democracy is limited to the political sphere. It focuses on process and clearly differentiates process from substance,' (Hearn, 1997, p. 15). Without substance to these programmes, how can recipients transition? Moore further observes:

'There is some evidence that the most prosperous western societies have been democratic, and that they have recently had the most competent and accountable political leaders. But to assume a causal relationship between these favourable outcomes and democracy is misleading because it ignores the cultural and historical factors that led to the current state of affairs' (Moore, 1996, p. 201).

The argument of cultural and historical roots within non-democracies being ignored is vital in showing how the third wave of democracy promotion has become more donor-centric and frames how democracy became to be in decline/crisis from 2005 onwards. However, it is recognised that the third wave of democracy promotion places emphasis on the rise of grassroots organisations and NGOs. Therefore, democracy promotion has become more complicated with local actors becoming more prevalent throughout the 1990s, especially in Africa (The Spirit of Marikana (Sinwell & Mbatha, 2016) being a prime example of how fundamental rights based uprisings by local South Africans can start revolutionary democratisation). The third wave of democracy promotion very much transitioned from being dominated by foreign policy, to locally driven democratisation from the bottom, up. Although this is an important factor of democracy promotion, it is not the explicit focus of democracy promotion in reverse which focuses on the role of donors. The democracy promotion audit this thesis contribute knowledge to does not look specifically at NGOs and grassroots levels of democratisation; it could be a possible exploration for a future study.

In conclusion, the progression from post-World War Two to the current timeframe selected by this thesis highlights how the 'waves' of democracy promotion are primarily foreign policy-based and is navigated by the donors. It is crucial to understand the archaeology of democracy promotion in order to show how it is a dynamic process. With this comes the emergence of a new 'wave' and the need for additional understanding of democracy promotion as a concept. This thesis focuses more on how this new wave of democracy promotion is related to democracy in decline/crisis (2005-2017) and how the process has come to be in reverse.

2.2 What is Democracy Promotion?

This thesis explores the concept of democracy promotion; what it is, how it is done and why certain aspects of it are failing. In order to comprehensively look into democracy promotion as a model, it is important for this thesis to outline a definition of democracy promotion. Though it is not possible to draw upon every academic definition of democracy promotion, this thesis sheds light on some important and defining aspects of it and how they are relevant. A few important scholars will be discussed later on in Chapter 2, sections 2.2 and 2.3 (Huntington, Rose and Shin and Carothers to name a few), but this introductory section will outline the key components of outlining what democracy promotion is.

A theoretical concept of democracy promotion is fundamental in aiding the discussion of what it is and why it exists. Lipset, a renowned political science scholar, summarises that ‘if a political system is not characterized by a value system allowing the peaceful "play" of power- the adherence by the "outs" to decisions made by "ins" and the recognition by "ins" of the rights of the "outs"-there can be no stable democracy,’ (Lipset, 1959, p. 71). In summary, Lipset argues that democracy cannot be achieved if those resisting democratisation exist to destabilise. It also draws upon the need for checks and balances for successful democratic governance, providing an impartial administration as a foundation to democratisation. If this is the pretence to which democracy building should follow, then democracy *promotion* should also seek to create a peaceful balance of power.

Additionally, one definition of democracy promotion as explained by Grimm and Leininger is, ‘democracy promotion entails activities by external actors that seek to support democratisation; that is, to enable internal actors to establish and develop democratic institutions that play according to democratic rule,’ (2012, p. 396). This definition offers a substantial emphasis on democracy as a regime and process and that these are requirements for democracy promotion. Lipset also reiterates this by arguing that democratic institutions are built upon an elected government but warns: ‘if the outcome of the political game is not the periodic awarding of

effective authority to one group, a party or stable coalition, then unstable and irresponsible government, rather than democracy, will result,' (Lipset, 1959, p. 72). This touches upon participatory engagement as an important element to democracy. Therefore, democracy must be upheld by an elective authority that seeks to democratise its state by championing fundamental democratic rights (such as inclusive suffrage and clean elections). The literature so far has outlined three components (fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration) for what democracy promotion is and these are the basis of this thesis's Conceptual Framework (see Chapter 5, p. 95).

Another scholar, Timm Beichelt, also lends thought to this observation by explaining:

'most democracy promotion research examines under which conditions a linkage between external and domestic actors leads to domestic regimes that are more liberal, free, or stable than before. The question usually rests on the assumption that an external actor intentionally tries to influence the quality of a political regime elsewhere,' (Beichelt, 2012, p. 1).

Beichelt and Grimm and Leininger are particularly relevant as they delve into the argument this thesis makes of donor states promoting democracy in their own self-image. Democracy promotion is defined within this thesis as external actors promoting their democratic values and structures (fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration) into recipient states. Grimm and Leininger go one step further on the issue that there are inconsistent ideas of democracy promotion itself. They explain that 'any target country of democracy promotion will find itself facing a multitude of international actors pursuing divergent interests and goals,' (Grimm & Leininger, 2012, p. 392), a point further explored on p.62. With this division of intentions and goal in what components of democracy to promote, it is evident to see why democracy and democracy promotion is in crisis and decline. Therefore, the need for a Conceptual Framework (like this thesis has created) is apparent.

The authors also go on to identify two research objectives that have been explored within academia:

‘One branch focuses on the relationship between democracy and development, whether socio-economic development is best suited for democratisation, and vice versa. The other branch is founded in peace and security studies and researchers ask to what extent and under what conditions processes of democratisation complement, support, or undermine stabilization and peace in a post- conflict society,’ (Grimm & Leininger, 2012, p. 394).

These branches are explored in more detail later on in Chapter 2; however, it is crucial to give an idea of how democracy promotion has been observed and criticised from an academic perspective. This also supports the research gap within academia that there is another branch of democracy promotion that has not been explored fully yet and one this thesis has coined; democracy promotion in reverse.

Burnell, however, offers more analysis by emphasising the *actors* of democracy promotion. Where Grimm and Leininger describe democracy promotion as the pursuit of democratic components being implemented into recipient nations by external actors or donors, Burnell holds a more critical view of democracy promotion. He agrees that external actors are the channels by which democracy should and is promoted. However, he goes one step further in acknowledging that democracy promotion itself is a confusing term. He recognises that ‘boundaries between democracy promotion and the international advocacy/defence of human rights and support for ‘good governance’, are not clear and precise. Similarly, the terminology of democracy promotion itself is not uniformly agreed,’ (Burnell, 2017, p. 1). This point is key to this thesis as the acknowledgement that there is little universal application of democracy promotion proves that this is one of the reasons democracy promotion is failing.

However, Beichelt offers a rebuttal to Burnell's statement that democracy promotion is simply undefinable. He alludes to areas in which democracy can be promoted to help solve the issue of confusing terminology for democracy promotion. He categorises four features:

'Coercive action: use of legal or physical force. *Offering incentives:* giving assistance with threat of withdrawal, imposing sanctions. *Persuasion:* promotion of ideas as legitimate through justification. *Social interaction:* exhibition of norms and values in social practices,' (Beichelt, 2012, p. 4).

Though there may not be a universal application method for democracy promotion, Beichelt does give practical examples of how democracy can be promoted; the later sections of this thesis will prove these four objectives are present in UK and US democracy promotion programmes. Nonetheless, this study will take the overall assumption that democracy promotion is defined as a donor state implementing their own experiences of democracy into a nation that has little to no experience or evidence of democratic ruling. Yet, the flaws in democracy promotion as a policy enacted by Western donors is a cause for concern. Again, Burnell articulates why this a worry:

'The motives that ultimately account for the investments of time, resources, and energy in spreading democracy are mixed. In specific cases their precise identity is often the subject of debate. Promoting democracy for its own sake or out of some idealistic commitment could be the least of them,' (Burnell, 2017, p. 2).

If promoting democracy in order to enhance the recipient nation's quality of governance is not a top priority, then it is evident that democracy promotion is more beneficial to the donors. Burnell writes between 2005- 2017 (the timeframe of this thesis) and yet there is still no solution to the democratic decline, but instead, more decline ('democracy today is in crisis' (Freedom House , 2017)). Overall, Burnell draws upon three problems with democracy promotion and/or democracy assistance:

‘What is, or what counts as, sustainable democracy and democratic progress? Where are the borders between human rights, and the rule of law, and better governance? How do we measure and compare improvement, and should we, and if so, how do we factor in the amount of resistance or the obstacles to democratic reform when trying to assess and compare instances of success and failure?’, (Burnell, 2007, pp. 6,7).

This thesis’s Conceptual Framework (see p. 95) addresses these questions. If a theoretical definition of democracy promotion is ambiguous then the practical implementation of democracy promotion could help define it.

As mentioned on page 9, one organisation that this thesis recognises as sufficient within the realm practical of democracy promotion is Freedom House: ‘an independent watchdog organization dedicated to the expansion of freedom and democracy around the world,’ (Freedom House, 2018). It is a US based and funded Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), so this thesis recognises that there can be an argument made that it may have US political and policy influence. Nonetheless, this organisation has been at the forefront of democracy promoting and building since 1941 and the organisation ‘has never shrunk from criticizing America policies that inhibited freedom’s spread at home or abroad,’ (Sussman, 2002, p. 4), which makes it a body that holds the US to account and is therefore seen as an objective organisation. The organisation’s fundamental belief in democracy is that it ‘guarantees prosperity, security and is the best form of government,’ (Freedom House, 2018), but it also exists to spread these beliefs throughout the world. It categorises nations into three sections; free, partly free and not free (Freedom House, 2018). These categories are based on two components that the organisation argues are paramount in democratisation; ‘civil rights and political rights, which are marked on a scale of one (most free) to seven (least free),’ (ibid). These are considered, internationally, to be fundamental rights by which citizens should have; they are another defining aspect of democracy promotion. Thus, ‘Freedom House was the first group to monitor human rights abuses,’ (Sussman, 2002, p. 5). Over the decades of the organisation’s existence, American led democracy has flourished through the governments departments such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (Sussman, 2002). Freedom

House's core values and objectives for democratic promotion works alongside this thesis's own interpretations of Western promotion abroad:

'We advocate for U.S. leadership and collaboration with like-minded governments to vigorously oppose dictators and oppression. We amplify the voices of those struggling for freedom in repressive societies and counter authoritarian efforts to weaken international scrutiny of their regimes,' (Freedom House, 2018).

Freedom House allows for a broad overview of how democracy is viewed within the international arena, though it is recognised that it is firmly based on US-led democracy promotion. An important note to be made is that Freedom House has recognised that democracy itself is in crisis claiming that 'democracy faces its most serious crisis in decades,' (Freedom House, 2018). It is this statement that supports the timeframe selected (2005-2017) but also is explored in depth in the next chapter. It is a notion that should be kept at the forefront of people's mind when assessing the present state of democracy today, around the world.

Another organisation that helps build the concept of this thesis's view of democracy promotion comes from the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD). This is the UK's equivalent to Freedom House, in that it is:

'The UK public body dedicated to supporting democracy around the world... [that] partners with UK political parties, parliaments, electoral and financial audit institutions to help over 30 developing countries make their governments fairer, more effective and accountable,' (Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2018, p. n.p.).

It is a foundation that seeks to work, similarly to Freedom House, in spreading and assisting democratisation in nations across the world. Their 'initiatives include: helping protect women from violence in the Middle East, making politics more inclusive in Africa and consolidating democratic institutions in Asia and the Balkans,' (Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2018).

The WFD's main objectives are politically based, with the majority of focus being upon parliamentary democratisation (Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2018). A key point to be made here is that the UK's ambitions for democracy promotion are, at the time of writing, bound to certain EU laws. Therefore, the WFD works with Brussels to ensure transparent and effective democracy promotion. The focus of parliamentary promotion abroad highlights the arguments made by scholars that elected governments (participatory engagement) are the foundation of building a democracy. Where Freedom House champions civil rights as well as political rights (fundamental rights), WFD draws upon its historical experiences with governance which reiterates the argument that donors, such as the UK, tend to promote in their own self-image.

Nonetheless, with parliamentary strengthening in nations deemed undemocratic as the focal point for the WFD, this provides a policy area in which this thesis can explore in regards to UK democracy promotion. Similarly, to Freedom House, it seeks to establish democracy as the most effective regime type across the globe:

‘WFD’s vision is the universal establishment of legitimate and effective, multi-party democracy. Democratic processes are shaped by many actors including citizens and social movements, government, political parties, media, civil society organisations, universities, private sector organisations and traditional authorities,’ (Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2018, p. n.p.).

The objective of universally collaborating with various actors and governments supports the basis of what comes to mind when one thinks about democracy promotion. Consequently, it is encouraging to know both the UK and the US have established NGOs that work to enhance democracy promotion. These two organisations reflect the images of democracy that the UK and the US seek to promote internationally. They allow for a practical analysis of *who* can promote democracy with restricted political ties to the government. They have been selected as this thesis views them as most relevant to the objectives at hand and acknowledges that there are indeed

other organisations, however these two are best suited to this thesis's analysis. The selection of these two organisations demonstrates how democracy promotion can be successful, in the long-term. As they are not government based, however, they are not able to be as influential (namely financially), as organisations such as DFID and USAID (the government departments that this thesis argues are contributors to democracy promotion in reverse).

Ultimately, democracy has been in crisis at home (donors) and abroad (recipients) for over a decade. In turn has meant democracy promotion is also affected by the decline and backlash of the system that was once the most influential regime in the world. It is this link between the democratic decline and Western democracy promotion that has brought forward the need for this thesis. If democracy is being promoted successfully, why is there a decline? As this thesis will argue, this is largely due to *how* democracy is promoted and because the issues of ambiguity vis-a-vis the definition of democracy promotion are problematic. These issues show that as much as researchers and academics can explore the concept of democracy promotion, there is still no structure or agreeable way to implement it in the real world in order to benefit recipient nations for the long-term. Of course, there are ways to do it, but does democracy promotion offer more questions than answers? This thesis will provide some answers to these questions.

2.3 Democratisation and Democracy Promotion: Emphasising Democracy

Is democratisation built on values (socio-economic equality, justice, human rights, and freedom) or procedures (rule of law, accountability, and clean elections)? We can date liberal democracy back to Ancient Greece, considered the founders of democracy. Greek democracy ‘was based on active involvement of the citizens...making decisions was entrusted to the citizens directly in an ekklesia, assembly, open to all citizens,’ (Rhodes, 2004, p. 3). This form of democracy was described as ‘the most systematic and aggressive democracy promoter of all time,’ (Huber, 2015, p. 2). Democracy developed across Europe and the USA (The ‘West’) early in the 18th century and quickly became the *preferred* regime type for developed states. After World War Two and the Cold War, the need to assert democracy as the *only* regime type became the focal point of the West’s foreign policy and democracy promotion initiatives.

However, in order to understand a deeper meaning of democratic transitions, a basic philosophical understanding of the state is required. Alexis de Tocqueville’s ground-breaking book, ‘Democracy in America’, was the first of its kind to study, in-depth, what democracy is and how it works. His work is specifically relevant due to Tocqueville choosing to study America as the nation, seen at that time of his work, to be the most established democracy in the world. He describes democracy in America as having ‘no less empire over civil society than over Government; it creates opinions, engenders sentiments suggests the ordinary practice of life, and modifies whatever it does not produce,’ (Tocqueville, 1839, p. 1). His choice to study America came from his observations within Europe, where democracy was on the rise, post-French Revolution and that ‘a great democratic revolution was going on...and [democracy] is the most permanent tendency,’ (Tocqueville, 1839, p. 1). His works date back to the 19th century, where it is most evident that democratisation began. The collapse of monarchies and authoritarian rule in Europe meant scholars looked across the Atlantic for guidance and structure of how best to build a democracy. It was this publication of studying democracy that sparked a discussion amongst many scholars about democracy and how it should work. As explained by Friedrich Hayek (a 20th

century observer of Tocqueville's work), he summarised Tocqueville's own views on how democracy began to overpower socialism:

'Democracy extends the sphere of individual freedom, socialism restricts it. Democracy attaches all possible value to each man; socialism makes each man a mere agent, a mere number. Democracy and socialism have nothing in common but one word: equality. But notice the difference: while democracy seeks equality in liberty, socialism seeks equality in restraint and servitude.' (Hayek, 2005, p. 47).

What Tocqueville did was create a platform for the discussion against socialist regimes to be criticised and he further gave insightful knowledge into the alternative to socialism: liberal democracy. He was the first to directly associate democracy with freedom and individual's rights to choose how they want to be governed. This strengthens the argument of fundamental rights as a basic component of democracy. This idea of democracy is still prevalent today two centuries on from when Tocqueville first wrote, so these ideas and concepts are not new, they are just being revived in various ways.

An alternative perspective is the role of the societal class system being the most important aspect of the state as society and the classes are who hold accountability for their own democratic transitions. Marx coined the term 'mode of production', to help demonstrate the idea of how integral the social classes are to democratisation. The 'mode of production' is a capitalist machine invented by the government to advance the middle and upper classes of society, subsequently making the poor, poorer (Marx & Engels, 2016). This type of governance leads to what Marx defined as a 'class revolution' where 'political power is merely the organised power of one class oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by force of circumstances, to organise itself as a class, by means of revolution, it makes itself the ruling class,' (Marx & Engels, 2016, p. n.p.). Marx 'identified the bourgeoisie as the major force behind the emergence of democracy. He argued that the capitalist class used parliamentary systems and democratic mechanisms to capture the control of the state from the traditional elite,' (Arat, 1988,

p. 21). Moore also reiterates a neo-Marxist view that focuses on the emergence of the social class and the role classes play in democracy (Moore Jnr., 1966). He mused that ‘a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element in the growth of parliamentary democracy. No bourgeois, no democracy,’ (Moore Jnr., 1966, p. 418). The bourgeoisie is the most established aspect of democratisation in a modernising era. Likewise, Soboul also emphasised the importance of the bourgeoisie in his explanation of the French Revolution. He explained that the rise of the social classes consciousness to take part in political matters led to ‘a rising class, with a belief in progress, the bourgeoisie saw itself representing the interest of all and carrying the burdens of the nation as a whole,’ (Soboul, 1975, p. 5). This can be seen as the beginning of the transition towards modernising society, democratising states and overthrowing oppressive regimes.

The argument that the bourgeoisie are the ‘ruling class,’ (Miliband, 1977, p. 68) is an Instrumental Marxist view. Miliband argued that ‘class is not monolithic, it cannot act as a principle to an agent, and ‘it’ cannot simply use the state as ‘its instrument,’ (1977, p. 68). However, an Instrumental perspective explains that the bourgeoisie governs in its own interest in order to keep society oppressed: ‘instrumentalists see the state mainly as a neutral tool for exercising political power: whichever class controls this tool can use it to advance its own interests,’ (Jessop, 2016, p. 11) further reiterating that impartial administration is key to democracy building. If the bourgeoisie hold the power, Marxists claim that they represent capitalism because they are holding most of society’s wealth. This links back to Miliband’s argument who argued that ‘the ‘ruling class’ of capitalist society is that class which owns and controls the means of production and which is able, by virtue of the economic power thus conferred upon it, to use the state as an instrument for the domination of society,’ (Miliband, 1969, p. 23). On the other hand, Structuralist Marxists argue that ‘the very structure of the modern state means that it organizes capital and disorganizes the working class,’ (Jessop, 2016, p. 7). Therefore, we have two opposing arguments of how society is *allowed* to participate in their governance. Literature is confirming that there are various views on defining democracy. Therefore, defining democracy *promotion* is equally difficult. With the mode of production in the hands of the private sector, the state works

independently from society and this advances the private sector. This then allows people to achieve economic stability and wealth regardless of who is in power. Consequently, this illustration of a capitalist society can help explain how the modern state came to be, which incidentally led to oppressive regimes being overthrown and the birth of democratisation. Marxist views on democracy can be summarised as:

‘Not only is democracy not seen as merely the political efflux of a circumscribed set of economic conditions, but Marx makes the positive case for democracy as bearing a peculiar and intimate relation to politics and its emergence as a historically specific cultural complex—a uniquely intimate relationship that is not shared by other regimes such as monarchies and aristocracies,’ (Springborg, 1984, p. 538).

By this explanation of democracy, Marxism takes into account that democracy offers a form of government that is not achieved by authoritarian and oppressive regimes, helping aid the transition from oppressive regimes towards democracy. Moreover, this Marxist view is still relevant today. These democratic transitions have occurred in waves, as argued by Samuel P. Huntington’s analysis; these waves linked to revolutions and uprisings against the establishment.

The most crucial literature to this thesis is the ‘waves’ of democratisation (Huntington, 1991) as these are observable in line with the ‘waves’ of democracy promotion (see Chapter 2.1, p. 19). The first two waves spanned across the early 19th century until the start of the Cold War and similarly to democracy promotion, there was a progression towards *what* is being promoted. Elections were a key part of democracy based assistance. Huntington noted ‘two criteria marked this first development: 50% of males were eligible for the vote and a responsible executive who had to maintain the support of majority voters in an elected parliament or is chosen in periodic popular elections,’ (Huntington, 1991, p. 16). Electing political representatives is an important foundation of democracy (participatory engagement and impartial administration). Though at this point half of males voting did not mean democracy was inclusive as it is today, it does show how democracy has progressed. Democratisation became noticeable throughout the world after the

collapse of colonialism and during the Cold War, instigating the Third Wave: 'democratic regimes replaced authoritarian ones in approximately thirty countries in Europe, Asia and Latin America. In other countries, considerable liberalization occurred in authoritarian regimes. In others, movements promoting democracy gained strength and legitimacy,' (Huntington, 1991, p. 21). However, Huntington further observes establishing elections to be at the core of democratisation:

'By 1990 the point had been reached where the first election in a democratizing country would only be generally accepted as legitimate if it was observed by one or more reasonably competent and detached teams of international observers, and if the observers certified the election as meeting minimal standards of honesty and fairness ' (Huntington, 1991, p. 8).

Interestingly, the idea of 'good governance' as spoken previously, highlighted that elections were not enough, yet Huntington argues for the need of international observers a critical. Huntington's contributions show the academic evolution of the concept of democratisation, rather than the practical implementation ideas behind organisation such as the World Bank. It also shows the waves of democracy promotion goals do not always align with the waves of democratisation which is crucial to take note of when assessing democracy promotion in reverse. Nevertheless, elections incorporate and require civil participation thus this is why they are considered the starting point for democratisation. The Third Wave focused a great deal on what makes a democracy, democratic; what elements are necessary to build a democracy. Elections are a focal point and they have played an essential part in UK and the US democracy promotion abroad.

The emphasis from the Third Wave onwards has been more Marxist orientated; democracy has flourished where social and economic matters took priority. Elections build up the social classes and allow them to participate actively in politics and increases national unity, to an extent. Rustow supported a Marxist view that social and economic aspects of democratic ruling take precedence above all else (Rustow, 1970). Rustow further emphasised national unity must be a precondition to any nation attempting to democratise; it is 'a background condition in the sense that it must precede all the other phases of democratisation' (Rustow, 1970, p. 350). Those who believe in

democracy will want it to succeed and they will work for it to be sustained. Democracy is a 'competitive process and this competition gives an edge to those who can rationalise their commitment to it, and an even greater edge to those who sincerely believe in it,' (Rustow, 1970, p. 358). This viewpoint highlights the attempt to say, 'this is what we need to create a democratic state' and draws attention to the prerequisite for there to be united opinion within the state for democracy to be lasting. The next sections look at the various issues democratisation literature presents, as a concept, when understanding how it is applied to democracy promotion.

1. Democracy promotion is complex

Democracy promotion exists in order for donor states to facilitate the transition of developing/authoritarian regimes towards democracy. However, democracy promotion is a complex process, namely due to donors advocating for differing criteria when implementing programmes. Hegel's analysis of democracy is that 'democracy is based on the principle of virtue,' (Springborg, 1984, p. 540) and it is not solely about political participation. Hegel believed:

'the 'political state' is the plexus of political, which in espousing the universal aims of the state community, secures objective freedom as the highest end and as a prerequisite for the exercise of the subjective freedom of the particular individuals who constitute the members of civil society,' (Hegel, 1991, pp. 258, 276).

Democracy promotion is multi-faceted; there are various institutions, competing values and different aims/objectives surrounding democracy building literature. This thesis reasons that there is no universal operationalisation of democracy promotion and this is reiterated in the quote from Hegel above; democracy itself is a regime of intricacies and democracy promotion and as a result, is complex. Nonetheless, it can be argued that the virtues of democracy, as Hegel argued, are more superior to establishing institutional changes. The virtuous argument is a reflection of what democracy looks like within the UK and the US, which accordingly encourages the idea that these states promote democracy in their own self-image of their own democracy. What Hegel argued is that 'the mere fact of membership in the state is considered grounds for political participation, as

if the state were not a complex organization with differentiated functions, but simply the shadow of society at large,' (Springborg, 1984, p. 541). This offers criticism to Marx supporters.

Hegel contended that political participation is important in building a democracy, yet does not divulge what political participation encompasses and to what decisions participants have. It is necessary, but not the defining element of a democracy. Consequently, in recent years, the idea of political participation as a large part of democratising a nation has been rebuked. Linz and Stepan wrote that 'in a modern polity, free elections cannot be held, winners cannot exercise the monopoly of legitimate force, and citizens cannot effectively have their rights protected by a rule of law unless a state exists...No state, no democracy,' (1996, p. 14). Therefore, the emphasis is not on political participation, but on the state and those elected to provide democracy for its people (impartial administration is crucial to a democratic regime). They do, however, support political participation as a useful way to start the democratic transition: 'democracy cannot be thought of as consolidated until a democratic transition has been brought to completion. A necessary but by no means sufficient condition for the completion of a democratic transition is the holding of free and contested elections,' (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 14).

However, Robert Dahl favours political participation as the main component and developed on the idea that elections and participation are necessary for democratising states. His definition of democratisation is heavily reliant on political engagement as the primary focus:

'effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, inclusion of adults...each is necessary if the members (however limited their numbers may be) are to be politically equal in determining the policies of the association...to the extent that any of the requirements is violated, the members will not be politically equal,' (Dahl, 2000, p. 38).

The emphasis of democratisation is greatly dependent on promoting certain features and 'producing desirable consequences: avoiding tyranny, essential rights, general freedom, human development, political equality, peace seeking and prosperity' (Dahl, 2000, p. 45). There is more importance on liberal rights like freedom, equality and having an inclusive society. It targets


citizens, enticing them to want democracy, as they have the power to say who governs or represents them. Linz and Stepan went further to reproach the idea that political participation is solely enough for a state to be democratised, 'if freely elected executives (no matter what the magnitude of their majority) infringe the constitution, violate the rights of individuals, and fail to rule within the bounds of a state of law, their regimes are not democracies,' (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 14). This is a very clear definition of democracy. Therefore, though political participation is a good basis, it is not the only defining aspect of a democracy. This is essential for addressing the research problem (see pp. 10-12), that democracy promotion lacks clarity. Democracy promotion is therefore complex.

2. Democracy promotion is not linear

Due to the complexity of democracy promotion as a concept, it has faced more resistance in recent years (see Figure 1, p. 46) and this has led to an issue of the non-linearity of democracy promotion. There is a plethora of literature surrounding elections being the utmost focal point of democratisation. However, literature that is more recent has described that there is a backlash against democracy and this has led to 'democracy backwards,' (Rose & Shin, 2001). Rose and Shin have coined this term in order to articulate the problems that have arisen with democratisation. They conveyed that 'constructive critics of third-wave democracies are not worried about the gap between an ideal democracy and existing polyarchies... their anxieties focus on daily violations of the rule of law, corruption and unaccountable government,' (Rose & Shin, 2001, p. 332). These are all aspects of impartiality in governance and necessary for democratisation. Rose and Shin are making a case for 'democracy backwards' (Rose & Shin, 2001) which means democratisation itself can lead to a backlash against democracy. As mentioned by Rustow those who want democracy to succeed will be accepting of aid and facilitation of this. If not, a backlash occurs and democratisation reverts and a decline emerges. This is important for this thesis to explain as it assumes that democracy promotion is not just complex, but it is also not a linear or one-way process; democracy promotion may be present before the institution or establishment is built or elected. This negates previous literature emphasising political participation and engagement as solely important for democratisation.

Rose and Shin argued further that without transparent and regulated governance, political participation does not have much use, ‘while free elections are necessary, they are not sufficient for democratisation. In many third-wave democracies, something is missing, but what is it? The short answer is: basic institutions of the modern state.’ (Rose & Shin, 2001, p. 332). This is a more constructivist perspective; institutions that help build democracies are at the core of making a democracy work. Whilst one can claim that elections allow for government, the opposing argument is that without a government to rule and elect, there would be no need for political participation. This becomes a contested cyclical process within academia, but one that has shown that ‘third-wave democracies have started democratisation backwards, introducing free elections before establishing such basic institutions as the rule of law and civil society – and they have yet to complete the process of becoming both modern and democratic states,’ (Rose & Shin, 2001, p. 333). This is a critical observation that later gives strength to the argument that democracy promotion is in reverse. It further highlights why democracy promotion is not a linear process and what the repercussions of this are. Larry Diamond offers further support to this argument. Since 2005, there has been a slight decline in electoral and liberal democracies.

Figure 1: A graph representation of the ascension and slight decline of electoral and liberal democracies between 1974 and 2013 (Diamond, 2015, p. 143).



As his graph above shows, the world is currently experiencing ‘democracy backwards’ (Rose & Shin, 2001). Electoral democracies in particular are declining which could suggest that elections do not necessarily equate to democracy. Though the percentages of the decline are small, the

increases are also slight therefore the graph, at the very least, shows democracy promotion is not as effective as it should be. Diamond suggests that there has been an increase in the number of electoral democracies in which free elections are held, but a decrease of liberal democracies. This raises the question of what constitutes democracy: are free and fair elections enough for a post-conflict state to classify as a democracy or is there a need for something more? Diamond argued that:

‘In the former Soviet Union, Africa, parts of Asia, and the Middle East, elections themselves are increasingly hollow and uncompetitive, a thin disguise for the authoritarian hegemony of despots and ruling parties,’ (1996, p. 25).

As a number of cases have shown, elections themselves are reverting to becoming state controlled, hindering democratic progression. These viewpoints offer a direct criticism to previous literature on how elections are the basic criteria for democracy promotion and that it is a linear process of implementation. Each democratising state is different and requires a different approach; something the West seems to ignore (by promoting in their own self-image and interests). Though there is a need for different approaches, the objectives and benchmarks for donors to promote democracy by should be uniform. That is where the distinction lies. Nevertheless, a good analysis of what is currently going wrong within the democratisation process is that ‘it is possible for a new democracy to persist indefinitely as a ‘broken-back’ democracy, with free elections but deficient in the rule of law, civil society and/or accountability,’ (Rose & Shin, 2001, p. 333); democracy promotion is not linear.

3. Democracy promotion includes international pressures

The outcomes of democracy promotion are influenced heavily by the international pressures placed upon recipient nations by donors. These pressures have led to a reversal/decline in democratisation (see Figure 1, p. 46). Building upon this argument that elections have become hollow and lacking, the concept of what Ottaway calls ‘semi-authoritarian regimes’ (Ottaway, 2003), has arisen. Ottaway has explained, ‘semi-authoritarian systems are not imperfect

democracies struggling toward improvement and consolidation but regimes determined to maintain the appearance of democracy without exposing themselves to the political risks that free competition entails,' (2003, p. 3). These regimes look on the surface to rule as a democracy, but look a little deeper and they actually conduct their governance under corruption and one-party politics. Again, the need for an impartial administration whilst democratising or promoting democracy is essential. Ottaway placed blame on democracy promoters for the emergence of these semi-authoritarian regimes by saying 'that direct or indirect international pressures have pushed governments toward giving themselves a democratic facade,' (Ottaway, 2003, p. 188). Democracy promotion includes an important role for the international community but that does not always produce positive results. She explained 'certain countries are neither categorised as authoritarian nor democratic, but have elements of both regime types, so semi-authoritarianism justifies this new 'political hybrid,' (Ottaway, 2003, p. 3). The development of hybridity means that the dilemma is not that states must implement institutions to preserve democracy, but that active resistance towards democratisation is arising. The concern with hybrid democracies is that 'they allow little real competition for power, thus reducing government accountability. However, they leave enough political space for political parties and organizations of civil society to form,' (Ottaway, 2003, p. 3). This leads to criticisms of democratisation led democracy promotion.

As there is a dispute over what is the core criteria for building a democracy, Thomas Carothers offers an alternative explanation to democratisation altogether. Carothers has argued that democratisation has largely diminished in the past decade, due to what he refers to as, 'the end of the transition paradigm,' (Carothers, 2002). He is very critical of democracy promotion and observes that there is a decline of democracies, with the world currently witnessing a 'backlash against democracy' (Carothers, 2006). Carothers has also offered criticism to the idea of democracy as a progression or transitional process. He has clarified that the problem is infant democracies are rebelling against democracy, leading to the potential of transitional democracies to enter into 'grey zones' (Carothers, 2002, p. 9). These 'grey zones' define transitional democracies that are neither moving towards democracy nor moving away from it; they are stagnated in their development:

‘By describing countries in the grey zone as types of democracies, analysts are in effect trying to apply the transition paradigm to the very countries whose political evolution is calling that paradigm into question,’ (Carothers, 2002, p. 10).

He has coined the term, feckless pluralism as nations that ‘tend to have significant amounts of political freedom, regular elections, and alternation of power between genuinely different political groupings,’ (Carothers, 2002, p. 10). He then added that ‘despite these positive features democracy remains shallow and troubled,’ (Carothers, 2002, p. 10), which is a similar observation made previously by Rose and Shin; elections are seen to be more shallow than successful. Despite donors implementing democracy into developing nations, the outcomes confirm that there is a reversion from democratisation. International pressures from donors can be a justifiable reason for this reversion as donors push for their own complex and non-linearity democratisation approaches into developing nations.

Fareed Zakaria also follows the observations of previous critical scholars that democracy is seen as ‘political systems marked not only by free and fair elections, but also the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property,’ (Zakaria, 1997, p. 22), a similar understanding to Carothers and Rose and Shin. He has suggested that a range of fundamental rights, participatory engagement and an impartial administration are all necessary. He also observes that there is a rising number of ‘illiberal democracies,’ (Zakaria, 1997). He has defined illiberal democracies as ‘democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been re-elected or reaffirmed through referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms,’ (Zakaria, 1997, p. 22). As the Third Wave has continued, growing societal unrest has also stirred, which would highlight the beginnings of the backlash towards Western democracy promotion. This backlash has led to donors being motivated to promote democracy more aggressively, causing democracy promotion to be conducted via donor-led, international pressures.

4. The tracing of, and outcomes of, democracy promotion are diverse

The results of democracy promotion being, complex, non-linear and subjected to international pressures (see Table 1, p. 55) has meant there are issues with tracing democracy promotion, and its outcomes. A direct weakness of democracy promotion, through democratisation, is the idea that promoting free and transparent elections is not necessarily the most efficient way to democratise a nation. Hence, the ideal concept of democracy promotion this thesis presents (see Conceptual Framework p. 95), acknowledges that it is bigger than just enforcing participatory engagement. It can also be found in more ways than simply observing elections; UK and US programmes tackle an array of areas in their democracy promotion programmes (from civil rights, to election building, to accountable governance). This means ways of locating democracy promotion in programme aims and objectives in recipient nations, are diverse. It also means that due to the outcomes being varied, racing them is difficult. Carothers argues that democracies can revert to their old regime types, or can progress, but it is the responsibility of the political party in power to achieve this, not the donor states promoting democracy (Carothers, 2006). In one regard, Carothers supports the idea that recipient states are responsible for the successful implementation of democracy promotion within their state. On the other hand, scholars such as Zakaria argue that Western democratic supremacy is ‘coming apart in the rest of the world,’ (Zakaria, 1997, p. 23), therefore, a resurgence of democracy promotion by donors is needed. This is interesting to this thesis, as the idea of democracy promotion is to assist and aid transitional states to achieve democracy. However, transitional democracies do not essentially know how to sustain democracy; therefore, it *is* the responsibility of the donor state to provide continual support, an argument that will be explored later on in Chapter 7 (p. 148).

Carothers adds further strength to his argument by outlining that ‘it is necessary for democracy activists to move on to new frameworks, new debates, and perhaps eventually a new paradigm of political change—one suited to the landscape of today, not on the lingering hopes of an earlier

era,' (2002, p. 20). He says democracy promoters are 'action-orientated people and organisations, much more inclined to throw themselves into the next challenge than to take time to analyse carefully and critically what they did last,' (Carothers, 2006, p. 15). This is one of the research puzzles (p. 9) of this thesis and something the Conceptual Framework will seek to address. Ultimately, without uniformity in democracy promotion application and the absence of embedding aims into programmes, it is difficult to trace what works and what improvement can be made to ensure permanent outcomes and improve democracy promotion successes.

5. Democracy promotion is about donor 'self-image'

As the tracing of and outcomes of democracy promotion are diverse, this leaves space for donors to promote in their own self-image of democracy. Moreover, the problem is that these donors are often promoting their own self-image of democracy and their own vested interests (see Table 1, p. 55). Subsequently, the pragmatic approach is falling short in several respects: 'state officials act in response to complex incentives, and those who appear as champions of reform one day, often disappointed donors the next.' (Carothers & de Gramont, 2011, p. 6). Effective programming thus requires rethinking of how donors work and what goals they pursued:

'The importance of engaging seriously with political realities in recipient countries became particularly clear as donors expanded their attention to fragile and conflict-affected states... Identifying the good guys and the bad guys is less important than understanding how power is distributed, the grievances of particular groups, and possible paths to achieving consensus,' (Carothers & de Gramont, 2011, p. 6).

Therefore, there is a need to have a more effective way of looking at the promotion of democracy through the donor self-image argument, which is what this thesis does. The problem with self-image democracy promotion is that it causes a lack of sustainable democratisation outcomes. Furthermore, the promotion of democracy in the donor's self-image accounts for the argument that democracy promotion is in reverse as donor-bias becomes a major part of programmes. The West's style of democracy is not flawless, so how can they implement their own experience of it

into recipient nations and expect positive results? This way of promoting democracy (in the donor's self-image) has led to no permanent outcomes and democracy promotion in reverse (see Figure 3, p. 92).

6. Democracy promotion is not inflicting long-term change

Not only do donors promote democracy in their own self-image, there is a recognition that donor organisations promote democracy but do not deliver long-term successes within countries, spurring on the backlash against democracy as a concept (see Table 1, p. 55). The contribution to knowledge is there is a short-term and long-term dimension to democracy promotion, but it is the latter of imprinting permanent change and outcomes on a recipient nation, is not happening. There is a big problem with democracy promotion projects suffering from 'short-terminism'. Carothers articulates that 'democracy assistance organisations have shown some tendency to pursue short-term projects and to move rapidly from one to the next while drawing little overall connection between them,' (Carothers, 2004, p. 21). This point is developed further in the Chapters 5, 8 and 9, but it is nonetheless important to highlight this point now.

Consequently, highlighted in these points is the beginnings of a shift in the donor/recipient relationship. Donor intentions become more about who will be more beneficial to them as allies or perhaps as a state that they could control regionally and less about promoting values and institutions that the recipient actually needs. This is why democracy promotion is in reverse and Carothers's work is crucial to this argument. Additionally, 'not all countries with authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes (or, in Freedom House terminology, not free and only partly free states) receive much by way of democracy assistance, or are targeted resolutely and consistently by international democracy promotion actors,' (Burnell, 2006, p. 5). Burnell supports this thesis's argument that there is a self-interest from donor states when they promote democracy abroad. He also brings to light the issue that although countries may receive democracy assistance, this can be a futile attempt at democratisation:

‘Assistance can be ill-judged, technically flawed, badly planned or poorly executed. For example, using an international elections observation mission that the election winners use to claim an international seal of approval for an electoral process that was far from free or fair,’

(Burnell, 2006, p. 5).

Overall, these primary scholars have helped define what democracy promotion is, through the formal process of democratisation. They have outlined the requirements for a democracy, be it free and fair elections, political participation, civil rights and a transparent government; democratisation is how the West promotes democracy. Currently the world is experiencing a backlash, perhaps the Third Wave in reverse. There have been many failures from the West in regards to democracy promotion abroad; the Middle East (Iraq war, Arab Springs), Asia (China, North Korea, Philippines) and Africa (Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa), to name a few. Promoting democracy to states that have no background or historical roots in democracy has become a failed initiative that results in the improbability of permanent consequences of democracy within recipient nations. Democracy promotion as democratisation has been heavily researched, so there is a clear understanding within literature of what democracy promotion is; it is a transition away from authoritarianism and towards liberal democracy.

An in-depth and comprehensive analysis of the observations made are discussed in Chapter 4 (p. 87), however the main arguments drawn from democratisation literature has present six key explanations. The first observation of democracy promotion being complex is highlighted through the options of *what* constitutes a democracy. Is it elections, values, institutions? It is argued to be all of the above. However, the impact these options have on democracy promotion is that donors reflect these complexities into recipient nations. Next, democracy promotion is not linear; are elections promoted so that political participation can occur or does the government have to be in existence before elections can ensue? Subsequently, this means that democratisation (and therefore the backlash to it) can occur in multiple ways and it is not just a one-way process. Thirdly, democracy promotion includes international pressures; donors push for their own self-interests. Consequently, democracy promotion is a diverse enterprise due to varying international

organisations promoting their interests, thus the outcomes and promoted in the donor's self-image and this has contributed to the lack of permanent outcomes and imprinting of democracy on recipient nations. These observations reinforce the argument put forward by this thesis that an asymmetrical relationship has arisen through donor-led democracy promotion and that this has led to democracy promotion in reverse (see p.148).

The literature on democratisation is essential to this thesis because it helps show how donor states decide where to engage in promoting democracy. Be it through facilitating free and fair elections or offering financial aid, democratisation is a theoretical understanding of what democracy promotion is. However, the literature lacks further analysis of how to practically promote democracy. Although there is a clear understanding of what democracy promotion is, little is provided further on how to achieve long-term democratic change through democratic assistance. This is where the gap of knowledge is, as democratisation literature does not show the formal process of democracy promotion. However, foreign policy alludes to that more effectively.

Table 1: Main concepts and points discussed relating to democracy promotion through democratisation (Source: Author.)

<p>What is democratisation?</p>	<p>-Democracy: ‘creates opinions, engenders sentiments suggests the ordinary practice of life, and modifies whatever it does not produce,’ (Tocqueville, 1839, p. 1). -Marxist view that the bourgeois are the catalyst for democratisation and elections are critical for political participation and democracy -Democracy promotion through democratisation shows: 1) Democracy promotion is complex. 2) Democracy promotion as non-linearity 3) Democracy promotion includes international pressures 4) Democracy promotion is difficult to trace 5) Democracy is promoted in the donor’s self-image 6) Democracy promotion is not inflicting long-term change -Those who promote democracy are ‘action-orientated people and organisations, much more inclined to throw themselves into the next challenge than to take time to analyse carefully and critically what they did last,’ (Carothers, 2006, p. 15), which is what hinder successful democracy promotion implementation. -‘Democratisation is failing as ‘it is possible for a new democracy to persist indefinitely as a ‘broken back’ democracy, with free elections but deficient in the rule of law, civil society and/or accountability,’ (Rose & Shin, 2001, p. 333)</p>
<p>How is it used as a form of democracy promotion?</p>	<p>-WFD focuses on UK’s interest in ‘parliamentary and political party programmes, election observations and research,’ (Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2017)- building democratic institutions to achieve a successful democratic transition. -UK Magna Carter Fund for Human Rights and Democracy (2016) aims to: ‘strengthening global peace, security and governance, strengthening resilience and responses to crisis, promoting global prosperity, tackling extreme poverty and helping the world’s most vulnerable’ (UK Government, 2017). -MCFHRD has ‘3 interconnected themes that provide the basis of our funding strategy: 1. Democratic values and the rule of law: uphold universal rights, democracy and the rule of law as key building blocks for more secure and prosperous societies. 2. The rules-based international order: support an effective rules-based international order that stands up for universal rights. 3. Human rights for a stable world: promote a more stable world by upholding universal rights in tackling conflict and extremism (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2016). -USAID Framework Objectives: ‘Promote participatory, representative and inclusive political processes and government initiatives, foster greater accountability of institutions and leaders to citizens and to the law, protect and promote universally recognised human rights, improve development outcomes through integration of Democratic, Human Rights and Governance principles and practices across USAID’s development portfolio,’ (USAID, 2013, p. 14) -DRG Guide areas of practical democratisation: civil society and media, elections and political transitions, governance and rule of law, human rights, empowerment and inclusion (USAID, 2015)</p>

2.4 Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy: Understanding Promotion

The second stream of thought relevant to democracy promotion is foreign policy analysis (FPA). FPA is a branch of International Relations theory whereby ‘foreign policy is essentially the political strategy conducted by independent units,’ (Hill, 2003, pp. 3, 13). FPA is important to this thesis for several reasons. For example, it offers an insight into how actors and agents (leaders; elected officials) come to a decision to which they act upon: ‘it is the process of decision making that is the focus of inquiry, including problem recognition, framing, perception, goal prioritization, option assessment, and so forth,’ (Hudson, 2005, p. 2). Hudson supports Hill’s analysis that foreign policy is a political strategy by explaining foreign policymaking is ‘the attempt to work with and through large organized governmental groups,’ (Hudson, 2005, p. 8) to which they can be mutually beneficial to one another to reach a shared goal. For instance, USAID is a government organisation that carries out the US led democracy promotion programmes; likewise, DFID does the same for the UK. Undoubtedly, these organisations act upon the decisions made by the actors and agents of government.

How democracy is promoted lacks in-depth analysis that is available from democratisation literature. However, there is a larger scope of knowledge of how democracy is promoted through a foreign policy perspective. Though there are many theoretical discussions and frameworks, there is less action-orientated evidence to suggest how to promote democracy effectively and successfully. What is known is that democracy is promoted namely through actors and agencies such as DFID and USAID. This is carried out more politically; developmental foreign policy will be explored in the next Chapter, which offers further insight into the problem of UK and US led democracy promotion in the 21st century. The foreign policy literature explored in this section however brings forth six key points of democracy promotion and foreign policy (see Table 2, p. 76).

The ‘good governance’ era resurged under the Blair administration who ‘reproduced the idea that Britishness is constituted through a struggle against anti-democratic others,’ (Elliot, 2017, p. 11)

which almost echoes a colonial feel to British foreign policy. As described by Elliot, ‘democracy promotion is the conventional, state-based attempt to build and support the institutions of liberal democracy beyond conventional domestic borders,’ (Elliot, 2017, p. 12). Similarly, Fukuyama and McFaul argue that the Cold War era, though technically initiated the promotion of democracy in an ever- changing world, lacked a certain element of modernisation towards promoting democracy; ‘there are new strategies and better modalities for pursuing democracy promotion,’ (Fukuyama & McFaul, 2007, p. 26). Fukuyama and McFaul go further from Elliot’s analysis and highlight the negative impact the new foreign policy of democracy promotion can have:

‘some argue [we] should not pursue democracy promotion for four reasons: democracy is culturally rooted and not a universal good, the principle of respect for sovereignty is the basis for international order, idealism should not trump concrete national interest, and the introduction of democratic reforms is complex and problematic and therefore cannot be shaped by external actors,’ (Fukuyama & McFaul, 2007, p. 27).

Their argument supports the arguments made in the democratisation literature of democracy promotion being complex and subject to international pressures (see Table 1, p. 55). It gives strength to the reasons this thesis argues for democracy promotion in reverse. The Bush Administration created the Freedom Agenda, aligning with Blair’s government seeking to focus on particular regions. The Agenda ‘has culminated in a series of high-profile policies seeking to reform the Middle East,’ (Hassan, 2008, p. 269). The Middle East was of particular interest in the 2000s and highlighted the shift from the third wave of democracy promotion, to the fourth wave which has identified democracy promotion to be in reverse.

Democracy promotion through a foreign policy analysis perspective shows how there is thought behind what the donors intend to gain from these policies, rather than what the opposite side has to gain: ‘foreign policies are part of a smart ideological manoeuvre...They benefit the national interest by pretending to transcend it and by making everybody believe it,’ (Chandler & Heins, 2007, p. 5). Therefore, it raises the question about whether democracy promotion can be used

successfully as foreign policy when it is orientated around the specific goals and interests of the donor state.

1. Democracy promotion is a bureaucratic process

Through the perspective of foreign policy, the decision-making process of initiating UK/US democracy promotion programmes, is embedded in a bureaucratic process by which donors are promoting democracy based on their own goals, not the recipients. One model that is applicable in explaining how democracy promotion is operationalised is through the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM), which is prevalent in transatlantic FPA (see Table 2, p. 76). This model argues ‘where you stand depends on where you sit,’ (Miles, Jnr., 1978, p. 399), which is also referred to as ‘Miles’ Law’. This Law explains that ‘in order to be effective within an organization [you] had to be its strong advocate in its external relationships,’ (Miles, Jnr., 1978, p. 399) which is an integral part of the BPM. The BPM implies ‘events in international politics consists of more or less purposive acts of unified national governments and that governmental behaviour can be understood by coordinated acts of individuals,’ (Allison & Halperin, 1972, p. 41). The BPM supports Miles’ Law in arguing that there is ‘no unitary actor but rather many actors as players-players, who focus on many diverse intra-national problems,’ (Allison & Halperin, 1972, p. 43), which leads to the coordination of policymaking. Therefore, a strength of using this model for policymaking is that one could argue decisions are thoroughly thought through, as there is strong communication between actors and players in the decision-making process. Hence, one person is not dominating the process with their views and the power is not solely in the hands of the executive. The primary focus of the BPM is the actions of governments and their outcomes (Allison & Halperin, 1972).

However, there is criticism towards this model. Alder and Aran write the BPM ‘tends to develop common attitudes and shared images,’ (2017, p. 46). Whilst this can be useful to create a unilateral decision of policies, it can also lead to bias: ‘framing how a particular foreign policy issue, or event, is perceived by foreign policy makers,’ (Alden & Aran, 2017, p. 47) can consequently lead to donor states such as the UK and the US promoting democracy in their own image (see p. 51).

The BPM alludes to propelling a certain agency's own agendas of their organisation's interests, rather than the interest of the state. Consequently, this leads to promoting democracy in the donor state's self-image as it is in their own interest to do so, rather than advocating for the recipient state's needs; democracy promotion in reverse.

This model shows that democracy promotion is often embedded as a bureaucratic process with policymakers having their own dynamic interests in regards to democracy promotion. Therefore, democracy promotion is an idea that is translated into practice, by bureaucracy. Jones argues that 'the model is considered too complex,' (Jones, 2012, p. 122) and goes on further to say 'the model, if accurate, undermines accountability and democratic responsibilities,' (Jones, 2012, p. 122) as it gives actors the chance to be excused if policies fail; this could help explain why democracy promotion is failing. Highlighted here, is that democracy promotion is affected by bureaucratic intentions or entrenched political issues of the sender country; the BPM supports the argument of democracy promotion in reverse.

Conversely, the BPM was written at a time where foreign policy was dominated by the politics of the Cold War and the expansion of Europe-based democratisation. However, today, we see foreign policy focusing on international democratisation alongside security concerns, when promoting democracy in an era where democracy is in decline. Furthermore, the BPM has only been applied to US foreign policy (and not UK foreign policy) during the start of the Third Wave so it can be argued that it may not be necessary or relevant to today's foreign policy ventures and therefore, this is its limitation. Nonetheless, Jones and Alden and Aran argue, the way a policy is framed and to whom it benefits is vital in understanding how foreign policy is conducted. This echoes the current argument that *how* democracy is promoted has led to its ineffectiveness in results in recipient states.

2. The political bias of democracy promotion

The BPM promotes an environment where policies are decided based on political 'actors' and their vested interests in organisations and not on the recipient's needs and wants. This allows for

the possibilities for donors to influence democracy promotion aims/objectives with their own political motives and bias. Rosati explains the weaknesses of the BPM by arguing that ‘since no one participant is powerful enough to force a decision through, when disagreements exist, the eventual decision is a result of consensus,’ (Rosati, 1981, p. 237). This does not necessarily mean it is the right decision, it is just the most popular one. Rosati further explains that ‘decisions are a result of ‘pulling and hauling,’ (Rosati, 1981, p. 238), which can lead to personal preferences being pushed for or, in other words, compromising the right approaches for personal choices. This weakness of the model is important to this thesis as it shows that leaders are imperfect during the decision-making process. Literature is thus highlighting an important point. Democracy promotion will be affected by political bias from the sender country; democracy promotion is not a politically neutral activity. This leaves space to argue for democracy promotion to also be seen as in reverse. If the recipient’s best interests are not the priority on the donor side of democracy promotion, it is inevitable that recipient nations will not be able to sustain democratisation if the sender country is not impartial. Consequently, this can lead to policy-bias and donor states promoting democracy for their own benefit and the BPM style of foreign policy can definitely be applied to today’s democracy promotion (see Chapter 7 for empirical findings of this). The most important points are the self-image of the politics of the sender state’s bias *and* the politics of bureaucracy are contributing to the argument this thesis makes, democracy promotion is in reverse.

Even Allison and Halperin accept the flaws in the model by explaining ‘decisions are rarely tailored to facilitate monitoring. As a result, there is great difficulty in checking on faithful implementation of a decision,’ (Allison & Halperin, 1972, p. 53). This is a point to what this thesis argues as a reason as to why democracy promotion is in reverse; there is a lack of long-term implementation or follow-ups to projects once they are completed. Lack of enduring execution and survival of decisions is an example of how democracy promotion is failing:

‘Once a decision has been reached, the decision-making process does not come to an end; the decision must still be implemented. Due to lack of central direction and control considerable spillage can occur between formulation and implementation,’ (Rosati, 1981, p. 238).

Egos and bias can cloud judgement on what is the best policy to choose and go for, thus democracy is susceptible to not being promoted in the interest of the recipient state and therefore not a beneficial and sustainable project for recipients. The reasons and explanation above are core ideas as to *how* democracy is promoted by the UK and the US. It is clear that the BPM is utilised in their foreign policy decision-making process. The idea of consensus and Miles' Law echoes the failures within democracy promotion as a foreign policy initiative. This is key in showing how democracy is promoted as it displays the process of the agents, or channels to which democracy is promoted, is dependent on the motives and interests of the donor government.

Democracy promotion should be based on what the recipient state needs but currently it is reversed and promoted based on what the donor will gain from it. There is a common belief by the West that 'democracy and widespread political participation are good because they tend to lead to just, efficient or stable outcomes (at least compared to the alternatives)', (Brennan, 2016, p. 7). Subsequently, one can argue that with democracy promotion as a foreign policy acted upon in the reflection of the donor state, democracy should be increasing worldwide. A reason as to why democracy is not increasing worldwide could be due to there being no universal method of promoting democracy that the UK or the US uses. Understanding democracy promotion as a foreign policy supports the argument that the UK and the US do not have a general method of promoting democracy and that this uniformity is necessary in order to limit the influence political bias has on the outcomes of Western democracy promotion.

Democracy promotion as a foreign policy is relevant to this thesis because it is a clear example of how democracy promotion has become about preserving the self- image of donor (see p. 51), rather than for the needs of the recipient state due to there being no clear way to promote democracy. As Burnell highlights on page 17, differing strategies help the donor organisations to promote democracy, but that does not necessarily mean recipient states benefit from it. The donor/recipient relationship is explored further in the Chapters 8 and 9.

3. Democracy promotion is a hybrid concept: Mixing values with interests or values vs. interests?

The issue of the politics of bias from donors is that it leads to questioning whether democracy is promoted to instil democratic values into recipient nations (such as fundamental rights and participatory engagement) or whether democracy promotion is motivated by foreign policy-led interests. Or is it a mixture of both?

Democracy is promoted under the assumption that ‘Western foreign policy as pursued by major states and international institutions, was covered by the project of furthering the national interest,’ (Chandler, 2007, p. 161). This is key as it shows the agents or channels to which democracy is promoted are dependent on the motives and interests of the government. The problem this thesis highlights throughout is that even with democracy promotion as a foreign policy concept, it is still unclear how states promote democracy. Huber outlines that ‘today’s main protagonists of democracy promotion...are rather fighting with the dilemma of having proclaimed democracy as a principled foreign policy goal, but not pursuing it coherently when it endangers other interests,’ (Huber, 2015, p. 1). She makes a very crucial point here. For example, the US could be interested in democratising Iraq because they have vested interests in oil or creating a regional ally. However, once their foreign policy turns away from the original motives and has a focus elsewhere, Iraq becomes an incomplete project of democratisation. This results in the possibility of Iraq reverting away from democracy and therefore, democracy promotion in reverse. It is the same with the UK. The UK is at the forefront of assisting Europe in changing regimes and enticing nations into the security and safety of the EU. If Turkey is in the EU (as an example), there could be a safeguard from the influx of terrorism spreading from ISIS/Middle East and North Africa. Yet Turkey’s human rights record, along with their low levels of transparency and high levels of corruption, keeps them from having official membership. The UK still maintains a strong political relationship with Turkey (namely through trade and commerce (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, p. n.p.)), as they have a vested interest of keeping peace with them in order to keep their trade/economic relationship intact. Therefore, democracy promotion is no longer a purely recipient based policy; it is biased to donor interests and the added extra of values, such as

human rights as one example, is included leading to the mixing of interests and values. Consequently, one can posit whether there is a way for the UK and US to promote democracy under a universal guideline.

The key observations made in regard to how foreign policy analysis contributes to the idea of democracy promotion is the interests and values of policymakers/ donor governments are the driving force behind democracy promotion. This makes democracy promotion a hybrid concept. What this means is that democracy is promoted for the self-interest of the donor; the donor benefits more from these projects and once their foreign policy interests are achieved, they retreat. This is problematic as it leads to the lack of permanent outcomes within the recipient countries, contributing to the decline and reversion from democratisation and alas, democracy promotion is in reverse. These are statements that are supported by the findings from interviews (see Chapters 7, p. 148 and 10, p. 251).

The BPM model highlights the interests and values of the goals behind the donor's foreign policy ambitions, are the driving forces behind UK and US democracy promotion. The values of democracy are used as a way to embed the ambitions of donor nations promoting their own agendas into projects. Thus, foreign policy driven democracy promotion is not just about the interests of the sender country, but of the values of democracy (such as fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration; see Figure 6, p. 97). Again, this reiterates the need for uniformity in the UK and the US's democracy promotion programmes (see p. 9, research puzzle). However, though there is hybridity in democracy promotion through foreign policy, the political bias and interests of donor countries takes precedence over the values of democracy. Thus, there is also an element on unequally weighted priorities of interests versus values. Nonetheless, the overall approach is a mix of both interests and Western values driving democracy promotion programmes and they are founded on the basis of the sender countries' own self-image; democracy promotion in reverse.

4. The need for a universal application to democracy promotion

This thesis argues for the need for donors to promote democracy, uniformly, in order for projects to remain absent of donor political bias/interest and to avoid donor bureaucracy (see Table 2, p. 76). IDEA distributed a report, *The Global State of Democracy (GSoD)*, in 2017. The GSoD supports the definition of democracy comprised by the democratisation literature, which is why this framework has been selected for this thesis. Their publication offers a practical and insightful argument towards what democracy is defined as: ‘IDEA defines democracy as a political system that is based on popular control and political equality,’ (Bekaj, 2017, p. xiii); participatory engagement and impartial administration. However, the GSoD framework goes further in arguing that ‘IDEA’s core principle is that democracy is a universal value for citizens and a globally owned concept for which there is no universally applicable model,’ (Bekaj, 2017, p. xiii); fundamental rights. This point cannot be stressed enough and is vital to this thesis. The fact that there is no universal application or methodology evoked by donor states to promote democracy shows how the very concept is in reverse. No longer are donor states using this as a foreign initiative to help and aid democratisation, but to further their own interests within the state or region (a resurgence from the second wave of democracy promotion).

The GSoD ultimately offers a framework that scores and uses indices to assess the level of democratic change, progression and/or regression (not too dissimilarly to Freedom House). As explained by Skaaning & Jiménez, ‘the GSoD indices provide a nuanced perspective on democratic developments by identifying varying degrees of change on the multiple dimensions of democratic governance,’ (2017, p. 12). These indices are covered in five dimensions: fundamental rights, checks on government, representative government, participatory engagement and impartial administration,’ (Leterme, 2017, p. viii)¹. It ‘uses the GSoD indices to determine how many countries experienced substantial positive or negative changes in the five dimensions of democracy from 2005 to 2015,’ (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017, p. 13). Skaaning & Jiménez offer a solution to the lack of universal application to democracy promotion by exploring that

¹ Although there are five GSoD indices, this thesis has chosen to use fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration as the three benchmarks. Checks on government and representative government are being recognised within the indices of participatory engagement and impartial administration.

‘ultimately, the descriptive comparison of global and regional trends can indicate the circumstances under which various aspects of democracy move in the direction of (or away from) the democratic ideals they represent,’ (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017, p. 13). By doing so, the framework takes into account that democracy operates in various ways and is many-sided (see pp. 43). Therefore, it cannot be categorised similarly, but appreciates that ‘the framework does not collapse all the scores for the difference dimensions into a single score,’ (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017, p. 13).

This framework works extensively at filling the gap of assessing and implementing democracy in a uniform way. Yet, the UK and the US do not use it. If the two largest donor states in the world do not integrate a framework that has clear categories and indices for what/how to promote democracy, as well as to assess it, is the GSoD only relevant in theory or does this unawareness to the framework strengthen the argument that democracy promotion is donor-centric? It is possible to argue that IDEA’s independent work might be considered useless if it is not utilised by the two largest donor states. The overall conclusion the GSoD makes from 1975-2015 is:

‘Long-term progress has been observed in four of the five dimensions covered by the five GSoD indices and has not shown significant progress at the global level. This finding could help explain some of the widespread public dissatisfaction with democracy in many countries. Corruption, discrimination and ineffectiveness make citizens feel that democracy does not deliver the basic services and equal treatment that they request...and are entitled to,’ (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017, p. 27).


Ultimately, Skaaning and Jiménez argue that ‘majority of the electoral democracies established after 1975 have survived...since 2005 there have been 24 democratic reversals,’ (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017, p. 7). The decline and backlash towards democratisation can be accustomed to the global shift in how democracy is promoted by the West. From the onset of the Third Wave, democracy promotion was about eradicating the types of regimes that led to World War Two and The Cold War; to ignite citizens to participate in the struggle against oppression and to enhance

their democratic rights. This was all well and good when the world was collaboratively working to achieve the same goal, however this thesis argues from the literature presented, that the framing of democracy promotion is what has contributed to the reversal in democratic trends and transitions.

International IDEA's GSoD defines democracy as 'popular control over public decision-making and decision-makers, and political equality between citizens in the exercise of that control,' (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017, p. 5). It also explains that 'more people today live in electoral democracies than ever before, however, numerous countries grapple with challenges to democracy, contributing to the perception that democracy is in decline,' (Bekaj, 2017, p. xiii). This links to the arguments made in the previous section exploring the reasons as to why democracy is perceived to be declining and that superficial democracies are emerging, and free and fair elections are the backbone to a legitimate democracy. The GSoD has designed its own indices in order to help measure the success rate of democratic transitions and 'measure five main attributes of democracy and tap into five features emphasised by various democratic thought that are associated with the concepts of electoral democracy, liberal democracy, social democracy and participatory democracy,' (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017, p. 5)². The indices include five attributes (mentioned previously) to which democracy promotion projects seek to implement in democratising nations, with sub-attributes. Figure 2, below, is a visual diagram of the GSoD's aims:

² The GSoD also looks at liberal democracies, social democracies and participatory democracies but for this thesis, the focus will be on their works in electoral democracies.

Figure 2: The Global State of Democracy. Source: (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017, p. 10)



These indices are used as a form of measurement to help assess the level of democracy in democratising states, ‘the GSoD data set involves country-year data for 155 countries that have at least 1 million inhabitants. Indices range from 0 (lowest democratic achievement) to 1 (highest democratic achievement),’ (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017, p. 5). The GSoD framework is vital in advocating for the argument that UK and US democracy promotion is in reverse because donors do not use a universal method of application for it.

5. The contradictory nature of democracy promotion

Without a universal application of democracy promotion to audit the process, alongside the mixing of democratic values with donor interests, a contradictory nature of democracy promotion has emerged (see Table 2, p. 76). Skaaning and Jiménez show that influencing factors, out of the control of recipient states, have led to a contradictory picture of how successful democracy promotion really is. The importance of this is democracy promotion already has contradictions, thus the contribution to knowledge is exploring how these contradictions occur in practice (see p. 9 for research puzzle). For example, ‘a closer look at the last ten years reveals that there is little evidence of a substantial global decline in democracy; instead the number of electoral democracies has increased,’ (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017, p. 9). Yet, the ‘current landscape of democracy around the world is influenced by complex processes such as, economic growth and inequality, violent conflict (including terrorism), geopolitical power shifts and immigration,’ (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017, p. 6). Therefore, a contradictory perspective is being built around democratisation. On the one hand, electoral democracies are said to be increasing (inevitably proving democracy promotion is successfully implementing participatory engagement-based programmes and negating evidence argued within literature). Yet on the other hand, the global climate and political unrest is leading to a reversion from democracy. If there is no consensus on whether democracy is flourishing or declining, then it is plausible to state that the West cannot promote democracy effectively. The GSoD suggests to ‘use a narrow, crisp understanding of democracy and then count how many countries fulfil a given set of criteria for electoral democracy in different years,’ (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017, p. 8). This is one way of comprehensively assessing how democracy can be promoted.

However, despite efforts to measure and enhance democracy, ‘autocracies, including several major regional powers, are developing and refining counter-strategies to democracy promotion,’ (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017, p. 6). Sisk goes further in exploring how democracy as a concept has adopted a resilient behaviour:

‘Amid global unease over the rise of populism and ‘strong-leader’ autocrats, or the endemic challenges of state capture and corruption in many countries, enthusiasm for democracy seems to have decreased: doubts have arisen about its ability to address the contemporary problems of providing peace and security and broad-based human development.’ (Sisk, 2017, p. 36).

Sisk argues against the optimistic view of Skaaning and Jiménez’s. The literature thus far has shown that in theory democracy as a regime sounds great, yet in reality democracy falls short for several reasons. For example, ‘the gaps between the international norms of the ‘right’ to democracy and its implementation, particularly in elections, are often at odds with the realities of managed elections, in which the rules of the game are biased,’ (Sisk, 2017, p. 37). Burcher and Bisarya support this and explain that ‘the most serious concern is that democracy is rotting from the inside,’ (2017, p. 71) and the numbers of illegitimate democracies are only increasing; negating the observations made that previously argue democracy is not declining. Consequently, there is no incentive for democratising states to continue towards democracy when they can essentially have their cake and eat it too. The GSoD shows that democracy promotion is about more than just a Western style of democracy. Moreover, this thesis argues that donor states promote democracy in their own self-image, but the West’s democracy is not flawless (see Table 1, p. 55).

One crucial example of how donor democracy is not flawless is ‘the narrowly approved ‘Brexit’ referendum in June 2016 in the United Kingdom to leave the European Union [which] has raised concerns about the ability of a razor-thin majority to make decisions that deeply affect the lives of all citizens,’ (Sisk, 2017, p. 40). Even countries that have been viewed as true democracies can experience regression. Sisk shows that it is all well having tools to assess democracy, as Skaaning

and Jiménez have argued, but without recipient states willingness to truly assert democratic authority within their states, the efforts are futile (see Chapter 7, p. 148). Burcher and Bisarya extend on this further by arguing ‘modern democratic backsliding can take place through the manipulation of democratic rules and institutions,’ (2017, p. 71). Zakaria (1997) and Ottoway (2003) have argued in the previous section that illiberal or semi-authoritarian regimes have led to the backlash against democracy. The impact of this is that democracy promotion is ‘backsliding’ too; that concept is already present today. Consequently, the process of democracy promotion can also include regressing factors; this is important to recognise the need for democracy promotion benchmarks/counter-measures in order to measure the success and failures of democracy promotion.

6. The importance of auditing democracy promotion

The contradictory nature of democracy promotion (an observation that strengthens the need for uniformity in applying democracy promotion), brings forward the need to audit and measure democracy promotion. Burcher and Bisarya identify three factors that exist ‘in countries that experience backsliding,’ (2017):

- ‘(a) A party or leader coming to power through elections broadly considered to be free and fair;
- (b) manipulation of the institutions and procedures designed to provide checks on executive power;
- and (c) use of the law to reduce civic space and political freedoms in order to crush dissent and disable political opposition, and diminish the role of civil society,’ (2017, p. 71).

Burcher and Bisarya are highlighting, once again, that fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration need to be pushed for by donors in democracy promotion projects. Consequently, it is plausible to say democracy is not in decline because of factors such as the above, however whether these elections and other criteria are indeed legitimate, is another issue. Appearances outwardly on the global stage can go a long way in convincing leaders that a country is democratic. Inwardly though, another story can be told; one of regression

and authoritarian control seeping back into power to break down any democratic advances made. If democratic backsliding (Burcher & Bisarya, 2017) is to be believed then the five indices the GSoD has created will not be achieved and ‘even fully consolidated democracies are at risk of backsliding,’ (Burcher & Bisarya, 2017, p. 87); examples of backsliding occurs within donor nations such as the UK and the US too (Brexit and Trump) further linking back to the six observations also made in Table 1 (see p. 55). If everyone is at risk of backsliding, then how can the UK and the US attempt to promote democracy successfully?

The GSoD has built upon IDEA’s State of Democracy assessment framework and this framework is most relevant because it is currently (at the time of publication) one of the most prominent frameworks used to independently assess the state of global democracy today. It provides the principles and a ‘starting line’ as such of how to promote democracy (based on the GSoD’s indices), but only assesses the state of democracy, not *how* to promote democracy. This thesis is linking this framework to democracy promotion in order to present how to measure democracy promotion, how it is conducted and how much progress is actually being made. The further contribution to knowledge is in showing the challenges in operationalising democracy promotion, namely measuring the impact of democracy promotion in regards to the backsliding of democracies. Furthermore, it is an independent organisation so there is little external influence or bias.

IDEA’s framework (see Appendix 1, p. 271) is outlined as:

‘Our State of Democracy (SoD) assessment methodology helps citizens assess the quality of their democracy and define priority areas for policy and democratic reform. The assessment frameworks enable citizens to periodically monitor the health of their democracy and can contribute to strengthening national and local governments,’ (IDEA, 2017).

It aims to achieve successful democracy promotion based on what the recipient nation needs, through advocating for participatory engagement by citizens and governments. It acknowledges

that ‘there are striking differences between the countries in which assessments have taken place, which suggests that the methodology has a universal application,’ (Beetham, et al., 2008, p. 18). Therefore, this suggests that applicability in any nation is high. The International IDEA framework is, in brief, the only framework to insist that only those who know a country’s culture, traditions and aspirations are adequately qualified to assess its democracy. One can assume that would entail the recipient state needing to be the assessors of the democracy promotion they receive. The purpose of International IDEA’s SoD assessment programme ‘is to put the future of democracies around the world in the hands of their own citizens,’ (Beetham, et al., 2008, p. 19), an important aspect this thesis believes is integral to sustainable democratisation.

IDEA links in with the motives of the UK, who have described their democracy promotion motives as ‘the universal establishment of legitimate and effective multi-party representative democracy. We can contribute to this by supporting inclusive governance which strengthens policy-making, accountability, representation and citizen participation,’ (Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2017). The framework outlines its own defining aspects of democracy promotion:

‘The democratic ideal, in and of itself, seeks to guarantee equality and basic freedoms; to empower ordinary people; and to bring about political and social renewal without convulsions. The principle of ‘popular rule’, or rule by popularly elected representatives, is at the heart of this ideal, but it also has different and overlapping meanings for different people within and between nations and regions.’ (Beetham, et al., 2008, p. 17).

The IDEA framework also links to USAID ideals and the idea that democracy is harmonious so must be the correct way of governing: ‘democracy is an attractive form of government because its principles embrace these human needs and desires and can often deliver them in reality. And the more experience people have of living in a democracy...the more they support democracy,’ (Beetham, et al., 2008, p. 17).

SoD is a framework that is usable by any agency. If the act of promoting democracy is embedded in foreign policy, why, then, is democracy promotion in reverse? Is it because nations are not following the same protocols and guidelines? Is it because there are two main actors in democracy promotion and they work independently rather than collaboratively (due to following donors' own reflections, experienced and interests/values of democracy)? Is it because there is a lack of research into recipient states and the effect of democracy promotion on them? As this thesis progresses, these questions will be explored in more depth.

Subsequently then, how is democracy promoted? Through geostrategic and democratisation based foreign policy interests of the donor nation. Democracy promotion is clearly a foreign policy initiative carried out by states for their own world assertion of power based on their stakes. The transaction of 'selling' democracy as a product for recipients to benefit from has now become more beneficial for the 'sellers' than the 'receivers. Therefore, arguing that democracy promotion is in reverse aims to highlight the wider issue of why democracy is in decline. Thus far, it is evident that democracy promotion has become a donor-centric process, rather than a mutually beneficial transaction.

It has been mentioned that democracy promotion has become a business transaction where donor states are set to gain more than recipient states. Who authorises this becomes integral to the survival of democracy promotion and even more so to the success of it. The world has developed, with the increase of globalisation and backlash against democracy promotion; regions of interest to the West in the past have now revolted against the West. Whereas in the 1970s, everyone wanted to be part of the democratising world and be allies with the West (China opened its markets because it needed global trade, and Russia lost the Cold War), in 2017 we have the opposite developing. We have Russia and China continuing to keep their cards close to their chests. We have an increase in democratic fallacies, such as South Africa and Latin American countries. Now power is in the hands of these 'grey zone' (Carothers, 2002), countries and they are not bowing down to the demands of the West anymore.

Even so, democracy promotion has become ever more popular as a foreign policy initiative:

‘Never in human history have so many states spent as much money and energy trying to “promote democracy” in foreign lands as the United States and the European Union have spent since 2001. National leaders make speeches about it, newspapers write editorials about it and foundations commit large sums of money to it. This all adds up to a deeply inspiring spectacle, or it would if democracy promotion were having much impact on the ground,’ (Mead, 2015, p. n.p.).

Mead observes that democracy promotion has weak results, indirectly supporting Beetham et al who argue democratisation needs to be in the hands of the people. His argument also strengthens the need for this thesis in highlighting the necessity for re-examination of the quality of democracy promotion. The fact that democracy promotion is more popular than ever with donors, (but democracy is also in decline), is an intriguing problem. This thesis’s aim is to explore this further in order to answer the question of why democracy promotion is in reverse. Mead further argues:

‘The grim reality is that democracy is in retreat in much of the world. The Arab Springs failed to bring liberal democracy almost without exception. In Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America it is easier today to find countries falling back from democratic reforms than countries striding forward to make new ones...and the rise of radical parties in many member countries of the European Union testify to the weakening appeal of democratic values,’ (Mead, 2015).

Though foreign policy literature offers a greater insight into *how* democracy is promoted than democratisation literature, it also highlights that democratisation-based democracy promotion is not the ultimate goal for the UK and the US. Through a foreign policy point of view, democracy promotion has become donor-centric focused since the War on Terror began. The six key points made from foreign policy literature will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4 (see p. 87), however, broadly speaking they can be summarised as follows: democracy is a bureaucratic process; there is political bias; it is a hybrid concept; there is a need for universal application;

democracy promotion has a contradictory nature and it is important to be able to measure democracy promotion.

Ultimately, what exactly do donors want to achieve through their foreign policy? It can range from regional allies, security or trade cooperation, yet none of these stems from asking what a recipient nation wants from the UK or US's assistance towards their democratisation. How democracy is promoted has shaped what democracy promotion should be, reiterating the argument that democracy promotion is in reverse. The table below alludes to how foreign policy has shaped the motives of democracy promoters and how it established.

Table 2: Highlighting the key aspects of democracy as a foreign policy. Source: Author

<p>What is democracy promotion as a foreign policy?</p>	<p>- Democracy promotion has become orientated around achieving a foreign policy goal, rather than to benefit a recipient nation: 5 key points relevant to understanding the thesis's objectives:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Democracy promotion is a bureaucratic process 2) There is a political bias to democracy promotion 3) Democracy promotion is a hybrid concept 4) The need for universal application of democracy promotion 5) Contradictory nature of democracy promotion 6) Importance of measuring democracy promotion <p>-Miles' Law: 'where you stand depends on where you sit,' (Miles, Jnr., 1978, p. 399), highlights the case that foreign policy-led democracy promotion is based on preferences of key players and actors within governments.</p> <p>-Problem is <i>how</i> to promote democracy: 'today's main protagonists of democracy promotion...are rather fighting with the dilemma of having proclaimed democracy as a principled foreign policy goal, but not pursuing it coherently when it endangers other interests,' (Huber, 2015, p. 1).</p> <p>-GSoD and SoD frameworks show how democracy can be universally applied and implemented, but the UK and the US do not use their framework.</p>
<p>How is democracy promoted?</p>	<p>-Through NGOS, governmental agencies, independent organisations, political think tank groups. For example, US National Endowment for Democracy (NED), USAID DRG, Office of Transition Initiatives, State Department, Human Rights and Democracy Fund- all pillars of foreign policy for US democracy promotion.</p> <p>-For the UK, DFID, FCO and this thesis will use work from the NGO, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy</p> <p>-Countries need to assess individually the needs of the country recipient for success- not to look at their own geostrategic interest in the recipient country. (This is what the IDEA Framework offers, however neither the US nor the UK use it).</p> <p>-Five objectives GSoD uses to aid in democratisation: Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government, Participatory Engagement and Impartial Administration (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017, p. 27). Areas the US and UK tackle with their democracy promotion projects too.</p> <p>-It also highlights that democratisation-based democracy promotion is not the ultimate goal for the UK and the US. Through a foreign policy point of view, democracy promotion has become donor-centric post 9/11 for both nations.</p>

Chapter 3: Introducing UK and US Developmental Assistance as Democracy Promotion

One of the main research puzzles (see p. 9) this thesis recognises on the topic of democracy promotion is the lack of clarity surrounding how to promote democracy and who promotes it. This section looks at explaining how the UK and the US has used developmental assistance as a way to promote democracy, identifying ways they promote democracy and the channels by which it is operationalised. One of the issues raised is the amount of finances poured into UK and US democracy promotion programmes leads to the question as to why it is not sustainable: ‘democracy-promotion groups funnel money to nascent political parties and help train people to run the institutions considered central to democracy...Western advisers push democratic ideas and try to strengthen local civic organizations...when the opportunity for a new government arises, the wisdom goes,’ (Cambanis, 2014, p. n.p.). Cambanis’ observation brings forward the need to assess the role UK and US developmental assistance plays in translating into democracy promotion, but also supports the argument that donors promote in their own self-image and interests. This is crucial in strengthening the argument of democracy promotion in reverse.

3.1 The UK

The UK has long placed democracy promotion at the forefront of its foreign policy, especially when it comes in the form of developmental assistance. However, what has become apparent about this type of UK foreign policy is that it has not always been altruistic and is not a new concept either. It is important to look, historically, at how and why the UK promotes democracy and understand what the UK’s aims and motives are in doing so. The UK has been using aid as a way of promoting its interests since the start of the Third Wave and this is important for this thesis as it shows the UK has been involved in producing democracy promotion programmes for quite some time. The programmes the UK seeks to implement are choices made by UK international development and though this is not a new concept, the wider objectives have developed.

For the past twenty years, The Department for International Development (DFID) has been at the forefront of many foreign assistance programmes and this answers the question of *who* promotes democracy. In 1997, the New Labour government became more focused on human rights: ‘DFID adopted a new approach to development assistance and put poverty eradication firmly at the centre of its work. At the same time, the Secretary of State requested that human rights be incorporated within DFID policy resulting in a 1997 White Paper highlighting the importance of rights,’ (Piron, 2003, p. 4). This initiated a new spotlight on how to assist recipient countries in achieving democratic status. By emphasising human rights and civil liberties, the UK began to implement their own definition of democracy, abroad, whilst placing fundamental rights at the forefront of UK developmental assistance. Values such as human rights and eradicating poverty were what the British government sought to do at home; they now wanted to promote democracy abroad in the same way (donor self-image). The UK government ‘insisted that DFID should be concerned with the *elimination* of poverty, rather than merely its reduction,’ (2003, p. 8), re-emphasising fundamental rights as a UK international development priority. This rights-based approach set a high bar for the government to achieve.

As summarised in Table 2 (see p. 76), the BPM alludes to actors pushing their own agendas through as political policies. It is possible that this is what happened in the beginnings of the New Labour reinvention of democracy promotion, as ‘the Secretary of State came to her position not just as a strong advocate of poverty eradication, but also as a defender of human rights,’ (Piron, 2003, p. 8). This supports Miles’ Law of ‘where you stand depends on where you sit,’ (Miles, Jnr., 1978, p. 399) and reinforces the argument that democracy is promoted in the interest of the donor state and without universal application, if it is enacted by motives of individuals. This observation further strengthens the argument that the BPM and foreign policy contributes to democracy promotion in reverse (see Table 2, p. 76). One of the research puzzles (see p. 9) and research objectives (see p. 16) highlight that there needs to be uniformity in promoting democracy and thus, the need for a Conceptual Framework that provides ways to deliver this. If uniformity is present in the UK programmes, this could enhance the likelihood of neutral democracy

promotion that produces permanent outcomes; not just donor-led programmes created, consisting of the politics of bias (see p. 59) and a mixture of values and interests (see p. 62).

In 2015, DFID published a report outlining its continual commitment to contributing aid in the form of democracy promotion. It outlined four objectives to: ‘strengthen global peace, security and governance (which will also strengthen our own national security at home). Strengthening resilience and response to crises. Promoting global prosperity through the ODA. Tackling extreme poverty and helping the world’s most vulnerable,’ (Department for International Development, 2015, p. 3). These objectives are not new nor do they advocate for anything different to previous objectives. The UK government is just reinforcing the idea that they *must* promote democracy as their duty, in order to continue being a ‘global leader,’ (Department for International Development, 2015, p. 5). What is different is *how* the UK is pursuing goals to implement democratic change, abroad. For example, ‘committing 0.7% of Britain’s Gross National Income (GNI) is now enshrined in law, and is a powerful demonstration of the UK’s moral commitment to helping the millions of people around the world who live in poverty,’ (Department for International Development, 2015, p. 5). The UK has also boasted significant achievements from 2010-2015 in facilitating positive change in the following areas: wealth creation, poverty, education, health, water sanitation and hygiene, humanitarian assistance, governance and security, and tax and transparency,’ (Department for International Development, 2015, p. 6). The UK sees itself as a crucial participant in enhancing democracy, globally, by financing thousands of projects and giving considerable donations to recipient countries. However, it is easy enough to give money to a problem, but solving the problem is entirely different. The UK has attempted to erase poverty for decades, yet no substantial evidence has suggested they have made a dent in tackling the problem. This could be due to the lack of implementing projects and supporting them.

According to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) ‘in 2015, the FCO’s spending on international development included: over £50 million to promote human rights, democracy and the role of civil society around the world and almost £10 million on projects aimed at preventing

and resolving conflict,' (UK Government, 2017, p. n.p.). The UK government continues to make democratisation a defining issue of its foreign policy, which would allude to democracies around the world flourishing. However, it is interesting to look at 2015 (see Figure 1, p. 46) as literature suggests that democracy has been in decline for the past twelve years, yet funding has been rising dramatically. If the financial aid is there, then why is democracy promotion failing? This is a core issue surrounding democracy promotion and a reason this thesis argues it is in reverse.

As Carothers explains, the UK is seen to view democratisation efforts as 'a broader notion of democracy that encompasses concerns about equality and justice and the concept of democratisation as a slow, iterative process of change involving an interrelated set of political and socioeconomic developments,' (Carothers, 2009, p. 5). The developmental approach 'looks past political procedures to substantive outcomes such as equality, welfare, and justice...supporters of the developmental approach tend to see economic and social rights as being no less important than political and civil rights,' (Carothers, 2009, p. 8). A UK based organisation that is starting to address the issues of promoting inclusive society, sustainable development and the eradication of poverty (Global Challenges Research Fund , 2017, p. 3) is the Global Challenges Research Fund. It builds upon the new 2015 strategy that the UK's 'aid strategy is underpinned by a very clear guiding principle: 'that the UK's development spending will meet our moral obligation to the world's poorest and also support our national interest,' (Department for International Development, 2015, p. 9) (cited in (Global Challenges Research Fund , 2017, p. 3). The UK government has started to acknowledge that though international development is still embedded in their foreign policy goals, the need to strengthen democracy at home shows there is a crisis of democracy within the UK. Again, the idea of the UK promoting a flawed concept of democracy into developing nations can contribute to the reversion from democratisation in these nations and the lack of long-term sustainability. Both of which are crucial to the argument this thesis makes of democracy promotion in reverse.

Zakaria's, concept of 'illiberal democracies' shows support for the developmental approach as he describes 'democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been re-elected or reaffirmed through referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms,' (Zakaria, 1997, p. 22). Therefore, the developmental approach backs economic and social values as equally important. The developmental approach usually uses an 'indirect method' (Carothers, 2009, p. 9) of promoting democracy. For example, its approach to democracy support, almost always stresses the importance of partnership with the host government and steers clear of activities that might be seen as politically confrontational or even "too political.," (Carothers, 2009, p. 9). This would suggest that the UK aims projects at Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and helps citizens at the grassroots level, rather than advocating for projects through governments (evident by the work of the WFD); another point that is expanded on in the Empirical Investigations and Findings (Chapter 7, p. 148 and Chapter 10, p. 251). The findings have also shown that the UK does not conduct their programmes with political neutrality and thus confirms democracy promotion is in reverse (see p. 251)

Coinciding with the developmental approach is the UK's main target of combatting and facilitating non-democratic states in attaining human rights. The developmental approach aligns with the UK's humanitarian efforts, where human rights-based democracy promotion offers a gateway to accessing other socioeconomic areas which the UK wants to help democratise (Carothers, 2009). Ultimately, the UK's approach is to develop projects over a longer period, focusing on humanitarian projects, in order to facilitate their democracy promotion initiatives. A brief analysis, to conclude, identifies that the UK uses a developmental approach to developmental assistance, and this is firmly based within humanitarian causes. This gives direction by which the UK chooses its recipients and links to the ideas of democracy promotion being embedded in bureaucracy and influenced by political bias. However, as previously touched upon, the findings from the data collected negate this and will later prove UK democracy promotion is in reverse. Additionally, given the UK's approach to democracy promotion, it is worthwhile to explore the US's, more political, approach to developmental assistance.

3.2 The US

The US's democracy promotion intentions are slightly different from that of the UK's. Though promoting democratic rights and advocating for human rights across the world is crucial to American foreign policy, their aims are more political. It is not a new phenomenon that 'democracy has unquestionably lost its global momentum...newer democracies in the developing world are struggling to put down roots, and many older democracies—including the United States—are troubled,' (Carothers & Youngs, 2017, p. n.p.). The argument that new democracies are reverting from democracy, whilst old democracies are troubled is important to note. How can democracy be sustained when those promoting it are not able to implement it upon themselves successfully? This point will be discussed later in this section, but for now it is important to understand *how* the US offers developmental assistance, abroad.

The US primarily promotes democracy through USAID. They have, over the years, addressed multiple democratic values within their programmes and implemented them into projects in recipient countries. Some have focused on human rights (as a fundamental right) such as the 'Democracy, Human Rights and Governance programme (USAID, 2013) and the 'USAID Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment,' (USAID, 2018). Others have focused on participatory engagement and strengthening governance through free and fair elections, 'USAID Bringing Unity, Integrity and Legitimacy to Democracy (BUILD),' (USAID, 2016) and transparency through 'Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality,' (USAID, 2002). These programmes are all relevant to understanding how the US promotes democracy, as it highlights *what* is being promoted; this is important in arguing that democracy promotion is in reverse. It is also crucial to understand *why* it is in reverse if there are clear objectives behind these USAID programmes.

US democracy promotion has dominated the latter part of the 20th century. The US has always been seen as a great example of democratic freedom and values. However, the Cold War

showcased the ability for the US to deter from democratisation policies and focus on issues that concern their own security. Scholar, Daniela Huber explains how The Cold War showed that ‘stability took precedence over values and the fight against communism over the promotion of democracy,’ (2015, p. 51). Whilst the UK seeks to establish a consistent policy of human rights advocacy and democratisation post-World War Two, the US places ‘stability as the primary foreign policy objective as it was perceived that stable dictators were better for U.S. interests than countries in democratic transition, which may be susceptible to communism,’ (Lawson & Epstein, 2019, p. 4). The policy of stability dominated the US’s agendas from Johnson’s presidency through to President Ford’s. President Carter did however revive the democratisation efforts. Yet, ‘since the Carter administration was the first during the Cold War to anchor human rights and democratic freedoms in its foreign policy agenda, there were no established models on how to pursue this path,’ (Huber, 2015, p. 51). Huber’s analysis is key to this thesis’s argument that using no universal blueprint to promote democracy has led to a lack of sustainable efforts to promote democracy. Having little structure back then (towards democracy promotion) has had consequences on US democracy promotion, today. She also shows that the US and UK’s differing aims in promoting democracy has probably had an impact on recipient nations seeing as they are the two largest promoters of democracy. No standard consensus on promoting democracy equates to no consistency and the possibility of no sustainable democratisation, and that is democracy promotion in reverse.

Nevertheless, it highlights that the US were seeking to promote democracy, with little idea of how to do so. As Reagan was ushered into the White House, this newly revived lens upon democracy promotion had ‘shifted towards an electoral model of democracy at the expense of the human rights agenda,’ (Huber, 2015, p. 52); the US’s method differs from the UK’s humanitarian, developmental approach. Huber’s breakdown supports that foreign policy was conducted under a BPM style, with actors influencing policy. Reagan set up the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which is a vital cog in the US’s democracy promotion efforts today, and argued that ‘democracy was the precondition, for which human rights would be adhered,’ (Huber, 2015, p.

53); this links back to Dahl and Rustow's ideas being explored practically. Electoral assistance and human rights became a key part of the US's democracy promotion, primarily in Central and South American countries. However, this all shifted after the Clinton administration and George W. Bush came to power and as previously mentioned in Chapter 2.2 (p. 56) 9/11 instigated the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to overthrow authoritarianism and introduce a democratic state.

As previous democratisation literature has debated, instilling free and fair elections is not enough to ensure a democracy thrives. As Freedom House explains: 'a truly democratic system includes a variety of other checks and balances that ensure freedom and resilience over time, such as independent courts, a robust opposition, and unfettered civil society groups,' (Puddington & Roylance, 2017, p. n.p.). The Bush administration did not initiate any of the above 'criteria' in the case of Iraq. Consequently, 'pushing democracy promotion as a primary objective of U.S. national security and foreign policy has reduced support, and generated a scepticism around the world, for democracy promotion activities,' (Epstein, et al., 2007, p. 9), supporting the weakness of democracy promotion bring foreign policy driven by donors and this equating to democracy promotion in reverse.

In 2017, US Congress issued a report outlining the US's role to play in foreign assistance, in terms of democracy promotion. The 'Democracy Promotion: An Objective of US Foreign Assistance' report summarised the inconsistent role the US has played since democracy promotion became an issue the US government felt it had to partake in. The events of 9/11 sparked a political motive for the US to promote democracy and to ensure security and reduce threats, worldwide. However, other 'world events, competing priorities, and political change within the United States shapes the attention and resources provided to democracy promotion efforts and influence whether such efforts focus on supporting fair elections abroad, strengthening civil society, promoting rule of law and human rights, or other aspects of democracy promotion,' (Lawson & Epstein, 2019, p. n.p.). This differs from the UK's approach, who have focused on human rights and democratic

values consistently over the past twenty years. This report shows that the US places its weight behind causes that will benefit their state, perhaps more so than in the recipient state; democracy promotion in reverse. Nonetheless, ‘more than \$2 billion annually has been allocated from foreign assistance funds over the past decade for democracy promotion activities, including support for good governance (characterized by participation, transparency, accountability, effectiveness, and equity), rule of law, and promotion of human rights,’ (Lawson & Epstein, 2019, p. 1). Yet, under Trump’s administration, foreign assistance spending is to be reduced. Trump seeks to unravel democracy promotion efforts and ‘seeks to shift the United States away from the broad commitment to actively supporting democracy’s global advance that former president Ronald Reagan established in the early 1980s,’ (Carothers, 2017). Again, the BPM foreign policy model applies here; Trump’s own agenda and preferences are shaping US foreign policy and US democracy promotion.

What this all shows is in contrast to the UK’s developmental approach to assistance, the US hold a political approach to democracy promotion. Carothers explains that the political approach consists of ‘a relatively narrow conception of democracy—focused, above all, on elections and political liberties— and a view of democratisation as a process of political struggle in which democrats work to gain the upper hand in society over non-democrats,’ (Carothers, 2009, p. 5). An obvious example of this is the US’s democracy interests in the Middle East. Instead of investing a long-term plan in facilitating democratisation, the political approach ‘directs aid at core political processes and institutions—especially elections, political parties, and politically oriented civil society groups,’ (Carothers, 2009, p. 5).

In the previous section, Chapter 2.3, the Dahlian conception of democracy is heavily featured in the political approach to democracy assistance. Epstein et al continue this by voicing that ‘the various tools to promote democracy abroad — foreign aid, military intervention, diplomacy, and public diplomacy — can be very expensive and may provide little assurance that real long-term gains will be made,’ (2007, p. 9) which is opposite to the developmental approach of the UK. The

opposing ways in which the UK and the US promote democracy brings forth an important point. These are the two largest donors and facilitators of democracy promotion and do not work in collaboration with one another. This is a possible reason as to why both efforts at democracy promotion are futile and unable to be sustainable and implemented successfully within recipient nations. Both nations have flaws in their methods and within their own nations. The UK has stayed consistent with their motivations of what to promote but has fallen short in implementing those ideas in the long-term. Likewise, the US has developed a way to implement projects, but the aspirations behind every administration is not consistent, which hinders sustainable successful implementation. The core argument this thesis makes in arguing why this has happened is that the UK and the US do not promote democracy under a universal banner and instead promote democracy in their own self-image and for their own benefits, amounting to confirmation that democracy promotion is in reverse.

Chapter 4: Concluding Remarks of Literature Review

The above literature has offered various perspectives of understanding holistically what democracy promotion is and how it has become an integral part of international relations (see Figure 4 p. 93; Figure 5 p. 94). Whilst democratisation theory (see Table 1, p. 55) focuses on social classes, civil society and ideologies, foreign policy literature (see Table 2, p. 76) offers a practical element to the discussion. For instance, if one considers the argument that political participation is the utmost important aspect of democracy building (see Huntington and Dahl, Chapter 2.3 p. 38), then it is apparent that donor-led democracy promotion projects will use this as a foundation to sustain democratisation in a recipient state. In theory, this should provide long-term sustainable democratisation. Yet, as explained by Rose and Shin in Chapter 2, ‘broken-back democracy,’ (2001) is gaining momentum and democracy promotion is yet to defeat the ‘backlash against democracy’ (Carothers, 2006) that has halted democracy promotion efforts and caused a reversal to occur. Foreign policy literature also helps build a case for democracy promotion in reverse. Skaaning and Jiménez’s Global State of Democracy (GSoD) diagram (see Figure 2, p. 67) illustrates very well how donors approach democracy promotion. By segmenting the foundations of democracy and how best to promote it, donors are able to clearly target recipient states and tailor programs to deliver specific outcomes (see Figure 6, p. 97).

In Chapter 2.2, this thesis brought forward six observations that have linked democratisation with democracy promotion in reverse (see Table 1, p. 55 and Figure 4, p. 93). Firstly, democracy promotion is complex. It is not just about institutional change, but democratisation is also about promoting virtues of democracy itself, and these being promoted into recipient nations. There are many scholars who are putting forward different priorities for building a democracy. As such, democracy promotion (through democratisation) is multi-faceted and complex. This being the case, highlights how democracy promotion can lead to a misalignment of objectives by the donors and gives insight on how this leads to democracy promotion in reverse. Secondly, democracy promotion is not a linear process. As highlighted in Chapter 2 (see Table 1, p. 55), democratisation

can lead to backsliding. The reason this is important to take note of is because it further supports democracy promotion as complex, but it shows that it is not just a one-way process. Thus, it is not as simple as democratisation equates to instilling institutions or an establishment of governance into a recipient nation. Democracy promotion can start before those aspects of government are even built and this strengthens democracy promotion in reverse because donors are exporting their own concept of democracy into a nation that does not know how to build on it. Democracy promotion also includes international pressures. With international pressures coming from donor nations emphasising their own self-image/interest on recipient nations, the recipient receives a biased form of democracy promotion. This also leads to projects having strings attached. If a donor is promoting virtues of democracy (such as impartial administration through transparency and accountability), and those outcomes are not long-term, then recipients do not have an incentive to continue implementing the projects and to democratise (see Figure 3, p. 92). This is how the number of illiberal democracies rise and gives reasoning behind the backlash against democracy (see Table 1, p. 55). Fourth, tracing democracy promotion is diverse. Free and fair elections have been primarily recognised and academically supported, as the key way to promote democracy. However, scholars such as Carothers, suggest that it should be in the hands of the recipient nations to democratise. Simply tracing democracy promotion to free and fair election outcomes is not the only way, or best way, to assess the effects and results of democracy promotion. UK and US programmes show interest in a diverse range of projects, including varying aspects of fundamental rights, and impartial administration, not just participatory engagement through elections (see Figure 2, p. 67). Lastly, democracy promotion is about promoting aspects of the donor's self-image of democracy and that democracy promotion is not inflicting long-term change into recipient states. Expecting developing nations to then sustain the democracy that is being imposed on them has not proved to be lasting and this is a contributing factor to why projects are not continual (see Figure 3, p. 92).

Overall, democratisation literature present key contributions to what democracy promotion is and how its flaws are causing a backlash and decline in democracy (see Figure 1, p. 46). It also shows

what democracy is (see Figure 4, p. 93). Western democracies are not flawless in themselves, so the outcomes of democracy promotion should not be either which is why promoting in the donor's self-image is problematic.

Foreign policy itself allows for the reasoning that donor states are driven by their own desires and motives (see Figure 5, p. 94). In Chapter 2.3, there are five key points that are made about foreign policy and how it is reflected in democracy promotion. Two of the issues raised in regard to foreign policy literature, is that democracy promotion is a bureaucratic process and suffers from political bias (see Table 2, p. 76). This initiates foreign policy to mirror what donor states seek to achieve from promoting democracy. It also shows that democracy promotion is embedded in bureaucratic processes. This strengthens the argument of donors promoting for their own gains, and most importantly, that there is a political bias to democracy promotion. Thirdly, democracy promotion is a hybrid concept because there is a mixing of interests and values from the sender country; this leads to there being a contradictory nature to democracy promotion. Are donors promoting fundamental rights or participatory engagement or impartial administration (values of democracy), or are they promoting based on creating regional allies, destabilising security threats/volatile regimes or building up trade (interests)? It is not clear as to which path the donors are following (links back to democracy promotion not being linear and traceable, highlighting that there are overlapping observations between democratisation literature and foreign policy (see Table 1, p. 55). What this means for democracy promotion as a concept is that there are several ways in which it can be in reverse and the biggest concern and cause of this stems from foreign policy, leading to contradictory motives and interests being pushed for.

Burcher and Bisarya added to the foreign policy literature by arguing 'modern democratic backsliding can take place through the manipulation of democratic rules and institutions,' (2017, p. 71). Consequently, the concept of modern democratic backsliding is already here, so it is plausible to state that the process of democracy promotion is also backsliding and at the very least, contributing to that backlash. This is very important for this thesis because it leads onto another

key observation made; the need for democracy promotion benchmarks/ways to measure democracy promotion to be present and operationalised successfully. The Conceptual Framework (see Chapter 5, p. 95) further argues the case for how crucial it is to have benchmarks and outlines that fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration are the benchmarks used to measure democracy promotion by. With the advocating for benchmarks to be applied to project objectives and the need to measure democracy promotion being argued for, the GSoD diagram in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2, p. 67) offers a platform for donors to assist in democratising recipient states by compartmentalising elements of democracy to promote. Yet, neither the UK nor the US use the framework as a guideline for universal democracy promotion. In some cases, tailoring programmes is the best way to understand a recipient nation's wants and to initiate that dialogue with them. However, this thesis argues that this is not happening (and proof of this is in the data presented in Chapter 10, p. 251).


Moreover, the literature on developmental assistance (see Chapter 3, p. 77) highlights how the UK and the US approach democracy promotion. With the UK advocating for a developmental approach (focusing on fundamental rights and participatory engagement) and the US focusing on a political approach (impartiality in governance and administration), it is clear to see how the two donors promote democracy. Again, this difference calls for the need for a universal guideline framework, (the Conceptual Framework created by this thesis contributes knowledge to address this problem). The GSoD is particularly important as it gives a starting point for democracy promoters to follow by outlining what democracy should include, thereby giving a starting foundation for donors to work with. This offers a way to address issues such as lack of clarity in democracy promotion and needing uniform way to promote democracy (see p. 9 for research puzzles). The framework further offers an introduction in understanding how democracy promotion can be operationalised and this is a central basis for how this thesis is looking at democracy and thus, how democracy promotion is in reverse. Due to this, there is a focus on needing a sophisticated understanding of democracy promotion and this is where this thesis adds

a contribution to knowledge, as the Conceptual Framework seeks to offer a solution to these issues.

This two-dimensional understanding of theoretical and practical democracy promotion is further explored in the next section as a Conceptual Framework. By using democratisation and foreign policy literature, these theories highlight what, how and who is promoting democracy (see Figure 4, p. 93 and Figure 5, p. 94). This thesis can further develop on existing ideas in order to contribute extended knowledge into the concept of democracy promotion in reverse. Only then, once a conceptual and practical understanding of democracy promotion is shown, will it be possible to survey how successful democracy promotion is and analyse the reasons this thesis argues for democracy promotion in reverse. However, in order for this thesis to argue beyond a theoretical perspective of democracy promotion, there needs to be an evaluation of UK and US programmes in the form of a document analysis. This is presented in Chapter 5 (see p. 95) and will show how both the UK and the US promote democracy to serve their foreign policy interests (through the developmental and political approaches (Carothers, 2009)).

The flow diagrams below visually represent the ideas literature has offered for democracy promotion in reverse. More importantly, they give strength to the objective of this thesis's contribution to knowledge; donors promoting democracy in their self-image has led to democracy promotion in reverse.

Figure 3: Flow diagram representing democracy promotion in reverse. Source: Author's own



Donor: The state promoting democracy.

- Aims:

- 1) To promote fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration
- 2) Building conditionality's (needed to reinforce changes)
- 3) 'Democracy promotion efforts have to anchor themselves to specific agents within local society,' (Muskhelishvili & Jorjoliani, 2012, p. 41), collaboratively working alongside locals.

Communication in the form of feedback is a broken link. Recipients have not articulated feedback to donor countries and vice versa. This broken communication leads to the lack of adaptation or learning on the part of the donor as to how to promote democracy abroad.

Fundamental rights- enhancing civil society organisations and NGOs, human rights

Participatory engagement- enhance political participation, election building

Impartial administration- accountability, institution building

Recipient: The state receiving democracy promotion.

- 1) Expectations: rebuild institutions, deepen relationships with democratic states, and focus on building internal structures and generally working towards better governance.
- 2) Donor's lack contextualisation: 'the recipient context is generally categorized by a conflict situation that leads to conflicting objectives on the part of the donors,' (Wolff & Spanger, 2014, p. 16).
- 3) Projects are short-lived with a lack of long-term sustainability due to conflicting motives of donors and recipients.
- 4) Recipients receive democracy promotion in the image of the donor state and foreign policy, not based on the needs and aspirations of the recipient state.

Feedback Loop (in reverse):

- 1) The lack of feedback is not useful for evaluating the success of democracy promotion.
- 2) Feedback links to aims and objectives of the donor programmes, not on the outcomes of the project and recipient opinions.
- 3) Recipients do not offer critical evaluation to donors either, leading to a lack of retrospective analysis needed to learn valuable lessons that can be implemented in future projects.
- 4) Lack of recipient feedback and donor analysis consequently offers little validity of projects as to whether they have achieved their aims.

-Ensuring timely project completion, adequate funding allocated, free of corruption

- Follow ups conducted a few months later, little to no further financial aid from donor
- Volunteers/NGOs leave and no further contact by donors, made once project is completed

Evaluation process (in reverse):

- 1) Lack of critical analysis of projects for two reasons: processes are temporary and there is a lack of permanent imprint on the recipient state.
- 2) Evaluation does not reflect the process of democracy promotion because the donor has accomplished their aims, not the aims of the recipient state.
- 3) There is a lack of long-term planning and follow-ups as recipients are not at the heart of objectives.
- 4) Overshadowing the recipients needs by donor. This leads to very slow evaluations with very narrow remits, leading to weak evaluation processes in the recipient countries.

Figure 4: Democracy promotion as democratisation. Source: Author's own





Figure 5: Democracy promotion as foreign policy. Source: Author's own



Chapter 5: Conceptual Framework

As previously discussed in Chapter 2.3 (see p. 38, 56), Skaaning & Jiménez's Global State of Democracy indices (see Figure 2, p. 67) outline the foundational elements a democracy should have; this will form the basis of this thesis's Conceptual Framework. The reason behind choosing their work is two-fold. Firstly, they published their work in 2017, making their work current and relevant. This also means that anything this thesis adds to their work is contemporary and contributes to knowledge surrounding the field of democracy promotion. Secondly, it has eloquently compartmentalised sections of democracy promotion, which has created a basic visual representation of what democracy is and therefore what democracy promotion should set out to achieve as outcomes. Their work is affiliated with the IDEA Framework (see Appendix 1, p. 271) meaning it is as impartial as can be, which enhances the validity of the framework this thesis has created.

This chapter presents a generic Conceptual Framework, built around the ideal type of democratic benchmarks for which donors should use to facilitate and to measure the successes and failures of democracy promotion. From Skaaning & Jiménez's indices, the aim of this framework will be to contribute benchmarks of what democracy promotion should include. It also gives a structure by which to instigate the values of democracy that donors could use as foundational objectives and aims for donor's democracy promotion projects. The GSoD is about democracy and the role this thesis has is developing these into democracy promotion indices in order to argue democracy promotion is in reverse. Thereby, if these were utilised by donors, there would be a solution to the need for a universal framework and for clarity (see p. 9). The reason this thesis argues that democracy promotion should be a uniformed concept by the UK and the US is because it could help eliminate donor bias and aid the process of long-term outcomes of democracy promotion (which is what should be the end goal). If these indices are not incorporated as objectives and

guidelines for donors, and do not achieve permanent outcomes in recipient nations, you are left with democracy promotion in reverse.


The three conditions this Conceptual Framework will measure successful or unsuccessful democracy promotion against are fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration. These have been chosen as important and necessary conditionality's to measure against in order to determine if democracy promotion works and more importantly, if democracy promotion is in reverse. These three particular elements, chosen from the GSoD indices (see Figure 2, p. 67 and Figure 3, p. 92), encompass the foundations of democracy, to which there are various degrees of democratisation.

Successful fundamental rights in projects would be achieved through the implementation of civil liberties, access to justice and societal equality (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017). For participatory engagement, it would be through processes that facilitate free and fair elections and direct democracy (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017). Impartial administration would be demonstrated by addressing areas such as checks on government and having a representative government through transparency and the absence of corruption (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017). These ideals, if successfully operationalised in projects, will translate to long-term, permanent democratisation; if these are not the outcomes of projects, then democracy promotion is in reverse. This thesis will observe these three benchmarks within UK and US democracy promotion programmes and in turn, this will allow the Conceptual Framework to measure democracy promotion in practice and whether it is successful, or in reverse. The successful outcomes that would be expected from democracy promotion would be examples such as women's rights and girls having access to education, or freedom of speech, as a fundamental right. In a project engaging its citizens through direct democracy, we would expect to see democratic actors and large numbers of stakeholders being impartial in their approach to projects and consequently, participating and engaging in them. The projects themselves need to be participatory and representative as democracy promotion is not just about what it achieves, but also about the three benchmarks being incorporated into the

programme aims. These benchmarks should be embedded in the projects, as well as in the outcomes.

Below, Figure 6 highlights the way democratisation is operationalised within democracy promotion, in terms of the benchmarks this thesis puts forward, and the expected outcomes of democracy promotion projects.

Figure 6: Conceptual Framework: Operationalised democracy promotion



Source: Author's own (adapted from (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017))

Figure 6 shows the process of benchmarking democracy promotion and supports the argument of the importance of measuring democracy promotion (see p. 70). However, in the practical implementation of democracy promotion programmes, project aims are not amounting to permanent project outcomes, and so, democracy promotion is in reverse (see Chapter 7, p. 14848 for data supporting this).

This thesis hypothesises that the UK and the US promote democracy in their own self-image and seeks to find practical evidence of this. Therefore, the reasoning behind choosing these as benchmarks follows on from the observation that the West does promote in their own self-image (see Chapter 2.2, see p.38), because fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial

administration are core features of Western democracy. Consequently, when these are not achieved within, and as outcomes, of projects, what would be expected as a result instead is democracy promotion in reverse. If democracy promotion fails, then these three benchmarks have not been integrated into UK and US objectives. If it does not leave anything permanent in the recipient countries once donors leave, democracy is in reverse.

This Conceptual Framework assumes that democracy promotion is about three basic conditions. If we have a particular type of fundamental right, a particular type of participatory engagement, and a particular type of impartial administration, present within a programme aim, then the outcomes observed would be successful democracy promotion. If we do not see this, then we are seeing democracy promotion in reverse. Therefore, any successful projects that promote democracy should also embody these three elements. Evidence of these three, and the subsections of these three benchmarks, in the aims of programmes and also within the projects when implemented (see Figure 6, p. 97) would show democracy promotion works. What happens in reality is that though they are present in the programme's aims, the projects are not leading to permanent outcomes. If the benchmarks cannot be found as long-lasting results, then what is left behind in the recipient nation is democracy promotion in reverse.

There also needs to be a recognition of the difference between democracy *promotion* and what is being *promoted*. This thesis presents indicators by which to assess democracy promotion with and by, it is about both the processes which these indicators are implemented into recipient states (the *promotion* of the benchmarks) and the outcomes of the projects (what has been *promoted*) (see Figure 6, p. 97). For example, the process of achieving fundamental rights in a project (democracy *promotion*) and the achievement of that fundamental right in the recipient nation (democracy *promoted*) is how this thesis observes this difference. However, for the nature of this thesis's aims and methodology, any difference between democracy promotion as a process and democracy promotion as a deliverable is not critical to this particular study. It would, however, be a potential exploration for a future project. This is not a pathfinding study and so the thesis's

aims are not to reinvent the topic of democracy promotion but to recognise what is wrong within this area of study and in turn, shed light upon the weaknesses of democracy promotion. The contribution to knowledge is applying the concept of democracy promotion in reverse and giving recommendations to improve the process, via this Conceptual Framework. As this is an early study, the distinction is not a central focus to this thesis, however it is necessary to explain how democracy promotion is seen as a promotable concept as a whole. It is also difficult to measure all outcomes of democracy promotion for both the donors and recipients. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the successes/failures of democracy promotion within the recipient states and how, through that process, the donor's benefit.

As a result, what would be the benchmarks for judging if a democracy promotion project is successful? We might expect to see that there are clear rules in the design of democracy promotion projects. We might expect to see high levels of human rights or direct democracy from different types of democratic actors. We might also expect to see the administration become more transparent and not seen to be favouring one party or the other; it will not be corrupt or accept bribery and therefore not undermine the democratic principles the project is trying to promote. There should be consistency between the applications of these benchmarks in UK and US programmes; this would be a comparable way to measure the success of the projects. Another success would be that the donor imprints these ideas, long-term, in the recipient country and leave something behind for the recipients to then use and to autonomously democratise. If these are not achieved, then what we have is the idea of democracy promotion in reverse. Therefore, the understanding of an ideal type of democracy, the benchmarks (fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration) of democracy promotion, and the way these are embodied into UK and US projects, is what the Conceptual Framework will test against to draw out the successes and failures of Western democracy promotion. The next section will outline the UK and the US's democracy promotion in practice (using the three benchmarks) to demonstrate the successes and failure of democracy promotion; fulfilling the research objectives (see p. 16) of assessing how democracy is promoted and evaluating UK and US programmes to critically argue

that when these benchmarks are not integrated into project objectives, democracy promotion is in reverse.

5.1 The Benchmarks of Democracy Promotion

One of the research objectives (p. 16) of this thesis is to define and identify benchmarks to measure democracy promotion with. This thesis considers three key benchmarks, namely fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration, and discusses whether or not the UK and the US are integrating these benchmarks enough (if at all) into their project objectives and designs. These three benchmarks represent the general set of standards established by this thesis and inform the degree to which democracy promotion in reverse may be evident or apparent. It is therefore worthwhile now exploring aspects of these three benchmarks in further detail.

5.1.1 Fundamental Rights

According to Skaaning and Jiménez (2017) (see Figure 2, p. 67), fundamental rights consists of access to justice, civil liberties and social rights and equality (see Figure 7, p. 108 and Figure 8, p. 112). They are the general set of values (that this thesis argues) should be integrated into the core aims and eventual outcomes of democracy promotion projects (see Figure 6, p. 97). For example, if democracy promotion is successfully implemented, the expected result would be an increase in these sorts of fundamental rights outlined by Skaaning and Jiménez. If there is no increase that is evident, reported on or even shows signs of reversal, then democracy promotion is in reverse.

Introducing Fundamental Rights by the UK

The UK's efforts in addressing fundamental rights comes in the form of their Human Rights and Democracy Programme (HRDP). The HRDP 'is an annual fund that funds human rights projects

to support transformative change across our eight thematic priorities,' (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2013, p. n.p.):

'Abolition of the death penalty; business and human rights; democratic processes; promoting women's rights; freedom of expression; freedom of religion or belief; global torture prevention and preventing sexual violence in conflict,' (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2013, p. n.p.).

It is a programme developed by the FCO thus has a foreign policy perspective to its aims. The 'FCO spends excess of £5.8 million in support of more than 80 human rights projects in more than 40 countries,' (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2013, p. n.p.). The HRDP, however, only foresaw into 2015 and has since been replaced by other projects. Consequently, this highlights the changing nature of democracy promotion as a viable interest used by donors.

Introducing Fundamental Rights by the US

Similarly with the UK, the general set of goals are the same (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017) and allows for a comparative analysis when assessing the outcomes of projects (see Figure 6, p. 97 and Figure 12, p. 125).

One organisation that has developed projects to implement fundamental rights in the US is the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour (DRL). Its aim is focused on promoting freedom and US style values such as protecting human rights but central to U.S. foreign policy (U.S. Department of State, 2017). As previously explained in the Chapter 2, section 2.3, and (see p. 56), by using democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal, the US is able to manipulate their interests into any project that could be implemented. Nonetheless, the US DRL seeks to namely:

'promote greater respect for human rights, freedom of expression, women's rights and children's rights, and the protection of minorities; promote the rule of law, seek accountability, and change cultures of impunity,' (U.S. Department of State, 2017, p. n.p.).

The US DRL enacts these motives in several ways. One way is, yearly, the ‘DRL develops, edits, and submits to Congress a 5,000-page report on human rights conditions in over 190 countries that is respected globally for its objectivity and accuracy.... relevant information on country conditions,’ (U.S. Department of State, 2017, p. n.p.). By securing a standard of human rights conditions, it is easy to see if they are being violated, abroad. Another way is by ensuring that human rights are incorporated into assistance programmes and coordinates with key allies (U.S. Department of State, 2017). DRL acknowledges that its work is more sustainable and more likely to succeed with the help of other organisations; a crucial aspect to this thesis, as though there is acknowledgement of what can sustain successful democracy promotion if projects are short-lived and this leads to democracy promotion in reverse.

5.1.2 Participatory Engagement

Participatory engagement, in general, consists of direct democracy, subnational elections, electoral participation, civil participation, clean election, inclusive suffrage, free political parties, elected government (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017) (see Figure 6, p. 97 and Figure 9, p. 116).

Introducing Participatory Engagement by the UK

The focus here is on elections being a viable and solid foundation to building a democracy and this is the general standard by which outcomes will be measured. The UK FCO also plays a pivotal role in promoting representative government and enhancing citizen participation. In particular, their work alongside UK Aid has shown that enhancing a transitional state’s ability to hold free and fair elections is crucial to promoting democracy. The FCO sees its role as integral ‘in delivering free and fair elections through thorough planning, supporting and delivering clean elections to political systems,’ (UK Aid, 2010, p. 7). The FCO produced a report in 2010 outlining nine principles of election support:

‘Understand the wider context within which elections occur; be clear when to advocate for and support elections; analyse electoral risk at all stages; integrate diplomatic, financial and technical approaches to elections support; systematically adopt the electoral cycle approach; recognise limitations of development partners’ role in elections support; support election observation; support women’s political participation; follow principles of harmonisation, alignment and ownership,’ (UK Aid, 2010, p. 5).

The FCO works with other organisations, both governmental and non-governmental, to enhance the rights of citizens and to allow them to engage with their democratic progression. For example, DFID fund programmes to research recipient states that are affected by conflict which allows the UK government to then have a better understanding of how to implement democracy promotion projects. Furthermore, ‘the UK government helps countries develop fully functioning democracies by implementing parliaments, civil society, political parties and media,’ (UK Aid, 2010). This is democracy promotion in the donor’s self-image, in practice (see p. 51)

Introducing Participatory Engagement by the US

The US, through the National Democratic Institute (NDI), seeks to ‘promote the integrity of electoral and political processes based on international standards and the practicalities of mobilizing citizen participation,’ (National Democratic Institute, 2018, p. n.p.). Here is an acknowledgement of democracy promotion coinciding with international objectives (see Figure 11, p. 120 and Figure 13, p. 128), however that does not necessarily occur and thus, the need for measuring US democracy promotion, through participatory engagement is essential in order to understand what the outcomes should show (see Figure 6, p. 97). The NDI uses elections as the forefront of their democratisation work as it believes ‘elections are a periodic test of the strength of democratic institutions, and they are a vehicle for the participation of citizens in the democratic process,’ (National Democratic Institute, 2018, p. n.p.). This is important as it shows that the NDI has a goal and focus in mind. The ‘NDI's assistance reaches across party organizations, from grassroots party membersto mid-level party officials and senior party leaders,’ (National

Democratic Institute, 2018). The NDI shows how true democracy promotion *can* work if framed correctly and not politically loaded with donor interests.

5.1.3 Impartial Administration

Skaaning and Jiménez have generalised impartial administration to include predictable enforcement, absence of corruption, media integrity, judicial independence, effective parliament (2017) (see Figure 6, p. 97 and Figure 10, p. 119). Ensuring that the ruling government is transparent is perhaps the hardest form of democracy promotion and the least successful aspect of democratisation for an authoritarian state (see Chapter 8.3, p. 200). This is merely due to the nature of an authoritarian regime, existing for many centuries, as the exact opposite of a democratic state. Nonetheless, this has not deterred the West from promoting checks on government and impartial administration and this is why it is an important benchmark for democracy promotion.

Introducing Impartial Administration by the UK

The UK government has established a Building Stability Overseas Strategy programme that unites the FCO, DFID and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to work collaboratively on targeting anti-corruption and strengthen judiciary's abroad (Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence , 2011, p. n.p.) (see Figure 7, p. 108). The 'Building Stability Overseas Strategy acknowledges that fragile states have complex web of institutions that need re-building,' (Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence , 2011, p. 11). This strategy seeks to create transparent and corruption-free institutions by 'investing in police and legal systems and building civil society organisations as these are seen to be weak or poorly functioning,' (Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence , 2011, p. 11). Interestingly, the Building Stability Overseas Strategy incorporates a reflection of UK values and ideas. The document outlines that:

‘The UK promotes idea that the more peaceful political systems are, the more accountable and trusted they are seen to be, and can enhance democracy within a fragile state. Democracy provides the best route to build accountable and responsive states able to safeguard human rights and promote social and economic development as access to justice is a basic right.

(Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence , 2011, p. 11).

Therefore, the UK is projecting the image and experience their own style of government has produced, onto countries that are considered fragile. This leads back to the argument that democracy promotion is in reverse. The donor has more to gain from this strategy than the recipient does. Even so, the document echoes a very important point, that:

‘Access to justice is a basic need for all citizens. The law, the judicial system, respect for human rights and combating impunity are all integral to justice. The links across the criminal justice system, from policing to prosecution, courts to prisons are all crucial,’ (Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence , 2011, p. 12).

This shows that the UK is attempting to improve all aspects of governance and not just targeting one element of a democracy, which a positive aspect of the project. They acknowledge that ‘working in just one segment is rarely sustainable and can place undue burden on another part of the chain,’ (Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence , 2011, p. 12). Whether this is actually what is produced is debateable, but the motive to promote democracy and how the UK government does so, is clear in its aims and does have the intention of creating long-term goals within their project objectives, in theory. It is the practical implementation, however, that is weaker on this point.

Introducing Impartial Administration by the US

USAID for example focuses on enforcing impartial administration through the judiciary and accountability. Their aim is to tackle the strengthening judicial independence with five aims:

‘1) Building support and reforms 2) Confronting interference through institutional structure 3) Developing judicial capacity and attitudes 4) Increasing transparency 5) Promoting societal respect for the role of an impartial judiciary,’ (Office of Democracy and Governance, 2002, p. 9).


By ensuring a strong judiciary is established within a state, it is easier to monitor parliamentary effectiveness and most importantly, governmental accountability. Consequently, This allows for the evaluation of the outcomes of democracy promotion by using impartial administration as a generic benchmark (see Figure 11, p. 120 and 14, p. 132). The trouble with transitional states is largely to do with corruption, as that is rooted in their way of governance. In order to address this, ‘USAID, in collaboration with their local counterparts, designs and implements programs that effectively strengthen judicial independence,’ (Office of Democracy and Governance, 2002, p. 5). One way USAID seeks to tackle this problem is at a grassroots level: ‘a key strategy for fighting corruption would be to streamline the administration of courts, especially at the local level. Long delays, lack of transparency, and disorganized filing systems provide enormous opportunities for corruption,’ (Office of Democracy and Governance, 2002, p. 71). By tackling corruption from the ground up, it allows states to begin change locally which in the long run can help maintain democracy. The next section of this chapter highlights the operationalisation of UK and US democracy promotion programmes³.

Ultimately, the creation of this Conceptual Framework enables further exploration into democracy promotion in reverse by outlining three key benchmarks to measure it by. In addition,

³ This thesis has chosen to use fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration as the three benchmarks to assess UK and US programmes by. Checks on government and representative government are recognised within the indices of participatory engagement and impartial administration.

evidence of departments and agencies who are promoting democracy are used as examples to highlight numerous ways in which the processes of these projects are in reverse. The focus is to look at three particular cases from the UK and US, to show the 'processes' of democracy promotion (in reverse). These case studies show the procedural implementation of democracy promotion and have presented substantial evidence that democracy promotion is in reverse.

Figure 7: UK democracy promotion programme. Source: Author's own (adapted from DFID, UK Aid, FCO and MoD documents)



5.2 UK Democracy Promotion Scenarios

Above, Figure 7 represents the channels by which the UK promote democracy through. The UK has government bodies working towards promoting aspects of democracy abroad. Similarly, to the previous section, an example of how the UK promotes democracy will be examined and evaluated in order to understand UK democracy promotion and where it is perhaps going wrong. There is a brief description and examples of the types of projects the UK has implemented (or is implementing) in democratising states (highlighted in Figure 7). This section will focus on fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration projects, as they are the benchmarks this thesis has recognised for assessing democracy promotion in reverse. The UK government channels their democracy promotion programmes through two major government bodies: the FCO (with their sub-division of ODA) and DFID, (with their sub division, UK Aid). The three benchmarks of democracy that have been created for the Conceptual Framework will be used to highlight how to measure democracy promotion and argue that it is in reverse. The programmes used to help illustrate how the UK promote democracy, have been outlined in the document analysis (see p. 109).

5.2.1 The UK and Fundamental Rights


Figure 6 (see p. 97) shows the process of democracy promotion from its aims to its expected outcomes. It is therefore essential to understand how the UK operationalises its democratisation ambitions by looking at projects that have been implemented/are being implemented, in recipient nations. This will allow for the evidence that democracy promotion is in reverse (see Figure, 8, p. 112). Perhaps the most important benchmark for the UK is fundamental rights, as they are considered a keystone to building a democracy (see Chapter 3, p. 77). The UK provides substantial amounts of aid to this area alone. One example of how the UK promotes fundamental rights is through the Human Rights and Democracy Programme (HRDP) 2014-15 (see Figure 7, p. 108). It has targeted over eighty countries worldwide, aiming to build democratic foundations and protect human rights across the world: ‘the Programme aims to make a difference to people’s

lives, helping to build the capacity of governments and civil society to promote and protect human rights,' (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2014, p. 2). The FCO Strategy focuses on areas of human rights and democracy the UK should pursue rather than selecting specific recipients. HRDP has multiple aims, such as prevent torture, abolish the death penalty, enhance freedom of expression and promote gender equality (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2014). For example, in Kenya the HRDP implemented the Business and Human Rights Training Course, which intended to help facilitate the democratisation of Kenyan businesses to help society improve, through human rights. The context of the project was that 'companies in Kenya face many human rights related challenges such as poor working conditions, land issues, community tensions, gender equality, corruption,' (Official Development Assistance, 2016, p. 1). Therefore, the ODA 'sought to increase the capacity of businesses to respect and support human rights,' (Official Development Assistance, 2016, p. 1).

The project ran a two-day training course that 'targeted 30 business delegates. Around one third of the participants were from a major ICT company, with others from the food, drink, steel, electricity and salt extraction sectors,' (Official Development Assistance, 2016, p. 1). However, the project only partly achieved its aims. The review of the project explained that 'continuous oversight and communication between project partners is essential and [needed] to keep delivery on track and training courses are most effective when they are carefully tailored to the local country context,' (Official Development Assistance, 2016, p. 2). It is possible to argue two points in favour of democracy promotion in reverse. Firstly, without proper lines of communication between donors and recipients, it is hard to sustain a project long-term and ensure it is successful (see Figure 3, p. 92). Secondly, the UK promotes democracy based on their experiences of democracy and not with the recipient's needs in mind, which reaffirms the notion that democracy is promoted in the donor's self-image. Furthermore, the HRDP 'targets areas that make the greatest impact in delivering the FCO's overarching purpose to pursue an active and activist foreign policy,' (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2014, p. 2). Consequently, project objectives are framed using UK foreign policy goals. This shows that projects are pre-emptively

choosing recipient states that will enhance UK goals, as oppose to improving overall democracy for the recipient states. This could help support the need for a framework like IDEA being utilised in Western democracy promotion and thus helps solve the research puzzles (p. 9) of this thesis arguing for clarity and uniformity in donor democracy promotion programmes. As shown in Kenya, had the project been tailored to Kenyan society, the project would have been more successful. However, it was driven by a wider foreign policy objective (which this thesis argues is a reason for democracy promotion in reverse, see Table 2, p. 76) to create a stable ally in a region of instability and conflict.

Figure 8: Democracy promotion through fundamental rights. Source: Author's own



5.2.2 The UK and Participatory Engagement

The brief document analysis on page 87 highlights that the UK places a huge emphasis on elections as a focus point for long-term democratisation. This section looks at how the UK seeks to implement aspects of participatory engagement into recipient states. It is important to look at a UK democracy promotion programme that incorporates participatory engagement, as this helps strengthen the argument of democracy promotion in reverse (which is clearly illustrated in Figure 9, p. 116). An example of DFID's attempt to promote democratic elections is in the case of Malawi through the Institutional Strengthening of the Electoral Process (ISEP), implemented by UK Aid (see Figure 7 p. 108). The programme was enacted with the aim to:

‘Provide £7.8 million between November 2012 and March 2017 to support long-term institutional strengthening of the electoral process in Malawi, as outlined in the DFID Malawi Operational Plan. £6.1 million of this will be focussed on supporting the lead up to, the event and immediate aftermath of the 2014 Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Elections,’ (UK Aid, 2017, p. n.p.).

The amount of money spent on this project aligns with the argument that despite millions of pounds being spent on programmes, the results are not producing permanent outcomes; democracy promotion is in reverse.

The main aim for this project was to help the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) facilitate elections that are more democratic: ‘as an electoral management body, MEC has weak technical capacity and its budget is not guaranteed,’ (Department for International Development, 2016, p. 2). This has hindered Malawian democratisation and consequently, UK Aid identified three main problems in Malawi's electoral process. One was that ‘key electoral actors including the Malawi Electoral Commission, Political Parties and Civil Society lack the financial and technical resources to play an effective role in ensuring free and credible elections,’ (UK Aid, 2012, p. 4). Secondly was the issue of patronage, which ‘undermines accountability of politicians to the

people and leaves the electoral system open to the influence of money, vote-buying, and other attempts to subvert the process,' (UK Aid, 2012, p. 4). Lastly is the issue of sustainability; 'capacity that is built for electoral "events" tends to be ad-hoc and quickly dissipates once elections are over,' (UK Aid, 2012, p. 4). The UK government therefore implemented ISEP in order to address these concerns and to facilitate Malawi in becoming an inclusive and transparent state.

However, in the 2016 review of the project, ISEP faced difficulties in achieving its aims, which were largely due to donor discrepancies. The Annual Review explained that there was some successful transition post-2014 election. However, there were issues that arose and could have been avoided with more planning. For example, the Review highlights that 'stakeholders could not agree the process for taking the reforms to parliament. A key lesson is to clarify reform process right from the start and involve strategic actors,' (Department for International Development, 2016, p. 4). This emphasises that a lack of selection planning regarding which stakeholders to work with caused a lack of clarity in project implementation. This could also be described as project disorganisation on behalf of the donor. If the project itself is disorganised and lacks clarity, how can the recipient nation continue this successfully?


There is also an issue of lack of retrospective follow-up. The Review explains that 'although ISEP will remain a live programme till 2017, all its current components are coming to an end in 2016 and DFID should consider designing a successor programme by December, 2016,' (Department for International Development, 2016, p. 4). However, according to the DFID website, no review or documents have been published since November 2016. Consequently, it appears that no long-term follow-up plan was agreed or actioned. Furthermore, lack of strategic planning was raised in the Review:

'Before the 2014 polls, the political parties' bill was ready for submission but when the new government came in, this bill had to be sent back for fresh consultations. The key lesson

learned is not to pass such an important legislative process from one government to another,'
(Department for International Development, 2016, p. 4).

This highlights the lack of planning, as DFID was engaging with the Malawi government before and after the 2014 elections, yet failed to prepare for the change of government having an effect on the project outcomes. This can be identified as democracy promotion in reverse, as the UK invested their interests in cleaning up Malawian elections, yet did not seek to engage with the correct stakeholders or prepare for the new government's role in DFID's work. Again, this supports the need for the benchmark of participatory engagement needing to be integrated into the project's aims (see Figure 6, p. 97 and Figure 7, p. 108). Furthermore, this thesis argues that the lack of long-term planning has led to no permanent outcomes for the project; democracy promotion in reverse (see p. 16 for research objectives). However, the real successes and failure cannot be fully known until the 2019 election in Malawi, but as this thesis focuses on the timeline of up to 2017, the observations made will be solely based on outcomes up until this point. Therefore, these are current arguments made based on the documents and publications provided and available from DFID, at the time of researching. Figure 9 below visually represents democracy promotion in reverse, in Malawi.

Figure 9: Democracy promotion through participatory engagement. Source: Author's own



5.2.3 The UK and Impartial Administration

This section looks at how the UK seeks to promote the benchmark of impartial administration into recipient states. It is worthwhile to explore how the UK implements processes to create a government that runs legitimately in a state that has no historically rooted concepts of democracy. It is a difficult task (as supported by the document analysis) and this is necessary to look at further in order to validate the argument that democracy promotion is in reverse (see Figure 10, p. 119). A good example of this is DFID's Operational Plan 2011-2016, created in order to aid Somalia towards democratisation (see Figure 7, p. 108). DFID describes Somalia as 'one of the world's most fragile states,' (Department for International Development, 2014, p. 5) and is situated in a region full of instability. Therefore, it is within the UK's interest to enhance Somalian democracy. DFID explains that the programme 'has a particular focus on governance and peace-building, supporting the political settlement, and building the capacity of institutions and conflict resolution mechanisms at the federal and sub-federal levels,' (Department for International Development, 2014, p. 6). The project's government and peace-building initiatives are based on DFID's 2010 state-building and peace-building framework, showing that impartial administration is a core aim of this project. This framework outlines four objectives to state building:

'Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms; Support inclusive political settlements and processes, develop core state functions and respond to public expectations,' (Department for International Development, 2010, p. 7).

These objectives reflect UK ambitions to promote democracy to fragile states, but the framework itself is broad and was not created for a specific recipient state in mind. Therefore, contextual applicability is questionable. Nonetheless, DFID aimed to establish local governments and strengthen the political landscape of Somalia. However, the Operational Plan published in 2014 highlighted that DFID 'is currently developing a programme to improve the availability of data on governance and peace-building in Somalia, to enable us and others to determine baseline results and impacts of interventions in these sectors,' (Department for International Development,

2014, p. 9). There is no evidence that this was developed (see Figure 10, p. 119), moreover, the project was dominated by UN agencies and International NGOs, side-lining UK efforts to stabilise Somalia. This dominance of multiple donors makes it hard to assess whether the UK was directly improving Somalia's institutional development or whether it was due to another donor organisation or assistance. The report claims the successful 'formation of federal member states across Somalia, completion of the constitutional review, and preparation for parliamentary elections at the Federal level,' (Department for International Development, 2014, p. 9), which is progress. However, the later statement that DFID has inadequate systems to analyse results of the project highlights that there could be a lack of detail and organisation to this project. By using a framework that has a broad scope in state building has meant that finer details and the political context of Somalia itself has been lost; this is democracy promotion in reverse (see Figure 10, p. 119).

DFID have also not thoroughly researched the recipient state's needs but instead implemented a framework they have used previously, on a number of very different states. This is a weakness of UK democracy promotion because, though this thesis argues a universal framework should be applied to donor projects, the framework itself needs to be neutral and have impartiality as the core principle of the project and not just simply exporting one project design (that may already have flaws) into another country. It can be argued that DFID was acting upon UK interests, likely foreign policy related as Somalia is located in a critical crisis zone. Consequently, the recipient has not received the aid they need but the aid that the donor thinks they need. This thesis explores and argues that foreign policy-driven democracy promotion results in the donors benefiting more from programmes and therefore the projects are not sustainable. This programme highlights and supports that argument. The plan itself is also vague. There are no real concrete goals and achievements, which makes assessing the recipient's benefits harder. As a result, the document analysis (see Figure 7, p. 108) has found little to no long-term ambitions for this project and even less successful implementation in democratising Somalian parliament and impartial administration; democracy promotion in reverse.

Figure 10: Democracy promotion through impartial administration. Source: Author's own





Figure 11: US democracy promotion programmes. Source: Author's own (adapted from USAID documents)



5.3 US Democracy Promotion Scenarios

As the previous section has analysed UK democracy promotion, it is worthwhile to assess the US's democracy promotion programmes, for comparative purposes. As shown in Figure 11, above, the US promotes democracy in various ways. This section will focus on the three benchmarks of fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration and use them to assess US democracy promotion programmes. The diagrams in this section will illustrate how US democracy promotion is in reverse. This will be presented primarily through the documents reviewed in Figure 11 (and see p. 120). The document analysis has been the starting point for this section as the evidence gathered here is from USAID publications. In this section, however, USAID projects will be used as examples of how the US implements democracy promotion programmes and will be evaluated to highlight where democracy promotion is successful, and when it is in reverse.

5.3.1 The US and Fundamental Rights

The document analysis reveals that USAID tackles the problem of fundamental rights through various programmes (see Figure 11, p. 120). For example, USAID launched the Access to Justice Programme (AJP) in Colombia, in order to strengthen their justice systems in areas most affected by the nation's violence and corruption (USAID, 2012, p. 4) (see Figure 12, p. 125). The 'AJP awarded 48 grants to 32 civil society organizations. The investment in these grants amounted to \$1.6 million, and the average grant amounted to \$33, 000,' (USAID, 2012, p. 5). This was a considerable monetary project, seeking to democratise Colombia through solidifying their fundamental rights. Again, it highlights how much money is poured into international development programmes.

The AJP focused on regional activities in 21 municipalities of interest, which subsequently allowed the 'AJP to provide legal aid services to approximately 2,684 people in the regions,' (USAID, 2012, p. 6). The programme was achieving widespread recognition across Colombia

and ‘the benefits were two-fold: ‘for the first time, the rural population had access to legal services in their own territories; and regional universities were able to expand their community outreach efforts and expose their students and professors to complex legal contexts,’ (USAID, 2012, p. 6). Providing education in the area of justice, citizens could engage with their communities and be aware of their rights.

The AJP addressed five components of reform: Justice Sector Reform, Court Administration and Management, Justice Houses, Alternative Dispute Reforms and Public Defence (USAID, 2012). Justice Sector Reform focused on ‘knowledge management/transfer and (training, study tours and assessments/studies) and procurement for CAVs (Centro de Atención a Víctimas/Victims Attention Centre) (USAID, 2012, p. 7). In practical terms:

‘USAID/AJP actively participated with the US Department of Justice (DOJ) in the design, planning, implementation, and evaluation of two national and eight regional university competitions on oral trial techniques. AJP also planned, organized, and implemented five courses on the Criminal Accusatory System (Sistema Penal Acusatorio – SPA) with the participation of professors from law faculties,’ (USAID, 2012, p. 7).

Engaging educators allowed AJP workers to enable citizens to be knowledgeable about their judicial rights (see Figure 12, p. 125). Court Administration and Management ‘focused its efforts on supporting the Judicial Branch through the CSJ (Consejo Superior de la Judicatura/Superior Council of the Judiciary),’ (USAID, 2012, p. 8) by using technology. Technology plays a vital role as the ‘AJP [introduced] technology transfer (via electronic files) from foreign judiciaries in the United States, Chile, Brazil and Costa Rica, and promoted knowledge transfer from other judiciaries in the area of judicial governance,’ (USAID, 2012, p. 8). Knowledge sharing and educating citizens of their own roles to play in society allows civil society to thrive and become responsible for their own democratic governance.

Additionally, the ‘AJP’s implementation of the National Justice Houses Program (NJHP) and equity conciliation, Justices of the Peace, and arbitration under the alternative dispute resolution system,’ (USAID, 2012, p. 8) tackled the issues of Justice Houses and Alternative Dispute Resolution. Similarly, with Court Administration and Management, educating people of justice reforms and their legal rights was a crucial aspect of the AJP (see Figure 11, p. 120). The ‘AJP conducted training for Justice House personnel on a basic induction module, alternative dispute resolution module and human rights. As a result, the newly-established JH staff now has solid skills that are relevant to the context of the cases that most commonly affect the neighbouring communities,’ (USAID, 2012, p. 9).

Furthermore, AJP established a Public Defence strategy. AJP:

‘Helped to ensure that the public defence system has the necessary tools to investigate and refute, if needed, the factual, legal, and evidentiary bases of cases presented by the Colombian Attorney General’s Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación) (FGN), protecting the defendants’ right to due process and a fair trial,’ (USAID, 2012, p. 10).

In these three areas, giving citizens access to fundamental rights has furthered their knowledge of what it means to have civil rights. In turn, this has secured the pathway for democratising the judicial system for Colombians, therefore this project was twofold (see Figure 12, p. 125).


Ultimately, AJP allowed scope for access to justice, which is a core US principle. Therefore, in the reflection of the donor state, this is echoed throughout the project. It highlights the argument that donors promote in their self-image, but in this case, it works as a positive. More importantly, a second AJP (A2JP) was implemented in 2016 for two years showing that long-term fundamental rights change was not been successful in Colombia. It focused on ensuring that improvements are continual and long-term (USAID, 2016, p. 1). This is actually a strength of USAID’s programme as it shows that lessons that were learnt from AJP were recognised and a further programme was

created for this. It also shows the long-term commitment by the US. This is a stark contrast to UK programmes observed thus far. However, long-term sustainability has still not been achieved and that is why, in this case, it can be argued that democracy promotion is in reverse. Furthermore, the programme seeks to maintain USAID assistance for the long-term, which takes the recipient nation's capabilities to democratise autonomously, away. The diagram below visually represents democracy promotion in reverse in the area of fundamental rights.

Figure 12: Democracy promotion through fundamental rights. Source: Author's own

Democracy objective: Fundamental Rights
Democracy promotion objective: Access to Justice

Specific program objective: Access to Justice Programme (by donor: USAID)




-Aim is to strengthen Colombian justice services, allowing access to legal services and improved access to justice (USAID Office of Inspector General, 2012, p. 1).
Democracy promotion was successful in:

- ✓ Training institutions: Program trained 81 law schools to part take in mock trial competitions; target was 40 schools (USAID Office of Inspector General, 2012)
- ✓ Training people: Public defenders, conciliators and government officials reported training was helpful and relevant to their jobs (USAID Office of Inspector General, 2012)

However, democracy promotion was weak in recipient nation:

- ✗ Lack of implementation. Incomplete security plans and regional offices poorly planned (USAID Office of Inspector General, 2012)
- ✗ Limited resources: Not enough resources provided to targeted zones (USAID Office of Inspector General, 2012).
- ✗ Inadequate Performance plan and report (PPR) and did not produce accurate results (USAID Office of Inspector General, 2012).



5.3.2 The US and Participatory Engagement

The US also promotes aspects of participatory engagement through democratisation programmes. In order to adequately argue democracy promotion is in reverse, it is necessary to highlight how the US promotes participatory engagement. This is shown in the USAID's Bringing Unity and Legitimacy to Democracy (BUILD) programme in Somaliland (see Figure 11, p. 120). Its aim is to:

‘support electoral and political processes across Somaliland, by fostering increased citizen participation; building the capacity of election management bodies (EMBs) and other relevant government bodies to administer credible elections; and supporting the development of issue-based and viable political parties,’ (USAID, 2016, p. 1).

This therefore illustrates, from the perspective of this thesis, how important participatory engagement is as a benchmark for democracy promotion; Somaliland is a good example of how US participatory engagement is operationalised through democracy promotion (see Figure 13, p. 128). BUILD has four objectives:


‘Encourages citizen participation in political and electoral processes through building civil society organizations’; Improve media capacity to cover and disseminate information on these processes; Develop the capacity of Election Monitoring Bodies (EMBs); Supports political parties to become more competitive, inclusive and representative of citizens’ interests,’ (USAID, 2016, p. 1).

These objectives seek to create an inclusive environment for the people of Somaliland to participate in, democratically, when electing their government. By issuing grants and expanding existing civil society networks (USAID, 2016), USAID seeks to implement a strong parliamentary system, in which citizen actively engage with and participate in their own democracy (see Figure 11, p. 120). The current impact BUILD is having is largely technical,

however. So far, BUILD's achievements have involved providing the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) with legal requirements and procedures, as well as providing expert technical assistance on electoral management and systems (USAID Bringing Unity, Integrity and Legitimacy to Democracy, 2018, p. 2). What this really means is that USAID has supplied Somaliland with practical tools to implement clean elections, (such as training in party polling, operational management and strategic planning),' (USAID Bringing Unity, Integrity and Legitimacy to Democracy, 2018, p. 2). Though this is useful for building democratic elections, a crucial argument for US foreign policy-led democracy promotion is that Somaliland has already made significant progress when it comes to participatory engagement. As reported by Africa News, 'Somaliland has held successful presidential elections in 2003 and 2010 including a parliamentary election in 2005,' (Alfa Shaban, November 2017).

The work USAID has done is important, as Somaliland has more knowledge of technical procedures and their elections are more incident free, however the nation's elections were proving to be more democratic before the BUILD programme was initiated. Therefore, it is possible to argue that as Somaliland is a regional interest to the US's foreign and security policies, this could be the reason BUILD was implemented in the nation (see Figure 13, p. 128). Again, this highlights that the donor gains more from promoting democracy than the recipient state does. A full analysis however will not be able to be carried out until the project is completed in 2021, therefore it must be acknowledged that any information and arguments made are based on current reviews since the project's implementation in 2016. The diagram below further highlights how democracy promotion is in reverse.

Figure 13: Democracy promotion through participatory engagement. Source: Author's own



5.3.3 The US and Impartial Administration

Enforcing impartial administration is a crucial part of democratisation, so it is important to look at an example of how the US promotes impartial administration in order to argue democracy promotion is in reverse (see Figure 14, p. 132). Many of the countries that fall under Carothers' 'grey zone' (2006) countries, Ottaway's 'semi-authoritarian regimes,' (2003) or Zakaria's 'illiberal democracies,' (1997) (see Table 1, p. 55) consist of a serious lack of impartial administration. Thus, this area of democracy promotion is important. USAID established the Anticorruption Strategy (2005) which focused this renewed strategy on 'expanding to better encompass grand corruption—exchanges of resources, access to rents, or other competitive advantages for privileged firms and high-level officials in the executive, judiciary, or legislature, or in political parties,' (USAID Strategy, 2005, p. 1) (see Figure 11, p. 120). USAID's anticorruption policy was 'emerging as an important U.S. foreign policy objective,' (USAID Strategy, 2005, p. 1). This programme further reiterates the argument that US democracy promotion is fundamentally rooted in US foreign policy. Nonetheless, USAID acknowledge that 'new analytical approaches help illuminate a broader range of assistance strategies and tactics—many already in USAID's portfolio—that can help target the critical problem of corruption in all its manifestations,' (USAID Strategy, 2005, p. 1).

The Anticorruption Strategy encompasses a few objectives (see Figure 14, p. 132). Firstly, to create 'a consensus on the critical importance of fighting corruption through development,' (USAID Strategy, 2005, p. 5). By ensuring there is a global consensus and a platform to engage nations with anticorruption policy, internationally, it was perceived that recipient countries will be able to combat corruption far more easily, with the weight of the international arena behind them. The second objective of the Strategy highlights the donor-centric argument but encompasses the idea that 'USAID efforts to address corruption in developing countries, enhances U.S. national security,' (USAID Strategy, 2005, p. 7). This is not an absurd motive for the US, as this was initiated in a post-9/11 world, yet it does show the donor state is shaping the recipients need; democracy promotion in reverse. The next objectives are 'defining corruption...as the abuse


of entrusted authority for private gain,' (USAID Strategy, 2005, p. 8) and USAID's role, which is to 'focus on preventing corruption and on civil aspects of enforcement,' (USAID Strategy, 2005, p. 9). These areas focus on de-compartmentalising corruption into 'prevention and enforcement,' (USAID Strategy, 2005, p. 9). Overall, USAID's focus is on practical delivery of anticorruption projects and activities in recipient states.

Yet, as clear as the project objectives were and impartial administration was integrated into the programme aims, the Strategy's outcomes fell short of performing successfully. In the case of the Strategy, the implementation of the programme was hindered, namely due to USAID facing many constraints in enacting this project. One limitation was due to lack of resources, 'seventy-eight percent of USAID field offices indicated they would expand anticorruption programming if they had additional staff and resources,' (USAID Strategy, 2005, p. 11). Another was due to the recipient state's lack of commitment, 'sixty-nine percent indicated that insufficient political commitment on the part of national counterparts was a constraint,' (USAID Strategy, 2005, p. 11). Perhaps the most important reason this project was not successful is reinforced by the 'failure to take a long-term, sustained approach to the problem of corruption means that the approach is unlikely to succeed,' (USAID Strategy, 2005, p. 12). This is crucial to this thesis for several reasons. Firstly, it highlights that USAID projects are self-sustaining for the donor's interest. USAID aims and objectives are carried across all projects, allowing swift change to be brought in, but no long-term solution or follow up to strategies implemented.

Furthermore, the foreign policy perspective is evident in this case, as national and international security was high on the agenda for the US after 9/11. Consequently, USAID programmes were targeting countries who were suitable regional allies for the US. The ultimate conclusion of this project was 'corruption remains a serious problem and a serious impediment to development. Most "measures" of corruption are actually measures of perceptions of corruption, so it is difficult to assess what real progress has been made,' (USAID Strategy, 2005, p. 12). Again, the idea that the donor state promotes their self-image of democracy upon a recipient state is strengthened by

this project and its failures (see Figure 14, p. 132). This is further demonstrated in the diagram below, which summarises democracy promotion in reverse in regard to impartial administration.

Figure 14: Democracy promotion through impartial administration. Source: Author's own



5.4 Conceptual Framework Summary

This chapter has defined the components to which the UK and the US, as donor nations, should implement into recipient nations in order to achieve successful democracy promotion. Through using fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration as the benchmarks essential to democratisation, the Conceptual Framework has offered an approach in which democracy promotion can be measured by and to test whether democracy promotion is in reverse. This thesis identified three problems with democracy promotion, today (see p. 9). The lack of clarity of how to promote democracy, sustainably, has been highlighted throughout this chapter and that has been shown through donor programmes promoting democracy in their own self-image and through donor-centric foreign policy (see Table 2, p. 76). This has also led to a lack of adapting programmes, from lessons learnt, and consequently leading to little long-term and permanent change in recipient countries.

The first objective of this thesis is to evaluate UK and US projects in order to develop a framework that would highlight how the UK and the US as donors, promote democracy. In doing so, it also brings forward the importance of needing benchmarks (fundamental rights, participatory engagement impartial administration) to be integrated into the objectives, design and expected outcomes of projects (see Figure 6, p. 97). If this is apparent and present within the project, then democracy promotion is likely to be sustainable due to there being less donor bias and less foreign policy influence over motives. This would be the case as the projects would be in the interest of recipient nations, as they would have a major role in the implementation process, rather than donor's being the primary movers of the programmes. If fundamental rights (see Figure 8, p. 112 and Figure 12, p. 125), for example, is included in a project, this translates practically into recipient nations having the platform to voice what they want from donors and the freedom to give feedback to donors, as examples. As shown through Figure 3 (see p. 92), a big problem with democracy promotion is the lack of feedback and communication between donors and recipients.

Integrating fundamental rights as a benchmark by which to measure democracy promotion by can offer a solution to strengthen that communication. Similarly, if participatory engagement is intrinsic to the project, approaching the recipient governments/organisations in the appropriate manner will mean the governments will work alongside each other (mutually and equally) and recipient nations will partake in the process of implementing long-term outcomes of the democratisation projects. Thus, projects will be sustained as there is a strong engagement between donors and recipients. The latter will be able to continue the projects after the donor retreats (as they will have had the training and understanding of how projects work because they are involved from the outset). In reality this is not occurring (see Figure 9, p. 116 and Figure 13, p. 128). Lastly, if impartial administration is inherently present, governments will accept donor aid and implement projects transparently as there will be no strings attached, however the diagrams created in this chapter show how this is not the case (see Figure 10, p. 119 and Figure 14, p. 132). With these three benchmarks at the forefront of donor programmes, democracy promotion can be successful and permanent. This will be further explored in the Chapters 7, 8 and 9, however, all UK and US interviewees said that engaging with recipient nation's pre, during and post-project were the biggest failure of democracy promotion but that is most important part of the process.

A commonality between the UK and the US scenarios, is that both donor nations promote democracy through their own self-image (see Chapter 2, p. 19) which is embedded in UK/US foreign policy ambitions. This has led to short-term projects and democracy promotion in reverse. However, what differentiates the UK from the US is that DFID and the FCO have documented projects far less compared to USAID. All information acquired was through the DFID website or through the UK's official government website, yet details of projects (especially post-project), were hard to find. It is possible to argue that this is due to the lack of project completion and implementation or that information is just not available online. If that is the case, it further differs from the US (who are transparent with their citizens as to where their money goes and the projects that they have invested in). Efforts have been made to contact DFID to obtain more information

on projects presented in this thesis, but at the time of publication, no response was given. Therefore, the conclusions drawn in this section are based on the information that was available.

Overall, the UK places much more emphasis on promoting fundamental rights-based democracy and enhancing democratisation to ‘fragile states’ (see Figure 7, p. 108 for examples of recipient states). However, there is evidence to show that these projects are short-lived and implemented in states that have no historical background in democracy (see Figure 8 p. 112 , 9 p. 116 and 10 p. 119). This is a crucial point because this lack of understanding of cultural and historical roots of recipient states is not being considered into projects. This can be one of the causes of democracy promotion in reverse/democracy in decline (a point further explored in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 of Empirical Investigations and Findings). The problem, nonetheless, is evident and that is that UK democracy promotion is in reverse. This chapter highlights how and why it is in reverse.

Though the US has shown more initiative in learning from their past mistakes and attempting to rectify them by maintaining presence in the recipient nation (see A2JP, p. 123), ultimately, the US projects that have been reviewed have shown the pattern of short-term success, though with long-term failures. The initial motives for USAID involvement is also apparent; foreign policy goals (see Figure 13, p. 128 and Figure 14, p. 132). Recipients are selected based on what will enhance the US’s position abroad, as oppose to what countries categorically require the US’s support. This again supports the argument that democracy is promoted based on the donor’s needs rather than the recipients, and the reinforcement of the US’s self-image into these nations has amounted to democracy promotion in reverse (see Figure 12, p. 125). There is, therefore, a strong argument for US democracy promotion being in reverse. As previously argued, foreign policy plays a huge part in the donor’s benefiting from democracy promotion, however, the issues of the lack of integrating fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration into the appropriate projects has led to a misalignment of donor objectives and a lack of permanent outcomes in recipient nations (see Figure 12, p. 125; Figure 13, p. 128; Figure 14, p. 132). This, inevitably, equates to democracy promotion in reverse. Although in comparison to the UKs

democracy promotion programmes, the US maintains a longer presence (albeit they do not produce long-term outcomes) and embed objectives into their programmes more clearly.

However, in order to exclusively argue that democracy promotion is in reverse, evidence must be used by collecting data from high level and experienced professionals working in the area of democracy promotion. The next chapter presents the research methods and ethics used in order to collect data from participants who have been involved in implementing democracy promotion in the field. The Conceptual Framework has been tested to show if democracy promotion, in practice and not just theory, is in reverse.

Chapter 6: Methodology

The central argument of this thesis identifies key aspects of democracy promotion in order to argue that it is in reverse. The research problem is threefold. Firstly, there is a lack of clarity on how democracy is promoted. Secondly, there is a lack of retrospective analysis of existing programmes and lastly, there is a framework available to use for universal application yet neither the UK nor the US uses it (see p. 9 and see Appendix 1, p. 271). Ultimately, this thesis addresses these three research problems and presents arguments for why democracy promotion is in reverse. The first section of the thesis identified what democracy promotion is, how it is done and who is promoting democracy (see Figure 4, p. 93 and Figure 5, p. 94). The UK and the US are the largest donor countries therefore using them, comparatively, has helped to strengthen the core purpose of this thesis. It is clear that ‘the democracy promotion community has a pressing need for an analytical framework to conceptualise and respond to ongoing events’ (Carothers, 2002, p. 6). According to the evidence this thesis has already presented, successfully implementing long-lasting democracy promotion has been limited and the expected outcomes have not been permanent either (see Figure 3, p. 92 and Figures 8-14, pp. 112-132). These have been the main contributing factors for validating that democracy promotion is in reverse.

A mixed methods approach to gathering the evidence has been needed to support democracy promotion is in reverse. Chapter 2 (see pp. 38 and 56) presented two streams of thought regarding democracy promotion: democratisation theory and foreign policy analysis. These theories explain what democracy is and how donors promote it (see Figure 4, p. 93 and Figure 5, p. 94). From this analysis, of a combination of information gathering and document surveys, this thesis has linked democracy promotion in reverse to the decline/crisis in democracy as a regime around the world today. A mixed methods approach has meant ‘the researcher tends to base knowledge claims on pragmatic grounds...It employs strategies of inquiry that involve collecting data either simultaneously or sequentially to best understand research problems,’ (Creswell, 2003, p. 20). A mixed method approach also addresses the core research objectives (see p. 16) in a variety of

ways. Therefore, this thesis has reviewed literature, conducted a document analysis of UK and US programmes and collected qualitative data, in order to complete appropriate research into democracy promotion.

Reviewing literature was essential to this thesis because a ‘substantive, thorough, sophisticated literature review is a precondition for doing substantive, thorough, sophisticated research... To advance our collective understanding, a researcher or scholar needs to understand what has been done before, the strengths and weaknesses of existing studies, and what they might mean,’ (Boote & Beile, 2005, p. 3). A literature review was also necessary for the academic development of this thesis as it, ‘shows that you have understood the main theories in the subject area and how they have been applied and developed,’ (Hart, 1998, p. 1). In addition to the reviewed literature, there was a need to collect information through a document analysis of UK and US programmes. These documents focused on elements such as democracy promotion programmes, frameworks used, project analyses and other relevant materials. Surveying documents further provided ‘data—excerpts, quotations, or entire passages—that are then organised into major themes, categories, and case examples specifically through content analysis,’ (Labuschagne, 2003). Moreover, ‘documents provide background information as well as historical insight...helping researchers understand the historical roots of specific issues that impinge upon the phenomena currently under investigation,’ (Bowen, 2009, p. 30). A literature review, combined with a document analysis, gave a retrospective exploration of democracy promotion and allowed for the link between theory and practice to be presented. Furthermore, my previous experience of research methods, from attaining a Master of Research, has been utilised throughout the data collection process⁴.

Open semi-structured interviews (see Figure 15, p. 147) were the most appropriate form of data collection for this thesis because they have allowed for ‘exploration of the perceptions and opinions of respondents...and enable probing for more information and clarification of answers,’

⁴ Modules undertaken include Research Methods and Research Design, worth 60 credits together, which equated to one third of overall credits.

(Barriball & While, 1994, p. 330). Open semi-structured interviews proved more useful than fully structured interviews as they generated more of a free-flowing discussion about the topic. The freedom for participants to speak flexibly and in detail was crucial to this thesis, due to this topic being niche. Also, the aim of this thesis was not to create an environment by which to push participants into agreeing democracy promotion is in reverse; the interviews allowed for the investigation into whether there was any evidence to suggest that this may be the case practically, not just theoretically (having already validating democracy promotion is in reverse in Chapters 4, p. 87 and Chapter 5, p. 95). Premediating interviewees' responses by initially asking if democracy promotion is in reverse would not produce credible data.

Moreover, 'semi-structured interviews consist of several key questions that help define the areas to be explored, but also allows the interviewer or interviewee to diverge in order to pursue an idea or response in more detail,' (Britten, 1995, p. 251). Thus, the questions were not rigid to allow the participants to articulate and contribute as much as they felt was necessary about their experiences and knowledge. The open semi-structured interviews 'approach, particularly compared to structured interviews, also allows for the discovery or elaboration of information that is important to participants but may not have previously been thought of as pertinent by the research team,' (Gill, et al., 2008, p. 291), increasing the chance of collecting informative data. The purpose of choosing this approach was to keep the notion of democracy promotion as the exclusive focus, but also allow participants within this study to discuss willingly, their experiences and views.

Alongside producing primary data through open semi-structured interviews, case studies of programmes were used to gather in-depth, secondary data, to contribute to this thesis by focusing on an explicit topic, democracy promotion (see Figure 7, p. 108 and Figure 11, p. 120). The reasoning behind this was to use three examples of UK and US democracy promotion programmes, respectively, as comparable case studies. Comparative case-orientated analysis was a crucial method to use for this thesis because it 'attempts to account for comparable outcomes

by piecing evidence together in a manner sensitive to historical chronology and offering limited historical generalizations,' (Ragin, 1987, p. 35). Additionally, 'it is a method of discovering empirical relationships among variables, not as a method of measurement,' (Lijphart, 1971, p. 683) which supports this thesis's methodology rationale, as it is rooted within social science. As explained by Wengarf, 'social research moves from model-building to testing the model that was built... an unknown area is given a preliminary mapping to theory-testing research where the current provisional map is tested against reality,' (Wengarf, 2001, p. 51). The Conceptual Framework developed from using the case study programmes has allowed for the transition of creating a model to testing the model by using data collection.

This thesis focuses on using similar democracy promotion projects by the UK and the US in countries or regions, such as the Africa, the Middle East and South America. By using comparable projects within certain regions, a conclusive remark on how democracy promotion works, and comparing like with like, offers validity to the research. Consequently, by using this form of methodology, this was kept in mind during the selection of interviewees and was reflected in the choice of sample of participants. Due to the time constraints of this thesis, a comparable study of a few cases put forward by participants, rather than a large-scale evaluation. This was more appropriate for this thesis's research. The case-orientated approach was complemented by the use of open semi-structured interviews. As a result of this mixed methods approach, the data produced detailed knowledge about the specific area to which this thesis focuses on: democracy promotion in reverse.

Snowball sampling was used as the selection method for participants, where 'in the first stages a few people having the requisite characteristics are identified and interviewed. These persons are used as informants to identify others, who qualify for inclusion in the sample,' (Bailey, 1994, p. 96). This method of sampling was reflected by using Bournemouth University's Disaster Management Centre's contacts who are/have been involved in democracy promotion programmes. The first initial participants who took part recommended further participants for

interviews, and so the sample grew as the interview process continued. The reason snowball sampling was best suited for open semi-structured interviews was because this project is rooted in phenomenology, where ‘the study goals are to understand the meanings of human experiences or to explore concepts from new and fresh perspectives,’ (Lin, 2013, p. 469). Furthermore, qualitative data allowed the:

‘Researcher to be immersed in the research field, to establish continuing, fruitful relationships with respondents and through theoretical contemplation to address the research problem in depth. Therefore, a small number of cases will facilitate the researcher’s close association with the respondents, and enhance the validity,’ (Crouch & McKenzie, 2006, p. 483).

Snowball sampling was also the most appropriate research method as ‘it results in the recruitment of particular samples (enhances validity of the research), and produces participants’ accounts of their lives,’ (Browne, 2005, p. 47) which is needed to acquire knowledge of democracy promotion as it happens in their reality. The sample consisted of thirteen high-level and elite policymakers with at least two years’ worth of experience in the field (see Table 3, p 146). There was careful consideration to the selection of interviewees for this thesis. The sample was representative of the practicing field of democracy promotion. Participants were senior and middle-ranking policymakers who have held their position for at least two years and have been working on projects directly involved with democracy promotion. The sample has been inclusive of males and females. Table 3 below, summarises the range of participants, whilst maintaining their anonymity (as per their requests). Those who have preferred not to outline their roles have verified they have over two years’ worth of experience in their roles.

In order to provide a sufficient argument, either supporting or negating democracy promotion in reverse, factual accounts were necessary; one cannot solely rely on document studies and literature. Snowball sampling was therefore suitable because the participants had knowledge about the subject area and enhanced the quality of the research; random participants were not

suitable for this thesis's methodology. This method eliminated as much bias and enhanced the credibility of the project by 'examining information collected through different methods, the researcher can corroborate findings across data sets and thus reduce the impact of potential biases that can exist in a single study,' (Bowen, 2009, p. 28). This is highlighted through using the mixed methods approach.

In order to allow for verification and falsification, a variety of approaches were taken to ensure the data produced was as credible as possible. For example, probing was used in order for participants to elaborate on answers, and also using the same question for participants, but with different angles as the snowball took effect, generated different responses. Furthermore, issues raised or discussed from participants were then used as discussion points for the future participants. This helped validate many arguments this thesis has already brought forward. Nonetheless, all data was evaluated with the same objectivity irrespective of whether the data supported the hypothesis. Ultimately, the Interview Guide (see Appendix 2, p. 274) was founded on the discoveries made from reviewing the literature and issues raised by the Conceptual Framework. This triangulated, mixed methods approach allowed for a final conclusive analysis from data, literature and document analyses, providing a holistic view on democracy promotion is in reverse.

Chapter 8 presents the data collection and divides it into sections of fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration. Due to the method of using open semi-structured interviews, Interviewees were able to provide detailed quotations and opinions of the topics discussed (see Appendix 2, p. 274). This enabled a vast amount of information to be gathered from the interviews, all of which was vital to examining the nuances surrounding democracy promotion in reverse. In particular the usage of quotations enabled the researcher to understand more deeply the intricacies of delivering democracy promotion in reverse and are regarded as an essential tool of qualitative research methods. This facilitated the inclusion of all relevant data in order to present findings that were holistic and formed the foundations for the

analytical conclusions included in this thesis. As the sample size was thirteen, the wealth of evidence produced by the interviews validated the hypotheses of this thesis and thus, the incorporation of quotations strengthened this thesis's arguments. More specifically, data collection is drawn firstly from the UK interviews to provide a more holistic interpretation of democracy promotion in reverse, while the small number of US interviews (2 participants) is utilised to draw out comparisons that can inform this study of democracy promotion in reverse.

Moreover, the Interview Guide (see Appendix 2, see p. 274) not only produced the discussion points for the interviews, it acted as a questionnaire in order to derive statistics for analysing the themes and contributing factors to democracy promotion in reverse. This thesis is namely based in a descriptive research design and due to the purpose of the interviews was to gather opinions to 'effectively measure some phenomenon of interest', (McNabb, 2010, p. 109) and that interest is democracy promotion in reverse. Questionnaires also compliment the open semi-structured interviews as it aids 'getting information from people (or answers to our research questions), usually by posing direct or indirect questions,' (Gillham, 2007, p. 2). The questionnaires, however, had the sole purpose of providing answers that would be converted into statistics in order to allow for a representation of what the key factors to consider were. Furthermore, the questionnaire supported the answers given by interviewees, thus this combination of methodology complimented the structure of the data collection. The open semi-structured interviews allowed for qualitative data and 'were more efficient for collecting information about people's knowledge and opinions,' (Thomas, 2003, p. 66); the questionnaires added a quantitative aspect to the thesis's methodology.

6.1 Research ethics

This thesis has secured ethical approval as part of Bournemouth University's research ethics procedures and processes for collecting qualitative data. In order to use the data collected in the thesis, the interviews were recorded so quotes and/or references of interviewees could be used. The sole purpose of collecting audio transcriptions was to ensure efficiency for the participant as,

once recorded, interviews were referred back to without having to constantly contact participants for follow-ups. Due to the nature of the sample being high-level participants, the aim was to ensure the process for the participants was as simple as possible. This thesis is aware of ethical restrictions and so provided an information sheet to participants, which included information regarding consent and their right to withdraw. The information sheet (see Appendix 3, p. 281) summarised the key aspects of the project and explained why the interviews were necessary. Participants also had the option to withdraw from interviews at any stage and were able to get in contact if they had any queries. The participants were sent copies of the extracts that are used in Chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10, in order to approve the content. The participants were also given a Participant Agreement Form to consent to the requirements of the interviews (see Appendix 4, p. 286).

As open semi-structured interviews were used, it was important to have informed consent from participants before interviews commenced so quotes or references to interviewees' responses could be included in the thesis. Informed consent allowed participants to have all the 'information about the purpose of the study, who the research team is, how the data will be used, and what participation will require of them,' (Lewis, 2003, p. 66). The participants were briefed on the thesis's aims and discussion points; 'participation is voluntary and the researcher should explain that participants can decide not to participate,' (Creswell, 2014, p. 97). There was no forceful or coercive nature to the interviews. Participants had the right to withdraw or question any part of the interview process (or quotes produced) that made them uncomfortable. The aim of this was to make interviews as transparent and clear as possible for participants. Interviews were recorded on a device and transcribed after the interviews were completed. This was the preferred method as 'writing notes at the time can interfere with the process of interviewing and notes written afterwards are likely to miss out some details,' (Britten, 1995, p. 253). The interviews were transcribed by listening to the audio recordings taken at the time of the interviews. No software was used to transcribe the data; it was done manually. Any uncertainties during the process of

transcribing were clarified by participants and once the text has been transcribed and written, participants were asked to approve the transcripts that are used in Chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10.

Table 3: Interview sample

Interviewees	Sex	Seniority and Experience
A (UK)	F	Project manager for 3 years (Asia)
B (UK)	M	Consultant for economic development 3 years (Africa)
C (US)	M	Project management and implementation (20+ years, Middle East primarily)
D (US)	M	Director of Economic Growth and Sustainable Development (20+ years, Middle East and South America)
E (UK)	F	Project coordinator (3 years, Africa)
F (UK)	M	Policy for Nigerian Emergency Management Agency (5+ years, Africa)
G (UK)	F	Project delivery (5+ years, Asia and Africa)
H (UK)	M	Project Manager (3 years, Africa)
I (UK)	M	High ranking official in National Disaster Management Organisation (5+ years, Africa)
J (UK)	M	Prefer not to say
K (UK)	M	Prefer not to say
L (UK)	M	Democratisation through disaster management (15+ years, Caribbean, Middle East and Africa)
M (UK)	F	Academic researcher and implementer of development, through democratisation (10+ years)


An acknowledgement of limitations to the empirical evidence gathered is that the expected sample size was twenty, but due to a lack of US interviewees, that sample was not achieved. There were substantial efforts made to attain more US participants, however many declined to take part in the study or did not respond. However, some UK participants spoke of their own experiences of working alongside USAID and this provided some further insight into US democracy promotion. All participants wished to express their interviews are solely based on their own opinions and **not** on behalf of any government or company they work/ed for.

Each interview began with the lead researcher asking the participants about themselves in order to form a rapport with them and establish that they were suitable for the study. This ensured the participants were comfortable during the interview, before the questions could then move onto

the more detailed subject matter. Participants also had the choice to remain anonymous when being referenced (and all chose to be) but also ‘have a say in how their statements are interpreted,’ (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 63) to avoid any falsifying from the data collection process. The average duration of interviews was between 45-55 minutes. There was a breadth of detail and knowledge shared in this time. The interview was split into themes, in order to create a logical flow to the topics needing to be covered, but to also allow for flexibility towards the discussions. The themes were: the global state of democracy today; what elements of democracy are promoted; practical implementation of democracy; evaluating democracy promotion and is democracy promotion in reverse? (see Appendix 2, p. 274 for questions asked). Therefore, the sample size of thirteen was sufficient for this thesis’s data collection as the quality of information given was in-depth and detailed (as presented by the subsequent chapters of this thesis).

The figure below displays the process of the research methodology applied to this thesis.

Figure 15: Research Objectives and how they will be produced through the methodology





Chapter 7: General Findings from the UK and the US

Empirical Investigations

This chapter presents key results from all interviews in order to generate common findings from the data produced. The data collected was derived from open semi, qualitative interviews, by which participants have had direct experience of working on UK and US democracy promotion projects. There is a sample size of thirteen, senior and experienced individuals from the UK and the US, who have anonymously shared their knowledge of practical democracy promotion (see Table 3, p. 146). As highlighted on page 129, the interviews have been based upon five themes: the global state of democracy today; what elements of democracy are promoted; practical implementation of democracy; evaluating democracy promotion and is democracy promotion in reverse? The Interview Guide (see Appendix 2, p. 271) formed the basis of general statistical findings.

As discussed in Chapter 6 (see p. 137) the participants all chose to remain anonymous as to protect their identities and there will be no direct details of their projects or job titles, as per their request. Any information they have all shared is on behalf of their own views and opinions and not on behalf of their organisations, governments or any agencies (see Appendix 4, p. 286), for Participant Agreement Form).

1. General Findings

All interviewees were asked to share their opinions and experiences on the practical implementation of democracy promotion and the processes of evaluating democracy promotion. They were asked to share their opinions and experiences within the field of democracy promotion,

based on the topics and sub-sections of the Interview Guide (see p. 274). In terms of what elements are fundamental to ‘building’ a democracy, the majority of the sample said that a mixture of benchmarks (see Chapter 5, p. 100) are necessary: 69.2% of the respondents said that impartial administration and participatory engagement, together, were vital to ensuring a foundation for democratisation. One participant explained:

‘Accountable government implies free and fair elections; ability to get rid of their government, transparency; (know what is happening with their government and freedom of speech; participatory engagement...therefore a strong and impartial government is the core of democratisation,’ (Interviewee B, 2018).

The remaining 30.8% of participants said that fundamental rights were important, but as integral parts to establishing an impartial administration and having participatory engagement. However, one participant felt ‘fundamental rights underpins impartial administration and participatory engagement; thus, it is the most important component,’ (Interviewee E, 2019).

2. What is being promoted?

The responses from the participants all highlight that the three benchmarks (fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration) this thesis has identified for measuring the successes of democracy promotion are interrelated and validated that they should be keystones to assessing democracy promotion as a concept. Another participant strengthened this view by arguing ‘you cannot try and reduce violations of rights or promote more equal rights, without an impartial administration and engagement from society; you cannot divorce rights from the administration,’ (Interviewee M, 2019). When breaking down *what* should be promoted, 92.3% of the respondents said that it should be through free and fair elections, accountable government and protecting/advocating for human rights. What this data shows is that the participants largely agreed that the most integral part of a democracy is establishing a transparent government and creating a solid foundation for which citizens can choose and hold that government to account,

by exercising their rights to vote. The data strengthens and confirms the Conceptual Framework's identification of the benchmarks for democracy promotion and that fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration are essential to democracy promotion (as confirmed by participants).

3. How should democracy be promoted?

The overall results further showed the opinions of *how* democracy should be promoted: 69.2% of participants said it should be through diplomatic relations (i.e. providing financial assistance or trade deals). 23.1% emphasised disaster relief assistance and development as the best way to facilitate democratisation and lastly, 7.7% advocated that technical assistance (providing resources, training, equipment etc.) is the best way to promote democracy. With the majority of participants alluding to diplomatic relations being the best way to instigate democratisation, this shows that when democracy is promoted, donors have the intentions of it being a joint endeavour.

4. Who should promote democracy?

Furthermore, all interviewees unanimously agreed that the three benchmarks (fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration) are important for long-term effectiveness of democracy promotion. The respondents were divided in their opinions on *who* is best positioned to promote democracy (within a recipient nation). 46.1% stated that governments and parliament are the best actors to promote democracy. One participant articulated that this is simply 'if the government does not embrace democratic ideals and principles, then democracy cannot flourish,' (Interviewee D, 2018). This comment acknowledges that recipient nations need to have the will and ambition to push forward their democratisation. Their views would imply that donors are not the driving forces, or the best positioned to promote democracy. The remaining participants viewed that a mixture NGOs and think tanks should be at the forefront of democracy promotion. This would limit the possibilities of political bias (see p. 59) and the mixing of values and interests (see p. 62).

5. Why do donors promote democracy?

With the argument of recipient states needing to be the primary movers of democracy, the participants were asked to establish what they thought was a reason for *donors* to promote democracy. Over 53.8% said recipient states, from their experiences, were politically unstable and a potential regional/security allies. This reinforces the idea of donors promoting for their own self-interests, through foreign policy (see Table 2, p. 76 and Figure 5, p. 94), providing evidence that supports democracy promotion in reverse. Interviewees have also argued that democracy promotion needs to be nationally driven by recipients, but donors are the ones promoting democracy, and even more critically, for their own gains; democracy promotion in reverse.

6. Who benefits from democracy promotion?

The commonalities in the findings showed that majority of interviewees said the donors benefitted more from democracy promotion programmes; or the donors were at least equal beneficiaries in the process, rather than the recipient nations. One participant said ‘the donor benefits more from these projects...it is 70% benefit for the donor and 30% benefit for the recipient,’ (Interviewee F, 2019). From this perspective, there is strong evidence proving that democracy promotion is in reverse. Another interviewee stated ‘recipient nations are the ones who can successfully implement these programmes for the long run, yet that is not happening and this goes back to the donor benefiting and this relationship being in favour of donors who have more leverage than recipients,’ (Interviewee G, 2019). On the other side, those who said it was a mutual venture argued that ‘you have to hope that democracy promotion will help; the more aid you [recipient] get, the more likely you will get to a point where you will not need it anymore. Democracy promotion helps that,’ (Interviewee A, 2018). Additionally, one interviewee explained that ‘it is mutual and that is how it should be; mutual,’ (Interviewee C, 2018). Interestingly, none of the participants said that recipients were the only beneficiaries, just that they were hopeful that democracy promotion was mutual, at the very least, in terms of benefits. What this suggests is

that donors are not placing recipient nations at the heart of these projects, thus the expected outcomes are not achieved (see Figure 6, p. 97) These experienced democracy promoters have idealistically expressed that recipients should be the beneficiaries but in reality, it is the donors who generally benefit more and this is evidence of democracy promotion in reverse, in practice.

7. Democracy in decline or crisis?

Moreover, the general findings showed that at least 53.8% of participants thought that the progress towards greater global democracy was not present, confirming democracy is in a crisis of decline. The literature and document survey have already presented the link between democracy promotion in reverse and democracy in decline, therefore having half the responses being in favour of democracy in crisis/decline is important, as it confirms this connection. From the point of view of democracy promotion in reverse, these observations from experienced practitioners raise the question as to how much is democracy promotion really working? A startling 7.7% of participants said democracy was in good shape, 38.5% said it was in a bad shape and 53.8% said it was neither in a good nor bad shape. An optimistic view was given by Interviewee B who claimed ‘globally, we are more democratic than 50-100 years ago. Parts of the world that have been closed off for a long time have democratic potential- non democratic states are more democratic,’ (2018). However, an alternative view to democracy in crisis was given, ‘within the region you work in, there are going to be other nations that are working well and thriving under undemocratic conditions,’ (Interviewee J, 2019). This point shows that geopolitics plays a factor in the crisis of democracy today and that democracy itself is also in reverse, not just the promotion of it. It also shows how important willingness from the recipient nation is. The majority, however, agreed that democracy was neither increasing nor declining. One interviewee said that their opinion on democracy being in neither good nor bad shape is ‘a direct result of democracy promotion in reverse,’ (Interviewee L, 2019). A point that gives weight to the idea that democracy promotion is not achieving its goals and is in reverse.

Overall, the general findings from the data gathered, confirmed strong evidence that democracy promotion is in reverse. It has also confirmed that fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration are the benchmarks by which democracy can, and should be, measured by. Furthermore, more than half of the sample revealed donors benefited more so, or equally, to recipients and the majority of interviewees said democracy is not in good shape and/or progressing, globally. This is in line with Freedom House's observation of democracy in decline and crisis. The next chapter looks at UK democracy promotion findings and gives further evidence to support democracy promotion is in reverse.

Chapter 8: Empirical Investigations and Findings for the UK

Previous chapters have outlined how and why the UK promotes democracy abroad (see Figure 7, p. 108). The overwhelming responses to democracy promotion in practice showed three major supporting observations of democracy promotion in reverse. Firstly, there is an issue of sustaining projects after donors leave. Secondly, on the whole, donors benefit more from projects than recipients do. Thirdly, the initial approach to recipient nations/establishing a relationship with their governments, is weak and has a consequence to the project's long-term successes. This chapter uses the data collected from experienced individuals, who work in the field of international development, to validate democracy promotion in reverse.

The overall data of UK interviewees showed that participants were fairly evenly split on what benchmarks are crucial to promote democracy: 46.1% felt participatory engagement and impartial administration were the primary objectives of UK democracy promotion. 46.1% said that both participatory engagement and impartial administration should be part of projects *but*, the predominant focus should be on fundamental rights and 7.7% said it was a combination of all three. The results have confirmed this thesis's Conceptual Framework. Interviewees gave insight into whether it is important for donors to promote their own self-image of democracy. The findings showed 53.8% of participants agreed it was important. However, one participant in particular expressed their opinion on donor self-image democracy promotion saying that 'even when things were better (say twenty years ago), I would have always argued very strongly against the idea we should promote democracy in our own self-image. As soon as you start thinking that people should imitate the Western model of democracy, it is doomed to fail,' (Interviewee M, 2019). This confirms donors are not promoting in the best interests of the recipients, but for themselves; democracy promotion in reverse. Those who said it was important to promote in the donor's self-image explained that this way, a known and working form of democracy was being implemented.

Participants were split on what elements show successful outcomes of democracy promotion. Whilst 38.5% claimed that having free and fair elections are an indicator of success, 23.1% said it was contextual; successful indicators are measured by the project's aim for a particular recipient nation. A further 23.1% said accountable governance and transparency and human rights progression show successes. Only one participant said that their experience, at the time of interview, of working in Nigeria has not shown any progress in the areas of fundamental rights, participatory engagement or impartial administration (Interviewee F, 2019). This is a particularly vital finding because Nigeria (as later referenced) has received the most UK aid out of any other recipient nation mentioned in the results.

8.1 Fundamental Rights

The overall findings (highlighted above) confirm the role of fundamental rights as an objective for UK democracy promotion programmes. This supports the observations made in Chapter 3 (see p. 77) that human rights are integral to UK democracy promotion. In particular, eight specific findings emerged from the interviews in relation to the role of fundamental rights in UK democracy promotion. Firstly, the investigations have highlighted that fundamental rights are often a core focus for DFID funded projects. Interviewee E, for example, highlighted how the way to strengthen fundamental rights as an integral part of democracy promotion was to enhance the educational capabilities of the recipient nation's teachers, in order to provide resources to support children in maths and literacy (Interviewee E, 2019) and ultimately enhance the fundamental right of access to education and making it nationally accessible across the recipient nation.

Second, the findings also noted how the embedding of fundamental rights in projects often requires continuous, effective monitoring, by project leaders as the programme progresses. Again, the case of Interviewee E's project is highly indicative in showing the effective operation of educational projects often requires the existence of 'field officers who work throughout all of [the recipient state], and visit the schools once a month to support them with the integration of

resources to advance learning gains,' (Interviewee E, 2019). This highlights how aspects of fundamental rights often requires ongoing support to locals.

Third, the UK findings also make clear that training on fundamental rights projects remains a critical feature of practical UK-led democracy promotion. Within the UK programme, training was implemented as a way to instil the objective of the fundamental right of access education, into the project's aim. Moreover, as Interviewee E stressed, training also must be a regular occurrence, in order, to ensure continuous embedding of ideas of fundamental rights: 'we provide training once a year which started with basic ICT skills as teachers did not know how to use a keyboard,' (Interviewee E, 2019).

Fourth, the findings also show that the existence of notable obstacles to the practical embedding of the promotion of fundamental rights during the execution phase of projects. Indeed, there seem to be many practical obstacles to the promotion of fundamental rights during the implementation phase of projects in particular. One such obstacle noted was that the promotion of fundamental rights is constricted by issues surrounding technology. In some ways, this can be seen as a Western concept of technology-based education being imposed on a nation that has little to no experience of it. This could affect the ability of, for instance, the recipient teachers to engage with the project: 'it is a large uphill battle in trying to get [teachers] to have adequate ICT skills,' (Interviewee E, 2019). Participants did note, however, that there have been progressive improvements as respective projects developed, although this is often related to the issue of access to technology rather than the training of it: 'we have overcome the issues of the basic use of equipment and now we are focusing on two components,' (Interviewee E, 2019). Several good examples were cited, such as:

'1) creating a lab where children will sit down and do the tutor work online. 2) Installing the equivalent of projector lessons, that we have in the UK, so teachers can teach a pre-designed

maths lesson, which aligns with the recipient nation's curriculum in order to help teachers deliver their lessons,' (Interviewee E, 2019).

This shows a positive aspect of UK democracy promotion, as their experience of the fundamental right of accessing free education for all is embedded in the project. However, by using education plans and resources that have been used in the UK, it is plausible to argue that democracy is being promoted in the donor's self-image. As explained in Chapter 7, by Interviewee M (see p. 153), promoting democracy in the self-image of the donor is 'doomed to fail' (2019) and supports the argument that this is contributing to democracy promotion in reverse. With the UK promoting its own experiences of its education systems into the recipient nation, the participant further shared 'maybe a general Western idea of education is being promoted and the UK is a facilitator of that and is imposing what we think 21st century education should look like...though that is not a specific aim of DFID,' (Interviewee E, 2019).

Fifth, the findings additionally illustrated that 'choosing' a recipient nation is problematic. One of the key challenges relates to the nature of project selection and thus, it is often the case that fundamental rights do not necessarily feature since it is often unclear, at least according to interviews- as to how recipient nations are selected for democracy promotion programmes. What seems more important is for DFID to identify a basic need in more general terms, so that 'DFID see that there is definitely a need for it [project] and that is what drives the motivation behind the project,' (Interviewee E, 2019). Consequently, in particular, interviewees often discussed the need to find key criteria on which to discuss the notions of success in embedding fundamental rights in a recipient nation, as part of any project. Interviewee E clarified, as an example, that often, there was a need to assess the successful progression of any project 'in three areas; quality, scale and scope,' (Interviewee E, 2019). Scope, for instance, could be assessed in terms of access to learning platform being utilised by students. Additionally, the successful application of quality could be evaluated in terms of accessing the learning tools and ultimately whether teachers and students were 'progressing faster with our intervention and support,' (Interviewee E, 2019). As a

result of their education programme, society is engaged and participating, which is another key component of democratisation led democracy promotion.

Sixth, the detailed findings of UK promotion of fundamental rights showed that there is often evidence of a call for a greater effort from donors, and particularly the need to have long-term effects on the sustainability of projects. Indeed, a key feature of the interviews was that fundamental rights needed to be not only embedded in programme aims, but also have the chance of sustainability within the recipient country once a project came to an end. In order to achieve this, interviewees highlighted that this was a required aspect for the autonomy of the recipient nation from the partner. As Interviewee E commented: ‘there needs to be a level of autonomy for the recipient nation in order for projects to continue after the donors retreat,’ (Interviewee E, 2019). This is particularly important since sustainability will require recipient nations to pledge further resources to continue once sizable project funding tails away. Undeniably, it is important to note that DFID projects were often regarded as focusing on ‘niche’ areas, with a strong concentration of resources on smaller, targeted, areas. Several interviewees noted how DFID has a clear motive and direction to achieve targets and this can enhance the long-term effects of democracy promotion, if they are done for the benefit of the recipient. Increasingly, it seems that DFID has taken the role of being a fund provider and not an implementer of projects, ‘but they do monitor closely and have exposure to what the limitations in the field can be,’ (Interviewee E, 2019). This at the very least shows that there is an ambition from DFID to follow-up and evaluate project as they develop. This would improve the progression of the successful outcomes of a project. However, this has not been the case and the participant shared areas where the failings were happening.

Indeed, long-term success is limited once the donor’s retreat their resources and support, it is often best practice to use later reviews of the outcomes of short-term projects to maintain political pressure. Another interviewee who agreed that there needs to be a stronger drive for long-term results explained: ‘the problem with programme-led donor work is the *initial* push is where your

activity is most concentrated...but having long-term political pressure and checks is necessary. If we want to seriously promote democracy abroad, we have to be invested in the long-term,' (Interviewee B, 2018). The findings have shown that even though the practice may require heavy reliance on short-term outcomes of projects, long-term goals need nonetheless to be present within the programme objectives in order for democracy promotion to last. As Interviewee B, in relation to a respective project in Libya noted, this often a difficult balance to strike and there are underlying tensions:

'In terms of measuring impact, civil society workshops and raising awareness about the constitution, it is difficult to measure, but it shows a long-term commitment to democratising Libya at least. The UK and EU are sending signals that if peace breaks out, we could think about elections and other aspects of democracy so that Libya will have a partner committed to supporting them,' (Interviewee B, 2018).

Yet there were many instances in the interviews where respondents hoped for long-term impacts of projects in terms of democracy promotion. As Interviewee B nicely encapsulated, democracy promotion remains 'geopolitically motivated, but I would hope this project is a small part of the long-term success story,' (Interviewee B, 2018). The bottom line is democratisation often will take more time than many of the projects' timeframes allow. Although there are elements of DFID wanting to impart long-lasting results of projects, there were many instances of short- foreign policy interests being influential.

Seventh, the interviews also showed how increasingly, projects faced some challenges in terms of promoting fundamental rights due to issues relating to the project design itself. It is important to highlight that 'all resources are recipient government approved... with the need for their approval on training, resources etc.,' (Interviewee E, 2019). In terms of mutual cooperation and recipient governments having an active role in projects, this is positive. However, the interviews did show how it was critical that the relationship needed to be established clearly from the start.

Unfortunately, the importance of this particular aspect of programmes is not always appreciated across DFID funded projects; there were problems identified with how projects were instigated and the level and duration attributed to the initial contact being made with the recipient governments. Interviewee E, for instance, noted how ‘we did not realise that contact with the government was the first point of call and a priority. Other non-profit organisations would know that in order to get a project running efficiently, you need to make government your priority,’ (Interviewee E, 2019).

This point links back to who is best positioned to promote democracy and supports the idea that it should be local NGOs and organisations who should be at the forefront. Moreover, establishing respect for the partner in the recipient countries needs to be incorporated as early as possible, if any project is to be deemed likely to be a success (in terms of sustainability). Therefore, working relationships can be built over time and on very concrete foundations. As Interviewee E highlighted, ‘you need to set [those] relationships from the start and if you do not have a good working relationship with the government, that will make the project a lot harder,’ (Interviewee E, 2019). If the process of donors approaching recipient nations is weak, or even done without the full participation by recipients, it shows donors are the ones who are leading the projects. Successful democracy promotion is about the recipients learning and actively partaking in their democratisation, autonomously. This weakness in initiation highlights democracy promotion in reverse.

And finally, one of the significant findings concerning to the promotion of fundamental rights actually relates to the wider picture of the perceived global state of democracy today (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017) and that it is in ‘bad shape’ (see Appendix 2, p. 274). Interviewee E encapsulated the views found in many of the interviews in that ‘it feels like the West tries to impose a way of thinking and their definition of democracy, which is not necessarily in line with the way certain countries run,’ (Interviewee E, 2019); donor’s promoting in their own self-image (see Table 1, p. 55) and democracy promotion in reverse. The UK has shown evidence of

encompassing the benchmarks outlined by the Conceptual Framework, and so it is plausible to expect these values to be within the project goals and result in enduring outcomes. However, imposing the UK's experiences of democracy into countries that have no cultural roots in democracy is of more benefit for the promoters to be 'do gooders'; democracy promotion in reverse. The most important point the interviewee made, and one this thesis explores and argues for throughout, is in their analysis of democratic rights:

'Enforcing them [rights] into a developing nation means that they implement it because that is what they are told to do... in reality that is not the most useful way to promote democracy. Practically, promoting all these democratic ideals and everyone trying to reach this ideal of democracy can hinder progression of democratising states because in reality, in the field it is met with resistance and lack of sustainability,' (Interviewee E, 2019).

Overall, this summary of the specific findings concerning fundamental rights highlights many observations supporting the contention that democracy today really is in crisis and democracy promotion is in reverse.

8.2 Participatory Engagement

The findings regarding participatory engagement further reiterate that it is a, if not the, core element of democracy building (highlighted in Chapter 7, p. 148), according to the data collected. Again, several key aspects for understanding the role of participatory engagement in democracy promotion, can be drawn from the empirical findings.

First, the promotion of participatory engagement is often more robust in projects being implemented in recipient countries with strong civil societies, For example, one participant said that ‘when civil society is strong and free the rest of the elements will drop out from that,’ (Interviewee B, 2018). The participant also made an important point in explaining that (in terms of promoting democracy) ‘it is hard to know how to promote democracy in broad terms- if we knew how to promote democracy effectively we would not have problems,’ (Interviewee B, 2018). The results confirm the research puzzle outlined in this thesis of the lack of clarity surrounding democracy promotion (see p. 9), exists in practice.

Second, whilst participatory engagement is a vital benchmark of democracy promotion, the interviews have also shown that successful project implementation does not always require there to be democracy promotion programmes as a way to develop participatory engagement, successfully. In other words, democracy itself may not actually be essential as a promotable concept. In particular, Interviewee B summarised this view as follows:

‘From a development point of view, you do not necessarily need democracy; the biggest development success story of recent years is China, and that comes back to political will. The Chinese government is invested in performing and showing the workability of Communism; poverty has lifted. Africa success stories are Rwanda and Ethiopia and there are question marks of their democracies,’ (Interviewee B, 2018).

These two observations on participatory engagement also raise an interesting view on democracy as a regime. It offers the opinion that democracy might not always be the best regime for developing nations (therefore, democracy promotion is not necessarily the right solution to democracy in decline). This also supports this thesis's argument that donors promote in their own interests (create a regional/security ally, or trade partnership for foreign policy reasons etc.; see p. 47 democracy promotion includes international pressures). Nonetheless, in terms of implementing successful elements of democracy, Interviewee B supported participatory engagement in the form of free and fair elections, as the biggest priority for democratisation. They voiced that successfully holding free and fair elections shows a significant achievement and intent for a developing nation (Interviewee B, 2018).

Third, if this is the case, then there may be issues with the definition of 'democracy' in democracy promotion programmes. The interviews also showed that there is also a need to consider the temporal impact of any participatory engagement, if it is strongly linked to the promotion of democracy. In other words, although we may think that projects should be about promoting democracy in the long-term, the reality may be to build very strong short-term aspects of participatory engagement that will deliver very practical short-term outcomes. Interviewee B gave more insight in relation to promoting free and fair election by showing that often there is a need to focus on democratic outputs that deliver practical measures: 'donors can potentially help in funding/assessing if 'X' has a free and fair election, but comparatively it is easy to say 'X' has held a free and fair election and achieved value for money (on the donor side) but that is short-term with an end date,' (Interviewee B, 2018). Ultimately, what this implies is that implanting democracy promotion in the long-term is an ambiguous concept, largely because projects can only ensure participatory engagement and concrete outcomes in the short-term. In simple terms then, long-term implementation (from donors) is a vague concept and one that is hard to attain. This could mean that democracy is not promoted with a sustainable goal in mind and therefore is in reverse; it is implemented for as long as the donor needs it to be, rather than it being about the benefits for the recipient. That is, however, an assumption drawn by this thesis and not stated by

the participant, but it does show that there is not complete neutrality in the design and concept of the project aims.

Fourth, the findings often highlighted how participatory engagement required material support and resourcing through projects. The results derived from UK participants clearly established that democracy promotion is often about money and/or inadequate resources. This comes across very strongly as a dimension of participatory engagement-based democracy promotion, and complements findings discussed in the previous section on fundamental rights. In particular, issues of resourcing wider participatory engagement programmes featured in many of the interviews; several of them were specific about the impact of resourcing on participatory engagement issues. Interviewee B, for example, argued that financial aid budgets have an impact on the quality of the donor's ability to promote democracy:

‘With pressure on aid budgets, a lot is about showing what donors have achieved, so free and fair elections are a goal and targeted because it is easier to show the success story of that in the short term and show donor nation is successfully promoting democracy,’ (2018).

Is that not a clear sign of democracy promotion in reverse? If it seeks to check boxes of accountability that benefit the UK government, rather than trying to establish long-lasting democratisation? Similarly, several of the interviews highlighted how increasing resources would lead to an easily noticeable increase in participatory engagement, and thereby possibly enhance the successes of democracy promotion:

‘If advice and pressure can come from local partners within recipient/neighbour countries i.e. in Africa if it can come from the East Africa Community (EAC) or African Union (AU), rather than from donors or World Bank or Western based/image entity, that would enhance success of democratisation more,’ (Interviewee B, 2018).

Yet, this discussion also emphasises a fifth aspect that comes notably from the empirical findings – namely that participatory engagement must not just involve the locals but also be seen to benefit them more than the donor. Practical democracy promotion needs to be for the advantage of the recipient more so than for the donors. As Interviewee B rather nicely commented, from experiences in Africa, that:

‘Having something to aspire to is important to create neighbourly competitiveness and accountability that would help long-term success, especially in Africa where there is a continental body to oversee this....it allows for more recipient autonomy and for nations and regions to own their own democratisation and not have it influenced by donors,’ (Interviewee B, 2018).

The results from the data collected reinforce this thesis’s argument of democracy promotion being led by foreign policy. Interviewee B suggested (in regard to who is best positioned to promote democracy), ‘commercial suppliers are held to donor funds and linked to government, so is led by where is the money being spent and those government departments that have vested interests,’ (Interviewee B, 2018), supporting the BPM idea of foreign policy and pre-empted ways of promoting democracy. With donors pre-determining *what* to promote, recipient nations have less of a voice over the aid they receive; democracy promotion in reverse.

A sixth issue raised by this review of findings in relation to participatory engagement reveals rather clearly how DFID utilises key agencies as surrogate actors in order to enable donors to promote for their own benefit. In this way, DFID funded project have also seen an expansion in donor actors involved in UK democracy promotion. In essence, the findings show how important it is for the UK to incorporate principles of participatory engagement into the project design and frameworks of programmes. Yet, this raises the question as to whether DFID is best positioned to promote democracy due to the issues of bias and donor interests being a predominant motive for donor-led democracy promotion. Interviewee B, for example, argued that supported NGOs

and think tanks are often those best positioned to help democratisation despite their abilities perhaps not being as far reaching; ‘NGOs/think tanks that are not receiving significant amounts of government funding but are best suited as they can campaign on policy issues. What they say is more impartial but they do not necessarily have the influence to be heard or platform to make huge difference as government would,’ (Interviewee B, 2018). Nevertheless, by including more NGOs in democracy promotion activities, it also confirms how the observation of impartiality needs also to be present in democracy promotion since there may be tensions between maintaining the impartiality of NGOs and the overall priorities of enhancing participatory engagement as part of democracy promotion, as pushed by DFID. Equally, there may be tensions between the use of UK based NGOs and more local organisations. In this way, this also supports this thesis’s Conceptual Framework’s identification of incorporating the benchmarks is necessary for measuring successful democracy promotion. If donors were to take less of a role and the power handed to local NGOs and impartial think tanks (as Interviewee B advocates for), then the results would more likely result in permanent outcomes of democratisation. Interviewee B used Ethiopia to highlight how this can produce some short-term successes:

‘Political leaders are invested, listening and engaged. Free and fair elections happening would show voting turnout and how inclusive it is. Where the turnout is higher, not just within capital city which is densely populated, would be signs of success if high levels of minorities, illiterates, women etc. are turning out to vote,’ (Interviewee B, 2018).

When assessing the specific findings, context is important and has a discernible impact on how we frame democracy promotion in reverse. This is something various participants bring to the forefront.

Seven, and similar to our findings in relation to fundamental rights, the importance of seeing democracy as a *regime* is highlighted clearly from our findings in relation to participatory engagement. More specifically, that (successful) democracy promotion often requires the

acknowledgement and existence of general guidelines on how democracy as a regime needs to be assessed universally (and again represents a key issue raised by this thesis). The interviews supported that this is a contributing factor to democracy promotion in reverse. For example, Interviewee B stated ‘various indices about freedom of media etc. and those things are helpful for a starting point or to put pressure to show how far a country has come/regressed. Democracy is a long-term project, even countries that are highly democratic can take backward steps i.e. Trump and Brexit,’ (Interviewee B, 2018). The acknowledgement of using indices to assess democracy promotion successes reaffirms the purpose of the Conceptual Framework and reinforces the research problem outlined earlier of the need for a universal application of democracy promotion (see p. 9).

Eight, the findings also confirm one of the key reflections raised by literature and the assumptions of the Conceptual Framework; namely determining clarity of who benefits ‘most’ from UK democracy promotion programmes. In particular, when discussing participatory engagement, a prevailing feature across the interviews (and validating the Conceptual Framework) was the need to identify stronger ways to measure the successes and failures of Western democracy promotion. Interviewee B, for instance, was particularly notable in emphasising that ‘there should be a set of indicators for which donors can measure against (i.e. freedom of media or civil society participation etc.) and then seek to control or engage with these areas as much as possible,’ (Interviewee B, 2018). Equally, there is a need for equivalent indicators denoting lack of success. An indicator, at least in terms of participatory engagement, for example, of projects not being successful would be the government not engaging with the projects or if some indicators show regression in terms of losing participation of local actors over time (Interviewee B, 2018). This, again, supports the Conceptual Framework but also offers a solution as to how to make democracy more successful for the recipients. Crucially, and as noted in the section examining fundamental rights, awareness of temporal aspects remains important since, ‘democracy promotion is long-term so it does not necessarily mean you have been unsuccessful in two years if there is no change, but if it does show successes, it is likely to be recipient success as their government has changed,’

(Interviewee B, 2018). This could mean that donors should (if so, more often), allow recipients to take the lead on their democratisation, rather than having donor-led initiatives. This may help sustain long-term successes. From a recipient point of view however, relapse is likely to occur if they ‘sense that their aid is coming with strings attached and the incentives are undemocratic i.e. vested interests of US or UK,’ (Interviewee B, 2018), which has been the case for at least the last few years.

Indeed, measuring the success of democracy promotion is particularly challenging when considering projects that are there to encourage innovation and thus need more dynamic measurements of success. Interviewee F noted that a success of these kinds of projects ‘is that they bring in new innovation, in the form of knowledge, and give you contacts which can be considered as a success,’ (Interviewee F, 2019). This was particularly seen to be the case in terms of bilateral projects. Yet, as noted previously, since ‘bilateral projects are never completed from my personal experiences and they are always short-term’ (Interview F, 2019). Projects are often short-lived and this strengthens the argument made in this thesis that projects are left unfinished and this results in a lack of long-term sustainability which means they cannot be sustained (see research objective p. 16). This is seen as a failure of UK democracy promotion.

Nine, the findings in relation to participatory engagement also show similarity when compared with those on fundamental rights in terms on views on trends in democracy. As the general findings in Chapter 7 (see p. 148) outline, there is an opinion that globally, democracy is in a crisis of decline. This decline is also evident in responses in relation to participatory engagement found in the respective interviews and is also supported by the interviews, as a relating factor to democracy promotion in reverse. For example, as Interviewee B commented, ‘DFID focuses on where UK can make a difference, but foreign policy is a big aspect. It is likely we will not promote democracy to dictators but will perhaps promote democracy in countries we want to destabilise,’ (Interviewee B, 2018). This is not necessarily ‘wrong’ but it could play a part in why democracy

is in decline. If countries are not accepting of being democratised or, as pointed out previously, that there are strings attached to donor aid, regression can occur.

Ten, and rather strikingly for this thesis, the interviews also showed instances where the self-image argument is a further causative factor to democracy promotion in reverse. In order to address the idea of donor-centric promotion that these investigations have supported, there needs to be a far better way of investing in sustainable democratisation, rather than promoting democracy in the donor's self-image. One participant argued:

‘We promote our own perception of democracy... but at the same time thinking we can impose this on another country and they can mirror our democracy. It is more complicated than that and we need to understand the local context and this process,’ (Interviewee B, 2018).

Ultimately, one way to offset this is if donors can work alongside recipient nations and not dominate with their own agendas and experiences, this might be more sustainable in the long-run. Interviewee B said ‘it [democratisation] needs to be led by locals and national governments and civil societies in these countries, which will lead to more successful democracy promotion; it has to be recipient based and led,’ (2018); it needs participatory engagement from the recipient nation. As a benchmark, participatory engagement is crucial in allowing for a mutually beneficial relationship to form between the donors and recipients. Interviewee F, for example, spoke of how this ‘[DFID] are most keen to see [Nigeria] integrate military and civil society so they work together as a team. DFID facilitate this through training programmes where all those sectors were integrated,’ (Interviewee F, 2019). A way to strengthen the participatory engagement between donors and recipient (and create mutually beneficial outcomes) is through eliminating the foreign policy motivation that encompasses many UK projects. Highlighted by the interviews, is the argument that donors need to keep the recipients at the forefront of the programme aims and objectives; in reality, this does not happen and DFID targets areas that they are particularly interested in, rather than introducing nationwide assistance. Other states may also require

assistance, so why did they not receive it? It supports the weakness of DFID programmes in that there is not enough budget for these projects which could suggest the UK has other motives (foreign policy) for being in a recipient nation (such as Nigeria); democracy promotion in reverse. Eleven, the findings not only confirm that the implementation of democracy promotion programmes within a recipient nation remains complex (see p. 43), but they also emphasise strongly how a fundamental aspect of implementing participatory engagement is ensuring the recipient nation is willing and accepting of the democratisation support. Once again, the results on participatory engagement re-affirm that having that good relationship from the start is imperative. However, the investigations also show that this is not always the case in practice. Interviewee F commented on this, in relation to a project in Nigeria: ‘the Nigerian government does not really have any options other than to accept the help, considering the influence of the British government in Nigeria,’ (Interviewee F, 2019). This insight further supports this thesis’s assessment that donors have influence in some recipient nations more than others and this can be a pre-determined aspect of a project (Miles’ Law see Table 2, p. 76). Again, pre-determinism of aims show donor bias and democracy promotion in reverse.

Interestingly, the interviews also showed how political will and support for projects in recipient countries was still largely seen, by donors, in a rather traditional way as an essentially elite-level activity and process:

‘Frankly speaking, [projects] are orientated at the elitist aspects of society. The people who mostly come from DFID are the heads of DFID, so they are knowledgeable... the other UK people are just here to work on the job. They are not as experienced or skilled; they have simply been brought so they can be given the opportunity to have a job...so these projects are short-term and do not make the impact desired,’ (Interviewee F, 2019).

By suggesting that these projects are aimed at, and for the elite aspects of society, it is clear to see why democracy promotion is in reverse. The point of introducing democratisation into a country

is to allow for it to be inclusive to all aspects and levels of society. In this case, there is no participatory engagement being pushed for by DFID. The Conceptual Framework identifies this as a crucial component for measuring democracy promotion. With the lack of participatory engagement being a major factor, this can explain why democracy promotion is in reverse. Consequently, this means ‘these projects are then not at all sustainable after DFID leaves. DFID has money and influence,’ (Interviewee F, 2019).

The findings also indicated the challenges of not just monitoring, but also perhaps more harder elements of trying to enforce long-term effects of democracy promotion programmes. While in previous sections, the findings highlight the opportunities that later programme reviews provide in trying to seek out longer term impacts of projects, it was also noted that often following-up is actually a rather more haphazard process in practice after the donors leave. One interviewee stated that there are:

‘No follow up periods. When the project is ongoing [DFID] monitor and evaluate, but that costs money so it is only during the project that that happens. When the project is completed and the papers are signed off, it is considered an issue solved by DFID because they work on budget and have projects all over the world. So, this project is not something they intend to keep here,’

(Interviewee F, 2019).

This reiterates the points highlighted by other interviewees that donors need to aim for long-term outcomes (see Figure 3, p. 92); yet the interviews show how this often procedurally more difficult to achieve than first appears.

The twelfth point drawn from the findings follows on from what several of interviewees argued of one way to ensure better long-term outcomes from short-term projects. There were suggestions that, to ensure that participatory engagement succeeds in producing permanent outcomes, it needs to strongly and integrally embed into the aims of programmes. This would, in turn, achieve these

long-term results. Most saw participatory engagement as one of the most viable areas where success could be measured and longer-term impacts could be discernible. Several interviews suggested that: (i) an improvement could be made by further incorporating NGOs and think tanks, as a way to make the donor/recipient partnership more neutral, and (ii) that ‘a way to improve the project’s sustainability is to make these projects multi-lateral (Interviewee F, 2019). Multilateral donors working on a project can help overcome the issue of sustainability:

‘Funding should be through the African Union, UNICEF, World Bank or IMF etc. It takes a lot of effort though for all these organisations to consider a project and implement it, but they have a very broad feedback mechanism which means the issue of creating a dialogue is stronger and that makes [projects] more long-term...i.e. you bring X amount, we bring Y amount, we put the money together and do this job together so then it is more sustainable and more realistic,’

(Interviewee F, 2019).

However, once again, any movement to multilateral project raises the issues of this being accompanied by effected multifaceted criteria to measure the success of democracy promotion. Furthermore, several interviews presented clear opinions that if recipient nations were to have greater levels of participatory engagement, this would not necessarily always be cost free. It suggests that it is not the West, generally, that is the issue when promoting democracy, but *how* and *who*, is promoting it. Consequently, for participatory engagement to be a measurable benchmark, there need to be a ‘buy in’ from the recipient nations, into the projects:

‘There must be some element of commitment by the recipients, so if DFID comes with X amount of resources to advance the system of democracy in Nigeria, it has to be accepted and there be a dialogue and should co-fund the project with the recipient nation. That way you have joint vested interest to make it work,’ (Interviewee F, 2019).

Indeed, this (at least according to some of the interviews) might also help to address aforementioned concerns over any longer-term impact of UK democracy promotion projects. Interviewee F, for example, claimed ‘even after the life of the project (DFID leaving), you have an incentive and interest, because of the buy in, to move it forward. If donors commit with money, dump it, then leave, you will never solve the problem,’ (Interviewee F, 2019). Again, this reinforces the need for participatory engagement to be integrated into the projects and there to be willingness from the recipient nation.

Thirteenth, it is clear that the findings, in relation to participatory engagement, produce some of the most important information supporting the argumentation of democracy promotion in reverse; advocated by this thesis. The data collected shows strong evidence that donors benefit more from programmes than the recipients and this is highlighted throughout the investigations and findings: ‘the donor benefits more from the projects...it is 70% benefit for the donor and 30% benefit for the recipient,’ (Interviewee F, 2019). Yet, this may partly reflect that Western developed concepts may simply not be transferable. As Interview F highlighted expressed repeatedly – promoting a flawed concept of democracy from a developed nation will not work in developing ones. In particular:

‘People are overtaxed in the developed world; I do not see the rationale of them bringing that process into a developing country, it does not make sense. I studied in the UK and lived there so I have seen the needs of the British people. I know they complain about taxation, but the UK government takes that taxpayer’s money and brings it into my country [Nigeria] whilst your own people are suffering. It is all political,’ (Interviewee F, 2019).

Fourteenth, the findings on participatory engagement show some deviations in opinions about the role of international assistance, per se. Both Interviewees B and F expressed strong views that by the West pushing their own image of democracy, this also brings about why recipients may resist donor development assistance; democracy promotion in reverse. As a partial solution to this, it

may be wise to also embed any democracy promotion via more regionally owned international multilateral frameworks to reduce such resistance:

‘Another way to solve the issue of sustaining projects in Nigeria and Africa in general, is to allow less external influence over our projects and there is the initiation from regional bodies (ECOWAS) and the continental body (like the AU) to integrate trade, movement of people and services as well as common currency. External donors would limit that cooperation within the continent because [countries of external donors] will lose out,’ (Interviewee F, 2019).

This is not suggesting getting rid of external assistance altogether, but just that it should be reduced. The reason this idea is perhaps unattainable, to an extent, is because donor organisations such as DFID, would not be able to push their own agendas into recipient nations. By allowing Africa to take control of its development in a way that might not enhance democracy but at least enhance continental cooperation, would provide no real benefit to the West or the ability to impress their own foreign policy or systems into the recipient (see Figure 8; p. 112, Figure 9, p. 116; Figure 10, p. 119).

A fundamental aspect of successful democracy promotion should produce an autonomous, more democratic, regime within the recipient nations and ‘ultimately the recipient should be allowed to run its own show,’ (Interviewee F, 2019). There is little evidence from the findings that shows DFID has integrated the benchmarks of fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration in cases like Nigeria; all the nation is left with is democracy promotion in reverse.

The fifteenth finding also showed that in the case of participatory engagement, there was also a concentration of focus often in including electoral centred projects. In the literature, free and fair elections have been cited as integral to auditing successful democracy promotion (see p. 70 for the importance of measuring democracy), but this also showed strongly in relation to the

participatory engagement dimension of the interviews.. For example, ‘democracy should capture the essence of every society; you can still elect leaders but certainly there are many ways of doing it that still leaves important things that matter to people,’ (Interviewee F, 2019). Here, an emphasis on inclusive society and fair elections is key to democratisation, which supports the Conceptual Framework created by this thesis. However, what *type* of elections should be promoted is problematic. There are various forms of voting and one example of how this is challenging is summarised in the context of ‘in Nigeria we will never ever get democracy as long as we do not have proportional representation (PR); we have over 350 ethnic groups and we are culturally very diverse. So as long as you do not have a way to assist all these segments to have their say, which is what PR does, you will always have the same problem,’ (Interviewee F, 2019). This opinion could be applied globally as a reason to why transitional democracies around the world are struggling to attain this form of regime. Therefore, real change is not happening despite extensive UK electoral and development assistance. Participatory engagement is a key goal for the UK but after all the years spent investing in Nigerian elections, for example, no long-lasting change has occurred. This is clear evidence of democracy promotion is in reverse. The benchmarks of democracy promotion are not the focus of UK programmes aims and objectives, leading to no long-term plans for the recipient states to not have a reliance on donor aid or achieve permanent outcomes. This is not beneficial to the recipient, but to the donor who is pushing their own agendas. This further helps explain the research problem (see pp. 9) of aims not being achieved, through lessons learnt, thus democracy promotion is in reverse.

Elections are a focal point of democracy promotion, as highlighted in the Conceptual Framework, as it encompasses participatory engagement and fundamental rights and is widely seen as a starting point for democratisation. An objective of UK democracy promotion programmes is to make elections freer and fairer (see Figure 9, p. 116) and the UK does increase the prospect of elections being freer, ‘the UK provides technology transfer and scholarship schemes which avail applicant to competitive selection. This promotes democracy, as the best participants are selected,’ (Interviewee I, 2019). With the UK providing transferable experience and knowledge

into election building in recipient nations, it shows that there is scope to argue that the UK does promote in its own self-image and that this can be a positive thing.

Sixteenth, an interesting feature that has come to light is that the encounters of democracy promotion (at least in terms of embedding participatory engagement) were often more challenging in projects that were deemed to be more economically focused. Here, the relationship of the respective project to democracy was more indirect and ambiguous, but often deemed by the interviewees to be of notable importance overall. However, the challenge was often more complex given the asymmetry of economic relations and well-being between the participants in the respective project. As Interviewee I added, ‘the UK promotes democracy through trade with other countries... such trade terms are usually unfair and skewed towards the interest of UK, that it becomes clear that less endowed countries do not have a sovereign democratic right to fair trade,’ (Interviewee I, 2019). Though strengthening internal democracy is a priority, so is creating trade links and allies for the donor, which can lead to the donor gaining more than the recipient and resulting in democracy promotion in reverse.

Following on from this, this often led to rather practical challenges in terms of participatory engagement, since with more diverse (non-election) based projects., it is not just about *who* the recipient nations are, but *where* to promote democracy. Certainly, as Interviewee I highlighted, this often takes us back to the central question of how donors choose democracy promotion programmes and implement them:

‘In the process of choosing recipients and the implementation process of projects, the UK normally has its policy on programmes that will be sponsored over a defined period. Any sponsored project must conform to specific requirements of the UK. Countries requiring sponsorship have no choice other than to tailor their programmes to meet the UK’s requirement, even if it does not fall in line with their national priority,’ (Interviewee I, 2019).

Yet, regardless of what type of respective project the interviewees discussed, a crucial observation remains – namely that recipient nations do not get to create projects that they need, so the projects result in rigidity. Interviewees, B, E, F and I also showed remarkable synergies in their argumentation that, ultimately, the first step to implementation should be engaging with the recipient governments and if this is not done correctly, it can be the downfall of a democracy promotion programme. Moreover, from this perspective, even with that initiation, the projects are still driven by UK requirements. This shows that even if the recipient wanted particular objectives for the project to be achieved, they would not be able to voice what that was if it did not adhere to UK policy. The recipient nation would need that sponsorship and aid, so they do not refuse it, but how can that be viewed as successful democracy promotion? It further supports the argument that democracy promotion is in reverse.

Overall, the investigations presented so far in this section have highlighted how projects play out once in the field and that participatory engagement is recognised as a core benchmark to promote democracy by. Other interviewees have supported that democracy promotion is in reverse because it benefits the donors more and because the projects are not sustainable. A further reasoning as to why sustainability is not being achieved is because programme employees and technology are largely Western; the recipient loses out on the opportunity to employ their own people and to learn how to sustain the projects after donors leave. Instead, recipient nations are reliant on Western equipment and assistance because they have not been trained enough to keep the project running. This is a weakness as participatory engagement has not been prioritised, so how does that benefit the recipient? It is evident that this does not, ‘in this manner, the project funds are dropped from one tunnel in the UK and fall into another tunnel into the UK,’ (Interviewee I, 2019). It also further reiterates the need for participatory engagement from the recipient’s governments and communities. If there was a universal framework that was independently created and used by donors, these weaknesses in projects could be improved. Alas, there is currently no such framework being used, hence the need for the Conceptual Framework (see Chapter 5, p. 95).

This lack of universality could be contributing to the decline in democracies and why democracy promotion is in reverse.

An important reason for conducting interviews was to gather information on who gains the most from donor funded democracy promotion programmes. The findings have proven donors to be benefiting more; 'it seems that gains are mutually favourable but when looked at closely, it is the UK that gains most,' (Interviewee I, 2019). This fits in with the analysis of other participant's views on the donor/recipient relationship. It shows that there is a surface level of mutually beneficial outcomes, however, this could be seen as a way for donors to 'look good' back home and to say that they are indeed helping developing nations when in reality, they are not offering any long-term help or outcomes (see Figure 6, p. 97). The participant went further to give an example of how, from their observations and practices, the UK benefits on projects more so than a recipient:

'For example, consultants from the UK organise discussion forums across countries and gather all the knowledge back to the UK...the UK gains the aggregation of all of what has been carried out in [recipient] nations. The UK has, consequently, benefitted from unequal trade terms and the dictate of prices of particularly agricultural commodities [as examples],' (Interviewee I, 2019).

A significant point has been made here. It shows that projects seek to allow the UK (as donors) to reap the benefits of programmes and once this has happened, they cease efforts to further democratise the recipient nation. There is little evidence that there is a motive to fully incorporate the recipient nation into the process and engage them in the implementation and development of their own democratisation. Donors are seen to be conducting their own research in a recipient nation, yet taking that knowledge and research back to the UK. How can that help the recipient deepen their democracy? It cannot and that is why the UK benefits more from democracy promotion and it is in reverse.

Investigating a link between democracy promotion and the current decline in democracy is important to the findings of this thesis. As Interviewee I forthrightly explained, ‘global democracy is in crisis. There are interferences in election results. Using technology [for example] compromises the choice of the masses,’ (2019). The participant gave a strong and current example of why they perceive democracy to be in crisis today and a reason for that; participatory engagement is not being promoted successfully or producing permanent outcomes (see Figure 6, p. 97). A further observation is, again, the political bias of donors: ‘the UK and the US tend to enforce democracy in countries where democracy is lacking under certain conditions. However, under similar situations elsewhere, this so-called democracy will not be enforced by the West,’ (Interviewee I, 2019). Highlighted here is another supportive opinion of democracy promotion in reverse. It depicts the West as cherry-picking recipient nations for their own gains. Therefore, democracy promotion is driven by Western foreign policy this is contributing to democracy in crisis:

‘A case in point is to compare the situation of Syria and Libya, or Libya and North Korea. The internal democracy of the West also influences their foreign policies, which usually gives little recognition to the sovereign and democratic rights of other countries,’ (Interviewee I, 2019).

Equally, the above remark, in combination with prior analysis presented in this section, further echoes the ideas of foreign policy and political interests being a large driving force behind Western democracy promotion (see Table 2, p. 76). It also shows how democracy promotion is subject to international pressures (see p. 47). A further example of a democratic ‘right’ or ‘foundation’ this thesis has recognised as free and fair elections (which encompasses citizens’ fundamental rights, participatory engagement and holding the administration accountable), is also referenced:

‘Some leaders, particularly in Africa and the developing world, tend to overstay their constitutionally mandated tenure either through the rigging of elections or altering the constitutional term of the Head of State in order to remain in office,’ (Interviewee I, 2019).

The idea of elections becoming increasingly hollow and uncompetitive (Diamond, 1996, p. 25) is academically observed in the literature, reaffirming that democracy is in crisis. It additionally shows democracy promotion does not work effectively and is in reverse because impartiality is not being promoted as a core principle and objective of democracy.

When broken down, the issues remain twofold. Firstly, democracy promotion is a flawed concept due to donors choosing recipients based on their own motives; they are gaining more from the relationship than the recipients are (see Figure 3, p. 92). Secondly, the projects are then unable to be continued in the long-term because there is little to no infrastructure left for recipient nations to build on with (once donors leave). If participatory engagement, as a measurable benchmark, was a prioritised and integrated aim of the project, this could perhaps help overcome these issues. These are observations that have been observed by numerous interviewees who have worked with or on DFID funded programmes. Ultimately, it is possible that these core issues surrounding the process of UK democracy promotion are creating incentives for democracies to revert or stagnate in their democratisation prospects; echoing that argument that democracy promotion is in reverse.

The investigation so far have supported various arguments this thesis has recognised as the contributing factors to democracy promotion in reverse. A recurring raised by the participants involves the initiation of programmes and engaging with the government. From the outset, there should be primary goals that programme should seek to achieve and there are examples of successes of that. As one interviewee described from their experience:

‘We set ourselves three questions: 1) Can we achieve access through our project? Over the course of the project we have had a large amount of engagement with our system. 2) Can we

achieve quality? Over the years of the project, the rate of learning, when using our products in the recommended rate we provide, has gone up; the students are now learning at an accelerated rate,' (Interviewee J, 2019).

It is evident that having clear objectives are important in order to ensure implementation and goals are met and the core objectives are based upon participatory engagement; a crucial element to democracy promotion (see Conceptual Framework, see Chapter 5, p. 95). However, as one example, the participant said that in regard to the third question, '3) is that access and quality achievable at scale? We have achieved our objectives, but in pockets. We have not seen widespread success, but we are addressing it and have ideas on how to,' (Interviewee J, 2019). This shows that there are continual assessments of productivity which can contribute to the overall success of the application period; other interviewees have stated that this is not the case on their projects.

However, coinciding with what other interviewees have also pointed out, the relationship with the government of the recipient nation caused obstacles: the 'main issue is that, though the Ministry of Education is a partner and we have their endorsement, we do not have their active support for the project,' (Interviewee J, 2019). This point is reiterated throughout the findings; the initial approach of the programme implementation phase, by the donor to the recipient's government, is a big hurdle if it is not done properly. This results in democracy promotion in reverse, as strong participatory engagement is not present from the outset. The purpose of democracy promotion programmes is for recipient governments to 'embrace our [donor] resources, so what we need to do is strengthen the relationship with the Ministry of Education to make it routine and make it part of a teacher's daily practice,' (Interviewee J, 2019). Again, the need for participatory engagement to be embedded into the programme aim is crucial to the success of a project. Similarly the argument that Interviewees E have made that a buy in from the community is equally as vital, is further reiterated; 'maybe that is a fault of the project in that we did not get that initial buy in at the beginning from the government...it was more the government approving us to go ahead rather than 'we [the recipient]' approve you, endorse you and actively

support you in making it work,' (Interviewee J, 2019). The recurring problem interviewees raised of not getting the initial relationship right, indicates that this hinders aspects of the project's operationalisation into communities. If this is the case, then projects with these flawed relationships with recipients from the outset can lead to recipient nations having either less willingness or less involvement in implementation. With this in mind, there is a lower chance of permanent outcomes and so, democracy promotion is in reverse. It is fair to say that this is largely the fault of the donors; this thesis argues that there is a broken link between communication between them and the recipients and these observations from the interviewees have supported that. However, democracy promotion should not require buy ins just from the government, but from the community too. Again, Interviewee F (who spoke from the viewpoint of being on the receiving end of development programmes) argued that a 'buy in' from the communities who are receiving the assistance first hand, is crucial to the cycle of development. This further supports that both implementers and the receivers of development aid, have to prioritise participatory engagement within, and as a result, of the project. Likewise, Interviewee J expressed, 'where that [buy in] is in place, we see the community really supporting the project and contributing towards sustainability,' (2019). Linking back to the Conceptual Framework (see p. 95) the idea of having participatory engagement by government and communities is fundamental to the success of international development, therefore it is crucial to get this aspect right. If it is not done appropriately, as several interviewees have suggested, it can lead to democracy promotion in reverse. If the engagement is not in the foundations of the project, then democracy promotion in reverse as obstacles will appear and hinder sustainability. Therefore, without long-term impact as an outcome, democracy promotion is in reverse.

The interviews have already raised the issue of the longevity of projects as a large concern for implementers. The long-term plans of projects intend for governments to continue the process of democratisation. However, in several cases this is not or has not happened. One suggestion of how to improve this was, 'if we are able to develop that relationship with the Ministry, and those community level relationships, then sustainability has a better chance...but because of the cost

element of the project, it will still be difficult to sustain,' (Interviewee J, 2019). Again, it is highlighted that participation from all stakeholders in the recipient nation is needed for progressive democracy promotion. In contrast to other projects discussed in this chapter, Interviewee J's project has a 50/50 split of private sector and government collaboration and involvement. Previous interviewees have spoken of DFID having a self-interest in projects, which has led to influencing objectives and who 'gets' development aid. On this project however, with public and private sector consolidation, there seems to be a more open and proactive approach; lessening the element of donors choosing recipient nations to benefit their own agendas. As a result, there is a lower risk of strings attached to projects and this enhances the impartiality of the programme. With this in mind, there is an assumption that could be made of the donor/recipient relationship being stronger in this format. However:

'The companies involved will benefit, so for us it is a great opportunity to expand where we work and use that for future projects. In fact, we are able to use the funding to develop our product to make it better quality, so the company benefits,' (Interviewee J, 2019).

From this standpoint, it shows that a private sector company has a more mutually beneficial relationship with recipients, due to the absence of political motives or foreign policy goals. However, it still supports that the recipients are not the ones gaining more or benefiting more from the programme, especially if it still does not lead to permanent outcomes (see Figure 3, p. 92). It does show, though, how the international development community can work more efficiently when there is less governmental bias placed within donor programmes. This is important to acknowledge when assessing democracy promotion in reverse. Within this project, participatory engagement and impartial administration are particularly strong, 'we hold each other to account and challenge each other on things that need to happen. We collaborate a lot; have weekly calls. There are challenges in the field, which we address as they arise. As a result of that, I feel it works,' (Interviewee J, 2019). Again, this highlights how neutrality of a project's

objectives is crucial. This further reiterates that communication and engagement on all levels is integral to democracy promotion (see Figure 3, p. 92).

The overall findings have shown that participation from communities is just as important from the recipient governments as it is from the donors. Creating a strong communication loop will inevitably result in sustainability because the recipient nation is able to use the resources and tools given to them, and not rely on donors. Interviewee J shared an example of how this can work, ‘we are taking this project to communities that are developing and have little resources. They embrace it and the feedback is very positive about the learning resources we are providing,’ (Interviewee J, 2019). This would be likely to incentivise communities to carry on these projects after the donors leave, if they are included in the process and see the rewards of it. The students and teachers are the main focus in terms of engagement. Interviewee J said that the students are very engaged and happy (2019), but the issue that arises comes from the teachers. The participant outlined:

‘Some teachers are engaged, some are not; we are constantly having to sell the benefits to them and get willing to adopt a new way of doing things. We are trying to overcome those challenges but on the whole, teachers are engaged but it would be good to develop that more,’ (Interviewee J, 2019).

This particular project focuses a great deal on interacting with local communities and ensuring that there is a constant loop of communication between them (the donors) and the recipient community. This is not something that has been strong in previous projects that have been discussed in this chapter; as it has been outlined numerous times, creating a dialogue is important. In this sense, it not only allows donors to do their job efficiently, it also gives local stakeholders a voice. The analysis offered by Interviewee J greatly strengthens the argument made by the Conceptual Framework that participatory engagement is one of the central elements to the success

of democracy promotion. What needs to be acknowledged though, are ways to improve the chances of longevity after donors leave. One opinion was that:

‘I would like to see more regional ownership of the donor streams going forward. I do feel, as a British person working on a project within the recipient nation but based in the UK, that when I go there [recipient nation] it does feel a little comfortable in an imperial sense and I would like to see more regional involvement and funding. That would be a positive move,’ (Interviewee J, 2019).

This point can be compared to Interviewee E and F’s opinion of how multilateral partnerships can enhance the successful outcomes, impartiality and benefits for recipient nations.

As explained in the Conceptual Framework (see p. 95) this thesis defines three benchmarks for which democracy promotion can be observed and measured by. The results, so far, have validated the Conceptual Framework works as a tool for measuring and applying democracy promotion. However, it is important to factor in the context for which democracy promotion programmes are being implemented by. As an example, Interviewee M gave a relative response to what benchmarks should be priorities in democracy promotion, ‘in countries (like Ethiopia), most of scholars I work with think that the administration’s not doing too badly, but fundamental rights are weak and participatory engagement has got a very long way to go,’ (Interviewee M, 2019). However, in the context of Myanmar, they explained ‘Myanmar is different because it has only had a recent experience of democracy, but my colleagues would say all three relatively work, but fundamental rights is the weakest because of the exclusion of ethnic minorities,’ (Interviewee M, 2019). A strong democracy needs to have participatory engagement (as well as fundamental rights and impartial administration), but core to that is having universal suffrage and an inclusive society that can express their political views. Here are two examples of how facilitating in democratisation through the promotion of these three benchmarks can be observed. Importantly, however, is the acknowledgment that the participant made, arguing, ‘which of the three

benchmarks is most important is not a question you can answer in relation to more than one country at a time. I do not think they are comparable or separable,' (Interviewee M, 2019). They argued that:

‘You cannot try and reduce violations of rights or promote more equal rights, without an impartial administration; you cannot divorce rights from the administration. In Ethiopia for example; what is most important to them? I would say what they are all concerned about right now is the danger of the exclusion of certain ethnicities. That brings in questions of fundamental rights and participatory engagement- they are all interrelated,’ (Interviewee M, 2019).

This opinion helps support the idea that you need fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration to be embedded into the process of democracy promotion. If one element is driven for more by donors than another element, you have democracy promotion in reverse. Thus, if democratisation is to be sustained, with this perspective of a correlating relationship between the benchmarks, all three must be inherent goals and objectives of democracy promotion. Nonetheless, the interviewee’s experience and research focus largely on parliamentary relationships of government and society, thus participatory engagement was a focal discussion point for them.

The results from the interviews showed that democracy promotion needs to be a national driven process. Interviewee M commented, ‘I am a great believer of coalitions and international collaboration but there needs to be a massive decentring away from donors and international NGOs,’ (Interviewee M, 2019). This comment is crucial to this thesis. It highlights why democracy promotion needs to be in the hands of recipient states and the importance of giving them the autonomy to push for their own democratisation without donors influencing with their own interests and image. It further strengthens the argument that participatory engagement from the recipients is vital and that should also be pushed forcibly into programme aims. However, this is something that is not currently occurring, as shown by the various examples given throughout

this thesis, because donors are the predominant actors. The participant also explained that ‘if donors are involved at all, it needs to be through facilitating better democratic processes and contributing to the facilitation of democratisation,’ (Interviewee M, 2019). By donors taking on the role of being *facilitators* and not *drivers* of democratisation, it means there is less possibility of donors promoting democracy for their own desires. They illustrated that:

‘Working towards deeper democracy has to be a national led process, otherwise it is implied that outsiders are the primary movers. It is the other way around; democracy promotion is something which can be helped with international collaboration and coalitions, but the main drivers need to be national agents, actors and groups,’ (Interviewee M, 2019).

The findings have shown that donors push for their own agendas on projects and this limits the ability for recipient nations to take the lead on democratising. This is validated by Interviewee M who said ‘if you take the UK, it is interesting how the rhetoric of why we are involved in international development, or conflict prevention or democracy promotion, changes drastically from government to government,’ (Interviewee M, 2019). Consequently, this strengthens the argument that donor governments use their own views to push through donor-centric policies in regards to international development (see p. 58, democracy promotion is a bureaucratic process).

An important factor of democracy promotion in reverse is the argument that donor agencies are not actually enforcing democracy into recipient nations, ‘the history of democracy, and whether or not it gets shallower or deeper, has little to do with foreign governments. DFID and USAID’s impact are very minor,’ (Interviewee M, 2019). This is a different perspective to previous interviewees, in suggesting that donor agencies from the UK and the US are not the most influential players in international development. They further explained their reasoning behind this statement by saying:

‘When we talk of democracy promotion in Ethiopia and Myanmar, what my colleagues are trying to do is understand the history of people trying to make democracy work in their countries. In that history, donors play a pretty tiny role. The problem is donors want to inflate their influence. Britain, for example, has more influence in our former colonies; their influence would be in Myanmar more so than Ethiopia,’ (Interviewee M, 2019).

This highlights that recipient/developing nations have to nationally drive their democratisation prospects and engage society to partake in the process in order for it to be sustainable. That would ensure democracy promotion is long-lasting; if this does not occur, the recipient nation is left with democracy promotion in reverse once donors leave. Yet again, this links back to the argument that countries who have not had historical roots or any cultural experience of democracy, cannot be expected to accept Western experiences of democracy and sustain those ideologies.

The general findings discussed so far have presented the lack of sustainability of projects as one of the core reasons for why democracy promotion is in reverse. Interviewee M said ‘there is a lot of performativity in democracy that takes their [politicians] attention away from things like promotion of rights for all, or to encourage participation in an inclusive way,’ (Interviewee M, 2019). If this is how the donor country’s politicians behave, then recipient nations will receive a reflected version of that when democracy is promoted to them through these projects. This is why this thesis argues, and is now validating that democracy promotion, in the donor’s self-image, is detrimental to the success of long-term democratisation. Even in a fully-fledged democracy, such as the UK, there are issues of ensuring rights and engagement are understood through the relationship of parliaments (who are chosen by society) and society (who politicians seek to represent). If this is then the model to which the UK promotes democracy abroad with, then it is evident that democratisation in the UK’s self-image is a flawed endeavour and one likely to be unsuccessful in inflicting permanent change. The relationship between the electorate and elected has become polarised within developed nations and this could be having a potential impact of

election-led democracy promotion programmes because participatory engagement is fundamental to democratisation.

Additionally, the argument this thesis presents of donors promoting in their self-image as a contributor to democracy promotion in reverse, is supported by Interviewee M. They stated:

‘I would seriously question the idea that we should be promoting our own model in the first place. DFID (as are other donor agencies) are doing democracy promotion through the UN; it gets complicated when you have a coalition of UNDP or DFID or USAID stakeholders promoting democracy in Ethiopia (for example) as they all take different lines,’ (Interviewee M, 2019).

Their opinion strengthens this thesis’s argument that democracy promotion in the self-image of the donor is not sustainable and aligns with what other interviewees have voiced. This shows that the UK’s democracy promotion is severely flawed. What is further highlighted is that despite donors having fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration as goals, simply exporting those concepts into a developing nation and expecting it to work is not possible or maintainable. Therefore, why have donors not learnt their lessons through retrospective evaluations of projects? Simply because it would likely not be in the donor’s interest to solely promote democracy without an element of strings attached. This is a bold claim for this thesis to make, however it is one that has been supported through much of data collected and helps answer the research question of why lessons are not learnt in order to provide long-term change.

A further investigation this thesis has observed is the relationship between democracy in decline and democracy promotion. Democracy, as a regime, has been argued to not be the best type of regime (Interviewee B shared this) and Interviewee M argued ‘democracy is inherently problematic and a struggle. It is very different in how it works in France, or the UK or the US.

Any country needs to promote democracy in their own way,' (2019). Is there a way to improve the way the West promote democracy? 'In some way, I think if DFID and USAID officials are more cautious about framings things, in terms of following Western models, then in a way that is an advantage,' (Interviewee M, 2019), as it would then be assumed that recipient nations are the sole beneficiaries of democracy promotion.

This thesis recognises that there has been a decline in the number of democracies around the world and the general findings have supported this observation. Participatory engagement is a vital benchmark to promote by, and an example of how this has been incorporated within a project is within the area of parliamentary strengthening and the positive effects this has had was shared: 'Myanmar has parliamentary history and in Ethiopia, in the last year, there are signs that democracy is getting stronger in some prospects,' (Interviewee M, 2019). Participatory engagement is strengthening in developing nations and this illustrates that it is a core part of democratisation and necessary to measure democracy promotion by. However, though the participant recognised that there is an insurgence of political engagement through elections, they stated clearly that they disagreed with the remark of democracy in decline. They went on to say that:

'There are aspects of democracy that are getting stronger, but you could say that is partly because they [democracy] has to...there are other aspects that are not in decline, but perhaps in crisis. A decline implies some sort of weakening. Democracy is not weakening because you have an increase in engagement through social media, particularly,' (Interviewee M, 2019).

An important comment is made here. The distinction made offers an etymological argument of the global state of democracy today. It is argued by the participant that it is in crisis, not decline. This thesis has acknowledged democracy is also in crisis, however the exclusive focus has been on democracy in decline. The participant further outlined, 'to say democracy is in decline is misleading and I do not think that democracy in decline is necessarily true. There is a decline in

deference, but there is a crisis in democracy; this is different from a decline,' (Interviewee M, 2019). Furthermore, the participant said democracy itself needs to have a clearer definition:

'We did podcasts of 20 people in Ethiopia and asked them 'what does democracy mean to you?' 20 people all said different things; that is partly why participatory engagement matters, because we need (in every country) to develop ways of debating and working out what democracy means,' (Interviewee M, 2019).

This remark gives strength to this thesis's outlook that democracy promotion requires defining, as there needs to be an understanding of what democracy is, to then use that understanding to define democracy promotion. It also emphasises that the tracing and outcomes of democracy promotion are diverse, therefore there needs to be guidelines for democracy promotion (see p. 50, tracing and outcomes of democracy promotion). It further supports the need for clarifying how to measure democracy promotion (which is what the Conceptual Framework does).

Nonetheless, with the identification of democracy in *crisis*, not *decline*, the interviewee added to the investigations and stated 'it is a very scary time for democracy and the massive increase in conflict, and potentially even worse conflict than we are seeing, shows there are real threats,' (Interviewee M, 2019). The threats that the participant raises are to do with the increase of violence against politicians (in the West); 'what will that do to the recruitment of politicians in the future? In a way you have this amazing rush in America of interest in government and an increase of talented people standing, but on the other hand and longer term, will we have another decrease because of the threat of violence against politicians?' (Interviewee M, 2019). If political engagement of those who stand for and represent democracy is being threatened, where does that leave democracy as a concept, especially as these are problems occurring within the West? If we are experiencing a crisis in democracy at home and donors are promoting that image/model of democracy abroad, then is the result not almost guaranteeing a lack of sustainability? Interviewees F and J have also commented on this, highlighting again that these are problems across all aspects

of UK democracy promotion. Nevertheless, these are questions that this thesis has given some answers to. Ultimately, democratisation needs to be ‘more vernacular, locally driven and defining of what democracy means to people,’ (Interviewee M, 2019); linking back to the argument that recipient nations should have self-rule over their democratisation and that they need to actively participate (from civil society to government) in the process. Interviewee M advocated for ‘scholars to really interrogate and ask questions about what democracy means, what democratic processes places need and what that means for the practical process of running democracy and government,’ (2019). Consequently, this thesis is further validated in its aims in defining democracy promotion and creating benchmarks by which to measure it by.

In addition to the data collected so far, there was further acknowledgment that participatory engagement is essential to successful democracy promotion. As reiterated throughout this chapter, engaging with the recipient states is a vital step in the initial stages of democracy promotion projects. In order for recipient nations to sustain projects, they need to be involved in every aspect of the projects. Interviewee H shared their experience of this, ‘we procured the content of education from local suppliers, so all of the content is aligned and approved by the recipient nation’s government. It is accepted by teachers. Some [content] came from South Africa and Uganda for example, but the curriculum was all regionally relevant,’ (Interviewee H, 2019). Interviewees B and F similarly argued that regional involvement was a crucial step to creating strong regional relations and having an education system that is recognised in that way is a strength of this project. They further described:

‘By the time I joined, we had already rolled out the programme extensively within the recipient nation. [My] first year was getting the resources into the schools and working with local stakeholders to ensure these resources were looked after, being used and that local communities were taking on responsibilities like paying electricity bills, for example,’ (Interviewee H, 2019).

This project strongly advocates for participatory engagement from the recipient country. It shows that with participatory engagement as a primary objective, the intentions are for locals to take control of the programme and to be able to make long-term changes within communities.

As previous interviewees have suggested (Interviewees E, F and I), a way to strengthen programmes is by having a buy in from the recipient nation, be it by the government or the community. However, a weakness of democracy promotion projects is centred on engaging recipients in this buy in. Donors do not communicate sufficiently between themselves, or to the recipients, and this leads to weak democracy promotion. For example:

‘DFID had told [us] that they would be handling all types of relations with government...but it transpired quickly that we did need to be involved those relationships at the central level; they [government] needed to be involved with the implementation,’ (Interviewee H, 2019).

Again, this is a point that is said to be a weakness of DFID funded programmes by other interviewees. Without that initial strong relationship between the implementers and the government, Interviewee H declared that ‘we were always fighting a slight uphill battle as they [government] felt slightly excluded from that initial design and implementation phase,’ (2019). Two issues are raised from this insight. Firstly, the approach (which several interviewees have commented on in relation to UK international development programmes) of engaging with the recipient governments is not transparent or participatory. Secondly, there is a breakdown in communication between DFID, who fund the project, and the implementers on the ground (see Figure 3, p. 92). Integrating involved engagement within the project’s aims has to be intended to reach both recipient governments/stakeholders/communities *and* donor workers. Otherwise you have democracy promotion in reverse. Furthermore, they added ‘on a local level, because we [organisations] did not have much experience in implementing development projects, we might have struggled in those first stages of the project to get permission for teacher training, for

example, because we had not built that relationship up at the start,' (Interviewee H, 2019). It is possible that these points support the argument that donors promote their own agendas foremost.

However, successes are present in projects too. One participant spoke positively about the impact their project was making within the recipient nation:

'In terms of maximising times on tasks we were very successful from 2015-16. We were successful in terms of getting teachers and pupils on the devices more. We have very strong attendance data, which is unique as attendance records are typically quite poor here....basic ICT skills have massively improved for all stakeholders involved, demonstrated by observations the data generated,' (Interviewee H, 2019).

A research puzzle (see p. 9) of this thesis focuses on arguing that a lack of retrospective analysis leads to lessons not being learnt and eventually results in democracy promotion in reverse. Interviewee H articulated that a lesson to be learnt on their particular project was; 'putting in good content and getting teacher or pupil to access that content is not enough to move the dial in terms of pupil's learning outcomes...fundamental components need to be effective to maximise those gains, particularly around teacher capacity,' (Interviewee H, 2019). Furthermore, 'if you have a poor teacher with good content the likelihood is the teacher will still deliver a largely poor lesson so we as a project have really focused on stronger support to the teacher, gender responsiveness, content and knowledge and basic use of ICT for example,' (Interviewee H, 2019). This reiterates the need for the Conceptual Framework by highlighting that a project that seeks to deliver the improvement of education and learning to teachers and pupils, needs to have participatory engagement at the core of the objective. If this is not a priority or even present in the programme objectives, then the outcomes will be unsustainable; democracy promotion in reverse.

This thesis has argued, and is now validated by the findings from interviews, that the donor benefits more than recipients in democracy promotion: 'from these donor funded programmes it

is always the way it plays out in terms of donors benefiting more than recipients,' (Interviewee H, 2019). Though they reiterated that their project was different due to half of the funding coming from the private sector, they did speak of DFID's involvement: 'DFID has involvement at a very high level but portfolio analysis, how the portfolio is generally performing as a whole, the granular micromanagement monitoring, and evaluation, is all done by a private sector, outsourced company,' (Interviewee H, 2019). This private sector involvement can be seen to be positive as, 'you have far more private sector consciousness around these kinds of issues now and that is generally a positive thing widely speaking,' (Interviewee H, 2019). This could be because the intentions are less political, and this is something that was also recognised in Interviewee J's remarks. In this instance, the project was not receiving a hands-on approach from DFID, but merely the initial engagement with the nation (which has been established that that was not instigated adequately), and the funding. This, from an outside perspective, does not show any real commitment from DFID to the recipient nation's education, other than financial. An argument can then be made that the recipient was then chosen because of the donor's own motives and the failures lay with DFID (the UK government). The participant alluded to this further when they shared their opinion on strings attached to development programmes:

'Absolutely, again I have not looked into the location of DFID funded projects, but I imagine a clear pattern would emerge. Where my project was based is a hotspot at the moment for these types of projects and that almost certainly has a underlying connotation that there are additional benefits that will aid this type of relationship,' (Interviewee H, 2019).

This reinforces the argument that democracy promotion is in reverse and that the broken link of communication with permanent outcomes is a cause of this:

'Donor funded programmes can be divorced from national development processes and policies, which means that once the funding for these projects stops, you have some lessons learnt and

you might be able to have some success stories and what the challenges were, but at the end of the day you are not mainstreaming into nationwide policy level,' (Interviewee H, 2019).

In order to achieve the rollout of a nationwide education policy, the government needs to be heavily involved and participating in this. Due to the donor benefiting more than the recipients, this engagement is not incentivising the recipient and so, what is left behind is democracy promotion in reverse.

The problem that seems to be recurring from the data is that there is a focus on the donor's motives and there is little wider perspective as to how these programmes can be sustained. Sustainability of a project would come from understanding the recipient nation as a whole; their systems, the way they work, their processes etc. If that understanding is not there, then there is only so much of the project that can work. Inevitably, without nationwide scope and scale of a recipient nation's systems, the projects will be harder to manage in the long-term. One participant contextualised this in terms of their view of how this affects a recipient nation, 'we might target X amount of students within a region and we might improve their learning outcomes and transitionary rate to secondary school, but that is a very small proportion of data within their education system,' (Interviewee H, 2019). They further added that:

'Often these projects work with little synergies to other projects. There is little connection with government actors or policy level thinkers... it is not particularly coherent. I do not think DFID has produced a particularly coherent framework to fit within local policy,' (Interviewee H, 2019).

One of the research puzzles (see p. 9) of this thesis highlights that there is no clear framework that donors use for programmes and this is a hindrance to successful and long-term democracy promotion. The need for this thesis's Conceptual Framework (see p. 95) is vital for understanding democracy promotion and why it is in reverse. This is supported by the statement above.

With democracy in decline, there is sufficient evidence that supports the argument that Western democracy promotion is contributing to this: 'I think there is probably a resistance against democracy promotion,' (Interviewee H, 2019). This resistance is also linked the lack of long-term outcomes produced by programmes. Interviewee H has supported this by analysing, 'generally donor funded projects do not really help with long term development; they may paper over cracks or give Western countries/organisations data to write papers with, but actually that has little impact, on say, the education system at large,' (2019). This is a crucial outlook that gives insight as to *why* democracy promotion is in reverse, as well as confirming it is in reverse. The interviewee further offered an interesting point, 'as a country you do not want to be perceived as being reliant on donor aid and DFID funding to develop your systems. There is a sense of national unwillingness to want to have that status,' (Interviewee H, 2019), perhaps causing a resistance against democratisation as a concept in general. There is also a reference to Huntington's Third Wave of democratisation and that:

'In 1990s, a new wave of democratisation swept across Africa; you fast forward twenty years and things have stagnated or regressed due to economic problems or structural adjustment policies, for example. I think it is very difficult to say whether or not [democratisation] is heading downwards indefinitely and then there is maybe an uplift again, or this cycle is continuing downwards,' (Interviewee H, 2019).

This comment adds more substance to the observation surrounding the uncertainty of democracy, today, and in the future.

This thesis explores the relationship between Western experiences and images of democracy being imported into developing nations and the expectation of that process leading to successful democratisation of that state. The need to understand historical and cultural roots of recipient nations is pinnacle to ensuring successful democracy promotion and participatory engagement.

Similarly, to Interviewee M, context is needed when discussing how successful self-image-led democracy promotion is. Interviewee H stated:

‘Look at cases like Rwanda and Ethiopia, which are seen as very undemocratic but have seen unprecedented levels of economic growth. Other countries in Africa might be looking at those two success stories and thinking is democracy the best fit for us? Does that lead to the best chance of national economic development? I think the narrative is changing a bit,’ (2019).

It is interesting to see that those in practical implementation of democracy promotion are also acknowledging that democracy promotion is experiencing resistance from developing nations. It is more of a feeling that attaining democracy now equates to fantastic development; countries are now sceptical of that correlation (Interviewee H, 2019).

The seventeenth validation of democracy promotion in reverse this thesis puts forward, comes from the argument that the West is promoting a flawed image of democracy: ‘it is limited exposure [that I have had], but even being in field for the past 18 months, the Brexit situation has made us a laughing stock... this is a general perception of, generally, people outside the UK,’ (Interviewee H, 2019). In reference to how policies like Brexit impact democracy promotion, the interviewee explained that:

‘You probably have countries looking at Brexit and thinking that we have a nation that colonised us and is now trying to force its political system on us and they cannot even manage that particularly well at home...why then should we tend to something like that? It is a valid perception,’ (Interviewee H, 2019).

The statement above supports this thesis’s arguments and it is insightful that those who the West consider to be in ‘need’ of democratic regimes, are probably a lot more advanced than we give them credit for. Regardless of if that regime is democratic, semi-democratic or undemocratic, the

goal should be to strengthen a country because that is what they, the recipient, wants and not because that is what the donor wants.

Likewise with the argument that the West is promoting a flawed image of democracy, the eighteenth observation from the findings highlighted the idea of understanding the recipient nations and the West not simply imposing their ideologies into them: ‘it is easy for a company to go in and say ‘we are helping a few hundred thousand kids in Africa’ but are you actually helping them and is that money well spent? Those are questions that need to be addressed and there needs to be more open conversation about this,’ (Interviewee H, 2019). By raising this point, it shows that there are those who work within international development and see first-hand the type of projects that are implemented, and are concerned about how democracy is promoted. The interviewee further argued that ‘not everyone has the expertise in development; not everyone can just walk in and do a successful education project. There needs to be understanding and knowledge of recipients,’ (Interviewee H, 2019). This circles back to the need for appreciating the historic and cultural roots of the recipient nation. It also reinforces the argument that the benchmark of participatory engagement is needed from the onset, within programme aims and to be measurable throughout the process, in order to overcome this problem.

The overall findings from all of the interviewees regarding participatory engagement, have confirmed the Conceptual Framework this thesis has created. Interviewee H confirmed this:

‘A framework needs to be worked out. There is definitely a space for private sector organisations to enter this conversation and start providing solutions to traditional development problems...but I think there is a lack of understanding from policymakers and donors, like DFID, on how to integrate these organisations properly,’ (2019).

8.3 Impartial Administration

The findings concerning impartial administration showed how significant it is as a core element to UK democracy promotion. Once more, there were several crucial findings surrounding the understanding the role impartial administration plays when assessing democracy promotion in reverse.

First, the interview findings confirmed the need for transparency and accountable governance to be, and remain, a core objective for impartial administration; one that is at the forefront of UK democracy promotion (see Figure 10, p. 119). Indeed, discussions of transparency and accountability generally featured much more strongly in the findings relating to impartial administration (compared to fundamental rights and participatory democracy). What this shows is that respective projects' aims, such as commitments to reducing corruption, can (potentially) lead to a long-term change in creating accountable governance. In one example given in Nepal, Interviewee A stressed how the respective project's focus on impartial administration could enable Nepal's government to lessen corruption and enhance democratisation by building an accountable government. Interestingly, an emphasis on promoting impartial administration was also tied to the accompanying objective of creating resilience. Areas where the projects were situated in disaster prone zones often experienced great pressures for transparent and impartial administration given the importance of funding at specific times of stress. As Interviewee A, for instance, voiced:

‘Money is an indicator of the ability to participate in a democratic society. Japan is prone to a lot of natural disasters but their ability to handle the crises at hand is far more efficient as they have a strong economy and wealth. Less money promotes corruption and a country more prone to disasters will have less money because they gave a strain on their budget already,’

(Interviewee A, 2018).

Nevertheless, the interviews on impartial administration also confirmed that moves towards reform also worked best in those recipient countries with strong economies (see also Interviewee C, Chapter 9), with reducing corruption. In particular, several interviews highlighted the potential for individual embezzlement opportunities. As Interviewee A highlighted: in relation to respective experiences in Nepal:

‘There were a lot of reconstruction projects of historic sites and temples [in Nepal] but those contacts came from contacts within government rather than restoration projects or companies...they were reconstructed wrong; it is more about what individuals can get from this [projects] than what the population wants or needs,’ (Interviewee A, 2018).

The phrase, ‘money makes the world go around’ seems fitting here. It is evident from the insight shared by Interviewee A in the quote above, that Nepal’s handling of their economy has a deeply entrenched relationship with the lack of transparency and heightened corruption.

Second, the findings also revealed that the role the UK plays, in promoting impartial administration, was not always that straightforward. More specifically, the part the UK plays in facilitating impartial administration projects is not always mutually beneficial between donors and recipients. For example, ‘financial aid [is an] effective way to promote democracy by the UK; if financial aid is administered properly than it can work. Democracy promotion does work in that case, but it has to be mutual in the recipient nations i.e. they have to want to work with donors to make change,’ (Interviewee A, 2018). The issue raised here is that the Nepalese governments have a history of corruption and lack transparency; if DFID is financing this project, there is every chance the money will not be used appropriately by the Nepalese. Thus, impartial administration needs to be integral to democracy promotion projects. This emphasises the point made previously (see Figure 3, p. 92), that if democracy promotion is to be sustainable, the donors and recipients have to communicate and work together. However, this does not happen in reality, resulting in democracy promotion in reverse.

Third, the findings in relation to impartial administration also showed a strong concentration on this priority in those projects dealing specifically with electoral issues – and showed a striking similarity with prior discussions relating to participatory engagement (see previous section). According to several interviews, a huge problem with democratising states relates to the lack of free and fair elections and the government’s ability to remain transparent through this process (see Figure 9, p. 116). The link between creating an engaged administration and an accountable government highlights that these benchmarks are vital to the success of democracy promotion. As Interviewee A, for example, identified: ‘in Nepal, free and fair elections are important to achieve democracy, but that [election] is an outcome of transparency and freedom of speech,’ (Interviewee A, 2018). The participant did also suggest a solution to this issue:

‘If the will of the population is being reflected then that is a human right in itself to some extent. Nepal is starting to have more democratic progress... but [the] government is not accountable; though they have elections it is not free and fair as there is a lot of corruption,’ (Interviewee A, 2018).

What is being explored here is how democratisation can only be successfully achieved with the recipient nation *wanting* to achieve a democratic regime. Where the political will to progress towards a more democratic regime was less forthright, then, at least according to Interview A, this represented: ‘a big obstacle for endorsing democracy from a donor,’ (Interviewee A, 2018) and could help explain why democracy is in crisis.

Fourth, the findings on impartial administration also revealed the complexities of understanding which type of organisations are best placed to promote democracy when operating in recipient nations. In particular, Interviewee A also confirmed the prior assertions of Interviewees B and F, namely that donor agencies (such as DFID) are not always best positioned to promote democracy. However, if DFID does have a large role, it should be one that aids democratisation and creates a

strong initial relationship. Yet, this is not an easy process to successfully achieve at least in terms of promoting norms of impartial administration. Interviewee A, for example, offered some key insights into this complexity, arguing that it often required two stages where: 1) donors work with potential recipient governments and design programmes that will contribute to a stronger economy and fairer society. 2) Recipient governments take their democratisation forward with financial and advisory support from the donor,' (Interviewee A, 2018). In this way, both donors and recipients can mutually benefit from these projects. As this is a point made about improving democracy promotion, however, it emphasises that currently, democracy promotion is not equally beneficial (with donors gaining more so). There are ways to improve this process, but they are not utilised enough and lessons are not being learnt. Moreover, Interviewee A shared a way to help overcome the issue of government accountability by advocating for a fairer society (fundamental rights) and for governments to hone their democratisation (participatory engagement). When these aims are embedded into programme objectives, democracy promotion works. These observations chime with the assertions of Interviewee M who also argued that the three benchmarks of fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration cannot be divorced from one another.

Fifth, the findings also show the importance attached to the following-up the outcomes of projects and that there were equal levels of frustration among interviewees since, for the most part, follow-up processes needed to be improved. This mirrors findings for both fundamental rights and particularly those relating to participatory engagement. In line with the declarations of this thesis, the lack of retrospective follow-ups, by donors, is contributing to the reversal of democracy, or 'democracy backwards,' (Rose & Shin, 2001). The data so far has supported that this is an issue with practical UK democracy promotion. Again, in the case of Nepal, 'DFID wants to follow up for both their own sake and the recipients, so there is half an element of donor bias. They are trying to create sustainable long-term success stories but they have to show the UK public that their money has gone here, and this is the result. So, DFID's intentions are held to account by the UK,' (Interviewee A, 2018). The UK has to be accountable to their own people too, thus,

logically, if democracy is promoted through the donor's self-image, then it should result in accountability being embedded in UK programmes. This has not been the case however, as proven by Figures 8, 9 and 10 (see pp. 112; 116; 119).

Sixth, whilst impartial administration has been validated as a core element of democracy promotion, this also means that there needs to be indicators to measure successes of UK democracy promotion. The findings showed many instances where interviewees intimated that the pursuit of impartial administration should be regarded as the primary goal for ensuring permanent outcomes of democracy promotion programmes. Equally, material and financial pressures were mentioned extensively in terms of contributing to failure of project outcomes. Interviewee A argued:

‘DFID have increased their focus on value for money in the last 3 years, but it is all financially based. I.e. if we did X we saved this much, if we did it like this instead, we would save X amount, however. DFID do not want to compromise on quality but it is difficult when in planning phase to know if you are compromising aspects of the project because of money,’

(Interviewee A, 2018).

There are also indicators for successes too, however they are short-term (a point reiterated throughout the findings, namely by Interviewee E). Both Interviewee A and E, for example, acknowledged that financial pressures did play a role in restricting impact and often led to strongly donor-centric activity. Indeed, financial cuts were cited as playing a role in democracy promotion in reverse as aid is then donor-centric.

The interviews also revealed that government accountability is a strong component of creating an impartial administration. Donors and recipients needed to be accountable for the projects they deliver in order to sustain long-term democracy promotion. A crucial aspect of international development is tracking financial aid and focusing on accountability to ensure the aid to where it

needs to be and who it needs to be given to (Interviewee G, 2019), which falls under the banner of facilitating an impartial administration, in order to enhance transparency. Interviewee G, who has worked for a UK DFID supplier in the private sector on a variety of DFID funded projects predominantly in project delivery, explained, 'I was working on how different NGOs were delivering, using finances. We also used community feedback to hold the aid sector and government accountable for what was being distributed after the tsunami,' (Interviewee G, 2019).

The findings have shown thus far that there are several contributing factors to democracy promotion in reverse, namely initiating projects and building a strong relationship between the donor and recipients. However, it is not always the case that this is done badly. In particular, Interviewee G highlighted that commitments to promoting impartial administration could be a source of best practice for DFID programmes:

'Outlining objectives of the programme, setting up local offices and admin work has to be done first. We identify team members. DFID will usually (USAID the same) connect with recipient country reps and the delivery teams. A very strong relationship is built up with donors and delivery teams in the countries. It works well,' (Interviewee G, 2019).

There is evidence here that building a strong relationship with recipient countries is crucial in ensuring a good start to the project. This will help with transparency (an aspect of impartiality) of the actual project as well. With clear objectives and engagement with recipient locals/society, both donors and recipients will know what their aims are and thus, the need for impartial administration to be integrated into these aims and objectives is paramount to the success of democracy promotion.

Seventh, the findings, regarding impartial administration, once again confirm the importance of the integration of promoting impartial administration within respective aims of project and programmes as an element of good practice. According to Interviewee G, integrating impartial

administration into programmes aims facilitates closer understanding of transparency between donors and recipients; vital in analysing the successes/failures of democracy promotion. Additionally, the transparency between donors and recipients highlights the need for impartiality within projects. DFID operationalises democracy promotion abroad, but there are still big issues between the donor and recipient nations' relationships – not least because 'there is always a political agenda to aid,' (Interviewee G, 2019). Indeed, the dominance of donors' political agendas was regularly cited by interviewees as a good instance of democracy promotion operating in reverse. As Interviewee G noted:

'Why does the UK government keep pumping money into Nigeria, and other governments, that they know are corrupt? You know the money is not going where it needs to and you can see that in where [the UK] choose to engage in. USAID are the same with having their own regional motives,' (Interviewee G, 2019).

Hence, one aim of democracy promotion is simply to sustain the profile and presence of the donor country in the recipient country as part of an overarching political agenda and in this way donors can benefit more. However, Interviewee G also stressed that recipients 'also have to be smart...but they are not in a position to be as the majority of recipient nations can be corrupt,' (Interviewee G, 2019). If aspects of impartial administration, such as anti-corruption or an accountable government as examples, are basic concepts within projects then they will more likely lead to withstanding outcomes of democracy promotion. Indeed, Interviewee G also highlighted that this was likely to be the case if governments were involved since 'ultimately if the recipient is the government or an NGO etc. there is always a sustainability and longevity of funding issue,' (Interviewee G, 2019). Perhaps this is where the multilateral route could be pushed for more. The more donor organisations (governmental and private sector) that work together, equates to more funding. This approach is highly unlikely to happen though, as pointed out above due to the UK and US losing out on opportunities in countries that are of interest to them.

Eighth, the findings also provided numerous examples of how dialogue even on difficult issues such as promoting impartial administration can yield positive results and result in a willingness from recipients to engage with projects. However, one key to this is that recipient countries must be convinced that they are being actively consulted with. As Interview G noted: ‘gaining feedback from within the society as to which and how these projects are affecting, is a good way of being able to assess and analyse the project’s successes. It will also help the feedback loop between donors and recipients (see Figure 3, p. 92) which strengthens engagement. Similar observations were also made, particularly, by Interviewee A and Interviewee M, supporting their argument that all three benchmarks, are dependent upon each other and cannot be separated.

Ninth, the goal of UK democracy promotion is to ensure permanent outcomes are achieved and that democratisation continues once the donors leave. However, the recurring issue of the lack of sustainability is the biggest contributor to democracy promotion in reverse. Interviewee G, for example, highlighted that even when follow-on funding was secured from a recipient country (which was often not the case anyway), ‘so that commitment is there, then often capacity to deliver was not,’ (Interviewee G, 2019). This highlights the need for aspects of governance to be promoted properly; effective parliament and absence of corruption (over finances in this case particularly) are integral to successful democracy promotion and should be an expected outcome in the recipient nation, before donors depart, in order to sustain democratisation (see Figure 6, p. 97). This was not the case and consequently led to democracy promotion in reverse.

However, there are ways to improve the issue of sustainability, ‘the traditional way of sustaining a project may not be through government, but through private organisations and partnership,’ (Interviewee G, 2019). Interviewees B, F, G and I all noted that the dialogue now has been shifting towards the private sector and a buy in from society, rather than simply involving governments. With the private sector, there are broader ranges of investors and they are also more accountable to the dollar. And are less likely to be politically motivated by pressures from donor governments to achieve their own goals (see Table 1, p. 55; Table 2, p. 76). One interviewee argued further,

‘donors are committed too, but you have to get a buy in from society and those who are driving it forward are, and should be, national,’ (Interviewee G, 2019). In this way, the power and ownership of these projects are handed to the recipient nations and that could enhance sustainability, even when the donors are gone. This would require a strong government, however, so the obligation to support an impartial administration is paramount to the success of democracy promotion. Furthermore, DFID could improve their successful outcomes from programmes by using the multilateral approach: ‘different organisations, several local NGOs and international NGOs could work together and then, perhaps, bring in DFID or an independent organisation to evaluate project,’ (Interviewee G, 2019). Having an independent organisation evaluating projects will improve accountability and transparency. This leads to a higher likelihood of these elements being established into the recipient nation for the long-term. This insight also shows that there is a problem with donor organisations, such as DFID and USAID, being the predominant actors in democracy promotion. These projects could be more successful in the long-term if these agencies were to take a more limited role (as supported by Interviewee M).

Tenth, the findings reveal that there are lessons to be learnt from donor projects in order to improve the quality and outcomes of programmes. Highlighted here is that sometimes bids can be won based on the project objectives *but* these objectives might not always be deliverable; ‘donors also need to have resources and not just bid for the contracts,’ (Interviewee G, 2019). A disorganised project would be implemented then, with little chance of having durable impact, resulting in democracy promotion in reverse.

Eleventh, the findings relating to impartial administration also emphasise how there are major over the short-termism governing projects (highlighted by Interviewee E and B). This mirrors findings for fundamental rights and participatory engagement also. In many ways, this relates to the fact that change in all three areas often requires longer time periods than those offered by short-term projects:

‘In reality the possibility of really achieving change will take longer than we have... if you do not start with local delivery mechanisms or promote people’s voices, that can be difficult and disruptive to society because you have international development organisations coming in to promote democracy,’ (Interviewee G, 2019).

However, the findings for impartial administration also highlight that notions and terminology around impartial administration often require more detailed explanation as part of democracy promotion. Put simply, implementing democracy into a country that has no roots in democratic governance, will be a flawed endeavour and could make life harder for those living in recipient countries, especially as organisations, such as DFID, will be promoting their own self-image and experiences of democracy. This explains why there is resistance towards democratisation in many developing countries, and is a lesson that needs to be drawn for those seeking to promote impartial administration when implementing projects on the ground. For example, as one interviewee noted: ‘I saw a lot of that in Sri Lanka; international development agencies promoted things like human rights without understanding that a lot of people did not know what human rights are, or what we [the West] recognise to be human rights... without that understanding and using local bodies to enact change it does not really work,’ (Interviewee G, 2019). It is evident that these programmes need recipient governments, local organisations and NGOs to be driving and enforcing these projects but also to be clear in explaining the prevailing concepts like ‘impartiality’ that underpin them. Unless this is done, and with donor self-image democracy promotion at play, permanent outcomes are not achieved. In the case of Sri Lanka, ‘donors did not push enough for the local/international bridging and that is a massive mistake. Donors are quite threatened by the local NGOs...the locals know their country, they can move quickly, they have knowledge, they can speak to the communities,’ (Interviewee G, 2019). If anything, the recipient nations are the ones who can successfully implement these programmes for the long-run, yet this does not happen. Of course, there are internal reasons within recipient nations as to why recipient nations lack sustainability; ‘for example, local NGOs may not have the right systems in place or accountability for those system...but there should be concerted efforts to build

their capacity to deliver effectively,' (Interviewee G, 2019). Part of building that capacity should be promoting accountability as part of the projects. The participant's concluding remark addressed this point and expressed their opinion, candidly, saying: 'in terms of lessons learnt, people [donors] may not prioritise those aspects of projects because if you did that, millions of people in the sector would be made redundant on these programmes,' (Interviewee G, 2019); democracy promotion is in reverse.

Twelfth, and developing this line of reasoning a little more, the findings on impartial administration also emphasise the fact that implementation of democracy promotion must remain context-specific if it is to be effective. As Interviewees B and F noted the context and 'choosing' of a recipient nation affects the outcomes and type of democracy promotion the UK delivers. In Sierra Leone, Interviewee K showed how impartial administration was integrated into the programme through supporting the Sierra Leonean armed forces in the run up to, and during, the 2012 elections. The facilitation of enabling the governmental body to create elections that are absent of corruption is crucial in ensuring long-term democratisation occurs and ensuring an accountable and representative government is elected, democratically.

There have been issues raised that successes have tended to be short-term and that democracy promotion is in reverse due to this lack of sustainability. Interviewee K, however, argued: 'they [military] became more professional and the proof of that was in the fact that they, twelve years after the civil war ended, were able to deploy peacekeeping troops themselves into another African country,' (2019). From a war-torn country, to an organised military, this is a great success, in terms of outcomes, for Sierra Leone. It shows willingness from the recipient to create a democratised government. Furthermore, in relation to developing an impartial administration:

'Sierra Leone carried on free and fair elections very well...the military did not get involved with any party politics in the lead up to elections and any activity by any of the officers or soldiers that had political connotations, was quickly dealt with. During the election process they

remained very impartial and provided support to the police as is their role,' (Interviewee K, 2019).

The neutrality of the military shows Sierra Leone as a strong example of how continued democratisation can work. It also supports the Conceptual Framework in that impartial administration is a crucial aspect of democracy promotion. In addition, the assistance given helped Sierra Leone achieve free and fair elections, which strengthened their participatory engagement by giving citizens the right to elect an accountable government (all of which are crucial to having an impartial administration).

Additionally, Interviewees A, G and K all highlighted how projects needed to learn to be responsive and flexible if they were to be efficient in promoting impartial administration in recipient countries. Conversely, such lack of flexibility and responsiveness is also a contributor to democracy promotion in reverse due to donors not promoting democracy effectively/efficiently. As Interviewee K contributed, when reflecting on the case of Sierra Leone:

'My own view is that their own bureaucracy and slow decision-making processes made it more difficult for us to help them. They were always happy to take any aid on offer, but actually getting them to organise themselves to the point where we could easily provide the support was always very challenging,' (Interviewee K, 2019).

Again, this offers insight into the donor/recipient relationship. It shows that the relationship can be challenging at times. This in turn, can lead to problems with programme implementation, which is supported by the findings from various other participants.

A thirteenth observation has arisen from the findings regarding impartial administration and the need for the recipient nation to be willing to accept aid (highlighted by Interviewees A and K). However, once again the results showed how often projects were seen as engaging with key elites

in recipient countries for the most part. In the example of Sierra Leone, ‘it has a top down decision making process that they adhered to; very few decisions could be made at any level below either the President or the chief defence staff of the Ministry of Defence and that hindered things,’ (Interviewee K, 2019). Though the recipient nation was showing willingness to build upon the crucial elements of impartial administration in order to democratise, the issues that were causing hindrances appeared to be political. Again, Interviewees A and K highlighted how much this all had to do with the extent and nature of political will within and of the recipient nation, which they regarded as essential to effective democracy promotion. This emphasises the need for the Conceptual Framework to be applied to Western democracy promotion.

Fourteenth, Interviewees F and K referred actively to the importance of key recipient institutions and even regional cooperation and collaboration, especially within Africa, in pushing forward with promoting impartial administration. Interviewee K, for instance stressed how in the case of Sierra Leone, the role of the military and the existence of key projects had contributed toward developing the nation, with the military- ‘being seen to be politically impartial during the elections was an important part of the process of democratisation...Sierra Leone’s Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Force (RSLAF) had a slogan, ‘Force for Good’; that was an important part of their ongoing development,’ (Interviewee K, 2019). Though the project has been ongoing for over a decade, there are signs of constant engagement and positive outcomes. The importance of ensuring long-term facilitation and impartial administration is embedded in the programme objectives, and shows how democracy promotion can work, sustainably. For example, in Sierra Leone, one of the interviewees highlighted that promoting impartiality could be a source of best practice:

‘I was last in Sierra Leone in January (2019) and I spoke to some of the British military still working there. They have been there since the most recent elections (2018) and said the RSLAF performed very well in terms of remaining impartial and not taking any politicised role,’

(Interviewee K, 2019).

A fifteenth observation drawn from the findings is that any success in promoting impartial administration does require that donors need to understand the historical roots and the capacities of the recipient nation they are promoting democracy in, ‘due to the Sierra Leonean civil war, there was an absence of any democratic foundations within the country,’ (Interviewee K, 2019). This thesis has presented arguments showing donors choose recipients based on their own interests and the findings thus far have suggested this is the case. Interviewee K had a unique opinion on Sierra Leone being a nation of interest to the UK and their willingness to accept UK developmental assistance, arguing that democracy promotion was facilitated by the UK’s role in bringing civil war to an end in the country. The effect of the UK’s military intervention has been considered as a successful endeavour for UK democracy promotion. The Sierra Leoneans have had ‘a degree of gratitude towards British for coming and saving them and felt the realisation that we [UK] were there to genuinely help them and bring them back from depths of civil war they had suffered,’ (Interviewee K, 2019). Furthermore, the participant explained that ‘we [British] supplied not just armed forces, but from 2000-2007, DFID invested considerable amounts of money in police and the justice system, as well and in turn built up society at a local level,’ (Interviewee K, 2019). This further reiterates that democracy promotion needs to integrate impartial administration (such as rule of law in the case of the police) and shows that it also has to be a core goal in the UK’s objectives within Sierra Leone for democracy promotion to create long-term outcomes. The participant shared a more positive image of UK democracy promotion and it is possible to correlate this to impartial administration being an integrated project aim and that the presence of assistance has been ongoing for more than five years.

The findings in Chapter 7, (see p. 148) showed accountable governance as a core element of democracy promotion and democracy as a regime. Reducing corruption was highlighted by Interviewee A as a way to ensure UK democracy promotion instils an impartial administration into a recipient nation, such as Nepal. Interviewee K also said, ‘corruption has not gone away [in Sierra Leone] and continues to be a significant problem in the country as a whole. That will not

change,' (Interviewee K, 2019). An important point here is developing nations are perhaps not ever able to reach a Western style of democracy and the concept of democracy promotion (led by the UK and US) is confirmed to benefit them as donors. Anticorruption has to be embedded in the objective of the programme and if it is not (due to the donor-centric approach and donors benefiting more), democracy promotion is in reverse because permanent outcomes are not achieved:

'You talk to younger and able officers and ask, 'are you going to change things?' They effectively say no. I suspect a lot of it is down to the fact that the government can only pay low wages, so there is an incentive to take money from wherever they can get it,' (Interviewee K, 2019).

With the only options of parties that can be elected being considered to be corrupt, it has a knock-on effect on the government's ability to remain impartial. Importantly, though, is that the fundamental right to vote is at least still happening; democratising is still edging forward as oppose to a nation such as Nigeria. It is plausible to assume corruption will always be a part (whether big or small) of Sierra Leonean governance. Does this make democracy promotion then redundant or less important? The interviewee reasoned on the contrary, 'arguably this makes democracy promotion more important. I can see the link between democratisation and corruption, but in the election I was involved in, there was no proven corruption of the actual election process; that is an example of democracy promotion working,' (Interviewee K, 2019). In a country that is rooted in corruption, it will be harder to eradicate that in the space of five, which is typically the length of DFID funded projects. Yet, with the UK presence in Sierra Leone extending to nearly twenty years, a solution to ensuring states democratise, and UK developmental assistance works, is to offer continued support.

As emphasised by previous participants, the findings have validated donors have been said to benefit more from democracy promotion. Interviewee K argued: 'ideally, [benefits] should be

50/50 benefit on both sides. There is no doubt that the recipient (Sierra Leone's armed forces) are benefiting significantly from the ongoing support and resources given to them by the UK over the last 10-15 years,' (Interviewee K, 2019). The interviewee further discussed that 'they [UK] provided building infrastructure, considerable amounts of equipment and training for individuals and groups. They [Sierra Leone] have done very well out of it,' (Interviewee K, 2019). In this example, Sierra Leone is an example of a successfully democratising state (although this cannot be explicitly related to general UK democracy promotion programmes).

With the opinion that Sierra Leone has benefited positively from UK democracy promotion, the participant offered negation to previous findings of there being strings attached to donor-led programmes. The interviewee said, 'I can see how that might be the case in other countries but in Sierra Leone, there was not much for the UK to gain in terms of investment; business interests for example,' (Interviewee K, 2019). The participant shared a very different experience of UK democracy promotion and how it is making a great deal of positive change for the recipient country. Moreover, with many other examples and opinions of sustainability being a huge issue with UK democracy promotion, the participant expressed their own opinion on project sustainability. They stated, 'without donor assistance/funding or [donors] in the field, I am pretty sure it would be the case that the project would not be sustained and that they [Sierra Leone] would struggle without the donors,' (Interviewee K, 2019). Though democracy promotion is not necessarily in reverse in the case of Sierra Leone, democracy promotion still is not sustainable and without that long-term support for recipients to continue these projects, there is the possibility of a reversal of democratisation. This can help explain the stagnation or decline in democracies today (see Figure 1, p. 46). When there are no permanent outcomes after donors leave, that is clearly democracy promotion is in reverse. With Sierra Leone, however, there is no way to currently know if that is the case.

As the previous data has shown, there is an agreement that democracy is in decline and that the global state of democracy today is in decline, or crisis (as Interviewee I and Interviewee M

argued). Democracy promotion in reverse is a primary factor for this and ‘one of the problems [with democratisation aid] is there are a lot of levers that can be pulled by the political parties and by those who want to influence elections, to the point where ensuring the elections are free and fair is becoming more difficult,’ (Interviewee K, 2019). Having a representative government forms the basis of both participatory engagement and impartial governance and the interviewee’s viewpoint shows how integral these are for the implementation of democratisation. If society feels their vote will not ensure their fundamental rights, then the number of transitional democracies could drop (as is currently occurring). As a result, democracy is in crisis. Interestingly, the participant outlined a thought-provoking explanation of their view of what this thesis argues as democracy in crisis, today:

‘My view would be that democracy itself is not necessarily at risk, but the processes by which it is achieved are becoming more difficult and more challenging. There is a polarisation between the political parties that exist and they are not, necessarily, able to meet the needs of the electorate,’ (Interviewee K, 2019).

With events like the Arab Springs and Orange Revolution, where citizens protested openly against their regimes, the number of democracies in the world should be on the rise. This is to be expected especially in the current climate, now that there are more platforms than ever before for people to vocalise their unhappiness with their regimes. Yet, this observation of political polarisation (as highlighted by Interviewee M) between the parties that are there to represent their people shows how important and necessary democracy promotion is, especially the promotion of impartial administrations. However, the arguments of this thesis, and evidence supported by interviewees, suggest the process of democracy promotion itself, is also in crisis. If our own democracies are experiencing a decline in engaging with politics, resulting in a disenfranchised electorate, can we expect recipient nations to uphold the promotion of democracy from the West? Especially when, as this thesis argues, the West promotes democracy in their own self-image. The participant

added, 'I think it is not so much *what* the people who are delivering aid are saying, but it is more about the recipients and the example we are setting,' (Interviewee K, 2019).

Sixteenth, the findings of this thesis have shown that promoting democracy in the donor's self-image is problematic. An example of how promoting in the donor's self-image can influence democracy promotion was given:

'I was in Sierra Leone in 2012, during the summer where there was rioting in the UK. I received a number of comments from Sierra Leoneans about how we [the UK] should get our own house in order before we tell them [Sierra Leone] that they should not behave like that,' (Interviewee K, 2019).

This circles back to the point many other interviewees have observed; the West is experiencing its own crisis of democracy and we are promoting those ideals into recipient nations. This all contributes to democracy promotion in reverse. Interviewee K added, 'it [democracy promotion] is something we should aspire to deliver, so long as our own systems are ones that we can justifiably believe in exporting,' (2019). Ultimately, democracy promotion is important, now more than ever, but is struggling to attain its fundamental goals of permanent democratisation.

Impartial administration is a diverse aspect of democracy promotion. The findings have shown various approaches of promoting this benchmark into recipient nations. One way is through disaster management and 'what we find frequently, when we are looking at areas that are in need of development in terms of disaster management, is that the top priority is governance,' (Interviewee L, 2019). This requires a stable and impartial administration. The results of these investigations have shown donors promote in their self-image and acknowledged this is a contributor to democracy promotion in reverse, however Interviewee L gave a different perspective of this. They said:

‘Very few countries where we work are only getting a British view. If you go into Mongolia, they have had a Russian influence, a Chinese influence, a South Korean influence and then by the time we [UK aid] arrive, the Canadians, Americans and French have been there too; all of whom are pushing different ideals and different ways of doing thing,’ (Interviewee L, 2019).

This is an important point to take note of. The participant draws on the issue of how donors press their own agendas upon recipient states, confirming that democracy promotion is driven more by donor’s objectives than that of recipient nations (democracy promotion in reverse). It also shows that donors all pushing their own images and experiences can be chaotic, as they do not operate under the same universal framework aiming for the same goals. Interviewee L also gave an example of their experience of various donor countries impressing their own ideas into recipients.

A seventeenth observation offered from the findings; is that we need not only to understand democracy promotion as context specific activity, but also as a competitive environment that leads to a multitude of competing, and sometimes contradictory, impact on recipient countries. Indeed, the findings further support the argument this thesis makes that donor-centric democracy promotion results in a lack of permanent democratisation. As Interviewee L highlighted: ‘the Americans offer ‘X’ for free, but the French come in and offer ‘X’ for free too; the Chinese then come in and offer something different for free,’ (Interviewee L, 2019). From this standpoint, it can be argued that it is the donors who compete to make the most impact, but nowhere is there a mention of the recipient nation’s needs and wants. The participant supported this point by arguing that ‘what you end up with is a model where different recipient agencies are told different things, by different countries; it is a mess and you have to unpick all this and get them [recipients] to understand what is best for you, as the recipient country,’ (Interviewee L, 2019). The argument that donor-centric democracy promotion fails to produce permanent outcomes relates to donors needing to understand the context and history of recipient nations. Interviewee L vouched for this, ‘they [Trinidad] say their politics is based upon a heavy Indian influence, because of the Indian settlers that came as slaves and workers, matched with the African indigenous population that

was brought across by the British, then add onto that the fact that the Chinese and Americas, French and Dutch are all influencing too,' (Interviewee L, 2019). What is clear from the findings on impartial administration is that recipient countries are experiencing impacts of a multitude of western countries who all seek to impact slightly differently in relation to their own self-image. Hence, we may be talking not of democracy promotion in reverse, but a practical setting of a multitude of simultaneous democracy promotions in reverse.

One aspect of the thesis's research puzzle points (p. 9) focuses on the lack of uniformity in the application of democracy promotion, and whether it enhances the donor's opportunities to benefit more than the recipient does. This concern of multiple donor nations all influencing one country shows donors are not in communication with each other on how best to promote democracy (see Figure 3, p. 92) and thus, projects are short-term: 'the British come in as a short-term solution. We are bad at committing...we get them [recipients] excited for a few years, then the funding dries up and DFID will say they are no longer interested in this project and now we want to move onto something else,' (Interviewee L, 2019). This crucially supports the argument that democracy promotion is in reverse as DFID not only adds to the problem of sustainability of projects, but that there are pre-determined intentions that the donor has. Once donors have achieved their own goals, they move on from incomplete projects. This is a lesson that is not being learnt and so, democracy promotion is in reverse. UK international development comes across more as a business transaction than for the advantage of democratising a nation to improve the lives and governance of that recipient country. Therefore, aspects of impartial administration need to be integrated into these programme aims in order for recipient nation governments to be able to have the knowledge to continue democratisation and for project outcomes to be permanent (see Figure 6, p. 97).

One of the aims of collecting empirical findings was to understand how democracy promotion is practically implemented and the findings so far have shown that the initiation of projects is weak, within UK international development. One interviewee concurred with other participants and explained:

‘The in country [donor] embassy or military attaché, would identify a real opportunity to have a significant influence on development with the country and contact us with that in mind...especially in the area of disaster management as it is seen as politically neutral and an opportunity to engage with the government in a non-threatening way,’ (Interviewee L, 2019).

The idea that disaster management is seen to be politically neutral, shows that it is a way to help donors instil impartial administration into a recipient nation, through resiliency or diplomacy. Several of the interviewees highlighted practical ways to build confidence with local partners and thus to enable successful democracy promotion. One participant, for example, highlighted the importance of undertaking a recce since:

‘The recce is an important part of the process because it shows a willingness from the donor to understand what the recipient country wants out of these projects. It consists of the donor workers being within the recipient nation for at least a week to meet people like the chief of police, disaster management agencies or local government etc.,’ (Interviewee L, 2019).

Transparency is seen to be incorporated into the democracy promotion project and this has a higher chance of creating permanent outcomes. In keeping with the process of understanding recipient nations before the project is implemented, the recce is important as: ‘we go talk to these various people because what we are trying to find out is what they already know, and do not know, and what do they think the real issues are that we are being asked to address,’ (Interviewee L, 2019). By approaching projects in this way, it shows the willingness of donors to really interact with recipient nations in order to truly deliver their needs. It is the way all democracy promotion programmes should work, in order to ensure they survive, long-term. This way of democracy promotion also lessens the power the donor has over recipient nations. In turn, this also limits donor bias and self-interests as influential factors to projects. Interviewee L supported this and said ‘we do not, at any point, say ‘this is the course and this is what you’re going to get’; we go

with more of a menu style and say what is important to you? What do you want? So, they can select what they want,' (Interviewee L, 2019). There are also practical elements of the recce discussed and reported on, to see who will pay for what (i.e. British pay for their workers and maybe in country pays training locations as an example),' (Interviewee L, 2019). This approach shows careful planning, but most importantly, a dialogue is created where recipient nations are in control of the assistance they get in and donors can prepare recipient nation workers to then start delivery (Interviewee L, 2019). This is a pragmatic approach that benefits the recipient greatly.

As highlighted throughout this chapter, though the process of the beginning of the implementation period can be positive (Interviewee K and L have shown this), democracy promotion is in reverse because of the lack of sustainability of projects. The interviewee shared that 'the UK used to commit to five year programmes, with three years of that being delivery and two years of winding down on the UK's influence on the project, with newly trained instructors take the leading role, and donors less of a role,' (Interviewee L, 2019). In an ideal world, as many participants have argued, within the five years of a project timeframe, the donor would leave and a group of people who are trained and informed enough to keep the project within the recipient nation going would ensure long-term outcomes of democratisation exist. Importing Western experiences of an impartial administration and expecting it to be sustained in a non-democracy will take longer than five years:

'Projects are not sustained for a very simple reason; someone who has been doing disaster management for sixteen years (i.e. the donor instructors), will take someone who has done a few weeks' worth of courses (i.e. recipient locals) and make them the national trainers? With all the best will in the world, they need their hands held for at least another five years, until it becomes so normal to them that they can start thinking innovatively for themselves,' (Interviewee L, 2019).

This circles back to the previous comments made of DFID funding projects that are of interest to them at the time and then moving onto another project. All of this affects the recipient's ability to withstand the democratisation process. Without this continuous assistance from donors, until recipients no longer need it, democracy promotion will be in reverse and untenable because everlasting outcomes will be unlikely. The decisions should be made by the recipient nations about as and when to continue democratisation autonomously. Otherwise, democracy promotion is in reverse. The issues raised here is an example of why five years is not a long enough period to implement projects. It also highlights donor ignorance towards understanding the people who receive the training. If, as donors, you are going to make any impact, you have to commit for longer because the recipients need more time to process information. This further gives strength to the argument that in order to build successful democracies, you need the three benchmarks of the Conceptual Framework because then, recipient nations can understand what democracy is and how to utilise the resources they are being given through democracy promotion. This all takes time however, and this is a big problem within the area of democracy promotion; there is not enough time spent on implementing the foundations of democratisation and therefore efforts are not made to ensure permanent outcomes.

Furthermore, 'the other problem is that DFID funding is not committed (long-term) so it will give perhaps two years to us and then pull the plug and we, as implementers, and the recipient nations, are left high and dry,' (Interviewee L, 2019). Conversely, other donors do not have this issue of withdrawing after a short period of time, therefore this is an issue with UK democracy promotion. For example, 'the Americans will come every year, or the Chinese will invest for many years. DFID's agendas are not through commitments, but fads that come for a while then go away for a while,' (Interviewee L, 2019); democracy promotion in reverse. The concerns over creating a dialogue between donors and recipients has been suggested as a way to improve democracy promotion, by numerous participants. Interviewee L offered one too, 'the way to improve all these different donors having different approaches is to create more dialogue between donors...the recipient countries use the confusion of multiple agendas and donors, as an excuse for failure. If

it [projects] all goes wrong, they can blame donors,' (Interviewee L, 2019). This refers back to the Figure 3 (p. 92), where there is a broken link in communication and this lack of communication leads to a deficiency in adaptation or learning, on the part of the donor and on the part of recipients to continue democratising. One reasoning as to why donors fail to deliver projects in the long-term is politically based. According to Interviewee L. The interviewee gave their work in Asia as a case example. Long-term success was hindered, not by donors however, but by the recipient nation's non-democratic roots. The interviewee explained that, as part of a disaster management course, they had trained 150 people, of which 50 are trainers that will go on to maintain the project (Interviewee L, 2019). In terms of failures, the participant shared that 'the bad news is they [trainers] are all gone because of the political change in the country,' (Interviewee L, 2019). The participant makes a crucial point about democratisation:

'No one would suggest that in the UK, if there was a change of power and we had a new Prime Minister that would then mean we immediately have to change things (like the head of the Metropolitan police or whoever runs the Cabinet Crisis Management Office. This is what happens in developing countries though,' (Interviewee L, 2019).

This observation strengthens the need for the three core principles that the Conceptual Framework outlines (see Chapter 5, p. 95), but shows the overriding importance of having an impartial administration. Nonetheless, without these fundamental ideologies in place, democratising nations cannot overcome the issues that transitions of political power have on democracy promoting projects and lead to either improvement in democratisation or regression (as seen by Nigeria). Democracy promotion, as a result, is in reverse. Although this is not the fault of the donors, they can help stabilise this problem by ensuring the governments are accountable and transparent as a part of their democratisation aims and objectives. In turn, this could be another way to engage local NGO/INGOs (more neutral bodies) to enforce these programmes once donors leave. This would mean that political change of power would not undo the work of donor organisations.

The eighteenth observation is in regard to how political change within a recipient country can hinder democratic progression. Interviewee F told of their experience of this in regard to participatory engagement, whilst Interviewee L spoke openly about their reasoning for how crucial it is for donors to implement an impartial administration. Interviewee L described:

‘The many people who we train have a ticking time bomb because of the impact of political change and the democracy of the country. If you have taken over as the President and you know there might be a chance a building will collapse and fires will break out, it is easy to blame the previous government; you can only do that if you sack all the old heads of disaster management and bring in new people,’ (Interviewee L, 2019).

This again goes down to needing to implement impartial administrations that work to hold themselves accountable to the people who elect them, and not to pass blame onto each other and safeguard democracy to ensure it is upheld.

As the findings have shown, donors need to retrospectively evaluate the results of programme in order to improve the success of projects. This is particularly relevant when implementing an impartial administration because institution building forms the foundations for which democratisation can flourish. DFID has been criticised for leading donor-centric programmes and the impact of this is that ‘in the recruitment process or contracting process, really experienced people are pulled in to expand the credibility of bids, with no intention of applying those people again on the project,’ (Interviewee L, 2019). Furthermore, ‘the personnel that DFID use are often inappropriate for the nature of the work...they have never been to the country and they are perhaps more focused on the main objective of ensuring the funding is spent in a timely fashion... I feel that is what they [donors] are driven by,’ (Interviewee L, 2019). This again, reinforces the idea of democracy promotion in reverse; if the people on the donor side are not the right people to deliver the projects, then this will have a knock-on effect within the recipient nation. Why does DFID do

this? The participant explained ‘from my experience, the moment we win the contract for the recipient nation, DFID never contacted us. We went out to the recipient nation three times over a six month period and at no point did they check to see if we had gone or if we were safe; there was absolutely no oversight whatsoever,’ (Interviewee L, 2019). This highlights that the UK’s interest in international development is focused largely on finances and ensuring contracts are correct, rather than what the project is doing, how it is progressing and what the outcomes are (as supported by Interviewee A). It reiterates that UK international development has a developmental approach (see p. 81) as they want to be seen to help but are not focused on the outcomes or putting recipients at the heart of these projects. This reinforces that an approach where accountability is incorporated by donors is important. If not, this yet again highlights democracy promotion in reverse. If DFID has no follow-up system of how the project is doing or even who is working on the projects, then that is not successful democracy promotion. The interviewee said ‘there is a lesson to be learnt here; we need to have people who engage in this application process and see it right the way through to make sure people are doing the work they said they would,’ (Interviewee L, 2019).

A previous observation derived from the data has been that recipient nations need to be willing and engaged with projects, in order to ensure long-term democratisation. Interviewee L agreed with this:

‘DFID is using project managers for the duration of these programmes, so you are not getting a buy in from the community. We have been working in a particular African recipient nation for ten years, at which point the disaster management agency head [in the recipient] said we want to fund the programmes ourselves; that way we get what we want and that way there is no political agenda attached with DFID funding,’ (2019).

This is a key experience shared by the participant and brings forward the issue of donors promoting democracy with strings attached.

All interviewees have spoken of their view on the global state of democracy, today. Yet, several of the interviewees made a direct link to the role of the rule of law in the context of impartial administration. The reasons for this are important to explore since there may offer insights into the relationship between democracy in decline and democracy promotion in reverse. Interviewee L explained, ‘imagine governance is based on the rule of law; do I think the rule of law is in good state in governments and around the world? No. The rule of law serves certain people but not others,’ (Interviewee L, 2019). The rule of law enforces the need for an impartial administration; transparency and the absence of corruption in organisations (such as the judiciary or the police). It also requires the people to hold their government accountable for their actions by having checks and balances in place. As the participant expressed, the rule of law, in their opinion is in a bad state within democratising nations, which could be a contributing factor to the decline of democracies. They went on to say ‘another form of democracy is transparency. Do I think democracy is transparent? No.,’ (Interviewee L, 2019). There is the example of elections in certain countries in Africa given to support this opinion. DFID have poured millions of tax payers pounds into supporting free and fair elections into an African recipient nation, however ‘the recipient nation was unable to run its national elections for the third time, as it is inefficient and not all the relevant materials were able to get to the locations they needed to,’ (Interviewee L, 2019). It begs the questions as to why democracy promotion is failing in Africa if DFID have spent more money on governance and elections there than anywhere else, and yet, they still cannot run their elections cleanly (Interviewee L, 2019).

Moreover, recipient nations resisting aid and assistance was a contributing factor to democracy in decline, as raised by Interviewee K, who said Sierra Leone were grateful to the British and received their aid well. On the other hand, Interviewee L argued that ‘they [recipients] will never resist aid that gives them legitimisation, however the big worry is that this aid can lead to legitimising a corrupt government,’ (Interviewee L, 2019). This ties back to the argument that foreign policy is a contributing factor to aid programmes and can help answer the question of why

democracy is in decline but also that impartiality needs to be a priority (see Table 2, p. 76). If donors are more focused on democracy promotion within the last decade and more than ever before, why is democracy in decline? The participant suggested that ‘recipients are clever, they will find ways to receive the aid and filter out the bit they do not want,’ (Interviewee L, 2019). The issues raised of strings attached to donor programmes negates the very essence of impartiality and if donors are not neutral when promoting democracy, the outcomes are likely to be negative; democracy promotion in reverse. In one particular case in Africa, the participant outlined that ‘the people said to us, ‘we do not want any more DFID funding if it comes with ‘secret’ strings attached (such as women bishops or allowing gay marriage),’ (Interviewee L, 2019). This does not showcase impartiality of the recipient nation’s government. It can be argued that because of the ‘strings attached’, recipients do not see any reason to be transparent either.

The findings have observed that the UK, as the donor, benefits more from democracy promotion programmes than the recipients does; this has been across UK fundamental rights and participatory engagement projects. Several interviewees have supported this. Rather nicely, Interviewee L suggested that ‘the main people who benefit from DFID projects are the deliverers. The beneficiary is always the last in our thinking,’ (Interviewee L, 2019). This reiterates that democracy promotion is in reverse. Moreover, this also extends to the assessment procedure that are often designed by the donor for the donor’s purposes. Interviewee L, for instance, strongly argued that this was unsatisfactory and that beneficiaries should be involved in the feedback process of projects:

‘DFID reports are not written by the beneficiary; they are written by other people who delivered the programme. There is no evidence, then, as to what way the beneficiary benefited from the training, as they are not invited to write the feedback reports or what their thoughts on the delivery of a project,’ (Interviewee L, 2019).

Again, without that dialogue and communication between donors and recipients, democracy promotion projects cannot be sustained due to the donor-centric way of evaluating projects. It further shows that transparency is needed from both sides when projects are being implemented. Therefore, democracy promotion is in reverse as again, this highlights that donors stand to gain more, and this could be contributing to the decline in democracies around the world. A way democracy promotion can help solve the issue of democracy in crisis was articulated by Interviewee L:

‘I work at a national level effecting national change in governments. DFID tend to go down to roots of communities and try to affect change in civil society. Both are absolutely necessary, but what is not happening is that these two approaches are not joining together. The whole point of governance at the top should be that it then allows for what is being developed at the bottom to flourish and grow,’ (2019).

This final comment made by the participant encapsulates, nicely, how democracy promotion can be more proactive and enforce real and permanent change within transitional nations. The participant outlined at the beginning of the interviewee that they have worked on DFID funded projects and advocated for the need for a collaborative approach between DFID funded projects and those who work for DFID. This relationship needs to be strengthened for democracy promotion to work more efficiently and effectively. The most important point, however, is how the participant argued that an impartial administration is the core for democratisation.

8.4 Deductions from the General Findings of the UK

In conclusion, the participants who are experienced in the field of democracy promotion, despite having different backgrounds and years of experience, have all responded in agreement of three major issues that contribute to democracy promotion in reverse and addresses the three research objectives of this thesis (see p. 16).

Importantly, one of the research puzzle (see p. 9) objectives is to address that there are billions of pounds and dollars being spent on international development, yet there is still a lack of clarity on promoting democracy. This thesis argues that promoting in the donor's self-image is a motivation for how donors promote democracy, and this has been supported by several interviewees. Although, 53.8% said it was important that donors promoted in their own self-image because democracy is a regime, we know works, the lack of understanding the cultural roots of a recipient nation is what causes the self-image approach to confirm democracy promotion is in reverse. Interviewee E shared that the fundamental right of education leads to lessons being taught in the style of UK based experiences (Interviewee E, 2019). This reinforces the argument of self-image driven democracy promotion. This has proven to be problematic as it means that recipients are not receiving democratisation facilitation based on the context of their systems and roots but based on the donor's. In doing so, a flawed objective of democracy promotion ensues leading to democracy promotion in reverse.

There was also a large acknowledgement from participants that there is a lack of retrospective analysis of projects, resulting in no long-term or sustainable outcomes of projects (see pp. 9). This supports the foreign policy driven aspect of democracy promotion this thesis argues. Interviewee B highlighted this in their analysis of their projects being 'strategic decisions of where we focus and what programmes we do, or where we think we can have success,' (Interviewee B, 2018). Again, this shows how democracy promotion is in reverse. Furthermore, what the general findings into UK democracy promotion showed, on a whole, is there is no uniformity in the application of democracy promotion. Therefore, the findings have validated this thesis's Conceptual Framework (which creates a framework that can be applied to programmes). Without this, the infiltration of donor bias and donors as the main beneficiaries is high; hence democracy promotion is in reverse. As an overall result, the overwhelming impressions from the interviews was supportive of democracy promotion in reverse.

Chapter 9: US Findings and Comparison to UK Democracy

Promotion

The US's approach to democracy promotion varies from that of the UK's, in several ways. Therefore, it is necessary to comparably assess their democracy promotion programmes in order to argue the two largest donors of democratisation are the main contributors to democracy promotion in reverse. Only two participants were obtained for the US sample. Contact was made with several other individuals within US international development, however they declined to take part. Nonetheless, both interviewees have worked for USAID for more than ten years and have extensive knowledge of US democracy promotion in practice and wish to remain anonymous and state that any quotes are their own opinions and not on behalf of any US government capacity. This chapter will highlight aspects of US democracy promotion that compares and contrasts to the UK's approach. This will enable an argument to be presented that the two largest donors are promoting in their own interests and that there is a need for the Conceptual Framework to be utilised.

Both participants acknowledged that participatory engagement and impartial administration are fundamental to democracy promotion. Interviewee D, however, vocalised that fundamental rights are also a strong factor as they 'believe all of these [benchmarks] are necessary for democracy to flourish,' (2018). Both interviewees also differed on how to promote these benchmarks of democracy promotion. Interviewee C stated that it should be through technical assistance (Interviewee C, 2018) and Interviewee D advocated for diplomatic contact/negotiations (Interviewee D, 2018). However, both participants were in total agreement that free and fair elections, transparency, protection/advocacy of human rights, freedom of speech and an accountable government were critical to a well-functioning democracy (Interviewees C & D, 2018).

Interviewee C has worked with USAID and has over twenty years of experience in both project management and implementation. They contributed to the investigations of this thesis by explaining their role in a water systems project. In one example given, they explained that they worked closely with the recipient government in order to find out which areas they (USAID) needed to target, in order to update water systems. This showed there was strong participatory engagement with the government present within the project from the start. The initial approach to the recipient nation was carried out well; differing from the UK's approach and this is a strength of US democracy promotion. The interviewee told that 'we did mostly infrastructure and technical work but some work that we did was with Water Users Associations. So, the technical programme had a democracy component in too,' (Interviewee C, 2018). Water Users Associations are organisations that play 'a key role in integrated approaches to water management that seek to establish a decentralised, participatory, multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary governance structure (ClimateTechWiki: A Clean Technology Platform, n.d.). By working in association with an organisation such as a WUA, fundamental elements key to democratisation (such as participatory engagement and transparency with government) are strongly advocated for and integrated into recipients, through the project aims (see Figure 6, p. 97). A key observation is made here; the three benchmarks (see Chapter 5, p. 95) for democracy that this thesis has outlined can make democracy promotion sustainable if they are combined into the project objectives. In turn, this further support this thesis's argument that when you do not have these benchmarks within the donor programmes, you are left with democracy promotion in reverse as there is no long-lasting imprinting of outcomes in the recipient nation. It also shows how important it is to work in association with local NGOs, a point reiterated by UK participants. There is an agreement from both donors that collaboration is important for successful democracy promotion. As already stated by UK interviewees, this has not been the case. However, with Interviewee C, they have responded that the US has taken that approach.

The US investigations found that the relationship between donors and recipients is 'mutually beneficial, no matter where we work,' (Interviewee C, 2018). Of course, this cannot always be

achieved, as idealistic and practical as it sounds. Interviewee C further added that ‘there was a time when donor work was viewed as a way of getting into a country to take its resources, (that is perhaps what the Chinese are doing now with Africa) but generally speaking, the efforts should be mutually beneficial,’ (2018). In order to create a long-term, democratising state, ‘the goal should be for the country to develop and become self-sustaining...a partner and a country you can trade with, invest in and vice versa... one that one day may be able offer development assistance to others. Korea, for example, does that and they used to be a USAID recipient,’ (Interviewee C, 2018). This is an important opinion; the goal of sustainability is at the forefront of USAID’s priorities. This is in contrast to UK international development. However, the aim is also to build a partnered relationship with the recipient states. That is why, from a US perspective, democracy promotion is mutually beneficial. Whether this is always achieved is questionable, however from the information given by Interviewee C, it shows that the US focuses on giving more autonomy to recipients than the UK does. It also shows there is an objective of mutual participatory engagement.

Moreover, the interviewee spoke of how the project was implemented, in its first stage. They said that ‘the areas of democracy we focused on were ones that the government was comfortable with us helping with. Rule of law, for instance, was important and so we looked at the court system,’ (Interviewee C, 2018). Similarly, to Interviewee L, rule of law is vitally important in promoting democracy, which is comprised of promoting an impartial government. This shows that the US were able to implement a project with government cooperation, at the same time ‘the government had some of the foundations and wanted to build upon them,’ (Interviewee C, 2018). The US targeted a country that already had a level of democracy within their government and institutions, which is a contrast to the UK’s typical recipient nations. This links back to Chapter 3, where the UK uses a developmental approach to democracy promotion, whilst the US uses a political approach (see p. 81).

Nevertheless, the Middle East is a hotspot for US democracy promotion and it could be argued that this is due to foreign policy interests (see Table 2, p. 76). Where African development assistance is within the UK's foreign policy interests, the Middle East (post- 9/11) has become of geopolitical interest to the US. Here, presents a similarity between the two donor nations in the thought process behind promoting democracy. Consequently, both nations use foreign policy as a way to integrate democracy promotion aims into a nation. Interviewee C described 'governments use democracy programmes to support foreign policy goals,' (2018), supporting the argument this thesis makes. Interviewee C additionally helped draw a comparison between UK and US democracy promotion by stating how recipients are approached:

'There is a lot of research into what we think the needs might be.... It is always better to go to someone with ideas of how work can be mutually beneficial and then hear from them. Sometimes a government will come to us and say we need help with X, Y, Z and we will say we will look at that and see what we can do. Sometimes we get flat out asked for something,'

(Interviewee C, 2018).

The participant gave an insight into how the US's democracy promotion approached in a manner that allows the recipient states to engage with programme from the onset, whilst make it a mutual endeavour (unlike the UK). Most importantly, they (USAID) give recipient governments and organisations a voice to take control of their journey towards democratising. In the long-term, this can ensure sustainability towards democracy building. The US shows again that participatory engagement is embedded in their programme aims and this sets democracy promotion projects up well from the beginning. This is not something interviewees from the UK stated was done well, thus the US is more engaged with recipients than the UK is. The US is more proactive with engaging with the recipients and the experience given by Interviewee C, so far, shows democracy promotion works when the benchmarks are integrated into programme aims.

In looking at representative government as a democratic component, the participant explained that ‘we worked on the court system and training judges and we supported civil society organisations,’ (Interviewee C, 2018). They added further that ‘the government had a big economic reform programme and there were protests against it. Were we out there supporting protests? Were we giving them grants to protest louder? No, because it was a dicey situation,’ (Interviewee C, 2018). The interviewee showed that within USAID’s programme, impartiality was embedded into their aims in order to promote a neutral concept of democracy in Jordan. In this regard, donors being somewhat neutral shows that programmes can be focused on what they are there to facilitate. They are not looking to revolutionise the government but to just enable an aspect of better living for citizens, from the bottom up. This is suggestive that maybe this type of democracy promotion allows for mutual cooperation and maintainable projects.

The US findings show initiation of projects start with a discussion between the governments (the same approach as the UK makes). The participant went on to explain, ‘we have limited resources so we find out what the priority areas are and we find a nexus of priorities for both sides,’ (Interviewee C, 2018). The issue of limited resources was also raised by UK participants who recognised this as a problem regarding democracy promotion. Interviewee C went on to say, ‘we work with governments to figure out what the priority areas are. Water conservation is a project that was four years long; we looked at conservation, to improving systems, to finding new sources. We have been working on water with Jordan for about fifty to sixty years. We have always had that in the portfolio,’ (Interviewee C, 2018). Interestingly, the length of the US’s involvement in this project far exceeds that of any of the projects discussed by UK participants. Though the participant mentioned that the project was four years long, US presence in the nation has spanned decades and that shows long-term commitment. The UK interviewees emphasised how there is not enough of a timeframe for their work to be sustainable. The US does not seem to have that issue, if they can have a portfolio of fifty plus years in one nation. The US’s long-term presence is ongoing and that is a major difference between how the two donor nations promote democracy.

The UK findings presented sustainability as one of the biggest factors contributing to democracy promotion in reverse. Interviewee C gave their experience from a US perspective and stated, ‘some of the projects might be short term or short-lived, but the goal is that the projects are sustainable. When we put in, along with the government, water pumps, we handed it over to them in the assumption that they will carry it on,’ (Interviewee C, 2018). The participant’s comment shows that having benchmarks by which to measure democracy with (fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration) means that long-term sustainability is attainable. Interviewee C also said the goal of USAID is to *create* sustainable projects. This is a huge strength of US democracy promotion in contrast to UK democracy promotion. Interviewee C further expressed that ‘we put into place training and budget for maintenance so they can take over themselves. It is not as if we have been doing the same work for sixty years; just over sixty years we have had different projects that helps to increase Jordan’s supply of water,’ (2018). It shows how donors can be adaptable and work to ensure a project can be a long-term success. It also shows that the US has an intention to allow the recipient state to take ownership of these projects. What is present is an engagement between the donor and recipients and the space for mutual trust between the governments to occur (participatory engagement and impartiality). This has been noted by UK participants to be a weakness of UK international development.

In order to argue democracy promotion is in reverse and to draw a comparative analysis of the UK and the US, participants were asked how democracy promotion links with the argument that democracy is in decline/crisis, today. The findings from the UK have shown a strong link between democracy in decline and democracy promotion in reverse. Interviewee C explained that there has ‘not necessarily [been] a backlash, but definitely a resistance coming from governments, primarily because the 2008 crisis put a lot of pressure on recipient governments and people protested about what they were experiencing,’ (Interviewee C, 2018). The participant theorised that some officials of these democratising governments ‘viewed democracy as something that could detract from stability instead of enhancing it,’ (Interviewee C, 2018) which could lead to the regression from democracy as a regime, and consequently democracy promotion. They also

said institutional factors and responsiveness can help maintain a stable democracy (Interviewee C, 2018) and ‘when you have governments that cannot respond to people’s needs because they do not have the capacity to, then the [governments] will have more resistance,’ (Interviewee C, 2018). This further reinforces the need for impartial administration to be a priority goal within democracy promotion projects and for them to be imprinted upon recipient nations. Otherwise what is left behind as an outcome is democracy promotion in reverse.

The idea that economic development can be a cause for resistance to democracy within transitioning nations is also important to take note of. Likewise, is the point made about institutionalising governments and strengthening the constitution as a foundation for stabilising democracy as a regime type. In contrast to the UK’s interviewees, economic development was not commented on when discussing strengthening institutions through democracy promotion. This highlights another difference between the UK’s approach to democracy promotion, against the US’s. Interviewee C explained their reasoning of backwards movements from democracy in a very thought-provoking summary:

‘Countries that have no history or roots in democracy find it harder to sustain anything democratic; they do not have institutional resilience. In our countries [US and UK], we have people up in arms and questioning our own democracy. Is the country going to crack or fall apart? No. It is the institutional resiliency and the belief that democracy works that serves as a safeguard. Whereas these fragile states will be resistant to democratic reform because that is not how they have traditionally governed,’ (Interviewee C, 2018).

Here, there are strong similarities echoed in the opinions of the UK and the US when it comes to acknowledging that historical and cultural roots of recipients have to be understood if democracy promotion is going to make long-term impacts. Highlighted also, is the problem with global democracy today; there is perhaps too much international pressure (see p. 47) resulting in recipient/fragile nations trying to democratise too quickly or against their political will. This will

undoubtedly lead to democratisation sliding backwards, as governments will find it hard to cope with what they feel are economic and destabilising aspects of democracy. Giving the people a voice is not a privilege people have had before. Therefore, donors need to take time to understand the processes that should be put in place, in a context that is suitable to the recipient nation and not because the donor will benefit more.

On the point of needing political will from the recipient nation's governments and how crucial it is (a point also voiced by Interviewee A and B, showing similarities in democracy promotion with the UK), the participant clarified that the need for working with the recipient is crucial. They argued:

‘If we [the donors] are doing it [democracy promotion] on our own, it can be seen to be divisive or undermining. If we look at Egypt, the donor community has been blamed for what has happened [there] by the Egyptian government because some of what the donors had been implementing did not have the government's complete support,’ (Interviewee C, 2018).

This reinforces the reasoning behind democracy promotion in reverse and why the Conceptual Framework this thesis has created is so vital in validating it is in reverse. The Framework also offers a solution as to how to fix this. In the case of Egypt, engagement with the government was not as strong from the outset, making it harder to sustain long-term elements of democracy; participatory engagement is needed to ensure impartial administration and permanent outcomes of democratisation (see Figure 6, p. 97).

Interviewee C also gave their opinion on how democracy as a regime type has shifted to becoming less attractive for non-democracies. They gave their opinion on this by using Ukraine as an example; ‘Ukraine went forwards with Western influence and then backwards again because Russia intervened and stopped their forward movement,’ (Interviewee C, 2018). Again, this supports the need for impartial administration to be incorporated into programmes to help

recipient nations democratise for the long-term. This antagonistic relationship the West is experiencing with Russia, though, highlights a very real concern within the international arena of democratisation and where the power has shifted to. Nations like Russia and China are becoming ‘workable democracy’s’ and this (as the participant explained in the case of Ukraine) can be harmful for democracy promotion.

Interviewee C also added to the investigation and findings by offering another interesting view on perhaps why non-democracies revert away from democracy, as a regime type. They analysed carefully that:

‘When I look at Russia there was a huge unleashing of resources when they initially moved towards democracy. When that happened, there was a consolidation of their wealth to a limited group but that group provided some income and opportunities to the general population. The lack of democracy is something people tolerate because incomes are increasing and the ‘dictator’ is helping them do reasonably well; Russia is turning themselves back into a world power; the people are comfortable with that,’ (Interviewee C, 2018).

The idea that people are getting ‘comfortable’ with the idea of regressing away from democracy, as long as they [the people] are happy, is why democracy promotion is failing and in reverse. As donors, the primary objective of democracy promotion should be to enhance the democratic values of fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration, to create these as permanent outcomes from donor programmes. Unfortunately, democracy promotion is in reverse because nations are turning away from democracy as a regime, despite donors pouring more and more money into international development. If democracy promotion was successful, this regression would not be occurring so drastically, if at all. US/UK democracy promotion is contributing to democracy in decline/crisis.

Interviewee C has shed light upon areas that this thesis has conceptualised as ‘democracy promotion in reverse’. Ultimately, the findings have been supportive of the observation that democracy has been declining in the recent years. However, what is most useful is that the participant has experienced democracy promotion that is mutually beneficial for the donor and recipient. More importantly, it gives recipient governments and organisations a voice to take control of their journey towards democratising. In the long-term, this can surely help lead to sustainable democracy building. This is in contrast to the insights given by interviewees on UK democracy promotion. The participant highlighted several ways in which the benchmarks of democracy have been more incorporated into their programmes than the UK has done, thus US democracy promotion is stronger in terms of keeping in mind the aims and objectives for sustainable. Nevertheless, the US as a donor nation is still contributing to democracy promotion in reverse and that is primarily through the US promoting in their own self-image and through foreign policy (see Figure 12, p. 125; Figure 13, p. 128; Figure 14, p. 132).

Adding to the findings from the investigations so far, Interviewee D provided further experience and knowledge within US democracy promotion, from a new perspective. Interviewee D has over twenty years’ worth of experience in US democracy promotion and has primarily worked in the Middle East and Latin America. They have worked on civil society enhancement, economic development and growth, health and environment natural resource management, to name a few. Their opinion of the state of global democracy today was, ‘in general, it is mixed depending on where you are looking. There have been improvements, but some areas have had little change or going retrograde,’ (Interviewee D, 2018). Consequently, the participant explained:

‘If I had to pick one [benchmark]; participatory engagement. The strength of democracy is in engaging people from all facets and spectrums to be involved in the process. If you exclude voluntarily or even involuntarily a sector or multiple segment, it is then not a democracy and the ideals of democracy will not flourish,’ (Interviewee D, 2018).

Engaging citizens has been one of the core elements of measuring the impact of democracy promotion and this is also supported by the Conceptual Framework and several UK interviewees.

Moreover, Interviewee D contributed to the investigation of this thesis by offering their opinion on whether donors benefit more from programmes than the recipients. The participant stated that democracy promotion *should* be mutual, however it has become less so. They argued to ‘look at Scandinavian models; they are more agnostic and development is seen to be a moral obligation to support nations that are less developed as ours. Whereas, in the US, there is a carrot and stick approach,’ (Interviewee D, 2018). In this sense, the US can be seen to use policies that seek to benefit their own interests; democracy promotion in reverse. The participant explained their concept of the ‘carrot and stick’ approach in saying that ‘financial aid and trade deals are an example. Trade deals act as carrots to encourage better behaviour and/or expected outcomes, and as a way to support and forward our own interests in the US abroad, especially in terms of trade deals,’ (Interviewee D, 2018). This shows, in contrast to the knowledge Interviewee C shared, that impartiality is not always embedded in USAID’s programme objectives supporting the argument of democracy promotion in reverse. The reason behind the difference in views is perhaps down to the recipient nation or the foreign policy objectives of that targeted country. If this is the case, then democracy promotion is in reverse.

Interviewee D’s input showed recipients fall victim to donor-centric USAID programmes, mirroring what UK participants have said about DFID/UK international development programmes. It can also explain why recipient states may not have the political will to cooperate or progress towards democratisation in the future if they feel they do not gain much from donor assistance. Furthermore, the participant gave additional details of how donors can benefit more than recipients:

‘On one level, we [US] want to broaden economic growth and to build those trade relations with recipient states. On an idealistic level we anticipate it is mutually beneficial for both sides, but

in reality, the benefits usually are greater of one side than the other; the side that has more leverage and power,' (Interviewee D, 2018).

It would be appropriate to assume the donor, in this context, is the one with the power and leverage. With this then, democracy promotion is in reverse through the imprinting of the US's self-image and foreign policy on the recipient nation. Similarly, Interviewee G, who worked on a DFID project and alongside USAID, spoke of power and leverage in favour of donors. Thus, there is a building consensus that donor's benefit more from democracy promotion than recipients; reinforcing democracy promotion in reverse because it then became a donor-centric initiative.

Interviewee D provided more insight into the investigations of whether democracy promotion is donor-centric. They articulated that 'in certain countries we could overlook certain things like the advocacy of human and political rights because there are geostrategic interest or economic relationships that could be at risk,' (Interviewee D, 2018). With this in mind, the lack of neutrality that is being promoted by the US means that continuous outcomes are far less likely to be imprinted upon the recipient nation. This is due to the donors being driven by their own interests of foreign policy goals; no permanent outcomes equate to democracy promotion in reverse.

The findings also showed successful aspects of US-led democracy promotion. Interviewee D spoke more positively of the impact democracy promotion can have (when it works well). Based on their experience on projects, the participant shared one particular example of their experience working in Latin America. They explained 'decentralisation and deconcentrating programmes, through economic development, in a programme for Bolivia, sought to decentralise and deconcentrate government power and to push it onto municipal level and even on sub-level Mayoral level,' (Interviewee D, 2018). Practically, this essentially meant that Bolivia's decision-making and finances became decentralised and was given to communities for them to have control over these processes. This echoes participatory engagement also being crucial to democratisation and for recipient nations needing political will. Furthermore, it also shows that when participatory

engagement is a goal within the programme, it leads to a more sustainable project in the long-run. Another example of success was given in the context of the Arab world:

‘Here you have very large youth cohorts that are unemployed or under employed, but are expanding. The idea to provide people with economic opportunities helps alleviate the idea that idleness and radicalisation is an option. If someone has a job and economic stability, they are less susceptible to being influenced by elements that prey upon the idea of no future,’

(Interviewee D, 2018).

Not only does this offer insight into the motives of donors within this region (supporting the argument that donors are driven by foreign policy, see Table 2, p. 76), it also provides the ability for a nation to keep modernising and sustaining an economy. This is because the people are then happy and contributing to the country’s success story. This then has a knock-on effect of society’s engagement of politics and holding their governments to account. As explained by Interviewee D, ‘if the rules of the game are known and stable, then businesses are happy to cooperate and work with the governments. They are less concerned with who is in power but have more interests in what happens politically as the government can affect their ability to thrive,’ (2018). Interviewee D’s comment here is in agreement with Interviewee M’s argument that you need fundamental rights, participatory engagement and an impartial administration to be integrated into democracy promotion, but that they are not separable. Therefore, the investigations have found a consensus between the US and the UK in *what* needs to be promoted (the three benchmarks outlined in Chapters 5, p. 95).

A crucial purpose for collecting data through these open, semi-structured interviews was to investigate if donors promote democracy in their own self-image and the repercussions of this, if they do. The participant agreed that this is what happens and explained the pitfalls of this. They said they believe ‘democracy is not the perfect system, but it is the system that has worked best so far. We see how ‘democracy’ functions in the US; it is not a perfect system but we should be

able to have those ideals and concepts and processes applied elsewhere,' (Interviewee D, 2018). Interviewee D has shown evidence that the US seeks to incorporate concepts (fundamental rights, participatory engagement or impartial administration) into their projects in order to maximise the longevity of that on recipient nations but also that exporting a Western form of governance into a developing nation is problematic. Overall, the US shows evidence of embedding the benchmarks of democracy promotion into their projects better than the UK does. In this sense, the participant justified promoting democracy in the US's own image as a viable way to progressively change non-democracies. On the other hand, they also acknowledged that even a democracy like the US's is flawed. They further said 'can you really replicate and overlay [our] system on another country and expect the same result? That is the question we need to ask,' (Interviewee D, 2018). This supports democracy promotion in reverse as the US is promoting in its own self-image and not in the context of the environment of the recipient nation.

Interviewee D referred back to their experience in Latin America and explained 'the Mayoral system and decentralising power to a municipal level in society is similar to the US model of electing senators and governors. A federal system allows states to have their own legislature and judiciary...in that sense US is reflecting what they know and have experienced and transition it into other countries,' (Interviewee D, 2018). The interviewee's experiences and knowledge lent great insight into the practical implementation for democracy promotion. Their input highlighted that any form of democracy promotion will be flawed, as even the best and oldest democracies have imperfections. Does this then mean that promoting a flawed system of democracy into non-democracies will lead to failure? Perhaps not. Yet, it assumedly will have an effect on the nation's ability to receive and sustain democracy and that is why democracy promotion is in reverse. This does, however, then raise the question of, if it is flawed to begin with, how can the US enhance the success of projects?

Interviewee D further spoke of their work in Jordan. Their project was to create an environment for business to flourish by being regulated under strong and transparent compliances, to facilitate

economic development. They clarified that the democracy promotion aspect of this project was in incentivising businesses to ‘share transparency and do away with systems that exist now which are built in and work against the aspiring citizens...move away from a system that takes bits from people here and there and enhance equality,’ (Interviewee D, 2018). Essentially this is working in the territory of allowing fundamental rights to be held and giving the people a right to partake in their country’s development, whilst also encouraging impartiality/transparency. Where the failures are, are in the steps that involve the process of recipients implementing donor programmes. For example, ‘when you have an eighteen-step process compared to a three or four step process, we see steps in the longer processes start to be eliminated affecting the success of a programme. There is a lot of friction and resistance to something like that as a lot of these systems are entrenched,’ (Interviewee D, 2018). This could support the observation of the backlash against democracy that is currently occurring around the world.

Another example the participant gave is in regard to creating trust and transparency:

‘In the case of shipping companies, a spot check on one container for every fifty encourages you to be honest and forthright on what it is you are importing. If you are caught violating that trust then we will scrutinise every little thing you import in. It is in the best interest for the importer to be truthful and declare honestly. That helps the transparency process which in one thing we do and try to push,’ (Interviewee D, 2018).

By allowing recipients to have self-sufficiency over how they continue to democratise, it should create a relationship of mutual trust. It should also enhance the longevity of the project as there is still the possibility that if recipients are untruthful, they will not have that right and control anymore. Importantly, it shows that transparency is incorporated into the programme aims and goals which leads to a more successful way to promote democracy and ensure permanent results are achieved. This is something that US democracy promotion does far better than the UK does;

impressing aspects of the Conceptual Framework (such as accountability, transparency and civil rights) into projects.

Throughout this thesis, the argument that democracy promotion suffers from short-termism has been supported. The participant added to this and echoed the ideas that (for the US), there are motives such as creating regional allies and stabilising a region that could be a security threat (Interviewee D, 2018) that are at the forefront of USAID goals. In the short-term, within Latin America, the interviewee spoke of how people are standing up and questioning the traditions of governance through the decentralisation project they were on (Interviewee D, 2018); supporting the need for fundamental rights to be a part of democracy promotion aims. However, in areas where there is more of a US-centric motive, the long-term projects seize to achieve results that could be defined as a success. The participant shed light on their opinion of Afghanistan as an example:

‘We did not learn our lessons. US democracy is in crisis at the moment so how can we enforce certain issues successfully without resistance? We went to implement our current form of democracy into transitional states and disregarded the fact that we had to go through industrial revolutions and wars to get to our current form of democratic regime. We expect recipients to skip to democracy and make that leap without going through the motions of our own democratic journeys,’ (Interviewee D, 2018).

This is perhaps one of the most important points that has been made by any participant. How can a non-democratic country understand and grasp what a democracy entails when it has never experienced it and it has seen how withstanding democracies can, themselves, descend into crisis? This point has been echoed by other interviewees, both UK and US, and shows a consensus that cultural and historical understandings by donors is essential. However, what makes this quote even more important is that it shows how democracy promotion is in reverse. It highlights that democracy is in crisis and that democracy promotion is flawed when promoted in the donor’s

self-image, confirming it is a donor-centric process. It affirms this thesis's argument of democracy promotion is in reverse. The participant made one final remark that encompasses the overall comments of previous interviewees and simply stated, 'with democracy, the basic fundamentals must be there but they can take many different forms and come out in difference ways,' (Interviewee D, 2018). These interviews, as a cohort, argued that donors are not getting to the heart of a recipient nation, or put differently, do not stay long enough to watch and support the flourishing of democracy. Therefore, without this long-term mission to sustain democracy, can an imported model of the US and UK's own democracies produce the same results as our own? Likely, no, from the evidence and findings presented by the participants selected.

1. US vs. UK democracy promotion

This chapter has shown that targeting a recipient nation's constitutions and building upon their administration is a crucial aspect to ensuring sustainable democratisation. The US focuses heavily on that aspect of democracy promotion and from what the participants have shared, this has resulted in an engaged recipient nation and an ongoing donor/recipient relationship that is, and should be, mutual. This highlights democracy promotion can work. The UK, on the other hand, does not incorporate the benchmarks into projects, as well as the US does. When all three benchmarks are present and incorporated into projects aims, then democracy promotion is successful as it is more likely to be sustainable. However, when these are not present in the projects goals and objectives, then no permanent outcomes are achieved, resulting in democracy promotion in reverse.

Ultimately, it is evident from the knowledge shared by the US participants that there is a real emphasis on participatory engagement and institution building in regard to what the US promotes. The UK places a heavy focus on these elements too, however, the US has a clearer way of integrating these concepts into their projects. Both US participants have shown and shared examples of engaging mutually with recipients and in an open and transparent way. They have also both shown that recipients have an equal responsibility to continue their democratisation

projects and, for the most part, they engage with USAID more so than DFID. With the UK, there is a lot more emphasis placed upon donor financial constraints and timeframes, which has led to inefficient and poor project delivery (contrasting from the US's approach). The criteria for UK international development are based more upon where they have maintained a strong presence (for example colonially, Africa) and there is emphasis on rights (through factors such as education). The US focuses on regions such as the Middle East and Latin America, where constitution building is at the foundation to USAID goals. Funding has been raised as a constraint for UK international development, by numerous participants, however for US funding of projects has not been raised as an issue with how they promote democracy. This in itself highlights the correlation between funding and longevity of projects. If you have the sufficient amount of funding, projects can last longer than three to five years and outcomes can be longer-term. Otherwise, democracy promotion is in reverse (as supported by various UK interviewees). Furthermore, if, as a donor, you are not allocating adequate amounts of funding to these projects, then it is plausible to argue that this is because you have an aim that justifies your own interests and not the recipient's.

The results have shown, in terms of indicators for assessing whether projects are successful, that there was an agreement from participants that successful elements of democratisation, leads to accountable governance and free and fair elections within recipient states. This further reiterates that participatory engagement and impartial administration are vital components by which to measure democracy promotion by. In terms of projects being ineffective, all US participants said that low participatory engagement from the recipient nation was the indicator by which to measure the unsuccessful implementation of democracy. These are all long-term issues with democracy promotion.

Additionally, it is apparent to see that the US commits to long term presence within a region/recipient nation, more so than the UK does. The failures for the UK's democracy promotion efforts stems from what most participants argued as short-termism. There is little

evidence of the three benchmarks being consistently incorporated into DFID projects aims, so that recipient nations can then democratise autonomously. There is also a strong consensus that there are strings attached and donor-centric motivations that drive these programmes (UK). These are all aspects of failures of projects and confirm that democracy promotion is in reverse. In comparison, the US participants have also shown that they have foreign policy motives that drive projects, so there is a similarity between *why* the US and the UK promotion democracy. The difference, however, is in the processes of democracy promotion. The US maintains a longer presence in the countries which shows the link between the lack of permanent outcomes equating to democracy promotion in reverse.

On the other hand, the two donor nations are not comparable in some respects in the way they promote democracy, supporting the need for uniformity in promoting democracy. The outcomes of democracy promotion in reverse have different causes. The fact that the two largest donors are promoting democracy differently highlights the need for a standardisation in promoting democracy in order to ensure long-lasting outcomes. When there is regularity in both the US's and the UK's aims (and inclusion of the Conceptual Framework's three benchmarks), the results are more successful. These successes can translate into engaging governments and citizens, for example, as all participants have said have occurred in some way. However, the successes that both the US and the UK have commented on have always been associated with short-term results which, again, reiterates the link between lack of sustainability and democracy promotion in reverse. Both donors need to be working along the same guidelines and timeframes so that the US and the UK's democracy promotion initiatives are successful. This reaffirms the need for a uniform way of promoting democracy and validates the Conceptual Framework this thesis has created. When they differ in their approach, permanent outcomes are not achieved and so, democracy promotion in reverse occurs.

One of the UK participants who took part in the data collection, had experience of working alongside USAID on one of their projects. They shared their insight into how they felt USAID promoted democracy and revealed some vital information of US democracy promotion, which is essential for comparing the US and the UK. Interviewee G explained USAID also uses the same strategy as DFID, however, their actual programme works differently to that of their experiences on DFID programmes (Interviewee G, 2019). What is most interesting is the view of scepticism, from the interviewee, about USAID; ‘they [USAID] had poor management of their side of things. At that particular time, there was not much structure or identification; they micromanaged some things. The work I generated, in terms of research, they would try to be heavily involved,’ (Interviewee G, 2019). This highlights a similarity between US and UK democracy promotion, as several UK interviewees also said that DFID lacked strong organisation and management of projects. Furthermore, from USAID, there was ‘a lack of structure. They had their own objective and that was their goal. There was also a lack of accountability and a messy structure...from the work we did with them in West Africa, we know they are fussy,’ (Interviewee G, 2019). There are two points supporting democracy promotion in reverse made here that help strengthen this thesis’s arguments. Firstly, the idea that USAID have little structure to their programmes means that there is not a clear incentive, other than their own motives, to implement a project in a certain recipient nation; democracy promotion in reverse. By micromanaging and pushing their own goals it is highly possible that US foreign policy motives are at play here. Secondly, if there is no accountability within the USAID project itself, it is promoting a flawed version of impartial administration into the nation; democracy promotion in reverse. It must be noted that Interviewee G expressed their own opinion and experience of working with USAID. The document analysis presented in Chapter 5 (see pp. 109-121), shows that USAID focuses on its projects aims and seeks to involve the recipient states in a mutually beneficial relationship. Interviewee C has also supported that this is the case. However, these documents are published by USAID and Interviewee G has given their experience in the field of working with USAID, from a UK development perspective. Therefore, it shows the difference in USAID published works and those

who work alongside USAID. The distinction highlights, again, the need for impartiality and a universal framework.

Chapter 10: Empirical Investigation and Findings Summary

The data from the thirteen participants who took part in this research study highlighted that there is strong evidence supporting democracy promotion in reverse. This chapter summarises the most crucial aspects of the data, in order to clarify the most important reasons and validations of this thesis's concept of democracy promotion in reverse. The five most crucial findings ultimately showed that:

- Donors benefit more from democracy promotion programmes than recipients;
- Projects implemented into recipient nations are not sustainable and produce little to no permanent outcomes because of donors promoting in their self-image;
- Engaging and building a robust initial relationship with recipient nations is weak from the outset, due to donor's promoting for their own self-interests;
- The Conceptual Framework is validated as a way to measure the successes/failures of democracy promotion;
- Democracy promotion is in reverse.

Chapters 7, 8 and 9 have further confirmed that the Conceptual Framework's benchmarks are essential to facilitating successful democracy promotion results. This is highlighted by 69.2% saying participatory engagement and impartial administration are necessary to promote and the remaining 30.8% acknowledging that fundamental rights are also needed. The evidence from all interviews confirms, in various ways, that democracy promotion is in reverse.

The common findings from UK democracy promotion showed weaknesses in establishing a good working relationship with governments and that democracy promotion was not providing long-term impact on recipient states. One of the arguments this thesis puts forward for democracy promotion in reverse is due to donors promoting in their own self-image. As one participant explained 'as soon as you start thinking that people should imitate the Western model of

democracy, it is doomed to fail,' (Interviewee M, 2019, p. 152). This is particularly striking as it reinforces the point of democracy promotion failing due to donor's promoting in their self-image. This is one of the most important reasons for democracy promotion in reverse. Ultimately, the conclusion drawn from the UK data is affirming the need for the Conceptual Framework to be deployed into project's as objectives and expected outcomes. If this is not the case, permanent outcomes are not achieved, and recipients are left with democracy promotion in reverse. Similarly, the US also promotes in their self-image and Interviewee D explained this as a weakness of US democracy promotions; 'US democracy is in crisis at the moment so how can we enforce certain issues successfully without resistance,' (Interviewee D, 2018, p. 243). Additionally, the US participants also agreed that there must be a driving factor of fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration for democracy promotion programmes to work. However, the US is stronger when engaging with recipient nations. Their approach allows for recipients to take more control over what it is they require from the US development assistance. The US integrates the benchmarks more prominently within their projects, more so than the UK does. This is a strength in US democracy promotion. The US participants shared that initial contact with recipient nations from the onset of projects is mutual. For example, Interviewee C described 'there is a lot of research into what we think the needs might be...Sometimes a government will come to us and say we need help with X, Y, Z and we will say we will look at that and see what we can do. Sometimes we get flat out asked for something,' (Interviewee C, 2018, p. 231). The US participant's experiences and observations have provided evidence to show there is a difference between the UK and the US in their approaches taken in the initial engagement of projects with recipient countries. This is important for this thesis as it, again, reinforces the need for a uniform way to promote democracy in order to create a higher chance that democracy promotion will succeed.

Unfortunately, the US does strengthen the other main reason this thesis argues as democracy promotion in reverse; US democracy promotion is foreign policy led. One participant shared, in relation to their observation in the Middle East, 'the idea to provide people with economic

opportunities helps alleviate the idea that idleness and radicalisation is an option,' (Interviewee D, 2018, p. 240). Helping to reduce the outcomes of radicalisation in an area that has been a priority interest to US foreign policy for decade's highlights *why* democracy is promoted. It also shows how the Middle East has been a target since 9/11 as radicalisation is a reason for offering democratic assistance. The UK similarly has a foreign policy aspect to their democracy promotion initiatives. The UK's approach bolsters the argument that democracy promotion is in reverse due to a lack an adequate time-frame given to implement projects in the long-term. Thus, donors leave and projects remain incomplete because their interests are now elsewhere. The UK focuses on nations it can see as strategically beneficial, summarised by Interviewee B 'strategic decisions of where we focus and what programmes we do, or where we think we can have success,' (Interviewee B, 2018, p. 227). The UK's projects are usually short-term and incomplete and there is the element of foreign policy. Although, the US invests more time in projects than the UK does, the US are far more foreign policy driven and this is a huge factor to US democracy promotion in reverse.

The overall opinions shared by participants were that of agreement to democracy being in crisis/decline (see Figure 1, p. 46) and that democracy promotion is donor-centric and unsustainable; democracy promotion in reverse. The purpose of collecting data was not only to test the Conceptual Framework's analysis of democracy promotion, but to measure how democracy is promoted practically and whether this was sustainable and successful (by using the benchmarks of Conceptual Framework to test against). Issues that have been raised across this thesis's literature review and document analysis were asked as a way to gauge the UK and the US's reasons for why they promote democracy, how they promote it and what is being promoted. For example, in terms of how democracy is promoted, 63.6% of UK participants said it was important that donors promote in their own self-image. There were various reasoning's behind this; in order to promote a system that you know works or to transfer experiences and knowledge from the donor into recipients, as a few examples. There was a general feeling though that this was not a positive way of promoting democracy. One participant explained that 'there is little to

no regard for context and the reality of the field which yields negative results,' (Interviewee E, 2019). This statement shows that donors cannot export their own concepts of democracy without understanding the context of the recipient nation's own environments and capabilities. It shows that promoting democracy in the donor's self-image is not successful.

On the other hand, both the US participants agreed that it is very important to promote in the donor's self-image but has different views on the success of this approach. Interviewee C stated that you have to believe in the systems you are promoting in order for it to work (Interviewee C, 2018). However, in agreement with Interviewee E, Interviewee D stated that on the other hand, 'advanced nations [as our own] still suffer from issues of crime, economic injustice, poverty, wealth gaps etc. we promote the 'nice' parts as a sign of our successes,' (Interviewee D, 2018). This remark shows that promoting in the donor's self-image also leads to democracy promotion in reverse. These points are particularly important and singled out in this conclusion because this thesis argued that one of the most important contributing factors of democracy promotion in reverse is that the UK and the US are promoting their own flawed democratic systems into developing/transitional countries and expecting it to work.

A strength of US democracy promotion is that the US has a longer presence in recipient nations. This shows a stronger initiative by the US to continually engage in promoting democracy. The UK participants all argued that there is a short-termism about their projects, thus democracy promotion is unsuccessfully implemented for the long-term. On the other hand, both the US and UK participants have expressed that due to the foreign policy incentive behind programmes, donor bias has led to strings attached and a donor-centric approach to democracy promotion is being implemented into recipient nations. The reason the US may stay longer in certain regions is due to the political approach they have to international development. This information affirms that recipients are not at the heart of donor programme's objectives and expected outcomes. This is important for this thesis as it further reinforces that democracy promotion is in reverse and it shows a similarity between the UK and US as to *why* they promote democracy. However, there

are different reasons for UK and US democracy promotion in reverse; some are due to inadequate timeframe for implementation and some are due to donor bias/interest. Importantly, this highlights how crucial it is to have a standardised framework that ensure the two largest donors are promoting democracy, whilst incorporating the same benchmarks and using the same guidelines.

In conclusion, what has been validated is that the UK and the US promote in their own self-image (largely through foreign policy); programmes are not sustainable due to numerous donor related weaknesses and there are no universal guidelines that both donor nations follow in order to enhance permanent outcomes of democracy promotion. The reason, therefore, for the need of a universal framework is because if there were basic guidelines and a generic framework donors could follow, it means that the same concept of democracy would be promoted. This eliminates a lot of donor bias and promotes more benefits for recipient nations, aiding democratisation in the long-term. Donor *and* recipient nations will then be able to take control of the implementation phases but if there are set rules on how to incorporate the three benchmarks this thesis identifies or how to approach recipient nations properly, then democracy promotion can thrive. This thesis makes the recommendation to practitioners that using a framework like the Conceptual Framework, would provide donors with essential benchmarks to which they would have to incorporate into their project objectives. If these are minimum requirements for programmes, democracy promotion is likely to be neutral, focused on the rights of citizens and have full engagement from society and accountability from the government. This would significantly help democracy promotion and the crisis in democracy that the international arena is facing.

Chapter 11: Thesis Conclusion

The contribution to knowledge this thesis has presented has been through identifying key factors to why democracy promotion is in reverse. This has been achieved through critically assessing the two largest donor states: the UK and the US. The fundamental argument has been that there is an unequal relationship between the donors who promote democracy and recipients who receive it (donor's being the bigger beneficiaries). The issues have been primarily concerning the lack of long-term change within developing/democratising nations, and this is supported by the global decline in democratic regimes presently occurring. One cause of this is a lack of universal application of democracy promotion, leading to (what this thesis argues) a reversal in the way democracy is promoted. The intention was to answer the primary question of why democracy promotion is in reverse.

This thesis confirms democracy promotion in reverse. The research puzzles (see p. 9) highlight three problems with democracy promotion: lack of clarity as to how to promote democracy, projects are no sustainable/long-term and there is no universal way to promote democracy leading to donors benefiting more than recipients. The research puzzles have been validated through the findings and investigations this thesis has made and have proved democracy promotion is in reverse (see p. 251). Moreover, the research objectives (see p. 16) have been just as important to this thesis as these have focused the research on aspects of democracy promotion that have, since, confirmed democracy promotion is in reverse. The evidence compiled from this thesis has brought forward important issues with democracy promotion and some solutions to the research puzzles, through the research objectives.

11.1 Literature Review

In order to argue democracy promotion is in reverse, reviewing literature and understanding *how and why* the UK and the US promote democracy was necessary to achieve the objective of creating a Conceptual Framework and demonstrate evidence that democracy promotion is in reverse. The

literature, especially was a crucial aspect of this thesis as it allowed for the understanding of the meaning of democracy promotion and *what* is actually being promoted; as well as observing why the UK and the US (as the largest donors) promote democracy abroad (see Figure 4, p. 93 and Figure 5, p. 94). Scholars Grimm and Leininger outlined their view as ‘democracy promotion entails activities by external actors that seek to support democratisation; that is, to enable internal actors to establish and develop democratic institutions that play according to democratic rule,’ (2012, p. 396). Their succinct summary highlighted that donors should *support* democratisation and allow recipient nations to have the knowledge to continue the process. What this thesis’s research has presented is that this has not been the case. Donors have been benefiting more than recipients and recipient nations are left with democracy promotion in reverse. Another renowned scholar, Burnell, also raised a question mark over how successful democracy promotion can be if there is not even a definition of what democracy promotion is. He argued ‘boundaries between democracy promotion and the international advocacy and defence of human rights and support for ‘good governance’, are not clear and precise. Similarly, the terminology of democracy promotion itself is not uniformly agreed,’ (Burnell, 2017, p. 1). In turn, there have been attempts to define democracy promotion, showing that there is an acknowledgement of needing a clearer definition for democracy promotion to be based upon. Beichelt gave four features:

‘*Coercive action*: use of legal or physical force. *Offering incentives*: giving assistance with threat of withdrawal, imposing sanctions. *Persuasion*: promotion of ideas as legitimate through justification. *Social interaction*: exhibition of norms and values in social practices,’ (Beichelt, 2012, p. 4).

This quote was previously used (see p. 33) as a way to offer a definition of democracy promotion. Through the investigation of this thesis, aspects of Beichelt’s analysis have validated democracy promotion in reverse. Offering incentives (Beichelt, 2012, p. 4) supports that there are strings attached and donors benefit more from programmes (see Figure 3, p. 92; Chapter 7, p. 148). Persuasion and social interaction (Beichelt, 2012, p. 4) reinforce the argument that democracy is

promoted in the donor's self-image (see p. 51, 'Democracy promotion is about donor 'self-image') due to the donor's own values and experiences of democracy being projected into the recipient nations without an understanding of the recipient's history or cultural roots and ability to democratise.

Once democracy promotion was defined, this thesis argued that literature presents two forms of democracy promotion: democratisation and foreign policy. The six observations this thesis made from democratisation literature, were: democracy promotion is complex; democracy promotion is not linear, democracy promotion includes international pressures; tracing and outcomes of democracy promotion are diverse; democracy promotion is about donor self-image and democracy promotion is not inflicting long-term change. Democracy promotion is a complex commodity and is not a linear process, highlighting the need for uniformity in application and universal guidelines to donor projects. The conflicting international pressures and the tracing of democracy promotion outcomes further support that there needs to be clarity of *what* to promote and the objectives of donor projects, otherwise democracy promotion is in reverse (see Figure 6, p. 97 for operationalisation democracy promotion). Finally, democracy is promoted in the donor's self-image and due to the bias on their part, permanent outcomes have not been achieved and no long-term imprinting on recipient nations has occurred; democracy promotion is in reverse (see Table 1, p. 55). The democratisation literature bolsters the argument that UK and US democracy promotion programmes is in reverse.

Foreign policy consists of various objectives; ensuring regional/political stability, acquiring allies in areas where there are security threats, creating valuable trade deals with nations (to name a few). It helps example how and who promotes democracy (see Figure 4, p. 93 and Figure 5, p. 94). This is not a new approach to UK and US democracy promotion, however the effect it has had within international development has led to democracy promotion in reverse. Democracy promotion, explained by the BPM, is embedded as a bureaucratic process with policymakers having their own dynamic interests in regard to democracy promotion. Consequently, democracy

promotion is an idea that is translated into practice, by bureaucracy. Jones argued ‘the model is considered too complex,’ (Jones, 2012, p. 122) and went on to say ‘the model, if accurate, undermines accountability and democratic responsibilities,’ (Jones, 2012, p. 122). As a result, this has led to programmes being implemented in the donor’s self-image. The BPM gives substantial strength that democracy promotion is subject to the political bias of donor governments (see Table 2, p. 76). Foreign policy also contributes to the issues of projects not having permanent results within recipient nations. Donor bias can affect what is the best policy to choose and go for; democracy is then prone to being promoted in the interest and benefit of the donors, not the recipients, making it difficult to implement sustainable projects. Therefore, democracy promotion is both a hybrid concept and contradictory (see Table 2, p. 76). As explained by Foreign Policy Analysis scholars Chandler & Heins, democracy is promoted under the assumption that ‘contemporary foreign policy is about values rather than interests,’ (2007, p. i); values vs. interests. This standpoint shows the agents or channels by which democracy is promoted, is dependent on the motives and interests of the government. Donor bias and the donor’s self-image is prevalent here and both are contributing factors to democracy promotion in reverse. However, what is contradictory about foreign policy driven democracy promotion, is that interests and values are also mixed together. This is shown by the interests and values of policymakers in donor governments being the driving force behind democracy promotion and reiterates that the self-interest of the donor equates to them benefiting more. Consequently, a mixture of interests and values are also being promoted at the same time interests over values (or vice versa) are being promoted. Again, this reinforces democracy promotion in reverse and the lack of clarity surrounding democracy promotion, itself. Lastly foreign policy literature shows that there is a great emphasis on the need to measure democracy promotion and a solution to that has been put forward by the thesis’s Conceptual Framework.

This thesis has critically assessed the roles the UK and the US play in democracy promotion/assistance (see Chapter 3, pp. 77 and 81). Carothers defined two aspects of development assistance: the developmental approach and the political approach (examples of this

are in Chapters 8, p. 154 and 9, p. 230). The UK's democracy promotion follows the developmental approach as it seeks to 'look past political procedures [and] towards substantive outcomes such as equality, welfare, and justice...supporters of the developmental approach tend to see economic and social rights as being no less important than political and civil rights,' (Carothers, 2009, p. 8). The developmental approach also offers an 'indirect method' (Carothers, 2009, p. 9) to democracy promotion, showing that, to some extent, values are more important to the UK than interests. The UK uses government agencies such as DFID and WFD as a way to support the implementation of human rights and eradicating poverty as forefronts of their foreign policy. These organisations champion these values and basic rights as a way to emphasise that this is the driving factor of UK democracy promotion.

On the other hand, the US have adopted a political approach to democracy assistance. Both nations channel and operationalise democratisation through foreign policy (see Table 2, p. 76). However, what the US has, a 'a relatively narrow conception of democracy—focused, above all, on elections and political liberties— and a view of democratisation as a process of political struggle in which democrats work to gain the upper hand in society over non-democrats,' (Carothers, 2009, p. 5). Therefore, it is the interests that are mixed with the values of democracy that shape US foreign policy-led democracy promotion. Why is this important for this thesis to highlight? It shows that both the UK and the US, though rooted in values and interests of democratisation, are still promoting their own flawed, self-image of democracy into recipient nations. It further reinforces that there is a factor of pre-determinism to UK and US democracy promotion. As the literature consistently highlighted, this leads to ineffective solutions to democracy promotion and all that is left behind in the recipient nations are the effects of democracy promotion in reverse.

Ultimately, the main arguments over what foundations are necessary for building a democracy are democratic values, free and fair elections, and for rulers to govern democratically. What these criteria, marked by several academics, show are the core aspects of democratisation that translate

into fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration. From these observations, the generic Conceptual Framework created by this thesis established a way to highlight *how* donors should promote democracy and *how* to measure the successes and failures of democracy promotion. It further highlighted *why* this is not occurring and therefore, democracy promotion is in reverse.

11.2 Conceptual Framework

Developing a Conceptual Framework was vital to achieving the first research objective (see p. 16) of this thesis. This objective was important as it focuses on providing alternative ways and recommendations to improve democracy promotion. It was necessary to create a generic framework that would highlight *how* to promote democracy and ensure it is sustainable for recipient nations (see Figure 6, p. 97). This thesis selected the GSoD (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017, p. 10) as the foundation for measuring democracy promotion by (see Figure 2, p. 67). The IDEA framework presents the GSoD (see Appendix 1, p. 271) as an independent way of assessing what democratisation is and how *democracy*, as a regime, can develop. This thesis has, therefore, used this framework as a way to lay the foundations for how democracy promotion can develop and for the basis on the questions for the interviews. By doing so, it addresses 1) the problem of why democracy is not providing long-term and permanent outcomes within recipient nations and 2) the need for donors to use a universal application of democracy promotion.

The Conceptual Framework identified three benchmarks: fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration. They were selected on the basis of the literature and from what academia acknowledged were the most important aspects of democracy building. Chapter 5 (see p. 95) ultimately draws upon using the three benchmarks of democracy promotion and critically evaluating how they are operationalised in UK and US programmes. Figure 6 (see p. 97) presents a visual representation of the expected outcomes for democracy promotion projects. This is an additional way to clearly assess whether programmes have achieved successful outcomes or if democracy promotion is in reverse.

The thesis also addresses the second research objective (see p. 16) of comparing UK and US aid programmes. Figure 7 (see p. 108) visually shows various UK democracy promotion programmes that have been implemented by the government. The example of the UK's fundamental rights programmes of Business and Human Rights Training Courses (see Figure 8, p. 112) states clearly the aims and goals of that project. Figure 8 shows how it has made some improvements in Kenya; however, it also strengthens the argument of democracy promotion in reverse. The project shows that there is a lack of planning and lack of sustainability. It further emphasises that the UK promotes in its own self-image. This is problematic for democracy promotion as not only is the donor's own experience of democracy flawed, but this makes it harder for a recipient nation to imitate a longstanding democratic regime into their own governments (democracy promotion is in reverse). Figure 9 (see p. 116) also shows democracy promotion in reverse. The ISEP programme (participatory engagement) has educated citizens on the power of their votes and delivered a clean election, however, there has been a lack of follow-up of the project. The argument of foreign policy shaping the UK's democracy promotion is relevant here and democracy promotion is in reverse, as Malawi has not been able to sustain the project without the donor's presence. Additionally, Figure 10 (see p. 119) symbolises the UK's Somalia Operation Plan (impartial administration). The programme aimed to improve the policing and judiciary of Somalia. Again, democracy promotion is highlighted as in reverse as foreign policy plays a role and impartial administration was not embedded into aims of the project. Consequently, this was not the permanent outcome of the project.

In addition to the UK, Figure 11 (see p. 120) also visually represents some of the US's democracy promotion programmes in practice. On page 125, Figure 12 signified a US fundamental rights project in Colombia. The aim of the project was to improve the ability for Colombians to have access to justice and legal services (as a basic civil right). Although the training process was successful, there was a lack of implementation and resources, producing inadequate long-term results of the project. Democracy promotion is in reverse as the US was promoting their own

image of their justice system into a country that they knew it would be hard to implement into. Imitating the US's own fundamental rights into Colombia resulted in a lack of sustainability; democracy promotion is in reverse. Figure 13 (see p. 128) showed participatory engagement through the BUILD programme in Somaliland. The aim of the project was to create awareness for citizens to know their rights and support them (USAID, 2016). It was successful in laying the groundwork and training for electoral bodies and government; however, it was weak in being inclusive (women and youths were not engaged despite a lot of funding). Training also proved difficult for the recipient nation to implement as there was a lack of support for CSOs. What this demonstrates is US foreign policy motivated this programme (Somaliland is a nation of US interest) and this is supported as there was already some electoral progress being made within the country before BUILD was implemented. This equates to democracy promotion in reverse, but also highlights how there is a geopolitical interest by both the UK and the US in this area, affirming the foreign policy argument. Finally, Figure 14 (see p. 132), explored implementing impartial administration into any recipient nation. The first issue with this was, although a universal application of democracy promotion programmes is necessary, it is the basic benchmarks (see Figure 6, p. 97) that need to be uniformly integrated into projects. The UK and the US should not create one overall strategy for combatting a large-scale issue, such as reducing corruption. The difference between these two points is that the absence of corruption needs to be present in the aims and objectives of the project, however, there needs to be aspects of personalisation to the recipient's wants/needs in order to produce permanent outcomes. Without the imprinting of these objectives on recipients, democracy promotion is in reverse and Figure 14 (see p. 132) highlighted this.

By using the three benchmarks, the Conceptual Framework has given a generic model by which this thesis can measure the successes and weaknesses of UK and US democracy promotion. It crucially addresses the research objective (see p. 16) of assessing donor programmes and validates the argument put forward of democracy promotion in reverse. These benchmarks were discussion

points for interviewees to share their opinions and observations on practical implementation of democracy promotion and whether it is in reverse.

11.3 Empirical Investigation and Findings

In order to answer the third research objective (see p. 16) of this thesis, Chapters 8 (see p. 154) and 9 (see p. 230) presented data from interviews with UK and US participants who have worked on UK and US democracy promotion programmes. The investigations and findings confirmed five key validations of democracy promotion in reverse: donors benefit more from democracy promotion programmes than recipients; projects implemented into recipient nations are not sustainable and produce little to no permanent outcomes because of donors promoting in their self-image; engaging and building a robust initial relationship with recipient nations is weak, from the outset because of donor self-interests; the Conceptual Framework is validated as a way to measure the successes/failures of democracy promotion; democracy promotion is in reverse (see p. 251).

The results validated the research method consisting of using open, semi-structured interviews, in order to gather data on the operationalisation of democracy promotion (see Figure 15, p. 147). Empirical investigations were crucial to the thesis as the research objective (see p. 16) of creating a Conceptual Framework needed to be endorsed by those who work for donors and implement democracy. In turn, the research purpose of exploring whether democracy promotion is in reverse was addressed through the interviews. The arguments put forward by this thesis is the idea that donors promote democracy reflecting their own experiences of it into recipient states. This has led to reinforcing that image upon recipients, instead of supporting the recipient's need. Therefore, these topics were the foundations of the interviews (see Appendix 2, p. 274). By using a snowball sample of high-level policymakers, with at least two years' worth of experience in the field (see Table 3, p. 146). The overall investigations and findings supported democracy promotion in reverse.

Based on the research from the literature review and document analysis, the Interview Guide was created in order to offer discussion points for participants to share their views and experiences (see Appendix 2, p. 274). This chapter was split into three sections in order to clearly present the findings from the interviews. The general findings showed the most important benchmarks for democracy promotion are participatory engagement and impartial administration (69.2% of respondents expressed this), whilst 30.8% acknowledge fundamental rights as the most important aspect of democracy promotion). However, all participants agreed the three benchmarks the Conceptual Framework defines are necessary for measuring successful democracy promotion. Another important finding from all participants was the consensus in agreement of the argument for democracy promotion in reverse (see Chapter 7, p. 148). The primary reasons for this align with the contribution to knowledge this thesis provides; democracy promotion is more prevalent than ever within the UK and the US's international development objectives, so why is it not resulting in permanent democratic outcomes in recipient nations? This is answered with participants supporting this thesis's reasoning's of: donor foreign policy being the driving force behind projects which leads to donor bias and donors being the main beneficiaries of democracy promotion. It also leads to unsustainable projects that are left incomplete and with no permanent outcomes (see Figure 3, p, 92), thus democracy promotion is in reverse.

The UK general findings supported that donors promote in their own self-image and interests; therefore, donors benefit more from projects than recipients. As a result, projects are not sustainable in the long-run. One participant who works on a fundamental rights project in the area of access to education explained, 'a problem arises that universal free education is a democratic right. Therefore, in [recipient nations], they get all these students into schools because that is what the [donor] agenda is pushing for it,' (Interviewee E, 2019). Their statement supports the problem of the self-image argument and the role it contributes to democracy promotion in reverse. The general consensus from UK participants was DFID spends three to five years on projects and then move onto other recipient nation of interest. There was further agreement that this is not a long enough time frame for recipient nations to be able to implement these projects autonomously and

sustainably. Interviewee B supported this further and argued ‘if advice and pressure can come from local partners within recipient/neighbour countries...rather than from donors or Western based/image entity, that would enhance success of democratisation more,’ (Interviewee B, 2018, p. 163). By suggesting that recipient governments/organisations should be the forerunners of their democratisation translates into both the arguments of foreign policy determining the donor’s interests and bias in democracy promotion. This helps explain why the lack of clarity of how to promote democracy in the long-term occurs. Both of which strengthen the argument that democracy promotion is in reverse.

A large proportion of participants shared their experiences of the initial approach between donors and recipients being weak and many suggested this as a lesson to be learnt by donors. One participant explained, ‘where that [buy in] is in place, we see the community really supporting the project and contributing towards sustainability,’ (Interviewee J, 2019, p. 181). However, what was frequently highlighted throughout the general findings of the UK, is that the donors have not learnt from past experiences, in relation to getting recipient governments engaged from the onset. This lack of lessons learnt, along with benchmarks not being integrated into the programmes, has led to no permanent outcomes being achieved and recipients are left with democracy promotion in reverse (see Figure 3, p. 92 and Figure 6, p. 97). By using the Conceptual Framework, a uniform approach to what should be promoted and how to do so would help overcome the issues of lack of sustainability and reduce donor bias. The interviewees namely expressed free and fair elections and accountable governance as successful indicators of democracy promotion programmes.

Chapter 9 (see p. 230) offered a comparison of how the US promotes democracy to how the UK promotes democracy. Figure 11 (p. 120) presented examples of USAID funded democracy promotion programmes, in the same likeness as Figure 7 (see p. 108). Participatory engagement and impartial administration were selected by the interviewees as important objectives of US democracy promotion. This coincides with what majority of the UK participants who also acknowledged both as the most important benchmark for measuring democracy promotion. The

common trend between the US and the UK lies within foreign policy being a primary goal of democracy promotion (see Table 2, p. 76). One interviewee stated, 'governments use democracy programmes to support foreign policy goals,' (Interviewee C, 2018, p. 232). Furthermore, Interviewee D shared Interviewee C's sentiment, 'on an idealistic level we [the donors] anticipate it [project] is mutually beneficial for both sides, but in reality, the benefits usually are greater of one side than the other; the side that has more leverage and power,' (Interviewee D, 2018, p. 239), reiterating the argument that donors benefit more from democracy promotion and as a result, democracy promotion is in reverse. The interviewee also addressed the issue of the lack of lessons learnt, impacting democratisation in recipient states: 'we expect recipients to skip to democracy and make that leap without going through the motions of our own democratic journeys,' (Interviewee D, 2018, p. 244). This observation is critical to understanding why there is little to no lasting impact or longevity, to donor programmes. This is why recipient states struggle to fully sustain democratisation. It further supports the argument that donors promoting democracy in their own self-image is not a successful way to facilitate democratisation in a developing nation. All of this equates to recipients struggling to sustain democracy and as highlighted previously, there is a decline/crisis in democracy and democracy promotion is subsequently in reverse because it is contributing factor. The argument that the donor's self-image hinders successful democracy promotion is further strengthened when Interviewee D questioned the idea of democracy promotion through donor experiences: 'can you really replicate and overlay [our] system on another country and expect the same result? That is the question we need to ask,' (Interviewee D, 2018, p. 245). If implementers ask these questions during the project design phase and then seek to integrate the benchmarks (fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration) into programme objectives, the likelihood that democracy promotion will successfully be sustained is greater (a conclusion derived from the evidence presented by all interviewees).

11.4 Policy Recommendations and Future Research Challenges

The questions raised by the research puzzles (see p. 9) and the aims of the three research objectives (see p. 16), have produced evidence that supports the argument this thesis makes of democracy promotion in reverse. As a result of this, recommendations to specialists within the field of how to improve UK and US democracy promotion programmes to ensure they are sustainable, without donor bias and benefit the recipients, have been made. The idea of democracy promotion in reverse is an important concept for practitioners to take note of in order to understand the constraints of implementing democracy promotion. Therefore, a recommendation is a Conceptual Framework such as the one created by this thesis, offers a potential solution by offering benchmarks that can be integrated into projects, easily, and help measure the successes/failures of other international development programmes.

However, future research challenges are in the fact that this thesis has established a model for UK and US democracy promotion, but can it be applied to other donor nations? There is a need for further research into other donor nations in order to generalise democracy promotion is in reverse from donors in general and globally. A thematic, path-finding study could help deliver this and give further investigation into more recipient nations. This could also incorporate all five indices of the GSoD (see Figure 2, p. 67). Furthermore, using the case studies of the UK and the US refers to only a Western perspective. It would be useful to compare Western democracy promotion to non-Western approaches. It would then be enlightening to use these comparisons to incorporate more knowledge and insight into sender countries' relationship with donors, as well as vice versa.

11.5 Final Reflections

This thesis's contribution to knowledge has been to argue UK and US democracy promotion is in reverse. The questions asked revolved around what democracy promotion is, how it is implemented and who is promoted it.

Chapters 2 (see p. 19) and 3 (see p. 77) presented an array of literature and theories by which to explore the question of what democracy promotion is. As summarised in Table 1 (see p. 55) and Table 2 (see p. 76), democratisation and foreign policy show there are keystones for what elements of democracy, as a regime, are necessary for democratising states and how it is done. Subsequently, these theories presented various arguments made by scholars to explain different ways of what democracy promotion is and how it is failing. The encompassing arguments made by academics within the literature, highlighted the point this thesis argues are the reasons for democracy promotion in reverse.

Chapter 5 (p. 95) created a Conceptual Framework that offers the evaluation of UK/US democracy promotion by producing a way to measure the successes and failures of democracy promotion. It also provides alternative ways to ensure and help advance democracy promotion for the benefit of the recipient states, rather than for the benefits of the UK and the US. The Framework identifies fundamental rights, participatory engagement and impartial administration as benchmarks essential to ensuring democracy promotion is long-term. As represented by Chapter 5 (p. 95), there are clear examples of how UK democracy promotion is in reverse (see Figures 8, p. 112; 9, p. 116; 10 p. 119) and how US democracy promotion is in reverse (see Figures 12 p. 125; 13 p. 128; 14 p. 132). The Conceptual Framework validates this thesis's core argument of democracy promotion in reverse and presents evidence to strengthen that argument. It is created to highlight how uniformity in promoting democracy can be achieved.

The Empirical Investigations and Findings chapters addressed whether donor's lack of retrospective evaluation and lessons learnt contribute to democracy promotion in reverse. There is overwhelming evidence presented by UK participants, in particular, that UK international development does not provide sufficient timeframes for projects. What this has led to is a lack of implementing substantial training to locals to ensure donor-led democratisation is sustainable. The US participants shared a more positive experience of USAID funded projects. USAID provides a long-term presence in recipient nations, but the weaknesses of US democracy

promotion are with the primary aims being foreign policy based and the acknowledgment that promoting in the US's flawed self-image of democracy is problematic. This chapter concludes that the experience and knowledge provided by practical implementers of democracy promotion have confirmed that democracy promotion is in reverse.

The concluding argument of this thesis is in the coining of the term 'democracy promotion is in reverse'. The UK and the US have promoted democracy in their own self-image, which has hindered democratisation as recipient states cannot sustain a regime, they have no experience of and are not culturally/historically rooted in. The recommendation to implementers of democracy promotion is to use generic universal guidelines (such as the Conceptual Framework) that allow for aims to be clearly embedded into projects. This will lessen the influence of donor-centric motives and enhance the chances of permanent outcomes and help developing nations, democratise. If this does not change, democracy will continue to decline, and democracy promotion will remain in reverse.

Appendix 1: The IDEA Framework to Democratisation

IDEA aims to allow recipient nations the ability to assess their own democratic progression, rather than allowing Western influences. The main features of the International IDEA approach may be summarized as follows.

- Only citizens and others who live in the country being assessed should carry out a democracy assessment, since only they can know from experience how their country's history and culture shape its approach to democratic principles.
- A democracy assessment by citizens and residents of a country may be mobilized by government or external agencies only under strict safeguards of the independence of the assessment.
- The prime purpose of democracy assessment is to contribute to public debate and consciousness raising, and the exercise ought to allow for the expression of popular understanding as well as any elite consensus.
- The assessment should assist in identifying priorities for reform and monitoring their progress.
- The criteria for assessment should be derived from clearly defined democratic principles and should embrace the widest range of democracy issues, while allowing assessors to choose priorities for examination according to local needs. (Beetham, et al., 2008, p. 19)
- The assessments should be qualitative judgements of strengths and weaknesses in each area, strengthened by quantitative measures where appropriate.
- The assessors should choose benchmarks or standards for assessment, based on the country's history, regional practice and international norms, as they think appropriate.
- The assessment process should involve wide public consultation, including a national workshop to validate the findings.
- Old as well as new democracies can and should be subject to a similar framework of assessment. (Beetham, et al., 2008, p. 20)

The key democratic principles are those of popular control and political equality. (Beetham, et al., 2008, p. 20).

How IDEA carries out an assessment:

STEP 1: INITIAL DECISION AND AGENDA SETTING (International IDEA , 2017)

- define purpose, benchmarks and comparators;
- decide on content, priorities, time frame and resources;
- select a multi-stakeholder and multi-disciplinary core team and consultative team;
- compile the range of data sources to be used;
- plan consultations with a variety of stakeholders; and
- decide on a publication and dissemination strategy.

STEP 2: DATA COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND ORGANIZATION (International IDEA , 2017)

- construct a bibliography;
- collect, identify and sort data;
- arrange and prioritize any issues that emerge;
- confirm answers to search questions; and
- write a draft assessment report.

STEP 3: NATIONAL WORKSHOP/VALIDATION (International IDEA , 2017)

- invite all key stakeholders, ensuring a gender balance and the participation of marginalized groups; and
- link the findings to a reform agenda.

STEP 4: PUBLICATION, DISSEMINATION AND PUSH FOR REFORM (International IDEA , 2017)

- disseminate results to target audiences; and
- provide input to reform proposals.

STEP 5: EVALUATION AND NEXT STEPS (International IDEA , 2017)

- evaluate and assess the assessment process, outputs and outcomes;
- decide whether to institutionalize the assessment; and

-engage in follow-up activities. (International IDEA , 2017)

Basic principles:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>popular control over public decision making and decision makers</i> • <i>equality of respect and voice between citizens in the exercise of that control</i> 		
Mediating values	Requirements	Institutional means of realization
Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rights to participate • Capacities/resources to participate • Agencies for participation • Participatory culture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil and political rights system • Economic, social and cultural rights • Elections, parties, NGOs • Education for citizenship
Authorization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Validation of constitution • Choice of office holders/ programmes • Control of elected over non-elected executive personnel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Referendums • Free and fair elections • Systems of subordination to elected officials
Representation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legislature representative of main currents of popular opinion • All public institutions representative of social composition of electorate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electoral and party system • Anti-discrimination laws • Affirmative action policies
Accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clear lines of accountability, legal, financial, political, to ensure effective and honest performance; civil service and judicial integrity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rule of law, separation of powers • Independent auditing process • Legally enforceable standards • Strong powers for scrutinizing legislation
Transparency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government open to legislative and public scrutiny and debate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Parliament as a forum for national debate • Freedom of information laws • Independent media
Responsiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accessibility of government to electors and different sections of public opinion in policy formation, implementation and service delivery 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Systematic, open and accessible procedures and channels of public consultation • Effective legal redress • Local government close to people
Solidarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tolerance of diversity at home • Support for democratic governments and popular struggles for democracy abroad 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civic and human rights education • International human rights law • UN and other agencies • International NGOs

Appendix 2: Participant Interview Guide

Thesis title: Democracy promotion in reverse: An evaluation of the UK's and the US's democracy promotion programmes (2005-2017)

This thesis intends to explore the argument that democracy promotion is in reverse. As discussed in the literature review, democratisation is at the forefront of donors promoting democracy. The latest addition to democratisation theory is that donors are driven by their foreign policy initiatives in order to target their recipients for democracy promotion programmes. Qualitative data is needed to meaningfully explore the argument that democracy promotion is in reverse. This open semi-structured interview guide will consist of five sections under the topics of: the global state of democracy, area of democracy that should be promoted, democracy promotion objectives, the successes and failures of democracy promotion and motives for donor states to promote democracy.

You will be given a series of questions and will be asked to talk about your preferred options to questions. After each question you will be asked for your reasons and rationale behind your answers with the aim of creating an open discussion based upon the questions structured. If you have any other views not reflected in this guide, you are free to discuss those thoughts too.

The Global State of Democracy

This section of questions will focus on how the participant views the global 'state' of democracy, (Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017) today.

1. How do you view the state of global democracy today?

- Excellent shape
- Good shape
- Neither good nor bad
- Bad shape
- Inexistent

2. What are the main reasons for this view? (Above question)
3. When building a democracy, what do you are the most important things?
 - Fundamental Rights (e.g. access to justice, civil liberties, social rights and equality)
 - Checks on Government (e.g. effective parliament, judicial independence, media integrity)
 - Impartial Administration (e.g. predictable enforcement, absence of corruption)
 - Participatory Engagement (e.g. civil society participation, electoral participation, direct democracy, subnational elections)
 - Representative government? (e.g. clean elections, inclusive suffrage, free political parties, elected government)
4. Why do you regard these are being the most important?

Promoting democracy

This section uses the sixteen sub-section of Skaaning and Jiménez's to identify the participants opinion on what elements of democracy to promote.

5. You have chosen important elements of democracy promotion; how would you promote these aspects of democracy? Through:
 - Diplomatic contact/negotiations
 - Financial aid
 - Trade deals
 - Disaster relief
 - Other (please specify)
6. If one would like to improve democracy, what should we promote?
 - Free and fair elections

- Transparency
- Protection/advocacy of human rights
- Freedom of speech
- Accountable government
- Other (please specify)

7. How important do you think these are for promoting democracy?

Free and fair elections

- Very important
- Important
- Neutral
- Unimportant
- Irrelevant

Transparency

- Very important
- Important
- Neutral
- Unimportant
- Irrelevant

Protection/advocacy of human rights

- Very important
- Important
- Neutral

Unimportant

Irrelevant

Freedom of speech

Very important

Important

Neutral

Unimportant

Irrelevant

Accountable government

Very important

Important

Neutral

Unimportant

Irrelevant

Other

Very important

Important

Neutral

Unimportant

Irrelevant

8. From your experience, which elements of building a democracy have been successfully promoted so far?

- Free and fair elections
- Transparency
- Protection/advocacy of human rights
- Freedom of speech
- Accountable government
- Other (please specify)
- Not successful

Practical democracy promotion

9. Who is best positioned to promote democracy? (Rank from 1 (best positioned)- 6 (least positioned))

- Government departments
- Parliaments
- NGOs
- Impartial think tanks
- Charitable organisations
- Other (please specify)

10. What are the main reasons for these/those answers?

11. Given your experience of projects, what improvements can be made to enhance their success?

Criteria of evaluating democracy promotion

12. What criteria, in your opinion, does a recipient country need to meet in order to be considered for a democracy promotion project?

- Politically unstable
- Weak economically
- Disaster prone area
- Potential regional ally
- Security threat/interest
- Other (please specify)

13. How do you judge the success of projects in recipient countries?

- A) What short-term successes are there?
- B) What long-term successes are there?

14. Can you think of any projects that have had long term democracy promotion success and why?

15. Consequently, what indicators show a project is not successful for the donor country?

- Financial expenditure
- Low level of participation from recipient nation
- Project incompleteness
- Lack of communication between donor and recipient
- Lack of planning/implementation
- Limited resources
- Other (please specify)

16. Consequently, what indicators show a project is not successful for recipient country?

- Initial hostility to project

- No follow up period
- Lack of long-term support
- Regression
- Other (please specify)

Democracy promotion in reverse?

17. What motives does a donor state have for promoting democracy in a particular recipient state?

18. How important do you think the UK/US's own view of its democracy, is when they promote democracy abroad?

- Very important
- Important
- Neither important nor unimportant
- Not important
- Irrelevant

19. If so, how do you think the self-image and understanding of their own democracy relayed into recipient countries through projects. If not, why not?

20. Who will benefit from democracy promotion in the long-term: the donor or the recipient?
(Ask for examples)

Appendix 3: Participant Information Sheet



Participant Information Sheet

Title: Democracy Promotion in Reverse? An Evaluation of the US and the UK's

Democracy Promotion Programmes (2005-2017)

I am Meera Patel, PhD researcher based at the Bournemouth Disaster Management Centre (DMC) in the Faculty of Management. I am researching the conceptual idea and practical implementation of democracy promotion (in reverse). You are invited to take part in this study however, it is necessary to understand why the research is being carried out and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. Please do not hesitate to contact me, Meera Patel the PhD student and primary researcher for this project, if anything be unclear or any questions arise of concern. My details are at the bottom of this participant sheet.

1. What is the purpose of the study?

Using an analysis of the US's and the UK's projects, run by the two largest donor organisations USAID and DFID, this PhD study will investigate how projects promote democracy. This study evaluates how democracy is promoted within projects and how it gives benefits to the donor organisations. It also analyses whether sometimes those benefits can be higher for the donor than for the recipient nations, and explores what can be done to improve democracy promotion projects to recipient nations, in practice. The purpose of the interviews, using a semi-structured format, is to discover why and how projects prioritise certain forms of democracy promotion, what impacts projects have had on recipient nations and why there may or may not be benefits for the donor organisations and countries, in practice. Any data collected will seek to test how/if projects promote democracy.

2. Why have I been chosen?

You have been chosen as you have unique knowledge and/or managerial experience in the area of policymaking and/or have contributed to knowledge regarding democracy promotion projects. Recruitment will be from the US and UK (USAID and DFID, or their agents) and are an identifiable group directly associated with democratisation/democracy promotion. Participants will be approached directly via recognised USAID/DFID contacts and/or via the DMC. The criteria for participant selection will be: (i) those who have held a managerial position for at least two years and (ii) have been working on projects directly involved with democracy promotion or crisis management. Any input and information expressed within the interviews will be handled without bias, in order to support the analysis and understanding of democracy promotion and using semi-structured interviews also allows time for discussing the premise and practice of democracy promotion in reverse.

3. Do I have to take part?

No, you are free to decide whether to opt in or out of the study. If you would like to take part you have this sheet to use as reference at any point during the study and will be asked to sign a consent form. However, you are free to withdraw your consent at any time and without reason.

4. What do I have to do if I take part?

The interviews will either be done in person (if possible) or via Skype; whichever is preferable for you, the participant. You will be asked a series of questions (see interview guide) and will be asked to talk about your preferred options to questions. After each question you will be asked for your reasons and rationales behind your answers facilitating an open discussion environment and give you time to add your own reflections. The questions allow for and encourage an in-depth conversation about democracy promotion, and provide opportunities for you to offer more detailed opinions and/or comments stemming from your practical experiences. As oppose to a questionnaire, which would not produce detailed opinions or participant experiences. The interview will last approximately 30-45 minutes however, if you feel there is more that you would like to say, it should be possible to meet again or extend the interview there and then. If you consent, the interview will be recorded and then transcribed in order to be quoted in the thesis.

5. What are the possible benefits of taking part?

This study will give you the opportunity to talk about your experiences and express your opinion on democracy promotion. It will allow the freedom to openly discuss issues that are relevant to your field and integral to future explorations into democracy promotion.

6. What are any possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?

The interviews will take time out of your day, but where possible, every effort will be made to minimise hassle and to make sure you're comfortable with the interview process.

7. What will happen if I do not want to carry on with the study?

You have the right to withdraw from being interviewed at any time during or after the interview. Careful consideration and treatment of potential information which could render your identity, such as job titles, will remain anonymous at you, the participant's, request. If you would wish to be named within the project, you will be asked to read and approve the transcripts and sign off on approval of them by a set date, after which you cannot withdraw their data or request it be anonymised. If you want to withdraw, your data will be destroyed.

8. How will my data be collected?

The data recorded from the interview will be transcribed and analysed for a final written project. It will either be directly quoted or used as a reference to democracy promotion. Recorded data will be deleted once transcribed and will be recorded on my own Apple iPhone 7 device. Any recordings for this research will be used only for the analysis of this project. No other use will be made of them without your written permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed access to the original recordings. If you would wish to be named within the project, you will be asked to read and approve the transcripts and sign off on approval of them by a set date, after which you cannot withdraw their data or request it be anonymised.

9. What will happen to the data?

Your data will be kept strictly in accordance of the General Data Protection Regulation (2018) and you will not be identified in the research without your consent. Personal data will be kept for up one

year after the award of the degree and Bournemouth University will hold the information, we collect about you in hard copy and on a BU, password protected secure network where held electronically. Only I and my supervisors will have access to the data.

10. Who is organising and funding the research?

The research is a PhD project undertaken by the support of Bournemouth University's Disaster Management Centre. The project is funded by myself, the PhD researcher.

11. Who has reviewed the study?

This study has been ethically approved by all relevant bodies.

12. Contact details

We do not anticipate any problems to arise during this study, however, if you do have a concern, about any aspect of this study or the conduct of the researcher, please feel free to contact my research supervisor Professor Lee Miles (contact details below).

Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. Contact details are below:

Researcher: Meera Patel, PhD Student

Address: Bournemouth University Disaster Management Centre

Dorset House, Talbot Campus

Poole, BH12 5BB

Tel: (+44) 7757056879

Email: i7600216@bournemouth.ac.uk or meerapatel610@gmail.com

Supervisor: Professor Lee Miles

Address: Bournemouth University Disaster Management Centre

Dorset House, Talbot Campus

Poole, BH12 5BB

Tel: 01202 965801

Email: lmiles@bournemouth.ac.uk

Complaints contact:

Professor Mike Silk, Deputy Dean for Research and Professional Practice, Faculty of Management

Email: researchgovernance@bournemouth.ac.uk

Appendix 4: Participant Agreement Form



Full title of project: Democracy Promotion in Reverse? An Evaluation of the UK and the US's
Democracy Promotion Programmes (2005-2017)

Name, position and contact details of researcher: Meera Patel, PhD Student.

Address: Bournemouth University Disaster Management Centre

Dorset House, Talbot Campus

Poole, BH12 5BB

Tel: (+44) 7757056879

Email: i7600216@bournemouth.ac.uk or meerapatel610@gmail.com

Name, position and contact details of supervisor: Professor Lee Miles, Supervisor.

Address: Bournemouth University Disaster Management Centre

Dorset House, Talbot Campus

Poole, BH12 5BB

Tel: 01202 965801

Email: lmiles@bournemouth.ac.uk

<i>Please tick the appropriate boxes</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
Taking Part:		
I have read and understood the Project Participant Information Sheet	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I confirm that I have had the opportunity to ask questions.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I understand that my participation is voluntary.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I understand that I am free to withdraw up to the point where the transcriptions are processed and be referred to as anonymous, so my identity cannot be determined.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Should I not wish to answer any particular question(s), I am free to decline.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I understand that the interview will be digitally recorded (audio) and then transcribed.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I agree to take part in the project.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Use of the information I provide for this project only:		
I understand my personal details such as name, job title and role will not be revealed to people outside this project.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I understand that my words may be quoted in publications, reports, web pages and other research outputs. Please choose one of the following two options: I would like my real name used in the above. I would not like my real name to be used in the above and remain anonymous. * Transcripts and withdrawals will be arranged as follows: - For named participants, you will be able to read and approve the transcripts and sign off approval of them by a set date, after which they cannot withdraw their data or request it be anonymised. You will be able to contact me via email or telephone. - For anonymous participants, you can also contact me via email or telephone requesting your withdrawal and your transcripts will be destroyed.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Use of the information I provide beyond this project:		
I understand that the anonymised transcript from the interview will be deposited in BU's Online Research Data Repository ⁵ .	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

⁵ Other Archives can be listed (if applicable). More detail can be provided here so that decisions can be made separately about audio, video and transcripts

References

- Abrahamsen, R., 2013. African Democracy- Still disciplined after all these years?. *University of Ottawa International Relations*, 27(2), pp. 241-246.
- Africa News, November 2017. *Africa News*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.africanews.com/2017/11/21/somaliland-ruling-party-candidate-wins-nov-13-polls-media-reports/>
[Accessed 14 March 2018].
- Alden, C. & Aran, A., 2017. *Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches*. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.
- Alexander, C., 2010. *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Allison, G. T. & Halperin, M. H., 1972. Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications. *World Politics*, Volume 24, pp. 40-79.
- Arat, F. Z., 1988. Democracy and Economic Development: Modernization Theory Revisited. *Comparative Politics*, 21(1), pp. 21-36.
- Azarian, R., 2011. Potentials and Limitations of Comparative Method in Social Science. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 1(4), pp. 113-125.
- Bailey, K. D., 1994. *Methods of Social Research*. 4th ed. New York: The Free Press.
- Barriball, L. K. & While, A., 1994. Collecting data using a semi-structured interview: a discussion paper. *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, Volume 19, pp. 328-335.
- Bazeley, P. & Jackson, K., 2013. Perspectives: Qualitative computing with NVivo. In: P. Bazeley & K. Jackson, eds. *Qualitative Data Analysis with NVivo*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 1-23.
- Beetham, D., Carvalho, E., Landman, T. & Weir, S., 2008. *Assessing the Quality of Democracy: A Practical Guide*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
- Beichelt, T., 2012. The Research Field of Democracy Promotion. *Living Reviews in Democracy*, pp. 1-13.
- Bekaj, A., 2017. Introduction. In: *The Global State of Democracy: Exploring Democracy's Resilience*. 1st ed. Stockholm: International IDEA, pp. xiii-xvi.
- Berry, J. J., 2012. Democracy Promotion and ODA: A Comparative Analysis. *Contemporary Politics*, 18(3), pp. 303-324.
- Bhattachan, K. B., 2005. Nepal: From absolute monarchy to "democracy" and back again- the need for inclusive democracy. *The International Journal of Inclusive Democracy*, pp. 1-6.
- Boin, A., 2009. The New World of Crises and Crisis Management: Implications for Policymaking and Research. *Review for Policy Research*, 26(4), pp. 367-377.
- Boote, D. N. & Beile, P., 2005. Scholars Before Researchers: On the Centrality of the Dissertation Literature Review in Research Preparation. *Educational Researcher*, 34(6), pp. 3-15.
- Börzel, T. A., 2015. The Noble West and the Dirty Rest? Western Democracy Promoters and Illiberal Regional Powers. *Democratization*, 22(3), pp. 519-535.

- Bowen, G. A., 2009. Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method. *Qualitative Research Journal*, 9(2), pp. 27-40.
- Brennan, J., 2016. *Against Democracy*. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Britten, N., 1995. Qualitative interviews in medical research. *Qualitative Research*, Volume 311, pp. 251-253.
- Browne, K., 2005. Snowball Sampling: Using Social Networks to Research Non-heterosexual Women. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 8(1), pp. 47-60.
- Bryman, A., 2006. Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Research: How is it Done?. *Qualitative Research*, Volume 6, pp. 97-113.
- Burcher, C. U. & Bisarya, S., 2017. Threats from within: Democracy's Resilience to Backsliding. In: *The Global State of Democracy: Exploring Democracy's Resilience*. Stockholm: International IDEA, pp. 70-97.
- Burnell, P., 2006. *Promoting Democracy Backwards*. Madrid: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE).
- Burnell, P., 2007. *Does International Democracy Promotion Work?*, Bonn: German Development Institute.
- Burnell, P., 2008. From Evaluating Democracy Assistance to Appraising Democracy Promotion. *Political Studies*, Volume 56, pp. 414-434.
- Burnell, P., 2017. *Promoting Democracy Abroad: Policy and Performance*. Abingdon, New York: Routledge.
- Cambanis, T., 2014. *Boston Globe*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/04/26/how-can-america-really-promote-democracy-abroad/3IxMLiJHdEnaIolNkeOGuK/story.html>
[Accessed 12 July 2017].
- Carothers, T. & Youngs, R., 2017. *Foreign Affairs*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-04-11/democracy-not-dying>
[Accessed 6 January 2018].
- Carothers, T., 1999. *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Carothers, T., 2002. End of the Transition Paradigm. *Journal of Democracy*, 13(1), pp. 5-21.
- Carothers, T., 2004. *Critical Missions: Essays on Democracy Promotion*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment.
- Carothers, T., 2006. *Does democracy promotion have a future?*. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Carothers, T., 2006. The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion. *Foreign Affairs*, Issue March/April, pp. 1-7.
- Carothers, T., 2006. The Standard Lament. In: T. Carothers, ed. *Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies*. Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 3-18.

- Carothers, T., 2009. Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental. *Journal of Democracy*, 20(1), pp. 5-19.
- Carothers, T., 2017. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. [Online] Available at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/09/06/democracy-promotion-under-trump-what-has-been-lost-what-remains-pub-73021> [Accessed 6 January 2018].
- Carothers, T. & Brechenmacher, S., 2014. *Closing Space: Democracy and Human Rights Under Fire*, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Carothers, T. & de Gramont, D., 2011. *Aiding Governance in Developing Countries: Progress Amid Uncertainties*, Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Caryl, C., 2013. *Foreign Policy*. [Online] Available at: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/06/the-democracy-boondoggle-in-iraq/> [Accessed 28 November 2017].
- Chandler, D., 2007. The Other-regarding ethics of the 'empire in denial'. In: D. Chandler & V. Heins, eds. *Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy: Pitfalls, Possibilities and Paradoxes*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 161-180.
- Chandler, D. & Heins, V., 2007. *Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy: Pitfalls, Possibilities and Paradoxes*. London and New York: Routledge.
- ClimateTechWiki: A Clean Technology Platform, n.d. *Water Users Groups*, s.l.: s.n.
- Corrales, J., 2015. Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela. *Journal of Democracy*, 26(2), pp. 37-51.
- Crawford, G., 2001. *Foreign Aid and Political Reform: A Comparative Analysis of Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Crawford, G., 2003. Promoting Democracy from Without- Learning from Within (Part I). *Democratization*, 10(1), pp. 77-98.
- Creswell, J. W., 2003. *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: SAGE Publications.
- Creswell, J. W., 2014. *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. 4th ed. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi: SAGE Publications.
- Crouch, M. & McKenzie, H., 2006. The logic of small samples in interview-based. *Social Science Information*, 45(4), pp. 483-499.
- Curtis, D., 2002. *Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemma & Dissension*, London: Overseas Development Institute .
- Dahl, R. A., 2000. *On Democracy*. Yale Nota Bene (Revised) ed. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
- Denton, J. R. E. & Voth, B., 2016. *Social Fragmentation and the Decline of American Democracy: The End of the Social Contract*. Switzerland: Springer.
- Denzin, N. K., 1970. *The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods*. New York: Aldine.
- Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, 2011. *UK Government*. [Online]

Available at:

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67475/Building-stability-overseas-strategy.pdf

[Accessed 18 January 2018].

Department for International Development; UK Aid, 2016. *Civil Society Partnership Review*, London: Department for International Development; UK Aid.

Department for International Development, 2008. *Justice and Accountability (Briefing DFID Practice Paper)*, London: Department for International Development.

Department for International Development, 2010. *Building Peaceful States and Societies*, London: Department for International Development; UKAID.

Department for International Development, 2011. *Operational Plan 2011-2015 DFID Somalia*, London: Department for International Development.

Department for International Development, 2014. *Operational Plan 2011-2016*, London: DFID Somalia.

Department for International Development, 2015. *UK Aid: Tackling global challenges in the national interest*, London: HM Treasury.

Department for International Development, 2015. *UK Aid: Tackling Global Challenges in the National Interest*, London: HM Treasury; Department of International Development.

Department for International Development, 2016. *Annual Review- Summary Report*, London: Department for International Development.

Department for International Development, 2016. *Civil Society Partnership Review*, London: UKAID and Department for International Development.

Department for International Development, 2017. *Department for International Development*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-international-development>

[Accessed 6 July 2017].

Department for International Development, 2017. *Somalia Security and Justice Programme*, London: Department for International Development.

Department for International Development, 2018. *Development Tracker*. [Online]

Available at: <https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-205069>

[Accessed 6 April 2018].

Development Assistance Committee, 2018. *OECD DAC Aid at a Glance*, France: Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee.

Development Assistance Committee, 2018. *OECD DAC Aid at a glance, United States*, France: Organisation of Economic Co-operation, Development Assistance Committee.

Diamond, L., 1996. Is the Third Wave Over? *Journal of Democracy* Vol.7(3) pp. 20-37. *Journal of Democracy*, 7(3), pp. 20-37.

Diamond, L., 2015. Facing Up to the Democratic Recession. *Journal of Democracy*, 26(1), pp. 141-155.

- Diamond, L., Plattner, M. F. & Walker, C., 2016. *Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University.
- Drummond, J., Metcalfe-Hough, V., Willitts-King, B. & Bryant, J., 2017. *Beyond Donorship: UK Foreign Policy and Humanitarian Action*, London: Humanitarian Policy Group.
- Drury, A. C., Olson, R. S. & Van Belle, D. A., 2005. The Politics of Humanitarian Aid: US Foreign Disaster Assistance 1964- 1995. *Journal of Politics*, 67(2), pp. 454-473.
- Dunn, K., 1999. The Democracy Discourse in International Relations: Identify, development and Africa. In: B. A. Ojo, ed. *Contemporary African Politics: A Comparative Study of Political Transition to Democratic Legitimacy*. New York, Oxford: University Press of America, Inc., pp. 1-23.
- Eckstein, H., 2015. *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway*. Princeton and London: Princeton University Press.
- Elliot, C., 2017. *Democracy Promotion as Foreign Policy: Temporal othering in international relations*. Oxford, New York: Routledge.
- Ensalaco, M., 2010. *Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Epstein, S. B., Serafino, N. M. & Miko, F. T., 2007. *Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy?*, Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service.
- Feuer, S., 2017. *Tunisia, A Success Story?*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/tunisia/2017-07-06/tunisia-success-story>
[Accessed 28 August 2018].
- Financial Tracking Service, 2015. *Financial Tracking Service*. [Online]
Available at: <https://fts.unocha.org/donors/2917/flows/2015>
[Accessed 4 January 2017].
- Ford, R. & Goodwin, M., 2017. A Nation Divided. *Journal of Democracy*, 28(1), pp. 17-29.
- Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2016. *Foreign & Commonwealth Office Gov.UK*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2015/human-rights-and-democracy-report-2015#democratic-values-and-the-rule-of-law>
[Accessed 14 July 2017].
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2013. *Foreign and Commonwealth Office*. [Online]
Available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/372586/Human_Rights_and_Democracy_Programme_informational_booklet.pdf
[Accessed 17 January 2018].
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2014. *FCO Human Rights and Democracy Programme Strategy*, London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2014. *The Human Rights and Democracy Programme*, London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2016. *UK Government*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/magna-carta-fund-for-human-rights-and-democracy>
[Accessed 8 January 2018].

- Freedom House , 2017. *Freedom House*. [Online]
Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017>
[Accessed 6 July 2017].
- Freedom House, 2005. *Freedom in the World 2005, Afganistan*, Washington D.C.: Freedom House.
- Freedom House, 2005. *Freedom in the World 2005, Jordan*, Washington D.C.: Freedom House.
- Freedom House, 2005. *Freedom in the World 2005, Kenya*, Washington D.C.: Freedom House.
- Freedom House, 2005. *Freedom in the World 2005, Pakistan*, Washington D.C.: Freedom House.
- Freedom House, 2010. *Freedom in the World 2010, Afghanistan*, Washington D.C.: Freedom House.
- Freedom House, 2010. *Freedom in the World 2010, Ethiopia*, Washington D.C.: Freedom House.
- Freedom House, 2015. *Freedom in the World 2015: Discarding Democracy: Return to the Iron Fist*. [Online]
Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.W4kX2yRKjIU>
[Accessed 31 August 2018].
- Freedom House, 2017. *Freedom in the World 2017, Afghanistan*, Washington D.C.: Freedom House.
- Freedom House, 2017. *Freedom in the World 2017, Ethiopia* , Washington D.C.: Freedom House.
- Freedom House, 2017. *Freedom in the World 2017, Jordan*, Washington D.C.: Freedom House.
- Freedom House, 2017. *Freedom in the World 2017, Kenya*, Washington D.C.: Freedom House.
- Freedom House, 2017. *Freedom in the World 2017, Pakistan*, Washington D.C.: Freedom House.
- Freedom House, 2017. *Freedom in the World 2017, Syria*, Washington D.C.: Freedom House.
- Freedom House, 2017. *Freedom in the World South Sudan, 2017*, Washington D.C.: Freedom House.
- Freedom House, 2018. *About Freedom House*. [Online]
Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/about-us>
[Accessed 11 September 2018].
- Freedom House, 2018. *Freedom in the World 2018: United States*. [Online]
Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/united-states>
[Accessed 31 August 2018].
- Freedom House, 2018. *Freedom World 2018 Table of Country Scores*. [Online]
Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2018-table-country-scores>
[Accessed 29 August 2018].
- Freedom House, 2019. *Freedom in the World 2019*, Washington D.C.: Freedom House.
- Fukuyama, F., 1989. The End of History?. *The National Interest*, Issue Summer, pp. 1-18.

- Fukuyama, F., 2015. Why is Democracy Performing So Poorly?. In: *Democracy in Decline?*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, pp. 11-24.
- Fukuyama, F. & McFaul, M., 2007. Should Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted?. *The Washington Quarterly*, 31(1), pp. 23-45.
- Gammelgaard, K. & Holmøyvik, E., 2014. Writing Democracy: The Norwegian Constitution 1814-2014. In: *Writing Democracy: The Norwegian Constitution 1814-2014*. New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp. 1-17.
- Ganguly, S. & Shoup, B., 2005. Nepal: Between Dictatorship and Anarchy. *Journal of Democracy*, pp. 129-143.
- Ghali, B. B.-., 1996. *An Agenda for Democratisation*, New York: UN Department of Public Information.
- Gillham, B., 2007. *Developing a Questionnaire*. 2nd ed. London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group.
- Gill, P., Stewart, K., Treasure, E. & Chadwick, B., 2008. Methods of data collection in qualitative research: interviews and focus groups. *British Dental Journal*, 204(6), pp. 291-295.
- Global Challenges Research Fund, 2017. *UK Strategy for the Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF)*, London: UK Research and Innovation.
- Grayling, A. C., 2017. *Democracy and Its Crisis*. London: Oneworld Publications.
- Grimm, S. & Leininger, J., 2012. Not All Good Things Go Together: Conflicting Objectives in Democracy Promotion. *Democratization*, 19(3), pp. 391-414.
- Guo, S., 1999. Democratic Transition: A Critical Overview. *Issues & Studies*, 35(4), pp. 133-148.
- Hart, C., 1998. *Doing a Literature Review: Releasing the Social Science Research Imagination*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE Publications.
- Hassan, O., 2008. Bush's Freedom Agenda: Ideology and the Democratization of the Middle East. *Democracy and Security*, 4(3), pp. 268-289.
- Hayek, F. A., 2005. *The Road to Serfdom: with The Intellectuals and Socialism*, London: The Institute of Economic Affairs.
- Hearn, J., 1997. Foreign Aid, Democratisation and Civil Society in Africa: A Study of South Africa, Ghana and Uganda. *Institute of Development Studies*, Volume Discussion Paper 368, pp. 1-28.
- Hearn, J., 2002. The US Democratic Experiment in Ghana. In: T. Zack-Williams, D. Frost & A. Thomson, eds. *Africa in Crisis: New Challenges and Possibilities*. London, Sterling West Virginia: Pluto Press, pp. 97-108.
- Hegel, G. W. F., 1991. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hill, C., 2003. *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hobolt, S. B., 2016. The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, A Divided Continent. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(9), pp. 1259-1277.

- Howell, J. & Pearce, J., 2001. *Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration*. London: Lynne Reinner.
- Huber, D., 2015. *Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy: Identity and Interests in US, EU and Non-Western Democracies*. UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hudson, V. M., 2005. Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Volume 1, pp. 1-30.
- Huntington, S. P., 1991. Democracy's Third Wave. *Journal of Democracy*, 2(2), pp. 12-34.
- Huntington, S. P., 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Huntington, S. P., 1993. The Clash of Civilizations. *Foreign Affairs*, 72(3), pp. 22-49.
- IDEA, 2017. *IDEA*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.idea.int/data-tools/tools/state-democracy-assessments>
[Accessed 10 May 2017].
- Indresøyde, . E., 2007. Democracy in Norway in a Historical Perspective. In: *Learning Democracy: A Resource Book*. s.l.:Montfort Media, pp. 79-95.
- International IDEA , 2017. *International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: How to do an Assessment*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.idea.int/node/255909/>
[Accessed 27 June 2017].
- Interviewee A, 2018. *Global State of Democracy Today* [Interview] (6 June 2018).
- Interviewee B, 2018. *Global State of Democracy Today* [Interview] (5 July 2018).
- Interviewee C, 2018. *Global State of Democracy Today* [Interview] (5 November 2018).
- Interviewee D, 2018. *Global State of Democracy Today* [Interview] (9 October 2018).
- Interviewee E, 2019. *Global State of Democracy Today* [Interview] (22 January 2019).
- Interviewee F, 2019. *Global State of Democracy Today* [Interview] (28 January 2019).
- Interviewee G, 2019. *Global State of Democracy Today* [Interview] (31 January 2019).
- Interviewee H, 2019. *Global State of Democracy Today* [Interview] (1 February 2019).
- Interviewee I, 2019. *Global State of Democracy Today* [Interview] (7 February 2019).
- Interviewee J, 2019. *Global State of Democracy Today* [Interview] (14 February 2019).
- Interviewee K, 2019. *Global State of Democracy Today* [Interview] (21 February 2019).
- Interviewee L, 2019. *Global State of Democracy Today* [Interview] (22 February 2019).
- Interviewee M, 2019. *Global State of Democracy Today* [Interview] (11 March 2019).
- Isyar, O. G., 2008. Definition and Management of International Crisis. *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 13(4), pp. 1-48.
- Jessop, B., 2016. Developments in Marxist Theory. In: K. Nash, A. Scott & E. Amenta, eds. *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology*. Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 7-16.

- Jones, C. M., 2012. Theoretical Perspectives. In: S. W. Hook & C. M. Jones, eds. *Routledge Handbook of American Foreign Policy*. New York: Routledge, pp. 59-132.
- Kagan, R., 2015. The Weight of Geopolitics. In: L. Diamond & M. F. Plattner, eds. *Democracy in Decline?*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Karkoszka, A., 2005. Crisis Management: The Transformation of National and International Systems of Response. *The Quarterly Journal*, Issue Summer, pp. 33-42.
- Kartman, K., 2007. *Worldwide Promotion of Democracy: Challenges, Roles and Strategy of the EU*. Brussels, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
- Kotler, P., 2016. *Democracy in Decline: Rebuilding its Future*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Dehli, Singapore: SAGE Publications.
- Krueger, R. A. & Casey, M. A., 2015. *Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research*. 5th ed. New Delhi, Singapore, USA: Sage Publications.
- Kurlantzick, J., 2013. *The Globalist*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.theglobalist.com/democracy-goes-into-reverse/>
[Accessed 13 July 2017].
- Kvale, S. & Brinkmann, S., 2009. *InterViews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing*. 2nd ed. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi: SAGE Publications.
- Labuschagne, A., 2003. Qualitative Research - Airy Fairy or Fundamental?. *The Qualitative Report*, 8(1), pp. 100-103.
- Landman, T., 2007. *Developing Democracy: Concepts, Measures, and Empirical Relationships*, s.l.: Background paper prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden.
- Lawoti, M., 2014. Reform and Resistance in Nepal. *Journal of Democracy*, pp. 131-145.
- Lawson, M. L. & Epstein, S. B., 2019. *Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance*, Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service.
- Lazarus, J., 2014. Contesting the Hegemony of Democracy Promotion: Towards the Democracies. *Critical Policy Studies*, 8(1), pp. 41-60.
- Leterme, Y., 2017. Preface. In: *The Global State of Democracy: Exploring Democracy's Resilience*. 1st ed. Stockholm: International IDEA, pp. viii-x.
- Levitsky, S. & Ziblatt, D., 2018. *How Democracies Die*. Great Britain: Viking.
- Lewis, J., 2003. *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Lijphart, A., 1971. Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. *The American Political Science Review*, 65(3), pp. 682-693.
- Lin, C.-S., 2013. Revealing the "Essense" of Things: using Phenomenology in LIS Research. Volume 4, pp. 469-478.
- Linz, J. J. & Stepan, A., 1996. Toward Consolidated Democracies. *Journal of Democracy*, 7(2), pp. 14-30.
- Lipset, S. M., 1959. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. *American Political Science Association*, pp. 69-105.

- Marx, K. & Engels, F., 2016. *The Communist Manifesto (Diversion Classics)*. New York City: Diversion Books.
- Masri, S. M., 2017. *Tunisia: An Arab Anomaly*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McFaul, M., 2004. Democracy Promotion as a World Value. *The Washington Quarterly*, 28(1), pp. 147-163.
- McNabb, D. E., 2010. *Research Methods for Political Science: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*. 2nd ed. New York; London: M.E. Sharpe.
- Mead, W. R., 2015. *The American Interest*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/04/09/the-paradox-of-american-democracy-promotion/>
[Accessed 23 June 2017].
- Merloe, P., 2008. *Promoting Legal Frameworks for Democratic Elections: An NDI Guide for Developing Election Laws and Law Commentaries*, Washington D.C: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.
- Miles, Jr., R. E., 1978. The Origin and Meaning of Miles' Law. *Public Administration Review*, 38(5), pp. 399-403.
- Miliband, R., 1969. *The State Capitalist Society*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Miliband, R., 1977. *Marxism and Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Miller, A., 2018. *DemocraticPost*. [Online]
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/03/15/tunisia-is-one-of-the-arab-worlds-biggest-success-stories-the-trump-administration-doesnt-seem-to-care/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3663f3688e7b
[Accessed 28 August 2018].
- Moore Jr., B., 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Moore, D., 1996. Reading Americans on Democracy in Africa: From CIA to 'good governance'. In: R. Apthorpe & D. Gasper, eds. *Arguing Development Policy: Frames and Discourses*. London, New York: Routledge, pp. 123-149.
- Moss, T. J., 1995. US Policy and Democratisation in africa: The Limits of Liberal Universalism. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 33(2), pp. 189-209.
- Muskhelishvili, M. & Jorjoliani, G., 2012. Georgia's ongoing struggle for a better future continued: democracy promotion through civil society development. In: S. Stewart, ed. *Democracy Promotion and the 'Colour Revolutions'*. 1st ed. Abingdon; New York: Routledge.
- National Democratic Institute, 2018. *NDI Elections*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.ndi.org/what-we-do/elections>
[Accessed 17 January 2018].
- Office of Democracy and Governance, 2002. *USAID*. [Online]
Available at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacm007.pdf
[Accessed 17 January 2018].
- Official Development Assistance, 2016. *Project Evaluation Fund: Kenya - Business and Human Rights Training Courses*, London: Official Development Assistance.

- Ornstein, N. & Mann, T., 2013. *It's Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided With the New Politics of Extremism*. New York: Basic Books.
- Ottaway, M., 2003. *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism*. USA: Carnegie Endowment.
- Patton, M. Q., 2002. *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods*. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: SAGE Publications.
- Perlin, G. et al., 2008. *Literature Review of Applied Research on Democratic Development*. s.l.:International Development Research Centre.
- Piron, L.-H., 2003. *Learning from the UK Department for International Development's Rights-Based Approach to Development Assistance*, London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Plattner, M. F., 2015. Introduction. In: *Democracy in Decline?*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, pp. 3-10.
- Przeworski, A., 1991. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Puddington, A. & Roylance, T., 2017. *Freedom House*. [Online]
Available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017>
[Accessed 6 January 2018].
- Ragin, C. C., 1987. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.
- Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011. *Commercial and Economic Relations between Turkey and the UK*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/commercial-and-economic-relations-between-turkey-and-england.en.mfa>
[Accessed 24 June 2017].
- Rhodes, P. J., 2004. *Athenian Democracy*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Robinson, W. I., 1996. Globalization, the World System, and 'Democracy Promotion' in US Foreign Policy. *Theory and Society*, 25(5), pp. 615-665.
- Robinson, W. I., 1996. *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rosati, J. A., 1981. Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective. *World Politics*, 33(2), pp. 234-252.
- Rose, R. & Shin, D. C., 2001. Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third Wave Democracies. *British Journal of Political Science*, Volume 31, pp. 331-354.
- Rustow, D. A., 1970. Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. *Comparative Politics*, 2(3), pp. 337-363.
- Saldana, J., 2011. *Fundamentals of Qualitative Research*. Oxford: Oxford University Press .
- Saunders, P. J., 2016. *National Interest*. [Online]
Available at: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-promote-democracy-without-demoting-us-interests-18829>
[Accessed 12 July 2017].

- Schlumberger, P. B. a. O., 2010. Promoting Democracy - Promoting Autocracy? International Politics and National Political Regimes. *Contemporary Politics*, 16(1), pp. 1-15.
- Scott, J. M. & Steele, C. A., 2005. Assisting democrats or resisting dictators? The nature and impact of democracy support by the United States National Endowment for Democracy, 1990-1999. *Democratization*, 12(4), pp. 439-460.
- Seidler, V. J., 2018. *Making Sense of Brexit: Democracy, Europe and Uncertain Futures*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Sejersted, F., 2011. *The Age of Social Democracy: Norway and Sweden in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Sharp, G., 2003. *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*. Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution .
- Sinwell, L. & Mbatha, S., 2016. *The Spirit of Marikana: The Rise of Insurgent Trade Unionism in South Africa*. London: Pluto Press.
- Sisk, T., 2017. Democracy's Resilience in a Changing World. In: *The Global State of Democracy: Exploring Democracy's Resilience*. Stockholm: International IDEA, pp. 36-67.
- Skaaning, S.-E. & Jiménez, M., 2017. The Global State of Democracy 1975-2015. In: *The Global State of Democracy: Exploring Democracy's Resilience*. 1st ed. Stockholm: IDEA International, pp. 4-33.
- Soboul, A., 1975. *The French Revolution 1787-1799*. New York: Vintage.
- Springborg, P., 1984. Karl Marx on Democracy, Participation, Voting, and Equality. *Political Theory*, 12(4), pp. 537-556.
- Springborg, P., 1984. Karl Marx on Democracy, Participation, Voting, and Equality. *Political Theory*, 12(4), pp. 537-556.
- Steinke, I., 2004. Quality Criteria in Qualitative Research. In: U. Flick, E. von Kardoff & I. Steinke, eds. *A Companion to Qualitative Research*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 184-190.
- Stokke, O., 1995. Introduction; Aid and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and the State of the Art. In: O. Stokke, ed. *Aid and Political Conditionality*. London: Frank Cass, pp. vii-87.
- Strand, H., Hegre, H., Gates, S. & Dahl, M., 2012. *Democratic Waves? Global Patterns of Democratization, 1816-2008*. Oslo, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo.
- Sussman, L. R., 2002. *Democracy's advocate: the story of Freedom House*. Washington D.C.: Freedom House .
- The Economist, 2016. *The Economist*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21685486-changing-how-britain-disburses-its-foreign-aid-will-be-challenge-strings-attached>
[Accessed 3 January 2017].
- The Guardian, 2015. *The Guardian*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jan/27/uk-aid-department-for-international-development-usaid>
[Accessed 29 June 2017].
- Thomas, R. M., 2003. *Blending Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods in Theses and Dissertations*. Thousand Oaks; London; New Delhi: Corwin Press, Inc.

- Tocqueville, A. d., 1839. *Democracy in America, Volume 1*. 3rd ed. New York: Scatcherd and Adams.
- U.S. Department of State, 2017. *U.S. Department of State Diplomacy in Action*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/hr/> [Accessed 18 January 2018].
- Uberoi, E., 2015. *European Union Referendum Bill 2015-2016*, Westminster, London: House of Commons Library.
- UK Aid, 2010. *Department of International Development*. [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67464/elect-asst-pol-less-int-supp.pdf [Accessed 18 January 2018].
- UK Aid, 2012. *Institutional Support to the Electoral Process in Malawi (ISEP)*, London: UKAID.
- UK Aid, 2012. *Institutional Support to the Electoral Process in Malawi (ISEP)*, London: Department for International Development.
- UK Aid, 2017. *Department for International Development*. [Online] Available at: <https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203567> [Accessed 11 April 2018].
- UK Government, 2016. *Gov.uk*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/magna-carta-fund-for-human-rights-and-democracy> [Accessed 23 May 2017].
- UK Government, 2017. *Gov.uk*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/official-development-assistance-oda--2> [Accessed 23 May 2017].
- UK Government, 2017. *Gov.uk*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/how-the-foreign-and-commonwealth-office-invests-in-developing-countries#fcos-oda-allocation> [Accessed 6 January 2018].
- UNDP, 2010. *Benchmarks and Self-Assessment Frameworks for Democratic Legislature: A Background Publication prepared for the International Conference on Benchmarking and Self-Assessment for Democratic Legislatures*, Brussels, New York: UNDP.
- UNDP, 2017. *United Nations Development Programme*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democratic-governance-and-peacebuilding/overview.html> [Accessed 9 May 2017].
- US Department of State, 2017. *US Department of State*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/democ/> [Accessed 23 May 2017].
- USAID Bringing Unity, Integrity and Legitimacy to Democracy, 2018. *Bringing Unity, Integrity and Legitimacy to Democracy (BUILD)*, Washington D.C.: USAID.

USAID Office of Inspector General, 2012. *Audit of USAID/Colombia's Access to Justice Program*, Washington D.C.: USAID.

USAID Strategy, 2005. *USAID Anticorruption Strategy*, Washington D.C.: USAID.

USAID, 2002. *Guidance for Promoting Judicial Independence and Impartiality*, Washington D.C.: USAID.

USAID, 2012. *Access to Justice Program, Final Report*, Washington D.C.: USAID.

USAID, 2013. *Best Practices in Electoral Security: A Guide for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance Programming*, Washington D.C.: USAID.

USAID, 2013. *Democracy, Human Rights and Government (DRG)*, Washington D.C.: USAID Strategy.

USAID, 2013. *USAID Strategy on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance*, s.l.: USAID Strategy.

USAID, 2015. *User's Guide to Democracy, Human Rights and Governance Programming*, Washington D.C.: USAID.

USAID, 2016. *Build Unity, Integrity and Legitimacy to Democracy*, Washington D.C.: USAID.

USAID, 2016. *USAID Access to Justice Program (A2JP)*. [Online]

Available at:

<https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/A2JP%20Fact%20Sheet%20October%202016.pdf>

[Accessed 2 July 2017].

USAID, 2016. *USAID Bringing Unity, Integrity and Legitimacy to Democracy (BUILD)*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/somalia/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/build>

[Accessed 21 February 2018].

USAID, 2016. *USAID CSO Sustainability Index Methodology*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/cso-sustainability-index-methodology>

[Accessed 21 February 2018].

USAID, 2016. *USAID Democracy, Human Rights and Governance*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/supporting-free-and-fair-elections>

[Accessed 27 February 2018].

USAID, 2017. *USAID Philippines*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/philippines/democracy-human-rights-and-governance>

[Accessed 13 July 2017].

USAID, 2018. *USAID Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment*. [Online]

Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment>

[Accessed 19 February 2018].

von Soest, C. & Grauvogel, J., 2015. *How Do Non-Democratic Regimes Claim Legitimacy? Comparative Insights from Post-Soviet Countries*. Hamburg, GIGA Working Papers, pp. 5-32.

Vreese, C. H. d., 2005. News Framing: Theory and Typology. *Information Design Journal + Document Design*, 13(1), pp. 51-62.

- Wengarf, T., 2001. Models of Research Design and Their Application to Semi-Structured Depth Interviewing. In: *Qualitative Research Interviewing: Biographic Narrative and Semi-Structured Methods*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 51-59.
- Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2017. *Westminster Foundation for Democracy*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.wfd.org/>
[Accessed 6 July 2017].
- Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2017. *Westminster Foundation for Democracy*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.wfd.org/about/>
[Accessed 8 January 2018].
- Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2018. *About the WFD*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.wfd.org/about/>
[Accessed 11 September 2018].
- Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2018. *Strategy*. [Online]
Available at: <https://www.wfd.org/about/strategy/>
[Accessed 11 September 2018].
- Westreicher, E., 2007. *Democracy Promotion: The German Approach*. Brussels, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
- Wiles, R., 2013. *What are Qualitative Research Ethics?*. London, New York: Bloomsbury.
- Williams, D. & Young, T., 1994. Governance, the World Bank and Liberal Theory. *Political Studies*, Volume XLII, pp. 84-100.
- Wolff, J. & Spanger, H.-J., 2014. Democracy promoters' conflicting objectives: the research agenda. In: J. Wolff, H. Spanger & H. Puhle, eds. *The Comparative International Politics of Democracy Promotion*. Abingdon, New York: Routledge, pp. 3-37.
- World Bank, 1981. *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*, Washington D.C. : World Bank.
- Yin, R. K., 2003. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Zakaria, F., 1997. The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. *Foreign Affairs*, 76(6), pp. 22-43.
- Zakaria, F., 2007. *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (Revised Edition)*. 2nd ed. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc..
- Zoubir, H. Y., 2015. *The Democratic Transition In Tunisia: A Success Story in the Making*. [Online]
Available at: <http://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/democratic-transition-tunisia/>
[Accessed 28 August 2018].