

The European Union–India Strategic Partnership: An Examination of the Economic Aspects



Sangeeta Khorana

1 Introduction

The European Union (EU) and India have a long relationship history that can be traced back to the Cooperation Agreement in 1994, subsequently cemented with the 2004 strategic partnership and the 2018 EU strategy on India. The EU–India partnership has evolved over the last decade and ambitious free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations were launched in 2007. This was followed by an Agenda for Action that was adopted at the EU–India summit in 2016. But it was not until the EU–India summit in October 2017 that both the partners agreed on a common vision of global governance, shared values and principles that led to the 2018 “EU Strategy on India” (European Commission 2018a, c).¹

Of late, strategic partnerships have become an important foreign policy instrument and are increasingly being used by countries in the multipolar world to indicate their commitment to engage on policy issues. Despite the lack of a concrete definition of what a strategic partnership is, it is observed that such a partnership provides “a useful instrument for pursuing European objectives and interests” (European Council 2010: 3), and serves as a means to find “a balance of mutual advantages and commitments” (van Rompuy 2010), of which trade is an increasingly important component (Jain and Sachdeva 2019: 1). The EU–India Strategic Partnership is no exception, and reaches beyond the formal agreement between the EU and India to form a network partnership to share finance, skills, information and/or other resources in the pursuit of common goals.

S. Khorana (✉)
Bournemouth University, Bournemouth, UK
e-mail: skhorana@bournemouth.ac.uk

¹For an analysis of the role, function and impact of partnership strategies on EU strategy-making, see the contribution by Aspengren and Nordenstam in this volume.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021

P. Gieg et al. (eds.), *EU-India Relations*, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65044-5_7

The 2018 strategy focuses on appraising the current EU–India ties, and sets out the EU’s vision for a strategy to strengthen partnership with India (European Commission 2018a). The factsheet released by the European External Agency Service (2018) stated that “The European Union and India upgraded their long-standing relationship to a strategic partnership in 2004, acknowledging their common goals and principles. Nowadays, in a challenging international environment, the EU and India share the same values of democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and support the rules-based global order centred on multilateralism”. The Joint Communication explicitly recognises India’s economic power as a rapidly growing economy and acknowledges its geopolitical role in the region. In order to strengthen the *economic* partnership between the EU and India, the *strategic* partnership focuses on sustainable modernisation and developing common responses to global and regional issues (European Council 2018).²

A key aim of this chapter is to unravel the economic aspects of the EU–India Strategic Partnership by discussing the driving forces of the EU–India relationship as a whole and how this might provide an opportunity for both sides to re-engage in discussions on how to further the EU–India Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) negotiations (De Nederlense Grondwet 2019). In addition, this chapter fleshes out why it has not been possible for the EU and India to exploit their economic partnership to its full potential and provides insights into how and with what effect the strategic partnership may be an important milestone for both partners.

2 The Timing for This Partnership Is Appropriate

Both the EU and India are important partners for each other, for economic, political and strategic reasons. From the EU’s perspective, the declaration of an EU strategy on India can be attributed to seismic shifts in the EU’s landscape—including Brexit, and Eurozone and migration crises—that are likely to have profound implications for the EU as a bloc. An important factor driving the partnership is the need to find new markets for EU businesses at a time when the EU–US relationship is suffering from the imposition by the Trump administration of tariffs on EU exports. The strategic partnership with India is an opportunity and offers potential for the EU to revitalise its economy, especially in light of the recent political developments such as the UK’s departure from the EU on 31 January 2020, which has inflicted a blow to the credibility of the EU’s integration project. These developments, complemented by growing nationalistic approaches in EU member states such as Hungary and Poland, lend credence to the importance of strengthening strategic partnerships for geopolitical reasons. From an economic perspective, the faltering of the Eurozone economy due to uncertainty and declining global trade compounded by the slowing down of the Chinese economy, is having a negative impact on EU trade. Further, trade

²Regarding the normative foundation of EU Foreign Policy as well as norm contestation within and beyond the EU–India Strategic Partnership, see the contribution by Lowinger et al. in this volume.

59 tensions between the EU and USA, as well as between India and the USA—following
60 Trump’s pursuit of a protectionist agenda—have serious implications compelling the
61 EU to look for new trade partners.

62 Both the EU and India are big influencers—the EU as a global power and India as
63 a rising power—and the strategic partnership is an acknowledgement of this reality
64 (Jain and Sachdeva 2019). Current realities make the EU–India strategic relationship
65 synergetic; India has until recently been the world’s fastest-growing large economy
66 (Khorana 2019). It represents a sizable and dynamic market, with an annual gross
67 domestic product (GDP) growth rate of around 7% in 2018 with over 1.3 billion in
68 population (EEAS 2018). Despite a dip in the growth rate in 2019, India remains
69 an attractive economic partner and has tremendous potential as an export market for
70 EU businesses. The Belgian European Council Representative (ECR) deputy Geert
71 Bourgois stated that “the market remains largely untapped as India accounts for only
72 2.3 percent of EU trade and only ranks ninth in EU trading partners”, which explains
73 the economic rationale for the strategic partnership. Further, the importance of India
74 as a trade and investment partner for the EU reflects that through the EU–India
75 Strategic Partnership, India is likely to seek to capitalise on its growing economic
76 status. The EU’s perception is that in light of growing global trade tensions restarting
77 the languishing EU–India trade negotiations might be useful, and all the more so as
78 this would also lead to a separate Investment Protection Agreement which could be
79 a step towards an ambitious FTA in the long term.

80 From the perspective of India, the strategic partnership with the EU could well be
81 a blessing in disguise given that having been the fastest-growing developing country
82 in the world, India has experienced broad-based growth deceleration; India’s growth
83 rate has slumped from 9% in 2018 to 4.5% in the third quarter of 2019, the slowest
84 pace in six years (Financial Times 2019). The Indian economy has lost momentum
85 with unmistakable signs of slowing down characterised by a decline in consumption,
86 investment and exports (Khorana 2020). Further, the automotive, real estate and
87 aviation sectors have suffered a slowdown in demand. To address the signs of the
88 faltering Indian economic engine, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi initiated
89 reforms to boost the economy. Corporate tax rates were lowered from 30 to 22% and
90 taxes for greenfield manufacturing plants were reduced from 25 to 15%; foreign direct
91 investment (FDI) limits were raised in a range of sectors; a nationwide goods and
92 services tax (GST) and bankruptcy legislation have been enacted (Economic Times
93 2019). But these reforms have failed to invigorate the stalling economy; so much so
94 that the South Asia Economic Focus report (2019) states “India’s cyclical slowdown
95 is severe”. The political situation in India is far from comfortable for PM Modi,
96 who despite leading the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) to an unprecedented
97 victory in the Lok Sabha election, is floundering (Business Standard 2020). This
98 explains why India might be willing to invest in the strategic partnership with the
99 EU.

100 From as early as the 2004 partnership India has looked at the strategic partnership
101 with the EU as a key element of its foreign policy. The Indian Ministry of External
102 Affairs (2004) identified key elements of the 2004 EU–India Strategic Partnership:
103 First, that the primary objective of this relationship was to increase the potential for

104 trade and investment, and ensure enhanced market access for Indian goods in the
 105 EU into the European market. Second, the partnership was perceived as a means
 106 to enhance India's strategic autonomy and there was enthusiasm for independent
 107 foreign and security policies with other countries. Third, the strategic partnership was
 108 to be based on sovereign equality and on "comparative advantage and a mutuality of
 109 interests and benefits" (2004: 4, para 2).

110 3 The EU–India Strategic Partnership Is Driven 111 by Economics

112 Trade flows between the EU and India are important. These have the ability to
 113 influence and shape the contours of the 2018 strategic relationship, and are likely to
 114 be the "propellant and lubricant" of the partnership. An examination of EU–India
 115 annual trade confirms that trade is a major driving force (Jain and Sachdeva 2019;
 116 Khorana 2019). Data shows that the EU is India's largest trading partner, accounting
 117 for EUR 92 billion worth of trade in goods in 2018 or 12.9% of total Indian trade,
 118 ahead of China (10.9%) and the USA (10.1%) (European Commission 2018). In turn
 119 India is the EU's 9th largest trading partner, accounting for 2.3% of the EU's total
 120 trade in goods in 2018, which is far behind the USA (16.9%) and China (15.3%)
 121 (European Commission 2018b).

122 Trade in goods between the EU and India presents an upward trend in the last
 123 decade and has increased by over 8.8% since 2003. Trade between the EU and India
 124 grew by as much as three times over the period 2002–2018, from EUR 28 billion
 125 to EUR 91 billion. The main items of export between the EU and India include
 126 chemical products (EUR 6.6 billion) and machinery and transport equipment (EUR
 127 6.4 billion). Among trading partners, Germany leads (EUR 19.6 billion), followed by
 128 the UK (EUR 13.6 billion), Belgium (EUR 12.8 billion), France (EUR 10.9 billion)
 129 and Italy (EUR 9.5 billion). Given that trade has been rising between the partners,
 130 and in light of India's high growth, the strategic partnership can be a driver to enable
 131 both countries to exploit trade potential to the fullest extent.

132 Data confirms that services are an increasingly important component of EU–India
 133 trade. At present, India is the fourth largest service exporter to the EU and the sixth
 134 largest destination for EU services exports. Trade in services between the EU and
 135 India increased from EUR 23 billion in 2010 to EUR 29 billion in 2016. In percentage
 136 terms, bilateral trade in services registered a 10% increase between 2016 and 2017,
 137 and in value terms the increase was from EUR 30 billion in 2016 to EUR 33.6 billion
 138 in 2017. Detailed analysis of flows shows that Indian services exports to the EU
 139 were EUR 16.6 billion in 2018, while imports were EUR 17.073 billion (European
 140 Commission 2018b; Khorana 2019).

141 The EU's share in foreign investment inflows to India more than doubled from
 142 8 to 18% in the last decade, making the EU the largest foreign investor in India.
 143 EU FDI stocks in India amounted to EUR 73 billion in 2016, which is significant

144 but still below the EU’s foreign investment stocks in China (EUR 178 billion). By
 145 2015, total EU FDI stock in India was at EUR 52 billion and Indian companies
 146 had invested nearly EUR 16 billion in the EU (Eurostat Database). The Europe
 147 India Chamber of Commerce (EICC) commissioned a study which showed that the
 148 European companies invested more than EUR 180 billion in India from 2008 to 2017
 149 (Charlie 2014). In terms of FDI from the EU, the services sector in particular has
 150 attracted investment from the UK, Germany, Netherlands, France, Italy and Belgium.
 151 Further, nearly 6000 EU companies are present in India, providing 1.7 million direct
 152 jobs and 5 million indirect jobs in a broad range of sectors (European Commission
 153 2018b).

154 4 What Drives the Strategic Partnership?

155 Two aspects of the strategic relationship are relevant from an economic perspective
 156 and need attention. Firstly, the EU’s efforts towards a comprehensive and balanced
 157 agreement with partners on trade and investment with a view to driving forward a
 158 rules-based global trade regime have been deadlocked, as the EU-FTA talks have
 159 stalled.³ Second, the Joint Communication lays out the road map for strengthening
 160 the EU–India Strategic Partnership. In this manner, the Joint Communication seeks
 161 to maximise the opportunities in terms of trade and investment, and to seize the
 162 full potential of the EU–India Strategic Partnership. In particular, the EU’s Agenda
 163 for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change and India’s *Sabka Saath, Sabka*
 164 *Vikas* (“Collective Efforts, Inclusive Growth”) initiatives create new opportunities
 165 for mutually beneficial cooperation between people and businesses on both sides.

166 From a rules-based perspective, the EU and India are partners, with a mutual
 167 interest in trade, but they also have a shared commitment to the rule of law, global
 168 norms and free and open markets. This has been articulated by both the EU and India
 169 at the World Trade Organization (WTO). In this light, a strong EU–India partner-
 170 ship is vital to both countries’ interests in protecting and promoting a rules-based
 171 international order.

172 The ambition of the EU–India FTA was to set the benchmark but, unfortunately,
 173 the FTA talks have been lost momentum since 2013. If the FTA talks were to progress,
 174 this would be an opportunity for the EU to lead the reform process in the WTO, and
 175 support the multilateral system in safeguarding and ensuring the effective functioning
 176 of trade liberalisation, monitoring and enforcement, which constitute the key pillars
 177 of the WTO system.

178 Within the context of EU policy, Hardacre and Smith (2009) eloquently argue that
 179 the EU has pursued an active interregional relations strategy that is linked with trade
 180 initiatives. The Union has developed a complex architecture of interregional agree-
 181 ments, varying from agreements at an intercontinental level to those with restricted

³For an overview of the determinants and impediments of an EU–India Trade Agreement also see the contribution of Köhler-Suzuki in this volume.

182 scope. Often these relationships result in “complex inter-regionalism” (Hardacre and
 183 Smith 2009, 2014), in which multiple actors at a variety of levels and scales of oper-
 184 ation in different regions come into collision or collaboration with each other. Trade
 185 policy plays a significant role given that this allows the EU’s companies market
 186 access on favourable terms to groups of countries and in this manner is a significant
 187 incentive to the building of interregional ties (Smith 2018). Strategic relations with
 188 India are no exception.

189 There is evidence that FTAs concluded by the EU with third countries are a step
 190 forward in the direction of overcoming the shortcomings of the WTO, in that the
 191 FTAs include commitments from partner countries to provide market access and
 192 remove barriers to trade at a bilateral level, and these commitments in most cases
 193 go beyond the level of WTO provisions. An analysis of FTA commitments between
 194 the EU and its partners reveals that these agreements are comprehensive, and allow
 195 additional market access to goods, services, investment and public procurement, as
 196 well as including rules that improve the broader framework to conduct trade and
 197 facilitate investment. Further, there are specific commitments by partners on the
 198 rules of origin, competition, intellectual property rights and cross-border data flows.
 199 In this manner, the EU employs FTAs as a means to “promote consensus among
 200 like-minded partners and to develop a network of relations that can promote not only
 201 economic but also political goals, including in the social and environmental areas”
 202 (Business Europe 2019).

203 The strategic partnership is an important step in reiterating the importance of
 204 the economic aspects of the EU–India relationship. Kick-starting the languishing
 205 EU–India FTA talks—formally termed BTIA—which commenced in 2007 but lost
 206 momentum after 16 rounds of negotiations, has been a non-mover given the uncom-
 207 promising stance and unwillingness of partners to narrow down to a manageable set
 208 of strategic priorities (Khorana 2019); the priorities vary widely between partners,
 209 and the EU focus on deep partnership, which is not on India’s agenda, has led to
 210 divergent priorities.

211 The obstacles to FTA talks include the lack of an agreement between the EU and
 212 India on tariff reductions, the extent of market access in a range of sectors, the extent
 213 of procurement and services liberalisation, and the demand for inclusion of social,
 214 environment and human rights clauses. While the EU attributes the lack of progress
 215 to the inflexibility of Indian negotiators in providing market access in dairy, wine
 216 and automotive sectors, India holds the EU’s unwillingness to provide access to the
 217 services market, data security and transparency laws as the main stumbling block to
 218 FTA discussions (Khorana and Garcia 2013). These challenges continue to exist and
 219 more demands for liberalisation have been added to the EU and Indian negotiating list.
 220 Studies examining the economic outcome of the EU–India FTA have not suggested
 221 any promising scenario (see Decreux and Mitaritonna 2007; Achterbosch et al. 2008;
 222 Powell 2008; Ecorys 2009; Khorana and Perdikis 2010; Khorana et al. 2011; Khorana
 223 and Garcia 2013; Khorana and Asthana 2014; Wouters et al. 2014). The analysis of
 224 the economic impacts of the EU–India FTA, which identifies sectors likely to gain
 225 and lose, shows that where services constitute over half of GDP, the potential impact
 226 of the proposed FTA goes well beyond tariff reductions on goods.

227 From the EU's perspective, the main sticking points in the talks are drug patents,
228 tariffs for second-hand cars, agriculture, services, rules of origin and an unacceptable
229 Indian list of 99 sensitive items and domestic pressures in sectors such as agricul-
230 ture, where the risk from European imports is marginal. The EU perceives India's
231 reluctance to open up its market to imports and inward investment as impediments to
232 future talks. While the EU has specifically asked India for an Investor-state dispute
233 settlement (ISDS) within the FTA setting, India has not been willing to accept this
234 (Jain and Sachdeva 2019). On the contrary, India has adopted an enterprise-based
235 approach and expressed a desire to narrow the scope of protected investments by
236 reducing the potential liability of the state under ISDS claims. Further, India has
237 dropped the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause making it mandatory for foreign
238 investors to seek domestic judicial and administrative remedies for a period of five
239 years before pursuing a claim under international law. India proposes that investors
240 be able to appeal to an arbitration tribunal only after they have addressed the issue
241 in an ordinary court, which is to ensure that domestic interests are protected. To add
242 even more to the misery of the non-progress of the FTA, India firmly believes that
243 tax rulings should not fall under the jurisdiction of investment protection. Simulta-
244 neously as the EU requested detailed provisions on ISDS in 2016, India cancelled
245 20 bilateral investment protection treaties with individual EU countries. Another
246 obstacle is that the EU is seeking to negotiate a strong intellectual property regime
247 (IPR) and a sustainable development chapter with social and environmental clauses,
248 both of which India is reluctant to negotiate in the FTA context (Khorana 2019).

249 India has its own expectations from the proposed FTA, and now the EU–India
250 Strategic Partnership could be an opportunity to address those issues not yet settled
251 by the FTA talks. India has consistently demanded a liberal visa regime in the EU,
252 which has been denied and over time become an obstacle to deepening India–EU
253 economic relations. The Indian demand for the relaxation of EU visa restrictions
254 is likely to remain a sticking-point, which could be addressed through the strategic
255 partnership. Another issue is that India has been demanding the status of *data-secure*
256 *nation* as this would reduce compliance costs for Indian software providers in the EU.
257 However, given the EU's concerns over regulatory norms and data-privacy standards
258 it is unlikely that the EU will agree to this demand under the FTA ambit, and the
259 strategic partnership might just be a forum to address this issue. However, in light
260 of the differences between the EU and India, the prospects of breathing life into the
261 EU–India FTA talks are slim, given that the EU and India continue to have divergent
262 negotiating positions. A word of caution—the divergence in partners' priorities and
263 unwillingness to concede to each other's request is likely to restrict the benefits from
264 the EU–India Strategic Partnership. The current political developments make the
265 prospect of an EU–India trade deal unlikely, which explains why an aspiration of a
266 relationship is best expressed through a strategic partnership.

5 Conclusion

India is a growing economic powerhouse, likely to be the third largest economy by 2030. The time has passed when the EU was an economic powerhouse that held sway at the international level. This has since been replaced by FTAs and developing partnerships with strategically relevant countries. As things stand, there is no simple linear relationship between the EU's trade power and its capacity to translate that into foreign policy action (Smith 2019). India, as a rising economy, could, if it plays the relationship well, hold the reins of the EU–India Strategic Partnership. For the EU to ensure that the partnership delivers, it is important to maintain momentum in the long term as both countries continue to carve out their place in what is the beginning of defining their role in an open and inclusive multipolar world order.

In light of the economic and political realities, the 2018 EU–India Strategic Partnership can be a vehicle for both the EU and India. This can be used to sensitise each other's expectations and understanding of perspectives towards bilateral, regional and global issues at a time when both the EU and India need each other.⁴ India needs support to boost its declining economic and political clout in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN); failure to demonstrate engagement with FTAs, as demonstrated by pulling out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) at the last minute, and growing animosity with Pakistan, are key issues to consider. Hence, both India and the EU need a strategic partnership for geopolitical and economic reasons. What both partners could realistically do is to re-engage with each other and have a firm commitment to build and consolidate the strategic partnership for mutual gain at a time when multilateralism is under threat and global growth is slowing.

References

- Achterbosch, Thom, Marijke Kuiper, and Pim Roza. 2008. *EU-India Free Trade Agreement: A quantitative assessment*. The Hague: LEI Wageningen.
- Adith, Charlie. 2014. European companies in India: reigniting economic growth. EICC/EBTC. https://www.europeindia.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/EICC_Study_report_2014.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2020.
- Business Europe. 2019. A trade strategy fit for the 21st century. https://www.buinessurope.eu/sites/buseur/files/media/reports_and_studies/april_2019_-_a_trade_strategy_fit_for_the_21st_century_light_0.pdf. Accessed 13 July 2020.
- De Nederlandse Grondwet. 2019. EU-India summit: A new momentum for the EU-India strategic partnership. https://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl/id/vk2ts63cl3z1/nieuws/eu_india_summit_a_new_momentum_for_the?ctx=vgaxlcr1jzjq. Accessed 22 February 2020.
- Economic Times. 2019. World Bank cuts India's growth projection to 6 per cent. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/world-bank-cuts-indias-growth-projection-to-6-per-cent/articleshow/71562469.cms?from=mdr>. Accessed 22 February 2020.

⁴On the development of India's view on the liberal world order see the contribution of Kugiel in this volume.

- 306 ECORYS. 2009. Trade sustainability impact assessment for the FTA between the EU and the
307 Republic of India, TRADE07/C1/C01. [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/june/tradoc_](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/june/tradoc_143372.pdf)
308 [143372.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/june/tradoc_143372.pdf). Accessed 13 July 2020.
- 309 EEAS. 2018. EU-India factsheet: A new EU strategy on India. [https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/4010/eu-india-factsheet-new-eu-strategy-india_en)
310 [india/4010/eu-india-factsheet-new-eu-strategy-india_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/4010/eu-india-factsheet-new-eu-strategy-india_en). Accessed 22 February 2020.
- 311 European Commission. 2018a. Explaining the European Union's partnership with India. https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-6483_en.htm. Accessed 13 July 2020.
- 312 European Commission. 2018b. Trade and regions: India. https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/india/index_en.htm. Accessed 13 July 2020.
- 313 European Commission. 2018c. EU shapes its ambitious strategy on India. https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6481_en.htm. Accessed 22 February 2020.
- 314 European Council. 2010. General Secretariat of the Council Delegations, Conclusions, 16
315 September, EUCO 21/10. [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/116547.pdf)
316 [ec/116547.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/116547.pdf).
- 317 European Council. 2018. India: Council adopts conclusions on a new EU strategy. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/12/10/india-council-adopts-conclusions-on-a-new-eu-strategy/>. Accessed 22 February 2020.
- 318 Eurostat Database. 2018. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>. Accessed 22 February 2020.
- 319 Financial Times. 2019. India and globalisation—Special report. <https://www.ft.com/reports/india-and-globalisation>. Accessed 22 February 2020.
- 320 Hardacre, Alan, and Michael Smith. 2009. The EU and the diplomacy of complex interregionalism. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 4 (2): 167–188.
- 321 Hardacre, Alan, and Michael Smith. 2014. The European Union and the contradictions of complex interregionalism. In *Intersecting interregionalism: Regions, global governance and the EU*, ed. F. Baert, T. Scaramagli, and F. Söderbaum, 91–106. Dordrecht: Springer.
- 322 Jain, Rajendra K., and Gulshan Sachdeva. 2019. India-EU strategic partnership: A new roadmap. *Asia Europe Journal* 17 (3): 309–325. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-019-00556-0>.
- 323 Khandekar, Gauri. 2018. The EU and India: Redefining a strategic partnership. Italian Institute for International Political Studies. <https://www.ispionline.it/en/publicazione/eu-and-india-redefining-strategic-partnership-21422>. Accessed 22 February 2020.
- 324 Khorana, Sangeeta. 2019. Is Brexit an opportunity to revive the EU-India trade deal? The Conversation. <https://theconversation.com/is-brex-it-an-opportunity-to-revive-the-eu-india-trade-deal-113780>. Accessed 22 February 2020.
- 325 Khorana, Sangeeta, and Anand N. Asthana. 2014. EU FTA negotiations with India: The question of liberalization of public procurement. *Asia Europe Journal* 12 (3): 251–263.
- 326 Khorana, Sangeeta, and Maria Garcia. 2013. European Union-India FTA: One step forward, one back? *Journal of Common Market Studies* 51 (4): 684–700.
- 327 Khorana, Sangeeta, and Nicholas Perdikis. 2010. EU-India Free Trade Agreement: Deal or no deal? *South Asia Economic Journal* 11 (2): 181–206.
- 328 Khorana, Sangeeta, Nicholas Perdikis, William A. Kerr, and May T. Yueng. 2011. *The era of bilateral agreements: The EU and India in search of a partnership*. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
- 329 Powell, Sophie. 2008. The EU-FTA: Initial observations from development perspective. Traidcraft. <http://www.indianet.nl/pdf/EU-IndiaFTAInitialObservations.pdf>. Accessed 13 July 2020.
- 330 Singh, R. 2000. The future of EU-India relations. *The Parliament Magazine*. <https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/opinion/future-eu-india-relations>. Accessed 22 February 2020.
- 331 Smith, Michael. 2018. Trade policy and foreign policy in the European Union. In *Handbook on the EU and international trade*, eds. Sangeeta Khorana, and Maria Garcia, 171–187. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- 332 Van Rompuy, H. 2010. Introductory remarks of the President of the European Commission, J.M. Barroso, at the joint press conference with the President of the European Council, H. Van Rompuy, ahead of the G8 and G20 summits. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/MEMO_10_276. Accessed 13 July 2020.

358 Wouters, Jan, Idesbald Goddeeris, Bregt Natens, and Filip Ciortuz. 2014. Some critical issues in
359 the EU-India Free Trade Agreement negotiations. *European Law Journal* 20 (6): 848–869.

360 **Prof. Sangeeta Khorana** is an international trade expert and leads research and teaching on EU
361 trade policy, focusing in particular on EU's economic relations with India and Vietnam. She has
362 authored several books and journal articles on EU-India trade issues as well as provided written
363 and oral evidence on trade issues to the European and Scottish Parliaments.