

1           **Regime switching effect of COVID-19 pandemic on renewable electricity**  
2                                 **generation in Denmark**

3

4   **Abstract**

5   Denmark has achieved remarkable success in renewable energy generation over the last several  
6   decades. However, the country's goals of meeting its 50% energy demand from renewable by 2030  
7   and becoming independent of fossil fuel by 2050 are currently in jeopardy due to the COVID-19  
8   pandemic, which emerged at the end of December 2019 in the Chinese city of Wuhan. This study,  
9   therefore, tries to see how COVID-19 affects renewable electricity generation in Denmark using  
10   the econometric framework. Several nonlinear estimation techniques such as Fourier ADL  
11   cointegration analysis and Markov Switching regression are used to estimate the relationship  
12   between the three channels of COVID-19 and renewable electricity generation. The result from  
13   the Markov Switching regression reveals that renewable electricity production in Denmark is  
14   adversely affected by the enforced lockdown as captured via the stringency index, economic  
15   support provided to tackle the pandemic, and daily confirmed deaths of COVID-19. Moreover, the  
16   causality test shows that the stringency index and daily confirmed deaths of COVID-19 are  
17   important predictors of renewable electricity, but the economic support index has weak causality  
18   with renewable electricity. The study finally presents some crucial policy suggestions for Denmark  
19   which can help the country achieve its renewable production goals.

20   **Keywords:** Denmark; Renewable electricity; COVID; lockdown; economic support; Nonlinearity

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## 27 **1.0 Introduction**

28           With over 87 million confirmed cases of infection and almost 2 million deaths in about 222  
29 countries across the globe, as of January 9<sup>th</sup>, 2021 [1], the COVID-19 pandemic has secured  
30 significant attention globally. It has affected almost every section of life. It has also prompted  
31 varieties of actions and reactions from governments across levels and their citizens. Policies, rules,  
32 and regulations are being administered to curb its spread and withdrawn or softened times to permit  
33 the execution of human and economic activities. With all these measures in place, the Organization  
34 for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) predicts that global Gross Domestic  
35 Product (GDP) is going to be reduced by 7.6 per cent in 2020 if there is a second wave of the  
36 pandemic, but 6 per cent drop if the second wave is avoided. They further mentioned that this drop  
37 might extend beyond the year 2020 if there is another outbreak towards the end of the year. And,  
38 if this happens, the growth accrued over the last five years could be lost by the end of the year  
39 2021 [2].

40           Although the pandemic is undoubtedly a threat to the economy, the same cannot be said for  
41 the renewable sector. On the one hand, this pandemic can act as a catalyst to reduce emissions,  
42 increase employment and economic growth and, therefore, can be creative destruction by replacing  
43 the old fossil fuel [3, 4]. But on the other hand, renewable energy development has encountered a  
44 challenge because of the pandemic, as COVID-19 has affected the supply chain as well as the  
45 manufacturing process of renewables. This disruption in the supply chain is again causing trouble  
46 in manufacturing, leading to a contraction in the renewable energy sector [5]. Also, the import and  
47 export of solar panel shipment experienced turbulence all around the world because of the global  
48 shutdown [6]. Specifically, wind energy stands to encounter significant risk due to the pandemic.  
49 Hence, Denmark, a country that experiences strong winds from the North Sea and the Baltic Sea  
50 and currently the global leader in wind energy development, also faces uncertainty in its renewable  
51 industry [7]. The country's over-reliance on wind energy makes it vulnerable to crisis events like  
52 COVID-19.


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54           According to the Environmental performance index of 2020, Denmark is the greenest  
55 country in the world, excelling in air quality, sanitation, safe drinking water, waste management,

56 and leading the world in tackling climate change with a target to cut GHG emissions by 70% by  
 57 2030 [8]. Over the last several decades, this country has achieved remarkable success in renewable  
 58 energy development. The policies introduced in developing renewable energy to stabilize the  
 59 climate are lessons for other countries. This proves that with appropriate policies, the government  
 60 can mitigate the gap between the primary cost of investment payment and getting the benefits out  
 61 of the renewable industry [9].

62 The electricity generation in Denmark mostly depends on wind energy, as has been  
 63 indicated in Figure 1. Before the 1970s, this country depended primarily on imported oil. But the  
 64 country's quest for energy independence began after the oil crisis of 1973-74. Since then, Denmark  
 65 has chosen and invested a huge amount in renewables, especially in wind energy generation. As a  
 66 result, renewable production amounted to 47% of its total energy generation in 2019 [10]. While  
 67 the global target is set at making renewables generate 50% of the global energy supply by 2050,  
 68 Denmark's targets are to make renewables supply more than half of her energy demands by 2030  
 69 and to have done away with fossil fuels for energy generation by 2050 [11, 12].

70 **Figure 1: Gross electricity production from renewable (TJ) in Denmark**



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
72 Source: Danish Energy Agency (2020)

73 Denmark is a leading player in Variable Renewable Energy (VRE) system integration and  
 74 energy-saving technologies that maximize energy and minimizes heat, such as the combined heat  
 75 and power (CHP) [13]. The country is therefore rightfully nick-named the laboratory of green

76 solutions. The Energy Trilemma Index of the World Energy Council [14] ranks Denmark as one  
77 of the top three countries with a score of 84 out of 100. However, the country ranks poorly in terms  
78 of energy security and energy equity compared to other neighbouring economies. The countries  
79 with a diversified energy system and a higher level of hydrocarbon power sources are ranked  
80 highly in terms of energy security. Nevertheless Denmark's energy production from hydro is  
81 almost zero, and the country relies heavily on wind power. The countries ranked highly in this  
82 category can also counteract and properly respond to any system shocks with minimal disturbance  
83 like COVID-19. Therefore, Denmark seems to be suffering from a lack of system resilience. In  
84 terms of energy equity, Denmark is not even in the top ten countries. Energy equity refers to  
85 countries with low energy costs, but consumers in Denmark have to pay high rates for electricity  
86 compared to other European countries, and taxes of energy are three times greater than that of the  
87 average in Europe [15, 16]. Therefore, Denmark has to take account of these issues while making  
88 its transition towards clean energy.


89         The COVID-19 pandemic has hit the entire supply chain of Denmark's energy sector,  
90 starting from commodities to components. This is evident from figure 2 where the gross electricity  
91 generation in Denmark declined substantially for the first time since 2000. Furthermore, figure 3  
92 shows that the decline in gross electricity generation can be attributed to the decline in net  
93 electricity production from wind turbines. This again is the reflection of the argument made by  
94 Bloomberg New Energy Finance which said that over-reliance on one particular source of  
95 renewable energy can be a damaging factor during crisis events [7]

96                     **Figure 2: Gross electricity production (GWh.) in Denmark**



Source: Danish Energy Agency

**Figure 3: Net Electricity Production (GWh.) from wind turbines in Denmark**




Source: Danish Energy Agency

Owing to the above discussion, our study contributes to the empirical literature in several ways. First, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic may not be uniform globally, because of the differences in containment measures and levels of their deployment across regions, countries, and

107 geographies. Therefore, economic, geographical, political, and other peculiarities, including  
 108 strictness of containment measures, relief, or palliative support measures, will provide quality  
 109 information on the effect of the pandemic [17]. Denmark was recorded to have relatively fewer  
 110 infections when compared to other European countries during the early period of the pandemic,  
 111 due to prompt government interventions such as the introduction of strict lockdown, social  
 112 distancing, and government support [18]. These measures, without a doubt, will have their short-  
 113 and long-term implications on the state of the country.

114 We are specifically interested in the renewable generation of Denmark because its  
 115 doggedness on sustainable energy development, triggered by the 1970s oil crisis, has placed them  
 116 on a high pedestal in renewable energy solutions. This journey is in line with the global goal to  
 117 generate all her energy independent of the environmental-damaging, carbon dioxide-emitting  
 118 fossil fuels. The electricity generation trend of renewable over the last several decades as shown  
 119 in figure 4, indicates a very rapid increase and a high potential. Furthermore, since renewable  
 120 energy sources have notable effects on economic growth, understanding its generation may  
 121 indicate a path toward economic recovery during and after the pandemic.

122 **Figure 4: Gross Electricity production by fuels (TJ) in Denmark**



123  
 124 Source: Danish Energy Agency  
 125

126           Second, our study highlights three channels by which this pandemic can exert its influence  
127 on renewable electricity generation in Denmark. First Channel is the stringency of the restriction  
128 and lockdown policies which make investments in the renewable industry uncertain. These  
129 lockdown policies also put construction as well as the operation of renewable plants in jeopardy.  
130 The second channel is via the economic stimulus that the government has implemented. The  
131 Danish government will have to sacrifice a significant amount of its GDP to attain the objective  
132 of being carbon neutral within 2050. But the government has already spent approximately 26% of  
133 its GDP to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic within its boundary [19]. Therefore as more and more  
134 money is needed to tackle the virus, more financial resources will be diverted away from meeting  
135 the goals of climate mitigation. The third channel is via the COVID-19 pandemic itself. We  
136 hypothesize that the COVID-19 pandemic will have a multiplier effect on renewable energy  
137 generation because it captures lockdown policies, health containment policies, economic stimulus  
138 as well as the dread of the pandemic itself.

139  
140           Third, only a few studies have empirically examined the effect of COVID-19 on the  
141 electricity sector using the econometric framework. For example, Carvalho et al. [20] used  
142 Joinpoint regression and showed that COVID-19 affected electricity consumption significantly,  
143 although the reductions were different across geographic regions. Norouzi et al. [21] on the other  
144 hand, explored the impact of COVID-19 on Spain's electricity market and they found that  
145 observations of deaths and cases due to COVID-19 were negatively associated with energy prices.  
146 In other studies, Alkhrajah et al.[22], Geraldi et al. [23], Bielecki et al. [24], Iqbal et al. [25], and  
147 Aruga et al. [26] also examined the association between energy consumption and COVID but only  
148 some of these studies utilized the econometric methods. This study is more similar to that of  
149 Alhajeri et al. [27] who provided evidence of COVID-19 preventing actions leading to a reduction  
150 in power generation. But our study differs from Alhajeri et al.[27] since we focus on the empirical  
151 aspect of the COVID-19 pandemic and renewable industry using a nonlinear framework, whereas  
152 the study of Alhajeri et al.[27] was more concerned with the qualitative aspect of this relationship.  
153 The nature of the COVID-19 pandemic and the induced restrictions is characterized by sudden and  
154 irregular jumps and linear dynamic is not suitable for capturing those jumps. Linear frameworks  
155 also cannot capture the asymmetric and complex dynamics between the variables [28]. Hence, not  
156 capturing the nonlinearity among the variables can lead to inconsistent outcomes with poorly

157 behaved estimates and therefore, can easily undermine the objectives of this study [29]. Therefore,  
158 our study contributes to the empirical literature by employing several nonlinear estimation  
159 techniques such as Fourier ADL cointegration analysis by Banerjee et al. [30] and Markov  
160 Switching regression model of Hamilton [31] to capture the relationship among the variables.

161 The next section presents the data and methodology used to achieve the aims of the study.  
162 The empirical results are presented and discussed in section three while section four concludes the  
163 study with vital policy implications and suggestions.

## 164 **2.0 Methodology and data description**

### 165 **2.1 Data description**

166 The objective of this study is to analyze how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected  
167 renewable electricity generation in Denmark. In particular, we analyze how the overall electricity  
168 generation for the renewable sector (sum of biomass, hydropower, solar power, offshore wind,  
169 onshore wind, and other renewables electricity generation) has been affected due to the stringency  
170 index, economic support index, and COVID-19 daily confirmed deaths. The empirical model of  
171 the study is specified as follows:

$$172 \quad REN_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 SI_t + \beta_2 ESI_t + \beta_3 COVID_t + \varepsilon_t \quad (1)$$

173 Where  $REN_t$  denotes the overall renewable electricity production of Denmark,  $COVID_t$  indicates  
174 the daily confirmed deaths due to COVID-19,  $SI$  is the stringency index,  $ESI$  is the economic  
175 support index and  $\varepsilon_t$  is the error term at time  $t$ .

176 We only transform the renewable electricity generation and COVID variables into natural  
177 logarithm and other variables remain in the level form since the other two variables are indices.  
178 These variables have been collected from different sources. For example, we use the daily death  
179 data for COVID-19 from the John Hopkins University database [32]. The stringency index and  
180 economic support index data come from the Oxford government response tracker database  
181 developed by Hale et al. [33]. The data for renewable electricity generation is sourced from the  
182 Energi data service developed by Energinet [34] of Denmark. This site provides the hourly data of  
183 renewable generation in Denmark. Since we do not have hourly data for any of our independent



184 variables, we have taken the average of 24-hour electricity generation. The data period ranges from  
185 January to November 2020.

186 Stringency index implies the strictness of lockdown measures which mainly restrict  
187 human behaviour. This index incorporates closure of the school, public places and workplace  
188 closure, cancellation of public events, restrictions on gatherings, international travel and internal  
189 movement, and stay-at-home requirements. It ranges from 0 to 100, 100 being the harsh restrictions  
190 and lockdown policies implemented and 0 being no restrictions or lockdown. Denmark  
191 implemented one of the harsh lockdowns in Europe ever since the COVID-19 hit the country. Our  
192 initial hypothesis is that these policies have negatively affected the renewable sector. Thus the  
193 following hypothesis can be formulated:

194 **Hypothesis 1:** SI has a negative and significant impact on REN

195 The economic support index, on the other hand, also ranges from 0 to 100, where 100 means the  
196 country is fully supporting the people through income support or debt relief. COVID-19 has  
197 induced many countries to support the economy through measures such as fiscal stimulus and other  
198 monetary measures. So far, Denmark has announced a total stimulus package of \$89,106 Million  
199 to tackle the pandemic, according to the Asian Development Bank [19], which is approximately  
200 26% of its GDP. This package is composed of liquidity support, credit creation, direct long-term  
201 lending, equity support, and health and income support. This bulk amount of economic support to  
202 tackle the pandemic demonstrates that many of the climate 'projects' financing will get delayed,  
203 and support will be diverted away from clean energy projects to support the economy. Therefore,  
204 our second hypothesis argues that some of the funds (including those of renewable energy projects)  
205 that were aimed at tackling the climate crisis are diverted away from supporting the clean energy  
206 sector to prevent the immediate threat of COVID-19 [35]. Thus, the second hypothesis can be  
207 written as follows:

208 **Hypothesis 2:** ESI has a negative and significant impact on REN

209 The restrictions and lockdown implemented by the Danish government forced people to  
210 stay in their homes. As a result, the renewable sector suffered from proper maintenance and  
211 operation. Besides, the COVID variable (captured through the daily confirmed death of COVID-  
212 19) variable also incorporates the other two variables, such as SI and ESI. Therefore, it is expected

213 that COVID will have a greater effect on the renewable sector than SI and ESI. Hence, our third  
 214 and final hypothesis can be specified as follows:

215 **Hypothesis 3:** COVID has a negative and multiplier impact on REN

216 Descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in Table 1. As we have already mentioned,  
 217 table 1 lists COVID and REN variables in logarithmic form and the other two variables in level  
 218 form.

**Table 1. Descriptive Statistics**

	COVID	ESI	REN	SI
Mean	0.551603	80.48664	3.248134	55.73370
Median	0.173000	87.50000	3.249994	54.63000
Maximum	3.798000	100.0000	3.316353	72.22000
Minimum	-1.036000	37.50000	3.146791	37.04000
Std. Dev.	0.755999	17.92189	0.035525	9.679303
Skewness	1.773064	-1.776110	-0.391970	0.184602
Kurtosis	5.948644	4.597531	2.642874	2.219191
Jarque-Bera	232.1923	165.6099	8.101258	8.143553
Probability	0.000000	0.000000	0.017411	0.017047
Sum	144.5200	21087.50	851.0111	14602.23
Sum Sq. Dev.	149.1704	83831.70	0.329384	24452.80
Observations	262	262	262	262

219

## 220 2.2 Methodology

### 221 2.2.1 Nonlinear dependence test

222 To examine the nonlinear dependence in the series of our model, we first employ the Brock-  
 223 Dechert-Scheibkman (BDS) test provided by Brock et al. [36]. This test is used for model  
 224 misspecification since it provides a high statistical power to determine the linearity or correct  
 225 specification structure of the proposed model [37]. It is considered an important advancement in  
 226 examining nonlinearity dependence when applied to pre-whitened data. It is based on correlation  
 227 integral, an idea developed by Grassberger and Procaccia [38] to estimate the dimension of  
 228 correlation. The performance of this test depends on the two parameters, one is  $\epsilon$  (distance), and  
 229 another one is  $d$  (value of the embedding dimension). It is expected that the distance between any  
 230 pair of points can be equal to or less than  $\epsilon$  under the assumption of independence [39].

231

232 **2.2.2 Unit root test**

233 To check the stationary of our variables, we have employed an Augmented Dicky Fuller  
234 test (ADF) and Fourier ADF unit root test. The general specification for the ADF test is as follows:

235 
$$\Delta y_t = \alpha y_{t-1} + x_t Y + \beta_1 \Delta y_{t-1} + \beta_2 \Delta y_{t-2} \dots + \beta_p \Delta y_{t-p} + v_t \quad (2)$$

236

237 Where  $\Delta$  is difference and  $\alpha = \rho - 1$  and  $\rho$  is the coefficient of the AR ( $\rho$ ) process.  $y_t$  is the  
238 variable under consideration and  $v_t$  is white noise. The lagged term has been added to tackle the  
239 autocorrelation problem.

240 However, the traditional unit root tests such as ADF cannot capture the structural breaks.  
241 Our variables might have undergone some structural shifts, which further result in different forms  
242 of nonlinearity. Hence ADF test was again augmented for a nonlinear framework by Enders and  
243 Lee [40] where they used the Fourier function consisting of different frequencies. The following  
244 equation specifies a Fourier function:

245 
$$Y(t) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 t + \sum_{j=1}^m \tau_j \sin\left(\frac{2\pi jt}{N}\right) + \sum_{j=1}^m \rho_j \cos\left(\frac{2\pi jt}{N}\right); m \leq \frac{N}{2}; t = 1, 2 \quad (3)$$

246

247 Here,  $\alpha_0$  and  $\alpha_1$  are the intercept and trend coefficients. The amplitude and displacement dynamics  
248 of the Fourier function are indicated by  $\tau_j$  and  $\rho_j$ . Also, we have  $N$  number of observations and  $m$ -  
249 optimal number of frequencies which will be determined by the information criteria, here  $j$  is  
250 Fourier frequency (values of  $j$  range from 1, 2... to  $m$ ).  $\tau_j$  and  $\rho_j$  are two nonlinear parameters in the  
251 above equation and if one of them is at least significant, this means that there is nonlinearity.  
252 However, the process will become linear if these parameters are zero. 2.2.3. Cointegration test

253 The essence of cointegration is to confirm whether the variables move together or not in  
254 the long run. Cointegration requires all the variables to be integrated in the same order. In this  
255 paper, we apply the Fourier ADL cointegration analysis suggested by Banerjee et al. [30] rather  
256 than Engle-Granger's [41] methodology or Johansen and Juselius [42] cointegration tests since  
257 they cannot capture the nonlinearity. This test does not require specifying the duration of the breaks

258 as well as prevents power loss when too many dummies are used. The formula for this test is  
 259 specified as follows:

$$260 \Delta y_{1t} = d(t) + \theta_1 y_{1,t-1} + \pi y_{2,t-1} + \tau \Delta y_{2,t} + \varepsilon_t \quad (4)$$

261 Here,  $d(t)$  is the deterministic term and  $y$ ,  $\tau$ , and  $y_{2t}$  is  $n \times 1$  parameter vectors and explanatory  
 262 variables.

263 The null hypothesis of this test is that of no cointegration. However, if the critical values  
 264 developed by Banerjee et al. [30] are under the test statistic that is estimated, the null hypothesis  
 265 will be rejected and cointegration will be confirmed.

266

#### 267 **2.2.4. Markov Switching Regression**

268 Considering the possibility of nonlinearity and sudden change in the variability of a given  
 269 indicator, here we employ a superior technique compared to other econometric models, which is  
 270 the Markov Switching Regression model advocated by Hamilton [31]. This model provides a  
 271 nonlinear alternative to linear models of Box Jenkins ARIMA or unobserved components models  
 272 of Watson [43], Harvey and Todd [44], and Clark [45]. In this technique, the models are very  
 273 flexible and can change against regime shifts. This test can be applied to non-stationary, dynamic,  
 274 and linear cointegrated models. Hamilton [31] used the process provided by Goldfeld and Quandt  
 275 [46] to determine the changes in the autoregressive 'process's parameters. According to Hamilton  
 276 [31], the nonlinearities arise when the process experiences discrete shifts in regimes, this implies  
 277 the episodes where the given series's dynamic behaviour is different.

278 The two regime Markov Switching regression can be written as follows:

$$279 X_t = \alpha_1 + \sum_{i=1}^p \gamma_{1,i} X_{t-i} + \alpha_{1,t} \text{ if } s_t = 1$$

$$280 X_t = \alpha_2 + \sum_{i=1}^p \gamma_{2,i} X_{t-i} + \alpha_{2,t} \text{ if } s_t = 2$$

281 Here,  $\alpha_{i,t}$  is independently and identically distributed with mean 0 and variance  $\sigma^2_i$ . The state  
 282 variable is denoted by  $s_t$ , and it is governed by a first-order Markov chain. The transition  
 283 probabilities of this state variable can be presented in the following matrix format:

284 
$$P = \begin{matrix} \rho_{11} & \rho_{12} \\ \rho_{21} & \rho_{22} \end{matrix}$$

285 Here, if the value of  $\rho_{ij}$  is small, the model will stay longer in state  $i$ . The duration of this state is  
 286 expected to be  $1/\rho_{ij}$ . The regime numbers can be  $r \geq 2$  [23].

287

288 2.2.5. Causality test

289 The cointegration test confirms whether there is any long-run relationship or not between  
 290 two variables, but it does not say anything about the direction of causality. Granger causality is  
 291 used to identify the direction of causality among the variables. Here, we employ Breitung and  
 292 Candelon [47] frequency domain Granger causality test to examine the causal inference among the  
 293 variables studied. Breitung and Candelon proposed a test which is based on sets of linear  
 294 hypothesis on the autoregressive framework using a bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) model.  
 295 The framework developed by them can be used to disentangle long-run and short-run  
 296 predictability. The superiority of this causality test over other traditional causality tests is that it  
 297 permits the forecasting of variables examined at specific time frequencies. This will allow us to  
 298 examine the changes where policy interventions can be provided, that is, whether in the short term,  
 299 medium-term or long term [48].

300

301 **3.0 Results and Discussions**

302 As outlined in the methodology, as an initial technique, the BDS test of Brock et al. [36] is  
 303 applied to capture nonlinearity in the time series variables. The outcomes of the BDS test for the  
 304 variables of SI, ESI, REN and COVID in Denmark are reported in Table 2. The results provide  
 305 empirical evidence that there is nonlinear behaviour in the time series variables.

306

<b>Table 2. BDS dependency test</b>				
	Dimension	BDS Statistic	z-Statistic	Prob.
SI	2	0.182878	39.15713	0.0000
	3	0.319833	43.47282	0.0000

	4	0.412207	47.47358	0.0000
	5	0.473506	52.79388	0.0000
	6	0.516991	60.31391	0.0000
ESI	2	0.203520	22.27613	0.0000
	3	0.343580	23.64981	0.0000
	4	0.438894	25.32817	0.0000
	5	0.502749	27.77520	0.0000
	6	0.544551	31.11504	0.0000
REN	2	0.166786	46.90841	0.0000
	3	0.276761	48.96380	0.0000
	4	0.344884	51.24503	0.0000
	5	0.384711	54.86046	0.0000
	6	0.404865	59.89285	0.0000
COVID	2	0.119421	15.77295	0.0000
	3	0.218391	18.03169	0.0000
	4	0.285335	19.64285	0.0000
	5	0.338107	22.16545	0.0000
	6	0.368046	24.82805	0.0000

Note: \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level.

307

308 We now proceed to estimate a linear unit root test, namely Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF),  
309 to examine whether the time series variables in the estimated models have a unit root. Moreover,  
310 we also employ the nonlinear unit root test, namely the Fourier-ADF (F-ADF) unit root test, which  
311 depends on the frequency and the lag length. F-ADF captures unknown structural breaks with  
312 frequencies to select the minimum sum of the squared residuals. The outcomes from these tests  
313 are reported in Table 3. As reported, at the 5% level, the time series variables have a unit root at  
314 the level. However, at the first difference, the variables are stationary. In other words, the variables  
315 are integrated into the same order or I(1).

<b>Table 3. ADF and Fourier ADF Unit Root Tests</b>			
<b>ADF Unit Root Test</b>			
Variables	T-Statistic		Probability
COVID	-2.4191		0.3688
$\Delta$ COVID	-20.1264***		0.0000
ESI	-2.4735		0.3411
$\Delta$ ESI	-16.1206***		0.0000
LREN	3.3915*		0.0547
$\Delta$ LREN	-14.3076***		0.0000
SI	-3.1852*		0.0897
$\Delta$ SI	-16.0783***		0.0000
<b>Fourier ADF Unit Root Test</b>			
Variables	Frequency	F-Statistic	Fourier ADF Test Statistic
COVID	1	8.010	-4.257*
$\Delta$ COVID	1	1.091	-5.606***
ESI	1	3.478	-3.414
$\Delta$ ESI	4	0.926	-16.172***
LREN	5	2.321	-3.421
$\Delta$ LREN	5	2.185	-9.590***
SI	2	2.368	-3.565
$\Delta$ SI	2	0.258	-8.005***
<b>Critical values of Fourier ADF Test</b>			
Frequency	1%	5%	10%
1	-4.87	-4.31	-4.02
2	-5.58	-5.02	-4.73
3	-6.19	-5.63	-5.34

4	-6.73	-6.18	-5.89
5	-7.24	-6.68	-6.39
Critical values of F			
	10.35	7.58	6.35
Note: $\Delta$ symbol indicates the first difference of the variables. *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. The decisions are taken based on the 5% significance level.			

317

318 As a next step, the present study applies the ADL cointegration test, which takes both  
 319 nonlinearity and unknown structural breaks into account. The outcome from the ADL  
 320 cointegration test is reported in Table 4. The null hypothesis of the ADL cointegration test is that  
 321 there is no cointegration equation among the time series variables. The findings reveal that the  
 322 null hypothesis can be rejected, imping that there is a long-run relationship between renewable  
 323 electricity generation and stringent index, economic support index, and COVID-19 deaths in  
 324 Denmark.

325

<b>Table 4. Fourier ADL Cointegration Test</b>			
Model	Test Statistics	Frequency	Min AIC
REN=f (SI, ESI, COVID)	5.142***	5	-6.725
	Critical Value		
	1%	5%	10%
	-5.08	-4.38	-4.01
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.			

326

327 Since the present study captures the long-run linkage among the time series variables, we  
 328 next explore the possible effect of the stringency index, economic support index, and COVID on  
 329 renewable electricity generation employing Markov switching regression. The outcomes of the  
 330 Markov switching regression are reported in Table 5. This test is a linear regression model with  
 331 nonlinearities arising from discrete changes in regime. The present study undertakes two different



332 regimes in the renewable electricity sector in Denmark, a high volatility regime (Regime 1) and  
 333 low volatility regime (Regime 2).

<b>Table 5. Markov Switching Regression</b>				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	z-Statistic	Probability
<b>Regime 1</b>				
SI	-0.0018**	0.0009	-2.0245	0.0429
ESI	-0.0005*	0.0003	-1.7758	0.0758
COVID	-0.0375**	0.0095	-3.9254	0.0001
C	3.4270***	0.0617	55.45868	0
<b>Regime 2</b>				
SI	-0.0017***	0.0002	-6.9143	0
ESI	-0.0004***	0.0001	-3.2837	0.001
COVID	-0.0175***	0.0031	-5.549	0
C	3.2862***	0.0195	167.7567	0
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively.				

334

335

336 The outcomes in Table 5 show that the stringency index has a negative and significant  
 337 effect on renewable electricity generation in Denmark in both regimes. The coefficients of the  
 338 stringency index under both regimes are similar, indicating a similar effect of the lockdown on  
 339 renewable electricity in high and low volatility periods. The negative effect of the stringency  
 340 measures on renewable energy can be supported by the fact that the construction of renewable  
 341 energy installations was delayed due to these measures implemented in the countries. These  
 342 measures also disrupted the supply chain and directly impacted the commissioning of renewable  
 343 electricity projects [49]. Also, many clean energy workers got unemployed due to the financial  
 344 pressure of their respective companies [14]. For example, in Denmark, the Vestas which is the

345 'world's largest wind turbine manufacturer, cut jobs due to financial uncertainty associated with  
346 COVID-19. The company decided to shut down its projects of MHI Vestas and those in Lem Blade  
347 and Aarhus located in Denmark [50]. The IEA [51] reports that biofuel projects and utility-scale  
348 electricity may encounter delays in commissioning. The crisis severely hit the biofuel sector as the  
349 biofuel used drops due to restrictions of transport activity all around the country. The decrease in  
350 biofuel production will be 11.5%. Considering that Denmark's widely used energy source is  
351 bioenergy and COVID-19 has halted the production of many transport biofuel, our result is  
352 therefore not surprising.

353 In July 2020, European Union (EU) leaders, including that of Denmark, agreed about the  
354 recovery fund for coronavirus amounting to approximately 750 Billion Euro. This meant that a  
355 compromise had to be met regarding the climate budget. For example, cuts had to be made from  
356 the Just transition fund, a flagship of the European Commission aiming to assist carbon-intensive  
357 economics get rid of fossil fuels. Besides, funds were also cut from InvestEU (which helps meet  
358 the green goals of the member countries) and scientific research regarding the climate crisis [35,  
359 52]. The aforementioned argument is reflected in our finding that the economic support index has  
360 significant negative impacts on renewable electricity. This segment of the finding falls in similar  
361 line with the findings from [39], who noted that financial or economic crisis could set back the  
362 target for reducing emissions as well as affect the deployment of renewable energies. These crises  
363 also happen to coincide with the commission of wind power projects. Since Denmark's electricity  
364 sources come mostly from the wind sector, our result that renewable energy was negatively  
365 affected by the pandemic is very reasonable.

366  
367 Furthermore, we find that COVID significantly and negatively affects renewable electricity  
368 generation under both regimes. However, the high volatility regime's coefficient is greater than the  
369 coefficient under the low volatility regime, indicating that COVID has greater negative effects in  
370 the high volatility regime. The effects of COVID are also greater than that of stringency and  
371 economic support indices under both regimes. This segment of the result demonstrates the  
372 multiplier effect of the COVID pandemic, as proxied by the daily confirmed deaths, on renewable  
373 electricity. The increasing rate of COVID-19 death rate makes people afraid to go outside home  
374 and makes the government impose further strict regulations and lockdown. As a result, the COVID

375 variable incorporates the impacts of the stringency index as well as that of fear of the employees  
 376 and employers working in the renewable industry. The result can also be explained by the fact that  
 377 many countries have experienced a total slowdown in the installation of distributed solar PV where  
 378 the installation requires access to commercial buildings and houses. This segment of the result is  
 379 consistent with Eroğlu [53], who noted that the renewable energy sector is getting affected severely  
 380 because of lack of government support, issues related to the tax stock market, and supply chain  
 381 delays that are caused by the pandemic.

382

383 To catch the causal impact of the stringent index, economic support index, and COVID-19  
 384 deaths on renewable electricity generation in Denmark at different frequencies, the present study  
 385 implemented the BC causality test, which allows us to separate long-term causality from short-  
 386 term causality. The BC causality test distinguishes nonlinearity and causal stages, whereas the test  
 387 also encourages the identification of causality between parameters at various frequencies. The  
 388 outcomes of the BC causality test are depicted in Table 6. We find that there is evidence of  
 389 causality from SI to REN in the medium and short term, imping that the stringency index is an  
 390 important predictor for renewable electricity generation in Denmark for the medium and short  
 391 term. Moreover, COVID-19 deaths can also predict significant variation in renewable electricity  
 392 generation in Denmark at different frequencies, specifically during the long and short term.  
 393 However, we fail to capture any significant causality from the economic support index to  
 394 renewable electricity generation in the long and short-terms.

395

**Table 6. BC Causality Test**

Direction of causality	Long-term		Medium-term		Short-term	
	$w_i=0.01$	$w_i=0.05$	$w_i=1.00$	$w_i=1.50$	$w_i=2.00$	$w_i=2.50$
SI → REN	2.754 (0.252)	2.645 (0.266)	6.651** (0.035)	16.806** (0.000)	23.919** (0.000)	33.760** (0.000)
ESI → REN	1.211 (0.545)	1.126 (0.569)	4.751* (0.092)	3.177 (0.204)	0.208 (0.901)	0.630 (0.729)

COVID →REN	5.471* (0.064)	5.511* (0.063)	2.217 (0.330)	2.383 (0.303)	5.982** (0.050)	5.310* (0.070)
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Note:  $\langle \rangle$  and  $()$  stands for Wald test statistic and p-value, respectively. The path of causality is represented by  $\rightarrow$ . 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance are illustrated by \*, \*\*, & \*\*\*, correspondingly. SIC is used to verify the VAR model's lag lengths.

396

397

## 398 **4.0 Conclusion and Policy Suggestions**

### 399 **4.1 Summary of Findings**

400 The need to assess the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on several parts of the economy  
401 cannot be overemphasized, with a special interest in the energy sector, which is one of those largely  
402 affected by the pandemic. As demonstrated by Eroğlu [53], renewable energy generation has been  
403 adversely affected due to uncertainty in the supply of materials, amongst others. Given the  
404 foregoing, this study presents a case for Denmark by investigating the impact of the COVID-19  
405 pandemic on renewable electricity generation. To achieve this aim, data on renewable electricity  
406 alongside stringency index, economic support index, and COVID-19 daily confirmed deaths were  
407 collected and analyzed via a Markov Switching Regression and other pre-and post-estimation tests.

408 The result from the cointegration test first reveals that the variables are cointegrated,  
409 indicating that they have a long-run relationship with each other. To account for the high and low  
410 periods of uncertainty, we analyzed the relationship between COVID-19 and renewable electricity  
411 via a Markov switching regression model. Findings from this study reveal that both the stringency  
412 index and economic support index adversely influenced renewable energy generation in Denmark  
413 and the effect of these two measures was also similar in magnitude. However, the impact of the  
414 COVID-19 pandemic, proxied by the daily confirmed death, varied across two regimes, with  
415 having a higher effect in the high volatility period.

### 416 **4.2 Policy Suggestions**

417 Our findings are informative for energy policy during crisis events such as the COVID-19  
418 pandemic and also during the post-crisis period. Regulations of economic activities amidst a  
419 disruption such as a pandemic require some flexibility. For example, issuing palliatives or forming

420 a support bubble by the central government may improve the performance of vital supply chain  
421 initiatives needed for generating renewable energy. Also, there is no limit to the disturbances that  
422 creating economic support initiatives and workable models of compensation will cause to the  
423 energy sector in Denmark. Given that the energy sector is affected by the number of deaths and  
424 uncertainty during the pandemic, there is a need to move power guidelines towards a model that  
425 will advance productivity, decarbonization, as well as investment platforms that assume flexible  
426 returns.

427 Denmark's goal is to meet its 50% energy demand from renewable by 2030 and to become  
428 independent of fossil fuel by 2050. But as our analysis has shown, renewable energy is severely  
429 affected by the shocks arising from the pandemic. Therefore, while designing the policy  
430 frameworks for the post-COVID-19 period, several different measures need to be implemented by  
431 the government as delays and supply chain disruption in the renewable sector has occurred.  
432 Renewable technology adoption can resolve the post-COVID dilemma moments for Denmark.  
433 This requires strategic actions as the country continues to transition itself to the sources of clean  
434 energy in the post-COVID world. Investors are currently acting unstable due to the uncertainty  
435 associated with the renewable industry. The world's largest turbine manufacturer, Vestas, has  
436 already cut jobs owing to the financial pressure in Denmark. Therefore, the financial risks  
437 associated with renewables must be reduced so that investors do not shift away from renewable  
438 [54]. More support in the form of production and investment tax credit must be provided for clean  
439 energy investors.

440  
441 The electricity sector of Denmark is highly reliant on wind farms, making it vulnerable to  
442 extreme events such as the pandemic. The country has to rely on its neighbouring countries to  
443 balance its renewable. For example, it has to import hydropower as the country is flat and has little  
444 opportunity of generating hydroelectricity itself. Furthermore, global accidents revolving around  
445 nuclear power plants have given rise to some prejudices regarding the development of nuclear  
446 energy in people's subconscious, including Denmark, where nuclear is banned since 1985. Yet, in  
447 terms of ensuring the environmental balance, nuclear power plants are considered to be one of the  
448 most reliable power source [55,56] Therefore, the incentives to boost the nuclear production in  
449 Denmark must come from the government as it will require changes in the perception of Danish  
450 people regarding nuclear power. . Also, instead of relying on neighbouring countries, the country

451 can also target demand response, which decreases consumption to balance as has been noted by  
452 Martinot [57].

453           Compared to other countries, 'Denmark's transition to wind power from oil imported nation  
454 was done in a short period. Although this is laudable, there are concerns about whether generating  
455 electricity from new technology is higher than that of the old one. For Denmark, this seems to be  
456 very true. Different measures such as alignment of transmission, distribution, and competitive  
457 auctions should be implemented to reduce the cost of electricity, especially that of wind and solar.  
458 The high rates of energy taxation have also encouraged Danish consumers to switch towards their  
459 electricity generation, and this is a blow to the government as it is not cost-saving socio-  
460 economically. In this regard, a further decrease in heating taxation can be recommended. The  
461 country should also evaluate the solar heating policies with regards to a further extension of  
462 seasonal thermal storage. Furthermore, a more flexible district heating system should be  
463 encouraged, and tax levels should be adjusted to efficiently align the electricity and heating system.

464

#### 465 **4.3 Study Limitations and Future research scopes**

466           Our study investigates how renewable generation can be affected by the COVID-19  
467 pandemic. As such, we used three measures of the pandemic to assess their effects on the  
468 renewable sector. However, renewable electricity generation in Denmark is extremely affected by  
469 policy changes. Apart from the policy changes in terms of lockdown and economic support, our  
470 study could not incorporate any other benchmark policy variables. This is mainly because daily  
471 data for such policy variables are not yet available. It is possible to incorporate them in future  
472 studies when they become available for the COVID period of 2020. Also, Denmark has two price  
473 areas and the effect of the pandemic can vary across these two areas. Future studies may also  
474 explore impacts on these two price areas depending on the data availability.

475

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481  
482 **Data availability**

483 Data are available upon request from the corresponding author.  
484  
485

486

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