

Bridging Copenhagen and Paris: How Hungarian police accept anti-immigrant discourse

Abstract

Integrating the discursive and practice-based approach to securitisation, this article explores how the police function as the audience of securitising discourse. Taking the Hungarian case of border control, it looks into how the police accept and buy into anti-immigrant discourses of the political elite. Based on a questionnaire survey of Hungarian police officers, it demonstrates the potential of discursive *legitimation* in shaping officers' understanding of mass migration. It describes the ways in which attitudes and hence, arguably, practice can be conditioned by securitising discourse. The overall aim of the article is to advance the understanding of the narrative dimension of power struggles between police and the political elite, and how that structures the field of border security. Critical security scholars have pointed out that police filter securitising discourse based on their professional dispositions and preferences. However, the Hungarian case seems to suggest that discourse may, in fact, influence dispositions themselves.

Keywords

border security; Copenhagen School; Critical Security Studies; Hungary; Paris School; policing

1 Introduction

It is well established in the literature how states have securitised and come to see migration as a threat (for review see Guild, 2009; Tsoukala, 2005). The relationship between the state and migrants falls outside the narrow scope of this article; its purpose is not to present a case study of securitisation of migration as such. Rather, it is interested in the relationship between securitising discourse and policing. The paper demonstrates the impact securitising discourses may have on police officers' understanding of mass migration, i.e. the potential of discourses to influence border control practices.

The aim of the paper is to contribute to critical security studies by integrating the Copenhagen (CS hereinafter) and the Paris School (PS) of security studies. According to the former,

securitisation functions by means of discursive representation of something as a threat, thereby obtaining the approval of the audience in support of securitising policy measures (Buzan, Waeber and de Wilde, 1998). To CS, securitisation is, fundamentally, a discursively generated phenomenon. However, according to the latter, security agencies take a significant part in the process. Bigo (2001) argues that practitioners of security do not simply respond to threats defined as such by political actors but are active participants in the (de)construction of security by virtue of their everyday practices and discretion. Securitising discourses themselves are heavily determined by the prevailing competition for legitimacy and dominance between agents and the overall conditions of the field of security, for that matter (Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008). The integration of these two different approaches to securitisation may help to better understand the potential impact of discourse on security practices (Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka, 2016; Bello, 2020a, b). Therefore, it is a relevant question to ask how the police's understanding of mass migration and, subsequently, their practices are affected by the police's interpretation of securitising discourses. Combining the discursive and practice-based framing of securitisation, this is the debate the article seeks to contribute to. The case of Hungary is ideal to analyse the problem: not only has the Hungarian Police gone through significant changes in line with the government's anti-immigrant campaign, but the police have also been addressed by the Prime Minister as "heroes" who protect and defend the Hungarian "homeland" against migrants. However, as we shall see later, there is a clear contrast between the "heroism" of border control in the narratives of the political and policing elite, and the circumstances of rank-and-file deployed at the border. I was interested in how the former could counterbalance the latter, i.e. to what extent legitimising discourses could outweigh the burden that border control duties put on the police, and whether officers have come to share the attitudes of the general public and approve government policy.

Following a brief review of both CS and PS, the article conceptually analyses how the police may function as the audience of securitising discourse. By merging the literature on the sociology of policing with that of critical security studies, it looks into the role of persuasion in facilitating the positive acceptance of securitising moves by officers. Policing scholars have extensively analysed the relationship between politics and the police and how police function under political interference (see e.g. Beare, 2007; Sossin, 2007; Reiner, 2010; Manning, 2010). Issues of police-government relations, professional socialisation and police culture are helpful to better understand the dynamics of power struggles in the field of security. Policing literature,

as a *blue* lens, provides a highly relevant perspective and theoretical background for critical security scholars when mapping the power structures of the field of security (cf. Bigo, 2016). Finally, drawing on the concept of *legitimation* put forward by critical discourse scholars, the theoretical section outlines the underlying mechanisms of how legitimising discourse may shape the police's understanding of mass migration with a subsequent impact on their practices. The article then goes on to provide a snapshot of the dominant political narratives, and the role and practices of the police in border control in contemporary Hungary. To measure the impact of the anti-immigrant campaign and PM Viktor Orbán's legitimising discourse on attitudes of the police towards mass migration, I designed a survey featuring some of the main themes of these narratives widely disseminated in the media. The questionnaire used Likert Scale, although not exclusively. The participants were students at the National University of Public Service (NKE), serving police officers in rank-and-file status. While the survey data presented in Section 4. provide no direct empirical evidence as to how discourse has affected police practices, the article nevertheless argues that it may serve as an adequate indicator in this regard.

2 Theory

2.1 The constitutive power of discourse

According to CS, as Jef Huysmans phrased it: "security questions are politically talked into existence" (Huysmans, 2006: 90). That is, securitisation works analogously to speech acts. It is irrelevant whether or not a phenomenon constitutes an ontological threat; it becomes a question of security by discursively representing it as such. In other words, to CS, securitisation is a *self-referential* process, where securitising actors, the government for example, discursively designate an issue as an existential threat to a *referent object* to be protected. Referent objects, in societal terms, might be collective identities, such as the national and cultural identity or the dominant religion of a community (Buzan et al., 1998).

However, securitisation is successful if, and only if, the *securitising moves* are accepted and approved by the *audience* of the utterance. Whether the audience accepts or declines securitising moves depends on a mutual agreement between the audience and the securitiser. What is decisive is the audience's understanding of, and attitude towards, the object of securitisation, i.e. whether it is, in fact, perceived as a threat by the audience. It is thus a relevant

question to ask what the context and facilitating conditions are, and, more significantly, why they make the security utterance hit home in lowering the threshold of the audience's threat perception. Securitisers may operationalise such conditions in order to emotionally manipulate their audience (Van Rythoven, 2015). In other words, to understand the dynamics of the securitisation process, not only linguistic, but also a sociological analysis is warranted; *felicity conditions* have an inescapable social dimension (Stritzel, 2007; Bourbeau, 2011). The constitutive power of the speech act alone is a necessary but not sufficient condition in terms of the outcome of securitisation. The securitising move is subject to "negotiation" between the securitiser and the audience; securitisation is ultimately an intersubjective process (Buzan et al., 1998: 26-31). Thus, Stritzel (2007) has promoted a more comprehensive approach to securitisation that reflects on the ability of actors "to influence a process of meaning construction", instead of the purely linguistic "internalist" concept of CS. Stritzel emphasised the importance of the relationship between security utterances, the pre-existing dominant political discourse and the historical context. As we shall see later (see section 3.1), the construction of threat correlates with the "actors' history, identities and strategic myths" in relation to pre-existing threats (Ciutá, 2009; cf. Robinson, 2017).

Balzacq (2005) argues that CS is inherently self-limiting in conceptualizing securitisation as an *illocutionary* act (self-referential) abandoning the *perlocutionary* (persuasive) effect of speech acts (cf. Austin, 1976: 101-108). As McDonald (2008) notes, it is worth considering an alternative interpretation of speech acts as something that can "construct or produce" the audience itself. The perlocutionary effect of the speech act deserves a lot more attention than it has gotten thus far. There are rhetorical techniques to promote political purposes and facilitate the positive representation of securitising moves. Governance does not necessarily imply explicit control, but persuasion can be effectively used to obtain consent (McNevin 2014). As discussed below, new policy may interfere with pre-existing organisational culture in providing a new "compass" to orient officers to tackle certain issues when enforcing the law (Bevir and Krupicka, 2007). Officers may, however, "feel like a fish out of water" and struggle with making sense of new policy announcements which they cannot bring in line with their understanding of their role (Chan, 2007). Since objectives that force rank and file outside their comfort zone are likely to meet resistance, they must be plausible in terms of the everyday routine and meet the previously given objectives of policing. "Translating" policy into pre-existing schemas and crime control practices is thus paramount to successful securitisation

(Skogan, 2008). Referent objects and the security agenda must be presented in a manner which allows the police to easily identify with the purposes of the securitiser (Salter, 2008). Promotive messages and success stories enhance the development of positive attitudes towards new initiatives and their endorsement (Gau and Gaines 2012). *Sensegiving*, for example, plays an important role in the process by providing plausible stories and cues that are rooted in the tradition, shared beliefs and procedures that inform occupational culture and are “salient” to the police. In other words, sensegivers link past, present and future experiences thereby establishing continuity, and a sensible and coherent frame of reference for the new policy. Such stories help officers to adjust to new circumstances and accommodate them in pre-existing practices and cognitive patterns of decision making (Chan, 2007). Drawing on Althusser’s theory of interpellation, Weldes (1996) has similarly argued that “the interpellation of individuals into subject-positions” by the representation of situations in a way in which they already make sense is instrumental in gaining consent.

2.2 The role of the police

According to PS, in neglecting the practices of security agents and focusing exceptionality on the performative “magic” of a single utterance, CS suggests that “what is done determines the doing, when in fact the opposite is true” (Bigo, 2001). Bigo does not dispute the constitutive role of discourses. Rather, he argues that practice and expertise “are as important as all forms of discourse” (Bigo, 2000: 194). The police are active participants in the construction of security in the way in which they select and identify (or not) something or someone as a security issue during their daily routine (Bigo, 2001). A social phenomenon, a person or a group automatically becomes a matter of (in)security under the spotlight of the police, because it is their prerogative to formulate legitimate and authoritative “pronouncements” about security (Williams, 1997; Loader and Mulcahy, 2003: ch. 2; Charman, 2017: 26; Loader, 1997; Manning, 2008: 208; Schwell, 2014; Léonard and Kaunert, 2020).

However, this professional authority of the police is often exploited by politics. Political actors exercise control over the police, and police leaders have a pragmatic interest in redefining their priorities and adopting the terms that political actors use to label threat (Bigo, 2008). Every government has a particular *law and order* strategy and decisions regarding the funding, organisational structure and the mandate of the police are vested in the government in order to effectively pursue this agenda. Ideological alliance between the police and political elite may

thus be a sign of opportunism to gain resources and appointments (Sossin, 2007). As Reiner (2010: 32) notes, the political neutrality and full independence of the police are myths: “all relationships which have a power dimension are political, so policing is inherently and inescapably political”. The police always face the risk of being deployed in line with political preferences of the ruling elite and are assigned tasks that serve electoral purposes rather than being objective or professionally warranted (Beare, 2007). Targets and objects of policing are shaped by the constantly changing political interpretation of social order (Manning, 2008: 205-26).

The meaning of (in)security changes over time and is influenced by the power struggles and “positioning games” between political and professional actors, rather than being fixed and constant (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002). This applies to both “strategic elites” and local agents who balance elite narratives and policy proposals against the unique and distinctive features of local settings, culture and traditions (Bevir and Rhodes, 2016; Bevir and Krupicka, 2007). How security policies are enacted on the ground is the outcome of practices generated by a multitude of competing narratives, beliefs, traditions and local interpretations (Bevir, 2016). Elite discourse and objectives may differ greatly from the discourse and priorities of practitioners working on the ground. In other words, policy implementation may be affected by tensions between national policy objectives and local needs (Frowd, 2014). Draconian draft proposals do not necessarily become practice. Fundamental rights, economic interests and accountability pose important limits to implementation; anti-immigrant governmental propaganda does not always mirror actual practice (Bigo, 2005).

It follows that the role of the police as the audience of securitising discourses cannot be reduced to static acceptance, but they actively constrain or facilitate securitisation (Côté, 2016; Bourbeau, 2011: 123-130). This Janus-faced nature of certain agency types, such as *elite* and *technocratic* audiences, has already been addressed in the literature (Salter, 2008; Salter and Piché, 2011; Roe, 2008). Security is an outcome of neither unilateral linguistic nor legislative moves, but professionals are “interpretive actors” who reflexively adopt (or not) policy and reshape it in accordance with their professional socialisation, dispositions, attitudes, interest and routine practices (Côté-Boucher, Infantino and Salter, 2014; Schwell, 2014, 2010; Bigo, 2014, 2008, 2005). Mainstream narratives are filtered; accepted by some and rejected by others (Salter and Piché, 2011). Such narratives offer new subjectivities and forms of behaviour which may be challenged by officers if in conflict with their occupational identity (Davies and

Thomas, 2003). The rank-and-file exercise a high level of discretion in policy enactment and tend to be selective if not “on board” with new policy announcements (Gau and Gaines 2012). Policy that resonates with the core function or “mission” of policing, such as crime control and protecting people, are likely to be successful (Wood, 2004; Chan, 2004). Policy is approved and practice changes (or not) depending on how officers can bring new objectives in line with their occupational dispositions and what strategic adjustments are necessary in order to survive in case old routines are no longer sustainable (Chan, 2007, 1997; Ganapathy and Cheong, 2016). In times of major changes, officers who fail to adjust to the new rules may drop out of the system (Chan 2001). However, police culture is certainly not monolithic or static, but officers accommodate new ideas, and adjust their practice and position in the face of new role expectations (Bevir and Krupicka, 2007; Bigo, 2011). They reconfigure their understanding of their role “in a constant process of adaptation” in light of political discourse (Davies and Thomas, 2003).

2.3 Legitimation - how discourse influences practice

If we accept that 1) discourse can create its own audience by prompting certain attitudes, and 2) the police enact policy discourses through their own interpretations guided by their own dispositions, then 3) discourse persuasive enough to appeal to them as audience might become actual practice. Critical Discourse Studies, also known as Critical Discourse Analysis, is a growing field that analyses the underlying processes of how discourse influences social practices. More specifically, it looks at the discursive manifestation and reproduction of xenophobia, discrimination, and abuse of power in society. Critical discourse scholars argue that there is a mutually constitutive relationship between social and discourse structures; discourse is conditioned by and informs social practices (Wodak and Meyer, 2015). This is, however, not an intrinsic feature of language. Rather, as Van Dijk argues, discourse functions through a “cognitive interface”, the shared knowledge and beliefs of the audience determined by the prevailing sociocultural and historical context (Van Dijk, 2014: 142-147; 2015). This shared knowledge makes up the cognitive environment against the background of which language users formulate and interpret discourse. Van Dijk essentially highlights the importance of social cognition for discourse comprehension, the subsequent attitudes, and actions; discourse can influence practice if tailored to the belief system of the audience (Van

Dijk, 2014). Concerning the police, professional socialisation and occupational culture have a significant role in this regard. Thus, in order to make an impact, securitising discourse has to be well-formulated and well-targeted with reference to the shared beliefs and common-sense knowledge of the police, i.e. the core function, values and the role of policing as understood by officers. Such discursive *legitimation*, in general, plays a crucial role in the functioning of public authorities (for review see Björkvall and Nyström Höög, 2019). More importantly for the purpose of this paper, it may have a significant impact on the decision making and practices of stakeholders in the governance of migration in particular (Smith-Khan, 2021). Legitimation is understood here as the explanation and justification of securitising moves in demonstrating that they fall within the existing legal, political and moral order of the community which the police represent (Martín Rojo and Van Dijk, 1997; Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Reyes, 2011). Legitimation can be thought of as a form of *interpellation*, whereby officers come to identify with the subject-positions of “protectors and defenders”. Again, such presentation of border control reflects and, simultaneously, reproduces certain shared beliefs and attitudes that are salient to the police (Hansen, 2006: ch. 2).

3 Overview of the Hungarian case

Securitisation of migration has been on the rise globally, but Hungary has taken on a leading role in it (Szalai and Göbl, 2015; Nagy, 2016). During the so-called *refugee crisis* in 2015, the government constructed a barbed wire fence at the Southern border and declared a “crisis situation caused by mass migration” (a new state of emergency, still in force at the time of writing). Hungary has completely dismantled its asylum system. Not only the Asylum Act but all related legislations have been continually amended with the explicit purpose of restricting the rights of asylum seekers (AIDA, 2020). Border control, reception and integration policies have been reshaped in line with Viktor Orbán’s “illiberal” approach to governance and politics. On the one hand, the government introduced strict border control measures coupled with new criminal offences criminalizing irregular entry. On the other hand, not only has it created a tax imposed on NGOs dedicated to support irregular migrants and secure their rights, but also established criminal liability for assisting migrants. The new offence of *facilitating/supporting irregular migration*, distinct from human smuggling, has been specifically tailored to members of civil society organisations (Gyollai and Korkut 2019). Anti-immigrant attitudes and legislative moves prevailed over any other matter in political discourse and decision making.

In maintaining a general atmosphere of crisis and using multiple referent objects, most acts of the government have pursued the securitisation of migration. It justified the new legislative developments as necessary to protect Hungarians, the Hungarian national identity and the European-Christian culture. The example of Hungary, where a “warlike” political discourse has been normalised (Szalai, 2017), illustrates that the line between extraordinary measures and normal politics might occasionally be blurred (Floyd, 2016).

3.1 Political discourse about migration

In tandem with the new policy developments, the government has launched an overwhelming anti-immigrant campaign clustered around the following main topics: physical, religious, cultural and welfare insecurity. It claimed that migrants pose a threat to the “Hungarian way of life”, “national homogeneity” and the physical integrity of citizens. Muslim “hordes” of “invaders” threatening Christianity have been a core element of the campaign (Mendelski 2019; Gyollai and Korkut, 2019; Vidra, 2017; Sereghy, 2017). The government envisioned Islamisation, terror, the destruction of Western civilisation and sexual harassment of Hungarian women. The campaign has targeted not only migrants but also those who expressed dissent, claiming that mass migration has been accelerated by the left-liberal lobby. EU institutions and NGOs that stood up against Hungary’s exclusionary politics have come under attack. Moreover, the government argued that the migration crisis had been unleashed by the Hungarian-American investor and philanthropist George Soros, whose “plan” was to “settle one million migrants in Europe”. In the government’s view, NGOs providing humanitarian aid to asylum seekers serve the execution of the so-called “Soros Plan” and act on behalf of Soros as his “agents” (Mendelski 2019; Vidra, 2017; Sereghy, 2017). These narratives have been disseminated through media outlets, giant billboards and propaganda leaflets entitled “national consultation” that were sent to every household. Most of the media in Hungary, including the national broadcaster, are controlled by individuals loyal to the government (Bayer and Tamma, 2020). Due to this media hegemony, the sources through which the public would have been able to acquire dissenting information about migration were limited. As a result, the government’s stance has enjoyed widespread public support and anti-immigrant public sentiments peaked in 2017, bringing a landslide victory for the Fidesz-KDNP at the April 2018 general elections. A significant proportion of Hungarians now perceive mass migration as a civilisational threat (Simonovits, 2020).¹

As Vuori (2008) notes, securitisation may be instrumental to maintain the status quo and the survival of a ruling regime.² In an authoritarian context, such as the Hungarian, the police are under the authority of the government, the requirement of consent is quasi-symbolic. Although the new rules lack the real option of refusal by threatening dissenting voices, even securitising acts of authoritarian regimes require some degree of legitimacy (Vuori, 2008). As we shall see in the next section, the police have been heavily affected by the government's new border control measures. For this very reason, and arguably because of the growing resignation rate, the PM has paid particular attention to the border police in his narratives. Orbán has regularly addressed the police, including graduates of the NKE, calling them “heroes” who “protect and defend” “Hungarian families”, the “homeland” and “the social order based on our Christian history of a thousand years” (Orbán, 2017a, b). He associated the border fence at the Serbian border with the medieval border fortress system and referred to the police as the heirs of those defending the country during the Ottoman Conquest in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. At an oath taking ceremony of the so-called “border hunters” (*határvadászok*), a newly established border control unit, PM Orbán called the police and military “members of modern-day border-fort garrisons”, “who today enable us Hungarians to live in peace and security”. The PM stressed that Hungary is “under siege” and reminded his audience that protecting “our homes, women, children and parents is a moral imperative stretching back centuries” (Orbán, 2019a). The medieval past was a recurring theme in the PM's speeches. On one occasion he praised the legacy of János Hunyadi, the hero of the Battle of Belgrade in 1456. He reassured his audience of police graduates that they “belong among those Hungarians who rallied to the flags of Hunyadi, Rákóczi, Kossuth and the 1956 Revolution” and who were “prepared to lay down their lives” for ideals, such as “freedom, security, order” (Orbán, 2019b). Krémer underlines that the PM essentially addressed the police as troops or an army of defenders, rather than as personnel of a law-enforcement agency (Krémer, 2020: 254-255).

3.2 The role of the police

Accordingly, policing has gone through significant changes since 2015, prioritising border and migration control duties above all else. “Protecting the order of state borders” and “preventing illegal migration” have become a constitutionally prescribed duty of the police; the recent amendment to the constitution requires all public bodies to protect the “Christian culture of Hungary” (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019). Under the new state of emergency, the police have

gained distinctive and extraordinary power in the governance of migration. Taking over from the Immigration and Asylum Office (IAO), the “National Directorate-General for Aliens Policing” (NDGAP) has been responsible for asylum and immigration matters since July 2019. The NDGAP functions under the remit of the Police Act; its current director is the former deputy head of the Hungarian National Police. Comparable to its legal successor, IAO operated in a centralised, top-down structure, overseen by the Ministry of Interior. It functioned strictly in line with, and in the spirit of, government policy: asylum seekers in transit zones³ were denied food on multiple occasions, thereby forcing them to leave the territory. IAO argued that the relevant government decree “only prescribes the provision of food in community shelters and does not specifically mention the transit zones” (AIDA, 2020: 48). This practice persisted under NDGAP control, irrespective of the intervention by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee and, subsequently, by the European Court of Human Rights (Ibid).

The border has been patrolled by joint police-military patrol, and undocumented migrants apprehended within territory have been pushed back to the other side of the fence regardless of requests for asylum; many of whom later reported serious injuries caused by beating and dog bites (HRW, 2016). It has been confirmed by an insider source that xenophobia among the police, in fact, posed “a problem” during border control activities (Varga, 2016: fn. 116). Between September 2015 and March 2017, 44 accusations were filed against the police for use of excessive force against migrants, most of which were found inadmissible. In two concluded cases, officers were fined for landing a knee to the face of a person and spraying tear gas at another through the fence, respectively (Lőrincz, 2017). Several allegations of ill-treatment of migrants by the police at the Hungarian-Serbian border, including the use of unmuzzled service dogs, have been recorded by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT, 2018). Frontex recently suspended operations in Hungary, as deployment of Frontex officers in the region had long put the Agency at risk of being complicit in the pushback practices of the Hungarian authorities (HRW, 2021). Prior to that, authorities essentially exploited and referred to the Frontex presence as a guarantee for compliance with EU and human rights law in denying accusations of brutality (CPT, 2018).

Due to staff shortage, especially early on, police officers have been transferred from all over and deployed at the border irrespective of place of duty, service branch and whether they had received training in border control.⁴ Balancing between local needs and necessities, and

national policy objectives does not apply in the Hungarian context. According to the dominant view, preferences of different organisational units, at any level, are subordinate to border control duties (Balla, 2017). This is because both the functioning of the police and its organisational structure is highly centralised, and the government, through the Ministry of Interior, exercises full control over the organisation. Objectives are determined top-down by the government, based on political preferences and without adequate professional consultation or impact measurement. As a legacy of the pre-1989 political system, the hierarchical structure follows an archaic and dysfunctional military rank system and appointments to key positions often presuppose loyalty rather than competence (Krémer, 2013, 2020). It is perhaps no accident that the PM's historical analogies and narratives about the heroism of police at the border have been echoed by police leaders. The Interior Minister, in his preface to an edited volume on the history of border control, implied that the border fence and the medieval border fortress system served one and the same purposes (Pintér, 2017: 7). The legacy of the medieval defence system to contemporary border control is a recurring theme in the volume as a whole. Most of the contributors to the volume are distinguished policing scholars and / or high-ranking members of the Police. A recent textbook on basic duties for police college students depicts medieval border soldiers as "border guards at the time" and devotes an entire section to the topic (Kalmárné Pölöskei 2018: 66-67). Röszke border crossing at the Serbian border was sealed in September 2015 and there was a clash between the police in full gear and asylum seekers stranded by the fence. The event became known as the "Battle of Röszke", a term also used by police leaders. As the "PM's chief internal security adviser", a former border guard general has become a regular guest on the national broadcaster to warn the audience about the "ever growing migratory pressure" almost every week since 2015 (for timeline see Haszán, 2020). All these examples show how securitising narratives informed professional police discourse, arguably for reasons of opportunism and loyalty.

Conversely, the rank and file deployed at the border showed signs of overburden, burnout and mental exhaustion, and resignations increased (Varga, 2016: 98), even though hundreds of police candidates were temporarily put on duty to assist officers (Christián, 2017). Police unions expressed concerns about the dire circumstances of police deployed at the border and raised the alarm bell about the dropping number of applicants for police training; patrolling the fence did not particularly "attract" potential candidates (Doros and Vas, 2019; Bors, 2015). While unions would ideally have the potential to intervene for a better working environment

(cf. e.g. Côté-Boucher, 2020: ch. 5; Page, 2011: ch. 3), this was not the case in Hungary (Krémer 2020: 272). The prolonged duty hours and deployment away from family, insufficient food supply and accommodation, coupled with the lack of routine and psychological support, eventually led to serious (mental) health problems. Symptoms of aggression, frustration and depression were not uncommon among both police and military personnel (Borbély, Farkas and Tózsér, 2017; Borbély, Fridrich and Tózsér, 2018). Moreover, due to the staff shortage, a nationwide recruitment of “border hunters” (határ vadászok) was launched in 2016, who are essentially civilians deployed at the border following a six-month fast track training course (Gyollai and Korkut 2019). As the justification goes, the name “border-hunter” has been chosen because “it is meant to carry the memory of those soldiers and military organisations who heroically defended the historical borders of Hungary against the advancing Soviet troops during World War II” (Dsupin and Kónya 2017: 769-770).

4 Findings and discussion

A total number of 29 officers filled in the questionnaire at NKE in December 2018; only a very few of those being present refused to participate.⁵ Preliminary questions inquired about the length of time served at the police, the service branch and place of work (Budapest or elsewhere). Although the questionnaire was anonymous, there were participants who left even some of the preliminary questions blank. Most respondents confirmed that they acquire information about migration-related questions predominantly from the media. While 62% were not satisfied with the general performance of the government, 83% approved the way the government has, in general, handled migration. For the sake of simplicity, “totally agree” and “agree”, and “totally disagree” and “disagree” responses have been merged in the presentation of results, respectively.




Figure 1. Attitudes towards migration-related matters.

Although the sample cannot be considered as representative, and as such it is insufficient to draw far-reaching conclusions about the Hungarian police in general, the overall anti-immigrant stance of the respondents is apparent and reflected in the responses. As Figure 1. shows, 79% and 76% respectively would not like Hungary to become a “country of immigrants” (Q6) and “would prefer not to live in the same city with Muslims” (Q7). Similar to findings on public opinions, the results suggest that the majority of respondents have bought into securitising discourses and approved the draconian border control policy. According to the overwhelming majority (83%), “the construction of the border fence was a necessary and good decision” (Q1). Most of the respondents (59%) agreed that “the EU should not interfere in migration-related matters” in Hungary (Q2). (Conversely, and paradoxically, only 28% agreed that “there is no need for Frontex, we can defend our own borders” (Q3).) Only 14% disagreed with the statement that “immigrants do not come on their own initiatives but are sent” (Q4). This question referred to the widely disseminated narrative that migrants are sent to Europe by George Soros.⁶ Regarding civil society organisations, more than half of the respondents (55%) agreed that “NGOs supporting migration should pay tax” (Q5). Based on the responses

regarding professional matters, a serious proportion of the participants seemed to share the government's justification of its measures by portraying migrants as a threat to the community. Less than half of the respondents (48%) agreed that "the fight against transnational crime is more important than the issue of irregular migration" (Q10), and 31% were neutral about the question. Only 41% disagreed that "irregular migration is a more serious issue than human smuggling" (Q11). 66% agreed that "the danger irregular border crossing poses to the public makes it necessary to sanction it as a criminal offence" (Q12). The result was almost identical concerning the danger posed by "facilitation/support of irregular migration" (Q13), the new offence targeting NGO members. The result shows great acceptance and support of the securitising measures, considering that 86% of the participants thought the current political atmosphere about migration has had a noticeable impact on the functioning of the police. 66% agreed that this interference was significant; 32% of these participants found the interference more than it should be, and only 16% found it acceptable. 79% have, in fact, been involved in at least one form of border/migration control activity. Although only two worked permanently as border control police, 45% have been deployed with transfer at the border section. Only 21% of the total respondents thought that border control tasks did not overburden the police at all, most of whom have been at the border. This is remarkable bearing in mind the working conditions and circumstances of deployment.

Interpreting these findings in light of what was said earlier about persuasion, legitimation and the police as interpretive actors, it can perhaps be argued that Orbán's legitimising narratives have been, to some extent, successful. To recapitulate his speeches cited earlier, the PM aligned policy objectives with a basic purpose of policing, such as to maintain public order and safety, and to protect citizenry by putting their own life on the line if necessary. Not only that, Orbán prompted collective memory of the Ottoman Conquest and linked it to his long-cherished ideal of "Christian national identity" thereby providing a symbolic frame of reference for border control. As he claimed, duties prescribed by the new policy surpassed the mundane nature of these tasks: when patrolling the border fence, not only are the police enforcing the law, but are also "protecting Hungarian families", defending "the Hungarian homeland" and "European Christianity", just like their medieval predecessors did. Thus, it is perhaps no surprise that 34% of the participants were neutral as to whether Hungary "must welcome people fleeing war zones" (Q8) or not, and 21% would deny access to them altogether. More significantly, 59% agreed that "human rights issues should not be mixed with migration-related matters" (Q9).

This finding is consistent with the observation that disregard for international norms goes hand in hand with hostility when a community feels threatened by an enemy, a phenomenon which Bar-Tal lists among the consequences of “siege mentality”. The police were likely to feel unbound by human rights because interests of the community override such considerations (Bar-Tal, 2000: 115-120).

To be sure, the numbers do not tell us much about whether legitimising discourse has explicitly influenced and manifested in border practices. Rather, the survey data suggest that the anti-immigrant campaign coupled with legitimising discourses have had an impact on the officers’ attitude towards migrants. Participant observation would have certainly been a better method to analyse the impact of narratives on practices; this was however not possible at that time.⁷ Nor could I include questions about details of police practices and techniques, about which only designated persons shall disclose information. Even if there was an opportunity to carry out ethnographic research, the impact of narratives on practice would not necessarily be observable and/or measurable for that matter. Nevertheless, we have earlier seen that attitudes and dispositions are a determinant of practice, and as such they may serve as an interface or indicator to make inferences about the relationship between discourse and practice. Since the questionnaire is an adequate tool to measure the impact of discourse on attitudes,⁸ which has been confirmed, it seems safe to assume that securitising discourse may also have had an impact on how migrants have been handled by the police at the border. The data certainly do not suggest that the participants, in particular, have or would necessarily use excessive force against migrants. However, the attitudes they display are concerning especially in light of the allegations recorded by CPT, bearing in mind that the police have been the first point of contact for those fleeing the warzones of Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, the systematic push-back of asylum seekers at the Hungarian-Serbian border is a well-documented fact.

More recent qualitative findings seem to corroborate the persuasive effect of narratives, where I was specifically interested in the role of collective memory in officers’ self-interpretation (Author, under review). When asked about historical analogies, an officer specifically compared mass migration to the Ottoman Occupation, while another argued that France had already fallen to Islam. According to a soldier, the only solution would be an order to fire at will, otherwise migrants would “kill us all in our own country”. Others sincerely believed that migrants were sent by politicians whose purpose was to thereby “weaken Europe”. These findings more explicitly suggest that the use of excessive force and brutality against irregular

migrants at the border may have been attributable not only to stress, as has been implied elsewhere (Borbély et al., 2018), but also to the anti-immigrant campaign.

However, this is not to say that the Hungarian police have unanimously and unconditionally embraced anti-immigrant discourses. There were participants, though the minority, who displayed overall positive attitudes towards asylum seekers. The police are a diverse and culturally heterogeneous society, which may engender conflicting views that challenge organisational mandates (Sklansky 2007). The differences in the motivation and interest of those at management level and that of frontline officers is clear in this regard. Although the questionnaire included variables such as place of duty, length of service and division, I found no convincing correlation; the distribution of responses displaying anti-immigrant attitudes was relatively homogeneous between different groups.




Figure 2. Cohort responses.

The average length of police service was 10 years, with a minimum of 5 and maximum of 21 years, and 41% of the participants worked in the capital. The participants' profile was heterogeneous. Except criminal investigation, almost all service branches have been represented. The two biggest and comparable groups were traffic police and public order police with 7 and 9 persons, respectively. As Figure 2. shows, while participants working elsewhere than the capital were more supportive (60%) of people fleeing warzones than those working in Budapest (33%), both groups were equally averse to the idea of living in the same city with

Muslims (73% / 75%) and Hungary becoming a country of immigrants (73% / 91%). Regarding length of service, only 40% of the participants who had served for less than 10 years and 50% of those with 10 or more years' service would welcome refugees. 73% of the first group and 79% of the second group would not live in the same city with Muslims, and 80% of the first group and 79% of the second group agreed that Hungary should not become a country of immigrants. Concerning division cohorts, although 71 % of traffic police and only 44 % of public order police would welcome refugees, 71 % and 56 % would not live in the same city with Muslims, and 86 % and 78 % agreed that Hungary should not become a country of immigrants, respectively. The effect of these variables should, however, be analysed based on a larger sample to be able to draw reliable conclusions.

In addition to the fragmentation of occupational culture, officers' personal identity is even less homogeneous. The police are ultimately "citizens in uniform" with different *subject positions* determined by their age, race, ethnicity, gender, parental status and so on. How they act in certain situations, and the decision whether to use coercion or not, is the aggregate function of the subject positions they occupy (Oberweis and Musheno, 1999). Accordingly, further research should look at how such personal circumstances as well as their micro-environment affect officers' interpretation of securitising discourse and hence their attitudes towards mass migration. More importantly, particular attention should be paid in this regard to the conditions of possibility for the development of empathy and/or sympathy to improve professional practice and training of officers. Another issue at hand is the question of temporality. Beare (2007: 320) notes that "socialisation into the status quo supportive culture" may result in close ideological partnership between the police and their "political masters". If the siege and defence analogy becomes solidified and prevalent over time, it will be interesting to see how future generations of police will understand their role in border control.

5 Conclusion

The basic thesis is that securitisation is shaped by both narratives and practices of various stakeholders in the process. This article reiterates that it does not merely mean a joint contribution, but the two are intertwined in the sense that the latter can be conditioned by the former (cf. Bello, 2020b; Crepaz, 2020). The sociology of policing teaches us that practice is heavily determined by the police's own understanding of, and attitudes towards, policy objectives. Additionally, critical discourse scholars argue that discourse has the potential to

influence these understandings and attitudes if tailored to the shared knowledge, beliefs, and values of the audience. Accordingly, the article argues that attitudes and dispositions do not function in vacuum and only adjust (or not) to changing work conditions. To a certain extent, they may be externally tuned and stimulated to generate the desired actions. Whether changes in practice occur in line with new policy initiatives is not necessarily or exclusively determined by the police's interest, ability, or willingness to adjust pre-existing practices and dispositions to new challenges and priorities. The persuasive effect of discourse may be significant, and engagement in new organisational goals and policy objectives can be facilitated by discursive legitimisation. The collected data do not enable a categorical conclusion to be drawn as to how securitising discourse has manifested in border control practices in Hungary. However, the survey results seem to suggest that securitising discourse coupled with legitimising narratives can prompt attitudes that may account for anomalies in the enactment of policy. More specifically, securitising discourse can influence not only public perception of immigrants, but, arguably, also the police's understanding of their role in the governance of mass migration with serious implications for how they treat people on the move.

Notes

¹ Locals voluntarily reported individuals to the police whom they assumed to be illegally present, mainly based on their skin colour or outfit. Many of these individuals later turn out to be Hungarian nationals (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019).

² Enemy construction, i.e. the *Us* and *Them* dichotomy has always been a core element of Orbán's politics (see e.g. Palonen, 2018). Prior to asylum seekers, he successfully polarised the country against the former left-liberal government and has recently launched a crackdown on the LGBTQ community (implying they are all paedophiles) to gain electoral support.

³ Transit zones were shipping containers behind barbed wire fence along the Serbian border, where asylum seekers were detained during the application procedure and were only allowed to leave towards Serbia. The zones have recently been closed, as the Court of Justice of the European Union confirmed that placing people in the zones amounted to unlawful detention.

⁴ It is notable that the 2015 events were a novel experience to most of the police regardless of training, as Hungary had not seen mass migratory movements on that scale since the Bosnian War.

⁵ While the University afforded me the opportunity to conduct the survey, it was administered by a member of the faculty. Although I was not allowed to be present at the lecture when the questionnaire was completed, the voluntary nature of participation and the research objectives were explicitly displayed on the questionnaire and were clarified by the administrator.

⁶ For reasons of transparency about the circumstances of data collection, it must be noted that the university found some of the statements to evaluate inappropriate and asked for changes or omission. One of the problematised statements was “Soros wants to settle migrants in Europe” which was changed to “Migrants are not coming voluntarily but are sent”. To be approved, the offences in the following statement had to be swapped. The original statement was: “In terms of border control, *human smuggling* is a more serious problem than *irregular migration*”; approved version: “In terms of border control, *irregular migration* is a more serious problem than *human smuggling*”. The rest of the statements which were criticised referred to the criminal law aspects of the newly introduced offences: “Based on the level of danger *irregular border crossing* poses to the public, it is not warranted to sanction it as a criminal offence”; “Based on the level of danger *facilitating/supporting irregular migration* poses to the public, it is not warranted to sanction it as a criminal offence”. I could only include these statements by switching the negation to affirmation. To secure access and because the changes had no impact on the collected data for the purpose of the study, I did not argue the decision, nor did I ask for justification. The approved modifications were more in line with the government’s discourse for that matter.

⁷ Even colleagues from Hungary complained about the difficulties they face when trying to gain access to the police unless from within the organisation, hence the almost total lack of research on Hungarian border police.

⁸ The impact of media depiction of refugees on public attitudes towards them has been extensively studied and confirmed in various settings (for review see Mustafa-Awad and Kirner-Ludwig, 2021).

References

- AIDA, 2020. Country Report: Hungary. Available at:
https://asylumineurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/AIDA-HU_2020update.pdf.
- Austin, J.L. 1976. *How to Do Things with Words*. Oxford: OUP.
- Author, under review. Border control reinterpreted: collective memory and the narrative self.
- Balla, J. 2017. Határőrizeti intézkedések a migrációs válság kezelésére és megszüntetésére.
In: P. Tálás (ed) *Magyarország és a 2015-ös európai migrációs válság: Tanulmányok*.
(pp. 83-100) Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó.
- Balzacq, T. 2005. The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and
Context. *European Journal of International Relations*, 11(2): 171-201.
- Balzacq, T., Léonard, S. and Ruzicka, J. 2016. ‘Securitization’ revisited: theory and cases.
International Relations 30(4): 494-531.
- Bar-Tal, D. 2000. *Shared Beliefs in a Society*. London: Sage.
- Bayer, L. and Tamma, P. 2020. Demise of Hungary’s media exposes Brussel’s weakness’,

Politico, 3 August 2020, Online: <https://www.politico.eu/article/brussels-looks-on-powerless-at-hungarian-media-demise-viktor-orban/>.

- Beare, M.E. 2007. Steeped in Politics: The Ongoing History of Politics in Policing. In: M.E. Beare and T. Murray (eds.) *Police and Government Relations: Who's Calling the Shots?* (pp. 313-365) London: University of Toronto Press.
- Bello, V. 2020a. The spiralling of the securitisation of migration in the EU: from the management of a 'crisis' to a governance of human mobility? *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, DOI: [10.1080/1369183X.2020.1851464](https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1851464).
- Bello, V. 2020b. The role of non-state actors' cognitions in the spiralling of the securitisation of migration: prejudice, narratives and Italian CAS reception centres. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, DOI: [10.1080/1369183X.2020.1851472](https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1851472).
- Bevir, M. 2016. Decentering security governance. *Global Crime*, 17(3-4): 227-239.
- Bevir, M. and Krupicka, B. 2007. Police Reform, Governance and Democracy. In M O'Neill, M Marks and AM Singh (eds.) *Police Occupational Culture: New Debates and Directions*. (pp. 153-180) Oxford: Elsevier.
- Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R.A.W. 2016. The '3Rs' in rethinking governance: ruling, rationalities, and resistance. In: M. Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes (eds.) *Rethinking Governance: Ruling, rationalities and resistance*. (pp. 1-21) Abingdon: Routledge.
- Bigo, D. 2000. When two become one: internal and external securitisations in Europe. In: M. Kelstrup and M.C. Williams (eds.) *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community*. (pp. 171-204) London: Routledge.
- Bigo, D. 2001. Internal and External Security(ies): The Möbius Ribbon. In: M. Albert, D. Jacobson and Y. Lapid (eds.) *Identities, borders, orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory*, (pp. 91-116) Minneapolis: UMP.
- Bigo, D. 2005. Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who is in Control? In: D. Bigo and E. Guild (eds.) *Controlling Frontiers: Free Movements Into and Within Europe*. (pp. 49-99) Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Bigo, D. 2008. Globalized (in)Security: the Field and the Ban-opticon. In: D. Bigo and A. Tsoukala (eds.) *Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal practices of liberal regimes after 9/11*, (pp. 10-48) London: Routledge.
- Bigo, D. 2011. Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations: Power of Practices, Practices of

-
- Power. *International Political Sociology*, 5: 225-258.
- Bigo, D. 2014. The (in)securitization practices of the three universes of EU border control: Military/Navy – border guards/police – database analysts. *Security Dialogue*, 45(3): 209-225.
- Bigo, D. 2016. Rethinking Security at the Crossroad of International Relations and Criminology. *British Journal of Criminology*, 56: 1068-1086.
- Bigo, D. and Tsoukala, A. 2008. Understanding (in)security. In D Bigo and A Tsoukala (eds.) *Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes After 9/11*. (pp. 1-10) Abingdon: Routledge.
- Björkvall, A. and Nyström Höög, C. 2019. Legitimation of value practices, value texts, and core values at public authorities. *Discourse & Communication*, 13(4): 398-414.
- Borbély, Zs., Farkas, J. and Tózsér, E. 2017. A tömeges méretű illegális migráció pszichés következményei a rendészeti feladatellátás során, *Hadtudományi Szemle*, X(3): 288-304.
- Borbély, Zs., Fridrich A.C. and Tózsér, E. 2018. Az ideiglenes biztonsági határzár menti feladatellátás hatása a határzárát védők magánéletére, *Honvédségi Szemle*, 6: 65-79.
- Bors, 2015. Tűz mellett szarítják bakancsukat a határmenti rendőrök. 28 October 2015, Online: <https://www.borsonline.hu/aktualis/tuz-mellett-szaritjak-bakancsukat-a-hatarmenti-rendorok/104832>.
- Bourbeau, P. 2011. *The Securitization of Migration: A study of movement and order*. London: Routledge.
- Buzan, B., Waever, O. and De Wilde, J. 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner.
- Ceyhan, A. and Tsoukala, A. 2002. The Securitisation of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies. *Alternatives*, 27: 21-39.
- Chan, J. 1997. *Changing Police Culture: Policing in a Multicultural Society*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Chan, J. 2001. Negotiating the Field: New Observations on the Making of Police Officers. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology* 34(2): 114-133.
- Chan, J. 2004. Using Pierre Bourdieu's Framework for Understanding Police Culture. *Droit et société* 1:327-347.
- Chan, J. 2007. Making sense of police reforms. *Theoretical Criminology* 11(3): 323-345.

-
- Charman, S. 2017. *Police Socialisation, Identity and Culture: Becoming Blue*, London: Palgrave.
- Christián, L. 2017. "Rendőri helyzetjelentés a frontvonalról". A 2015. évi migrációs helyzet rendőri kezelése. In P. Tálás (ed.) *Magyarország és a 2015-ös európai migrációs válság: Tanulmányok*, (pp. 149-158) Budapest: Dialóg Campus Kiadó.
- Ciutá, F. 2009. Security and the problem of context: a hermeneutical critique of securitisation theory. *Review of International Studies* 35: 301-326.
- CPT, 2018. Report to the Hungarian Government on the visit to Hungary carried out by the European, Strasbourg, 18 September 2018. Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5ba213d17.html>.
- Côté, A. 2016. Agents without agency: Assessing the role of the audience in securitization theory. *Security Dialogue*, 47(6): 541-558.
- Côté-Boucher, K., Infantino, F. and Salter, M.B. 2014. Border security as practice: An agenda for research. *Security Dialogue*, 45(3): 195-208.
- Côté-Boucher, K. 2020. *Border Frictions: Gender, Generation and Technology on the Frontline*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Crepaz, K. 2020. Overcoming borders: the Europeanization of civil society activism in the 'refugee crisis'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, DOI: [10.1080/1369183X.2020.1851471](https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1851471).
- Davies, A. and Thomas, R. 2003. Talking Cop: Discourses of Change and Policing Identities. *Public Administration*, 81(4): 681-699.
- Doros, J. and Vas, A. 2019. Nem csábít a szolgálat: drasztikusan csökkent a rendőrök utánpótlása. *Népszava*, 22 February 2019, Online: https://nepszava.hu/3026500_nem-csabit-a-szolgalat-drasztikusan-csokkent-a-rendorok-utanpotlasi.
- Dsupin, O. and Kónya, J. 2017. A Jelenlegi Határvadászok Toborzása és Képzése. In: L. Pósnán, L. Veszprémy, J. Boda and J. Isaszegi (eds.) *Őrzők, vigyázatok a határra! Határvédelem, határőrizet, határvadászok a középkortól napjainkig*, (pp. 769-792) Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó.
- Floyd, R. 2016. Extraordinary or ordinary emergency measures: what, and who, defines the 'success' of securitization? *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 29(2): 677-694.
- Frowd, P.M. 2014. The field of border control in Mauritania. *Security Dialogue*, 45(3):

- Ganapathy, N. and Cheong, H. 2016. The “thinning” blueline: a Bourdieuan appreciation of police subculture. *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice*, 40(4): 325-342.
- Gau, J.M. and Gaines, D.C. 2012. Top-Down Management and Patrol Officers’ Attitudes About the Importance of Public Order Maintenance: A Research Note, *Police Quarterly*, 15(1): 45-61.
- Guild, E. 2009. *Security and Migration in the 21st Century*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gyollai, D. and Korkut, U. 2019. Border Management and Migration Controls: Hungary report, RESPOND Working Papers, July 2019, DOI: [10.5281/zenodo.3266442](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3266442).
- Hansen, L. 2006. *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Haszán, Z. 2020. ‘SI-mértékegységet kellene kitalálni a migrációs nyomásnak, névjavaslatunk már van’, 14 February 2020, *444.hu*. Online: <https://444.hu/2020/02/14/si-meretekegyseget-kellene-kitalalni-a-migracios-nyomasnak-nevjavaslatunk-mar-van>.
- HRW. 2016. Hungary: Migrants Abused at the Border, Ensure Asylum Access; Investigate Cruel, Violent Pushbacks, 13 July 2016, Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/13/hungary-migrants-abused-border>
- HRW. 2021. Frontex failing to protect people at EU borders: stronger safeguards vital as Border Agency expands, 23 June 2021, Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/23/frontex-failing-protect-people-eu-borders>.
- Huysmans, J. 2006. *The Politics of Insecurity*. London: Routledge.
- Kalmárné Pölöskei, A. 2018. *Rendvédelmi szervek és alapfeladatok: Rendészeti ismeretek középiskolások számára*. Online: [http://bmkszf.hu/dokumentum/2717/Rendvedelmi szervek es alapfeladatok Rendeszeti ismeretek.pdf](http://bmkszf.hu/dokumentum/2717/Rendvedelmi_szervek_es_alapfeladatok_Rendes_zeti_ismeretek.pdf).
- Krémer, F. 2013. A rendőrség Orbán Viktor maffiaállamában. *Mozgó Világ*, 39(11): 33-40.
- Krémer, F. 2020. *Az elérhető társadalom és a rendőrség válsága*. Budapest: Gondolat.
- Léonard, S. and Kaunert, C. 2020. The securitisation of migration in the European Union: Frontex and its evolving security practices. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2020.1851469.
- Loader, I. 1997. Policing and the social: questions of symbolic power. *British Journal of*

Sociology, 48(1): 1-18.

- Loader, I. and Mulcahy, A. 2003. *Policing and the Condition of England: Memory, Politics and Culture*. Oxford: OUP.
- Lőrincz, T. 2017. 'Arcba térdeplő rendőr és könnygáz a déli határon', *Magyar Nemzet*, 16 March 2017, Online: <https://magyarnemzet.hu/belfold-archivum/2017/03/arcba-terdeplo-rendor-es-konyygaz-a-deli-hataron>.
- Manning, P.K. 2008. *Democratic Policing in the Changing World*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Martín Rojo, L. and Van Dijk, T.A. 1997. "There was a problem, and it was solved!": legitimating the expulsion of 'illegal' migrants in Spanish parliamentary discourse. *Discourse & Society*, 8(4): 523-566.
- McDonald, M. 2008. Securitization and the Construction of Security. *European Journal of International Relations*, 14(4): 563-587.
- McNevin, A. 2014. Beyond territoriality: Rethinking human mobility, border security and geopolitical space from the Indonesian island of Bintan. *Security Dialogue* 45(3): 295-310.
- Mendelski, B. 2019. The Rhetoric of Hungarian Premier Victor Orban: Inside X Outside in the Context of Immigration Crisis. In S Ratuva (ed) *The Palgrave Handbook of Ethnicity*. (pp. 1829-1852) Singapore: Palgrave.
- Mustafa-Awad, Z. and Kirner-Ludwig, M. 2021. Syrian refugees in digital news discourse: Depictions and reflections in Germany. *Discourse & Communication*, 15(1): 75-97.
- Nagy, B. 2016. Hungarian asylum law and policy in 2015–2016: Securitization instead of loyal cooperation. *German Law Journal*, 17(6): 1033–1081.
- Oberweis, T. and Musheno, M. 1999. Policing Identities: Cop Decision Making and the Constitution of Citizens, *Law and Social Inquiry*, 24(4): 897-923.
- Orbán, V. 2017a. 'Prime Minister Viktor Orban's speech at the oath-taking ceremony for non-commissioned police officer', 18 June 2017, Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-oath-taking-ceremony-for-non-commissioned-police-officers>.
- Orbán, V. 2017b. 'Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speech at the oath-taking ceremony for

-
- police cadets' Budapest, 9 October 2017, Available at: <http://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-speech-at-the-oath-taking-ceremony-for-police-cadets/>.
- Orbán, V. 2019a. 'Viktor Orbán's speech at the ceremonial swearing-in of new border hunters' Budapest, 7 March 2019, Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-ceremonial-swearing-in-of-new-border-hunters>.
- Orbán, V. 2019b. 'Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speech at the passing out ceremony for law enforcement cadets from the National University of Public Service' 1 July 2019, Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-passing-out-ceremony-for-law-enforcement-cadets-from-the-national-university-of-public-service>.
- Page, J. 2011. *The Toughest Beat: Politics, Punishment, and the Prison Officers Union in California*. New York, NY: OUP.
- Palonen, E. 2018. Performing the nation: the Janus-faced populist foundations of illiberalism in Hungary. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 26:3, 308-321.
- Pintér, S. 2017. Belügyminiszteri Ajánló, In L. Pószán, L. Veszprémy, J. Boda and J. Isaszegi (eds.) *Őrzők, vigyázatok a határra! Határvédelem, határőrizet, határvadászok a középkortól napjainkig*, (p. 7.) Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó.
- Reiner, R. 2010. *The Politics of the Police*. Oxford: OUP.
- Reyes, A. 2011. Strategies of legitimization in political discourse: From words to actions. *Discourse & Society*, 22(6): 781-807.
- Robinson, C. 2017. Tracing and explaining securitization: Social mechanisms, process tracing, and the securitization of irregular migration. *Security Dialogue*, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010617721872>.
- Roe, P. 2008. Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK's Decision to Invade Iraq. *Security Dialogue*, 39(6): 615-635.
- Salter, M.B. 2008. Securitization and desecuritization: a dramaturgical analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 11: 321-349.
- Salter, M.B. and Piché, G. 2011. The Securitization of the US-Canada Border in American Political Discourse, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 44(4): 929-951.

-
- Schwell, A. 2010. The iron curtain revisited: the ‘Austrian way’ of policing the internal Schengen border. *European Security*, 19(2): 317-336.
- Schwell, A. 2014. Compensating (In)Security: Anthropological Perspectives on Internal Security. In M. Maguire, C. Frois and N. Zurawski (eds.) *The Anthropology of Security: Perspectives from the Frontline of Policing, Counter-terrorism and Border Control*, (pp. 83-103) London: Pluto Press.
- Sereghy, Z. 2017. Islamophobia in Hungary: National Report 2016. In E. Bayrakli and F. Hafez (eds.) *European Islamophobia Report 2016*, (pp. 257-272) SETA.
- Simonovits, B. 2020. The Public perception of the migration crisis from the Hungarian point of view: Evidence from the field. In B. Glorius and J. Doomernik (Eds.), *Geographies of Asylum in Europe and the Role of European Localities* (pp. 155-176). Springer.
- Sklansky, D.A. 2007. Seeing Blue: Police Reform, Occupational Culture and Cognitive Burn-in. In: M. O’Neill, M. Marks and A.M. Singh (eds.) *Police Occupational Culture: New Debates and Directions*, (pp. 19-46) Oxford: Elsevier.
- Skogan, W.G. 2008. Why reforms fail. *Policing and Society* 18(1): 23-34.
- Smith-Khan, L. 2021. Deficiencies and loopholes: Clashing discourses, problems and solutions in Australian migration advice regulation. *Discourse & Society*, 32(5): 598-621.
- Sossin, L. 2007. The Oversight of Executive-Police Relations in Canada: The Constitutions, the Courts, Administrative Processes, and Democratic Governance. In: M.E. Beare and T. Murray (eds.) *Police and Government Relations: Who’s Calling the Shots?* (pp. 96-136.) London: University of Toronto Press.
- Stritzel, H. 2007. Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond. *European Journal of International Relations*, 13(3): 357-383.
- Szalai, A. 2017. Securitization as Enacted Melodrama: The Political Spectacle of the Hungarian Anti-immigration Campaign, ECPR General Conference 2017, University of Oslo.
- Szalai, A. and Göbl, G. 2015. Securitizing Migration in Contemporary Hungary, CEU Center for EU Enlargement Studies Working paper. November 2015.
- Tsoukala, A. 2005. Looking at Migrants as Enemies. In D. Bigo and E. Guild (eds.) *Controlling Frontiers: Free Movements Into and Within Europe*, (pp. 161-192) Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Van Dijk, T. A. 2014. *Discourse and Knowledge: A Sociocognitive Approach*. Cambridge:

CUP.

- Van Dijk, T. A. 2015. Critical Discourse Studies: A Sociocognitive Approach. In R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds.) *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies*. (pp. 62-85). London: Sage.
- Van Leeuwen, T. and Wodak, R. 1999. Legitimizing immigration control: a discourse-historical analysis. *Discourse Studies*, 1(1): 83-118.
- Van Rythoven, E. 2015. Learning to feel, learning to fear? Emotions, imaginaries, and limits in the politics of securitization. *Security Dialogue*, 46(5): 458-475.
- Varga, J. 2016. A magyar határrendészeti rendszer működése a tömeges méretű migráció kezelése során. *Határrendészeti Tanulmányok*, XIII(3): 94-108.
- Vidra, Zs. 2017. Dominant Islamophobic Narratives: Hungary. University of Leeds, Centre for Ethnicity & Racism Studies.
- Vuori, J.A. 2008. Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitisation: Applying the Theory of Securitisation to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders, *European Journal of International Relations*, 14(1): 65-99.
- Weldes, J. 1996. Constructing National Interests. *European Journal of International Relations*, 2(3): 275-318.
- Williams, M.C. 1997. The Institutions of Security: Elements of a Theory of Security Organisation, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 32(3): 287-307.
- Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. 2015. Critical Discourse Studies: History, Agenda, Theory, and Methodology. In: R. Wodak and M. Meyer (2009a) *Methods of Critical Discourse Studies*, (pp. 1-22) London: Sage.
- Wood, J. 2004. Cultural Change in the Governance of Security. *Policing and Society*, 14(1): 31-48.