



Online Silence: why do not people challenge others when posting misinformation?

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Online Silence: Why Do Not People Challenge Others When Posting Misinformation?

Abstract

Purpose: There is a scarcity of research studies on why people remain inactive when encountering and recognising misinformation online. The main aim of this paper is to provide a groundwork for future research into why users do not challenge misinformation on digital platforms by generating hypotheses through a synthesis of pertinent literature, including organisational behaviour, communication, human-computer interaction (HCI), psychology, and education.

Design/methodology/approach: Given the lack of directly related literature, this paper synthesised findings from relevant fields where the findings might be relevant, as the tendency to withhold opinions or feedback is a well-documented practice in offline interaction.

Findings: Following our analysis of relevant literature, the potential reasons for online silence towards misinformation can be divided into six categories: self-oriented, relationship-oriented, others-oriented, content-oriented, individual characteristics, and technical factors.

Originality: Although corrections coming from peers can effectively combat misinformation, several studies showed that people in cyberspace do not take such action. To the best of our knowledge, there has been scarce and virtually non-existent research investigating why people refrain from challenging others who post misinformation online. Thus, this paper attempts to address this gap and identify reasons in adjacent domains. The reasons provide a starting point for researching interventions to reduce reluctance and abstinence regarding the challenge of misinformation. Our findings can be beneficial beyond the area of challenging misinformation and are extensible to other types of content and communication that people are hesitant to discuss and challenge, such as online injustice, prejudice, and hate speech.

Keywords—*misinformation, challenging misinformation, digital platforms, online silence*

I. INTRODUCTION

Many users on digital platforms may not see themselves as key players in mitigating misinformation, but many may contribute to its dissemination through their silence. One of the main challenges in combatting misinformation is that when users notice it online, most ambivalently ignore it and do not respond to others to challenge it (Chadwick and Vaccari 2019; Vicol 2020). We call this behaviour "Online Silence". One might argue that, in not challenging such misinformation, users are complicit in its spread by being silent. In this context, silence is construed as a type of self-censorship, which refers to the choice not to speak out despite the belief that something should be said (Pinder and Harlos 2001). The way social media limits the exposure of diverse opinions and promotes a common narrative with like-minded people, known as an "echo chamber" (Cinelli *et al.* 2021), is also argued to amplify users' cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias, which refers to the tendency to search or remember information that confirms or supports one's previous opinions (Westerwick *et al.* 2017; Zhao *et al.* 2020). Thus, those who agree with the mindset of the false information, knowing it is

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3 indeed false, and see no harm in spreading it, may not only remain silent but also help to
4 disseminate it by showing their support for the content through “liking” or commenting
5 positively on it. Studying this group of users and their motives is beyond our scope as we only
6 concentrate on self-censorship, which refers to remaining silent and suppressing the will to
7 respond when something should be said.
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10 With the widespread use of the internet and Social Networking Sites (SNS) for information
11 seeking and users becoming content creators and broadcasters on such sites, information
12 starts to spread widely even before its accuracy can be verified. Although many terms such as
13 disinformation, fake news, and rumours are used interchangeably to refer to incorrect or
14 misleading information, throughout this paper, the term “misinformation” will be used as an
15 umbrella term, as it refers widely to any type of false information, regardless of the intention or
16 format.
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20 On SNS, fake news spreads six times faster than true news (Vosoughi *et al.* 2018) and
21 misinformation is engaged with more than factual posts (Edelson *et al.* 2021). A recent study
22 also showed that using words related to conspiracy theories in a tweet increases its chances
23 of being shared (Visentin *et al.* 2021). In such an environment, it becomes even more important
24 to combat the spread of misinformation. Even though prior research showed that approximately
25 5% of people's news consumption is comprised of misinformation (Acerbi *et al.* 2022), the
26 effects of information operations should not be underestimated as the spectrum of ramifications
27 and potential problems is quite broad. This spectrum ranges from affecting consumers'
28 attitudes toward brand image (Visentin *et al.* 2019; Borges-Tiago *et al.* 2020) and consumers'
29 purchase intentions (Mishra and Samu 2021) to altering people's attitudes toward issues such
30 as climate change (Lutzke *et al.* 2019) or voting behaviour (Cantarella *et al.* 2023). Social
31 media companies took proactive measures to combat misinformation after the 2016 United
32 States election prompted concerns over misinformation online (Pourghomi *et al.* 2017).
33 However, much as companies and scholars have raised concerns about the issue, the spread
34 and severe impact of misinformation are still being seen in critical domains, e.g. public health
35 information related to the COVID-19 pandemic (Cinelli *et al.* 2020; Galvão 2021) and political
36 and humanitarian domains, e.g. the Ukraine-Russia war (Park *et al.* 2022). This points to a
37 need to supplement these measures with new approaches and techniques employing
38 individuals as not only reporters but also activists in challenging misinformation.
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44 "Social corrections," which refer to correction attempts made by social sources where social
45 contacts are usually a primary source of information, have been identified as a possible
46 intervention (Bode and Vraga 2018; Walter and Murphy 2018; Bode and Vraga 2021b; Walter
47 *et al.* 2021). It reduces the spread of misinformation by influencing other users who observe
48 the corrections (Vraga and Bode 2018). It is even more effective when users provide credible
49 sources to refute the information provided (Vraga and Bode 2017). Therefore, it is important
50 that users who post misinformation are informed about this when possible. However, although
51 evidence shows that users' corrections are as effective as algorithmic corrections (Bode and
52 Vraga 2018), people can be hesitant to take any action to correct misinformation (Chadwick
53 and Vaccari 2019; Tandoc *et al.* 2020; Tully *et al.* 2020).
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57 Research that studied social corrections as an intervention strategy to combat misinformation
58 lacked the investigation of why people refrain from correcting misinformation or even do not
59 feel the need to make that correction in the first place. Existing research has mainly focused
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3 on strategies to motivate people to challenge misinformation rather than the barriers that
4 prevent users from doing so. Evidence suggests that exposure to norms (i.e., whether
5 individuals believe others typically correct misinformation) (Koo *et al.* 2021) or their loved ones
6 would want them to correct (Xiao 2022), people's perception of the severity of the influence of
7 misinformation on others (Sun *et al.* 2021) and social identity threat (i.e., when misinformation
8 threatens a person's social status in a group) (Cohen *et al.* 2020) seem to be effective in
9 motivating people to correct misinformation. Factors such as interpersonal relationships with
10 the poster, where, for example, participants were more likely to correct friends or family
11 members (Tandoc *et al.* 2020), and the format of the content, where, for example, individuals
12 were less likely to correct content presented in meme format (Lyons 2017) also seem to affect
13 users' intention to challenge others when posting misinformation. In addition, Bode and Vraga
14 (2021a) showed that social factors such as age, education, and reliance on mainstream news
15 and social media also affect willingness to challenge misinformation. A qualitative study that
16 interviewed participants in Vietnam revealed that the degree of closeness with the sharer, the
17 age of the sharer, and also whether the environment in which correction takes place is public
18 or private, impact the decision to correct misinformation (Rohman 2021).

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24 Previous studies exploring the barriers that prevent or discourage people from challenging
25 misinformation were limited in scope. Following a series of interviews in the United States with
26 physicians and nurses, the obstacles that they face when they correct health misinformation
27 on social media were identified in three categories: intrapersonal (e.g., the lack of time and
28 the perception of limited positive outcomes), interpersonal (e.g., fear of being harassed and
29 bullied), and institutional (e.g., a lack of institutional support and social media training)
30 (Bautista *et al.* 2021). Another recent study based on interviews with 102 people in the U.K
31 regarding COVID vaccines also found that the social norm of conflict avoidance affects
32 people's responses to vaccine misinformation (Chadwick *et al.* 2022).

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36 While prior studies present a broad range of factors that motivate people to challenge
37 misinformation, it is also essential to identify the barriers that prevent them from doing so and,
38 consequently, develop interventions to eliminate those barriers as a preliminary step. Offering
39 motivational strategies does not necessarily eliminate people's barriers to challenging
40 misinformation. For example, disclaimers from social media platforms (Colliander 2019) or
41 source ratings, as suggested in (Kim *et al.* 2019), do not necessarily serve to overcome
42 barriers such as fear of receiving a hostile response from the one who shared misinformation
43 or fear of harming the relationship with them.

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47 The findings of this paper pave the way for future research to understand the barriers that
48 prevent users from remaining silent when they see misinformation. Furthermore, exploring
49 these factors that have been overlooked previously might be a starting point for enhancing the
50 current design of digital platforms. The Persuasive Systems Design (PSD) model (Oinas-
51 Kukkonen and Harjumaa 2009) has been used in various domains to promote behaviour
52 change, such as health (Orji and Moffatt 2018), fitness (Oyibo and Vassileva 2019) and e-
53 learning (Widyasari *et al.* 2019). It provides principles and techniques to design socio-technical
54 solutions that can influence attitudes and behaviour by prompting cognitive, behavioural,
55 psycho-social, and other psychological processes. PSD strategies are extensive and based
56 on well-established theories of behaviour change. As the model has already been used to
57 change online behaviour, e.g. gaming (Alrobai *et al.* 2016; Adib *et al.* 2021) and cyber security
58 (Misra *et al.* 2017), it can also be a helpful reference model in designing for motivating users

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3 to challenge misinformation. The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first is to identify
4 reasons for not challenging misinformation and to pave the way for future research on the
5 topic, and the second is to propose persuasive socio-technical interventions to motivate users
6 to speak up when they encounter misinformation on SNS.
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9 In this research, the term “challenging” rather than “correcting” is used for two reasons. First,
10 “correcting” is an absolute statement that presumes the person doing the correction is
11 accurate; however, the person who intends to correct may not actually be correct. Second,
12 this paper does address not only corrections but also disagreements or disputes over the
13 content. In other words, the term “challenging” serves a broader function than simply
14 correcting.
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17 Taken together, this work is a starting point of a broader study that aims to contribute to altering
18 the trend of seeing misinformation but not questioning it. This research does not intend to be
19 a systematic review, scoping review, or narrative review as to our knowledge, there is no
20 literature primarily focused on this topic. This paper aims to synthesise pertinent literature on
21 related topics and provide potential reasons regarding users’ silence towards misinformation
22 online. This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review and an
23 overview of challenging misinformation. Section 3 provides insights into possible reasons
24 people are reluctant to challenge misinformation. We conclude and present possible solutions
25 and future work directions in Section 4.
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31 II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION

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33 As many as 53% of U.S. adults obtain news from social media (Shearer and Mitchell 2021).
34 Besides being a fertile ground for misinformation, social media also offers opportunities to
35 mitigate the problem (Katie Elson 2018; Djordjevic 2020). In addition to algorithmic approaches
36 or machine learning-based solutions, individuals’ active participation in conversations to
37 challenge misinformation can help reduce misinformation (Bode and Vraga 2018; Margolin *et*
38 *al.* 2018).
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41 Data from several studies suggests that correcting misinformation is not common on social
42 media. Almost 80% of social media users in the U.K. have not told anyone who shared false
43 news on social media that the news they shared was false or exaggerated (Chadwick and
44 Vaccari 2019). Another U.K. survey found that although 58% of respondents reported having
45 encountered content that they thought was false, only 21% said they did something to correct
46 it (Vicol 2020). Recent research in the U.S. regarding the correction of misinformation about
47 COVID-19 on social media revealed similar findings. Among 56.6% of those reporting that they
48 saw misinformation, only 35.1% said they corrected someone (Bode and Vraga 2021c).
49 Similarly, in Singapore, 73% of social media users dismiss fake news posts on social media
50 without taking further action (Tandoc *et al.* 2020). Some studies have documented that actively
51 interacting with corrections when exposed to unconfirmed claims is rare (Zollo *et al.* 2017),
52 SNS users are not consistently motivated to correct misinformation publicly (Cohen *et al.* 2020),
53 and explicit corrections of other users are rare in the online environment (Arif *et al.* 2017).
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58 Reporting misinformation is one of the techniques provided by social media, enabling
59 individuals to mark a post as false anonymously. However, much as reporting helps diminish
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3 the problem, it requires several steps and does not allow users to express their opinions;
4 thereby, it does not help to generate a constructive and meaningful dialogue. Such dialogue
5 may also have the extra benefit of altering the beliefs and enhancing the critical literacy of the
6 social sources posting or sharing misinformation and their audience, which can, in turn, foster
7 long-term behaviour change. Active engagement with false posts to challenge them by
8 deliberation, argumentation, or questioning is crucial to decreasing misinformation
9 dissemination and cultivating a diverse environment as it increases distinct ideas. Individuals
10 modify their beliefs about misinformation after seeing another user being corrected on social
11 media (Vraga and Bode 2017). Users are also less likely to spread rumours when they feel
12 they could be confronted with a counterargument, criticism, or warning (Tanaka *et al.* 2013;
13 Ozturk *et al.* 2015) and are more likely to comment critically on posts when they are exposed
14 to critical comments from other users (Colliander 2019).
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19 **III. POTENTIAL REASONS FOR AVOIDING CHALLENGING MISINFORMATION ONLINE**

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22 The online sphere was construed as fundamentally different from offline spaces by offering an
23 environment where individuals are less restricted from expressing ideas. Some believe that
24 the risks of expressing opinions and sharing content online are lower than doing the same
25 offline (Papacharissi 2002; Ho and McLeod 2008; Luarn and Hsieh 2014). However, according
26 to social information processing theory (Walther 1992), although interpersonal development
27 requires more time in a computer-mediated environment than face-to-face (FtF), users may
28 develop similar levels of interpersonal relations. This theory suggests that, regardless of the
29 medium, people are driven to form impressions and build connections, and that language or
30 symbols in computer-mediated communication (CMC) are as important as nonverbal cues in
31 FtF communication. Based on these findings, the constraints people have when expressing
32 contradictory opinions or challenging people in an online environment might not differ from
33 those in person.
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38 In FtF communication, withholding opinions, abstaining from participating in discussions, or
39 remaining silent even though there is an issue that needs intervention may all occur.
40 Refraining from providing opinions occurs in various environments, such as enterprise
41 environments where employees withhold information purposefully (Morrison and Milliken
42 2000; Dyne *et al.* 2003; Milliken *et al.* 2003) or in classrooms, where students keep silent
43 during discussions (Fassinger 1995; Jaworski and Sachdev 1998; Rocca 2010).
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47 The silence of employees in organisations is considered to be driven by several motivations
48 and should not be taken as a sign of acceptance. According to Pinder and Harlos (2001) and
49 Dyne *et al.* (2003), there are three types of silence based on employee motives: acquiescent,
50 defensive, and prosocial. Acquiescent silence is passive behaviour and is motivated by a lack
51 of desire to speak up. An employee could withhold their ideas due to the belief that speaking
52 up will not change the situation or that they are unable to make a difference. Defensive silence
53 is described as proactive behaviour and is motivated by the intention of protecting oneself. An
54 employee could remain silent due to fear of the consequences of expressing ideas, such as
55 getting fired or demoted. Finally, prosocial silence is defined as withholding ideas based on
56 positive intentions for others or the organisation. An employee could be reticent due to a desire
57 to protect others from embarrassment or trouble.
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3 In a qualitative study investigating why employees remain silent (Milliken *et al.* 2003), fear of
4 being viewed or labelled negatively and damaging valued relationships were the most
5 frequently mentioned reasons. Even in situations where silence might have devastating
6 consequences, people might still choose not to speak up. Bienefeld and Grote (2012) revealed
7 that although speaking up is critical for flight safety; aircrew members are reluctant to do so
8 because of the adverse outcomes of speaking up. Their most common reason for not speaking
9 was their desire to maintain a good relationship with the team and not lose the other crew
10 members' acceptance and trust. In addition, captains were afraid of embarrassing first officers,
11 and first officers were concerned that captains would view them as troublemakers if they
12 contradicted captains. Reasons that hinder employees from speaking up align closely with the
13 educational psychology literature investigating reasons for student participation in the
14 classroom. Barriers to participating in class range from negative outcome expectations or
15 evaluation apprehension to fear of appearing unintelligent or inadequate to one's peers or
16 instructors (Fassinger 1995; Rocca 2010). Logistics such as class size, seating arrangement,
17 mandatory participation, and the instructor's influence also affect students' participation (Rocca
18 2010). Taken together, these studies provide important insights into why people refrain from
19 entering conversations, speaking up, or questioning in offline environments.
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25 In CMC, users also choose to be silent. They refrain from discussing their ideas (Hampton *et*
26 *al.* 2014), posting content about political and social issues (McClain 2021), commenting on
27 questionable news (Stroud *et al.* 2016) and correcting misinformation (Chadwick and Vaccari
28 2019; Tandoc *et al.* 2020). The concept of silence or non-participation in the online environment
29 is conceptualised as lurking or passive SNS use, which refers to passively viewing and not
30 posting or participating in an online community (Nonnecke and Preece 2001). In trying to
31 understand the factors affecting lurking behaviour, Amichai-Hamburger *et al.* (2016) proposed
32 a model with three main reasons for remaining passive: individual differences (need for
33 gratification, personality dispositions, time available, and self-efficacy), social-group processes
34 (socialisation, type of community, social loafing, responses to delurking, and quality of the
35 response), and technological setting (technical design flaws and the privacy and safety of the
36 group). However, the concept of lurking or passive SNS use may not provide a comprehensive
37 explanation of self-silencing behaviour in the online environment, as self-silencing might be due
38 to reasons other than just passively browsing or choosing to observe over participating.
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43 There is a lack of evidence on what prevents people from challenging online misinformation.
44 Such active behaviour can effectively complement existing technical and socio-technical
45 solutions, such as those based on A.I. and natural language processing (NLP) (de Oliveira *et*
46 *al.* 2021), the analysis of the profile of media sources (Nakov 2020), and crowdsourcing that
47 enables the reporting of misinformation (Kim *et al.* 2018). The active role of users can also
48 combat misinformation beyond the public online forums and cover closed platforms such as
49 messaging groups, and possibly cover languages and dialects that current A.I. and NLP
50 solutions do not cover. We first scanned the literature to identify relevant papers to our mission
51 in identifying reasons for not challenging misinformation. We used combinations of keywords
52 to search for articles which contained them in their title, abstract or keywords list. The search
53 sentence we used was [factors OR reasons OR determinants OR barriers] AND [challeng*
54 OR question* OR correct* OR counteract* OR debunk* OR refut*] AND [misinformation OR
55 fake news OR disinformation OR rumour OR rumor OR false information]. Our search yielded
56 only two relevant papers, even after manually searching the proceedings of known
57 conferences in the area covering research in media, A.I. and computational linguistics. After
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that, we extended our search to include papers that studied why people remain silent when they see issues, whether misinformation or opinions, in other environments such as the workplace or classroom. These reasons can provide a starting point to understanding online silence in the context of online misinformation. Our objective was not to systematically determine which and how many articles provided a relevant result but to identify a theory-informed set of reasons for online silence by drawing a parallel with adjacent behaviours. We stopped the search when reaching a degree of saturation, i.e., finding the same identified reasons when reviewing new papers. To enhance presentation, we grouped the elicited reasons, based on their similarity, into six categories: self-oriented, relationship-oriented, others-oriented, content-oriented, individual characteristics, and technical factors (see Fig. 1.).




Fig.1. Potential reasons why people do not challenge misinformation

1) Self-oriented reasons

a) Fear of being attacked

Anonymity and lack of visual cues in CMC may lead to an online disinhibition effect, describing users acting less restrainedly in cyberspace than they would in real life by loosening social norms or restrictions (Suler 2004). Internet users who are aware that cyberspace enables and provides ample opportunities for hostile communication may be reluctant to engage in challenging misinformation due to fear of being attacked or becoming the victim of cyberbullying, which is deliberate, repeated hostile behaviour to harm others using information and communication technologies (Slonje *et al.* 2013).

The negative consequences of cyberbullying are known to be intense (Barlett 2015) and include depression (Patchin and Hinduja 2006) or emotional distress (Cao *et al.* 2020). Therefore, fear of cyber aggression may thwart users from expressing their deviant opinions. For instance, college students and young adults avoid expressing their opinions regarding politics in the online environment because of online outrage (Vraga *et al.* 2015; Powers *et al.* 2019). Evidence also suggests that users exposed to cyberbullying tend to decrease or abandon their usage of SNS (Cao *et al.* 2020; Urbaniak *et al.* 2022).

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3 The fear of being attacked might emanate from the polarisation of social media. Social media
4 enable an environment encouraging homophily, where individuals with the same beliefs and
5 opinions get together and become homogeneous (Cinelli *et al.* 2021). While convenient,
6 algorithms showing users customised content based on their interests and views facilitate
7 further polarisation. It is therefore likely that users who are aware that radicalisation and
8 extremism are prevalent in the online environment are more prone to keeping silent. For
9 instance, 32% of users who never or rarely share content about political or social issues cited
10 the fear of being attacked as the reason for not posting (McClain 2021). These findings
11 suggest that users might refrain from challenging misinformation due to fear of being attacked
12 in the online environment.
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18 **b) Desire to protect self-image**

19 Impression management (also known as self-presentation) is how people try to control how
20 others see them (Leary and Kowalski 1990). According to this approach, people sometimes
21 modify their behaviour to create positive impressions in the eyes of others by monitoring and
22 assessing others' perceptions of themselves. People seek to manage their impressions on
23 social media (Paliszkiwicz and Mądra-Sawicka 2016), where users are able to curate their
24 images easily (Weinstein 2014). They selectively disclose information to create a desirable,
25 ideal, and socially acceptable image (Zhao *et al.*, 2008). In order to meet the expectations of
26 the audience, they post information that their audience will find non-offensive (Marwick and
27 Boyd 2011) and avoid engaging in controversial topics (Sleeper *et al.* 2013).
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31 According to impression management theory (Leary and Kowalski 1990), individuals are
32 motivated to make a positive impression rather than act as they feel they should. In this case,
33 it can be speculated that although individuals think they should correct misinformation (Bode
34 and Vraga 2021c), they may remain silent owing to the risk of creating a negative impression,
35 as conflicts, negative feedback, and political discussions on social media are not desirable
36 (Thorson 2014; Koutamanis *et al.* 2015; Vraga *et al.* 2015).
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39 **c) Lack of self-efficacy**

40 Self-efficacy theory, derived from social cognitive theory, focuses on the interconnections
41 between behaviour, outcome expectancies and self-efficacy (Bandura 1977). According to
42 this theory, self-efficacy refers to a person's judgement of their own ability to determine how
43 successfully they can perform a specific behaviour. Simply put, self-efficacy is a person's
44 belief in their own capacity to succeed.
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47 Outcome expectancies, defined as a person's perception of the consequences of their actions,
48 have the potential to influence self-efficacy (Bandura 1977). The theory suggests that efficacy
49 beliefs influence outcome expectancies. More precisely, people's outcome expectancies are
50 heavily influenced by their assessments of how well they would perform in various settings. In
51 this case, we can speculate that individuals might not challenge misinformation due to a
52 perceived lack of efficacy in achieving the behaviour (e.g., a perceived lack of knowledge).
53 Indeed, when individuals feel equipped enough to express their opinions, they are more likely
54 to speak up on a political issue regardless of what the majority thinks (Lasorsa 1991). Similarly,
55 Tandoc *et al.* (2020) found that personal efficacy is one of the main factors affecting a user's
56 decision to correct fake news. In sum, users may avoid challenging others due to their belief
57 that their abilities are insufficient to succeed or that their efforts would not make any difference.
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d) **Lack of accountability**

The bystander effect suggests that people are less likely to offer help in an emergency when other people are present because of the diffusion of responsibility (Darley and Latané 1968). Although this phenomenon is associated with emergencies in physical space, it is also examined in virtual environments (Fischer *et al.* 2011), such as participation in conversations in an online learning environment or cyberbullying (Hudson and Bruckman 2004; You and Lee 2019). It was shown that one of the reasons for not intervening in cyberbullying or not participating in conversations is that the participants delegate the responsibility for intervention to other bystanders.

In SNS, misinformation can be seen by many people, which might lead to a diffusion of responsibility in which people do not feel accountable for not correcting misinformation. They might regard their responsibility as lower because they think others might be more accountable for correcting misinformation.

2) **Relationship-oriented reasons**

a) **Fear of isolation**

Asch (Asch 1956) demonstrated empirically that individuals adjust their behaviour in order to fit in with the group. Relying on the Asch conformity experiment, Noelle-Neumann (1974) introduced the Spiral of Silence theory, which proposes that people gauge the public opinion climate and, if they perceive that their opinion is in the minority, they are more likely to hold back their opinion, while if they think their opinion is in the majority, they tend to speak out confidently. One of the main reasons for conforming is the fear of isolation. Noelle-Neumann (1974) argues that because of our social nature, we are afraid of being isolated from our peers and losing their respect. In order to avoid disapproval or social sanctions, people constantly monitor their environment and decide whether to express their opinions.

Being isolated or ostracised (ignored or excluded by others) is painful as it triggers several physiological, affective, cognitive, and behavioural responses (Williams and Nida 2011). Therefore, users on social networking sites conform, comply, or obey so they are not excluded (Williams *et al.* 2000). One of the reasons they do not correct others might be the fear of being isolated as they want to fit in the group.

b) **The desire to maintain relationships**

Maintaining social ties plays a pivotal role in psychological well-being (Kawachi and Berkman 2001). The need to belong is one of the fundamental needs (Williams and Sommer 1997) and is linked to psychological and physical well-being (Baumeister and Leary 1995). The pursuit of belonging also exists in cyberspace (Williams *et al.* 2000) and on SNS such as Facebook (Covert and Stefanone 2018), Instagram and Twitter (Hayes *et al.* 2018). In SNS, users interact with a large number of friends. "Friends" on SNS encompass both strong and weak ties and include friends, family, neighbours, colleagues, or romantic partners, but also acquaintances or consequential strangers (Fingerman 2009), all of whom are sources of social capital (Antheunis *et al.* 2015). One of the main motivations for using SNS is the desire to maintain relationships (Joinson 2008; Dunne *et al.* 2010). As a result, people might be more cautious in their interactions. Indeed, Gallrein *et al.* (2019) found that individuals tend to withhold negative interpersonal feedback as they perceive it has the potential to harm their relationships. In another study exploring why employees do not speak up about issues or

concerns, Milliken *et al.* (2003) reported that fear of damaging relationships is the second most common reason for withholding opinions.

As conflicts may pose a threat to users' sense of belonging, users may avoid challenging or confronting others on social media.

3) Others-oriented reasons

a) Concerns about the negative impact on others

Individuals might withhold their opinions or refrain from challenging others for altruistic purposes, such as fear of embarrassing or offending others. For instance, in organisations, employees remain silent because of the concern that speaking up might upset, embarrass or in some way harm other people (Milliken *et al.* 2003).

Withholding opinions because of concern for others reveals itself in the public arena. A Norwegian study exploring freedom of expression in different social conventions and norms found that citizens withheld their opinions in the public domain due to fear of offending others (Steen-Johnsen and Enjolras 2016). On social media, users also adhere to the norm of not offending others. A qualitative study showed that users hesitate to counteract misinformation due to fear of embarrassing the sharer, preferring to use private communication to minimise the risk (Rohman 2021).

b) Normative beliefs

Perceived norms are people's understanding of the prevalent set of rules regulating the behaviour that group members can enact (Lapinski and Rimal 2005). They can be divided into two categories: descriptive norms and injunctive norms. While descriptive norms explain beliefs regarding the prevalence of a behaviour, injunctive norms explain others' perceived approval of that behaviour (Rimal and Real 2003; Lapinski and Rimal 2005). Engagement in the behaviour is influenced by these two norms, the extent to which a behaviour is prevalent and approved by others (Berkowitz 2003).

Social norms play an important role as behavioural antecedents in many contexts, as well as in the context of the correction of misinformation. Koo *et al.* (2021) showed that when individuals perceive corrective actions as common, they are more motivated to correct misinformation. In their experimental study, Gimpel *et al.* (2021) found that emphasising the socially desirable action of reporting false news using an injunctive social norm increases the rate of reporting fake news. Although individuals think it is normative to correct someone (Bode and Vraga 2021c), it is not easy to engage in a dialogue to challenge the content poster due to the norms that govern social interactions. On Facebook, for example, where everyone's social contacts could see the entire conversation, heated interactions and public discussions were viewed as norm violations (McLaughlin and Vitak 2012).

Taken together, as prevalence and approval by others influence engagement in the behaviour, it can be proposed that people do not challenge others since they perceive doing so to be unusual and unacceptable on social media.

4) Content-oriented reasons

a) Issue relevance

One reason that individuals choose to remain silent might be the extent to which the content is personally relevant or important to them. Indeed, studies have found that people are more

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2
3 willing to correct misinformation when the news story is personally relevant to them or their
4 loved ones (Tandoc *et al.* 2020). Another study showed that people skipped past false posts
5 without thoroughly reading them as they did not find them interesting or relevant enough to
6 read fully (Geeng *et al.* 2020).
7

8 **b) Issue importance**

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10 Issue importance also influences people's willingness to speak out publicly on a contentious
11 topic. The greater the perceived importance, the more willing people are to speak out (Moy *et*
12 *al.* 2001; Gearhart and Zhang 2014). Consequently, it might be argued that people's
13 avoidance of correcting false news can be related to the content's importance, relevance, or
14 appeal.
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16 **5) Individual characteristics**

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18 Although there are some contextual influences on people's decisions to discuss or confront,
19 individual factors such as demographics (e.g., age, sex, education level) may influence the
20 decision to engage in these conversations. For example, in their study about correction
21 experiences on social media regarding COVID-19, Bode and Vraga (2021a) found that
22 respondents with more education were more likely to engage in correction, and older
23 respondents were less likely to report correcting others.
24

25
26 Personality traits might also influence users' willingness to challenge. The five-factor model of
27 personality describes five dimensions of personality: extraversion, agreeableness,
28 conscientiousness, openness to experience, and neuroticism (McCrae and John 1992).
29 Personality traits influence the frequency and patterns of social interactions in political
30 discussions (Hibbing *et al.* 2011; Gerber *et al.* 2012), commenting on online news (Wu and
31 Atkin 2017) and students' participation in controversial discussions in the classroom
32 (Gronostay 2019).
33

34
35 In the context of politics, there is an association between extraversion and the tendency to
36 discuss politics (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Hibbing *et al.* 2011). As challenging someone
37 requires asking questions or voluntarily providing corrections, extraversion might be positively
38 associated with engaging in conversations to correct misinformation. It may influence people's
39 willingness to approach controversial dialogues on social media. Since agreeable individuals
40 focus on being acceptable in the eyes of others (Graziano and Tobin 2002) and agreeableness
41 is associated with conflict avoidance, it might be negatively related to challenging others.
42 Individuals high in openness to experience are amenable to new ideas and experiences. It
43 can be speculated that openness to experience might be positively associated with
44 approaching conversations to question and learn the perspective of the sharer. Neuroticism
45 describes individuals who are unstable and troubled by negative emotions such as worry and
46 stress (McCrae and John 1992). Therefore, neuroticism might be negatively related to
47 approaching conversations to challenge or correct misinformation.
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51 Perspective-taking and empathic concern could also impact a user's decision to challenge.
52 According to the empathy-altruism hypothesis, empathy for another person generates an
53 altruistic drive to improve that individual's welfare (Batson 1987). As people try to establish a
54 positive self-presentation on SNS (Zhao *et al.* 2008) and sharing misinformation could hurt
55 one's reputation (Altay *et al.* 2019), it can be speculated that users may develop empathy and
56 therefore refrain from challenging misinformation to protect themselves from negative feelings.
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6) Technical characteristics

Features and affordances on digital platforms impact users' engagement in several ways. These features can encourage young people to express themselves on political issues (Lane 2020), or affect a user's decision on whether to interact with the content, as they may choose not to engage by using available features rather than commenting (Zhu *et al.* 2017; Wu *et al.* 2020a; Wu *et al.* 2020b). Features like "hide a post", "unfollow", "snooze", and reactions (smiley face, angry face) can be utilised by users as avoidance strategies for not commenting (Wu *et al.* 2020b).

Research has shown that the way in which information is displayed on the interface can have an impact on users' misinformation sharing behaviour (Avram *et al.* 2020; Di Domenico *et al.* 2021). To illustrate, people who are exposed to high engagement metrics (i.e., the numbers of likes and shares) are more likely to like or share false content without verifying it (Avram *et al.* 2020). In addition, when misinformation is presented in a way that the source precedes the message, users are less likely to share it due to a lack of trust (Di Domenico *et al.* 2021). Social media design also affects users' misinformation sharing behaviour (Fazio 2020). Integrating friction into a design, for example, a question to make a user pause and think before sharing information, reduces misinformation sharing (Fazio 2020).

Given that features, affordances, and interface design have an impact on whether to engage with the content or how to engage on SNS, it can also be argued that they may also affect users' decisions to challenge misinformation. The lack of tools provided by the platforms and the way SNS are designed might affect users' tendency to be silent when encountering misinformation.

IV. CONCLUSION

Despite many studies demonstrating that individuals in cyberspace do not question false information (Chadwick and Vaccari 2019; Tandoc *et al.* 2020; Tully *et al.* 2020; Vicol 2020; Bode and Vraga 2021c) there is much we still do not know about why people remain silent when they encounter misinformation.

By synthesising insights from various bodies of literature, we presented hypotheses about why people refrain from challenging misinformation when they encounter it online. Although there is a commonly held belief that social media is a disinhibited environment where individuals discuss or express anything they like with little concern, studies show that users may feel restrained in some circumstances while expressing their opinions online (Thorson 2014) or correcting misinformation (Tandoc *et al.* 2020). Identifying why people do not engage in conversations to question or correct the content might help devise socio-technical measures to encourage people to challenge misinformation and contribute to mitigating its spread.

Scholars have proposed tools, design considerations, or systems to cultivate constructive discussions in online environments from different fields, e.g., web-based learning environments (Lazonder *et al.* 2003; Yiong-Hwee and Churchill 2007; Hew and Cheung 2008) and political deliberation (Semaan *et al.* 2015; Lane 2020). To the best of our knowledge, no application has been identified for facilitating challenging misinformation online. Given that incorporating design approaches into digital behaviour change interventions is successful in many diverse areas (Elaheebocus *et al.* 2018), design considerations can be extended to encourage users to disagree, question, or correct.

As the persuasive system design model has been employed in a variety of methods to encourage behaviour change (Torning and Oinas-Kukkonen 2009) it offers an opportunity to motivate users to challenge misinformation. Table 1 fleshes out a few design suggestions to illustrate the potential of using PSD strategies. These strategies aim to influence attitudes and behaviour.

Strategy	Definition	Example Implementation
Reduction	The design strategy of reducing complex behaviour into simple tasks	Stickers in instant messaging and SNS are used for many reasons, such as facilitating self-expression, filling the conversation or managing self-impression (Tang <i>et al.</i> 2021). Prefabricated stickers with questions to challenge, such as “Did you fact-check this information?” may help users question the content in a quick and impersonal way.
	The design strategy that offers fitting suggestions	Sentence openers are one of the successful techniques used in online learning environments to cultivate students’ participation (Lazonder <i>et al.</i> 2003; Albertson 2020). A sentence opener is a pre-defined mechanism to start a sentence (Yiong-Hwee and Churchill 2007). “This information is false because...” is an example. A user chooses a sentence opener and adds their comment to finish the argument, such as “the company made a statement that this is false.” They may help users in providing well-constructed arguments and challenging misinformation more quickly.
Self-monitoring	The design strategy that enables you to monitor your status or progress.	Affect labelling or labelling one’s feelings, helps users to regulate their emotions (Torre and Lieberman 2018). The idea behind using such an approach is to provide insight into users’ expressions of emotion. A tone detector is a tool that provides feedback to users about how their comment is likely to sound to someone reading it. As the user writes a comment, the indicator on the scale of emotions begins to form as word choices, style, and punctuation are identified. It may help users to monitor how their comments are likely to sound to someone reading them. This may increase the willingness to challenge misinformation as one of the reasons for refraining from doing so is the fear of seeming aggressive.

Recognition	The design strategy that provides public recognition for performing	A badge can provide public recognition. Users who occasionally correct misinformation can display the badge on their profile. As a result, other users are able to see that this user with the badge has taken the initiative to challenge misinformation on social media. Badges of the type 'Trusted Fact Checker' may motivate users to challenge misinformation more frequently.
Normative influence	The design strategy that displays norms regarding how most people behave and what behaviour they approve	A message that gives information about other users' acceptance and positive attitudes towards correcting misinformation on social media may motivate users. An example is, "Do you know, on this website, 80% of users correct others when they spot misinformation?"
Praise	The design strategy that uses praise as feedback for people's behaviour	A notification or message after correcting misinformation may motivate users. For example, "Your message is the third to dispute this content. Your contribution helps the fight against misinformation."
Rewards	The design strategy that rewards people for performing the target behaviour	A reward such as points after each correction may motivate users to correct misinformation more often. Such points, when accumulated, can translate to a free subscription to a media outlet, e.g., affiliated with where the discussion forums are hosted.

Table I. Design suggestions based on Persuasive System Design (PSD) strategies

1) Research limitations and future research directions

Research limitations

This paper has several limitations. These include a lack of previous research primarily focused on this topic. Therefore, it was not possible to conduct a systematic literature review. Instead, this paper seeks to synthesise relevant literature on related topics and provide potential reasons for users' silence towards misinformation online. It serves as a basis for further studies. We synthesised published literature from a range of fields, including organisational behaviour, communication, human-computer interaction (HCI), psychology, and education. Despite this broad range of topics, we may have missed literature from other research areas. Further, as we searched only published literature, we missed research from the grey literature.

Future research directions

Our identified factors stem from existing literature in different domains. Hence, future research should study whether these reasons are the same as those that prevent users from challenging misinformation in reality. We suggest that future studies expand upon this initial foundation by refining them into sub-factors, investigating other factors that influence the decision not to challenge, and studying whether there are dependencies amongst them. In addition, social

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3 media design can arguably introduce biases (Cemiloglu *et al.* 2021), encourage conformity
4 and hinder individual voices that can challenge what is perceived to be standard behaviour
5 (Zhu *et al.* 2017; Wu *et al.* 2020b; Cemiloglu *et al.* 2021). Future research should investigate
6 such reasons through primary studies. Additionally, research has revealed that open
7 discussion and direct confrontation are more acceptable in Western societies (Morris *et al.*
8 1998; Friedman *et al.* 2006). A systematic study conducted across cultures on large samples
9 to determine which reasons are common characteristics of human socialisation and which, if
10 any, are distinctive to individual and national experiences may prove useful in the context of
11 challenging misinformation. Another area for future work would involve examining whether
12 challenging behaviour varies according to the individuals' psychometrics and perception of the
13 group and others. For example, research has shown that those who perceive themselves as
14 having less power than the offender are less likely to confront them despite finding their
15 comments inappropriate than those who feel they have higher power (Ashburn-Nardo *et al.*
16 2014). According to this, the likelihood of challenge may differ depending on the perceived
17 power level of the person they confront (e.g., their boss at work).
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23 Technical solutions have been mainly based on A.I. One direction of research could relate to
24 improving social media design to empower people to speak up when they see misinformation.
25 Our design ideas presented in this paper are only a starting point and intended as hypotheses
26 about how to make people motivated to challenge misinformation through the design of social
27 media. Future research may focus on the actual design and implementation of these ideas.
28 Given the strong link to user experience, methods such as co-design (Sanders 2002; Sanders
29 and Stappers 2014) can be more effective in maintaining the balance between correction
30 requirements and other requirements, including connectedness to others and ease of use. We
31 proposed interventions based on the PSD model. More research is needed to determine
32 whether persuasive techniques are likely to break through the hesitancy and increase the
33 perception of utility regarding challenging misinformation. More research is also required to
34 identify the users' groups concerning their different reactions and preferences to such
35 persuasive interventions. Our identified barriers could also be used to interpret other types of
36 passive online behaviour. Research showed that many individuals who observe instances of
37 racism or prejudice do not attempt to confront the perpetrators (Dickter and Newton 2013).
38 Future research could investigate our hypothesised reasons for online silence beyond the
39 domain of challenging misinformation.
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