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Simon Frost[1] and Chris Madders

A Vast Amount of Strategy: Soviet Mapping, Neoliberal Publishing and Political Communication

An often-made claim is that the Arts and Sciences should be free from pressures by vested interests and corporate interference. The domains of Arts and Literature and of Science, and the outputs from them, are supposed to come from a place of autonomy, and by-and-large it is assumed that they do. While it is a commonplace that this claim is an oversimplification, exemplified in now-questionable critiques put forward by critical Marxism from 1970s and 1980s media and literary criticism, it is equally common to forget how deep and present is this still-oversimplified claim. For example, works of literature from the humanities, or of mapping from applied sciences, are supposed to be reliable texts free from promotional bias. But with two prime, and perhaps necessarily extreme examples, from Soviet and Google world mapping and from the phenomenon of world literature, the extent to which both can be irrevocably entangled in vested interests becomes apparent. Through its comparative case studies of mapping, this article will suggest that contemporary literary practices in corporate publishing are indeed saturated in corporate logic; and those cultural productions, while aspiring to be autonomous epistemological projects, can also be objects for strategic promotion and control. In short, the neutral standpoint from which cultural producers produce, becomes an asset to be grabbed by whoever is strongest.

Keywords: Publishing History, Neoliberalism, Soviet Maps, Global Publishing, Cold War, Realist Fiction

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INTRODUCTION

Conventionally, we do not approach texts from the arts or objective science as though they were, overtly, examples of political communication. Lines such as Emily Brontë's "… some time the loved and the loving / Shall meet on the mountains again," (Brontë 1992, pp.86-7) or 'Black Hill, at 582m, is the highest peak in West Yorkshire', are poetic communications of autonomous aesthetic experience and referential statements of objective mapping. Clearly, both utterances can *also* be used to evoke, say, a sense of national, cultural, or regional identity, and deployed, say, in political statements about the state of the nation. It means that, from a wider sociological perspective, such statements can be selected, ordered and disseminated in such a way as to take on a political function.

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Were you to ask anyone from literary studies or the natural sciences, this latter kind of identity-evoking instrumental use would be regarded, and very probably dismissed, as a Second-Order observation (Luhman 2002), quite distinct from the primary authored observation. But what if the selection and ordering of the statement is so invasive that it takes on an authoring role, to the extent that the political instrumentalization becomes inseparable from authorship. Might there not be a conflux, a blending of political interest into the forms of aesthetic autonomy and scientific objectivity? From a cultural studies perspective, it means we might question conventional demarcations between first and second orders, and, in a Kantian sense, between disinterested and interested communications; or that we admit to the political and commercial forces that co-author many such statements. Because, after all, what is the selection, ordering and dissemination of signs if not communication itself. The following contribution will argue, as sociological, cultural studies perspectives often do, that any demarcation between what Clover and Nealon call a separate domains model is a matter of historical convention rather than of logic (2017), but it will do so through the unlikely juxtaposition of two historical narratives, that of world literature and of world mapping, which together demonstrate the depth and irresolvability of the entanglement. Like the history of literature, the history of mapping comprises particular forms of textual object, and like literature (or more specifically literary realism) they are conventionally considered to provide neutral reflections of the world as it might be. But from another perspective that considers people, places and their texts in conjunction, inspired by Sydney Shep's model of situated knowledges (Shep 2015), both maps and literature become instruments of political intervention, in ways that we may not fully appreciate.

Within literary studies, exploration of how 'form effects meaning' (as in 'brings about') and how the interests of commercial production (printing, publishing and retail) organise literary forms were brought to the fore with the bibliography and book history movement of the 1990s, and with it later work by scholars such as Sarah Brouillette who try to recouple book history to cultural and political economy (Brouillette and Thomas 2016).[2] The emphasis on production and consumption, and the communication imperatives that these entail was necessary because "if you leave … the *production* of culture out of your analysis, you risk leaving out some crucial dimensions of your object; that is, some crucial dimensions of the world-literary itself perhaps cannot be understood in the absence of analysis of the global production of literary works targeted at selected readerships"(Brouillette and Thomas 2016, 511, cited in Rosen 2020). In short, when the material organisational dimensions to text making are neglected, then so too can be the ideological components of that practice and their attendant political pressures.

The idea that cultural expression was determined by the forces and relations of production, the "economic base" to use its catch-all term, was once a daily fixture of cold-war critical discourse.[3] Pre-dating postmodern-relativism, the cold war period itself was emblematic of this, with its clunky blocks of East and West that had intellectuals mapping the world into easy binarisms. Preposterous but in many ways refreshingly manageable, texts, any text, could be judged to be the result of a free liberal-arts critical practice, or else denounced as super-structural baubles pre-determined in the interests of those capitalists

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[2] Intended is the book history movement that emerged through the work of writers such as Donald McKenzie, Jerome McGann, Robert Darnton and the earlier *histoire du livre* of Roger Charier and Robert Escarpit.

[3] A high watermark of these debates can be traced to 1970s and 1980s critical Marxism in media studies, to studies in keyworks such as Wolff (1981), Wolff and Routh (1977), and Hauser (1982).

holding the means of production. And in extreme cases, in what US anti-war Marxists of the 1960s-70s easily named the military-industrial complex, it could be vociferously shown how autocratic power had shaped the making and reading of society's arts and literary communications.

For its proponents, such 1970s literary and cultural criticism was supposedly in the sophisticated vanguard of identifying where and how the ideological divide operated, leaving it to other disciplines to play catch-up. Then with post-modernism and post-structuralism, together with the omnipotence of global neo-liberalism, such easy consignments became musty, comic even, and were largely forgotten.

But the question about relations between production and communications forms is not merely anachronistic. Conditions produced by the military-industrial complex of the 1970s may well be very different to those produced by corporate neoliberalism in twenty-first century. And while the technological dimensions to textual communications have been given new prominence through digital online modes, the political-ideological conditions may have, not exactly disappeared, but become normatively opaque, obscured because their presence is a matter of habitual business. Nevertheless, as true of corporate literary publishing as of Google Maps, and as true of any "alternative" underground press or scribbled street directions to the food bank, the justifiable mapping of knowledge that a text can impart can never really be separated from the means by which and the task for which the text was produced in the first place.

For both autonomous literary aesthetics and for objective science, for both literary texts and for mapping, these points about political determination remain valid. To begin with, both create texts. Mapping comprises far more than measuring the geographic, as literature comprises more than merely literary realism, but few would argue against the epistemological convergences and textual co-extensivities between those two practices. As Richard Francaviglia asserts of the extent to which map-making is anchored in the Arts and Humanities, "a map is essentially a text'," (Francaviglia 2015, p.4) and cites cartographic historian Denis Wood on the semiotics of maps, in that, on the map's sheet of paper or from its smartphone screen, the representation of phenomena is organised as a code: "Title, legend box, map image, text [wording], illustrations, insert map images, scale, instructions, charts, apologies, diagrams, photos, explanations, arrows, decorations, colour scheme, type faces are all chosen, layered, structured to achieve speech: coherent, articulate discourse" (Wood 1992, p. 112, cited in Francaviglia 2015, p.4). It is a tempting, too, to see how far the convergences can be taken, organised along a chain from author to reader, equating authorship with map-making, literary text with map, and paralleling the various practices of decoding and reading required to create meaning from both types of text. And although this has been done with success, more attention could and perhaps ought to be paid to the material and institutional political forces behind the making of such texts.

THE LITERARY AND MAP TEXT – AN ENTANGLED HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

Among the convergences between the literary realist text and map text, one might imagine that a feature which kept the map unique would be cartography's experimental or scientific method. With cartography, interfering narratorial subjectivities are reduced to a minimum by always observing the experiment from the point of view, as Donna Haraway would put it, of the modest witness (2018). However – and neglecting Haraway's further objection that this metaphorical witness invariably is a white, male rationalist, with strongly nationalist views – we can still see scientific method in map-making troubled by

the subjective point of view, compromised by the position from where the map is conceived. Like a story's omniscient narrator, that map-narrator's point of view is often imaginary, and almost always assumes an elevated position. At its most pronounced, that position is entirely above or outside the action, from what narratologists would call non-diegetic space, and from what map-makers would call a planimetric perspective. From that omniscient point, the map's plot is described, through representation that is horizontal only, where planimetric extraction is no longer bound to the topographical properties of what is described, nor, indeed, by the vertical axis that makes its elevated point of view possible.

The subjectivity in omniscience then carries over into the process of reducing scale. Unless one wished to parody the unconscionable 1:1 maps described by Jorge Louie Borges in "Exactitude in Science", supposedly from the *Viajes Devarones Prudentes* of 1658, any scaling down requires the selective loss of (hopefully unnecessary) detail. Metaphorically, this miniaturisation in scaling down is what literary realism attempts, too. One of the milestones of western literary realism, George Eliot's epic *Middlemarch* (1871-72) is a case in point, which reduces "the history of man … under the varying experiments of time" to a narrative bounded by the parish of Tipton (Eliot 1995, p.5),[1] as does Karl Ove Knausgård's elephantine *Min Kamp* (2009-2011; in English as *My Struggle*), whose exhaustive detailing takes a few steps closer to the realism of 1:1 representation, but both of which nevertheless require selection taken or rather imposed from a point of view. The selection's veracity lies with the intelligence and empathy of the text's maker to create a manageable *weltanschauung* (and the reader's belief in the reading experience of that); hence the ironically acknowledged totalitarianism of *Min Kamp* as a title, and hence the devil in the omitted details that turn out to be neither unnecessary, nor their selection objective. Because as Wood says of maps, too, far from being neutral reflections of their subjects, maps "unavoidably, necessarily embody their authors' prejudices"(p.24).

For Victorian critics, Eliot's realism was judged by the extent to which it did or did not confirm what the judicious reader already knew to be true. As *Tinsley's Magazine* wrote of her work in 1870, "The first and chief business of the novel is to give us authentic descriptions of this or that section of the world," (cited in Olmsted 1979, p.8) while the *The Times* noted "nothing strikes us more than the topographical powers, if we may so call it, of her writing … This 'bump of locality' in her genius … the look of fields and buildings, the relative positions of villages and hamlets are conveyed to us" (*The Times* 7 March 1873, cited in Hutchinson 1996, p.333). By the twentieth century, however, realism came to be regarded "not as a kind of timeless truthfulness to human experience … but as an historically conditioned, ideologically motivated construction of 'the real'" (Lodge 1985, p.219). Like a map-pill to be taken in moments of ideological stress, realism, to quote Alice Jenkins and Juliet John on its Victorian variant, performed a "confirmation of middleclass power [which] is what is partly at stake in the realist novel" (2000, p.6). Nevertheless, as a formal literary procedure, unflinching 'realism' still promises to signify a reality that has previously been obscured. And as Jenkins and John make clear, and as Knausgård's work confirms – in the volume series *Why I Write*, Knausgaard claims his authorship crucially regards life from a position of defencelessness and unknowing – realism is a fair response to periods of profound unknowing and the "deep cultural need to make sense of change, [and] to impose order on potential chaos" (Jenkins and John 2000, p.6) For anyone doubting the persistent demand for realism (and of opportunities for its ideological exploitation), the response is to ask when there has ever been a period that was not marked by a profound sense of unknowing, and who wouldn't wish for texts that provide orientation to place and space, using salient points of reference – very much like a map.

As with Francaviglia's description of a map, the literary realist text, then, becomes an institutionalised bookish device that renders "ideas and beliefs about places more explicit through the use of graphic representation" (Francaviglia 2015, p.4). What is needed, therefore, is a mode of enquiry that not merely accounts for the semiotics of the representation of beliefs, but which accounts for the physical device itself, including its places and the people who use it; accounting for its production, dissemination and reception, and for the cultures and politics of its agencies. In "Books in a Global Perspective", Sydney Shep has proposed a mode of enquiry, an update to the communication model of book history popularised in the 1990s that tackled the materiality and culture of textual production (Shep 2015). Shep's model, based partly on *histoire croisée*, proposes that 'the book' be understood as a dynamic inter-crossing, occurring between people, places and (bibliographic) objects: the intersection of these three domains and their fields of study (prosopography, placeography and bibliography) being nominated as an event horizon. What the model allows, or rather insists on, is that meaning-making emerges in the event of interaction between people, places and texts, and that interaction returns the politics of material production to, not the fore, but forward as an ineluctable part of both meaning-making and the political economy of texts. Applied to the clunky realm of Soviet map-making – as the following section will undertake – the approach produces fairly predictable though entertaining results. But in transferring the approach back to literature and returning the obvious inferences about production and ideology onto literary publishing, it may be that the same broad strokes can be newly appreciated with renewed significance.

TEXT AND PRODUCTION – A NARRATIVE OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Since knowledge of territory is a pre-requisite of both home defence and the conquest of 'foreign' country – by which is meant someone else's 'home' – it should come as no surprise that "[m]any of the national mapping agencies originated as arms of the military" (Veldi and Bell 2019, p.1). Map production and military excursion historically have gone hand in hand, and logistically this makes sense. Invasion creates the need to record unknown geographies, as well as account for the human resources found there. Troublingly, access to someone else's territory might only be at its most unobstructed during the process of trying to take it, and historically there was often little opportunity to update maps of 'foreign' locations unless at war. When British forces arrived in France in August 1914 to fight the occupying German military, they had at their disposal only three maps of the area. All of these were based on surveys conducted during the Napoleonic Wars and were roughly a century out of date (Berg 2018, p.246). The condition necessitated updated mapping and, in a combat characterised by trench warfare and the minimal advance of ground troops, the military industrial innovation of the aeroplane became central to the task (Berg, p.247). The advantage of being able to conduct photographic map surveys from the air was in seeing exactly where the enemy forces were and what they comprised. This ability, that of combining the technological achievement of man-powered flight, photography, and the specific nature of WWI, produced for the first time in history an attack staged with the aid of a "full overview of the enemy's defence lines, positions and hideouts" (Berg, p.248). Of interest, here, is not merely the specific conditions that created the need and means for map production, but also the way that map production was driven by military ambition, and was able to produce a specific attack. In times of conflict, knowledge is required of both enemy positions, and details of the composition of forces

found there. The map maker's challenge, then, shifts from being the provision of an objective representation of a geography, to be used by whoever has access, to one of providing a record of human actions specifically designed to meet specific production needs. The map maker's objective epistemological pursuit becomes instead a military political *strategy*.

The use of the bi- and monoplane for aerial mapping mirrors other technological advancements in military map production, best exemplified during the Cold War by the satellite. Kent et al. claim of classified Soviet maps that "the vast majority were compiled during the 1970s and 1980s, reflecting the availability of Soviet satellite imagery collected especially for this purpose during this period" (2019, p.9). This timely addition of satellite to military technology aided a huge Soviet cartographic endeavour, transforming it into "the most comprehensive and systematic global mapping project that had ever been undertaken" (2019, p.5). Furthermore, the satellite and more specifically the knowledge acquired to use and defend against satellite use, became central to the development of another map innovation which was online mapping. Soon after the first Sputnik was launched from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in the USSR in 1957, two American physicists recorded its radio signals, out of curiosity. They found that they could use these signals to find Sputnik's trajectory and its position in orbit, which immediately begged the question of whether, "using a satellite, was it possible to determine one's position on Earth?" (Berg, p. 306).[26]

Fast forward the narrative by several decades and the consequence of these conflicting military industrial, ideological national interests led to the creation of Google Maps, GPS, and other digital locational facilities. The current use of satellites to determine one's position on the planet's surface, together with aerial and satellite photography and the ability to merge digitised visual data, provides us with a browsable version of the planet. As with Google Earth, this fictionalised screen-equivalent to Earth can be viewed with a magnification clear enough to show property infringements – the map may be a fiction, but it can still be a legally binding one. Or in maximum zoom out, when the Google's earth becomes the 'star-dogged' blue and white ship amidst velvet black, as Coleridge's ancient mariner puts it, the same fiction equips us with a planetary omniscience once expressed through the lines "In the beginning …" Though satellite use is increasingly transitioning from the military to the private corporate sector – though it should be noted that the acknowledgements and intellectual property rights listed on Google Earth include the U.S. Navy – the institutional instantiation of these global texts is as much a result of organising knowledge for strategic imperatives, as they were in the days of WWI.

That maps hold secrets and tell lies has long been commonplace within the history of military cartography. As with literary realism, it is the strategic selectiveness of their dissemination of knowledge that can turn maps into valuable assets. As Veldi and Bell note, "When a new regime takes over a country it may decide to prepare its own set of maps – not least for defensive purposes – and to restrict who has access to these maps." (2019, p.1-2). In 1798, Russian Czar Paul I passed a law requiring that all maps of potential military significance be handed over to the government, and offending maps were confiscated from shops and from civilians who possessed them. In 1919 the Soviet Premier Vladimir Lenin issued a decree that mapping should fall under state supervision (Kent, p.2), ensuring as far as possible that modifications to public maps were approved under state sanction. Even within the military, personnel may need a certain level of clearance to access specific maps. Interviewing a former Soviet soldier, Greg Miller found that a "signature was required before a map could be checked out for an exercise, and the army made sure every last one got returned"; in the event that a map was damaged, even the remaining pieces had to be returned (Miller 2015). In the Soviet Union in 1966, the Council

of Ministers, who controlled all mapping conducted in the USSR, issued a directive outlining four levels of secrecy for Soviet maps: very secret, secret, maps for professional purposes (which forbade the inclusion of military, industry, or transport facilities), and public maps (Veldi and Bell, p.3). Such a history of cartographic secrecy not only suggests the map's importance as a valuable object, but also extends the idea of map production as a strategy: thus map-text production contributes to policies of gatekeeping and becomes not a knowledge-building but a knowledge stockpiling exercise.

That fear of maps falling into unwanted hands also placed demands on what sorts of knowledge were to be exempted from the text, and in many cases Soviet public maps were devoid of accurate, valuable geographic information. During the Cold War, Soviet maps for civilian use became vehicles for a kind of politically motivated lying, where maps were "deliberately distorted with a special projection that introduced random variations" (Miller 2015). Postnikov, a Russian cartographer and historian interviewed by Miller, claimed "The main goal was to crush the contents of maps so it would be impossible to recreate the real geography of a place from the map" (Miller 2015). Should the map fall into enemy hands, the technique was designed to make the map useless for navigation and military planning. Something similar is observed by Veldi and Bell in their brief study of Soviet maps of Estonia, formerly a part of the Soviet Union. They noted "how difficult it was for the residents of Estonia to know their landscape, since no accurate maps at anything like a useful scale were allowed" (Veldi and Bell, p.10). And if the Soviet State's involvement in this manipulation of domestic maps was ever in doubt, then confirmation comes from the State prize awarded by Stalin to the cartographer who came up with the system of distortion (Miller 2015). Evidently, not only map production and distribution were placed in the service of state's political interests, but cartographic methodology too. The very process of omission and inclusion was no longer an unavoidable consequence of miniaturisation, or a logical result from adopting a planimetric perspective. It was instead a complex strategic event, to echo Sydney Shep's model of (literary) textual culture, occurring at the intersection between textual map, people within the Soviet regime, and places located within the Eastern block.

While maps produced within the USSR were rendered geographically inaccurate by State intervention, their maps of the foreign space of *rubezhom* [abroad] were staggeringly accurate. To an unprecedented degree, Soviet maps were drawn up covering "Europe, the Middle East, North and Central America, large areas of South America, the Indian subcontinent, south-east Asia, China, and the populated areas of Africa" (Kent, p.5). Not merely was the area of the world's surface covered astonishing in itself, but the detail with which these maps were annotated stunning, too.

> "…annotations indicate distance, width of carriageway, overall clearance and surface material (e.g. A = asphalt). Bridges are labelled with construction material, length, width and carrying capacity. In the forests, tree species are named, and the typical height, girth and clearance are stated, whilst in the river the speed of flow, width, depth and bed material are annotated" (Kent, p.8).

Such a large-scale mapping operation would have taken many thousands of men on the ground collating this information, as well as hundreds of cartographers to convert the information into maps. Geoff Forbes, Director of Mapping at a company that stocks Soviet military maps, argues convincingly that the detail to Soviet maps was achieved in direct relation to maximising the effectiveness of their military resources:

> "The US military's air superiority made mapping at medium scales adequate for most areas of the globe. The Soviets, on the other hand, were the global leaders in tank technology ... These maps were created so that if and when the Soviet military was on the ground in any given place, they would have the info they needed to get from point A to point B" (cited in Miller 2015).

US air superiority meant that detailed ground maps were not in such high demand as they were to the Soviets, who at that time had built up the world's largest tank army that would require highly detailed maps to navigate enemy territory. As a result, the detail of Soviet mapping was not only extraordinary but tactically relevant. Information such as the width of roads was provided to ensure tank access. The materials in bridge construction were given to ensure the bridge would bear a vehicle's weight. It mattered whether a road was A (asphalt), which would mean waterproof, rather than rough earth that might become impassable in wet weather. And whether trees were flimsy birch, as well as the spacing between them, had a bearing on how easily they could be passed through.

For clear ideological reasons or, rather, for clear reasons of ideological self-interest, and because the State organisation operated in a contested space, an expansive global programme of reconnaissance and cartography was undertaken to produce these detail-rich texts: ironically the same detailed map texts that would later provoke the US to develop their own (Miller 2015), where again the text's form and content would be directly derived from the material production requirements of an ideologically-motivated military industrial complex.

Francaviglia suggests that there is national bias in map making. Cold War maps in popular magazines used "red to depict the communist countries as an ever-present, and growing, 'red' threat to the West," and it is likewise no coincidence "that maps by American and British cartographers often place the Americas or England, respectively, at their center" (2015, p.4). But the prejudices and political needs of production stick far deeper than the 'vast amount of red – good to see at any time' that Conrad's Marlow admired on a world map in a Brussel's office, shortly before journeying into the Heart of Darkness. The army supporting the mapping of King Leopold's Congo was not a State army but a corporate one, the *Force Publique*, owned and run on behalf of Leopold's private company, but its needs and prejudices had a depressingly familiar ring.[4] Léon de Moor was one of its cartographers who worked for the publishing house J. Lebègue and Co., where he produced a text entitled "Congo Belge".[5] For its commissioners, it was a map, not of a regional geography, but of a private to-be-colonised resource with sufficient resolution to establish legally binding property rights. Like a Soviet map, de Moor's military-industrial cartographic operation required domestic locations to be deliberately misrepresented – no people of the Kasai ever called their region "The Belgian Congo"; with details of the region's 'foreign' resources – transport routes capable of conveying the produce from rubber-vine forests – recorded with a level of detail no domestic map would choose to. As with de Moor, as with Soviet mapping, and possibly as with Google Earth, these

[4] For an overview of Leopold's attack upon and corporate colonisation of the Congo region, see Hochschild (2011). For the view from a Black African-American missionary on the life of the Kasai people, of the Bakuba Kingdom, and of Leopold's atrocities there see Sheppard (1917), also available via The Open Library, https://archive.org/details/presbyterianpion00shep/page/n3 [accessed March 2024].

[5] For the map of Léon de Moor, see Carte du Congo Belge / éditée par l'Office de Publicité, anciens établissements J. Lebègue & Cie, online, World Digital Library, (1896), https://www.wdl.org/en/item/59/ [accessed March 2024].

cartographic cases suggest that the design and content of a map is not so much 'affected' by the intentions and values of its production but created by them.

It is taken for granted that a map accurately reflects its subject and that a mapmaker's work is primarily an epistemological project, and much the same could be said of literary realism. But the example of military maps in general, and the case of Soviet Cold War maps in particular, is evidence of other priorities made visible when the methodological approach allows for production to be thought of as an event at the centre of heterogeneous practices, involving people and their places. War creates the need and means for map production, but it also creates their design and function. Soviet Cold War Maps, military and civilian, achieved the forms they did directly as a result of the Soviet's reliance on tank technology, and the opportunities they believed this provided for ideological expansion and defence. A map, as with a text, far from only detailing locations in terms of ranked importance that unavoidably involves subjective judgement, as Francaviglia suggests, is instead distinguished for its choice of what constitutes 'importance' and, as tellingly, for the knowledge it chooses to withhold. Whether increasing the map's accuracy of desired resources or rendering protected resources unusable through inaccuracy, the author-mapper selectively distributes and withholds her knowledge, using whatever technologies are available. Bi-planes and satellites, as much as mobile apps and online media, along with the ideological interests that drive their use, are important parts of text creation – a point that applies as much to Sputnik and its political conditions, as it does to the outputs of publishing-conglomerates such as Bertelsmann or News Corp and theirs. Such texts are not so much epistemological projects for establishing representational knowledge but rather exercises in control through epistemological means.

TEXT AND PRODUCTION – A NARRATIVE OF GLOBAL PUBLISHING

In broader macro terms, publishers have a long history of seeking influence over contested market territory, both domestic and foreign, remembering that influence implies both increased distribution and the significance there of the distributed text. On the anglophone scale, the contestation became somewhat polarised after the Second World War, when US and British publishers tried to reach an agreement on who would control copyright over which areas of the world (Parker 1999). Representatives for both sets of publishers reached the Traditional Markets Agreement (TMA) that more-or-less approved a global carve-up (of the multi-lingual world). While US publishers would have exclusive rights over the US, its colonies and dependencies, the UK publishers "tended to exercise their monopoly in those territories, with the occasional exception of Canada, which had constituted part of former Empire, new Commonwealth. New Zealand and, to a greater extent, Australia were key protected markets," leaving the rest of the world as "fair game." (MacCleery 2010, p.43). What is thus achieved becomes visible when, methodologically, the author-centric view is parked for a moment, and the agreement is seen as an event at the intersection of place, with the publishers placed there and their published objects, made possible by applying post-war capital and policy technologies. Even a decade after the termination of the TMA, its effects could be felt, with a publisher such as Penguin, in 1984 still generating 11.8% of its turnover from Australia (Field 1986, p. 32 cited in MacCleery 2010, p.43). Under the TMA, Europe went only nominally to the UK, since 'agreement' occasionally was a signal for infighting between anglophone publishers, but

anecdotally, after Britain entered the Common market, Europe was more emphatically claimed by UK publishers, with Canada frequently surrendered in reciprocity.[6]

To add more complexity, however, it should be remembered that market territory can be diasporic, too, where the readership resides in a 'foreign' country, or where the diaspora publisher reaches 'back' to the domestic marketplace from abroad. Polish readers and printers arrived in London, in the nineteenth century, after the failed revolution of 1830-31, increasingly so after 1848, wherein Zeno Swietoslawski set up a Polish publishing house in Jersey in 1852 that he moved to London in 1865; and around the same time, Alexander Herzen "created a Russian press to smuggle materials back to Russia" (McKitterick 2009, p.30). Diminutive Lithuania (once part of an extremely large Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth that stretched from the Baltic to almost the Black Sea) had during the latter nineteenth and twentieth century its territories occupied by Russian, Polish, German, and Soviet forces (Navickienė 2021). Under Tsarist press censorship (1864-1904), Lithuania's capital, Vilnius, published 'Russified' literature (often in Cyrillic script), while Lithuanian nationalist literatures were published from abroad: mainly from Prussia, America and Britain. Under the Polish annexation of Vilnius in 1920, Lithuanian national literature was then published from its provinces (ironically creating the high point of independent Lithuanian modernist literature). During the German and Soviet occupations (1940-1990), the point of origin for Lithuanian nationalist literatures again returned abroad – often America or West Germany, but also Argentina and Brazil – while Lithuanian Soviet Republic literature returned to Vilnius. Here, the new version of republican literature was re-Russified, and controlled through 'positive censorship', in a revealing echo of the Soviet Council of Ministers' restriction classifications for maps, distributed according to levels of permissible access, where "publications came out with special labels: 'Top Secret', 'Strictly Confidential', 'For Official Use Only', 'Under Manuscript Rights', 'For Scientific Libraries', etc., in order to restrict the dissemination of publications" (Sabonis 1992, p.3-6 cited in Navickienė 2021). Currently, Lithuanian publishing struggles for market territory within the country, according to parameters largely imposed by global corporate publishing and the technologically driven distribution strategies designed for their digital content.

A classic example of how place not only effects but also creates the textual map, comes with the renowned Russian dystopian novel of totalitarianism *My* [We], with its prescient nods to both Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932) and Orwell's *1984* (1949). With its plot that can readily be interpreted as anti-Soviet, Yevgeny Zamyatin's Russian-language *My* (the manuscript was written in Russian between 1920 and 1921) was first published (in any language) in New York, by E.P. Dutton in English in 1924. Thereafter, at the height of the cold war, it was published in Russian for the first time, in 1952 and again in 1967, both from New York, targeted to Russian-language readers presumably with political alignment to the dissident *Samizdat* literary culture that flourished internally within the USSR. The US editions (in Russian language and English) clearly felt that *My* could do anti-Soviet political work. But, like the relative positions of 'home' and 'foreign', the critical challenge mounted by *My*, the politics of its map, could shift depending on where it was published. The first to be published in the USSR edition was in 1988, at the height of Glasnost. One might imagine this was only possible because of the period's 'new openness' that permitted criticism of the regime's totalitarian past. But, in complete contrast, it may also have been because the totemic God of Zamyatin's dystopic narrative

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[6] For a revealing anecdote, see publisher Nicholas Weir-Williams, "Canada", online listserv thread SHARP-L@LISTSERV.INDIANA.EDU (23 March 2006), https://list.indiana.edu/sympa/arc/sharp-l/2006-03/msg00063.html [accessed March 2024]

(equivalent to Big Brother in *1984*, Ford in *Brave New World*), which framed the novel's potential meaning, was no other than the American Frederick W. Taylor. It was Taylor whose scientific time-and-motion studies of human labour gave rise to the term Taylorism, which not only provided the US with radical efficiencies to its industries, but also concomitantly reduced working people to indices to be made efficient through mechanised thinking. In its pre-empting of the later neoliberal concept of human capital, Taylorism regarded human beings as no more than supply side items in the project of capital growth.

Clunky political interventions in publishing by government agencies are well documented. And rightly, the documents often fail to establish a significant degree of influence on the output of an individual author. Chinua Achebe was aware of the ambiguous motives of various American foundations funding his travel and literary networking during his early career, and that some were likely front organisations of the US Central Intelligence Agency, but he also felt that the cultural Cold War dollar could be accepted without loss of his literary integrity (Booker 2003, p.86 ff).[49] But if the aims of both parties met in an uneasy alignment, it must also mean, from the perspective of production funders, that the output also met the needs of the CIA (Saunders 1999). The great 'boom' in Latin American novels in the 1970s is as valued and welcome as the significant involvement of the CIA as a contributor to that field's success is not (Cohn 2012). Many of these novels carried revolutionary anti-capitalist sentiments (the several-decade friendship between Gabriel Garcia Márques and Fidel Castro is legendary), and make unlikely objects of CIA support, unless one regards this boom as an event at the boundaries of people, places and objects. Because from the US authorities' perspective, the magnification of leftist political content reduced with the increase of individualism required for "modernist literary techniques that were widely used by 'boom' writers … [which] were associated with anti-Communist politics in the United States, though not in Latin America"(Iber 2015, p.92). From a US perspective, the enthusiastic mapping of loadbearing literary bridges in Latin American (and Nigeria) took place precisely because those outputs were from *rubezhom*, in a way that domestic revolutionary literature was not.

The current iteration of the military-industrial complex appears to be global neo-liberalism and the state power required to protect, maintain and expand the supposedly free-market (Chang 2014, pp.66-78, and Harvey 2005). Helping construct that rationale of continuous growth are vast transnational media publishing giants (incl. Bertelsmann and Pearson, CBS Corporation, News Corp, Georg von Holtzbrinck Publishing Group), each with subsidiary yet still-vast corporations swallowed in the name of centralised efficiency (incl. Penguin Random House, Simon and Schuster, HarperCollins, Hachette Livre Macmillan Publishers), and within those corporations the swallowed traces of old publishing houses dating back to the twentieth and even nineteenth century. From a business perspective, creating and disseminating ever-increasing amounts of valuable copyrighted literature is entirely consistent with the strategy to capture increased global market share; as the 'subsidiary' Penguin Random House [PRH] are currently and far-from uniquely undertaking in East Asia, as part of the global 'anglophone diaspora' market. One product PRH currently proffers is a politicised climate fiction (CliFi), which is of interest to Jeremy Rosen precisely because, in opposition to sustainable environmental stewardship, it also comprises part of PRH's strategy to "keep producing different kinds of products, in all genres, and keep expanding into new markets …" (Rosen 2020). This tiny corner of corporate complexity is both a 'knowledge building' exercise in that its books tell the narrative of ecocide, but it also makes a valuable contribution to the corporation's copyrighted knowledge stockpile and to its project of economic colonial expansion.

From the point of view of Shep's event intersection, these CliFi maps like any other map can never be separated from the corporate task for which they are selected: they are not only epistemological projects but also objects for promotion and control using epistemological means. And as PRH continues its sweep of literary works, it ironically restages the strategies of Soviet mapping, not so much affected by but created by its institutions. The Soviet producers could make use of maps or texts that concealed as well as maps that revealed – the choice was a matter of place. Maps, whether literary or cartographic, enforce priorities to the extent that neutrality of choice is an illusion, and the choice of who gets to choose depends on who is in charge of production. This train of thought began with a concern for neutrality or for an oversimplified autonomy that turns out to be a highly valuable asset. The question then becomes to whom should that asset belong?

Conflict of Interest Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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