

Breaking wind: A comparison between U.S. and European approaches in offshore wind energy leadership in the North Atlantic region

Adam Gallaher^{a*}, Marcello Graziano^{b,e}, Stephen Axon^c, Amanda Bertana^d

^aDepartment of Geography, University of Connecticut, Austin Building, 215 Glenbrook Rd #442, Storrs, CT, 06269, USA E: adam.gallaher@uconn.edu

^bDepartment of Management and International Business, School of Business, Southern Connecticut State University, 501 Crescent Street, New Haven, CT, 06515, USA E: grazianom5@southernct.edu

^cDepartment of The Environment, Geography and Marine Sciences, Southern Connecticut State University, 501 Crescent Street, New Haven, CT, 06515, USA E: axons2@southernct.edu

^dDepartment of Sociology, Southern Connecticut State University, 501 Crescent Street, New Haven, CT, 06515, USA E: bertanaa1@southernct.edu

^eConnecticut Center for Economic Analysis, School of Business, University of Connecticut, 2100 Hillside Road, Storrs, CT 06269, USA.

*Corresponding Author

May 31, 2023

Abstract

The United States has only recently begun investing in commercial-scale offshore wind energy (OWE). Although the United States is slow to progress, it is uniquely positioned to build on the existing knowledge that coastal European countries have applied for their own energy transitions. In this study, we analyze how federal and regional plans for expanding the OWE sector in the United States brought to the surface decade-long tensions related to multi-scale governance mismatches, jurisdictional conflicts, and unclear pathways for implementing national industrial policies. Drawing upon the European experience with OWE, we employ a dynamic multi-level perspective framework enriched by socio-ecological elements to examine the United States energy transition through its most promising technology. From our framework we identify six categories of OWE developments characterized by both unique and shared elements between the United States and European coastal countries. These elements are: (1) role of local communities, (2) governance structures, (3) multi-scale government interactions, (4) regional socioeconomic structures, (5) socio-ecological impacts, and (6) relationships with existing industries. Drawing upon our analysis, we identify and conceptually map four research areas in need of further development for the United States and the research community— (1) knowledge, (2) potential, (3)

adaptation, and (4) learning. These insights provide critical information to ensure that the United States expansion into offshore energy generation is characterized by elements of justice, equity, and inclusive regional economic development.

Highlights:

- Drawing from the European OWE experience, the U.S. is poised to rapidly expand their own OWE sector.
- International comparison of North Atlantic countries and their pathways to OWE development.
- The multi-level perspective provides a holistic evaluation of the success and failure of OWE across four North Atlantic countries.

Keywords: Offshore wind energy, just energy transitions, blue economy, multi-level perspective, comparative analysis

Word Count: 8,410

Abbreviations:

BOEM: Bureau of Ocean Energy Management

FERC: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GW: Gigawatt

GWh: Gigawatt hour

ISO-NE: New England Regional Independent System Operator

MLP: Multi-Level Perspective

MOPR: minimum offer price rule

MW: Megawatt

MWh: Megawatt hour

NOAA: U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

OWE: Offshore Wind Energy

PTC: Production Tax Credit

PURPA: Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act

R&D: Research and Development

1 1. Introduction

2 As the post Covid-19 pandemic recovery evolves, nations worldwide have begun outlining methods
3 for rebuilding their economies. In the United States (U.S.), the Biden Administration has outlined a
4 course for tackling climate change, boosting the economy, and reducing vulnerability to global supply
5 chains [1,2]. The transition towards a decarbonized electricity infrastructure through the development
6 of offshore wind energy (OWE) plays a pivotal role in this plan (figure 1). In 2021, President Biden
7 announced a federal initiative to deploy 30,000 megawatts (MW) of OWE by 2030 [2], while in July 2022
8 the Administration spearheaded the Inflation Reduction Act [3]. By 2022, 22,431 MW were at the initial
9 stages of approval (“site control” or “permitting”) 800 MW were awaiting construction, and 42 MW
10 were operational [4]. Such an ambitious plan is expected to create over 30,000 jobs, generate electricity
11 for millions of residential homes, and substantially curb carbon emissions [2]. Yet OWE remains
12 contentiously debated with public opposition being one of the most significant barriers to
13 implementation [5–7], as was illustrated in the Cape Wind Project in Massachusetts, a failed 420 MW
14 offshore wind development that was canceled when concerns about decreasing local tourism were
15 raised [8]. Furthermore, the development of the OWE sector in the U.S. brought to the surface decade-
16 long issues related to multi-scale governance, jurisdictional conflicts, and unclear pathways for
17 implementing national industrial policies.

18 OWE is not new to the U.S., in 2016, the Block Island Wind Farm became the first offshore wind
19 farm operating in U.S. waters, four years later in 2020 a second offshore wind farm became operational
20 off the coast of Virginia [9,10]. Comparatively, OWE in Europe has a longer history with the first
21 commercial offshore wind farm constructed in 1991. The Vindeby wind farm built off the coast of
22 Denmark was a pilot project, intended to test the capability of OWE. With a nameplate capacity of 4.95
23 MW, it remained operational until 2017, at which point Vindeby was decommissioned due to its expiring

24 consent [11]. Since Vindeby, Europe's OWE developments have risen exponentially. As of 2021,
25 worldwide cumulative capacity of OWE reached 54,257 MW, a majority of which is supplied by China, a
26 rapidly emerging player in OWE, followed by the United Kingdom (U.K.), Germany, the Netherlands,
27 Denmark, and Belgium [12].


28 As the U.S. expands OWE to meet low carbon energy goals, it is well-positioned to build upon the
29 existing knowledge and development that European coastal countries have applied for their own energy
30 transitions. Moreover, renewed interest in OWE has the potential to transform the U.S. electricity
31 supply industry similar to, if not at a larger scale, than what other countries (e.g., Germany) experienced
32 in the early 2000s [13]. All the while, it has the additional effect of adding to the broader effort of
33 materializing the Blue Economy (see e.g., [14]), which centralizes inclusion, equity, and participation at
34 its core [15].

35 Our goal in this study is to identify priorities for learning from and areas of further research for
36 ensuring that the U.S. expansion into OWE generation is characterized by practices of justice, equity,
37 and inclusive economic development at the local, state, and national levels. Drawing upon the
38 deployment of OWE in Germany, Denmark, and the U.K., we employ a common socio-technical
39 transitions frameworks, the multi-level perspective (MLP), to examine the potential growth of OWE in
40 the U.S. The MLP allows us to take into consideration actors and interactions that are operating at
41 different governance scales (i.e., local, national, federal). Our work expands on the existing literature of
42 international comparisons of energy transitions, which is necessary, in spite of variations across
43 countries, to better inform alternative low carbon energy policy (see e.g., [16,17]). Methodologically, we
44 develop a systemic comparative analysis that utilizes a dynamic MLP framework enriched by socio-
45 ecological elements (see e.g., [16]). While the countries represented in this study have unique histories,

46 governance models, and geographic landscapes, we see the merit in drawing generalizable lessons that
47 can inform future OWE development in the U.S. Rather than make specific comparisons across
48 countries, we articulate these lessons in six thematic areas characterized by both unique and shared
49 elements between the U.S. and European coastal counties. These are as follows: (1) role of local
50 communities, (2) governance structures, (3) multi-scale government interactions, (4) regional
51 socioeconomic structure, (5) socio-ecological impacts, and (6) relationships with existing industries. We
52 conclude with a discussion on how the U.S. can employ principles adopted in Denmark, Germany, and
53 the U.K., while also identifying four research areas in need of further development for the U.S. and the
54 research community – 1) Stakeholders’ identification and engagement; 2) Data availability; 3)
55 Jurisdictional management; and 4) OWE as regional economic development.

56 The remainder of the work continues as follows. Section 2 contains a broad overview of the MLP
57 framework, contextualizing OWE and the role technology plays within each level of the MLP: niche-
58 innovations, socio-technical regime, and socio-technical landscape. Section 3 then provides an overview
59 of the identification of each European country evaluated in this study. Section 4 refines the
60 methodological approach used and discusses how the MLP draws out key elements of success and
61 failure as well as similarities and differences as they relate to experience with OWE over time. Section 5
62 discusses how the six thematic areas can be strategically utilized as lessons to inform priority areas of
63 research. We conclude with section 6, a brief summary on the direction of OWE research.

Offshore Wind in The United States



Map created by: Adam Gallaher
 Data: Active and planned
 renewable energy lease areas BOEM

64

65 Figure 1: Active and proposed offshore wind energy lease zones in the United States. Lease zone GIS data obtained from the
 66 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management's Marine Cadastre National Viewer.

67 2. Overview of the Multi-Level Perspective in relation to OWE

68 We draw upon the MLP¹ [18,19] to explain the larger socio-technical transitions occurring within the
69 electricity sector across multiple counties (figure 2). Studies examining transitions within the socio-
70 technical system context garnered attention starting in the 1980s; the MLP emerged as the one of the
71 more prominent theoretical frameworks in the early 2000s [20-22]. The MLP has been applied to
72 understanding various socio-technical transitions including transportation, electricity production, and
73 agri-food systems (see e.g., [23–29]). The MLP contains three different spatio-scalar heuristic analytical
74 concepts, from top to bottom they are as follows: socio-technical landscapes, socio-technical regimes,
75 and niche innovations forming a nested hierarchy (see e.g., [18,19,30]). Despite the widespread
76 applicability of the MLP, some aspects of the framework have been criticized; such as a lack of agency,
77 operationalization of regimes, bias towards bottom-up change models, and overall methodology among
78 others (see e.g., [31] for a review and response to those criticisms). Nevertheless, the MLP remains a
79 useful framework for exploring and analyzing by what means, and when, large scale socio-technical
80 transitions occur [25].

81 2.1. Niche-Innovations

82 Niches are ‘protective spaces’ where innovations are spun out of Research and Development (R&D)
83 laboratories, subsidized demonstration projects, or small markets whereby specific users support
84 emerging innovations [31]. Along with innovations, there are niche actors who work on, and support,
85 radical innovations with the goal of placing pressure on the existing regime to change, or even replacing
86 it all together [31]. However, this is easier said than done, at times resulting in incremental innovations
87 rather than those emerging from a radical breakthrough [25,31]. Such incremental development is

¹ For a detailed description and visual of the MLP see Geels (2002) [18]. Our adaptation of the MLP is presented in figure 2.

88 visible in the slow expansion of OWE, which only began expanding in the mid-2000s due to the opening
89 of resource-rich markets with large demand (U.K.) outside the home markets of leading companies
90 (Denmark) [13,32].

91 There are three core processes in niche development— the articulation and/or adjustment of
92 expectations or visions, a building of social networks (largely for the development of actors), and
93 learning and articulation processes [31]. There are many technical challenges hindering, or at times,
94 slowing OWE development such as, harsh offshore environments, development in deep waters, high
95 voltage direct current transmission system development, and manufacturing and installation of reliable
96 OWE systems [33]. Many of these challenges are contributing factors in the learning and articulation
97 process within the development of OWE. As OWE expands, beyond shallow waters, different turbine
98 foundations will continue to emerge. For example, currently there are four bottom-fixed foundations
99 (gravity, monopile, tripod, and jacket) and three floating turbine concepts (semi-submersible, spar, and
100 tension leg) [34]. These technological developments directly impact the resource potential of OWE. For
101 example, within the U.S. there is an estimated 2,059 gigawatts (GW) of technical OWE potential:
102 however, nearly 58% is in waters 60 meters or deeper and jumping to 95% when considering the Pacific
103 coastline [35,36]. If the U.S. rapidly expands OWE development, technological advancements in floating
104 OWE has the potential to emerge as a niche innovation contributing to the broader interplay of OWE
105 and the existing socio-technical regime. When landscape pressures such as climate change and social
106 support for renewable energy bear down upon the existing socio-technical regime, niche innovations
107 are given a window of opportunity to emerge into the market and attempt to disrupt the socio-technical
108 status quo [33,37].

109 2.2. Socio-technical regime

110 The socio-technical regime is an extension of what Nelson and Winter [38] referred to as the
111 “technological regime”, which defined a set of shared cognitive routines in an engineering-centric
112 community used to explain pattern development along technological trajectories [18]. However,
113 scientists, policy makers, users, and special interest groups also contribute to the evolution of
114 technologies. Thus, the socio-technical regime - which accommodates this broader community -
115 emerged from the original “technological regime” [18]. It is within the socio-technical regime that
116 existing trajectories are stabilized, through routines by engineers and users, regulations and standards
117 for various technologies, and investments in existing systems [18,39]. For example, in the U.S. the New
118 England Regional Independent System Operator (ISO-NE) implemented a minimum offer price rule
119 (MOPR) in 2013 to comply with a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) ruling aimed at
120 addressing inefficiencies in on-call energy markets. MOPR applies to power plants entering the market
121 for the first time. After which electricity transactions take place in the on-call market where
122 independent power producers can bid optimal prices. Since states operating within ISO-NE maintain
123 their own Renewable Portfolio Standards [40], renewable energy projects (such as OWE) have a legal
124 obligation to interconnect. Given that MOPR requires an unsubsidized bid price, the policy can
125 effectively render a project uncompetitive thus placing the price burden on the consumers [41].
126 However, as of March 31st, 2022, ISO-NE filed a proposal to FERC requesting the removal of MOPR from
127 the on-call energy market opening the door for future renewable energy development.

128 Similar interactions between niche innovations and the socio-technical regime are present across
129 the entire U.S. East Coast. Russel et al. [9] provides four case studies of OWE developments, of which
130 two failed and two succeeded. Among those that failed, the more notable Cape Wind project in
131 Massachusetts faced opposition from politicians, business figures, local commercial fishing groups, the

132 local municipalities, and environmental groups [9]. The main grievances cited as possible visual impacts,
133 potential environmental damage, interaction with existing commercial fishing spots, and impacts to
134 recreation and cultural resources [42]. While the project failed due to strong opposition from multiple
135 socio-technical regime actors, Cape Wind paved the way for future projects. For instance,
136 Massachusetts created zones in state waters for potential OWE developments and initiated a siting
137 review process to facilitate future development [43]. Unlike Cape Wind, Bluewater Wind, in Delaware
138 received strong community support [42]. However, given the infancy of OWE in the U.S., financial and
139 regulatory inadequacies led to investors pulling out of the project and ultimately the power purchase
140 agreement leading to the abandonment of the proposed Bluewater Wind project [9]. Yet new OWE
141 projects have emerged, most notably the Vineyard Wind 1 project, which began construction in 2021, an
142 800 MW OWE farm 15 miles off the coast of Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts. While the project
143 continuously faces opposition, mainly from commercial fishers, previous projects helped pave the way
144 for the latest round of OWE developments in the U.S., showing signs of institutions' ability to adapt.


145 2.3. Socio-technical landscape

146 The socio-technical landscape influences niches and regime dynamics [19], containing broader
147 demographic trends, political ideologies, macroeconomic patterns, and societal values [31]. It is through
148 the variation of these trends, under ideal conditions, that a 'regime shift' can occur. This happens when
149 downwards landscape pressures provide a window of opportunity for niche technologies to enter the
150 regime and begin integrating with existing regime dynamics [16]. Typically, downwards landscape
151 pressures are exogenous factors such as climate change, energy crisis events, and wars [37].

152 There are a few key examples of downward landscape pressure on the socio-technical regime that
153 have had direct impacts on the energy sector. Following the 1970s oil crisis, Denmark rapidly switched

154 from being 95% dependent on oil for electricity to only 5% within five years [44]. Denmark's rapid
155 transition contradicts the widely held assumption that energy transitions are long "protracted" affairs
156 [44, 45]. Denmark's trajectory, albeit was initiated by external pressures, indicates that energy
157 transitions can and do occur within more contracted timeframes. Denmark had accessible resources and
158 the political will to make a rapid shift whereas OWE in the U.S. is only recently a potential reality due to
159 a mix of resource endowments, prices, and sociopolitical preferences [13]. Similarly, Germany's anti-
160 nuclear movement initiated after the 1986 Chernobyl, and strengthened after Japan's 2011 Fukushima
161 nuclear disaster prompted permanent closure of several nuclear facilities in Germany and a rapid phase
162 out of the remaining by 2022 [46]. Both Denmark and Germany's shifts were motivated by external
163 pressures—Denmark to maintain domestic energy security, and Germany for risk reduction, yet they
164 both exemplify the socio-technical landscapes in which transitions occur.

165 Exogenous pressures have the capacity to influence endogenous energy transitions. Recent external
166 shocks in the global energy sector and disruptions in the global supply chain (e.g., COVID 19 pandemic
167 and Russian invasion of Ukraine) have strengthened the U.S.'s political motivation to transition its
168 energy source. Policies aimed at shifting electricity production in the U.S. have become a priority due to
169 the impacts of climate change and impending energy security concerns. [47].



170

171 *Figure 2: The multi-level perspective (adopted from figure 5 in Geels 2002 [18]) updated to reflect OWE transitions as they relate*
 172 *to the three North Atlantic countries.*

173 **3. OWE, Transitions Management, and Energy Security and Justice**

174 Denmark, Germany, and the U.K. are ideal case studies to draw generalizations from to inform U.S.
 175 OWE development. As highly industrialized nations that share similar consumption trends for domestic
 176 consumer goods and services, environmental and social standards, and with industrial and political
 177 institutions, these countries are comparable (see e.g., [13,48,49]). Additionally, there are contrasting
 178 contextual circumstances that provide opportunity for valuable considerations with respect to
 179 renewable energy policy, energy security, and transition studies. These differences illustrate why, for
 180 example, the U.S. has lagged in OWE developments when Denmark experienced early adoption of OWE
 181 in the 1990s. Also, following the oil crisis of the 1970s, all four countries responded by crafting energy
 182 policies aimed to increase domestic energy production by exploring alternative energy options or

183 reformulating concepts of energy consumption. Yet, even under the downward pressure of an
184 exogenous socio-technical landscape level shock, not all solutions maintained longevity. Three European
185 countries, Denmark, Germany, and the UK, demonstrate different approaches to energy security².
186 Denmark achieved energy self-sufficiency through consistent energy policies, emphasizing availability
187 and reliability [44]. Germany prioritized sustainability by implementing strong renewable energy policies
188 and focusing on wind energy exports for availability [13, 50]. The UK, however, lagged behind in
189 exploring wind energy and instead pursued an "all of the above" approach focused on affordability
190 [13,44,48]. The United States can learn from these approaches, especially in sustaining long-term energy
191 security policies, particularly through offshore wind energy (OWE).

192 The development of OWE both supports and bolsters a nation's energy security and independence
193 while bringing to the surface emerging complexities related to energy justice. There is a growing body of
194 literature centered on the idea of incorporating ideas of energy justice into energy transitions research
195 typically referred to as the "just energy transition" [51–54]. Energy justice has been summarized by five
196 elements: 1) distributive justice, 2) procedural justice, 3) restorative justice, 4) recognition justice, and 5)
197 cosmopolitanism justice [51,55]. Dwyer and Bidwell [55] point to procedural and distributive justice as
198 key considerations in, what they refer to as the "chain of trust", which was built during the development
199 process associated with the first U.S. OWE farm. Moreover, resistance to OWE exports points towards
200 issues and concerns related to distributive justice [56,57]. While both procedural and distributive justice
201 lend themselves to incorporating justice within OWE development, additional forms such as recognition
202 and restorative justice must also be included. This is particularly evident within the U.S. context whereby


² We draw our use of the term energy security from Sovacool's [58] adaptation of Elkind's [59] four elements of energy security: availability, reliability, affordability, and sustainability.

203 OWE development encounters local groups and has the added potential for interactions with Indigenous
204 American communities and federally-recognized tribal nations. These interactions were evident during
205 the planning of the Block Island Wind Farm when developers learned that part of the original lease block
206 was part of the Narragansett's tribe's oral history [60]. While concepts of energy security and energy
207 justice are typically presented separately, Jenkins et al [61] argue, within socio-technical systems
208 undergoing transitions these two concepts can be combined to reach a holistic evaluation of socio-
209 technical transitions. We do not aim to replicate previous work, yet building upon their work, we apply
210 the MLP to draw out the various elements of energy security and justice to not only evaluate and
211 compare our case study countries by also outline a research agenda for the U.S. specific to OWE.

212 4. Methodology and Study Area

213 We employ a case study approach similar to Cherp et al. [16] to analyze how federal and regional
214 pushes for expanding the OWE sector in the U.S. brought to the surface decade-long issues related to
215 multi-scale governance, jurisdictional conflicts, and unclear pathways for implementing national
216 industrial policies. Drawing upon the European experience on the development of OWE, we employ the
217 MLP to examine the U.S. energy transition pathway and identify elements of learning and areas of
218 future research. Much of the literature informing this research is that of sustainability or sustainable
219 transitions through a justice lens [22,62–64]. In an effort to ensure U.S. OWE is characterized by
220 elements of justice, equity, and inclusive regional economic development while aiding in the
221 decarbonization of the nation's grid. Research related to comparative international analyses of energy
222 transitions are a rare affair among the energy transitions literature [16,17]. However, they still serve as
223 important contributions to better understand how countries are implementing low carbon energy
224 systems (e.g., OWE) as they tend to exhibit patterns of development via policies, technologies, or spatio-
225 temporal patterns [17,44,48], in lieu of exogenous shocks to the socio-technical landscape [46,65,66].

226 This research examines four countries Denmark, Germany, the U.S., and the U.K. (see table 1). These
227 countries are evaluated with respect to their OWE development in contrast to the U.S. Globally, the
228 U.K., Germany, and Denmark are the second, third, and fifth largest markets for installed capacity of
229 OWE with 11 GW, 7.7 GW, and 2.3 GW [12]. Denmark leads in OWE development followed by the U.K.,
230 Germany, and finally the U.S. (figure 3). Both the U.K. and Denmark have been the largest markets at
231 different times (Denmark in 2000-2007 and the U.K. in 2008-2020). Each of these countries represent a
232 different combination of market and policies implemented (see table 2), which can offer pathways of
233 growth to the U.S.



234
235 *Figure 3: Timeline of OWE expansion from 2000 to 2020 as a percentage of overall electricity generation. Data obtained from*
236 *[12].*

237

238

239 *Table 1: Country level summary information for each study site. Information related to energy consumption and production are*
240 *for all forms of energy. 2022 is the reference year for all data contained in table 1.*

Country	Population	Electricity Production (GW)	Electricity Consumption (GW)	GDP Per Capita	Energy Consumption Per Capita (MWh)
Germany	83,111,000	33.4	33.7	\$46,252.69	5.7
Denmark	5,851,000	573.71	584.9	\$61,063.32	6.4
United Kingdom	67,503,000	305.53	317.3	\$41,059.17	4.5
United States	333,376,000	4157.1	4186.7	\$63,206.52	12.3
Ref. [67,68]					

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
242 4.1. Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom: three different OWE powerhouses

243 The ways in which Denmark, Germany, and the U.K. have risen to be leaders in OWE developments
244 vary considerably and offer insights for paths the U.S. could take as it seeks to fill a role of technological
245 and deployment leadership, as summarized in Table 2. Prior to the 1973 oil crisis, Denmark did not have
246 a formal national energy policy. From 1955 to 1974 nearly 85% of electricity came from imported oil
247 [44]. This lack of domestic energy policy reflected the fact that Denmark was not a primary energy
248 producer prior to 1972 [69]. However, following the 1973 oil crisis, Denmark headed down a path of
249 energy security despite the discovery of sizable offshore fossil fuel reserves [69,70]. As a result, oil
250 accounted for only 5% of total electricity in 1983, down from 64% in 1973 [68] through the 1976 Danish
251 Energy Policy [44,69]. By adhering to energy policy and not markets, Denmark became a pioneer in wind
252 energy, through cooperative and grassroots movements along with support from the government which
253 ultimately paved the way for Danish leadership in the global wind energy sector [69,70].

254 The Danish story of wind energy can offer lessons not only from a technical but also social
255 perspective on how to integrate wind energy into the broader socio-technical system [70]. Along with

256 grassroots efforts and a cooperative structure of ownership, the wind sector was largely supported by
257 two main actors, the Organization against Nuclear Power and the Organization for Renewable Energy.
258 The efforts of both non-governmental organizations helped formulate public awareness campaigns
259 which shaped wind energy during the early growth stages in Denmark [58]. In the context of the MLP,
260 both the Organization against Nuclear Power, the Organization for Renewable Energy, and the Wind
261 Turbine Owners Association worked within the socio-technical regime to sustain and facilitate the
262 window of opportunity provided by the oil crisis of the 1970s for wind energy to flourish. Additionally,
263 the introduction of a feed-in-tariff scheme bolstered up renewable energy, combined heat and power,
264 along with district heating during the destabilization of the existing socio-technical regime [44]. Beyond
265 the feed-in-tariff, investment subsidies and tax exemptions for wind power owned by households played
266 a supportive role in the development of wind energy [70].

267 From 1970 to 2016, Germany's electricity sector was fueled primarily by coal and nuclear power. By
268 2016, shares of nuclear energy were surpassed by wind and natural gas generation [68]. Nuclear energy
269 began to decline at the turn of the century, initially catalyzed by the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, but
270 following Fukushima in 2011, the German government announced the closure of Germany's nuclear
271 power plants by 2022 (figure 4) [45,50]. However, as of March 2022, nuclear generation still accounted
272 for approximately 10% of net electricity generated [71].



273

274 *Figure 4: Timeline showing the share of nuclear electricity generation from 1960 to 2021 as reported by the International Energy Agency. The three major nuclear reactor meltdown events have been marked with a dashed line and labeled accordingly.*

276 When considering energy transitions within the German context, *Energiewende* is found throughout
 277 the literature and policy documents [72]. Passed in 2011, “*Energiewende*” is a comprehensive legislative
 278 package composed of 120 measures designed to bolster domestic sources of renewable energy along
 279 with reducing overall greenhouse gas emissions from the electricity sector [73]. The policy calls for a
 280 reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 40% in 2020 compared to 1990 levels, furthermore Germany
 281 is aiming for 55% reductions by 2030, 70% by 2040, and 80 to 95% by 2050 [72]. Similarly, the share of
 282 renewables is set to expand 35% by 2020, 50% by 2030, 65% by 2040, and 80% by 2050 [72]. As of 2020,
 283 56.3% of electricity produced in Germany was powered by renewable energy, representing a 26.9%
 284 increase over 2010 levels [68]. Germany, in comparison to the other European countries in this study,
 285 initiated OWE developments much later. It was not until 2009 when the first OWE turbines came online
 286 with a cumulative installed capacity of 35 MW. However, given the strong onshore wind industry
 287 Germany experienced rapid growth thereafter. By 2014 installed capacity reached nearly 994 MW

288 representing a 2,740% increase in OWE development. From 2015 onward to 2020 growth in OWE
289 slowed, during that time OWE only grew 135.9%. However, as a result of strong political support and
290 favorable financial incentives, in 2021 German cumulative OWE installations totaled 7,774 MW placing
291 them second, to the U.K., in OWE developments. Expectations are that Germany will continue to
292 represent a large market for wind energy in Europe as a whole. Estimates show OWE installations from
293 2022 to 2026 to total 5,400 MW, nearly doubling the current capacity [74]. Socio-technical landscape
294 level interactions drastically influenced actors (e.g., community organizations, Greens Party, Coalition of
295 Social Democrats) decision making within the context of the German electricity sector. While fossil
296 energy sources remain (e.g., coal and natural gas), largely a result of incumbent pushback leading to a
297 'fit-and-conform' transition pathway [17]; Germany has still experienced an influx of alternatives
298 (namely, wind and solar), largely as a result of strong consistent political support [75].

299 In 1970, U.K. energy consumption was dominated by solid fuel use (e.g., coal) and petroleum that
300 accounted for 91% of total energy consumption [76]. From the 1980's, the energy mix had diversified
301 with North Sea gas coming online, reducing the proportion of solid fuel consumption and petroleum to
302 36% and 37% respectively. While the 1990's mirrored the 1980's, from 2000 onward, changes in
303 electricity generation primarily through natural gas becoming the dominant fuel source, responsible for
304 41% of energy consumption in the U.K. [76]. In 2014 however, more renewable fuels had entered the
305 energy mix for both electricity and bioenergy consumption, accounting for 19% of total energy
306 consumption. The U.K. has a long history of passing energy-related legislation into law. The Clean Air Act
307 of 1956 restricted the use of solid fuel in urban areas, while at the same time new processes for
308 developing gas from petroleum emerged [77]. The Thatcher Government decided to sell off the British
309 Gas Corporation in the 1980s and the coal mining industry was later privatized in 1994 [78]. Despite

310 landscape-level pressures such as the oil price shocks in the 1970's, fossil fuels continue to be the main
311 source of domestic energy consumption. Tepid responses to the energy crisis of the 1970's resulted in
312 the U.K. lagging behind other European nations in the transition to low-carbon energy sources,
313 particularly wind [13].

314 However, numerous regime-level policies and technologies have shaped the U.K.'s energy strategy
315 and direction. The Climate Change Act of 2008 and the Low Carbon Transition Plan of 2009 began the
316 U.K.'s commitment to addressing climate change and transition towards a low-carbon energy future.
317 Renewable energy use grew by 21% between 2012 and 2013 which equated to nearly four and a half
318 times the level it was in 2000 [79]. The Energy Act of 2013 indicated that both onshore and offshore
319 wind power become a substantial part of the U.K. energy mix, yet the Conservative Government in 2015
320 ceased subsidies for onshore wind and that OWE would only be financially supported if the cost of the
321 technology were to be reduced. Given that the Conservative Party has been in government since 2010
322 and energy policy towards wind power shifted in November 2015, the growth of the low-carbon energy
323 sector including offshore wind, new nuclear, and gas has grown to ensure domestic energy security [76].

324 Despite any ebbs and flows in energy policy and incentives, the U.K. is, however, a global leader in
325 OWE generation. In 2016, there were 28 offshore wind farms with a total of 1,465 wind turbines across
326 U.K. waters [78]. This rose to 40 offshore wind farms with a total of 2,297 offshore turbines in 2022 [80].
327 As of 2021, the U.K. has 11,256 MW of offshore capacity [12]. OWE will continue to expand as the U.K.
328 Government seeks to increase offshore wind generation to 50 GW by 2030, with 5,000 MW coming from
329 floating OWE [81]. This secures the role of OWE as a prominent component to the future of the U.K.
330 energy mix supported by primarily regime-level components for example, Energy and Industrial Strategy
331 2022, increased efficiency of offshore wind technology, increased finance from the U.K. Government,

332 and higher recorded levels of public support for wind energy [13,82,83]. The Energy Security Strategy
333 solidifies the position of the energy transition, and by extension the role of OWE, in the U.K. supported
334 by three mutually reinforcing goals: security, affordability, and sustainability [81].

335 4.2 The U.S. context

336 Prior to the 1970s, U.S. energy production, similar to the U.K., was dominated by coal, accounting
337 for around an average of 52% net electricity production between 1949 and 1970 [84]. During that same
338 time, natural gas, oil, and conventional hydro contributed 19%, 7%, and 21% respectively. The events of
339 the 1970s along with favorable policies and expansion of natural gas extraction shaped the energy
340 landscape currently operating in the U.S. Following the 1973 oil crisis, U.S. energy policy dramatically
341 reformed existing regime structures within the electricity sector. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies
342 Act (PURPA) of 1978, an act which was part of the broader National Energy Act of 1978 radically
343 reformed power plant ownership and sales of electricity [85,86]. PURPA enabled independent power
344 producers to sell their electricity to the utilities while also generating favorable conditions for the
345 expansion of renewable energy [85]. Moreover, the National Energy Act of 1978 along with the Energy
346 Policy Act of 1992 helped pave the way for renewables in the U.S. However, while inroads within the
347 existing regime were created for renewables, the majority of electricity production as of 2021 continues
348 to rely on fossil fuels. Coal used to produce electricity however, reached a peak of 56% of net production
349 in 1988; and as of 2021 only accounted for 22% [84]. Of the generating capacity set to retire in 2022,
350 coal will account for 85% of retirements largely a result of transitioning to natural gas [84,87]. Wind and
351 solar accounted for only 12% of net electricity production in 2021, leaving room for continued expansion
352 going forward. It is expected that the share of renewables, particularly wind, will increase as continued
353 investments are placed in OWE developments to meet the goal of 30 GW of OWE by 2030 [2]. However,
354 given the current geopolitical climate (Russia-Ukraine war) and surging demand for petroleum, U.S.

355 energy policy in the short term is backpedaling in an effort to curb the burden placed on consumers
356 [88].

357 The U.S. has access to vast offshore wind resources, nearly 4,000 GW of potential energy is available
358 or nearly four times the current generating capacity of the U.S. electricity sector [49]. A laggard in OWE,
359 the U.S. has only installed 42 MW of OWE, as of 2022. Additionally, there is currently 22,431 MW of
360 OWE between the “site control” and “permitting” process, both of which still require approval from the
361 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and other federal agencies [4]. With respect to onshore
362 wind developments, the U.S. has the second most installed capacity of onshore wind energy
363 contributing 21% of global wind electricity generated in 2020, second only to China who generated 30%
364 of total wind electricity [89]. Transitioning from 6.73 gigawatt hours (GWh) in 2001 to 379.7 GWh in
365 2021 the U.S. has a strong foothold in onshore wind energy development and production. While this
366 represents a 5,809% increase over 20 years, wind energy only accounts for around 9.2% of total net
367 electricity production.

368 Moving forward, the U.S. has implemented multiple energy policies which have supported the
369 development of OWE and other renewable energy technologies more broadly. During the 1980s, energy
370 prices began to rise once again forcing congress to reevaluate U.S. energy policy [90]. Along with the
371 above mentioned passing of PURPA and the National Energy Act of 1978, deCasto et al. [49] outline
372 eight more policies influencing the development of OWE farms. Missing from their list however is the
373 Energy Policy Act of 1992, which set forth the US production tax credit (PTC), a federal tax credit
374 available for eligible renewable energy projects, most notably wind, which provides 1.5 cents/kilowatt
375 hour produced during the first 10 years of a projects life [86]. Prior to the PTC, renewable energy
376 financing throughout the 1970s took the form of tax credits that subsidized the purchase of equipment

377 needed to build the projects [50]. The PTC along with state policies provided the much-needed financing
378 crucial to renewable energy projects and can be attributed to much of the growth the U.S. saw in wind
379 energy from the 1990s onward [50,91]. From the 1990s on, the PTC expired and renewed in a boom-
380 and-bust cycle creating uncertainty for investors in renewable energy and more specifically wind energy
381 (onshore and offshore) [86,49]. Firestone et al. [92] highlight the importance of continued investment
382 along with appropriate technology specific tax structures designed to spur development.

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395 Table 2: Country comparison with respect to OWE development adopted from Graziano et al. (2017) [13]. Data comes from the
 396 International Energy Agency (2022) [68] and the International Renewable Energy Agency (2022) [93].

Strategy	Installed capacity (MW) (2020)		Share of wind (onshore and offshore) by total electricity consumption (all sources) (2019)	National Companies
	Onshore	Offshore		
DK Feed-in tariffs (1991); constant R&D development (1970s onward); export- oriented (US market) social and political support	4,558.66	1,700.80	49.03%	Vestas
DE Feed-in tariffs (1991); constant R&D development (1970s onward); export- oriented strong social and political support after 1986 Chernobyl	54,414	7,774	24.66%	Siemens Enercon Nordex Senvion E.on Dong
UK NFFO, then ROCs, Feed-in-Tariff only from 2013 - CfDs no development of local industry for onshore wind; creation of the Offshore Renewable Energy Catapult for offshore wind research center (2013); until recently no social support	14,101.94	10,383.05	24.8%	N/A
US PURPA (1978) opened door for renewable energy interconnection market-based incentives; tax credits (production tax credit for wind) State led renewable portfolio standards; until 2021 all OWE was state led; OWE faces opposition from incumbent industries; Mixed support at state level	118,702.70	42	8.42%	GE

397 5. Implications for OWE development in the U.S. and areas of learning from across the 398 pond

399 One of the more complex barriers to large scale adoption for OWE is found at the nexus of a “green
400 dilemma” [94]. The “green dilemma” is characterized by support for a global transition towards
401 renewable energy, but opposition to localized projects. At the macro level, transition to low-carbon
402 energy sources is critical to mitigating the impacts of climate change. Particularly, when considering the
403 interrelated climate and health benefits that OWE can provide given its potential scale in comparison to
404 other low-carbon energy sources [95]. At the micro level, this highlights conflicting agendas and interest
405 amongst multiple stakeholders, developers, governmental agencies, communities, and utilities.
406 Additionally, OWE is expanding to new areas of energy production [96], and often faces local opposition
407 because of its *perceived* aesthetic and environmental impacts on seascapes (see e.g., [94,97]), or uses
408 (see e.g., [98]). These issues often find fertile ground in the multi-scalar and multi-jurisdictional nature
409 of these projects, which may create conflicts within public agencies (see e.g., [99]). Such micro level
410 tensions and concerns will most likely continue to evolve as more OWE farms are deployed, becoming a
411 part of the socio-cultural and historical development of seascapes, which are perceived in multifaceted
412 ways for example, industrial heritage, coastal cultural heritage, fragile ecosystems, and culturally
413 sensitive areas [100].

414 5.1. European lessons for an emerging U.S. OWE industry

415 The ability to advance the development and deployment of OWE in the U.S. to the scale proposed
416 will require communication and engagement across multiple governmental scales and communities. As
417 additional OWE developments proliferate the U.S. coast lines, new case studies and lines of inquiry will
418 emerge allowing for meaningful international comparison studies deepening our understanding of OWE
419 and its place in our societies [9]. The U.S. offers a unique opportunity to fill several gaps in the current

420 research and practice of sustainable transitions as it relates to OWE. In Table 3, we identify areas where
 421 additional research can enhance the efficacy of OWE and its relevance to low-carbon socio-technical
 422 energy transitions. These priority areas can be further distilled into four themes: 1) Stakeholders’
 423 identification and engagement; 2) Data availability; 3) Jurisdictional management; and 4) OWE as
 424 regional economic development. For each of these themes, the U.S. displays both peculiarities and
 425 commonalities with the three leading cases: each theme has been at least identified by existing
 426 literature based on decades-long practices and tools, especially in the European North Atlantic region.
 427 Overall, these themes reflect the broader instance of avoiding maladaptation through holistic
 428 approaches, reformulated definitions, and competing problems [101].

429 *Table 3: Priority areas and gaps in socio-technical research related to OWE*

Priority research	U.S. context	Gaps in research	Methods & Data	Relevance to low carbon transition	Relevant reference
Role of local communities	Pressure on institutions; Exclusionary communities; Equity planning.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Identifying myths and perceptions around OWEs. ● Outlining and addressing tensions between developers, communities, government, and utilities ● Role of ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ in highly segregated regions. ● Identifying the meanings of seascapes and ‘placefulness’ of marine/coastal environments. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Qualitative methods 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Proactive support for transition process. ● Understanding regional, informal power relations. ● ‘Just’ element in clean energy transition 	[5, 90, 102]
Governance structure	Multi-layered governance: federal vs local governments;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Outlining and addressing interactions between competing jurisdictions; ● Historical rights vs. national interests; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Rural and Urban Planning; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Understanding role of incumbents in varying 	[99, 103]

	indigenous rights.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Regional Science applications 	<p>jurisdictional landscapes.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Identifying relevant policy stakeholders and decision makers. 	
Governance interactions	Balance of interests and objectives among different agencies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● ‘Parallel’ plans between different agencies within across levels of governance ● State land use oversights vs federal jurisdiction of OWE siting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Policy analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Implementing workable and meaningful regional plans while eliminating inter- and intra-institutional conflicts. 	[97, 104-107]
Regional socioeconomic structures	Expansion in non/minimal resource extractive regions that are new to the energy value chain.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Community engagement with energy systems ● Emergence of OWE value chain to communities/states/regions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Equity analysis of OWE ● Socioeconomic data harmonization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Altering cultural/societal interactions with energy systems ● Reforming opposition to OWE and low-carbon transitions 	[108]
Socioeconomic & ecological impacts	Lack of federal, state, and local data harmonization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Non/minimally invasive construction processes. ● Environmentally conscious supply chains. ● Uncertainty of ecological effects on marine life. ● Regional economic benefits from OWE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Quantitative ● Structured Decision Making ● Data clearing houses 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Access to tools for making informed decisions based on appropriate (by type, format, and scale) socioecological data. 	[109, 110]
Relationships with existing industries	Interaction with subsidized fisheries and successful fisheries; Interaction with existing offshore energy extractive industries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Commercial and recreational fisheries ● Impacts of OWE grid integration and overall state/regional energy portfolio ● Shared knowledge between OWE and offshore drilling 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Technical assessments ● Energy sector/supply chain economic analysis ● Assessment of onshore wind and farmers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Offsetting retiring coal fired power plants ● Spillover financing from OWE to offshore drilling ● Mutualistic relationships between incumbent/existing industries and emerging OWE 	[108, 111]

5.2. Stakeholders' identification and engagement

430 The first two elements in Table 3 belong to the long-standing issue of identifying and engaging with
431 relevant stakeholders. This 'relevance' becomes increasingly complex within frameworks such as the
432 Blue Economy or Blue New Deal, where social justice is a fundamental pillar [112]. Within this theme,
433 the U.S. is both a learner and, if not a unique, certainly an extreme case. From the learning side,
434 developers and policymakers in the U.S. can rely on the existing works and tools developed in the UK
435 (see e.g., [113–115]) and Germany (see e.g., [116–118]). However, the identification of stakeholders and
436 community engagement remains a major issue in the U.S. A historical legacy of residential redlining in
437 the U.S., has led to socioeconomic segregation along racial lines throughout coastal states, particularly
438 along the North Atlantic leading to contentious opposition when it comes to approving OWE projects
439 and developing coastal infrastructures [119]. Fundamental questions of inclusion and participation such
440 as 'who gets to decide?' and 'what is representation?' can raise inquiries into how conceptualizations of
441 justice and equity are put into practice. Assumptions of public participation without reflexive attention
442 to existing power dynamics between stakeholders has the potential to lead to maladaptive outcomes in
443 the form of increasing social vulnerabilities [120]. Further complicating stakeholder dynamics are local
444 level hierarchies that often ignore the heterogeneity in local spaces themselves, this includes divergent
445 interests and agendas amongst multiple stakeholders.

447 The richness in diversity in the U.S. highlights the role of place for coastal communities and the
448 intrinsic value that the coast and seascapes provide for people across class and cultural lines. By
449 exploring and understanding the differing roles of seascapes and placefulness within the context of
450 coastal communities can enhance relationships between these communities, developers, and
451 governments [5]. It is known that factors influencing OWE development include visual impacts,
452 perceived effects on wildlife and tourism, along with integration of OWE into existing seascapes, and

453 fairness [121]. Fairness, or distributive justice is one example that could explain opposition to OWE
454 projects, specifically when framed as energy exports and not used locally [56,57]. Similar sentiments
455 were found when asking New England residents on proposed OWE projects located in federal lease plots
456 in the Long Island Sound. Bidwell et al. [121], found opposition to projects exporting electricity to
457 neighboring regions as opposed to use locally. Such regionalism is represented in the environmental
458 benefits of renewable energy projects as well, such as local air quality vs overall global air quality when
459 supporting renewable energy [102]. A better understanding of factors influencing attitudes towards
460 regionalism with respect to OWE projects could lead to less opposition and increased local support for
461 OWE.

462 5.3. Data gaps in existing OWE research

463 Similar to other innovative adaptation measures, OWE, requires a transition to a culture of learning
464 through data sharing of what works, and what does *not* work [112,122]. Whilst the existing know-how
465 still requires fine-tuning because of the complex seascapes-inland interactions of the OWE supply chain,
466 and the cross-sectoral impacts of these developments once deployed [14,104]. Needs will emerge
467 routinely as OWE development expands, creating the necessary preconditions for a national analytical
468 capacity to continuously monitor development— a characteristic common to all sectors involved in the
469 sustainability transition process in coastal regions [113]. Moreover, analytical capabilities will support
470 decision-making for pairing sound environmental planning with beneficial economic uplifting, thus
471 fostering a balanced transition process throughout the entire OWE supply chain. By building upon the
472 integration of multiple tools: from geographic information system-informed analysis to environmental
473 impact assessments, we can further our understanding of environmental interactions with OWE than is
474 currently available [123], while macroeconomic models can help understand societal effects over
475 multiple time horizons (e.g., [13]). For ex-ante planning and ex-post evaluation tools, however, building

476 national accessible databases with fine-scale data is pivotal [124,125]. The Marine Cadastre National
477 Viewer, a joint venture between BOEM and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
478 (NOAA) provides one example of such national databases. Within this theme, the U.S. is probably better-
479 suited than the other countries: this is exemplified by the partnership between Ørsted Wind Power
480 North America and NOAA whereby Ørsted will share physical and biological data related to OWE within
481 their lease plots in U.S. waters [126]. However, for the U.S. to fully embrace the Blue Economy there
482 needs to be a robust framework for data collection, sharing, and analysis unlike the NOAA Economics
483 National Ocean Watch program which maintains a limited database of only six economic clusters
484 compared to the 27 identified [122]. Most importantly, is the usefulness of building datasets and
485 facilitating a framework to disseminate such information to the proper channels [125].

486 Developing proper definitions will be required to advance and streamline OWE development as they
487 relate to the Blue Economy. Definitional ambiguity remains a knowledge barrier, particularly as it relates
488 to environmental frameworks such as adaptation (see e.g., [101] and Blue Economy (see e.g., [14]).
489 Developing a sound national level definition of the Blue Economy that allows regional definitions to
490 draw from, enable building informed decision making related to relevant stakeholders and their
491 engagement with the Blue Economy and OWE development [122]. Furthermore, a cohesive definitional
492 understanding of the Blue Economy allows for better integration with OWE development that also
493 delineates from other forms of economic development [101].

494 5.4. Harmonized government structures designed to streamline development of 495 OWE

496 Due to the hierarchical governance structure of the U.S., conflicting interest needs to be addressed
497 before moving forward, both between different jurisdictional levels, and among agencies within the
498 same level of governance [104]. For example, project siting is the most time-consuming aspect of the

499 entire development process. Developers need to adhere to multiple federal regulations, such as those
500 outlined in the National Environmental Protection Act, among others in addition to various state and
501 local regulations. The crosscutting of these various governmental levels can lead to delayed processing,
502 redundancies, and in some cases project failure [9]. In an effort to alleviate these challenges, the
503 Departments of Energy and Interior published a report aimed at providing a framework to streamline
504 development of OWE [127]. Despite these efforts, in the U.S. the current structure and allocation of
505 responsibilities within the same jurisdictions (e.g., states) and between different jurisdictions (e.g.,
506 states vs federal level) remain unsolved, especially in relation to energy projects and ocean
507 management/development [99]. Tools such as Marine Spatial Planning have been of little help: at the
508 root of the issue, is the lack of a hierarchical structure of both decisional/planning powers responding to
509 checks and balances. These gaps have been emerging quite significantly over the last decade: in
510 Massachusetts, the state's marine spatial plan has been consistently modified to reflect power relations
511 among state agencies [128]. Most recently, the Northern Pass and its evolutions have been consistently
512 defeated by referendums launched at the state level, which effectively impaired the energy system
513 design of entire electricity regions [129]. These events suggest that the scale of decision must be
514 identified: in this case, other countries offer relatively few 'best practices' or learning experience. The
515 U.K. has had issues with the continuous contrast between Scottish Government (state-level) and the UK
516 government [13], whilst Germany and Denmark have relied on planning mechanisms, which still
517 incorporate current power biases [99].

518 5.5. OWE as a tool for economic development.

519 The last theme relates to the ways in which OWE can contribute to the economic development of
520 the U.S., at what scale, and through which channels. Denmark and Germany have embraced an export-
521 oriented approach as a way of using OWE for economic development, while the U.K. has focused on a

522 mix of research and development attractiveness, resource abundance, and linked-industries know-how
523 [13]. The differences among these countries have been driven in part by the (lack of) abundance of wind
524 and market size. The U.K. most closely resembles the U.S. both in terms of resource potential and
525 planning approach. The U.K. decided not to impose local-content mandates, but rather used existing
526 industries (e.g., underwater cable industry) to attract investors for developing wind farms. At a larger
527 scale, the U.S. shows strengths similar to the U.K., in addition to existing offshore wind manufacturers:
528 however, most recently the U.S. Congress is attempting to strengthen a unique form of local content, by
529 imposing a nationality mandate on workers employed in OWE projects in an attempt to build out U.S.
530 OWE compliant vessels [130]. By taking a nationalistic approach, the U.S. risks delaying a transition to
531 OWE, rather than supporting the sector as a whole. Similar issues arose during the construction of the
532 first U.S. OWE project, Block Island [130].

533 6. Concluding discussion

534 In this study, we analyzed how federal and local efforts for expanding the OWE sector in the U.S.
535 brought the surface decade-long issues related to multi-scale governance, jurisdictional conflicts, and
536 unclear pathways for implementing national industrial policies. Through a dynamic MLP framework
537 enriched by socio-ecological elements, we identified six categories of OWE development characterized
538 by both unique and shared elements between the U.S. and European coastal countries. By exploring the
539 following shared and unique elements: (1) role of local communities, (2) governance structures, (3)
540 multi-scale government interactions, (4) regional socioeconomic structures, (5) socio-ecological impacts,
541 and (6) relationships with existing industries, we were able to link four priority research areas ((1)
542 Stakeholders' identification and engagement; 2) Data availability; 3) Jurisdictional management; and 4)
543 OWE as regional economic development) the U.S. and the research community to draw from the
544 European experience.

545 OWE development efforts integrate themselves across multiple United Nations Sustainable
546 Development Goals, specifically those linked to low-carbon transitions (e.g., affordable and clean
547 energy), economic development (e.g., decent work and economic growth and industry, innovation, and
548 infrastructure) and social justice (e.g., reduced inequalities and climate action). Each of the above
549 elements within the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals framework speaks to a broader call
550 of a 'just transition' or 'just energy transition' specifically in relation to low-carbon economies [64,51].
551 With respect to the ongoing energy transition, all four counties presented have explored distinctive
552 paths to OWE generation but faced different regime-specific challenges over various timelines (see
553 figure 2). For example, all enjoy a mix of renewable energy powering their respective grids and all have
554 pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and continue to expand shares of renewable energy.
555 However, shares of and approaches to OWE development are not uniform. Denmark can be
556 characterized as a pioneer in OWE having enjoyed consistent development with little rapid expansion
557 from 1991 till today, largely facilitated by strong community support and ownership along with
558 favorable energy policies. Additionally, Denmark has experienced the full life cycle of OWE thereby
559 fortifying a holistic knowledge other countries can draw from [11]. Germany, much like Denmark has,
560 since the events at Chernobyl, maintained strong community, political, and economic support for
561 renewable energy and pioneered a benchmark for energy transitions policy, *Energiewende*. From
562 laggard to leader, the U.K. has demonstrated leadership in OWE development throughout Europe.
563 Transitioning from Tepid responses to the energy crisis of the 1970's to increased interest and financial
564 incentives such as the 2002 renewable obligation policy, an energy policy mechanism similar to that of
565 the renewable portfolio standards in the U.S. only at the national level. When considering the U.S., such
566 structures (e.g., strong public support, community ownership) do not exist, potentially explaining strong
567 opposition and NIMBYism to local renewable energy developments, particularly wind. While the U.S. has

568 started making progress in OWE development, much remains to be seen. In both the U.S. and Europe
569 however, regionalism remains to play a strong role in shaping attitudes towards renewable energy
570 projects, particularly wind and specifically in relation to the end use of electricity, namely remaining
571 local. As the U.S. and others face the current energy crisis ignited by Russia's invasion of Ukraine [47],
572 many have temporarily turned away from clean energy goals in favor of suppressing economic hardship
573 [131]. As economics rebound from the Covid-19 pandemic and employ recovery packages designed to
574 spur economic development, specifically within the energy sector, the need for a 'just energy transition'
575 is more urgent now than ever [132].

576 Unlike with onshore wind, if the U.S. is to become a leader in OWE there needs to be strong political
577 support for OWE and sound economic structures. Additionally, by streamlining a process for identifying,
578 approving, building, and producing electricity via OWE, much like Germany who has a standing innocent
579 until proven guilty policy for OWE developments, the U.S. could facilitate consistent interest and
580 investment from OWE developers and make considerable progress towards energy security, clean
581 energy goals, and energy independence.

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Acknowledgements & Funding

589 This work was supported in part by the program Team-TERRA at the University of Connecticut, which is
590 supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant DGE-2022036.

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