

1 **Common Intentional Binding Effects across Diverse Sensory**  
2 **Modalities in Touch-free Voluntary Actions**

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32 **Abstract:** The intentional binding effect refers to the phenomenon where the perceived  
33 temporal interval between a voluntary action and its sensory consequence is  
34 subjectively compressed. Prior research revealed the importance of tactile feedback  
35 from the keyboard on this effect. Here we examined the necessity of such tactile  
36 feedback by utilizing a touch-free key-press device without haptic feedback, and  
37 explored how initial/outcome sensory modality (visual/auditory/tactile) and their  
38 consistency influence the intentional binding effect. Participants estimated three delay  
39 lengths (250, 550, or 850 ms) between the initial and outcome stimuli. Results showed  
40 that regardless of the combinations of sensory modalities between the initial and the  
41 outcome stimuli (i.e., modal consistency), the intentional binding effect was only  
42 observed for the 250 ms delay condition. The findings indicate a stable intentional  
43 binding effect both within and across sensory modalities, supporting the existence of a  
44 shared mechanism underlying the binding effect in touch-free voluntary actions.

45

46 **Keywords:** Intentional Binding Effect, Tactile Feedback, Cue Integration, Interval  
47 Estimation

48

## 49 **1 Introduction**

50 Human beings interact with external world through voluntary actions. The sense  
51 of agency (SoA) is the subjective experience of controlling one's voluntary actions and  
52 ensuing action consequences that arises during the interaction between actions and  
53 external world (Gallagher, 2000; Haggard, 2017; Wen et al., 2015). According to the  
54 classical comparator model (Blakemore et al., 1998, 2002), the generation of SoA is  
55 based on the sensorimotor predictions that emphasize the roles of internal signals and  
56 the comparison between predicted and actual outcomes. When an agent performs a  
57 goal-directed action, the brain generates not only the motor command but also an  
58 efference copy of the motor command. This efference copy is utilized to predict  
59 potential action outcomes which subsequently are compared with the actual outcomes.  
60 SoA arises when the predicted outcomes and the actual ones match. Any minor spatio-  
61 temporal discrepancies will contribute to a mismatch and further weaken or eliminate  
62 SoA (Blakemore et al., 1999; Shergill et al., 2013). In contrast, the apparent mental  
63 causation theory emphasizes external, contextual cues, i.e., the causal relationship  
64 between a performed action and its outcome (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). The agent  
65 retrospectively makes causal inference according to the priority (actions occur before  
66 the outcomes), consistency (actions are in accordance with the outcomes), and  
67 exclusivity (there are no other alternative causes for the outcomes) principles (Wegner,  
68 2003; Wegner et al., 2004). Unlike these models that tend to emphasize either internal  
69 or external factors, the cue integration theory proposes that SoA is generated by  
70 optimally weighing a combination of internal, sensorimotor cues and external,  
71 contextual, inferential cues according to their availability and reliability (Synofzik et  
72 al., 2013; Moore et al., 2009). In most cases, reliable internal sensorimotor cues, such  
73 as action intention (Moore & Fletcher, 2012) and proprioception (Synofzik et al., 2009),  
74 weigh intrinsically over external cues and dominate SoA. However, when the reliability  
75 of internal motoric signals decreases, the reliability of external cues becomes relatively  
76 prominent and plays a leading role in the generation of SoA (Moore & Haggard, 2008;  
77 Moore et al., 2009). In this study, we examined the cue integration theory by removing

78 the internal cues generated from the tactile feedback of voluntary actions. Although  
79 voluntary actions are accompanied by other internal cues, such as proprioception, we  
80 assumed that removing tactile feedback would significantly reduce the weight of  
81 internal cues in voluntary actions. This means the agent would rely more on external  
82 cues (e.g., action-outcome delays and outcome modalities), which would create a  
83 greater impact on SoA.

84 The intentional binding effect is a well-established measure of SoA, which refers  
85 to the phenomenon that the temporal interval between a voluntary action and its  
86 subsequent consequence will be subjectively compressed (Capozzi et al., 2016;  
87 Cavazzana et al., 2014; Haggard et al., 2002; Ruess et al., 2018; Sidarus & Haggard,  
88 2016; Yabe & Goodale, 2015). Studies adopted the interval estimation paradigm have  
89 shown the impact of various factors on the intentional binding effect, such as properties  
90 of voluntary actions (Zhao et al., 2013; Zhao et al., 2016), action-outcome intervals  
91 (Moore et al., 2009; Humphreys & Buehner, 2009; Kühn et al., 2013; Wen et al., 2015),  
92 and outcome modalities (Cravo et al., 2013; Engbert et al., 2007; Engbert et al., 2008;  
93 Imaizumi & Tanno, 2019; Tanaka et al., 2019; Wen et al., 2015). A study conducted by  
94 Zhao et al. (2013) investigated whether different types of voluntary actions (key-press  
95 versus key-release) would induce different intentional binding effects. The key-press  
96 action was accompanied by instant tactile feedback from the keyboard, while the key-  
97 release action was not. Results showed that the time window for the occurrence of  
98 intentional binding effect is narrower for key-release actions than for key-press actions,  
99 with ranges of 150 - 250 ms and 150 - 1050 ms, respectively. It indicates the importance  
100 of instant tactile feedback of voluntary action for the intentional binding effect (Buehner,  
101 2012). This finding was then confirmed by a further study which confined the temporal  
102 intervals to 240 - 280 ms and 440 - 480 ms (Zhao et al., 2016). They found an intentional  
103 binding effect for voluntary key-press actions but not for key-release actions in  
104 Experiment 1. Furthermore, in Experiment 3, they employed a novel laser induction  
105 apparatus, which allowed participants to make key-press/key-release actions without  
106 touching the keyboard, thus removing the influence of instant tactile sensory feedback.  
107 However, the experiment only included voluntary key-press / key-release actions and

108 compared the reported intervals between these two conditions. Since the intentional  
109 binding effect is assessed by the disparity in the mean reported interval between  
110 voluntary and involuntary/baseline conditions, their experiment was unable to verify  
111 the presence of this binding effect. To overcome the limitation, the primary aim of the  
112 present study was to explore whether the intentional binding effect could be detected in  
113 voluntary actions without tactile sensory feedback (i.e., weakened internal cues that  
114 only retain the proprioception from the key-press actions). Moreover, if the intentional  
115 binding effect could be observed in voluntary actions, we aimed to further examine  
116 whether it would diminish or disappear at long delay durations, similar to Zhao et al.'s  
117 (2013) finding. Specifically, we investigated how the absence of reliable internal cues,  
118 manifested by the lack of immediate tactile sensory feedback from the keyboard during  
119 voluntary key-press actions, influences the intentional binding effect, and how external  
120 cues, e.g., action-outcome delays, modulate this effect.

121 The binding effect has been observed across diverse action-outcome modalities in  
122 previous studies. Some researchers utilized auditory stimuli as action outcomes  
123 (Humphreys & Buehner, 2009; Imaizumi & Tanno, 2019), while others used visual  
124 stimuli (Cravo et al., 2013; Imaizumi & Tanno, 2019; Wen et al., 2015) or somatic  
125 outcomes (Engbert et al., 2008). Comparisons among these modalities have yielded  
126 inconsistent findings. Engbert et al. (2008) reported comparable intentional binding  
127 effects for auditory, visual, and somatic outcomes, while Imaizumi and Tanno (2019)  
128 identified a weaker effect in visual outcomes compared to auditory outcomes.  
129 Additionally, a robust and long-lasting auditory intentional binding has been observed  
130 with action-outcome intervals of less than 900 ms (Imaizumi & Tanno, 2019) and up to  
131 4 seconds (Humphreys & Buehner, 2009). In contrast, Cravo et al. (2013) found the  
132 visual binding effect occurred within a narrower action-outcome interval range of 250  
133 - 350 ms. Furthermore, Imaizumi and Tanno (2019) indicated that the auditory  
134 intentional binding effect diminished with increased action-outcome delays, and  
135 evidence suggests that an increased visual intentional binding effect is positively  
136 correlated with a longer action-outcome interval (Wen et al., 2015). Given these  
137 observations, no consensus has been reached regarding the influence of outcome

138 modalities and action-outcome delays. The prevailing understanding is that the  
139 intentional binding effect for visual and somatic outcomes is not as robust as that  
140 observed for auditory ones (Tanaka et al., 2019). Based on these findings, the current  
141 study intended to examine whether the binding effect was influenced by specific  
142 modality of action outcomes (external cues) when internal cues such as instant tactile  
143 sensory feedback became unreliable.

144 The final purpose of this study is to investigate the role of internal prospective  
145 cues (i.e., the congruency of action and outcome modality, which is manipulated by  
146 anticipation) on the intentional binding effect. To the best of our knowledge, no prior  
147 studies have employed the interval estimation paradigm to investigate whether the  
148 consistency of sensory modalities between the initial stimulus (S1) and the outcome  
149 stimulus (S2) can influence the binding effect. Here, the initial stimulus (S1) refers to  
150 the stimulus presented at the beginning of the trial, which disappears either immediately  
151 when the voluntary action is initiated (Action condition) or after a random period of  
152 presentation period (No-Action or Baseline condition). In contrast, the outcome  
153 stimulus (S2) refers to the stimulus presented after the initial stimulus (S1) disappears  
154 for a variety of temporal delays (i.e., the temporal interval between the disappearance  
155 of S1 and the appearance of S2). For example, in an experiment conducted by Cravo et  
156 al. (2013), participants assessed the temporal interval between the disappearance of a  
157 fixation cross (S1) and the appearance of a disk (S2). The disappearance of the cross  
158 (S1) can be induced by either an action (button press, voluntary conditions) or no action  
159 (involuntary conditions), with the temporal intervals between S1 and S2 systematically  
160 manipulated. Results indicated that temporal estimations were shorter under voluntary  
161 conditions than under involuntary conditions, and temporal judgments increased for  
162 longer intervals. Imaizumi and Tanno (2019) used a low tone (S1) and a high tone (S2)  
163 as auditory stimuli in the first experiment and substituted them with a gray circle (S1)  
164 and a blue circle (S2) as visual stimuli in the second experiment. However, this study  
165 only compared the role of outcome modalities between the two experiments on the  
166 binding effect, maintaining the identical sensory modalities of S1 and S2 in both  
167 experiments. It was found that a robust auditory intentional binding decreased for

168 longer outcome delays, while weak visual intentional binding only existed in small  
169 delay conditions (i.e., 100 ms and 300 ms). Given participants' preconceptions  
170 regarding the consistency of modalities between S1 and S2, the experimental context,  
171 and the instructed task (Synofzik et al., 2008), the present study employs visual,  
172 auditory, and tactile initial and outcome stimuli to evaluate how sensory modality  
173 consistency (internal cues) can modulate the intentional binding effect. To address this  
174 issue, we compared the magnitudes of the intentional binding effect when the sensory  
175 modalities of S1 and S2 were identical or different.

176 In summary, the present study employs the interval estimation paradigm to  
177 investigate two key aspects of the intentional binding effect. Firstly, by isolating the  
178 potential influence of tactile sensory feedback from the intentionality of voluntary  
179 actions, the study aims to explore whether the binding effect exists for voluntary touch-  
180 free key-press actions and whether it decreases for longer delay durations. Here, the  
181 tactile feedback refers to the haptic feeling of touching or contacting the keyboard  
182 surface. Secondly, the study sought to compare the results across different initial (S1)  
183 and outcome (S2) modalities to assess the impact of sensory modality and sensory  
184 modality consistency on the intentional binding effect. Since no prior studies have  
185 systematically examined the integrated roles of voluntary actions without tactile  
186 sensory feedback, delay duration, sensory modality, and sensory modality congruency  
187 upon the binding effect, this research will largely provide a promising exploratory basis  
188 for understanding the intentional binding effect within the framework of cue integration  
189 theory. Specifically, tactile sensory feedback is absent when performing voluntary  
190 actions (i.e., internal cues become unreliable), whether and how various cues (i.e.,  
191 external cues: action-outcome delays and outcome modalities; internal cues: sensory  
192 modality congruency) affect the intentional binding effect deserve our further  
193 investigation.

## 194 **2 Methods**

### 195 **2.1 Experimental Design**

196 Three experiments were conducted, all employing the interval estimation

197 paradigm and adopting a 2 Action Type (active and passive)  $\times$  3 Outcome Modality  
198 (visual, auditory, and tactile)  $\times$  3 Delay Duration (250, 550, and 850 ms) within-subject  
199 design. Participants were required to report temporal intervals between the offset of a  
200 visual, auditory, or tactile initial stimulus (S1) and the onset of an outcome stimulus  
201 (S2, in visual, auditory, or tactile modality). The three delay durations were carefully  
202 chosen to ensure that participants could perceive the variations of the interval between  
203 S1 and S2 and to avoid response sets (Engbert et al., 2007). The three experiments  
204 followed identical procedures except that the initial stimulus (S1) was visual in  
205 Experiment 1, auditory in Experiment 2, and tactile in Experiment 3. This variation in  
206 initial stimulus modality was added as a between-subject factor in further analysis,  
207 resulting in a four-factorial mixed design. The dependent variables of the experiment  
208 were perceived intervals and intentional binding scores across all three experiments.  
209 The calculation method is elaborated in 2.1.4 Statistical Analysis.

### 210 **2.1.1 Participants**

211 The sample size was determined using *MorePower* 6.0.4 (Campbell & Thompson,  
212 2012). Given the lack of similar prior research, we assumed a medium effect size  
213 (Cohen's  $f = 0.25$ ,  $\alpha = 0.05$ ) with 80% power and calculated the sample size for the  
214 four-way repeated-measures analysis of variance (rANOVA). Our main interest was the  
215 effect of the two-way interaction between Action Type and Delay Duration on the  
216 perceived intervals, which required a total of 81 participants across the three  
217 experiments.

218 We recruited 41 participants in Experiment 1 and 40 participants each in  
219 Experiments 2 and 3. After removing outliers (see 2.1.4 Statistical Analysis for details),  
220 there remained 36 qualified participants (17 males,  $20.11 \pm 2.21$  years) in Experiment  
221 1, 36 participants (18 males,  $20.78 \pm 1.99$  years) in Experiment 2, and 36 participants  
222 (18 males,  $20.75 \pm 1.89$  years) in Experiment 3.

223 All participants were right-handed with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and  
224 hearing. Participants all signed informed consent before the experiment and received  
225 monetary compensation for their participation. The study was approved by the  
226 Institutional Review Board of the Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of


227 Sciences.

### 228 **2.1.2 Apparatus and stimuli**

229 The apparatus used in the three Experiments were identical. The keystroke device  
230 was a touch-free, infrared grating multi-function reaction time recorder system created  
231 by our group (Patent No. ZL 2019 2 1272662.9, see Figure 1). It allowed the key-press  
232 action to occur without producing timely tactile feedback, i.e., the haptic feeling of  
233 touching or contacting the keyboard surface. Each touch-free key-press action was  
234 made by the thumb's vertical movement through the empty space between two laser  
235 units recorded by the device.

236 The computer program controlling the Experiments was carried out in MATLAB  
237 R2020a. Visual stimuli were presented on an XG2730 series 27-inch screen (2560  
238 pixels  $\times$  1440 pixels, 120 Hz refresh rate) with a Windows 10 operating system.  
239 Auditory stimuli were presented through Beats Solo3 Wireless headphones (used as a  
240 wired headset via the connecting cable). Tactile stimuli (i.e., vibrations) were produced  
241 by a mPTS 10-channel Piezo-Tactile Stimulator System, a tactile device, which was  
242 placed on the participant's left middle finger (see Figure 1). The device converted  
243 auditory signals into vibrations.

244



245

246 **Figure 1.** The set-up of the novel keystroke device and the tactile stimulator system.

247 The keystroke device consists of laser emission/receiver units (the gray columns on

248 either side of the red laser beams in the figure), a circuit board system, and a USB power

249 interface. During operation, 32 parallel laser beams were generated by the laser

250 emission unit (the left gray column which was covered by the participant's left hand)  
251 and received by the laser receiver unit (the right gray column). The distance between  
252 the two laser units (left versus right) was 6.3 cm. (A) The thumb is positioned above  
253 the horizontal plane of the keystroke device, in preparation for a key-press action. (B)  
254 The thumb is performing a key-press action by moving down to the same horizontal  
255 plane as the keystroke device (i.e., the thumb is within the range of laser beams emitted  
256 by the laser emission unit), which is shown by the red light on the thumb in the picture.  
257 This causes the laser receiver unit to not detect the signal of laser beams, which  
258 indicates the occurrence of the touch-free key-press action. (C) The thumb moves under  
259 the horizontal plane of the keystroke device, signaling the end of the key-press action.

260

261 The initial stimulus (S1) in Experiment 1 was a  $2^\circ \times 2^\circ$  white fixation cross  
262 presented on the center of a black screen. S1 in Experiment 2 was a sinusoidal tone  
263 with a frequency of 200 Hz. S1 in Experiment 3 was tactile vibration converted from a  
264 50 Hz sinusoidal tone by the Tactile Stimulator System. In Experiments 2 and 3, the  
265 maximum duration of S1 was 60 s. The outcome stimuli (S2), identical in all three  
266 experiments, were a  $2^\circ \times 2^\circ$  white disc presented for 100 ms on the center of the screen  
267 on a black background (visual), a 100 ms sinusoidal tone with a frequency of 500 Hz  
268 (auditory), and a 100 ms tactile vibration converted from a 250 Hz sinusoidal tone  
269 (tactile).

### 270 **2.1.3 Experimental tasks and procedure**

271 Each experiment had 6 blocks based on the 2 Action Type (active and passive)  $\times$   
272 3 Outcome Modality (visual, auditory, and tactile) conditions. The order of the 6 blocks  
273 was presented at random. The 3 Delay Duration conditions (250, 550, and 850 ms) were  
274 run within each block, the order of which was also presented at random.

275 All experiments began sequentially with a familiarization task, a short training,  
276 and a formal experimental session. The familiarization task containing only 3 trials for  
277 each of the 6 blocks (2 Action Type  $\times$  3 Outcome Modality) aimed to familiarize  
278 participants with the procedures and tasks of the experimental session. The 3 Delay  
279 Duration was tested once in each block. Succeeding each block was a self-paced break.


280 The formal experiment consisted of 6 blocks containing 45 trials each, which amounted  
281 to a total of 270 experimental trials. Each Delay Duration was tested in 15 trials within  
282 each block.

283 At the beginning of each block, instructions were displayed on the screen.  
284 Participants were informed about whether the task in the block required a keypress  
285 (Action Type: active) or a brief period of waiting (Action Type: passive), and whether  
286 the outcome stimulus (S2) at the end of each trial would be a visual, an auditory, or a  
287 tactile stimulation (i.e., Outcome Modality).

288 Figure 2 illustrates the procedure for a single, typical trial. The experiment began  
289 with an initial stimulus (S1), which could be a fixation cross (Experiment 1), a tone  
290 (Experiment 2), or a tactile stimulation (Experiment 3). The stimulus would persist until  
291 the participant pressed a button (Action Type: active) with the keystroke device or for  
292 a random duration ranging from 2000 ms to 3000 ms (Action Type: passive) in the  
293 absence of participant action. If the participant in the active condition did not press a  
294 key within 60 s, S1 would automatically terminate.

295 A Delay Duration succeeded the offset of the initial stimulus (S1) and preceded  
296 the onset of the outcome stimulus (S2), lasting for 250, 550, or 850 ms. Based on the  
297 condition of the block, S2 could be a disc, a tone, or a tactile stimulation, which was  
298 then presented for 100 ms and followed by a random, blank time interval varying from  
299 850 ms to 1150 ms. Afterwards, a continuous time scale showing a measurement  
300 between 0 and 1000 ms was presented on the screen. Participants were required to judge  
301 the time interval between the offset of S1 and the onset of S2 by adjusting the bar on  
302 the scale to indicate their response and pressing the Enter key to confirm their decision.  
303 The bar on the scale would only appear after participants moved the bar's terminus by  
304 dragging the mouse (the bar's starting position was zero). A new trial would begin after  
305 a random time interval (1200 – 1500 ms).

306



307

308 **Figure 2.** Trial procedure in Experiments 1, 2, and 3. Detailed descriptions are provided  
 309 in the text.

310

311 The short training session aimed to familiarize participants with different time  
 312 intervals within 1000 ms. It consisted of a single block of 20 trials. Each trial began  
 313 with a 1-s screen informing the participant of the duration of the following white disc.  
 314 Specifically, the first trial displayed the words “100 ms” for 1 s, and the subsequent disc  
 315 was presented in the center of the screen for 100 ms. For the first ten trials, the duration  
 316 of the disc started at 100 ms (i.e., the 1<sup>st</sup> trial) and increased in steps of 100 ms on each  
 317 subsequent trial. Inversely, for the last ten trials, the duration of the disc started at 1000  
 318 ms (i.e., the 11<sup>th</sup> trial) and decreased in steps of 100 ms on each subsequent trial. Each  
 319 trial ended with a blank screen which would remain blank until the participant pressed  
 320 the Enter key to begin the next trial.

#### 321 **2.1.4 Statistical analysis**

322 We defined outliers as trials where the perceived intervals were three standard  
 323 deviations away from the mean of each condition (18 conditions in total: 2 Action Type  
 324 × 3 Outcome Modality × 3 Delay Duration; see Barlas, 2019),  $M_{\text{excluded}} = 0.42\%$  of all  
 325 trials in Experiment 1,  $M_{\text{excluded}} = 0.38\%$  of all trials in Experiment 2, and  $M_{\text{excluded}} =$   
 326  $0.23\%$  of all trials in Experiment 3.

327 Data met one of the following criteria were excluded: (1) The proportion of outlier

328 trials was more than 20% of all trials in one participant; (2) Participants failed to follow  
329 the experimental instructions; (3) Participants failed to demonstrate a monotonically  
330 increasing trend in the estimations of 250, 550, and 850 ms (Barlas, 2019). Perceived  
331 intervals and actual delays for each participant were subjected to linear trend analysis  
332 (coefficients: -3, 0, 3 for 250, 550, and 850 ms, respectively). Five participants in  
333 Experiment 1, four in Experiment 2, and four in Experiment 3 were excluded based on  
334 these criteria. The remaining experimental data were analyzed using *SPSS* 26.0 and the  
335 significance level was set to 0.05. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied  
336 when the Mauchly's sphericity test for ANOVA was violated. Bonferroni correction  
337 was applied for multiple comparisons in post-hoc analysis for ANOVA.

338 To examine whether the intentional binding effect occurred (i.e., shorter perceived  
339 intervals under active conditions compared with passive conditions), a 3 (Initial  
340 Modality: visual, auditory, and tactile; between-subject factor)  $\times$  2 (Action Type: active  
341 and passive; within-subject factor)  $\times$  3 (Outcome Modality: visual, auditory, and tactile;  
342 within-subject factor)  $\times$  3 (Delay Duration: 250, 550, and 850 ms; within-subject factor)  
343 rANOVA was carried out on the perceived intervals (i.e., the temporal intervals between  
344 the offset of S1 and the onset of S2). Furthermore, to check whether the binding effect  
345 would decrease for longer delay durations if the intentional binding effect existed, the  
346 interaction between the Action Type and the Delay Duration in the aforementioned  
347 four-factorial rANOVA is our most concerned focus.

348 To identify the impact of Outcome Modality and the Consistency of Sensory  
349 Modality on the magnitude of the intentional binding effect, we employed the  
350 intentional binding scores as an index of the degree of intentional binding. The  
351 intentional binding scores were calculated by subtracting the mean perceived intervals  
352 in the passive Action Type from those in the active Action Type separately for each  
353 corresponding condition (Barlas, 2019; Imaizumi & Tanno, 2019; Poonian &  
354 Cunnington, 2013). A negative binding score implies shorter interval estimation under  
355 the active Action Type compared to the passive Action Type, which indicates the  
356 existence of intentional binding effect. A 3 (Initial Modality: visual, auditory, and tactile;  
357 between-subject factor)  $\times$  3 (Outcome Modality: visual, auditory, and tactile; within-

358 subject factor)  $\times$  3 (Delay Duration: 250, 550, and 850 ms; within-subject factor)  
359 rANOVA was then carried out on the intentional binding scores to examine the  
360 influence of Outcome Modality.

361 The sensory modalities for the initial and outcome stimuli were either identical  
362 (e.g., both visual) or different (e.g., visual for one but auditory for the other) in our  
363 experiment. To assess whether the consistency of the initial and outcome sensory  
364 modalities affected intentional binding, we conducted a 2 (Consistency of Sensory  
365 Modality: consistent and inconsistent; within-subject factor)  $\times$  3 (Delay Duration: 250,  
366 550, and 850 ms; within-subject factor)  $\times$  3 (Initial Modality: visual, auditory, and  
367 tactile; between-subject factor) rANOVA on the recalculated intentional binding scores.

368 Finally, to assess the evidence for and against  $H_0$  if null effects were found in the  
369 traditional frequentist statistical analyses, we calculated Bayes Factors (BF) for  
370 rANOVA, using JASP 0.17.3 (JASP Team, 2023) with default priors on the parameters.  
371 We reported effects in favor of the null hypothesis ( $BF_{01}$ ) and interpreted the strength  
372 of evidence as anecdotal ( $1 < BF < 3$ ), moderate ( $3 < BF < 10$ ), strong ( $10 < BF < 30$ ),  
373 very strong ( $30 < BF < 100$ ), or extreme ( $100 < BF$ ; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014). As  
374 there were four experimental factors in our current study, the Bayesian model averaging  
375 (BMA; Heck & Bockting, 2021; Hinne et al., 2020; Wagenmakers et al., 2018) was  
376 adopted for coping with many candidate models in the Bayesian analysis (reported as  
377  $BF_{\text{excl}}$ ).

### 378 **3 Results**

379 The descriptive statistics of perceived intervals under different conditions in  
380 Experiments 1, 2, and 3 are shown in Table 1. A four-way rANOVA was conducted on  
381 the perceived intervals, which showed no significant main effect for Action Type,  $F(1,$   
382  $105) = 0.90$ ,  $p = 0.344$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.01$ , or Initial Modality/Experiment,  $F(2, 105) = 1.05$ ,  $p$   
383  $= 0.353$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.02$ , while significant main effects was observed for Outcome Modality,  
384  $F(1.79, 188.13) = 8.66$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.08$ , and Delay Duration,  $F(1.14, 119.92) =$   
385  $972.42$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.90$ . The significant main effects were qualified by significant  
386 two-way and three-way interactions. Significant two-way interactions were found

387 between Action Type and Delay Duration,  $F(1.52, 159.20) = 33.05$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 =$   
388 0.24, and between Outcome Modality and Delay Duration,  $F(3.18, 333.56) = 2.99$ ,  $p =$   
389 0.029,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.03$ . The other two-way interactions were all non-significant, indicated by  
390  $ps > 0.05$ . The three-way interaction among Initial Modality (Experiment), Outcome  
391 Modality, and Delay Duration was significant,  $F(6.35, 333.56) = 3.13$ ,  $p = 0.005$ ,  $\eta_p^2 =$   
392 0.06. All other three-way and four-way interaction results were not significant,  
393 indicated by  $ps > 0.05$ .

394

395 **Table 1.**


396 Perceived intervals ( $M \pm SD$ ) as a function of Initial Modality, Action Type, Outcome  
397 Modality, and Delay Duration in Experiments 1, 2, and 3. (unit: ms)

Initial Modality	Action Type	Outcome Modality	Delay Duration		
			250 ms	550 ms	850 ms
Visual (Experiment 1)	Active	Visual	189 ± 93	409 ± 153	614 ± 170
		Auditory	198 ± 123	369 ± 148	583 ± 175
		Tactile	231 ± 117	426 ± 150	627 ± 155
	Passive	Visual	224 ± 80	406 ± 131	595 ± 162
		Auditory	230 ± 84	384 ± 108	586 ± 147
		Tactile	266 ± 107	431 ± 115	599 ± 129
Auditory (Experiment 2)	Active	Visual	164 ± 59	365 ± 133	585 ± 178
		Auditory	173 ± 71	376 ± 130	588 ± 191
		Tactile	174 ± 67	406 ± 142	623 ± 190
	Passive	Visual	190 ± 59	355 ± 104	550 ± 153
		Auditory	200 ± 98	373 ± 129	562 ± 181
		Tactile	187 ± 69	379 ± 120	582 ± 184
Tactile (Experiment 3)	Active	Visual	198 ± 85	379 ± 128	598 ± 143
		Auditory	189 ± 80	379 ± 122	568 ± 149
		Tactile	207 ± 69	410 ± 122	607 ± 145
	Passive	Visual	201 ± 70	361 ± 105	552 ± 146
		Auditory	204 ± 87	356 ± 117	530 ± 141
		Tactile	219 ± 67	380 ± 105	565 ± 132

398

399 Because the interaction between Action Type and Delay Duration was our most  
400 concerned focus, we next conducted a simple effects analysis on this two-way  
401 interaction (see Figure 3). When the Delay Duration was 250 ms, the perceived  
402 intervals were significantly shorter for the active Action Type than for the passive  
403 Action Type,  $MD = -21.99$ ,  $F(1, 105) = 10.38$ ,  $p = 0.002$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.09$ . When the Delay  
404 Duration was 550 ms, there was no significant difference for the perceived intervals  
405 under these two action types,  $MD = 10.37$ ,  $F(1, 105) = 1.87$ ,  $p = 0.175$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.02$ . The  
406 Bayesian paired sample t-test was performed on the perceived intervals, which  
407 moderately supported the null hypothesis ( $BF_{01} = 3.82$ ). When the Delay Duration was  
408 850 ms, the perceived intervals were significantly longer for the active than for the  
409 passive condition,  $MD = 30.25$ ,  $F(1, 105) = 13.91$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.12$ .

410



411

412 **Figure 3.** Perceived intervals as a function of Action Type and Delay Duration. Red  
413 lines and asterisks indicate that the intentional binding effect occurs. Note: 1) Error bars  
414 represent *SEMs*; 2) \*\*:  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*:  $p < 0.001$ .

415

416 To explore the influence of Outcome Modality and the Consistency of Sensory  
417 Modality on the intentional binding effect, intentional binding scores were calculated

418 by subtracting the mean perceived intervals in the passive condition from that in the  
 419 active condition for each Outcome Modality and Delay Duration separately in  
 420 Experiments 1, 2, and 3. The descriptive statistics of intentional binding scores in  
 421 Experiments 1, 2, and 3 are shown in Table 2.

422

423 **Table 2.**

424 Intentional binding scores ( $M \pm SD$ ) as a function of Initial Modality, Outcome  
 425 Modality, and Delay Duration in Experiments 1, 2, and 3. (unit: ms)

Initial Modality	Outcome Modality	Delay Duration		
		250 ms	550 ms	850 ms
Visual (Experiment 1)	Visual	-35 ± 84	4 ± 85	19 ± 112
	Auditory	-32 ± 112	-15 ± 101	-2 ± 135
	Tactile	-35 ± 125	-5 ± 134	29 ± 127
Auditory (Experiment 2)	Visual	-25 ± 61	10 ± 93	35 ± 131
	Auditory	-27 ± 74	2 ± 87	25 ± 125
	Tactile	-12 ± 77	26 ± 103	41 ± 113
Tactile (Experiment 3)	Visual	-3 ± 78	19 ± 102	46 ± 102
	Auditory	-15 ± 81	23 ± 92	38 ± 88
	Tactile	-12 ± 81	30 ± 111	42 ± 98

426

427 A three-way rANOVA (between-subject factor: Initial Modality/Experiment;  
 428 within-subject factor: Outcome Modality and Delay Duration) was conducted on the  
 429 resulting intentional binding scores to investigate the impact of Outcome Modality. The  
 430 result demonstrated significant main effect for Delay Duration,  $F(1.52, 159.20) = 33.05$ ,  
 431  $p < 0.001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.24$ , but no significant main effect for Outcome Modality,  $F(2, 210) =$   
 432  $1.00$ ,  $p = 0.370$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.01$ , or Initial Modality/Experiment,  $F(2, 105) = 1.41$ ,  $p = 0.248$ ,  
 433  $\eta_p^2 = 0.03$ . No significant two-way interactions were found between Outcome Modality  
 434 and Delay Duration,  $F(3.27, 343.41) = 0.29$ ,  $p = 0.848$ ,  $\eta_p^2 < 0.01$ . The other two-way  
 435 and three-way interaction results were all non-significant, indicated by  $ps > 0.05$ .

436 To assess the evidence for and against the null effects for Outcome Modality, a

437 three-way rANOVA Bayesian analysis was performed on the same scores. The results  
438 revealed a strong evidence in favor of the null effects for Outcome Modality ( $BF_{\text{excl}} =$   
439 11.49), extreme evidence in favor of the null effects for the interaction between  
440 Outcome Modality and Delay Duration ( $BF_{\text{excl}} = 200.95$ ), and extreme evidence in  
441 favor of the null effects for the interaction among Outcome Modality, Delay Duration,  
442 and Initial Modality/Experiment ( $BF_{\text{excl}} = 155.60$ ).

443 Finally, we also analyzed whether the intentional binding effect was affected by  
444 the consistency of both the Initial Modality and the Outcome Modality (i.e., the  
445 Consistency of Sensory Modality). A three-way rANOVA (between-subject factor:  
446 Initial Modality/Experiment; within-subject factor: the Consistency of Sensory  
447 Modality and Delay Duration) was conducted on the intentional binding scores. Results  
448 showed that there was no significant main effect for the Consistency of Sensory  
449 Modality,  $F(1, 105) = 0.03$ ,  $p = 0.856$ ,  $\eta_p^2 < 0.001$ , or Initial Modality/Experiment,  $F(2,$   
450  $105) = 1.38$ ,  $p = 0.256$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.03$ , while significant main effect was observed for Delay  
451 Duration,  $F(1.54, 161.94) = 30.34$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.22$ . No significant two-way  
452 interactions were found between the Consistency of Sensory Modality and Delay  
453 Duration,  $F(1.80, 189.01) = 0.20$ ,  $p = 0.799$ ,  $\eta_p^2 < 0.01$ . The other two-way and three-  
454 way interaction results were all non-significant, indicated by  $ps > 0.05$ .

455 To quantify the relative strength of our experimental data in favor of the null  
456 effects for the Consistency of Sensory Modality, a three-way rANOVA Bayesian  
457 analysis was performed on the intentional binding scores. The results showed that there  
458 was moderate evidence supporting the null hypothesis for the Consistency of Sensory  
459 Modality ( $BF_{\text{excl}} = 6.21$ ), but strong evidence for the interaction between this and Delay  
460 Duration ( $BF_{\text{excl}} = 25.02$ ), and very strong evidence for the interactions among all three  
461 variables ( $BF_{\text{excl}} = 41.96$ ).

## 462 **4 Discussion**

463 This study investigated how an agent's active or passive action affects the  
464 judgments of temporal intervals between the disappearance of a visual/auditory/tactile  
465 initial stimulus (S1) and the appearance of a visual/auditory/tactile outcome stimulus

466 (S2) when the tactile feedback from the keypress was absent. Our main results revealed  
467 that perceived action-outcome intervals were shorter for the active touch-free action  
468 than for the passive action when the actual delay duration was 250 ms, regardless of  
469 whether S1 was presented visually (Experiment 1), acoustically (Experiment 2), or  
470 tactually (Experiment 3). However, this difference disappeared when the delay duration  
471 was 550 ms and reversed when the delay duration was 850 ms. These results indicate  
472 that when we removed the instant tactile feedback, the typical intentional binding effect  
473 of voluntary actions only existed when the delay duration was 250 ms, and it decreased  
474 and was eliminated for longer delay durations (i.e., 550 ms and 850 ms). This aligns  
475 with the findings of Zhao et al. (2013), who identified that the intentional binding effect  
476 for voluntary key-release actions emerged exclusively within a brief delay of 150 ms  
477 or 250 ms. Notably, the lack of tactile feedback for key-release actions in their study  
478 could be comparable to the key-press action using the touch-free keystroke device in  
479 the present study. Both studies demonstrate that voluntary actions without tactile  
480 sensory feedback can still induce the binding effect. This indicates that tactile sensory  
481 feedback is not mandatory for the binding effect to occur, emphasizing the essential  
482 role of action intention in generating this effect. However, Zhao et al. (2016) reported  
483 that tactile sensory feedback was crucial to the difference in the mean reported interval  
484 between voluntary key-press and key-release actions. Our findings do not conflict with  
485 Zhao et al.'s (2016) study, as their study only compared conditions of voluntary key-  
486 press and key-release actions without directly confirming the occurrence of the binding  
487 effect. Therefore, their study does not conclusively testify that haptic feedback was  
488 essential for intentional binding effects to occur. In comparison, our results provide an  
489 extended, complementary illustration of the conditions that give rise to this binding  
490 effect.

491 Another goal of the present study was to examine whether the modality of action  
492 outcomes would modulate the binding effect when a voluntary keypress received no  
493 tactile feedback. The results of the intentional binding scores showed that all three  
494 outcome modalities (visual, auditory, and haptic) produced comparable results, and the  
495 results did not interact with the initial modality or the duration of delay. This means the

496 binding effect in the absence of tactile sensory feedback is stable and robust across  
497 outcome sensory modalities and different combinations of outcome modalities and  
498 delay variations. This finding is congruent with Engbert et al.'s (2008) report that the  
499 intentional binding effect for auditory, visual, and somatic outcomes is comparable.  
500 However, our results contradict some prior findings. For example, Imaizumi and Tanno  
501 (2019) found a weaker intentional binding in visual than in auditory outcomes, and the  
502 weaker effect was limited to shorter action-outcome delays (i.e., 100 ms and 300 ms).  
503 The reason for this conflicting finding is unclear, as our experimental designs and  
504 procedures share many similarities to theirs apart from delay durations and the kind of  
505 voluntary actions. The delays were 250, 550, and 850 ms in the present study, but were  
506 100, 300, 500, 700, and 900 ms in theirs; our voluntary actions produced no tactile  
507 sensory feedback, whereas their voluntary key-press actions produced this feedback.  
508 These may have contributed to the difference between our results and theirs.

509 The last goal of this study was to evaluate whether the consistency of the sensory  
510 modality between initial and outcome stimuli could exert an impact on the intentional  
511 binding effect for touch-free voluntary actions. The results of the intentional binding  
512 scores indicated that neither the consistency nor its interaction with other variables  
513 (Initial Modality or Delay Duration) influenced the intentional binding effect of touch-  
514 free voluntary actions. One explanation for this finding might be that in this study, the  
515 modalities of initial and outcome stimuli were fixed and paired continually within one  
516 experimental block and participants were informed of this in advance. Prenotification  
517 before and frequent pairings within each block might prompt participants to develop  
518 causal beliefs about S1 and S2, potentially enhancing the subjective temporal proximity  
519 between these two stimuli (Lorimer et al., 2020; Vuorre, 2017; Hoerl et al., 2020),  
520 thereby inducing the intentional binding. In this study, it may be the causal relationships  
521 between initial and outcome stimuli rather than the modality consistency that dominate  
522 the intentional binding effect, resulting in comparable binding effects across and within  
523 modalities, regardless of the modality types and modality consistency.

524 Based on the cue integration theory, the present study focuses on the impact of  
525 internal cues (e.g., Action Type and the Consistency of Sensory Modality) and external

526 cues (e.g., Outcome Modality and Delay Duration) on the intentional binding effect  
527 within our specific experimental context. In our experiments, voluntary actions without  
528 tactile sensory feedback merely retain the proprioception of the movement while almost  
529 all keystrokes are accompanied by both proprioception and instant tactile feedback in  
530 reality. Therefore, the reliability of internal cues might be significantly impaired in the  
531 case of touch-free voluntary actions. Moreover, with the aforementioned unreliable  
532 internal cues, SoA may mainly rely on external cues (i.e., Delay Duration) through an  
533 inferential process. Specifically, the temporal contiguity between our action and its  
534 outcome gives rise to a causal inference (i.e., action begets result) and simultaneously  
535 leads to SoA (i.e., “I produce the result”; Humphreys & Buehner, 2009). In daily life,  
536 we expect to receive the feedback immediately after our actions. As the interval  
537 between an action and its feedback increases, individuals are less likely to attribute the  
538 outcome of the action to their own agency. This may explain why implicit SoA (or the  
539 intentional binding effect) for touch-free voluntary key-press actions only appears at  
540 the 250 ms action-outcome delay (i.e., the occurrence time of action and outcome is  
541 close enough) but is absent at 550 and 850 ms delays. There are other researchers also  
542 indicating that action-outcome delays may strongly affect the intentional binding effect.  
543 For example, Ulloa et al. (2019) found the role of gaze direction on the intentional  
544 binding was restricted to specific time intervals, 300 ms for the gaze transition or 500  
545 ms for the single static gaze direction. This deserves further investigation to better  
546 understand how timing impacts the SoA under different experimental paradigms and  
547 contexts. To sum up, based on our experimental context and the cue integration theory,  
548 when the reliability of internal cues (i.e., touch-free voluntary action) is weakened,  
549 external cues (i.e., Delay Duration) will dominate the intentional binding effect and the  
550 Consistency of Sensory Modality and Outcome Modality have non-significant impact  
551 on the binding effect.

552 Certain aspects of this study could be improved in future. Firstly, future research  
553 could enhance the ecological validity of stimuli by incorporating emotional faces,  
554 emotional sounds, and using virtual reality devices, thereby increasing the applicability  
555 of experimental results to real-life scenarios. Secondly, the tactile stimulation system

556 utilized for vibration stimuli was accompanied by acoustic sound. To mitigate its  
557 interference with the task, participants were required to wear earplugs during the  
558 experiment. However, the actual influence of this acoustic-stimulus-induced vibration  
559 stimulus on the perceived intervals may be complex and vary across experiments. For  
560 subsequent studies, vibration stimulus parameters can be determined during pre-  
561 experiments to strike a balance between the intensity of the vibration stimulus and the  
562 accompanying sound.

563 In conclusion, our findings suggest that the intentional binding effect for voluntary  
564 actions without tactile sensory feedback occurs around 250 ms. This effect stably exists  
565 even in the absence of tactile sensory feedback and across different sensory modalities  
566 (initial modalities and outcome modalities).

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