The Important Role of Civil Class Actions in the Enforcement of Corporate Criminal Law.

Abstract

Recent experience in civil litigation, particularly with opt-out class actions against corporations for competition law offences, has highlighted the efficiency of ‘dual enforcement’ as a strategy for fighting corporate crime. The success of the opt-out class action regime has resulted in innovation and developments that have pushed the boundaries of competition law, involving cases that are traditionally considered matters of environmental, data or consumer protection law. However, although private litigation can overcome the deterrence deficit associated with criminal enforcement by deferred prosecution agreement, and is an increasingly important tool in the fight against corporate crime, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in the PACCAR case has created uncertainty in the third-party litigation funding market, upon which these class actions rely. Given the woefully inadequate funding afforded to public enforcement agencies, including the UK’s Serious Fraud Office, there is a clear economic case for the availability of dual enforcement, and thus an urgent need for Parliament to enact amending legislation, with retrospective effect, to reverse the PACCAR decision. Furthermore, the dual enforcement model should be extended to enable individuals to enforce consumer protection law through opt-out class actions. This would avoid the current situation in which claims are being framed as competition law infringements, such that success may well turn on the finest of distinctions. Lacking the various constraints associated with the criminal law, this extension would also enable the private enforcement of various types of corporate misconduct that, viewed through alternative the lens of the criminal law, are tantamount to fraud.