Check for updates

Philosophical Investigations

WILEY

ORIGINAL ARTICLE OPEN ACCESS

I Am Here

Doug Hardman

School of Psychology, Bournemouth University, Poole, UK

Correspondence: Doug Hardman (dihardman@bournemouth.ac.uk)

Received: 4 September 2026 | **Revised:** 4 October 2026 | **Accepted:** 20 October 2026

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I investigate how context can help to make sense of saying 'I am here', inspired by a conversation between Max Black and Ludwig Wittgenstein in which Black claims that the phrase obviously has no particular point. By considering various everyday situations in which we might sensibly say the phrase, I come to a number of realisations. First, contra Black, the phrase can have a particular point, which is determined by the context in which it is said. Second, its meaning in particular situations cannot be understood by semantics alone. Third, although adding pragmatic content can improve our understanding, the separation of a situation in which someone says the phrase into semantics and pragmatics is unnecessary and, in some instances, even hinders our understanding of what the phrase means. Fourth, if we reject the categorisation of a situation into semantics and pragmatics and consider its contextual whole, then we can better understand what the particular phrase means. I conclude by questioning the picture of language in which meaning and use should never be conflated.

1 | Introduction

In 1949, Norman Malcolm arranged for Ludwig Wittgenstein to visit Cornell University in order to lecture and discuss philosophy.[1] In one such discussion, at Max Black's house, discussion turned to the sense of the sentence, 'I am here'. As O.K. Bouwsma recalls in his notes from the visit, 'Black says that the sentence obviously has no particular point, nobody gets any information by it. But if it were a question in a True-False questionnaire, you would clearly answer "True" or "Yes" if asked: Yes or No. W. said: "No! No! Of course not, etc. Context determines use"'.[2] In this paper, I take this conversation forward to investigate how context can help to make sense of saying 'I am here'.

2 | A Single Character but Different Content

Suppose I am talking to you on the phone and say, 'I am here' in response to your question 'Are you on Bournemouth beach?' One way in which we might make sense of this is to focus on the indexicals in the sentence ('I' and 'here') and say that they have two kinds of meaning. On the one hand, they have a single character (usually understood in terms of linguistic convention); but on the other, they have different content with respect to different contexts.[3] More specifically, the indexicals have contextually invariant characters that map onto different contents depending on the context. This distinction seems to help make sense of saying 'I am here' semantically because, in this context, 'I' refers to me, and 'here' to Bournemouth beach.

Let us now consider a different situation. You call my house phone (yes, I still have one of those) but I do not pick up and it goes to my answering machine message: 'I am not here, please leave a message and I'll get back to you'. In this case, since when I said 'I am not here' I was in fact there (I was stood right next to the answering machine), this leads us to conclude that the sentence 'I am not here' is a logical falsehood whereas, in many instances, it is plausibly true.[4]

One way in which this problem might be overcome semantically is to say that the indexicals involved do not refer to the production of the sentence, but to its audition (or tokening) and that they are the same in both production and tokening.[5] So, although when I recorded the message 'I am not here' I was in my house, when you listened to it I was not and thus the sentence makes sense in its context. However, let us consider another situation. Suppose

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

© 2026 The Author(s). *Philosophical Investigations* published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

I send you a postcard from my recent holiday to Cornwall. 'It is dreadfully grey here' I write, 'but we are having a good time nonetheless'. In this instance, I am clearly not saying that it is dreadfully grey where I am when you read the postcard, but that it was dreadfully grey where I was when I wrote it. This seems to undermine the idea that the indexicals involved can refer both to production and tokening.[6] It seems that simply modifying our original semantic account in this way will not work.

3 | Being Ambiguous

Another strategy we might adopt is to say that indexicals are not just context-sensitive but ambiguous. On this view, 'I' and 'here' are lexically ambiguous and could refer either to the production *or* tokening.[7] This seems to solve the postcard problem as we are not required to say, in that instance, that the weather in Cornwall last week is necessarily the same as where I am when you read my message, which is plainly nonsensical. However, it does throw up further problems. Suppose that instead of calling to see if I am on Bournemouth beach you text me and I reply in the same way, 'I am here'. Yet when you arrive I am nowhere to be seen. There are many reasons why this could be the case. I could be there but you just cannot see me. I could have been there when I wrote the message but now I am not, for a variety of reasons. I could have thought that when I sent the message I would be there when you arrived, but it took me longer than expected to get there. I could have simply been mean and told you that I was there when I had no intention to go there in the first place. We could, of course, come up with many other plausible explanations. The point is simply this: saying that indexicals are not just context-sensitive but ambiguous is really no explanation at all. All it means is that we do not exactly know what I meant by saying 'I am here' and that in order to make sense of it—to decide which of the many, equally plausible, candidate disambiguations are correct—we will need more contextual information about the situation.

4 | Determined by Intentions and Expectations

If simply saying that indexicals are ambiguous gets us no further, perhaps yet another strategy will work. One such strategy is to say that it is not fixed linguistic conventions enacted through character rules that determine indexical reference, but the speaker's intentions[8] or the audience's expectations.[9] So, on the former, speaker control, view, when I say, 'I am here' in response to your question 'Are you on Bournemouth beach?', we can make sense of the expression based on what my intention is by assuming that the speaker's referent of, say, 'here' is the same as the token's semantic reference (i.e., what it refers to in the conversation). This seems to solve both the answering machine and postcard problems—as we sidestep the distinction between production and tokening—yet does not leave us without an explanation. For example, when I record my answering machine message, I do so with the intention that when you listen to it I will not be at home, so it does not lead to misidentifying a plausibly true expression as a logical falsehood.

Unfortunately, as with other accounts, there is a problem with making sense of 'I am here' solely through speaker intentions, for it assumes that the meaning of words can be arbitrarily assigned by the speaker alone. Setting aside the wider view that words do not have private meaning but only meaning within a community of language users, which itself seems terminal,[10] it is perfectly plausible that the speaker could just intend that the wrong context is content-determining for the indexical.[11] For example, when you ask, 'Are you on Bournemouth beach?' and I respond 'I am here', I could plausibly intend 'here' to mean on the actual sand, whereas you could plausibly interpret it to mean in the wider area of sand, tarmac and shops that is locally known as Bournemouth beach. Intention alone is not enough to make sense of 'I am here' in this situation.

The latter, audience expectations, view provides the counterpart to this account. Instead of making sense of 'I am here' through the speaker's intentions, we make sense of it relative to how the indexicals are interpreted by a competent and attentive audience. So, when I say, 'I am here' it is not my intention that is important, but how you, in asking the question, 'Are you on Bournemouth beach?', interpret it. Although this does not succumb to the problem of arbitrarily assigned meaning, it unfortunately faces an equally terminal problem. Namely, that it leaves the meaning of 'I am here' unspecified.[12] After all, it is unclear how the audience would identify the unique (i.e., correct) context to make sense of my expression, or how such a process would work. As with other accounts, there is much contextual information required to make sense of my expression 'I am here' in this instance: whether you have a sound idea of where Bournemouth beach is, what our shared understanding of what Bournemouth beach determines, whether I am a reliable person, etc. Despite some initial promise, it seems that neither speaker intention nor audience expectation will enable us to make sense of 'I am here' in specific contexts.

5 | A Distinction Between What We Say and Mean

An evident problem with any of these accounts is that without further, extra-semantic, content we are unable to make sense of saying 'I am here' in a particular context. Perhaps then, instead of persisting with semantic explanations, we should bite the bullet and propose a pragmatic solution. A standard, Gricean account proposes that, as is obvious in the answering machine example, there is often a distinction between what we literally say and what we mean. More specifically, in an attempt to provide an explanation of this phenomenon, Grice proposes that what someone means is associated with some rational maxims governing conversation, an assumption that conversational participants strive to achieve a common goal, and particular features of the relevant context (conversational implicatures).[13] So, when I reply to your question 'Are you on Bournemouth beach?' by saying 'I am here', what I mean cannot be determined simply from the conventional meaning of the semantics, but requires consideration of what I imply in the particular context, which could be affected by a range of factors. For example, it could be well known that I am never on time for anything and I am being ironic (I'm still faffing about at home as usual and will likely be at least twenty minutes late). Perhaps I am on Bournemouth beach and, in light of my tardiness, in saying 'I am here' I am not really informing you where I am but reassuring you that, for once, I am not going to be late (similarly, in light of my tardiness,

14679205, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phin.70040 by Bournemouth University The Sir Michael Cobham Library, Wiley Online Library on [30/10/2026]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

your question 'Are you on Bournemouth beach?' might actually mean 'Are you going to be late, as usual?').

Although Grice's account takes the meaning of 'I am here' beyond semantics (which we saw was problematic), it faces some well-documented objections. First, the whole Gricean edifice is grounded in the assumption that people strive to achieve a common, cooperative goal. But even a cursory reflection on how people converse suggests this is mistaken. After all, there are many everyday instances when such an assumption does not hold. For example, when conversations are between adversaries who have competing goals (such as in a negotiation). Or, more relevant to making sense of our conversation, I could simply be making a joke or being intentionally obscure. Many conversations, between adversaries and friends alike, have goals other than the simple exchange of information. Beyond this obvious objection, there is a wider problem that afflicts pragmatic accounts, including those that reject Grice's cooperation principle.[14] Namely, that in proposing a distinction between what we literally say and what we mean, they (even implicitly) attempt to identify a semantic (or representational) element to speech and thought that can be theoretically separated from whatever else is involved (i.e., pragmatics). Yet the idea that semantics and pragmatics can be separated—although perfectly sensible in the abstract—is perhaps a picture that leads us astray from the outset.[15] I propose that instead of considering yet more (explanatory) accounts that assume this separation, we set this picture aside and instead look, in detail, at how we make sense of specific instances of saying 'I am here'. Perhaps this will lead us to an account that is not beset by problems.

6 | The Unnecessary Separation of Semantics and Pragmatics

In light of the potentially problematic picture set out above, I see no other way forward than to simply consider some everyday examples in which we might sensibly say, 'I am here'.

1. 'Is Jones here?' calls out the colour sergeant to the group assembled outside company lines. 'I am here' calls out a marine from the back.
2. A patient arrives at the hospital and looks at the map next to reception to work out where she needs to go for her appointment. 'I am here' she says, while pointing at reception on the map, 'so I need to go down this corridor then take the first left'.
3. A professor arrives early to a workshop at an unfamiliar university. He is not sure where to go so messages the workshop organiser a picture of the main entrance with the caption, 'I am here'.

In example (1), the marine is not, as Black implies, simply unnecessarily stating where he is (i.e., at this particular location) but is *informing* the colour sergeant that he is present. Importantly, this social act of informing (rather than simply stating one's location) can only be made sense of within the wider context of the situation: that the troop is assembled at the company lines, that the colour sergeant calls out names because it is the quickest way to establish who is present, that in this instance he is not sure if the marine in question is there, etc. Moreover, it seems mistaken to assume that there is a general or core meaning of the marine saying 'I am here' that can be separated from everything else involved in the situation. The words in question do not *first* refer to things in the world and only *then* become suitably applied for their particular use in this particular situation. The situation is intrinsic to the meaning of the words from the outset. Of course, if are so inclined we could *retrospectively* apply the categories of semantics and pragmatics to this situation and then separate out what we determine are part of the former and latter. But the point is that (i) this abstract process of categorisation is unnecessary to understand the meaning of the phrase in context, and (ii) doing so provides *no more explanation* of the meaning of this particular instance of 'I am here' than we already obtained from simply describing what the marine is doing by saying the phrase in context.

Furthermore, although we could invoke speaker intention or audience expectation to try to explain what the marine means by saying 'I am here', it is difficult to see what sort of explanation is actually provided by making such a move. After all, what is the difference between saying 'the marine intended to inform the colour sergeant that he is present' and simply saying that 'the marine informed the colour sergeant that he is present'. Or, the difference between saying 'the colour sergeant interpreted the marine as informing him that he is present' or simply saying 'the colour sergeant found out that the marine was present'. After all, the marine did inform the colour sergeant (he did not just intend to) and the colour sergeant did find out. By invoking intentions or expectations, we seem to unnecessarily add a sense that something misfired; that the marine might have failed to inform the colour sergeant or that the sergeant misinterpreted what was said. Such potential confusion notwithstanding, by invoking intentions or expectations we merely push back a description of something observable that perfectly well enables us to understand the meaning of the phrase to some purported (functional) mental act that, as with retrospectively applying the categories of semantics and pragmatics, provides no more explanation of the meaning this particular instance of 'I am here' than we can obtain from a simple description of the situation.

In example (2), in saying 'I am here' whilst pointing at reception on the hospital map, the patient is again not simply stating where she is but *determining* how her real life location corresponds to the map, which will enable her to work out where she needs to go. This act of determining is intrinsically entangled with her pointing and with wider contextual information such as that she has an appointment at an unfamiliar hospital, that she could not determine where she needs to go from the appointment letter alone, that she understands how maps work and how they represent actual locations, etc. Of course, in this situation the meaning of 'I am here' is again somewhat aligned with the purported conventional semantic meaning of the phrase (i.e., 'I am at this location'). But, again, separating out semantics and pragmatics from the outset will not help us to understand what the phrase means in context. Indeed, doing so will likely hinder us, because we will first be armed with the idea that the patient is merely stating her location and then have to modify this understanding by adding her pointing and the contextual information surrounding her hospital visit to arrive at the fact that she is instead determining where she is in relation to the map;

14679205, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phin.70040 by Bournemouth University The Sir Michael Cobham Library, Wiley Online Library on [30/10/2026]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

something that is perfectly apparent from the original description obtained before any such process of abstract categorisation.

In example (3), the professor has arrived at the university but is unsure where to go. In this case, although he is in one sense stating his location ('I am at the entrance to the university'), he is also informing the workshop organiser that he does not know where to go. We could certainly make sense of this phrase if we already know that, for example, the professor has had previous conversations with the workshop organiser about how to get to the designated room, that the organiser knows that the professor is not likely to have read the joining instructions, that the professor is not the kind of person who likes asking for directions from strangers, etc. But perhaps, we do not even need all this specific detail. Perhaps if we simply have a general idea of what this situation is like—if we have attended academic workshops in the past, if we know what professors are like, etc.—we can make sense of the phrase just as well. Nevertheless, without *some* contextual information we are unable to determine the meaning of 'I am here' in this situation. With it, the meaning becomes perfectly clear.

In working through these examples, a realisation emerges about the problematic picture we tried to set aside. In separating meaning into semantics and pragmatics, we assume that there is the (conventional or representational) semantic meaning of words and phrases which is then added to or modified. But in each of these examples, although such a process of separation is possible retrospectively, it either plays no part or even hinders us in understanding what 'I am here' means in particular situations. Perhaps, therefore, it is more specifically this additive or modifying aspect that leads us astray. Let us consider some more examples.

4. A child is playing in the park when she slips off the climbing frame and falls to the ground, badly scraping her leg. Her dad rushes over and picks her up, saying 'I am here'.
5. A nervous patient is explaining his problem to his family doctor in a consultation. The doctor, listening intently, waits for a pause in the patient's account and says, 'I am here'.
6. A public relations team at a multinational have called a meeting to discuss the strategy to deal with the latest blunder by their CEO. They wait nervously, unsure of how to proceed until their team manager arrives, who usually has all the answers. The door swings open and the manager strides in with purpose and, without glancing at any of them, says 'I am here'.

In example (4), when the dad rushes to his daughter and says 'I am here' he is clearly not stating his location. Rather, he is comforting his daughter, who has hurt herself. Unlike in previous examples, where the phrase was closer in meaning to its conventional semantic interpretation, in this instance 'I am here' means something like 'Don't worry' or 'I've got you'. He is making clear that he is emotionally present and reassuring his daughter that she is not alone. In this instance, starting with a conventional semantic understanding of 'I am here' and then adding the relevant contextual information is even more obviously not going to help us understand what the phrase means. But if we consider the situation as a contextual whole, without the separation of semantics and pragmatics, we can quite easily understand what is meant.

In example (5), in saying 'I am here' the doctor is again not referring to her location but making clear to the patient that she is there for him, is listening intently and is ready to help solve the problem together. Given the patient and doctor have a long-standing relationship which is built on trust and familiarity, the patient has heard the doctor use this phrase before in similar situations and knows that she means it. There is no scope for misunderstanding here.

In example (6), the team is nervous as this time the CEO has really said something that could damage the company. But they know that their manager has a track record of solving these problems and will take control of the situation when she arrives. In saying 'I am here' when she strides into the room, therefore, the manager is clearly not telling them where she is but making evident that she will now take control and sort this out.

Even more obviously than with the first three examples, in all these situations it is clear that attempting to separate the purported conventional semantic meaning of the phrase 'I am here' from the way in which it is applied in particular contexts is not going to help us understand what it means. As Wittgenstein notes, the difference between the meanings of these instances of the phrase 'becomes obvious and clear only when we contemplate a *complete* example'.[16] There is no core or original meaning of the phrase that we should start with and then modify because, as Baz puts it, 'what [words] refer to when competently employed is inseparable from the work they do, and may only be seen aright through an appreciation of that work'.[17]

7 | Describing Language Games

This investigation into how context can help to make sense of saying 'I am here' has led to a number of realisations. First, contra Black, the phrase 'I am here' can of course have a particular point, which is determined by the context in which it is said. Second, its meaning in particular situations cannot be understood by semantics alone. Third, although adding pragmatic content can improve our understanding, the separation of a situation in which someone says the phrase into semantics and pragmatics is unnecessary and, in some instances, even hinders our understanding of what the phrase means. Fourth, if we reject the categorisation of a situation into semantics and pragmatics and consider its contextual whole, then we can better understand what the particular phrase means.

These realisations foreground a longstanding mistake in philosophy of language. Namely that, as Stanley puts it, 'meaning and use should never be conflated, and that any adequate account of meaning fundamentally employs the conceptions of reference and truth'.[18] Yet, as Baz argues, this view is grounded in a conception of language, with three features, that is not borne out by careful consideration of how we use it in everyday life.[19] First, the idea that each word has a meaning that is theoretically separated from its ordinary and normal use. Second, that this applies not just to words but to sentences. And third, that in the majority

14679205, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phin.70040 by Bournemouth University The Sir Michael Cobham Library, Wiley Online Library on [30/10/2026]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

of cases the meaning of a word is a matter of what it picks out or refers to (in the world, one's mind, or even some metaphysical realm).

The point of this investigation is not to provide a counter-argument or alternative theory that refutes this picture of language; trying to provide counter-arguments or alternative theories is what got us into such a mess in the first place. Rather, its point is to show that by working through various instances of how we use the phrase 'I am here' in everyday life, we come to see that the idea of words (and phrases) first referring to something and then becoming suitable for use in various contexts is simply unnecessary and self-creates intractable problems. But if we consider things the other way around and first consider the ordinary use of such words and phrases, then the purported problems dissolve. In so doing, we come to see that the picture of language in which meaning and use should never be conflated is not inevitable and, moreover, 'has a viable alternative'.[20]

Importantly, the realisations my investigation has uncovered are not new discoveries but reminders of what we already know from everyday experience, which have become confused when we started to philosophise. As Wittgenstein noted, '[philosophical] problems are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar with'.[21] By eschewing explanatory theories grounded in the idea that words (and phrases) first refer to something and then become suitable for use in various contexts, and instead simply describing the situations in which we say 'I am here' in their contextual whole—what Wittgenstein termed *language games*—we come to realise that the problems of meaning that much philosophising about language creates are really no problem at all. We mean many different things by saying 'I am here'. Sometimes what we mean is closely related to what we would find if we combined some dictionary definitions of the individual words and fitted them together syntactically. But many times it is not. Yet, if we simply start off by considering the phrase in its proper context, then we have no problem working out what we mean. All we have to do is let go of a picture of language that holds us captive.

Funding

The author has nothing to report.

Data Availability Statement

Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study.

Endnotes

[1] For a detailed account of this visit, see Pinch and Swedberg (2013).

[2] Bouwsma (1986, 14–15).

[3] Kaplan (1989).

[4] Cohen and Michaelson (2013).

[5] Cohen (2013).

[6] Michaelson (2014).

[7] Smith (1989).

[8] Predelli (1996); Predelli (2005).

[9] Romdenh-Romluc (2002); Romdenh-Romluc (2006).

[10] For discussion, see Wittgenstein (2009).

[11] Corazza et al. (2002).

[12] Cohen and Michaelson (2013).

[13] Grice (1995).

[14] For discussion, see Carston (2005), Levinson (2001) and Sperber and Wilson (1993).

[15] Baz (2012).

[16] Wittgenstein (1992, 79–80). For detailed discussion of this, see Penco (2025). Furthermore, a 'complete example' might not even involve any words at all. There are many examples of situations where no-one says anything and yet the meaning of 'I am here' is clearly communicated: pointing to a musical score as I am playing to inform someone where I am, pointing to a word on the page to inform someone who is reading along with me, etc.

[17] Baz (2012, 157).

[18] Stanley (2008, 428).

[19] Baz (2012).

[20] Baz (2012, 22).

[21] Wittgenstein (2009, §109).

References

Baz, A. 2012. *When Words Are Called for: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy*. Harvard University Press.

Bouwsma, O. K. 1986. *Wittgenstein Conversations, 1949-1951*, edited by J. L. Craft and R. E. Hustwit. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Carston, R. 2005. "Relevance Theory, Grice and the Neo-Griceans: A Response to Laurence Horn's "Current Issues in Neo-Gricean Pragmatics"." *Intercultural Pragmatics* 2, no. 3: 303–319. https://doi.org/10.1515/iprg.2005.2.3.303.

Cohen, J. 2013. "Indexicality and the Puzzle of the Answering Machine." *Journal of Philosophy* 110, no. 1: 5–32. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2013110143.

Cohen, J., and E. Michaelson. 2013. "Indexicality and the Answering Machine Paradox." *Philosophy Compass* 8, no. 6: 580–592. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12039.

Corazza, E., W. Fish, and J. Gorvett. 2002. "Who Is I?" *Philosophical Studies* 107, no. 1: 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013111419036.

Grice, H. P. 1995. *Studies in the Way of Words*. 4th ed. Harvard University Press.

Kaplan, D. 1989. "Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals." In *Themes From Kaplan*, edited by J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein. Oxford University Press.

Levinson, S. C. 2001. "Language, Speech, and Communication." In *Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature*, 2nd ed. MIT Press.

Michaelson, E. 2014. "Shifty Characters." *Philosophical Studies* 167, no. 3: 519–540. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0109-7.

Penco, C. 2025. "Wittgenstein's Indexicals." In *Grounds for Knowing and Acting*, edited by M. de Caro and M. Dell'Utri. De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111728599-012.

Pinch, T., and R. Swedberg. 2013. "Wittgenstein's Visit to Ithaca in 1949: On the Importance of Details." *Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory* 14, no. 1: 2–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/1600910X.2012.736399.

14679205, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phin.70040 by Bournemouth University The Sir Michael Cobham Library, Wiley Online Library on [30/10/2026]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

Predelli, S. 1996. “Never Put Off Until Tomorrow What You Can Do Today.” *Analysis* 56, no. 2: 85–91. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/56.2.85.

Predelli, S. 2005. *Contexts: Meaning, Truth and the Use of Language*. Oxford University Press.

Romdenh-Romluc, K. 2002. “Now the French Are Invading England!” *Analysis* 62, no. 1: 34–41. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/62.1.34.

Romdenh-Romluc, K. 2006. “I.” *Philosophical Studies* 128, no. 2: 257–283. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7792-3.

Smith, Q. 1989. “The Multiple Uses of Indexicals.” *Synthese* 78, no. 2: 167–191. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869371.

Sperber, D., and D. Wilson. 1993. *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*. Blackwell.

Stanley, J. 2008. “Philosophy of Language in the 20th Century.” In *Routledge Guide to 20th Century Philosophy*, edited by M. Dermot. Routledge.

Wittgenstein, L. 1992. *The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philosophical Investigations’*. Basil Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L. 2009. *Philosophical Investigations*. 4th ed. Blackwell.

14679205, 0, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phin.70040 by Bournemouth University The Sir Michael Cobham Library, Wiley Online Library on [30/10/2026]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License