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ToolsPapanikolaou, N.I., 2018. To screen or not to screen? Let the competition decide. Economics letters, 170, 175 - 178.
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Official URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/economics-le...
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.015
Abstract
We develop a model of spatial competition to explore how changes in the market structure affect the incentives of banks to screen loan applicants. We take a post-crisis perspective that treats the number of banks as exogenous. Our findings reveal that the relaxation of competition distorts banks’ incentives to invest in screening.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 0165-1765 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Financial crisis; Bank competition; Market structure; Screening |
| Group: | Bournemouth University Business School |
| ID Code: | 30944 |
| Deposited By: | Symplectic RT2 |
| Deposited On: | 12 Jul 2018 13:38 |
| Last Modified: | 14 Mar 2022 14:11 |
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