Performance pay and applicant screening.

Mohrenweiser, J. and Jirjahn, U., 2019. Performance pay and applicant screening. British Journal of Industrial Relations. (In Press)

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Official URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14678543

Abstract

Using German establishment data, we show that the relationship between intensity of individual-based performance pay and intensity of applicant screening depends on the nature of production. In establishments with increased multitasking, performance pay is positively associated with applicant screening. By contrast, in establishments without increased multitasking, performance pay is negatively associated with applicant screening. We do not find a similar pattern of results for group-based performance pay or profit sharing. Our findings fit the hypothesis that individual-based performance pay induces a positive self-sorting of employees if jobs are less multifaceted. In this case, employers with a high intensity of performance pay do not need intensive applicant screening to ensure a high quality of matches between workers and jobs. However, if jobs are more multifaceted, individual based performance pay can entail problems of adverse self sorting. In order to mitigate or overcome these problems, employers making intensive use of performance pay also screen applicants more intensively.

Item Type:Article
ISSN:0007-1080
Uncontrolled Keywords:performance pay; multitasking; self-sorting; applicant screening, non-managerial employees; managerial employees
Group:Faculty of Management
ID Code:31156
Deposited By: Unnamed user with email symplectic@symplectic
Deposited On:28 Aug 2018 08:49
Last Modified:28 Aug 2018 08:49

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