Saxena, N., Stone, J.A. and Dogan, H., 2018. Systematic Analysis: Resistance to Traffic Analysis Attacks in Tor System for Critical Infrastructures. In: SMC 2018: IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 7-10 October 2018, Miyazaki, Japan.
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Abstract
The threat of traffic analysis attacks against the Tor System is an acknowledged and open research issue, especially in critical infrastructures, motivating the need for continuous research into the potential attacks and countermeasures against this threat. This paper aims to provide an in-depth study into the driving technical mechanisms of the current state-of-art Tor System (Browser Bundle and Network) that aim to provide its benefits to anonymity and privacy online. This work presents the countermeasures that have been proposed and/or implemented against such attacks, in a collated evaluation to determine their effectiveness, suitability to Tor Project, and its design aims/goals.
Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Paper) |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | anonymity, privacy, tor, traffic analysis, critical infrastructures |
Group: | Faculty of Science & Technology |
ID Code: | 32071 |
Deposited By: | Symplectic RT2 |
Deposited On: | 19 Mar 2019 15:44 |
Last Modified: | 14 Mar 2022 14:15 |
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