Kretschmer, M., 2005. Access and reward in the information society: regulating the collective management of copyright. In: SERCI (Society For Economic Research on Copyright Issues) Conference, 06-08 July, 2005, Montreal. (Unpublished)
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Copyright Collecting Societies have proliferated, with more than 150 organisations now collecting and distributing licensing fees for rights in music, literary, audio-visual and graphic works within the European Union. From the perspective of Competition Law, collecting societies may be viewed as price-fixing cartels under Art. 81 EC, and as vulnerable to challenges under Art. 82 EC (i.e. abusing a dominant position as the sole provider of a management infrastructure to right holders, and as the only supplier of licences to copyright users). Yet, collective administration of copyright has important policy benefits: (i) From a user perspective, collecting societies may offer a single point licence providing easy and wide access to copyright protected contents. This can be a solution to innovation issues in an information society where major right holders otherwise may dictate problematic terms. (ii) Creators at the margins of commercial viability have access to a mechanism of collective bargaining against major rights exploiters, such as publishers, record labels and broadcasters. This may support a culturally diverse society. This article develops principles for regulating the collective management of copyrights from a critique of EC competition jurisprudence.
|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)|
|Uncontrolled Keywords:||copyright, collecting societies, collective administration, competition, information society|
|Subjects:||Social Sciences > Law|
|Deposited By:||INVALID USER|
|Deposited On:||05 Jun 2007|
|Last Modified:||07 Mar 2013 14:41|
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